Suppose someone invents a knife.

The problem with your example is that a knife has more than the function of cutting; but let’s hypothesize a new tool which has only the purpose of cutting. You are correct that this tool, let’s call it X, is good in the highest sense IFF it is optimal at cutting, and so an X which could cut through anything whatsoever would, indeed, be the best X.

Now, it does not become a ‘bad’ or lesser ‘good’ X because one cannot grab it; because we stipulated its sole function is cutting. Therefore, this example is not helping demonstrate your point.

A knife would be ‘bad’ if one cannot hold it without getting cut because it is designed to cut a specified thing via a person who wields it with their hands.

However, to be charitable, I think this is really what you are getting at:

The whole is intelligibly prior to the part.

It seems like you are denying that what is good is for a thing to fulfill its nature and instead it is for a thing to fulfill its nature if it is a proper part of the whole.

This doesn’t seem accurate to me; because then a thing could be bad which is fulfilling its nature. For example, imagine a species which is a freak accident and perishes quite abruptly. A member of that species would be good if it is fulfilling its nature, but would not be a fitting member of the whole of Nature. Likewise, for example, a being or tool which cuts through everything would not fit well into the universe (and, in fact, would probably damage a lot of it) but if it did exist then I see no reason to say that it isn’t a good X. See what I mean?

Moreover, the relation of a thing to a bigger whole isn’t necessarily an aspect of its nature: is a part of a rabbit’s nature to get eaten by a fox? No.

So we can further the discussion, please point out what is wrong with this claim within the context of Aristotelianism:

P1: If something is 'good' IFF it fulfills its nature and a species exists which has in its nature the need to torture other species, then a member of that species is 'good' IFF it is, among other things, properly torturing other species.

P2: Something is 'good' IFF it fulfills its nature and a species exists which has in its nature the need to torture other species.

C: A member of that species is 'good' IFF it is, among other things, properly torturing other species.

For intents and purposes, assume there exists such a species; even if it immediately goes extinct for whatever reason. If we can find common ground on the 'good' of this species, then we can move on to how well they would fit into the ecosystem of nature.

You are sidestepping the hypothetical. It is akin to if I asked you "if you had $1,000,000,000,000,000, then what would you buy?" and your response was "that's not actually possible, given how the economy as a whole works.". That's not an answer. I statement was "IF something is 'good' IFF it fulfills its nature and a species exists which has in its nature the need to torture other species, then a member of that species is 'good' IFF it is, among other things, properly torturing other species": to contend with this hypothetical, you will have to point out which antecedent is false and why.

A "devil species" is bad, no matter how good it is at being bad. In fact, the better it is at being bad, the less good is.

The good of a thing cannot be determined apart from what it is to be that thing, apart from its telos
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We are back again to the absurd notion that a natural thing's telos, its place is the cosmos is to harm other species. Such a cosmos would not be a well-ordered whole.

Whether or not such a species would fit well into the “ordered whole” of nature is irrelevant: if the good of a thing is relative to its telos such that it is good equally to how well it fulfills it, then it plainly follows that a species which has a telos which involves torturing other species is, in fact, good IFF it is excellent, apart from other things, at torturing other species. You are accepting Aristotle’s concept of ‘goodness’ (as underlined) and then turning around and irrelevantly commenting that it is absurd for such a species to exist as a coherent member of nature—that doesn’t address the hypothetical I have presented. You would have to demonstrate how the hypothetical (stated above) is inconsistent or incoherent with Aristotle’s concept of ‘good’. I understand the point is that Aristotle thinks that the telos of each species is well-ordered, but I think it doesn’t help his case because of how he defined goodness.

Aristotle points out that there are various meanings of good. The NE begins by saying that all things aim at some good.

The devil species would be aiming at a perceived good: their well-being.

Form (eidos) and nature (phusis) are not two terms with the same meaning. In Book V, chapter IV, of the Metaphysics he says:
In one sense, nature means the coming into being of things that are born.

