Good to see you again Philosophim!

I really appreciate your response! As a disclaimer, I am still working through my metaphysics so I am just as curious as you to see how well Analytic Idealism holds up to scrutiny!

First, what is your definition of reality?

By “reality” I am abstracting the entirety of existence under an abstract entity. I view it kind of like speaking of being as “substances” which are abstracted entities of kinds of existences (e.g., substance dualism is two kinds of being where monism says there is only one): similarly, I abstract the sum total of existence into “reality”. Reality is being (including all types one may believe in).

How does the statement above differ from stating that the mind is simply an interpreter of reality?

It just depends on what you are referring to by “interpreter”. I would say that, instead of mind being the emergent property of a mind-independent brain’s interpretation of a mind-independent world, mind is what fundamental is and perception is the representation of it (i.e., of mental events).

For sake of clarity, take the dream analogy. When I have a vivid dream, I assume the identity of a character within that dream (which usually mirrors myself from the “non-dream world”). Even though I am not aware of it while the dream is occurring, my perception as that character is the perspective of a relation of ideas within my mind (because my mind is ultimately responsible for the whole thing). When I wake up, I realize instantly that I was not that character (but rather simply seemed to be that character when I dreaming) for I was the mind generating the dream and my character was representing it from their perspective.

My dream character was indeed representing the world around it which was outside of its control, but the “world” was the relation of ideas within a larger mind than the character itself. In that sense, the character is “interpreting” the world; but it isn’t interpreting a mind-independent world.

So there is no question that mechanical processes of the brain cause qualitative experiences.

I disagree. For example, let’s say that you are holding and seeing a green pen. A neuroscience (and biologist) can absolutely account for how your brain knows that the pen is green (i.e., the reflection of wavelengths in sunlight in relation to what the object absorbs and the interpretation of it by the brain), but they cannot account for the qualitative experience of the green pen.

In the more abstract, a neuroscience can account for mechanical awareness (i.e., how brain functions can account for how a mind-independent being can come to understand and interpret its environment) but not qualitative experience (i.e., why there is something to be like a subject).

There is absolutely no reason why you should be having a qualitative experience of the green pen even granted the brain functions that interpret it as green.

As far as I understand it (and correct where I am wrong), we can only (by the reductive physicalist methodology) understand better how brain functions correlate to qualitative experience, but not how it could possibly be responsible for it.

The hard problem is that we cannot ourselves know what it is like for another being to experience that qualitative experience.

To me, this implies that the hard problem is not how to account for one’s qualitative experience, but how other people have qualitative experience and I think this is wrong. The hard problem is that the reductive physicalist method cannot account for qualitative experience at all.

We've learned that a particular string of responses equates to the brain being happy. But do we know what its like to be that brain experiencing happiness? No

To me, this is no different than the green pen analogy: the fact that a certain string of responses correlates with a person qualitatively experiencing happiness does not explain nor suggest that one can reduce the latter to the former.

Another crude way of describing the hard problem is the act of trying to objectively experience another thing's subjective experience.

I don’t think so. It is that reductive physicalism cannot account for why there is something to be like a subject, which includes one’s own qualitative experience.

Of course, I'm not sure what you mean by "physicalism" either

By physicalism, I mean most generally the view that reality can be reduced to a mind-independent substance (regardless of whether one is an indirect or direct realist about it).

I'm assuming we're speaking about the idea that everything is essentially reduced to matter and energy, so please correct me on this where necessary.

I am honestly not sure if every physicalist would agree with that, but that is definitely a position that I would qualify as physicalism (and is very prominent).

Bob

Making the virtue true -- that part takes a will.

Very interesting: so, to you, a moral judgment can exist without being true or false and whether it is true or false can be later provided by a will? Is that the idea?

Do you see how this is different from the usual notion of will, which generally revolves around making choices?

I see. Let me clarify that I am not using "subjectivity" in the sense of "something we 'choose'" in the sense of the colloquial usages of the word 'choose' (which I find to be a vague distinction that is practical but does not hold up to scrutiny). Instead, anything which is "will-dependent" is "subjective" to me. Our ego is really a "part" of a bigger will, which is ourselves ultimately in our entirety of existing as an organism (or conscious being), and so I consider event that which is "ego-independent" but yet "will-dependent" as "subjective". In other words, I don't use "subjectivity" to refer to just "opinions" or "whimsical desires" or what have you.

But if goodness is somehow a natural pattern, in a similar way to procreation being a natural pattern (the desire to procreate isn't exactly something one wills) -- then the objectivity comes from it being apart from our will.

With respect to how I define "will" (which is not synonymous with our egos), procreation would be subjective because it is will-dependent (regardless of whether it bubbles up to the ego in a way that one could intuit as the ego's decision). This doesn't mean that I think I can whimsically change my sexual orientation or general urge to procreate. So, if goodness were somehow a natural pattern analogous to procreation, then I am inclined to claim it is still subjective.

Such and such a moral proposition -- whatever form we decide is best(virtues, rules, or consequences) -- could be objectively good, if not objectively true.

Interesting: could you elaborate more an this distinction between a proposition being "objectively true" vs. "objectively good"? I do not fully understand what that entails.

Bob

But whenever we apply the results of logic and rational inference to a practical outcome, isn't that an instance of mental causation, in some sense?

That's fair. The "mental causation" would be simply reasons that determined a choice (to some extent) whereas "physical causation" would be the interaction of either mind-independent parts or phenomenal objects. Thank you for sharing!

Bob

I see no issue redefining terms so long as the new definition is explicated and clear. Furthermore, I do not think physicality is a criterium for causality in any mainstream (philosophical or otherwise) definitions in the literature.

Interesting. "Causality", as far as I have heard it used in the literature, is the idea of how material objects interact with each other or how mind-independent parts explain one another. Depending on the flavor of idealism, causality may still exist (e.g., schopenhauer's epistemic dualist view allowed for causality as the extrinsic representation of mentality); however, the mentality itself has no causality: what are you referring to by 'causality' in idealistic metaphysics? I don't see what the causal relationships would be between mentality--it is all immaterial mind operations.

Bob

I'd counter here and say that a metaethical theory in conjunction with a metaphysical theory of naturalism is what makes that fixation a form of moral realism.

I think this is a fair assessment of what is considered in the literature moral naturalism, but when I look at the actual metaethical theories thereof I genuinely don't see any objective moral judgments. I would grant that they claim that there are moral facts, but I don't see anything in the (prominent) theories themselves that back that claim adequately.

What I was trying to convey is that the obligation to naturalistic accounts of morals is not itself a moral fact but, rather, there could be genuinely will-independent morals which are natural (regardless).

The metaphysical claim of naturalism is what girds it. If you're a naturalist, what could be more objective than your nature?

...

Right! So the truthity of a fixation is your nature, and since nature is all that is real, it's a form of moral realism. It's not like you got to will your nature -- you were born human.

So here's where I think I have to be very careful. You are right that our nature is not in our control, as we cannot will what we will because we are that will; however, what we will is will-dependent and thusly the normative judgments we proclaim as true simply because we want it to be true are relative to our desires--they are not objective in virtue of our will in general being outside of our control nor being objectively true that they occurred (i.e., I desired X, and that is objectively true if I did desire X--but the desire for X is still subjective).

The idea, to me, of the distinction between will-dependence and will-independence is whether it was contingent on a will and not if that will has absolute control over itself.

I am a naturalist in the sense that I do think we are all a part of one, natural reality though; I just don't think that that justifies claiming that the propositions who's truthity is relative to (a) will(s) is somehow objective in virtue of our will's being a part of nature.

Bob

Hello Moliere,

I apologize for the belated response!

Any sort of moral realism which depends upon our nature, similar to your:

I want to clarify that my commitment to fixating upon what is of my nature is not itself an objective moral judgment. I don’t think that a metaethical theory that simply contains the obligation to what is one’s nature is thereby a form of moral realism.

will have to reconcile with some apparent difficulties like the naturalistic fallacy or the fact/value distinction.

