...philosophy... begins when we question our assumptions and givens. — 180 Proof

The above quote is how I boil down your statement to its essentials.

philosophy – reflective thinking – begins when... — 180 Proof

The above quote I understand to be synonymous with: Philosophy = reflective thinking. This can be restated as: Philosophy = deep thought.

'Topics in epistemology' (re: e.g. truth, know vs opinion, etc) comes later once philosophizing has begun in earnest and, IMO, themselves do not, cause us to philosophize. — 180 Proof

I read the syntax of the above quote as having 'Topics in epistemology' as the antecedent of themselves and thus I get: 'Topics in epistemology...' themselves do not, cause us to philosophize.

There might be a problem of contradiction because the sentence first claims topics in epistemology come later once philosophizing has begun in earnest, and then it says topics in epistemology themselves do not cause us to philosophize.

If topics in epistemology don't get underway until philosophizing has begun in earnest, and if topics in epistemology exemplify philosophizing (I think they do), then to follow that by saying topics in epistemology themselves do not cause us to philosophize appears to be contradiction.

However, this appearance of contradiction might be dispelled if you can say what precludes topics in epistemology from causing philosophizing after it has begun in earnest.

Reality is ineluctable and, therefore, discourse/cognition–invariant. — 180 Proof

The encompassing of reason that necessarily cannot itself be encompassed by reasoning, — 180 Proof

The real encompasses reason (Jaspers) and itself cannot be encompassed (Spinoza / Cantor) ... like 'the void within & by which all atoms swirl' (Epicurus). — 180 Proof

Reality is that which does not require "faith" and is the case regardless of what we believe. — 180 Proof

I read your definitions of "real" as follows:

Reality is inescapable because it subsumes the total being of sentients within its larger-than-sentience domain.

Reality is the acid test of the scope of sentient knowledge and understanding because the former is totally super-ordinate to the latter.

Reality is ontically independent of sentience. Humans, for example, cannot create themselves because self-creation would entail creation of a context for self, which is to say, self-creation would entail the concomitant of creation of reality, an impossibility given its permanent super-ordination of sentience.

Reality is totally stifling WRT to individuality of perception and WRT to self-determination of identity because there is one and one only nature of reality, and thus reasoned discussion and its understanding are confined to an absolute determinism thereof.

Philosophy, IMO, begins (again and again) wherever the question "How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real?" predominates like an itch that grows as we scratch it. — 180 Proof

As I understand it, your above statement claims the question therein seeks a way, a manner or a means of knowing our acceptances-without-proof are real.

Objectivist is one way of defining "real."

objectivism (noun) philosophy - the belief that the things of the natural world, especially moral truths, exist independently of human knowledge or perception of them.



What's your way of defining "real?"

How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real? — 180 Proof

Is it incorrect to characterize the above question as a spark igniting epistemological inquiry? — ucarr

No, ex mea sententia, no! — Agent Smith

I take you to mean (because of the double-negative) it is correct to understand:

How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real? — 180 Proof

as a question that sparks the epistemological project of philosophy.

There is, however, a caveat:

However, though the objective is knowledge (theoretical and practical, re sophia), philosophy is also the realization that the epsitemological [sic] project it has undertaken is futile, bound to fail). — Agent Smith

A general truth about the epistemological project, then, has it bound by the mathematical concept of the limit. The philosopher-as-knowledge-detective makes an ever-progressing approach to the goal of certain knowledge without arrival.

I myself adopt what I call an ad interim weltanschauung/philosophy (stick to appearances; those who promise ultimate truths are usually charlatans... — Agent Smith

Per your view, Agent Smith, philosophy vis-a-vis knowledge stays confined within the bounds of an insuperable skepticism. Moreover, your skepticism is coupled with a sardonic jeering at claims to penetrate the world of appearances with counter-intuitive insights. Like a savvy gumshoe, you regulate your beliefs with a worldview that, in parallel with a floatation device, keeps you in hover mode around promising candidates for truth claims yet non-committal.

Like @unenlightened once remarked, a brilliant observation, "I treat dreams as real until I wake up." :fire: — Agent Smith

With his clever approach to self-mockery, wittily characterizing himself as a would-be adept, @unenlightened puts the steamed milk into your latte.

"How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real?" — 180 Proof

Is it incorrect to characterize the above question as a spark igniting epistemological inquiry?

