I don't know what such discussions tend to do or how they end. I get the impression that Moliere has lost interest. Perhaps, for him, his questions have been answered adequately... — Amity

Heh, I'm enjoying reading along. I'm contemplating, now, how to make the material dimensional aspect of a critique of gender more explicit. And I feel like the conversation has elevated at this point so I'm taking longer to think it through.

I don't think so. Entropy is too rarified a concept to include in what I'd call what we face on the day-to-day. It's too complicated, and for specific purposes.

Even in terms of things falling apart -- entropy drives structures as much as their dissolution. But what we face daily? If it is a structure it's at least not obvious that it maps to entropy. In a sense I can interpret what I face entropically, but it's just one way of looking at what I face.

In terms of chemistry I know the difference, though if pressed I always have to look up what enthalpy means.

Enthalpy is one of those terms that highlights how much science is built for humans rather than is a universal concept. We wanted to know how much energy was not because of a change in temperature when measuring the temperature of chemical reactions so we invented a term called enthalpy to distinguish between heat and work in a chemical system which allowed us to put "heat" in a similar category to "friction" -- that other force/work that allows us to make the balance sheet work out.

Funnily enough humans invented the topic before modern theories of chemical bonding. It's very much an artifact of classical thermodynamics. And so your interpretation of it will depend upon how you interpret the various "levels" of science and how much historical terms are merely influential vs. are actually true. (EDIT: Also, funnily enough, by "modern theories of chemical bonding" I really only mean ones influenced by the quantum revolution. Soooo ya'know -- at least 100 years old)

But maybe this is all off-topic, because you're asking after ethical implications, of which I'd say there are none.

Oh I don't mind the category Feminist, insofar that I get to express what I mean. And in philosophical discussion the norms are such that you can clarify yourself, so in philosophical discussion Feminist fits the bill.

But in real life most people who aren't familiar with feminism think that a man calling themselves a feminist is trying to get sex -- most people interpret the expression as a kind of virtue signal for partners rather than a serious political or philosophical commitment with a whole body of thought behind it. And all I really mean are the books and ideas and politics, so it's just easier to not call myself a Feminist and stay at the level of books and ideas and politics.

Though there's something about Feminist thought that brings what was traditionally thought to be a personal affair into the open, into the public: Family relations, and in particular, patrilineal property inheritance and control over that property while living, and how that relates to one's identity. So I can't stay at the level of books and ideas -- I have to engage in politics, which necessarily means I am involved, rather than it just being some ideas.

So it'll come out eventually. I don't mind that, insofar that I get to say what I mean, though. I certainly am inspired by the Feminist writers! At the very least I think it makes sense to pay homage to them.

OK, I got the idea, but I want to know why and how they are philosophically important. If all he did was paraphrase Heidegger in even more obscure language, why would I bother to read him instead of Heidegger, since the latter would afford the same insights with less effort on my part? — Janus

Here's where my in-between-ness will be a handicap more than a help. I started on Derrida a long time ago before I was really able to comprehend him, and I still struggle. I wanted to understand what the fuss was all about given these two impressions of Derrida I had. At this point I think I've read enough to be able to say that I'm persuaded he's got a good philosophical point, but I don't feel enough confidence to say "And you should bother to read him too", because I'm still a bit shaky on some of the concepts. He's a pretty hard philosopher in the same way Nietzsche is hard because they don't come right out and say their point. Even Heidegger, in his circuitous way, was clearer than both.

Further, I know with certainty there's others who are better at Heidegger than I. I have a reading on B&T, but that's about it.

So it could very well be that Heidegger says the exact same thing in a different way, but I'm just picking up some of the bits from Derrida and some of the bits from Heidegger.

On the whole Heidegger's political orientation at least makes me interested in a re-expression of his philosophical ideas. I think there's something there, but I also think that Heidegger's romanticism is the bad kind of romanticism. Derrida, while playful, doesn't seem dressed up in the romantic gestures of Heidegger towards a forgotten past where only a God can save us from ourselves as much as he's looking towards a future. But that's just a seeming on my part, and not what you're asking after.