I think the way I'm reading unenlightened is the actuality of human realitionships require moral commitments to be shared overall in order for said set of human relationships to not deteriorate. And by and large I think there's some truth to that. And it makes for an interesting case where we are sort of combining values and facts together at once -- from the existential perspective we can always choose against some rule or value, and there are some who are smarter than others and can exploit the rules, but in actuality people are generally wise to who they can trust. If trust fades then relationships die, and trust is very important when it comes to keeping people together -- the very stuff of morality.

I appreciate you elaborating on this! I also understood them in that way; however, where I am confused, is how any of that is objective morality. This sounds like a form of moral subjectivism that accounts for its fundamental obligations by reviewing what is required to have a functioning society. What, in terms of how you explained it, do you think is the objectivity in the moral judgments (of unenlightened’s view)? That is what I am failing to see.

So actions are the value-makers in moral propositions -- if you act to make it so, and it is also good, then moral realism is true -- because the good is now true.

I am not sure if I entirely understood your second post, but let me try to adequately respond. If someone acts as though “P is good”, that does not thereby make P objectively good (although, arguably, it may be subjectively good). A normative judgment is objective iff the proposition (that expresses it) has a truthity that is will-independent. If the truthity, on the other hand, is indexical, then it is subjective.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

I apologize for the belated response.

Why would you argue that? I can't think of any rational or instrumental (goal-related) reasons for doing so.

Because that is what (I think) “objectivity” means: a proposition whereof its truthity is will-independent. I am not defining it that way for the purpose of a goal but, rather, because I think that is the only coherent definition for “objectivity” itself.

Thusly, I extend this definition to what a “objective” + “moral judgement” would be, and conclude it would be a proposition which expresses a normative statement whereof its truthity is will-independent.

Finally, I conclude that the only example of such that I can think of for an “objective moral judgment” would be an objective feature of being a will itself, which causes one to be obligated towards a norm irregardless of what one chooses to be obligated to.

That may be your intuition, but what is your intuition’s philosophical merit if it is an illusion foisted on you by your genes?

I don’t think that definition (nor my derivation) is “foisted on [me] by [my] genes” in a way that would invalidate or undermine it: why would that be the case?

Building moral philosophy on an illusionary understanding of “an objective moral judgment” is a recipe for endless speculations.

Why is it an illusory understanding?

Why not ground moral philosophy in the origins and objective function (the principal reason it exists) of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?

One could choose to do that, but it wouldn’t be objective morality but, rather, a kind of moral subjectivism. Do you think it would still be an objective form of morality if one chooses to do that?

With that, you can build a solid, culturally useful structure and, for the most part, leave the endless speculations behind.

It being culturally useful does not entail that it is a form of moral realism.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

I apologize for the belated response.

You are holding now to the standard of necessary truth, not objective truth.

I am failing to understand the relevance of this claim, nor what “necessary” vs “objective” truth means. Could you please elaborate?

To me, I think that truth is the relation between thinking and being: it is when the asserted being (by a mind) corresponds to the actual being (which exists independent of that mind’s will).

If I take my keys out of my pocket in front of you, then I have demonstrated that my keys were in my pocket; I do not have to prove that they couldn't have been anywhere else.

What is the relevance of this? I see that it pertains to your formulation of “necessary” vs. “objective” truth.

The point was that you have not adequately addressed my counter-example. I don’t think you can claim that society cannot flourish with lies and also hold that morality (at large) could (hypothetically) be all lies and still function properly (because that directly counters your own point): this does not cohere with your view well (at a minimum).

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

I agree with you. but I do not believe in the flourishing society of liars. You would have to show me a real example

I think you have missed the point if you are asking for an actual example (as opposed to theoretical). You claimed that society cannot flourish in lies, and I gave a counter-example wherein society would flourish in lies. It is irrelevant if there has ever been an existent society which was setup with lies or not (in the sense of morality): it does not negate my contention whatsoever.

If your claim holds good (i.e., that “society cannot flourish in lies”), then you will have to demonstrate why it is impossible for a society to function in the manner that I described (whether that be actual, logical, or metaphysical impossibility I leave up to you).

Likewise, the counter-example was not “a sub-culture exploiting the majority”: it was the majority exploiting the majority.

Bob

Hello Moliere,

So it seems, if universal objective categorical imperatives are real, we shouldn't be able to make exceptions. I think that might be some of confusion between yourself and @Bob Ross?

I wouldn’t say it is the root of our dispute (as I don’t even think their view has any objective morality in it but I would concede it would be generally categorized as ‘moral realism’ in the literature), but I would agree with you that, yes, there can’t be exceptions if it is an objective moral judgment. There can be seemingly exceptions within our pragmatic approach to upholding the ideal, but not in the ideal itself.

Maybe you, given you seem to understand what unenlightened is saying in terms of being moral realist, can explain what I am missing? Where are the objective moral judgments in their view?

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

That's fine with me, I'm not much enamoured of the objective/subjective distinction in the first place. I tried to explain myself in your conceptual language and failed. Or maybe I'm just confused.

I respect and appreciate you attempting to explain your moral realist view from my conceptual schema! If you would like, then please feel free to invoke your own schema and I will do my absolute best to understand it. It seems as though, based off of your comment, that you wouldn’t make even an “objective vs. subjective” distinction: what distinction would you make?

But now Bob's going to say that I'm promoting deception for the greater good. And i might be, but only as the exception, not as the rule.

To me, your acceptance, within our conversation, about the morality counter-example I gave is, indeed, an acknowledgment of an exception—but, likewise, to me, it is a rather large exception. How many counter-example would I need to give for it to become the rule?

If everyone is capable of lying about morals and society doesn’t crumble (but could actually flourish), then I think that a pretty large exception to the so called rule.

Which is pretty much straightforward Kant. Lies need to be justified, and the truth does not.

If I remember Kantian ethics correctly, then he actually thought that they are absolute: so, no, he would never permit a lie. He is famous for demanding we tell the truth to the axe man.

If your child walks into the road in front of a bus, it's ok to jerk them back to the pavement so violently it dislocates their shoulder. But if you do something like that because they are using the fish knife when they should be using the butter knife, that's child abuse.

For me, this is all in accordance with the rule that we ought to strive to uphold the sovereignty of wills (i.e., subjects), and, as a part of that plan, to quickly summarize, it makes sense (pragmatically) to do exactly as you outlined above (in the quote). It almost sounds like, to me, you are advocating for absolute rules (e.g., don’t lie) but yet they also can have exceptions.

Bob

Hello Count Timothy von Icarus,

Thank you for the elaboration on Bernardo Kastrupt’s “The Idea of the World”! I cannot say I have read it, but I will (eventually).

To be honest, I didn’t find anything in your post that I disagreed with, so let me try to build off of it (and you tell me what you think).

As an introduction, I think that when one takes on the mantle of discovering the ontology of the world (regardless of whether they come at it from a more idealistic or materialistic perspective) they should come to the same conclusion (which, I think coincides with how you also think that under physicalism we would still expect to be stuck in the same idealistic illusion as outlined in your post): first-order (ontological) idealism and second-order (ontological) agnosticism.

In order to even discover the ontology of the world, I think that we must understanding our approach, as it is going to heavily decide our conclusions; and I suggest that we fundamentally split the ontology of the world into two sub-ontologies: first-order (i.e., the structure of reality within first-person experience) and second-order (i.e., the structure of reality at “rock bottom”).

Since we are first-person experiencers (i.e., conscious beings), we must start our investigation within the first-order, and use that ontology to attempt to decipher the second, deeper ontology (I would argue). Within the first-order ontology (of reality), I think you have done a great job of outlining (generally) why idealism is true: we, as first-person experiencers, are always working with mentality—i.e., always within consciousness. Science only gives us better models of how to navigate the “mental territory”, but never tells us anything ontologically. However, this does not entail that what fundamentally exists is just mentality: that is a second-order concern.