Its predomination as an itch that grows as we scratch is not an investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion?

Its expansion does not encompass both truth content of particulars and precepts about general attributes of truth?

Philosophy, IMO, begins (again and again) wherever the question "How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real?" predominates like an itch that grows as we scratch it. — 180 Proof

Philosophy occurs when a community permits discourses that question its truth and necessity.

Philosophy, IMO, begins (again and again) wherever the question "How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real?" predominates like an itch that grows as we scratch it.
— 180 Proof

:up: — Baden

So the spark of philosophy is epistemological and philosophers are knowledge detectives?

...philosophy is life.
— ucarr
Philosophy Is Comedy.
— ucarr

Divine comedy therefore. — unenlightened

:grin: Flattery comes unexpected. Thank-you for putting my name near your beautiful thought.

An equation is gibberish for those who aren't meant to utilize it's final product. And rightfully so. — Outlander

Day-old bread for the rabble.

Philosophy is like one of those small mock-up towns, complete with dummy occupants equipped with sensors, and gas station, and convenience stores, and a children's park, etc., constructed specifically to test the destructive power of atomic bombs (critical thinking). — Agent Smith

Long stretch of time with dozens of mock-ups getting vaporized until, one fateful day, the atomic hurricane knocks the latest Hooterville sideways and... it stays upright, un-vaporized. Influx of residents as real estate values skyrocket. Join the cocktail party chit-chat and you're bound to hear someone say, "Are you cotton to the latest take on being post-modern? Gender phantasia!"

I've wondered what happens to those when a philosopher loses them. Now I see where they end up. — jgill

Oh, yeah! Aspirant philosopher-in-training knuckles down with his grandfather-to-thumb-acer (all black, of course). Thinks he's gonna win! And yea! Pulls it off! Grand prize, all-expenses-paid vacation in the The Twilight Zone.

[ ... ] Without laughter there is no Dao. — Laozi

Sword of truth!

...the overarching notion that humans can arrive at ultimate truth does make me laugh... — Tom Storm

It makes everybody laugh. :rofl:

Funny how? How is philosophy funny? Like a clown? — Joshs

Aw, man! You almost got me!

Proper philosophy which concerns itself with a logical solution to a problem divested of ego is much more serious. — Philosophim

What you say is true. The big "however" is no human (like me) is logical all of the time nor entirely without ego. :rofl:

Philosophy is just a form of critical thinking — dclements

Agreed. Can we also make space for a bit of imagination?

...not a lot of people know how to do it well nowadays as we are too often forced to act without really thinking about what we are doing. — dclements

Yes. Info overload.

This is likely more true for people in the US than other places in the world. — dclements

R-O-C-K-IN-THE-U-S-A! - Faster_smarter_better; condensed books; one-minute eggs; Cliff Notes; NFL highlight reels; motel rooms by the hour; muscle cars; fast food...

https://youtu.be/9p3DzUwxI0o

Well, for me, philosophy is inherently absurdist rather than comedic (even though most philosophizers are clowns). — 180 Proof

:ok: :smile:

I didn't even get one laugh out of the Critique of Pure Reason. — Baden

:clap: :grin:

Okay. The ace is a high card that can also be used as a low card with value of 1.

Aces are not ones... — Metaphysician Undercover

In most Western card games, the numeral 1 is designated ace and marked A accordingly. In games based on the superiority of one rank over another, such as most trick-taking games, the ace counts highest, outranking even the king. In games based on numerical value, the ace normally counts 1, as in cribbage, or 11, as an option in blackjack. In games based on arranging cards into ordered series, such as rummy, it may count either high or low or even both (as in a “round-the-corner” sequence such as Q-K-A-2-3). -- Britannica.Com

In Poker, the Ace is the highest card and the 2 card (Deuce) is the lowest. However, the Ace can also be used as a low card, with the value of 1. -- wsop.com

In Poker, the value of the ace is on a switch between highest card/lowest card. Which side of the switch is chosen by agreement prior to beginning of play.

An extension of the switch can be argued when numbers on the number line are viewed as being existential. Since this perspective on numbers destabilizes value as based on position, every number on the number line is on a highest card/lowest card switch by agreement, thus making the value of a given number arbitrary and axiomatic.

I can say axiomatic because through the lens of existential numbers, it's self-evident that an infinite line of positions unranked can be ranked axiomatically by agreement.