Nature encompasses both form (eidos) and matter (hule).

Form is the idea of the essence of a thing; and the nature (in the relevant sense from the many definitions Aristotle gives of ‘nature’) of a thing is “the intrinsic source of the primary process of each growing thing just qua the growing thing that it is” (Metaphysics, Book Delta, IV, p. 118). Form and essence are one: the form of a human being is the essence of a human being.

Likewise, like I stated before, the form, or essence, of a human being includes things which a human being may not have actualized (yet or ever); e.g., the form of a human being includes ‘having two arms’, but not all human beings have two arms. If I take your argument seriously (that a human being’s form is fully realized immediately), then a human being with one arm is not a human being (which is implausible); or, if I don’t, then it follows that the form of a human being is not fully realized in a human being per se.

'Essence' is an English translation of the Latin 'essentia'. A term coined by Cicero to translate 'ousia'. Literally it is the “the what it was to be” of a thing.
…
Its form is what it is to be what it is.

You are just going around in circles, trying to distinguish these terms when they are clearly the same. You literally circled back around to saying that a ‘form’ and ‘essence’ are the same thing without realizing it.

You take what is for Aristotle the question of the Metaphysics, the question of being, and treat it as an answer. Things do not realize their form as if it is something they do not already have, something that they are not already. It's form or eidos is not something that comes after it already is.

The form of a thing is its nature (i.e., its essence), and its nature is not fully realized upon beginning to exist nor arguably ever. The form is its design in terms of its essence, and this design can be realized to different degrees. E.g., not every man has realized their nature to the same degree--some are more excellent at being a human being than others.

Nothing you said addressed anything I said...at all.

I've been reading through Aristotle's "Metaphysics", and I think I understand Aristotle's points enough to start tackling this post you made.

Your problem seems to come up because you are thinking of the good as defined primarily in terms of an organisms' form. This is correct, but then we have to ask "from whence and why this form? You seem to be presupposing a sort of indeterminacy lies prior to form. The form of an organisms just is what it is.

This is exactly where I begin to have my doubts with Arisotle’s ethics: if what is good is just a thing realizing its form, then there cannot be a further question of “why is it good for a thing to realize its form?”. It seems like Aristotle is deploying ‘good’ twofold: a thing fulfilling its nature and its nature being determined by an omnibenevolent God. The problem is that this seems, under an Aristotelian view of ‘good’ qua formal fulfillment, like a nonsensical and internally incoherent question to ask, let alone to answer it with ~”God is omnibenevolent, and is the cause of the form which is good for a being to realize”: if ‘goodness’ is just ‘the fulfillment of one’s form’, then whence is God omnibenevolent other than ‘good’ insofar as God fufills their own form?

It seems like a consistent account would be to say that God is good insofar as God realizes God’s potential; and since God has no potential (being an pure actualization), God necessarily is absolutely realized qua God—but what is good for God, which is to be God, does not entail that whatever form God has for a given being is good for that being, nor the rest of nature, other than that that being, analyzed relative to themselves, is good when it realizes its own potential. You seem to be saying that God being a good God, and being so absolutely and necessarily, somehow adds something morally relevant to the good, e.g., human being: I am failing utterly to see that connection being made there.

The form which is the reality of anything is its limited, imperfect share of what the Unmoved Mover is purely and perfectly, that is, idea.

I’ve never understood why this pure actualizer would have an intellect; nor why it being essentially the ultimate substrate of existing things would make those things imperfect images of itself. Can you explain that further?

If the divine is hostile to what lies outside of it then it will be determined by those things; it will exist in response to them.

This is an interesting thought: if God is affected by, e.g., us, then God is not purely actualized; since, e.g., we have caused God to actualize a potential in themselves. Good point.

Likewise, if the divine is merely indifferent to that which lies outside of it, the divine is nonetheless still defined by "what it is not."