I understand the difference between vorhandenheit und zuhandenheit, and I think that is a valuable phenomenological insight, but it is also an example of categorization. — Janus

True -- but it's a category meant to disrupt the old categories of being-as-presence, as if presence is the whole of metaphysics. This act of revealing/creating categories which our present categories are reliant upon is the similar connection I see between the two thinkers. For Heidegger the question of being, and for Derrida the same -- only Derrida continues this move to other categories within other texts because he believes that Heidegger trips across something which he, as a lecturer on the history of philosophy for his day job, sees occuring throughout texts within the canon. Rather than a phenomenological reflection, though, he turns this into a reflection upon texts to attempt to demonstrate this pattern of the super-transcendental, in a way -- categories without name. And since there's this idea going on that categories don't capture being, but rather set it out in a certain way, and since we only have categorization to utilize within philosophy to set this out, this is the reason for the difficulty in the writing of Derrida -- he's trying to say what normally cannot be said and becomes yet another part of the super-transcendental.

At least that's where my thoughts go about. As I said in my opening I'm not at the level of saying "And this is why you should read him", only at the level of being persuaded there's something worth studying there.

Although I should point out that my understanding is that the former is a reflective presence, while the latter is not so much an absence as it is a transparence. The hammer becomes "invisible" when I use it, but it is there nonetheless. This is also foreshadowed by the ideas of the conscious and the unconscious, or the explicit and the implicit. I am not consciously or explicitly aware of the hammer as I use it, but its presence in my hand is unconscious and implicit.

Now, I can talk about these ideas in plain language, but I cannot think of any of Derrida's ideas that I could do the same with, unless they come to seem trivial. Differance, the idea that words only have their meaning in terms of other words which leads to the indefinite deference of meaning is, I think, either trivially true or just plain wrong. Logocentrism was foreshadowed by Klages, and the irony is that there is no philosopher more logocentric (or logorrheic) than Derrida. Are there any other of Derrida's ideas that can be explained in plain language, while remaining insighful and not becoming trivial? This is a genuine question since I have never penetrated far into the Derrida landscape, and so cannot claim to know that there could not be anything there that I've missed.

I think that question a step too high for me. I'd have to read more to make the point definitive. I can justify my interest, but I'm not so certain I can justify everyone else's interest. There's a lot of philosophy out there, after all, and only one life to live.

I'll take a plain language stab at it @Janus

Derrida is saying, at a minimum, that "tone, language, posture, gesture," are philosophically important -- else he wouldn't have written what he wrote, since Heidegger already wrote it.

But also that provides a clue into reading his philosophy: start with Heidegger, and then try and read what's different.

On the surface, at least, they both seem to share a certain suspicion of categorization. The present-at-hand and presence perform similar roles in that they have a non-visual complement -- the ready-to-hand and absence, which are meant to show how our phenomenology and language rely upon not just the metaphysics of presence, but this other unexamined side as well.

The tone, though! What a difference! Heidegger the joyless and serious spiritual questor for a Truth long forgotten, vs. the joyful and playful linguist. And in a way this makes sense with the above because tone, language, posture, and gesture are the absent components of writing in looking at language from the perspective of the metaphysics of presence.

:up:

Only the disgusting ones, especially when they are naked — Merkwurdichliebe

Probably unsurprising, but I'm going to say that all bodies are not disgusting. Bodies are an abstraction from the concrete perception of another individual. In the present you see a form, and that's all you can say theoretically. Your disgust is only yours, and not a society-wide disgust. I can honestly say I don't care (EDIT: in terms of disgust -- obviously I have sexual desires) about seeing naked bodies in the least regardless of their form.