Something akin to this is demonstrated by the motion of a material object through surrounding space. Many -- perhaps infinite -- positions are open to the positioning-by-motion of the material object because those positions are unranked by any kind of physical difference that makes one position more-or-less attainable than another.

The point, as small one, is that there is a distinction between stipulating a rule and taking it as self-evident. — Banno

Yes. What you say is true.

My word game here -- not generally valid -- contextualizes stipulating a rule under the super-ordination of an arbitrary governing rule -- aces are the highest card -- that analytically equates by decree stipulation a = self-evident truth. A parallel is when a judge decrees that the jury disregard evidence they've already heard. Under this analytical artifice, hearing evidence = not hearing evidence. The equation is false, but the governing rule compels human subjects to act as if it were true.

The above sophistry, I expect, would be upheld in any court wherein the deuce-holder might try to claim a winning hand.



This tells us that {stipulated rule ≠ self-evident rule} is not a simple inequality, but rather a negotiable inequality under the hierarchy of super-ordination-by-consensus, an actionable edict therefore legal in court.

This tells us that 2 is greater than 1 along the cardinal_ordinal axis; along the existential axis, however, all points on the number line are equal. (It's the same argument in our US Constitution: all humans are existentially equal: the most physically_mentally incapacitated habituè of intensive care exists no less than the most thoroughly endowed polymath at the prestigious university.

Now we know that the claim {2>1} is conditional and, moreover, the condition of its superiority -- in the context of our example -- is precluded by one of the rules defining the game of poker.

No, not the axiom! Being axiomatic is considered being self-evident; but it is clearly not self-evident that aces beat two's! Nor is it something that cannot be questioned - it might have been otherwise, it is not a necessary truth! — Banno

By my argument above, I can claim existential equality of one point on the number line with respect to any other point on the number line. That {2>1}, or that {1>2} are equally logically debatable claims by force of existential equality.

By my argument above, I can claim existential equality of one point on the number line with respect to any other point on the number line ⇒ {1>2} and {2>1} are moot.

From here I can proceed to the claim that it is self-evidently true that existentially equal numbers have cardinal_ordinal inter-relations that are moot with respect to size.

What you say is true. I must publicly acknowledge defeat.

I will, however, quibble as an exercise in futility in the following manner:

It's just that if you would play poker, you have to accept that aces beat two's. — Banno

This tells us the deuce-holding opponent in your example is playing Devil's Advocate for kicks, or doesn't know the game of Poker, which probably means the game couldn't've have gotten underway in the first place, which means your example, beyond the abstract, is dubious.

Alternatively, when the deuce-holder yells,"two is greater than one, a pair of twos beats a pair of aces," I yell "aces high!" Deuce-holder then yells, "numbers don't lie!" I then yell, "legal stipulations trump common sense!"

Furthermore, when a stipulation is common law by consensus and thus by a socially mandated definition, poker players, being savvy to "aces high!" by presupposition, must equate the stipulation with self-evident truth via the cognitive imperative of poker-as-defined.

I await your response to this word-salad.

P.S. I know it's pettifogging trench-fighting on my part. I think I could, in a courtroom, force a stalemate. What do you think?

... to infer a truth claim about how the world works — ucarr

For me, that's physics, not metaphysics. — 180 Proof

Can you write a flow chart showing the continuity extending from the five products of metaphysics (you listed: {categories, paradigms, criteria, methods, interpretations}) to the everyday world?

↪ucarr I don't follow any of this. — 180 Proof

Whaddya mean you don't follow? In making my explanation, I hewed to a close replication of your definition of metaphysics. I took in your definition and repeated it back to you in my own voice. This is meant to show I'm learning from what you communicated to me.

The reason I know a person uses a first-principle model (paradigm) to infer a truth claim about how the world works is because you taught the lesson to me.

Yes. I did add my two cents at the end. What's the mystery -- or incoherence -- about it? In order for a sign to point the way to wisdom, it must in itself be wise WRT to what it points toward. If you tell me you don't understand that small point, I can only say, once again, "Whaddya mean you don't follow?

Parsing precisely finely shaded distinctions of meanings between complex terms is your forté, not mine.

What is to count as proof here? In the end, you might just have to maintain that this is how we play the game... — Banno

Oh, yeah. The axiomatic, the limit of reasoned argument.