Wouldn’t the first actualizer have to be distinguishable from what is being ‘held up’ by it, though? If not, then everything is the pure actualizer, which undermines the whole argument, doesn’t it?

It seems like this is asymmetrical to the previous quote (above) because God can lack potentials without losing their ability to be purely actual—e.g., God can lack the potential to be me, not be me, and still be purely actual.

All goodness for organisms is filtered through their forms, but the forms themselves are not ordered to nothing at all, but to being itself

Again, by Arisotle’s concept of ‘good’, the goodness of God does not imply any significance to the goodness of an organism even if God is the one that ordered the forms in a particular way; exactly because what is good for one being is not necessarily good for another: so what is good for God is not necessarily good for, e.g., a squirrel.

Let me know what you think.

Physics cannot describe logic: the latter is presupposed for the former. E.g., to describe the physical relations of things, one must first presuppose that whatever is described is true and not also false.

There is no 'the good' in Aristotelian ethics and, consequently, there is no universal good which all species are geared towards. So I don't think Fooloso4's account is actually Aristotelian at all. What they have done is supposed that all the natures of each species are united insofar as they work towards some ultimate good, which is something Aristotle adamantly denies. Good simpliciter does not exist in Aristotelian ethics; and what is 'good' for a thing is for that thing to fulfill its nature: there is no room in Arisotle's ethics, thusly, for a separate 'good' which fulfilling one's nature works towards. By definition, what is 'good' is just for a thing to fulfill its nature.

Perhaps there's a 'good' for nature under his view? But this would not negate the fact that the devils species' 'good' would be to fulfill their nature, even if they are bad for nature. This is what happens when 'goodness' is relativistic like Aristotle claims.

If it is true that 'good' simpliciter simply does not exist (viz., 'the good' does not exist) and 'good' is relativistic to the nature of a being such that a being is good iff it fulfills its nature, then this 'devils species' fits fine into the moral hierarchy. What are the odds of such a species coming into being naturallistically? Not likely at all, which is what I think @Count Timothy von Icarus's response was getting at.

So, what is it that causes this "devil species" to torture, abuse and commit genocide? Do they do these things to their own species, or only to other species? If they do it to other species, what is the explanation for why they do it?

To keep things simple, I was saying they do it to other species; and this is how they are biologically wired to do in order to achieve their own well-being. If it helps, you can think of an entire species of the equivalent of the most brutal of psychopathic humans. Arguably, the particular nature of some human beings is such that they cannot achieve the richest sense of well-being without torturing other people.

The reason I say it is incoherent is because I can't imagine such a species, more intelligent than we are and in possession of symbolic language, not being bedeviled by ideologies, just as we are, which would mean such aberrant behavior would not be universal among them, just as it is not universal with us

I was trying to avoid using humans because Aristotle is going to say that the general nature of humans is such that it is antithetical to the occasional freak-accident psychopath that pops up. To object properly, I have to rise the “evil” to the level of the species, and not any particular member.

This is contrary to Aristotle's understanding of nature

How so?

you should not be avoiding what he says about nature and telos. for when they are taken into account there is no glaring issue that he is avoiding. For Aristotle the nature and telos of a species is in accord with the whole of nature.

I don’t see how a devil species, as outlined, would be contrary to nature anymore than lions eating their prey, diseases killing people slowly & painfully, etc.

:up:

Then why not reference that in the OP? Otherwise, it is simply too vague.

Allen never leaves the shop without Brown (¬A ⇒ ¬B)

This is a poorly translated sentence into logic: the fact that allen never leaves the shop without brown does not imply that brown cannot be in the shop when allen is not there. On the contrary, it just means that when allen was present in the shop and then left (or brown was in the shop when allen was there), one can be sure that brown (or allen) left with him; which can't be expressed accurately without temporal logic. E.g., just because you know that "when my niece is with me in walmart, she will not leave the store without me", it does not follow that "when I am in Walmart, my niece is with me"...that's just bad logic. Even when considering the other axiom (that at least one is there) it does not follow that ¬A ⇒ ¬B from the sentential form of the axiom.