The only condition I can think of in which some bodies are disgusting is that if I desire all bodies to be attractive to me, sexual or otherwise. But that's clearly a groundless desire, given how our notions of aesthetics are different from one another.

I think that's a great scene. Given Woody Allen: I think he was expressing his own anxiety about sexual contact but then putting it out there out large because he knew this would speak to people's emotions. He took a risk, and it paid off because we still remember this scene -- some for their masculinity, and some because they relate to Meg Ryan.

It hits several points of conflict for our own sexual lives, which is why it's interesting.What if I'm not man enough to even do the basic function of supplying orgasms to my partner, when I get orgasms? It doesn't seem that fair, at least if fairness is something you care about. And given the manly interest in protecting and providing, it's an anxiety.

All this is relevant to the Masculinity thread because Universeness and I are engaging in typical masculine rhetorical maneuvers. — BC

I had that thought too -- which is why I didn't say anything. I recognized "yup that's actually better than all of my theory -- here is a masculinity"

Well now what are we going to argue about?! :D

Good chat! I think I thought to the end of my thread.

Oh yeah. I like analytic philosophy, but I'm basically team continental, if I'm forced to choose.

The search for reality seems to me to be sublimated search for god. — Tom Storm

Also, often true! In philosophy it's more explicit, even. The god of the philosophers, even if philosophy is only a type of literature, is a prominent figure in the literature.

Are you saying we can encounter small "r" reality, but nothing which transcends this, hence language is anti-realism? — Tom Storm

I'm stretching so I'm not sure what I'm saying, exactly. But yup! I'd add that if we're consistent then language, in all its forms, is nothing but ooks/eeks -- meaning isn't real, but our ooks/eeks which enable us to do human things are.

More imaginative wonderings that should be taken with salt:

I think the response from the realist side would be "what is "ultimate" doing in your sentence?"

Is the adjective that important? If we can talk about reality, then the realist is right. Maybe with some modifications down the line to acknowledge things like our cognitive apparatus -- but even a pragmatic contingent reality is at least real.

But on the other side I'd say that this is to miss the point. The Cartesian Demon scenario isn't even being considered, but rather asking after, upon accepting realism, what is the relationships between the sign and meaning? Then finding that the relationship is itself meaningful, and hence, on the other side of reality. So language is anti-real. (though reality is, by definition, real -- of course)

Ah! OK. Got it.

Maybe the thought is -- where does it stop? On which side? The realist or the anti-realist?

True.

Are you asking after what the point of philosophy is, given practical problems?

I'm mostly interested in what a realist theory of language might be. — Tom Storm

I don't know Lawson, but I also don't mind taking a stab at odd questions. Take my imaginative wonderings for what you will.

At the very least I gather that a realist theory of language somehow incorporates language into what is real. But language is a fascination for philosophers because it's the topic where maps and territories are contested. It's fairly easy to admit that in spite of the possibility of the Cartesian Demon in a logical sense you certainly don't believe in it and what you see is what you get. (sight being an important metaphor for the history of European-derived philosophy) -- but we relate our language, which is in the world under the realist notion, to the world. How is it possible to use something in the world to represent that world and at the same time refer to reality? Why can I pick up a few stones and arrange them in a tray to calculate something about the world? Is our understanding of the stone movements, and our bodies, a part of the world? But then how do we access the world?

The other side might acknowledge the illusion of language standing apart from the world we live in, but note that it has to be a part of that same world because they are, after all, related somehow. So the anti-realist will ask: How is all this meaning possible, then? How can we have a finite set of symbols which can produce an infinite set of meanings? What is this real relation between symbol and meaning?

I think we're in agreement here then. :)

There are advantages to writing -- and just like the fruit from the tree of knowledge between Good and Evil, there's no going back anyways, so it's a groundless desire to become-animal, in the imagined innocence we perceive sense.

Just a few quirks about it that, if I'm correct, have philosophical ramifications.