...metaphysics consists of categorical inquiries into reality... — 180 Proof

The resulting categories, paradigms, criteria, methods, interpretations constitute reflective ways of 'being in the world' (or world-making)... — 180 Proof

Proceeding from the conclusion of the above quotes, it seems reasonable to understand the five terms listed as guidelines-by-example that suggest how one might make his/her way through the world with a grasp of actionable truth that has has been modeled conceptually. After reflection upon these models, the enlightened person embarks upon principled empirical journeys through the everyday world of society.

For these reasons I say that a first principle is a signpost. Moreover, in its action of pointing towards a truth claim, signpost must embody a truth-claim-as-directive pointing towards a truth claim.

I think the first-principle truth claim is an epiphenomenon of the empirical truth claim because the former has no causal influence upon the latter.

Does this tell me that a charge can be considered fractional in a ratio with another charge but not ontically fractional in of itself? — ucarr

You still haven't defined what you mean by 'ontically fractional', so the question is unanswerable. — noAxioms

An ontically fractional electric charge is my attempt to describe an energy field that can only be accurately mathematically modeled to experimental observation by assignment of a fraction, and not by an integer.

The numbers assigned to the charges of various things are just conventions. — noAxioms

Given this convention, could someone, by convention alone, assign -1/2, -1/3, -1/4... as numbers assigned to the charges of various elementary particles?

Since a field by definition covers all of space, it would not seem to have a boundary. — noAxioms

Does it follow from this that what we call the gravitational field of the earth and the gravitational field of its moon are really one gravitational field?

I've not heard any suggestion of a 4th macroscopic spatial dimension. It only takes 3 coordinates to define any point in space, so you'd have to demonstrate that to be incorrect. — noAxioms

Does this tell me the hypercube is not a real entity, just an imaginary object of science fiction?

The holographic theory of the universe -- along with the event horizon surrounding a black hole -- adds complexity to the facts about the location of a material object in proximity to extreme gravitation.

Susskind's debate with Hawking re: the conservation of energy of material objects consumed by a black hole and the claims black holes are animate and eventually evaporate add complexity to the facts about where things are ultimately within spacetime.

metaphysical questions have no truth value. They are not true or false, they are useful or not useful. Metaphysics sets out the rules — T Clark

I burden T Clark with another question because he wrote this informative quote.

I hope others here will weigh in with responses to my following question: If metaphysics sets out the rules, and if rules can be construed as signposts pointing the way to specific truth claims, then does it follow that a signpost, like its referent, must in its role embody the same attribute it points the way towards?

Clarifying Example -- a signpost points the way towards a city wherein truth claims in arithmetic are taught to members of the public who wish to learn them. The signpost, in giving its direction to the traveler, makes no arithmetic truth claims. It does, however, embody -- or not -- the truth claim that its direction is true, thus aiding the traveler's quest to arrive at the chosen destination. In this situation, the truth claim of the signpost is an epiphenomenon of the truth claims of the arithmetic instruction it points the way toward.

To vastly oversimplify; in my view... science is applied materialism, mathematics is applied idealism. — T Clark

Let me indulge in gross simplification by characterizing materialism as quantitative and idealism as qualitative.

Are you saying science is hands-on measurement in practice (quantitative) whereas math is cerebral language in practice (qualitative)?

What entrapment? — Zettel

From your question above I surmise you reject my supposition -- elaborated above in the OP -- that 1D, 2D, 4D and all dimensional expansions not the seamless 3D expansion of our empirical experience are only mental apprehensions known solely a priori. As this supposition claims, while I have some understanding of it, I can't actually pick up and hold in my hand an authentically 1D line. Any physical line within my empirical experience may appear to my senses to be flat, but no. It actually has depth, albeit in small volume.

Universness talked about compressing a 1D line into a dimensionless point and I thought, maybe that's an example of moving a 1D object in our 3D world. Wait a minute! In order for compression to happen, even along a straight line, don't we have to assume the presence of the third dimension of depth?

..."metaphysical objects" is an oxymoron — Zettel

Firstly, your comment suggests to me you hold that metaphysical implies abstract entity known solely a priori.. My interpretation here supposes that object in this context denotes a material thing that can be seen and touched.. If it is your supposition that metaphysics has no material members in its set, then I make brief mention of a notion of mine.*

Secondly, language posits another type of object as with "I hit the ball." wherein the verb hit takes ball for its object. This type of object is conceptual, not physical. Following this line of reasoning, I can claim the members of the metaphysical set are conceptual objects of my perceiving mind.

