But given many people spend a lot of time living emotionally and aesthetically, it is easy to see how god might be of use to them. — Tom Storm

Definitely. So I ought tone down my assertion that science says they're all false -- the sciences which have true things to say about religion are sociology and psychology.

What do you think of the uses of logic? — Tom Storm

I like to use logic when I feel the need for something clear and explicit. Sometimes, even in philosophy of religion, that's necessary to do.

I don't think anyone believes religious things due to the arguments, though. Like you said, and I think it's a good analogy, religious beliefs are more like a sexual orientation than an attitude towards a particular proposition "God exists" or "Jesus is God"; we have less choice over it than is often presumed by rationalist discussions on religion.

I'm all for rationalism, but I think the philosophy of religion is a good place to begin showing its limits. Not-pejorative -- I hold poetry in the highest regard, and so I hold religion. Religion, and its texts, expresses something deep about human beings.

Even though I'm an atheist I believe that Mystics have visited God, for instance.

True, but I think there's a difference between God and the perfect unicorn, because some people have religious experiences (mystics, for example) while no one has had a religious experience involving unicorns, perfect as they may otherwise be. Not to my knowledge, at least. — Arcane Sandwich

Religious practice develops its own kind of knowledge is what I tend to think. The logic within can be important, but oftentimes it's not.

But, as a philosophy nerd, I like to clarify things and see where they go -- and where they don't go -- so I am pro-logic, even if it's often misused.

Hence, "scientific justification" of that sort has some pretty severe limits. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yup!

I feel the need to say that one of the distinctions I keep coming back to is the difference between science and history, even at the academic level, for a basis of judging knowledge (and noticing it's hard to unify it all in some kind of conceptual structure)

People do make arguments based on the natural sciences for the existence of God though, teleological arguments, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Also yup!

Still... seems odd to infer from God's existence that God is such and such, yes?

EDIT: Also goes to show my skepticism credentials -- I don't question God on the basis of Science, I question Inferences about God on the Basis of a Skepticism of Science as the Truth of a Propaedeutic of Metaphysics. lol

Capital letters to make fun of myself for how many distinctions I feel the need to make.

Though it occurs to me -- if anyone who is lukewarm on participation because they want more guidelines then please say something.

We can come up with more guidelines together if that's necessary for participation.

I don't think that's true.

Though the meaning would not be the same kind of meaning.

I care about these arguments because of my history, so they have a meaning -- it's just not the same as those on a spiritual ascent.

And there's nothing wrong with a spiritual ascent, in my worldview. It's only different from what I'm doing.

I don't want people to worry about the rules too, too much. I'm mostly hoping to hear from many contributors who are stretching their creative sides and trying out something new, insofar that they are enjoying themselves.

One of the reasons I thought this a fun activity is I like to read other people's thoughts, no matter what they are thinking.

Less cryptically -- I believe that the Atheist and the Christian and the Muslim and the other various persuasions can believe in the Big Bang (even if that theory may be false), and believe it means something in a different way.

Heh, fair. I gave an irreverent example of influence -- there are influences which helped people through intellectual difficulties which we don't have to contend with, even.

I have a deep respect for the history of thought. I don't mean to be dismissive of that history, religious or not.

Just... I suppose Kant has influenced me enough, while I don't agree with him (being a materialist, and a realist -- if skeptic), I think he has a point.

Yet that wasn't always the case. As Hegel suggests, in The Phenomenology of Spirit, the history of philosophy is like the maturing of a plant. We wouldn't say that the fruit refutes the flower, or that the flower refutes the seed. I believe the same can be said about science. In its contemporary version, it's the end product of a history in which its roots were deeply interwoven with matters of theology, whether we like it or not. It is what it is, as you oosians like to say. — Arcane Sandwich

:)

It wasn't always the case, and our ideas have come from these influences. Newton stayed up late doing math to prevent himself from masturbating when he was horny -- it likely helped him in his career.