If I grant the logical form which they are translating to (such that is the axiom is actually '¬A ⇒ ¬B'), then it still the case, as I mentioned before, that there is no paradox at all: 'A ⇒ ¬B' and '¬A ⇒ ¬B' are not contradictory. Material implication is such that 'A ⇒ B' is the same as '¬X ∨ Y'.

Am I missing something?

What do you mean? Are you asking if they have the intelligence at par with human beings? Sure. Equal or more.

It is a species that, as per its nature, can only achieve a deep and persistent sense of happiness, flourishing, and well-being by committing egregious acts on other species (e.g., torture, abuse, mass genocide, etc.).

The entirety of this debate revolves around a vague OP:

Do (A implies B) and (A implies notB) contradict each other?

If you are asking:

"Is 'A -> B && A -> !B' a contradiction (i.e., itself contradictory)?"

Then the answer is clearly no. If you are asking:

"Is 'A && A -> B && A -> !B' a contradiction (i.e., itself contradictory)?"

Then the answer is clearly yes.

Everyone is just interpreting the OP's question, because it is too vague, one way or the other.

You are missing the point. Yes, this "devil species" and the some unjust acts that humans have committed will overlap.

And yet you begin with his metaphysical terms "purpose" "telos" "final causes" & "essence". :roll:

Of course. All branches of philosophy are interrelated; but we tend to focus on one or the other for the sake of the conversation. Ethics presupposes metaphysical commitments, no doubt.

Generally, yes. But would it be morally intuitive to say that a social species that maintains their society by torturing another social species as doing something 'good'? That's what is implied by Aristotelian ethics if the social species requires it to fulfill their nature.

That's fair; but I mean a species that inflicts torture, suffering, etc. on other species for the sake of their own well-being; which is generally understood by humans to be immoral. I am not talking about a species that merely kills animals to nourish themselves, or something akin to that.

This OP is about Aristotle's Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics; not his Metaphysics, Politics, or Physics.

If anything in those books is relevant to the discussion, then please feel free to bring it to my attention. As far as I am aware, Aristotle does not deal with what is good in his Metaphysics (but I could be wrong). I am currently reading the Metaphysics.

With respect to your critique about the conflation of the map with the territory: this critique applies to all philosophies, including your own. We always talk about the territory by way of the map. This doesn't seem to negate the validity of talking about essences. By your reasoning, we are stuck in a cartesian style dualism between the map and the territory such that we cannot know anything about the latter.

I am avoiding using humanity as an example because Aristotle would say our Telos directs us to care about others, but we fall short sometimes.

Sure, people act devilish. This is different from a species whose telos specifically non-being

You are reading the OP too literally: let me clarify. What I meant by “devil species” is what you are calling a “devilish species”. I am talking about a species of which they fulfill their nature necessarily at the expense of other species.

The critique I am making in the OP is an external criticism about how morally counter-intuitive it would be to say that devilish species member is being ‘good’ when they are torturing a human being for their own pleasure. Don’t you agree?

I don't think this makes sense. How does a species survive if its end is sickness over health?

That’s not what is being stipulated in the OP: e.g., it is the “sickeness” of other species for the “health” of the devilish species that I am discussing.

And for any sort of rational schemer, prudence still seems like a virtue. They won't get far doing evil if they act stupidly. Likewise courage will still be preferable to rashness or cowardice. You can't do your evil if you get yourself caught or are too scared to engage in evil acts. Etc.

Agreed. But this by no means entails virtues like kindness, liberality, etc. A devilish species would have no use for those with respect to other life.

A tiger is right to attack and eat people. I don't think the idea of a rational creature oriented wholly towards evil works the same way. Tigers' good is indeed fairly opposed to man as one of man's few natural predators. The good of the Bubonic Plague bacteria might be another example.