*As we have complex numbers with one part real and one part imaginary, might we have complex objects with one part real and one part imaginary? Meta holds here according to the ordinal scheme that posits first-order, second-order, etc.

Metaphysics is to philosophy what mathematics is to theoretical physics. — Agent Smith

What do you make of the following interpretation of your above statement: math is the infrastructure of theoretical physics(?)

Here's the definition of infrastructure I'm using:

infrastructure -- noun -- the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g. buildings, roads, power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or [the] enterprise:

mere fractional parts of elementary particles — ucarr

By definition, elementary particles cannot have parts. — noAxioms

Yes. I posted mis-information that claims ontically fractional quarks. Universeness
set me straight about that. It's fractional charges attached to quarks, not fractional quarks.

fractional quarks and gluons are expanded into three spatial dimensions — ucarr

I don't know in what way you might consider a quark to be fractional (or worse, 'ontically fractional;) other than it being a part of something non-fundamental like a proton. — noAxioms

I stand corrected on this info also. I see that what you say is true.

Do the fractional charges of quarks play an essential role in the outer boundary of a quark's field excitations? — ucarr

It is meaningful to talk about fractional charge, like a helium nucleus has 2/3 the charge of a lithium nucleus. — noAxioms

Does this tell me that a charge can be considered fractional in a ratio with another charge but not ontically fractional in of itself?

...I don't know what you mean by boundaries of a field excitation. A field is arguably 4D, so the title of this topic might be about being trapped in a 4D world. I don't think an excitation has anything that can meaningfully be considered a boundary. An electron for instance might be measured anywhere with finite probability. — noAxioms

In the above block you make important observations of some curious details of elementary particle physics and the theoretical math measuring them. At bottom, I'm trying to look at the elementary particles as physically real material objects. Looking through this lens I'm assuming a field excitation of an electron is a material object with some type of boundary. I understand that energetic fields require nuanced measurements unlike the more simple measurements of what we call solid objects. Since, however, energetic fields dissipate their volume of energy over distance, as in the case of the inverse-square law describing how visible light energy dissipates as it travels through space, I've been assuming energy fields have some type of physically real boundary. Am I wrong about this?

A field is arguably 4D, so the title of this topic might be about being trapped in a 4D world. I don't think an excitation has anything that can meaningfully be considered a boundary. An electron for instance might be measured anywhere with finite probability. — noAxioms

We humans have reason to believe our world includes a fourth spatial dimension? I've heard a claim the fourth spatial dimension is perpendicular to the other three spatial dimensions. The claim goes on to say that, given this configuration, the 3D level of spatial expansion in no way closes itself off from the fourth spatial dimension. Does this openness of 3D to the fourth spatial dimension explain to some extent your statement that,

An electron for instance might be measured anywhere with finite probability. — noAxioms

I can now explain that the root of my inquiry pertains to the whereness -- I hope you can tolerate the neo-logism -- of material objects and how the perception of whereness is being modified by evolving theories.

Your statement is clarifying. Math takes us on cerebral journeys to higher dimensions. If, as I read your statement, these higher dimensions we peer at from afar might exist up there as real material objects, then my question comes into a sharper focus. What is the ontological status of these theoretical objects represented by math entities within our 3D world?

Murray Gell-Mann characterized quarks as purely mathematical entities. As I understand him, unlike you, he's not claiming his mathematical entities might describe real material objects at higher dimensions. Or is he? Quarks are supposed to be telling us real things about protons. Last time I checked, protons exist as material objects.

When he develops mathematical proofs is he discovering what pure math can do independent of material objects? If these theoretical math representations run parallel to our material universe, what is theoretical physics doing beyond playing mind games?

I'm asking whether these existentially -- right? — ucarr

I don't know what you mean by these words. — universeness

For clarity, let me extend the quote just a bit,

I'm asking whether these existentially -- right? -- fractional quarks... — ucarr

Above I'm trying to ask whether quarks are ontically fractional and, if so, how does a fractional or incomplete object express itself as a spatially dimensional entity.. This, however, is a distortion of the facts by me. After revisiting the Murray Gell-Mann story, I see that,

...in 1964, Gell-Mann and George Zweig (PhD '64) independently flew in the face of all that was known by proposing that the fundamental triplet had one member with a +2/3 charge and two members with charges of –1/3.