Then we agree, I think. Clothes enable the disgust by creating a taboo around nudity. And, this is counter-effective in desensitizating people to the regular sight of a disgusting naked body. I would argue that such desensitization towards such a shameful thing as a disgusting fatbody is neither good nor healthy for society. — Merkwurdichliebe

Afterall some things, like poop, or disgusting fatbodies, have much further reaching ramifications in society than blue cheese. — Merkwurdichliebe

Do fatbodies have societal-wide ramifications?

I'm a good ol' fatbody. I don't mind being naked, but some others mind it if I am. But, really, I didn't care anymore when I was a young-body, either. Shaming people for the body they have is not only unkind, it's unnecessary.

What does your disgust of fatbodies do for you?

Nah, I didn't think you were. I think you're voicing your actual thoughts. That's a good thing, especially for men I think, because men rarely talk about their own masculinity. You're just supposed to know somehow.

I wouldn't put this up in such a public place if I weren't willing to engage with people who might have questions or reflections or want to voice what they actually feel.

Of course I behave in ways that might be described as typical for a women. I show affection in action and words. I try to look after the emotional well-being of people I'm around. I work toward consensus. I'm empathetic. I can be passive when it's appropriate. — T Clark

For myself I don't think gender is our behavior as much -- that's pretty close to a trait, though a step removed.

Rather it's part of our identity, and a usually important part, which modifies how we behave. It's not the acts or the traits of a person, but how they act or how they express various traits.

So persons who are -/- can behave in ways typical of the other three genders, but they'd do so in their own way.

I have never had any problem treating all sorts of people with respect. — T Clark

I agree. :)

I wouldn't bother talking if I thought you desired to treat people with disrespect.

Yup! Personal reflections are welcome, insofar that you're willing to share publicly.

A tactic I'm familiar with:

"In saying your identity fits with +/+ you're saying you don't know what it is to be a real man. So the entire conversation, from the opening to now, is negated by saying you're not quite a man, but this something else."

A penis is not enough, a masculine body is not enough -- what we need is for you to cut your hair, to stop talking about certain things, to stop expressing desires that are unmanly, and generally just be normal in public so that we don't have to deal with all that. You're a man! Be it! And if you're not just say you are then do the man things! Men don't care what they feel inside, they just do what is needed. So do it, son!

My thought is -- fuck you pay me.

It's easier to say that when you have a job and a place, though. And for the most part I prefer to get along, so it's just hard to say anyways. Just seemed important.

As I noted in a previous post, I don't identify myself as a man in opposition to anything. That would make me +/... I think people think that's impossible, as if the dialectic represents reality rather than human-manufactured mental process. — T Clark

"Negation" as in "does not express" rather than "is in opposition to" -- so if you do not express femininity, then "-" would be applicable in accord with the theory.

But it is just a theory. I think it's too simple for gender.

No. Telling me what you're not is work. Telling me nothing is the low-effort path. I won't bring it up if you won't. — T Clark

This would make sense if gender were simply a set of sentences or beliefs, but it's kind of wrapped up in one's whole identity, their way of presenting themselves to others and interacting. So "telling" doesn't have to be with words -- it can be done with mannerisms, dress, tone, and even unconscious actions. And that's only looking at behavior.

Telling you what I'm not, in most conversations, is an explanation that you're not treating me as I am. It's work to tell you, but it's even more work to pretend I'm something I'm not.

1 the weight of assuring us humans that we are superior in some moral sense to other animals (as shown by the fact that "animal" is used as a term of abuse in some contexts) and that the reason people sometimes feel that other animals are superior is because of their "innocence" (cf. children), which is ambiguous praise

2 the weight of justifying our dominance over other animals in the sense of justifying our abuse of them or at least our practices of treating them as means to our ends.

We don't think very much, do we, about the various ways that various animals are superior to humans? We think they are not important. That's telling. Like me feeling superior to you because of X, while failing to acknowledge that you are superior to me because of Y.