Yeah, so this is what I am talking about. You see it as internally coherent with Aristotle’s ethics (and you are right), whereas I agree and merely add that it is morally counter-intuitive to think of the Bubonic Plague as being ‘good’ by fulfilling its nature (of presumably infecting and killing as many people as possible). That seems to scream out: “this ethical theory has problems!”.

Have you read the Metaphysics yet? That's mainly the reason why I don't think this sort of thing is going to make sense from Aristotle's perspective (IIRC Book XII has most of the relevant stuff).

I haven’t, but I will.

Yes, in this context "telos" is fallaciously anthropomorphic (à la animism).

It can be; but I think Aristotle is very clear that Telos is just contingent on an agent’s intentions or purposes for things. Wouldn’t you agree that a member of a species gravitates towards fulfilling what it is to be that species?

Aristotle mistook – literalized / fetishized / reified – his causal mappings for the territory and called them "essences".

Yes, but, then, wouldn’t all of reason, concepts, and the understanding be about the territory? Why can’t we use the map we have to speak of the territory, which could include essences—no?

I think he definitely keeps definitions entirely too vague; but I don't see anything wrong with the concept of an essence or final causes (telos): do you?

It seems like human beings have an essence insofar as they can be subsumed under one shared concept of 'human being'.

How can a being be oriented fundamentally towards non-being?

This is a mischaracterization of evil as privation. No one reputable denies that a person can aim at being unjust, cruel, etc. It happens all the time. Now, with what you are noting is:

Sadism might be another example you have in mind, but the sadist is attracted to causing suffering and destruction because of a sense of power or pleasure(a good), not for its own sake

Which is correct insofar as a person cannot aim at what is bad in the sense of it being done for its own sake; however, it is wrong insofar as the “devil species” I outlined is doing bad things for the sake of their own well-being. So they are doing it for the sake of something good, being that it is in accordance with their nature to gain well-being through the suffering of other species, but must aim at bad things to achieve it. So your counter here seems to miss the mark, don’t you think?

My point is that, the “devil species” would be right to commit unjust acts for the sake of their own well-being, since there is nothing about their nature that relates them to doing just acts, and this would be entailed by Aristotle’s view—wouldn’t it?

But such a thing: a. doesn't exist, b. wouldn't come to exist in the whole order of things.

That’s not the point: the point is that a living being having their status of being ‘good’ relative to fulfilling their nature opens up, in principle, the possibility that what is ‘good’ is for a living being to not care at all about other living beings if their nature is such that they gain the deepest sense of happiness from it. Wouldn’t you agree?

With respect to point B, Aristotle kind of confusingly defines ‘good’ in a two fold manner: what is done for its own sake (i.e., intrinsic valuebleness), and what is excellence for a particular thing. I couldn’t really decipher which definition he holds, and they are not compatible with each other. When you say it can’t exist in nature, what you are referring to, I would guess, is your example of a being geared towards unhealthiness (decadence); which is besides my point (as I already noted).

Correct, but that is irrelevant to the OP.

Good exposition of Aristotle's thoughts; but it doesn't really address the OP: it seems to sidestep it. From what I can gather from your comment, you are not denying that "if a devil species existed and 'good' is defined as ~'excellence at one's nature', then a devil species would be 'good' IFF it is unjust, cruel, etc."; instead, you seem to be saying that God wouldn't allow the devil species to exist. This doesn't contend with the hypothetical, unless I am missing something.

I have no problem with the fact that we can reverse engineer, usually, the intention from the actions; but it does not follow that all the effects of those actions were intentional.

See this comment.

I think no matter which normative ethical view one takes, it will have to hold some set of absolute moral principles as fundamental; however, this does not mean all normative ethical views collapse into deontology: they are useful "modes" of thinking about normative ethics. Wouldn't you agree?