Gell-Mann called the members of his triplet "quarks..." Everything found in the old SU(2) symmetry group could be fashioned from +2/3 "up" quarks and –1/3 "down" quarks...

Quarks are not themselves fractional, but rather their charges are fractional. I don't suppose electric charge, an energy field, also possesses a particle configuration, so I won't be particular about asking whether electric charge has spatial expansion in three dimensions (unless you happen to know that it does).

Yes, quarks are 3D field excitations. A proton is made of 3 quarks, 2 'up' quarks and 1 down quark. Held together by gluons. There are no free quarks, all quarks are 'bound up.' — universeness

Do the fractional charges of quarks play an essential role in the outer boundary of a quark's field excitations?

Gell-Mann presented quarks as no more than an expedient accounting system, writing, "It is fun to speculate about the way quarks would behave if they were physical particles of finite mass (instead of purely mathematical entities . . . )."

Does Gell-Mann answer my question by identifying quarks as purely mathematical entities?

Well, I would ask, why you are differentiating is any sense between the 3 dimensions we 'empirically experience?' Why would 'two' spatial dimensions be abstract and another real? All three have equal 'significance of presence' and all three are experienced equally by humans (although up/down could be considered a different experience to forwards/backwards and side to side, I suppose).
I don't see how you can connect a dimension of space with the concept of an 'object'. An object can have dimensions but I don't see how it can be posited AS a dimension. Perhaps I am missing your main 'philosophical' point here. Can you exemplify further? — universeness

The above block of questions are important. They are clarifying and they address the philosophical point I'm trying to examine.

With respect to the central focus of my philosophical inquiry, the critical question is,

Why would 'two' spatial dimensions be abstract and another real? — universeness

Does the material universe have a one-dimensional realm? Does it have a two-dimensional realm? For three-dimensional humans, are these realms, if extant, inaccessible?

Your block of above questions present a picture of empirical reality a bit more complex than Gell-Mann's expedient accounting system of purely mathematical entities in that it posits two (presumably) purely mathematical dimensions as essential to the empirical experience of 3D humans.

If quarks, like you say of 1D and 2D within the human empirical experience, somehow play as essential to our empirical experience -- fractional charges included -- then do we have reason to see that Gell-Mann, by characterizing quarks as purely mathematical entities, creates some distortion of truth via simplification for the sake of clarity?

:up: Thanks for the citation. I'll check it out.

:up: You've answered my questions with useful info. Thank-you.

What about quarks and gluons, mere fractional parts of elementary particles, with fractional charges? — ucarr

What about them? What are you asking? proton's and neutrons are not fundamentals, Electrons are, as are quarks and gluons. — universeness

I'm asking whether these existentially -- right? -- fractional quarks and gluons are expanded into three spatial dimensions. Is the answer similar to your answer re: the 3D shape of the electron?

Given our apparent human entrapment within an empirical experience of 3D, does that entrapment render the first two spatial dimensions of our real world as metaphysical objects? — ucarr

You could use the very overburdened label 'metaphysical,' for such, imo, if you want to, but you invite the supernatural woo woo, associated with the term, if you do. — universeness

I'm not married to "metaphysical" as a modifier in this conversation. What do you say to the following reformulation: Given our apparent human entrapment within an empirical experience of 3D, does that entrapment render the first two spatial dimensions of our real world as abstract objects known solely a priori?

I see your OP as being generally concerned with the natural inequality of human individuals.

Touchy subject. Our constitution says all men are created equal. The gender omission of the preceding sentence is an example of how treacherous is the road to social justice.

Should beautiful people act in a way that acknowledges that... — Benj96

I subscribe to the dictum, "Know thyself!" If you exemplify what your culture regards as beautiful, you should know that about yourself and thus, behaving honestly in social situations means not parading false modesty before your friends. Given the power of physical beauty, it's hardly possible for the beautiful to be clueless about the fact, so putting on false humility is wrong. At any rate, whatever your physical package, it's good policy to couple honesty with sincerity when interacting with others.

As for rom-coms, they play a role in establishing and maintaining standards of beauty, so their influence is probably quite deep. There is evidence some humans will accept a particular standard of beauty mainly because it has been reenforced by the consensus of many people over a long period of time. Does political correctness counteract this? I'll wager that many people will pay lip service to political correctness when the stakes are low while inwardly maintaining self-serving politically incorrect standards of beauty and importance. I'm guilty of this wrong.