As second-order ontology (of reality), which consists of whatever the fundamental “stuff” of reality may be and what exists thereof, I find that the only legitimate response is agnosticism. We are essentially trapped in the first-order ontological idealism, and we have no means of deciphering anything being that (once we properly understand the first-order ontology [of reality] itself).

I look forward to your response,
Bob

Hello Mark S,

Thank you for the elaboration: let me try to adequately respond.

The problem I have with your syllogism is that the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

If P1 is true, then we are acknowledging that subjects tends towards solving cooperation problems: it is a fact about subjects in the sense of what they tend to will (which is not will-independent), not a moral judgment that is objective.

If P2 is true, then we are simply acknowledge a non-moral objective fact.

Therefore, the conclusion does not follow that “By doing so, you will advocate for an objective morality with no imperative moral oughts”.

Your conclusion is actually a hypothetical imperative (an objective fact that follows validly only if one accepts the antecedent); but I think (and correct me if I am wrong) you would agree with that because you say “with no imperative moral oughts”; however, you are claiming something about that syllogism just produce a valid entailment of objective moral judgments (even in the sense that they are not absolutely obligatory): is it in P1? Because, to me, P1 is the only place I would imagine you may push back with “the objective fact that a subject tends towards solving cooperation problems would be an objective moral judgement”: is that correct?

Would all rational, well-informed people wish to maintain or increase the cooperation benefits of living in their society? Perhaps.

Correct. But nothing about acknowledging that leads directly to any objective moral judgments.

If they did, then the proposed objective morality without imperative moral obligations would be normative by Gert's SEP definition.

Perhaps, but I think that definition is more for the purposes of noting different general camps of dispositions within metaethics, and not an accurate representation of what a moral judgment is. For example, one can be a moral realist by simply acknowledging there are objective moral judgments, but that doesn’t mean that I think they validly hold any necessarily: it’s just a depiction of their disposition on the subject-matter.

Is Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) a kind of moral realism? Does it determine mind-independent moral truth values?

It could be a form of moral realism in the sense that I could see its proponents advocating that it is a source of objective morality, but no I don’t think it determines mind-independent moral truth values.

Yes, a necessary moral component (a definition of right and wrong) exists for all highly cooperative societies of independent agents.

The fact that we need to solve cooperative problems to suffice our subjective wants does not include any mind-independent obligations. If I want to survive (subjectively), then I have to participate in society: it’s not an objective obligation to participate in society nor to solve cooperation problems but, rather, pragmatically necessary once one was committed themselves (for the most part) to surviving.

Does MACS tell us what we imperatively ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences?

An objective moral judgment itself, I would argue, is involuntary and is an imperative in the sense that we do it regardless of whether we want to or not. I don’t see how describing the most fundamental and subjectively universal hypothetical imperatives entails any objective moral judgments.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Right. The way everyone pretends that Father Christmas exists.

I think this is false: everyone does not pretend Santa (or perhaps you meant Jesus?) exists in an analogous sense to the morality counter-example. It is a faker, more-superficial acting that Santa exists because it is only for the sake of the children. In the sense of the morals, everyone would be acting very serious about it and would not only be faking it for children. When I say “Santa exists” in front of a child and an adult, the adult can look at me and we both acknowledge that that was a lie: we don’t then try to lie to each other about it.

but such conventions are not lies but agreed performances

This could be true in the counter-example if everyone was really bad at faking it, but my example was that they are all skilled deceivers: therefore, it is not an agreed performance, because everyone is convinced the other sincerely believes there are objective moral judgments—but each person knows that they themselves don’t buy it.

One of the things it talks about is the possibility of social collapse brought about by the ubiquity of deep-fakes becoming impossible to detect. Worth watching quite carefully, and rather supposing the moral case I have been making.

That is interesting, but, unfortunately, I do not have time to listen to it right now, so I will have to watch that later. I still don’t see, if I am being honest, how your view has any objective moral judgments in it.

Bob

Hello Invicta,

I appreciate your response!

I feel that the distinction is indeed blurry, however it only seems Hegelian in that respect if I may say so

Interesting, I am not that familiar with hegel (as I found his books incredibly poorly written and hard to comprehend): could you elaborate on what you mean?

In terms of meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism for right and wrong are both imperative and categorical using kantian terminology (if i was to really get dialectical in the German sense)

I am not sure what you mean here. Yes, Kant talks about “objective moral judgments” as “categorical imperatives”, but I actually think we mistakenly does so. Also, what do you mean by “meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism”?

The interjection only becomes obvious post fact although admittedly that is not always the case

I didn’t quite follow this part: can you please elaborate?

Bob

Hello 0 implies everything,

I see. Would you say your style of epistemological idealism is really just ontological idealism, but based on epistemological grounds instead of ontological grounds? That is, on a first-order level, you assert only the mental exist, but on a second-order level, you assert this assertion is not certain, but rather the best assertion; as opposed to a purely ontological idealism, which would assert the sole existence of the mental on all orders.

That is a fair assessment. I don’t really consider myself making a standard ontological argument for idealism because I am agnostic as to if there is a truly a physical substance; but I do know that it is, by my lights, indistinguishable from an empty concept—it thereby is still technically possible; and, yes, it is motivated heavily by epistemological idealism: I basically argue that there is no legitimate reason to hold there is an indirect “consciousness-independent” object when one’s “representations” could be 0% accurate (and they never come in contact with anything non-mental ever nor is it possible as a conscious being). Even if I could somehow go outside of my conscious experience and know that there is truly a physical substance of some sort, then I would still say that for conscious beings emergent therefrom they would have zero justification to think there actually is a physical substance.

Personally, I advocate for using the standard definitions. If the above paragraph is a correct description of your views, I would then refer to your view as epistemologically motivated ontological idealism. One must separate the contents of an axiom from its motivation, lest they be confused.

I have never heard of that term, but, yes, that seems to fit nicely!

No assumptions; from an absolutely skeptical standpoint. It may seem impossible to derive any propositions from no assumptions, but I believe I have. Nothing significant (yet) though.

Oh, I see. Have you looked into a priori knowledge?

In an objective idealism, there can be. If you, in addition to your idealist assumption, assume a regularity in reality (laws of nature), and a distributive awareness (God, mind at large, the simulator(s), etc.), then you can arrive back at science. Now, in such a framework, you'll have causality; and if it is restrictive enough, it will deny the possibility of non-mental objects interacting with your framework's solely mental reality.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but to me “causality” has been reserved for ‘interaction’ in a physical sense in the literature; but in the sense you just described there would be no ‘interaction’ other than mental events (e.g., the laws of nature are Ideas, platonic forms, etc. in the mind of God), which you are calling ‘causality’, which I don’t have any issue with (in the sense of defining 'causality' as simply a realist position pertaining to the 'cause' of sensations being objective).

Also, have you read George Berkeley’s idealism? If not, I think you may find it an interesting read.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Objective moral judgments are proclamations dependent on the same objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense

To me, cultural moral norms are inter-subjective: why do you think they are not inter-subjective? I see it analogous to economic value: the value of a diamond (in terms of currency) is not dependent on my will (particularly) but, rather, on multiple wills. It is not thereby objective, like, for example, the fact that a diamond is made of carbon. It is, likewise, not subjective but, rather, inter-subjective. Why, on the contrary, do you think norms are objective?

Furthermore, what do you mean by “moral sense”? Are you talking about an evolutionary conscience?

The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills since imperative obligation is not a necessary part of what is objectively moral.

I agree with this part: but why are cultural moral norms objective? Could you please walk me through that part? How do they meet the definition of objectivity (i.e., not contingent on wills)?

Perhaps you are still thinking something like “what is objectively moral is necessarily an imperative obligation”. This idea is “an illusion foisted on us by our genes" (as the philosopher of biology Michael Ruse likes to point out).