Yes, that is what I am arguing. We ought to associate intentionality with the act itself, which is the means, rather than with the end

Then you are not talking about intentionality as it is commonly and predominantly understood. So we are talking past each other. I am only interested in intentionality as it is largely understood. Your view of intentionality strips out the essence of intention and swaps it for causality; which of no use when we analyze the intentions of someone.

Intention is a cause, and what is caused is action.

The intention is wrapped up, inextricably, with the action; and what is caused is an effect.

we see that intention causes an act

Intention is an act; and does not cause it. The intention is no where to be found in physical causality.

I am using "intentional" to signify something which is cause by an act of intention

What is intentional is what is related to the intention; and the intention is the end which is being aimed at. You can’t implicate someone as intentionally doing something they entirely did not foresee happening just because it resulted from an act of intention towards something else. That makes no sense.

This creates the issue of what exactly does direct the conscious actions which are not consistent with the apprehended good

I don’t understand what you mean by a “conscious act” which is not intentional (in the traditional sense of intentionality); and this seems to be the crux of your argument. If I consciously decide to do X, then I intentionally did X—even if X is the end I am trying to actualize.

But that is undemonstrable and is easily refuted by people who are born with eyes and yet are blind

This is just an example of a thing not fulfilling its end properly; and NOT that it had no end. It is uncontroversially true that the body develops the eyes for seeing all else being equal. When the circumstances impede, then there can be an eye which is developed in an impoverished manner.

For example, we can say that the Sun will be extinct in X years exactly, that is a Telos that we understand, and we can do all the tests we want and that will not prove that it will be extinct in X years

The sun has as its end, albeit not intentional nor intelligently designated, to do exactly what a start does, and the particular one it is. We would say that sun, as per its nature, will eventually become a neutron star or a black hole.

With evolution, it is much clearer and we treat biology as if it has Telos: the doctor determines how healthy your body is by-at-large relative to what it is supposed to be doing and how it is supposed to be developing.

You can say that the telos of life is to reproduce and survive

No, the end is to realize the nature of a human; which does include procreation, family, etc.

There’s a lot more to being a human than reproduction and survival.

Do we say that people who do not want to have children have no life? And people who commit suicide? Thousands of similar examples can be proposed

There’s absolutely no relevance of these statements and our conversation.

The point is that you cannot take as a necessity that which is a possibility.

Aiming at an end, is always to say that the end is not actual nor necessary (per se) and that it is merely a possibility which is attempting to be realized. This objection is just an obvious misunderstanding of what teleology is.

I have no problem with the idea that our intentions are actualized imperfectly; and I don't deny that people can be held responsible for their negligence. So I am not following what you are contending with.

I think we are just disagreeing on what 'intention' is.

Just because something is caused by something done intentionally, it does not follow that that effect was intentional. You are forgetting or omitting that intentionality is about what is being aimed at---not what happens.

If I am aiming with a bow an arrow at a bullseye target, and I miss fire and hit a deer of which I had no clue was somewhere behind the target; then I did not thereby intentionally hit the deer even though it follows from the causal chain which derives back to an intentional action. According to you, it would be intentional.

The point is that Aristotle is setting out the meaning (or at least his working meaning) of 'good' in that phrase

I don’t think he is. I think he is clarifying what is most good and noting that goods are what we aim at.

Even the first sentence would contradict his second sentence if I accepted what you are saying:

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action as well as choice, is held to aim at some good. Hence people have nobly declared that the good is that at which all things aim

The first sentence clearly states that we aim at things that are good; which implies that there is a difference between aiming at something good and aiming at something bad; but if what is ‘good’ is just what we aim at, then there is no such distinction.

But this is where Aristotle disagrees with Plato. Aristotle thinks there is no Platonic Form of the Good.