So I'm uneasy about this game we have got into. — Ludwig V

You're right to point both of these things out. I hope to avoid both. We share uneasiness about both justifications/beliefs/thoughts.

My problem is that I don't understand what the significance is of the differences and similarities between humans and other animals. — Ludwig V

I think there's something of a romanticization going on, but it's not a bad one. The human notices how other animals, though they fear they do not worry as we do. The significance is therapeutic rather than in search of a justification. Rather than moral superiority the idea is that human beings are inferior in some way to how other animals live. The other animals seem to get by without worrying about their non-existence, for instance. The ability to verbalize is posited as a kind of fruit of the tree of Knowledge between Good and Evil -- we reach for verbalization naturally and find that it has a cost associated (but we'd surely reach again), namely, anxiety about things that are not only not-present, but can't be present.

At least so the story goes. Empirically I wouldn't be surprised if there are some other species which have similar odd-problems with their emotional life due to various capacities of the mind shaped by evolution. I just wanted to note what seems significant in making the distinctions here.

Don't think of money as value, think of it as a symbol - a claim - on resources. We don't value the empty promise to "pay the bearer"; we value the promise of being able to obtain the things we want and need. — Ludwig V

I agree! As Marx said -- money is a claim on future labor. In a sense there's reciprocity between animals, so a kind of economy where production is concerned, but I don't think that ability to tabulate as we do -- and its consequences of absurd power over others -- would be possible without writing in the small sense.

In a way it's a problem of having too much information to wade through, rather than relying upon a social instinct of reciprocity, and getting lost.

For me a critique of masculinity coupled with an acceptance of my own femininity is enough -- so androgenous man. I picked the term up from a book on gender which theorizes gender as an affirmation or a negation of either the masculine or the feminine -- so there are four genders in the theory, where +/+ is androgeny, +/- is masculinity, -/+ is femininity, and -/- is undifferentiated.

All four genders are a legitimate identity. (also, it's just one way to theorize gender to point out that the binary isn't complicated enough to really describe the phenomena of gender). It's not work to be oneself -- but if one is, say, +/+, and only respected when expressing as a +/-, then the work is in figuring out what the others respond like and only showing them what they like to see.

The person who declares they're not something has probably been treated like they are something -- so it's a correction under the assumption that others will care. When you find out that others don't care then, given the transactional nature of this relationship, why on earth would anyone declare otherwise? What benefit is there in telling you what you want to hear, or to lie about themself? That's work.

What confuses me is not that some people are not attached to their gender identities, but that it is important enough to them that they must reject those identities publicly at significant social cost to themselves and others. — T Clark

Can one cease to be themselves in public?

Can we just put our identities away for propriety?

Well, we can if we're being punished at least. But I don't think for long. Living up to a public image to be pleasing to others for no benefit other than the comfort of others who don't recognize your identity isn't exactly high on the priority list for most people. Seems like a whole lot of work just to feel alienated, in the long run. What it teaches is that the acceptance of others is conditional -- in which case the relationship is transactional and so it makes sense to ask, at some point "What am I getting out of this?"

Either way, whether I choose to conform for others or not, the opinions of others aren't about me but rather about how I function in their world("Be a man!" as "Do as I say!"). Which, to me, just sounds like work. And no one's paying me to make them comfortable with my identity, yet, though if the offer were right then I might accept it ;)

What about economy? Things like private/public property distinctions?

I can't find enough in law -- but counting sea-shells that aren't even collected but "printed" by governments and forcing people out of their homes because they can't give enough fake sea-shells -- how does that sit in your judgment? (EDIT: not ethically -- I think I know the answer -- I just mean with respect to animal/human distinctions and finding something we do that could only be done with writing, in the small sense)

Yup! That's exactly what I'm talking about.