I see. I think that an objective moral judgment would be, by definition, a true obligation which is stance-independent; however, the truthity of the obligation as being fixated-upon (i.e., consciously decided to follow) would be relative to the subject at hand. I think this is essentially what you are saying in the second quote of you I made hereon: “ The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills”. I agree (if I am understanding you correctly).

"It is moral to solve cooperation problems; it is immoral to create cooperation problems"

I really appreciate you giving an example: thank you! Let me try to dissect it and please correct me where I am wrong. The proposition “It is moral to solve cooperation problems” is directly translatable (by my lights) to “one ought to solve cooperation problems”. How is this proposition independent of our wills (in terms of its truthity). By my lights, the obligation to it is unclear (in an objective sense): could you elaborate on that? In other words, why is “it is moral to solve cooperation problems” itself true despite of anyone’s will.

It is objective (mind independent) in that it is the product of the objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense – cooperation problems and the strategies that solve them.

To me, this doesn’t prove that the obligation (previously expounded) is objective itself but, rather, that we need to cooperate to survive (or something along those lines). It almost seems like you may be arguing on these lines:

P1: One ought to consider what causes cultural moral norms and our moral sense objective moral judgments.

P2: Solving cooperative problems is the cause of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.

C: Therefore, one ought to solve cooperative problems.

Is that syllogism accurate? If so, I don’t see where the objective moral judgment is (besides defining, semantically, “objective moral judgment” in the sense in P1—but that isn’t what objectivity means: it is will-independent and that new definition would not be).

Bob

Hello enlightened,

Yes. it is possible occasionally that dishonesty can have good consequences, but not that it is 'a good thing'. It is possible that murdering Hitler would have had good consequences, but not that murdering people is a good thing. It is possible that abortion has good consequences sometimes, but it not a a good thing, in the sense that it is worth getting pregnant for.

I think you may have misunderstood my counter-example or perhaps I didn’t explain it well enough: it isn’t that faking objective moral judgments is sometimes beneficial; rather, I was outlining that 99% of the population didn’t think that there was such a thing as an objective “thou shall not kill”, but they kept promoting it as objective (thusly lying) because they recognize that it would be in their best interest to do so. In that example, lying is predominant and good.

If you are agreeing, then I think this throws a big wrench, at the very least, in your argument that lying is bad—unless, perhaps, you are saying that lying is only good in the case where we would be faking morality?

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

To be honest, I don’t think this conversation is very productive. You aren’t actually contending with my claims at all; but I am going to try one more time to respond adequately, and then if you still feel the exact same way, then we should problem just agree to disagree.

It's pretty obvious what it is.

I gave a fairly long, substantive response and I asked what you are contending with in my view (as you were simply disagreeing with me yet it sounded like, to me, you were actually agreeing with me without realizing it). Responding with ‘it is obvious’ does not help further the conversation.

My point in asking was not to send a condescending, rhetorical question: I genuinely don’t think you are seeing what I am saying and wanted clarification on what you are contending with. Your use of ‘feelings’ = ‘qualia’ is fine for you own view, but it doesn’t work to address my contentions. Let me ask you: why do you think ‘feelings’ are synonymous with ‘qualia’?

Again, no that is not what the PZ thought experiment is based on. A feeling cannot occur without being consciously aware of it.

The PZ experiment does not claim that a ‘feeling’ equates to ‘qualia’. Now, I will grant (as I already have many times) that many basic arguments for the PZ experiment are predicated on that assumption: but that is what I am questioning and arguing against. Telling me that the PZ thought experiment is not based on ‘feelings’ being disynonmous with ‘qualia’ just tells me that you are subscribing to that kind of argument: now tell me why feelings cannot be disynonymous with qualia (in the manner I already outlined it).

I am claiming that a feeling can occur without being consciously aware of it in the sense of qualia: you disagree. Now, tell me why.

The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really feel anything.

This is just semantics: you aren’t contending with what I am saying. By ‘feel’ in your sentence, you are assuming it is synonymous with ‘qualia’. Let me put it this way. I agree with this sentence:

‘The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really have qualia.’

I disagree with:

‘The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really feel anything.’

You have woefully misunderstood the thought experiment not to mention your example is just wrong.

How is my example wrong? A person can still be screaming in agony if they do not have qualia: surely you agree with that. I think you are getting caught up in the semantics. The ‘screaming out in agony’, to me, classifies it under the term ‘feeling’; for you, it does not. Why?

No you don't, you assume that. All that you said requires qualia.

This is just blatantly false: a person doing a nice thing for me does not require qualia. The whole point of the PZ experiment is that a person could do a nice gesture for you and yet still not have qualia. If qualia were required for such actions, then there would be no point to the thought experiment: everyone would know that everyone else has qualia because they do those things. On the contrary, that’s not the point of the thought experiment at all: it isn’t enough that she drove all the way across town to get me something as a token of love—she must be consciously aware of it as well to ‘feel’.

They can perform the action but without the emotion it's not really care and concern.

Yes it can: I could be completely numbed up on morphine and still care about you.

People lie all the time, lead people on, so you're just wrong here.

I never said that a person lying is truly concerned: obviously that would be false. I said that I can determine if a person is genuinly concerned based off of their actions and, yes, some clever psychopaths can pass my tests.

It's not just the action they have to actually feel and have love for you, which a P-Zombie cannot, ever.

But do you think that they need to have a conscious experience to love you? You keep using the term ‘feeling’, but that is just leading us to confusion. If conscious experience is what you mean by ‘feel’ in that sentence, then I think you are wrong because I don’t think one needs to have a subjective experience to love you; if you mean that they can love you without them being sincerely psychologically in love with you, then I agree. Do you see the distinction I am trying to draw (even if you still disagree)?

Acts of love aren't proof of love, they have to have the feeling for it to be so.

I disagree. To clarify, I don’t think that I can ‘prove’ that someone loves me with certainty; but I can pragmatically tell (and I would argue most people can too); and, again, when you say ‘feeling’, are you referring to ‘consciously aware of’ or ‘it is psychologically true that’?

Again the fact you can't understand why the emotion behind it makes all the difference is telling.

I am still, and have always been, claiming that emotions matter (in sense of emotions being ‘feelings’): but that term doesn’t translate to ‘qualia’ to me. You just keep trying to mesh the two terms together, because you use them synonymously, instead of trying to understand my distinction.

They have to be conscious otherwise it doesn't matter. Pretty much everyone knows this.

I can assure you that everyone does not know this: you are presuming that peoples’ actions only matter if they are consciously aware of them in the sense of a subjective, private, ‘along-with’ sensation.

It is entailed in the basic definition you gave me

No where did the definition use the term ‘feelings’: it used ‘qualia’.

Your whole chain shows you don't get it.

If you still think that there is no substance to what I am saying, then it may be for the best that we just agree to disagree.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Not quite. You are missing a critical element: the subject of the objective facts. The subject is the function of cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment).

I am understanding you to be saying here that we are heavily coerced by sociological factors (i.e., “cultural moral norms” as you put it): is that correct? If so, then I don’t see how those are objective themselves as moral jugdments (but I do see how the empirical inquiry of them would be objective): an objective moral judgment is not, to me, just a description of a norm but, rather, a norm which is involuntary.

If the norm is voluntary, then it is contingent on a will which is, by definition, subjective. A descriptive fact that one volunteered (subscribed) to a norm does not thereby make the norm objective.

On the other hand, are you claiming that some cultural norms are involuntary for subjects and that is the objective morals you are wanting to investigate?

Assume it is objectively (mind independently) true that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems and cultural moral norms are fallible heuristics for parts of strategies, such as reciprocity strategies, which solve those problems. Knowing the function of cultural moral norms enables us to resolve many disputes about if and when cultural moral norms will fail this function or will fulfil it in a way that is contrary to our values and goals.

Fair enough, but here’s where I don’t understand:

Therefore, this function provides an objective standard for moral behavior we can use to understand cultural moral norms better and thereby resolve disputes about them.