Still... determining if God exists by modern science can't be done, either way. I like to say that this is a positive thing -- in a way Kant's philosophy is attractive because people can be of any religious persuasion and still believe the same things about the world we experience, and independently believe whatever makes them fulfilled in a moral sense.

The metaphysics of Liberalism :D

I think he has a point with respect to science, though.

By "the science" I do not mean the broad definition -- which even carries over into my favorites like Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx -- but whatever the modern beast that is science says.

If I investigate textbooks which academic departments use to teach science -- there is absolutely nothing in there about Jesus or God.

Which paper ought I reference in proving the identity of God? :D

Got it.

At least in terms of the ontological argument it seems to me that "God" says very, very little. God exists because God is perfect, and to exist is more perfect than to not exist.

Or any rendition. Godel, I'm given to understand, formulated a valid form of the argument so the logical side isn't the issue, in my opinion.

It feels to me that when someone says that they are saying an analytic truth, rather than a synthetic truth -- which gets at a way in which this is very different from Quine. I can understand the argument, but I don't have any reason to believe that "God" is a part of reality -- that God exists.

"Empty" goes too far because of, what I would call, the poetic dimensions of religion. The meaning that's there, though false, is more meaningful than many true propositions.

It's just not rational in terms of scientific justification -- there's not a science which can evaluate which religious concept of god is superior because, by the science, they're all false, and mostly useless. So the science doesn't have much to say on the issue. (which is what Kant's "theoretical knowledge" is based upon)

Nah. I'll just deny that. God, as a concept, is not like the empty set. — Arcane Sandwich

Cool.

What about the claim that "the concept of God is empty"?

I think ↪Moliere was correct the first time. — Leontiskos

(Beyond that, I wouldn't count the formalizations of the OP as arguments, given that their premises are neither intuitive nor defended.) — Leontiskos

In terms of the formalization I can see what @Arcane Sandwich is saying. For any set of sentences P and Q --



So we cannot simultaneously believe that both of these are not the case due to contradiction upon formalization:

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

"Existence is not a predicate" is the slogan; it ought be qualified if being serious, though, else we can say things like "We use "...exists" in the predicate position all the time without error -- what do you mean?"

I don't believe either sentence, but that's different from taking the conjunct of two propositions in the formal sense.

So there's some confusion here between epistemology, logic, ontology, and all that philosophical stuff which is hard to ascertain ;)

And I think such would not be included in the word count Moliere but in-text would? — Amity

I wouldn't count it.

Three atheists walk into a bar.

I'm more tempted to say that God, as a concept, is empty than inconsistent -- it's like the empty set. There's just not much to talk about until we have some kind of religion to talk about with a history and all that. Else it's "The one property I know God has is perfection, so he exists" :D

Is the notion of Jesus inconsistent?

I believe that the concept of existence is important not only in the context of philosophy of religion, but also in the context of science. As Bunge says: — Arcane Sandwich

I agree! And with Bunge -- I prefer to go back to Kant for my real reasons because that's who persuaded me of the slogan, but it's also anachronistic and subject to open interpretation.

"Existence" is an old hard nutshell I've thought about a lot, and I think investigations into the arguments for/against God are great to study the predicate. And I think in the logic Anselm was using it's fair to say that his argument is valid.

Exactly. That's the "problem" (if it can be called a problem) with classic Christian arguments for the existence of God, such as the ones provided by Anselm and Aquinas. They never say that God is Jesus, they only say that God exists. — Arcane Sandwich

I think this is sort of what Kant has in mind, though he goes further and denies we can know such things. JTB wise I'd shorten to -- "God exists" may be T, and we may B, but there is no J for believing "God exists" with respect to theoretical (scientific) knowledge.

To respond to the argument here --

Using the existence predicate defined a while ago, we may reformulate Anselm’s argument as follows.

God is perfect ______________________ Pg
Everything perfect exists in R [really]_____∀x(Px → ERx)
God exists in R.______________________ ERg — Bunge (2012: 175)

I'd deny P2 on the basis of the problem of evil in countering it logically, but to be fair, I just didn't believe God existed and don't find the ontological argument persuasive. First time I came across the ontological argument that was pretty much my thought: "Well, I can see how the sentences follow, but I certainly don't believe in the conclusion."