:smile: :up: :100:

I am myself a materialist (in the sense that I believe the material world is primary and that our subjective experiences arise directly from the physical) and have been trying to reconcile the idea of the "self", with a materialist worldview. The self, as I see it, is the "fundamental essence" of who we are; this sense of "I" we are all likely familiar with. — tom111

What we are (in the materialist view) are simply piles of carbon,... using past memories and experiences to compile a constant "self" that simply doesn't exist; a human being is empty of essence.

Upon thorough examination, the idea of a "self" is as arbitrary as the idea of a "chair", or any other object. In a purely material world, concepts like these simply don't exist. — tom111

In the first quoted paragraph, you write about subjective experience with language that assumes it is an existing (therefore real) thing.

In the second quoted paragraph, you write about "self" as an existing thing, an idea. You also write about thorough examination of "self" (through a materialist lens), concluding it's a concept that doesn't exist. This statement is complicated logically because you name a concept whose existence you subsequently deny. You also label an attribute of "self" as "essence," declaring human being lacks it. Again, in naming something you subsequently deny, you paradoxically posit its existence.

In the third quoted paragraph, you resolve the paradox of material body/immaterial "self" by denying existence of the latter.

Do you understand yourself to be a material body exclusively?

In your rejection of immaterial self, do you reject those personal memories of yourself mentioned above?

Do you understand your "self" to be a material body?

That you don't conclusively understand your "self" to be a material body is suggested to me when you write,

...our subjective experiencesarise directly from the physical) — tom111

Do you understand your "self" to be a physical epiphenomenon of your material body?

I have been trying to reconcile the idea of the "self", with a materialist worldview. — tom111

Here I see your effort to decide upon the physicality/non-physicality of the "self" unresolved.

Have you studied meta-physics? Do you have a response to it?

:up: "Excelsior!"

...the great will believe themselves to be great, for that seems to be required actually to be great. Second, the great will 'know' that they are great - not simply unjustifiably believe it - for their belief in their own greatness will be based on their having discerned it. So they have available to them evidence of their own greatness that others - most others, anyway - will not have access to. — Bartricks

The above describes some important psychological traits of the winner. Self-confidence is bid as a ground of success, even to the highest levels of human achievement. The key to the above claim is its partnering of believing and knowing. The great believe they are great, and they know they are great.

The delicate balance between believing and knowing is the key to success regarding human endeavor.

It's kind of tricky because it's true that the great knowing they're great is not entirely justifiable. For this reason, the battle between knowledge of greatness and skepticism of greatness is so crucial to outcomes.

We humans can't succeed on the basis of our human power alone. We also need a higher power. The knowing part of success is what we know based upon our exercise of reason. The believing part of success is what is based upon what we receive by utilizing trans-rationality, better known as faith.

Trans-rationality is the thing that potentially empowers all human individuals to access and express greatness. Trans-rationality employed or not employed is the only difference between the great human individuals and the undistinguished human individuals.

Trans-rationality is the unseen window in the room without windows. For this reason, paradoxes should be embraced at the same time they're excluded.

Trans-rationality, the in-betweener, when utilized, establishes a bond between the human individual and the circumambient universe and, beyond that, the super-ordinate universe. Within the Christian faith, trans-rationality, the in-betweener, stands presently known as the Holy Ghost. Trans-rationality is partly reason and partly the unknowable known.

The unknowable known is hard for us to wrap our minds around because it entails more than mind. It entails more than reason. It entails more than perception.

Is the unknowable known perceived by the third eye? Perhaps.

The upshot is that greatness i.e., a going beyond the everyday is mostly but not entirely justifiable. This I say when justifiable means logically whole and internally consistent. Existence almost makes good sense, but not completely.

Jesus, with his departure to heaven at hand, gave comfort to his believers with a description of the Holy Ghost, a power that would keep them connected to Jesus, thus giving them comfort during his absence.

Trans-rationality unlocks the door to the doorless prison cell. Reason, essential though it be, becomes a prison when access to the realm that navigates a ghostly course between natural logic and what lies beyond it, for one reason or another, gets denied.

You've gotten hold of some important ideas here in your OP. I'm much engaged by it. Very interesting and instructive.

...we do not typically do things we think we're going to fail at. Indeed, that might even by psychologically impossible. — Bartricks

Here you introduce what looks like your basic premise: we only embark on a serious mission to accomplish a goal when we think success possible.