It seems to me like you are really just arguing that we should commit ourselves to using this guideline of ‘cooperative strageties’ because pretty much any (if not all) rational people would agree—but that doesn’t entail that anything about that is objective morality. It would be inter-subjective at best.

Again, I am operating under the semantic use of an ‘objective moral judgement’ being more than just a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills (in a voluntary sense): would you disagree with that usage of the term?

For example, consider “Do to others as you would have them do to you” as a fallible heuristic for initiating reciprocity. When tastes differ and following it would create rather than solve cooperation problems, the proposed moral standard (solving cooperation problems) provides an understanding that it would be objectively immoral to follow the Golden Rule in this case.

To me, it seems like you are noting that it is useful (from a rational agent’s perspective) to use the Golden Rule; and if it stopped functioning as a useful tool then we ought to disband from it. That is fine to me, but where are the objective morals in that?

Maybe it would help me understand if you gave me an example, if you can, of what you would consider an objective moral judgment. Is the golden rule an example of one to you?

Again, the function of cultural moral norms provides AN objective standard for morality. This objective truth is silent regarding the existence of other moral standards that are either “objective features of the world” (as it is) or “involuntary obligations” (which it is not).

It sounds like, to me, you are just engaging in an inter-subjective agreement with other rational agents, which is not objective morality. If the moral is not an objective feature of the world nor involuntary, then it seems as though you are using the term “objective morality” is a way that sounds like ‘moral anti-realism’ to me.

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

the sort of objectivity I am claiming is the objective inequality I mentioned way back – honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral; similarly killing folks is immoral and keeping them alive is moral. It cannot work the other way around, and thus there is objectivity, without that being the kind of law like gravity that one cannot defy.

My confusion lies in the fact that you say “honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral” because it cannot go the other way around in society, but yet you conceded that it can:

Yes, you have found an exception..If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful.

If you agree that people lying about there being objective moral standards (such as “thou shall not kill”) would actually sustain society (or at least not burn it to the ground), then you are conceding that it is possible for dishonesty to function as a ‘good’ thing in society. If that is the case, then I am not following what grounds you are claiming ‘lying is wrong’. As of yet, you were claiming that it is wrong because society would crumble if lying were predominant, but that example I gave (that you agreed with) negates that notion: there can be predominant lying which functions just fine in society.

Then I began to infer that you were claiming there is an actual objective standard, which is despite whether the given thing helps society sustain itself, based off of the previous quote I just made of you (i.e., “if one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false...one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful). It was starting to sound like you were claiming there is a standard that goes beyond just a need for particular norms to survive (because you still think lying is wrong despite it having the ability to help one survive even in a grand scale—in the sense of it being predominant).

The dishonesty has to be, as Attenborough says 'very occasionally', because otherwise the warning would not work either as a deception or as a warning. And I would add that it is clearly an intentional deception, and thus the original sin.

I understand what you are claiming with your summary points, but I don’t see any objective morality in it is my problem; and, by your own standards, dishonesty would be able to be frequent in society as long as each person was good at it.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Yes, you have found an exception.

But doesn’t this fundamentally break your previously claim? Or am I misunderstanding? As far as I understood, you were claiming society cannot function predominantly on lies, but then you just admitted (as far as I understand) that there are instances where they can. Are you just claiming that most subject-matters need to be predominantly submerged in truth while some minority do not?

If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful.

In my scenario, the assumption is that it actually is false and they are pretending it is true (not that it it “was true”); but now it seems as though you are claiming that there is some sort of “objective moral law” which is independent of the inter-subjective cooperation required to survive as a species.

(Not that I really know what an objective law is, mind. It tends to make me think of laws of physics that one obeys without exception, rather than human prescriptions that one can and sometimes does break.)

Well, this is exactly what I would need to know, because if you don’t know what the objective law is then, to me, you don’t have one; so you can’t claim that their pretending of it being true is actually accidentally corresponding to something that is true.

However, I will concede that I generally agree with your definition of “objective morality” if you mean “laws of physics that one obeys without exception”. I just define it as a “description of the faculty of normativity of a being which is involuntary”: mine is just in more philosophical terminology.

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

That’s not what it means. It’s to argue against an alleged inner life that might be occurring in the person. They don’t have qualia, hence the wording of “considered” as having it but not really.

If by “inner life” you mean “qualia”, then you are correct—but what are you contending with in my argument? That is what I said too. As far as I am understanding, you are just repeating the definition I already gave: nothing about what you quoted from me claimed that a PZ still has qualia .

Again you misunderstand the PZ. It acts and has all the normal actions of pain but doesn’t really feel pain.

I suspect that by ‘really feel pain’ you mean ‘has qualia’, which, in that case, I agree and simply ask: what is the contention?

Pain is eliminated as a PZ or rather it never truly was

Again, by “never truly was”, I am presuming you are still operating under the assumption that in order for one to ‘feel’ they must have qualia: I am denying this. A ‘feeling’ can occur without being consciously aware of it. For example, imagine that you were stabbed right now: you would ‘feel’ it in the sense that your body would react to it and you would be conscious of that pain (assuming, from introspection, you know you are conscious). Now, imagine the same scenario except your conscious experience of that pain is not present (i.e., you are conscious of everything except the pain—so you can see them stab you, etc.): your body is still screaming out in agony (you just aren’t aware of it). Now, to clarify, this is a different scenario than one in which you are numb to the pain (where the pain isn’t occurring because, for example, you get morphine). The PZ thought experiment is predicated on the idea that your nerve endings are not malfunctioning, numbed by a drug, etc.: you are still screaming, still in agony, but you aren’t consciously aware of the pain. I think you are committed to saying there is no pain, or finding some kind of logical (or maybe metaphysical) impossibility in this above scenario. But if you say it is impossible, then you’ve also annihilated solipsism, because if it is impossible for you to scream out in agony without being aware of the pain (i.e., having the qualia corresponding thereto), then a normal person who is screaming in agony must have qualia (by your own logic). Now, I am not saying that that would be correct, but I am simply pointing out that my analogy holds (in the converse direction) on the same assumption of the PZ thought experiment.

If you accept that analogy, then you can see (hopefully if I have explained adequately enough) that, in that scenario, you have a scenario where you have no qualia but your body is still 'feeling' pain. The ‘machine’, if you will, is feeling pain indeed.

You’re butchering the thought experiment to fit your narrative.

I think you may be misunderstanding I am saying, or maybe I am not explaining it adequately enough. I am not re-shaping the PZ thought experiment: I am agreeing with it. I cannot know that you have qualia, which is the whole point of the thought experiment. I am contending with an unnecessarily metaphysical commitment that sneaks its way into the definition of ‘feeling’ that solipsists tend to deploy: that to ‘feel’, one needs qualia (i.e., one needs an extra, along-side sensation with the pain the body is having).

Perhaps I may have confused you into thinking that by ‘pain’ I mean an ‘uncomfortable sensation within one’s subjective experience’--because I would agree, in that sense, that a PZ doesn’t have pain; but I am not arguing that. I am saying that ‘pain’ ought to be something ‘less’ than having a subjective experience of it (in the sense of qualia). Maybe to you this seems like cheating. To define ‘feelings’ in the sense of qualia is to meddle in transcendent affairs that are completely unnecessary (in my opinion).

There actually is a need to add that extra property. It’s what makes the difference. The fact you can’t see that is..telling.

Perhaps you should explain how that extra property makes a difference instead of throwing insults.

Let me elaborate on my love analogy.

I can tell if a person is genuinely concerned with my well-being based off of their behavior, which expounds their intentions. Yes, I cannot tell that they have qualia, but I can tell, for the most part, if they are narcassistic or not—nothing about this, by my lights (but correct me where I am wrong), requires qualia.

My spouse does nice things for me, sticks by my side through any times (good or bad), and constantly expresses behaviorally a love for me: that is all I require to define a person as ‘loving me’. Now, clearly you do not agree: for you, there must be qualia, a conscious experience which is aware of that expressed love, for the person to ‘truly’ love you. My question is: why?