I'm afraid not, you'd have to spell it out for me, if you fancy. — Arcane Sandwich

I'm always willing to try.

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.
(FTI2) God exists.
(FTI3) So, God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus.
(ATI2) God does not exist.
(ATI3) So, God is not identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, he could. For example, according to Muslims, God exists, and God is not Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

And Let's add in any third religion:

(FTButDifferent1) If God exists, then God is not identical to Jesus.
(FTBD2) God exists
(FTBD3) Therefore, God is not identical to Jesus.

It's a different argument from the atheist. Furthermore we can plug in any God here -- there's a lot to choose from in picking out God's identity. But God existing just says that without saying what God is.

Further, unlike saying something like "John Doe exists", there is no way to adjudicate between any of the above arguments. There is absolutely no difference in the external world whether God does or does not exist, which is normally how we'd go about making a decision as to which premise -- God exists or God does not exist -- to accept.

But we accept that up front while forming premise 1 such that premise 2 will lead us to believe that God is what we already believe him to be based upon whether or not we believe he exists or does not exist.

So, in isolation, sure -- but in terms of how people go about deciding these things I don't see a reason to accept that there is a relationship between God's -- or any objects -- existence and what they are identical to. The non-existence God is identical to the non-existent God, and the existent God is identical to the existent God, but the link between God and Jesus or any other name won't say much about its existence.

I believe that predicates are linguistic, while properties are ontological. The latter exist out there, in the external world, in the things themselves, independently of human beings. Existence is one such property, in my view. — Arcane Sandwich

I'm kind of uncertain about properties just as I'm uncertain about objects, but that'll take us pretty far astray :D -- a lot of my skepticism is based in wondering how we can reliably make inferences with respect to metaphysics, and generally wondering how it is we can really ascertain what metaphysics is preferable in the face of many smart and educated people asserting contradictory opinions on the subject.

We can set up an idiom such that "existence is a property of the external world, in the things themselves, independently of human beings", and I can follow along in this use of the word "existence" -- but that doesn't tell me how I go about ascertain what exists, and it seems to me that I could prove basically anything to exist if I accept something like an identity statement for inferring that such and such exists.

Such as your two arguments -- it's just kind of funny to make an inference between existence and identity. I'd be inclined to go the reverse -- if Jesus is God, then God exists. So God could exist without Jesus being God, rather than asserting existence in order to demonstrate identity. Imagine how the argument would go over with the Muslim, yeah? "If God exists, then Muhammed is the prophet, and Jesus is a prophet. God exists, therefore..."

Do you see how that's funny?

I follow Bunge in conceptualizing existence as a real property. The table in my living room has the property of existence. When I say that it exists, what I mean is that it has that property. As such, it's not a predicate. We instead symbolize it as a predicate, in particular with the first-order predicate letter "E". If the context is second-order or higher-order logic, we still use the "E" symbol, but as a predicate constant. Others disagree. Quine, for example, believes that we should symbolize it with a quantifier instead, "∃". I take it that Quine is wrong and that Bunge is right about this. However, I also believe that Bunge is wrong to distinguish two kinds of existence: real and conceptual. In my view, there's only real existence. Should the words "God" and "Jesus" be treated like Russellian definite descriptions? Or Kripkean rigid designators? Those are open questions. — Arcane Sandwich

I'd probably fall closest to Quine in that I can see a parallel between using the quantifier and treating existence like it's not some property added to a conceptual.

But in following Kant there's not an easy distinction between predicates and properties. So some of my influence influences me to be less precise just because it's what makes sense to me, but could definitely use work.

I'm wondering if a believer probably uses "God" and "Jesus" as Kripkean rigid designators, and a non-believer would use them as Russellian definite descriptions? It seems so, to me -- I see religious texts very much in the same vein as I see poetry. Their value isn't in their truth or falsity; they are likely all of them false, but in terms of religion that's not that significant -- people aren't persuaded into a religious position on the basis of its rational position. I think it's something that can be treated rationally, of course, but I don't think that the rational arguments are what are persuasive on the topic.