In the case of greatness, however, the path to success is filled with difficulty so, in pursuit of establishing the truth of your premise, you introduce a big obstacle in order to tackle it.

...given that the odds that you're a great artist or great thinker are so vanishingly small, surely you are not justified in believing you're a great thinker? — Bartricks

Pressing on, you assert the graceful confidence of the seeker (after greatness). Buried here is the premise grace dissolves the insecurity that causes self-defeat.

...a great thinker will think they are a great thinker, for they will be confident that they can have great thoughts. That's step one of having any. — Bartricks

You then bolster this assertion by contrasting it with the counter-example.

...if you think you're not a great thinker then guess what - you're not. But if you think you are a great thinker then, though the odds are against it, there's a tiny possibility that you are. — Bartricks

The above is an argument for faith. It has some flavor of theism and some flavor of Norman Vincent Peale's The Power of Positive Thinking.

Next you picture the epistemological manhole through which seekers are expected to fall en route to failure. It will be your job to argue that the grace of the authentic seeker will transcend them over the gaping abyss of the manhole that swallows non-believers.

So a great artist or great thinker seems inevitably to be guilty of epistemic irresponsibility, at least when it comes to their own abilities. — Bartricks

I do not believe the great are guilty of an epistemic vice, however. I think the great 'know' that they are great, rather than unjustifiably believe it. And I think this is the case despite the fact others will think they are not great and that the great thinker or artist will probably be aware that most people do not share their own assessment of their own abilities. — Bartricks

Above you state your mission: to show authentic seekers, through faith in themselves based on natural grace, escape the clutches of epistemic vice by "knowing" their greatness, believing in it and pursuing it to its natural conclusion: expression that brings new light to the masses of people.

First, if you believe something to be true that everyone else believes to be false - and that everyone else is justified in believing to be false, too - are you epistemically irresponsible for believing it? — Bartricks

Here's the main obstacle that you need to overcome: rationally justified belief, in this case, rationally justified belief that a seeker is not great.

Next you follow with a clincher argument borrowed from an unknown source.

Here's an example (not mine - don't know whose it is, but it isn't mine). Imagine your plane has crashed into the ocean and you have washed up on an unknown island. You know that rescue missions will have been launched to find you and your plane. And as you have now been on the island for months, you know by now that everyone else will now believe you are dead. Furthermore, it is clear that others are perfectly justified in believing this. Indeed, it'd be epistemically irresponsible of them not to believe it. Your plane crashed into the ocean and there's been no evidence of your survival for months - it is beyond a reasonable doubt that you're dead.

But you're not. And you know you're not. It'd be quite absurd, would it not, for you to conclude that you might actually be dead on the grounds that everyone else believes - and believes justifiably - that you're dead? — Bartricks

So, you know you're alive, even though everyone else is justified in believing you're dead (and you know this too). You're in no way being epistemically irresponsible in believing yourself to be alive. — Bartricks

...you have access to some evidence of your continued existence here that others do not possess. You are having your experiences. And so you can reliably infer your continued existence from those. But others can't, as they're not having them. — Bartricks

But this applies to the great artist and great thinker. Everyone else thinks the great thinker is not a great thinker. And they're probably justified in thinking this. They've considered what the great thinker thinks, and to the best of their judgement, it seems to them that the thoughts the great thinker is having are not that great at all - indeed, a lot of them don't really make much sense to them. So, in light of that, they are justified in believing the great thinker to be something else - a mediocre thinker or even a bad thinker. And the great thinker will be aware of this; aware that others think they're not a great thinker, and aware that they're probably justified in that assessment.

But the great thinker or artist has access to some evidence that others do not have access to. They are discerning, correctly, their own greatness. Others do not have access to this evidence, or at least most don't, for you'd need to be great or somewhere close to have such powers of discernment. But great people do have such powers, for it is by exercising [greatness of discernment] that they produce great art and great thoughts. And thus the great thinker and the great artist are not being epistemically irresponsible in believing themselves to be great. — Bartricks

I conclude, then, that great people 'know' that they are great and will typically know it a long time before anyone else does. — Bartricks

In the next-to-last paragraph above, you put what I've called some flavor of "faith" and "the power of positive thinking" onto a rational foundation by asserting authentic seekers possess not only great and original thoughts but also great judgment in identifying the greatness of those thoughts.