And again you’d still be wrong. One needs qualia to be concerned. I can ACT like it but it matters whether I feel it or not. Again people can tell.

I am not entirely following: are you claiming that you can’t tell if someone is genuinely concerned about your well being because they don’t have qualia? Again, to me, if they are constantly demonstrating acts of love, then they love you: there’s no need for them to be conscious, to have corresponding conscious experiences of the events they actualize, to love me.

Yes, I do think that most people think that ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’, but I disagree. What do you disagree with in terms of that assessment?

Again no. If they don’t have qualia or feelings then they aren’t sincerely anything.

The whole contention I am raising is that ‘qualia’ is disynonymous with ‘feelings’: which one, in my terms, are you contending with here? I understand that you use them synonymously, but to do that in contending with my view is to not contend with it at all.

Again you’re not getting it. Did you even finish the math link?

No, I have not read the math link. If you would like to invoke that into our conversation, then please feel free.

You keep making up stuff like “ultra feelings” when the feeling behind an action makes all the difference. It’s just basic.

I think you are getting stuck on the ‘basic’ expositions of the PZ thought experiment: yes, it can be presented, in its most basic form, as essentially ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’. I am making the argument that kind of basic form of the argument is wrong, but that isn’t the only argument (even in terms of basics) and certainly is not entailed by the basic definition I gave you.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

That is why I call it immoral realism as much as moral realism.

Fair enough: I didn’t fully understand what was meant by “immoral realism” until now.

it is only when the charlatans become dominant that there is a collapse, and then the hard lesson has to be learned again that nothing can be done without virtue.

I can see that, but I am hesitant to say that all forms of insincerity would cause society to crumble in the event that it is dominant. For example, let’s say that 99% of the population were convinced there wasn’t an objective law prohibiting murder, but they realize that the best bet to not get killed (in very unnecessary ways) is to promote and insincerely affirm that there is an objective law prohibiting it. In that case, I don’t see how society would crumble. In other words, dominant pretending isn’t necessarily a highway to destruction.

Bob

Hello Banno,

I see. I don’t think that is a good use of the term ‘moral realism’ because it fundamentally shifts the focus from the sole purpose of metaethics: whether there are objective moral judgments. One can be a moral cognitivist and hold that there are or are not objective moral judgments: it makes no difference.

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

This point is still not true as when you realize they are a P Zombie then those things stop. It would have a bearing, especially since people can tell whether you mean something or not.

I think we may need to dive into what a PZ actually is in terms of its definition. To keep it simple for now, I am going to just use the basic, standard definition from Wiki:

A philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that imagines a hypothetical being that is physically identical to and indistinguishable from a normal person, considered as having qualia, but does not have conscious experience, qualia

I would like to note a few things pertaining to the definition. Firstly, the sole aspect of a PZ is that it doesn’t have qualia which, in turn, is subjective, conscious feelings: it is not that a being cannot feel in the sense of being capable of crying, being concerned, etc.; The whole purpose of the PZ though experiment is to say that a person who is demonstrating signs of depression, suicidality, is crying, is screaming in pain, etc. may not be feeling it in the sense that they are not consciously aware of it happening. The PZ still cries: “those things” do not “stop” because they are a PZ.

Secondly, the term ‘qualia’ is a very specific term which does not translate to ‘feelings’ in the sense that I was deploying them before: it is a subjective, personally sensation which occurs simultaneously with the physical events themselves, but not within space itself. This is what I meant by ‘ultra-feelings’: it isn’t enough that a person is going through pain in the sense that it demonstrable—they must also have ‘qualia’, a “conscious sensation”, along-with the pain. To clarify, it is not that pain is eliminated if one is a PZ but, rather, the conscious sensation allegedly corresponding with it. This is very important.

There are many ways to dissect the idea of ‘qualia’ and illegitimize it, but, to stick with my original claims, I will put a pin in that for now.

My point is that whether a person I am experiencing has ‘qualia’ or not, they still demonstrate emotions: they still cry, they still hold intervention meetings for addicted love ones, they still perform acts of love, etc.; these do not go away if they are a PZ. What goes away is a corresponding , ‘along-with’ sensation. This ‘along-with’ sensation is superfluous to me as it is not required to infer a person is ‘feeling’ (in the sense that emotions are demonstrated: e.g., crying, genuine crying, ingenuine crying, etc.).

Regardless of whether they are a PZ, my spouse still demonstrates every possible indicator of loving me fervently—there is no need to add in an extra property required to meet the definition of ‘feeling’ to me. Yes, I am saying that one doesn’t need ‘qualia’ to feel: maybe that is what you fundamentally disagree with?

But there is a need for that “extra” because again people can tell. There is usually evidence for it but it’s not something you can test in a lab. It has to go beyond machinery to have feelings. What you’re saying is simply false.

When you determine a person is genuinely upset vs. they are not, you do so by indicators which will never provide information about if they have ‘qualia’. They are either demonstrating genuine concern or they aren’t regardless of whether they are a PZ or not. Again, I am claiming one can be concerned without having qualia.

Think of it this way: imagine a chronically depressed person. They are crying, in visible torment, lethargic, etc.: the solipsist can still rightly point out that they could not have qualia. But this is independent of whether they are sincerely crying, sincerely in torment, etc.: whether there is a corresponding, special, and ‘along-with’ sensation to the crying and torment is irrelevant.

And you’d be wrong. The reason people mistreated those before is they took their actions to be that of a machine, in other words they didn’t really feel anything or mean it.

When you say “machine”, I think you are conflating it with a “sophisticated machine”, like a human (in this PZ thought experiment).

Except no they are not because they are a P Zombie. Again your entire argument is nullified by the definition of a p zombie.

Hopefully I explained adequately why this is false. Please let me know if I did not.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Thank you for your response! I suspect we may be misunderstanding each other, so let me try to explain back to you what I am understanding you to being saying (and please correct me where I am wrong).

You seem to be essentially noting that we can derive objective facts pertaining to what norms societies are setup with (and sustain) and that these judgments (which are guided by the need for cooperation) are an objective standard for morals. Am I understanding you correctly?

I repeat, "Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad." How could you argue that was false?

I understand that you are not arguing that the objective standard (that you outlined) is absolutely obligatory; however, my problem is, more fundamentally, with your standard even being considered ‘objective morality’. I understand that descriptions of norms are, in fact, objective; but that does not thereby make it ‘objective’ within the ‘moral’ sphere of discourse.

For example, let’s say that a particular society (or even all societies) have a rule “thou shall not kill”. That is an objective fact (in this hypothetical scenario) because it is a description of a norm which exists in that society (or all societies); however, by my lights, it is not thereby an “objective moral judgement”--on the contrary, the depiction that a society decrees “thou shall not kill” is not a prescription itself (it is simply a description of what is currently the case in society). Therefore, it isn’t an objective moral judgment: it seems as though you are advocating that it would be simply in virtue of it being a norm in society. Am I misunderstanding you?

The key to many miscommunications in moral realism discussions may be that one side is assuming the subject is "imperative obligations" and the other side is assuming the subject is "objective features of the world".

I think I followed and agree: I just want to explicate that I am not contending that you have to hold a moral judgment as absolutely obligatory in order to be classified as an “objective moral judgment”. On the contrary, I am questioning how the study of subjects (being objective features of the world) is a source of morality. How does “It is an objective fact that most people think I shouldn’t kill” translate to “I should not kill”?

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

When the boy cries wolf when there is no wolf, he teaches the world to ignore what he says. When we all ignore what each other says, there is no meaning and nothing to understand. It seems so obvious to me that i struggle to understand what you cannot understand. You do know the story?