Not averse, but I wouldn't infer things between John Doe's existence and who John Doe is -- it's not something I'd infer because of some logical relationship between "John Doe exists" and "John Doe is James Calvin", as a statement of identity.

The hobbit talking to Gandalf is Bilbo Baggins. He does not exist, though.

A conditional statement of the form "if p, then q" is equivalent to a disjunctive statement of the form "not p, or q". Here's the proof. With that in mind, premise FTI1 is equivalent to the following:

(FTI1*) Either God does not exist, or God is identical to Jesus.

And premise ATI1 is equivalent to the following:

(ATI1*) Either God exists, or God is not identical to Jesus.

Conditional statements ("implications") are not causal statements. They do not state that there's a cause-effect relation between the antecedent and the consequent. Perhaps that's the source of your perplexity here. It's a common mistake. — Arcane Sandwich

O I flip around the values all the time because I don't usually bother to use the symbology unless I'm doing mathematics.

What I did before was represent it incorrectly in the checker. I checked "(P->Q) and (~P->~Q)", rather than "(~(P->Q) and (~(~P->~Q)) in my first reply so didn't see that it was a contradiction.

(EDIT: Funny to note, though -- you can believe both FTI1 and ATI1 at the same time, due to the funny thing that is the material conditional -- maybe an agnostic Christian?)

Maybe. Can you elaborate a bit more on that point? Doesn't matter if what you say isn't accurate. Just freestyle it and see what happens.

I do get the feeling that you want to treat this case in a similar way to how Russell treats the case of the current king of France. Is that so? Or am I way off here? — Arcane Sandwich

My thinking on existence is largely influenced by Kant. So sentences of the sort "God exists" do not have conditions of justification even if they have a truth-value, so I wouldn't bother believing "God exists", or its negation, on rational grounds. The old "existence is not a predicate" is something that rings basically true to me -- logic does not prove existence, existence exists regardless of a choice of logic -- and the thought experiment between the imagined unicorn and the imagined unicorn existing demonstrates to me that there's not really a property added to something I'm thinking about. I need some other kind of justification to infer that something exists.

Nope. These statements can only be false if their antecedent is true while their consequent is false. In this case, the antecedent in FTI1 is "God exists", and the antecedent in ATI1 is "God does not exist". By the principle of Non-Contradiction and the principle of Excluded Middle, they can't both be false. — Arcane Sandwich

Mkay, I agree. The conjunct of FTI1 and ATI1 yields a contradiction, but...

Perhaps. — Arcane Sandwich

If so then I'd have to find some way to deny both mostly because I don't think the implication itself holds. Since existence does not relate to identity, and implication is a relationship between propositions, I'm thinking that what's false is the implication itself.

At the very least I'm not tempted to say that Jesus is not God because God does not exist. I can set up the implicature, but it's not why I think these things -- and I don't believe either FTI1 or ATI1.

So how does one represent that? Is it impossible?

Conversely, it's not possible to reject both arguments at the same time. If you reject one of them, then that means that you accept the other one (again, unless you embrace paraconsistent logic, or some other logic in which contradictions are true). — Arcane Sandwich

Something about that doesn't seem right to me -- couldn't we reject both arguments on the basis that

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

Could both be false?

What God is identical to isn't the same thing as whether or not God exists, even treating it as a first-order predicate. So we could deny the implication as true in either case, saying that the existential predicate has no relation to the identity relationship. (or, perhaps, that the existential predicate is actually quantification, and the identity of something is different from quantification)

I'd be more inclined to say that "In the Christian Religion God is identical to Jesus", or something along those lines, so as to avoid mixing up description or identity with existence.

Thanks :)

I know I explore odd things, but I hope to maintain the notion that there's a reason -- even if only philosophical -- I pursue them.