I wasn’t suggesting otherwise: ‘the good’, in the sense Aristotle is using it in that sentence, refers to what is most good. ‘the good’ does not, as a phrase, exclusively refer to the platonic Form of ‘The Good’.

I mostly want to save this debate for another day. What I will say is that 'good' is notoriously difficult to define

It is clearly a bad definition, and I think it is clear Aristotle is not trying to define it there. The concept of ‘good’ is not identical to the concept of ‘aiming at something’ or ‘that which is aimed at’.
Likewise, your quote of Aquinas does not define good as that which everything aims at:

Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after."

He is just noting, rightly, just like Aristotle, that beings aim at perceived goods: no man aims at what is bad, except insofar as it is a means towards the good.

The difficulty with defining 'good' is that it ignores our subjective/objective distinction and it can act as a grammatical modifier of pretty much anything.

Does it, though? I would say the concept of good is identical to the concept of value.

I think Aristotle is just using the concept of good and claiming that what is good for a thing is for it to be excellent at what it was designed to do.

Saying "we ought to be virtuous" is expressing a duty to being virtuous: I take those to be the same thing, so I am not following your distinctions here.

To illustrate this, one can take the example of genetic transcription in biology: If we have a DNA sequence, this in itself does not possess genetic expression; it is only in its relation to the RNA and the process of transcription that something like an expression takes place. The idea here is that what we believe to be the prefigured result does not actually exist but only takes place in the relationship of the DNA to an other that interprets and translates it in its own way. The information of who we are is not in the genes, but, strangely enough, in the unprecedented process of transcription, interpretation, translation, etc., itself.

This doesn’t negate in the slightest that we are biologically predetermined in various ways: which is just to say that our bodies have functions. Those functions dictate our design in a weak sense of Telos.

Likewise, someone who wants to go for a strong version of Telos could say that evolution is a process ultimately with a design—but this is not something required for my position. My eye, even with everything you said, is designed to see; and to see in a particular way.

"Existence precedes essence" (Sartre)

This is the consequence of failing to see Telos in things—even in a weak sense. One resorts (typically) to radical individualism.

Man clearly has an essence; and just because it isn’t eternal doesn’t change that. My eye is designed to see and in such-and-such a manner: does that mean that it isn’t undergoing a process of evolution, and partaking in a broader process of evolution as it pertains to procreation? Of course not.

You are trying to go from “everything is transitory” to “nothing has an essence”.

I agree that we do not commonly call them "intentional", but in the sense that they are the direct effect of the intentional act, just like the desired end is the direct effect of the intentional end, there is fundamentally no essential difference between them

You just described the essential difference between them.

You claim that the effect of the act can be separated from its cause, to say that the cause was intentional but the effect was not intentional.

Yes, the cause and the effect can be separated in this way because, you are forgetting, intentionality is an idea (end) being aimed at; so it is entirely possible for a person to aim at something and completely or partially miss—like an an archer trying to hit their mark. If an archer misses and hits a deer instead of the bullseye they were aiming at, was killing the deer intentional? Of course not. If I take your position seriously, then it would be; because your view attaches the intentionality of an act to all causality related effects.

The fact that a person misjudges the effects of one's actions does not make the effects any less intentional.

Before we dive into this, I need you to define what you mean by “intention”; because you are using it in very unwieldy ways here.

A judgement as to the probability of success of one's intentional acts, is not useful toward determining whether the effect of that act is intentional or not.

The point is that what one knows is relevant to what one is aiming at.

Suppose I flip a coin, and the probability is 50/50. No matter what the outcome is, that outcome was intended, because I flipped the coin for the purpose of having an outcome, and the particular outcome which occurs is irrelevant to that intent

Sure, but that doesn’t negate anything I said. My point was that, e.g., you intentionally let a person die if you foresee that there is a 99% chance that the mere act of flipping the coin, which you intend to flip, will directly result in the death of a person. Was is intentional is not solely about the causation that occurs from a given act: it is more fundamentally about what the person is aiming at.