I am familiar with the story; however, it isn’t relevant (I would say) to the example I gave. Take our conversation right now: you are saying it is predicated on truth whereas I allow for the possibility of a functioning deception (e.g., that we are not trying to converse about what is true but, rather, just simply enjoying debating each other). The ‘moral’ of the story of the boy who cried wolf is that he demonstrated his lies and thusly no one cares anymore—I am not saying we are both explicating or ‘leaking’ our want to deceive each other. If we both were honest about the fact that we just wanted to debate each other (in the hypothetical scenario I outlined), then, yes, you would be right to say that that conversation is disfunctional (if we are saying we just want to debate but yet acting as though we are searching for the truth).

If the boy who cried wolf masked his narcissistic desire to spook his village with crafty, legitimate reasons for crying (whereof when they approached there was no wolf but everything indicated that the boy was sincere—even though he truly isn’t), then they would have kept showing up. I am not sure if I am explaining this adequately, but hopefully that helps.

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

I think we are misunderstanding each other, so let me try to explain in more depth (and let me know where you disagree).

When I was saying that a philosophical zombie has ‘feelings’ and ‘cares’, I was not contending that they have them in the sense that is in dispute for the term philosophical zombie—as you rightly point out that, by definition, a PZ ‘has no feelings’. However, what is meant by ‘having no feelings’ in that sense? My point was that the missing feelings in a philosophical zombie has, in actuality, no bearing on the ‘feelings’ which the average person, being a genuine person or a philosophical zombie, has: they still cry, they can hug you, they can demonstrate concern for you, etc. even in the case that they are a philosophical zombie.

The problem is that the feelings that are removed, by definition, from a philosophical zombie, I would argue, is a kind of ultra feelings which are described as ‘actual feelings’. A PZ can still cry, but it “isn’t real” because there’s an extra component of ‘being human’ which goes being the mere act of crying (allegedly); A PZ can show obvious signs of concern for your well being, but it “isn’t real” because there is something extra required, something beyond demonstrating obvious concern for another, which is required to be a ‘true’ feeling. This is my point: this ‘ultra-feelings’ is just another part of humanity’s mythology. There’s no need for anything extra nor is there any evidence of it, and a being doesn’t have to go metaphysically beyond a complex bit of machinery to ‘have feelings’ (in a non-ultra sense).

Although I don’t think human’s are robots necessarily, if you wanted to call a PZ a “highly sophisticated bit of machinery”, then I would still argue, in that case, that it still has feelings. The only reason we don’t do that with AI now, is because it isn’t a “highly sophisticated bit of machinery” like a human being: that’s the only meaningful difference for all intents and purposes.

Of course there is a world of difference when you’re interacting with a human who has feelings and emotions

I think you may have misunderstood me: I am arguing exactly that this is false. The reason historically people and animals were abused is based off of this false assumption: no, if a being is demonstrating obvious signs of being able to feel, being concerned, desiring, etc., then no matter if it is a lower life form or a robot, it thereby has feelings because that is the true standard of what it means to feel. Solipsism is providing something superfluous to the conversation: there has to be some impossible to attain component of existence that qualifies one as a ‘true’ feeling being. I am just trying to convey to you that (I think) it is a false dilemma--as regardless of whether a person is a PZ, where they cannot ‘feel’ in this ultra sense, they are still demonstrating the capacity to love, feel, and desire just the same as yourself (in a non-ultra sense): there just another component to your existence that you can’t verify for another person (i.e., that they are aware and feel in the same manner as you), and (I would argue) it isn’t actually relevant to solipsism (although I grant contemporary literature will disagree): I know there are other subjects, because by ‘subject’ I mean a will—not the whole package deal of ‘consciousness’.

Hopefully that clarifies a bit.

Bob

Hello Banno,

Don't misunderstand: I'm offering this as a clarification, a proscription, of the use of "antirealist", by way of bypassing the "contentious and unsettled nature of the topic". I'm basically stealing the use made of it by logicians such as Kripke.

Otherwise we will be prone to an unhelpful, even tedious, diversion into the many and various "..ism"s.

Oh, I see! So you are essentially saying that moral realism should be classified as simply moral cognitvism? Is that correct?

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

This means we are already in a social relationship and already necessarily committed to a common purpose that involves truth and not falsehood

Although I agree (in the sense that I am trying to get to the truth, and I have no doubt you are too), I don’t see how it is impossible for a discussion board conversation to be, on both sides, geared towards what is false (masked as truth). We could both be, for example, just interested in debating each other and are thusly just communicating counter points to each other (and not for the sake of what we think is true pertaining to the subject at hand) for the sake of having a good debate. To clarify, I don’t find any evidence either of us are doing that, but, as far as I am understanding you, it seems as though that kind of conversation wouldn’t be able to function properly (especially on a grand scale)--but I am failing to see how it would degenerate. Fundamentally, I think this is our dispute:

In your terms, there can be no intersubjectivity that is not committed to truth

But there can most certainly be in terms of first principles. Sure, if I lie, then I think it is true that should lie (i.e., I have uncovered the truth that I think I should lie)--but the lie itself is the covering up of what was uncovered. I would agree that the bigger the society the harder it is to be oriented towards untruth, but I don’t think it is impossible (or fundamentally radioactive). For example, we could all proclaim that “thou shalt not kill” simply because we don’t want to die (and it makes most rational sense to promote that in society) while lying that it is due to an absolute decree (devoid of any personal feelings and taste): this would operate just fine in society—wouldn’t it?

This is very different from, say, establishing intersubjectively a rule for driving on one side of the road and not the other, which is necessary but arbitrary.

I like that analogy, but I don’t think it holds if you are arguing for an objective morality: if the judgments themselves are ultimately arbitrary (and are not depictions of involuntary obligations), then those judgments are subjective (or inter-subjective).

Truth, honesty, care for each other.

I agree that promoting those principles is the most rational thing to do, but I disagree that most of society has to be sincere about them.

Bob

Hello Manuel,

Thank you for the elaboration!

It's a bit tricky. It's species-dependent in so far as evidence pertaining to other animals being moral is shaky, some apes show the first glimmerings of such a capacity, but it's nowhere near the level of sophistication we show when we make moral judgments.

It seems as though ‘morality’, to you, pertains solely to biology—is that correct?

If so, then I don’t really think we should be deriving moral commandments from whatever we were biologically born to do. However, I do get that we do quite a bit of things simply because it is a part of our nature (and that is certainly a rational thing to do): but, with morality, it just makes one wonder why one ought to do something simply because it is a part of their nature? Are they simply subjectively affirming it (and thusly it originates out of taste)?

So, it's "objective" in the sense that human beings tend to agree on moral judgments, much more frequently that is otherwise stated

If I am understanding you correctly, then I would agree, but I would call this ‘inter-subjective’ and not ‘objective’ at all.

but we do not know if hypothetical alien species would necessarily have the exact same morality we have. It doesn't have the same level of objectivity physics has, for instance.

It seems as though ‘morality’, to you, is the convergence of biological empathy (or something along those lines)--is that correct?

Otherwise, I am not following why it would matter if aliens agreed with us pertaining to moral judgments, as, for me, the truthity of those judgments (if they are objective) would be separate from our or the aliens’ understanding of them.

At bottom of these judgments, there's a feeling of repulsion or wrongness that is hard to verbalize./quote]

Why is a conscience a good indicator of what is right and wrong? A human can be bread to do the ‘wrong’ thing and feel good about it, just as much as the can not do the ‘right’ thing because it would bother them to do it.

Bob

I see. Although I did not read the whole thing (admittedly), I would like to note that that is not a mathematical proof: it is formal logic; and no one can prove solipsism (nor anything in actually as a matter of fact) from pure, formal logic alone (albeit they may not be claiming that, as I didn't fully read it yet). Logic is about the form of an argument, and says nothing pertaining to the content. The whole article is too long for me to read right now, but eventually I will get around to it.

But if philosophical zombies were real then it would affect how I feel and treat people. Since they don’t have feelings or care about me then I would be colder, it would also leave me hugely depressed.