It's not that interesting when you figure out the game is "say the weirdest thing you possibly can get away with"

Yeah, but I don't see a real motivation to saying something crazy just to say it.

I gotta know that it's true first. So I keep coming back to these various odd beliefs.

If you're asking if there could be a fourth position, "only extraordinary objects, none of the ordinary ones", then I would say two things:

1) Yes, it's logically possible to defend such a view.
2) No one actually defends such a view.

Why not? Because you would be saying that there are fouts, but no dogs or trouts. There are incars, but no cars. There are snowdiscalls, but no snowballs.

It would be the most insane position of all, even crazier than permissivism, and that's saying a lot. — Arcane Sandwich

Heh, cool. Then I don't think I'm going down that path, and have more to learn.

Then you have two options: eliminativism or permissivism. — Arcane Sandwich

What about "not-ordinary, and conservative"?

Some objects are real. Check. Some objects are not-real. Check.

Or "Names are weird" -- I think they really are weird and not understood.

"The ordinary objects" for a medieval baker, or the CEO of a Chinese business in 2017?

Seems like "Some of them" is the easy way out?

"Some" in a logical sense, at least. "Ordinary" seems sus

Which objects we talking about here?

;)

I have more to learn.

My thinking was that the medium-independence of meaning is weird, from a metaphysical perspective, whether we accept that meaning is real or not-real. It's unexpected from the perspective of an ontology of objects, at least if we believe there is a difference between speaking and writing.

I'd much prefer to save discussions on reality for after discussions on how we think about reality. There are currently a handful of traditions in philosophy which allow us to do that.

One thing I take seriously is that if we can, in fact, have thoughts sans-metaphysics then it must be due to language. Or something along those lines. We can communicate about whether or not Daniel Dennett was conscious and understand that perfectly, but in scenarios where we start to question the meaning of meaning -- and all the baggage that comes with self-reference -- I at least don't know how to tell y'all (not including me) that what I'm saying means nothing other than to demonstrate a contradiction**.

And, at least usually, we don't think of objects like that.

**EDIT: And to turn the confusion up to 11 -- even then, sometimes contradictions are meaningful. "Meaning is a mystery" makes lots of sense to me.

I can stop anytime I want!

:up: I'll keep it in mind.

Meaning is not found, it's made. Or better, drop meaning and reference altogether and talk instead about use. — Banno

Yeah, but I want to talk about meaning and reference :D

O shit.

It's more explosive than I had imagined, then.

Relating this back to Quine, it reminds me of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato%27s_beard

***

I'm tempted to say this is along the lines of Wittgenstein's PI 1 that I linked earlier -- that just because you have something to say that it must indicate or refer to something seems wrong to me.

Kinda weird, though, right?

Isn't it as weird as accepting that the vinyl scratches record meaning?

Shorter: it's better to have fouts and trouts, instead of not having either. — Arcane Sandwich

I prefer "names are weird"

:D

There is a tremendous multiplicity and diversity, and I'd add that a lot of it is quite observable. Every dog is different, and every person—each snowflake as well as each fingerprint. My copy of the Metaphysics has different dog ears than my professors, different coffee stains, different places where the ink didn't quite come off the press correctly. And the same person or dog is also different from moment to moment, year to year, sometimes dramatically so. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I like this description of multiplicity. That's what it feels like when I think about every fact, rather than every relevant fact.

So I was thinking we'd all want to adopt the tripartite diagram -- not as a rule, just as a distinction in trying to understand the beast that is reference. — Moliere

Though going back over a bit ...

as the dotted line an the bottom makes sure to emphasise that relation between signifyer and signified is an imputed one. — Dawnstorm

That I agree with. It's imputed. There needs to be a speaker and an interpreter for meaning to be/happen/whatever.

Yes. Thanks. I mean, that's the plot I'm seeing so far -- I was thinking that agreeing with the tripartite diagram furthered the "multiple ways" by making us able to talk about both object-reference and language-reference.

So I was thinking we'd all want to adopt the tripartite diagram -- not as a rule, just as a distinction in trying to understand the beast that is reference.