A philosophical zombie still has 'feelings' and 'cares' in the sense that you can see with your own eyes: they can express gestures of gratitude, they avoid pain, sit down and listen to your problems, they can still love you, etc.;

I think if you really reflect about what you can know (directly from experience), you will find that the warmth or frigidity of other people is a reflection of your pyschological state of mind. For example, imagine you sincerely believed that solipsism was false, wouldn't that bring some wanted warmth into experience for you? even though nothing changed about reality other than your state of mind, you would now experience a warmer kind of coexistence with other people. Now, imagine you believed it is true (or maybe that it is even indeterminate), then you lose that warmth--see how this is not a reflection of the truthity of the actual position of solipsism? It is a depiction of your state of mind. If you dive into yourself, then you can fix the issue without getting an answer to solipsism.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

It seems as though, to me, that you are a “moral realist” in the sense that you do think that there is a real conflict between social interest and self-interest—but these “interests” boil down to inter-subjectivity and subjectivity respectively (and, therefore, are not objective moral judgments).

Are you just trying to note that your attitude is that of a moral realist in the sense that there are things which must be done societally to preserve the nation, which have very minimal concern for any particular individual’s wants?

Bob

Hello Banno,

An antirealist will say that there are moral statements that are not either true nor false

I think this is incorrect: moral subjectivists are cognitivists and so are nihilists.

And not being statements, they may not have a truth value.

This is only a depiction of non-cognivitist moral anti-realist views and not moral anti-realism in its entirety. An error theorist claims that they do have truth value, but that they are all false; and, likewise, a moral subjectivist claims that they do have truth value, but it is relative to the subject at hand.

Whereas deontology and consequentialism may say that there are moral statements, and that these are either true or they are false, and thereby take a realist stance, what you might call an objective approach.

One could be a moral subjectivist, for example, and accept that stance you just explicated.

I wasn't able to follow your "fixated" and "implicit" account. It looked a bit like Anscombe's direction of fit.

Unfortunately, I am not that well versed on “direction of fit”, but from a basic reading off of google it was interesting. By “implicit” moral judgments, I mean that it is an involuntary obligation that occurs simply because a being’s nature is designed to orient in that manner, whereas an “fixated-upon” moral judgment is an obligation which one has voluntarily focused on to abide by it (and is possible for them to thusly not-focus, not-fixate upon it).

Bob

Hello Manuel,

In this example, I think so. To kill an innocent person for no reason, is not only irrational but outright evil.

I also agree that it is evil—but is ‘evil’ referring to something objective? And are we absolutely obliged to fixate upon “thou shalt not kill an innocent person” or does it bottom out at a subjective affirmation (that one ought not kill an innocent person). Ultimately, is “thou shalt not kill an innocent person” a matter of taste or is it stance-independently wrong?

I mean, it's even a bit embarrassing to spell out why killing an innocent person is evil.

In every day-to-day talk, you are absolutely right; however, philosophy accepts no presumptions and will question everything—even what we take for granted as right or wrong.

Having said that, I think it's important to realize that, at a certain point, it boils down to this is wrong (or this is good), without any further understanding of what this wrongness entails, beyond it being wrong.

So, you think the origin of morals is indeterminate?

I suspect that our understandings aren't elaborate enough to explore this topic with much more depth. If an alien species exited that had a higher overall intelligence, they would know significantly more about these topics.

I don’t think I quite understood this part: why?

Bob

I would push back and say that if they were philosophical zombies then yes that would change my experience of them.

How would it change your experience of them?

Again I'm pretty doubtful about my interpretation of the math one but I'm not versed in math to check what he's saying.

I reviewed your first, initial board post and I don’t see any linked papers making mathematical claims about solipsism: did I just miss it? What math argument are you referring to?

The vernon press one I'm not touching either, though my brain keeps obsessing over bits and lines in that text and it's really hard for me to reject the COMPULSION to open old wounds again. It's also making me think that he proved it true as well.

It sounds like to me the issue is not that it might be true, but that, for some reason, you would be tormented by the fact that it is true. Why does it bother you that it could be true?

I understand what people mean by doing the work when it comes to philosophical inquiry, but that doesn't work for everyone and definitely not for me. Not only can I not read those papers (TBH I'm surprised I managed that much from the math one) but I don't get the arguments they use. It's why I need other people to help because they get it, I'm (to be blunt) not smart enough to.

My friend, you underestimate yourself! How are you ever going to be able to hold views and ideas for yourself (as your own) if you rely on everyone else to give you theirs? Abide by what you think is true, not what other people necessarily say. Use their views to sharpen your own. I believe in you!

It's why I need their help with the papers so I can put it all behind me.

What makes me worried about this sentence is that it seems like you are thinking the solution is to prove solipsism is false (or to, at least, disprove those worrying papers you read): you must understand why it makes you upset in the case it is true and root that out, then it won’t matter anymore.

Bob

Well, I am in that boat, but only reluctantly so. I have been able to derive things from the empty set of assumptions, and as such, I might be able to derive ontological idealism

What do you mean by “empty set of assumptions”?

I think it might be possible via realizing restrictions on causality

What do you mean by “realizing restrictions on causality”? Idealism eliminates the possibility of causality: there is no physical interaction analogous to a physicalist worldview.

All knowledge is directly derived from the mental (by definition of the mental), and in order to know that we can know of the non-mental is to know that there is a completely reliable mapping between the mental and non-mental. However, any such knowledge would be mediated by the mental. How can we know of a mapping if we do not have access to both the domain and its image?

The problem I would have with this is that it is still positing a concept of “consciousness-independent” object, and simply noting we can’t be 100% sure we are understanding the physical correctly (by the logic you already explicated); but that is still fundamentally conceding that one can know of the physical as the entire conceptual model is predicated on the idea that the mental is a sensing of the physical—which places the physical still conceptually as primary. Which, in turn, to me, makes the view very anti-idealist, because idealism is, at its root, that the mind (or mental) is primary. Now I understand that is valid, in the contemporary literature, to use “epistemological idealism” to refer to the kind of argument you noted, but, to me, it is just a severely skeptical physicalist or substance dualist view because it is still conceives the world as fundamentally and primarily physical (hence the outlook that the mental is an image of the physical). In my kind of style of epistemological idealism, I do not conceptualize the world that way: I do not concede that the senses are of something independent of them. I just don’t see how one is an idealist in any sense if they are still viewing the world as fundamentally (and really ontologically I would argue) physical (or some other mind-independent thing). For example, Kant is considered an epistemological and trancsendental idealist (and to an extent I get why), but I think his view simply was incoherent with idealism in truth because he was still positing these realist notions of objects which we interpret as minds.

Bob

How about judgement and reason? Is a rational judgement, like a syllogism, reducible to sensations?

I hold that awareness, will, and reason are non-physical and aren't really objects--as all three are dependent on the will or is the will itself. What I was trying to convey was that all objects (i.e., physical stuff) is reducible to sensations themselves and there is no need to posit conceptually some kind of sensation-free object.

Bob

Hello Banno,

Realists say that all statements, even those about things we we don't believe, know, perceive or whatever, are either true or false. Antirealists say that at least some statements either do not have a truth value at all, neither true nor false, or have some third truth value that is neither true nor false.

I don’t think this is an accurate depiction of either view. To me, moral realism is the thesis that:

1. Moral judgments are cognitive (which you mentioned); and
2. They are objective.

Whereas, moral anti-realism is that there are no true objective moral judgments, and there are three main sub-categories: subjectivism (i.e., expressivism), non-cognitivism, and error theory (i.e., nihilism).

The subjective/objective discussion remains mired in imprecision, sometimes being about the difference between public and supposedly private statements, sometimes being about distinguishing the world from supposed mental states, and sometimes being about grammatical differences between first and third person accounts.

It seems to me that you might have inadvertently carried the ambiguity of the subject/object discussion into the realist/antirealist discussion.

That is fair. I think that, upon further reflection, that I failed to separate out clearly the distinction between an “objective” moral judgment and one that is absolutely obligatory: but I think that my “fixated-upon” vs. “implicit” moral judgment distinction suffices.

Bob