But I'm still *just* attached enough to my male-side that I prefer to say androgenous man. I, too, am attached to things no one cares about and will do it anyway without explanation because you wouldn't understand anyways and fuck it I'm a man. ;)

But I'm also ooey gooey, at times, and really don't mind sharing that side of me, and anymore prefer the predictable to the chaotic. I call it practical

So it just seems to kind of fit.

Yes -- but I've been acknowledging biology while saying it's the one with lesser influence on identity. Testosterone, I think, actually is an important factor in how men are, but things get complicated -- and it's just what I think, rather than a scientific belief. We don't walk around the world with testosterone concentration kits or estrogen concentration kits. This is the language of causes and science as opposed to the language of identity and intent.

A pop-biology isn't an insult as much as it's an acknowledgement of how we get by in these conversations. While I do biochemistry, it has nothing to do with the biochemistry of gender identity -- but my biochemistry background is what makes me suspicious of claiming that we're biologically this or that way. Especially if we're just referencing the genome, which is incredibly small in comparison to the proteome which arises from the genome (which is where I'd at least *predict* hormone differences to be predictable... but I don't know). The cutting-edge stuff in medicine is all about being able to simultaneously tailor medicines to an individuals genome because it's acknowledged that what's actually happening in the proteome is dependent upon the actual sequence you're working with rather than a generalized description of the chromosomes.

Philosophy, even in a world run by scientific fact alone, is still relevant because we, as people, will never be able to make decisions with respect to scientific fact. It just takes too long to figure out. So it's worth noting that this is a pop-biology, at least to say that we're not really doing science here.

From what I understand you identify as a male. Transitioned from boyhood to manhood. — Amity

Yes. Though my preference is to say "adulthood", in truth. I'm a man, but I can tell that my own mode of expression differs from a lot of people who are men. Might have something to do with my theory, eh? ;)

Else, I'm not a man. But that's somehow more confusing to me. That fits even less! So -- androgenous man is the gender identity I've come to prefer, but I'm not settled on the wording. I'm surprised to find others don't feel like me -- but isn't that all part of the path of self-discovery?

You focus on social traits (rather than physical, mental or psychological factors) related to being a woman or a man. Why?

Because if you compare cultures then men and women behave differently in those cultures than they do in other cultures -- suggesting that the social make-up is what accounts for variation among societies. If we expected the genetic factors, at least, you'd predict a lot more uniformity of roles across cultures than we observe. At least so my thinking goes. So I infer that the social has more influence than the biological from that, as well as because there are many people who break the expected traits to think that genetics is highly determinative of behavior.

What do you mean by 'social traits'? — Amity

The role which a person is to fulfill.

Do you mean the forming of personality or character/istics including the emotions, whether or not they are masculine/feminine?

Nope.

The emotions are deeper than these identities, I think. Or perhaps a better phrasing is that at childhood we have undifferentiated emotions which we can relate to one another, but through development we attain differentiation as well.

The Kate Millet tripartite division is Biology:Mentality:Role, and she turns this on its head in saying that role is primary, and the mentality is grafted onto biological traits in order to make an excuse for said role. So within patriarchy the reason women (biology) fit into the role of caregiver is because the mentality that arises from the biology is one that nurtures, and the reason men are the breadwinners is because their biological makeup influences their psyche to prefer the roles of risk-taking that men are associated with.

You think that the difference between the feminine/masculine (or men and women) is less relevant than the transition from boyhood>manhood (or girlhood>womanhood) when it comes to understanding 'Masculinity'.
Have I understood you correctly? I don't think it is that simple.

Complexities arise when you consider that males (young and adult) can have a heady mix of masculinities and femininities along a spectrum of human characteristics/traits.

This becomes even more complicated in the case of Gender Dysphoria.
For example, transitioning from male to female during puberty. Growing from boyhood to womanhood.
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/gender-dysphoria/
and treatment (psychological and medical):
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/gender-dysphoria/treatment/
Puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones. Side-effects.
In general, people wanting masculinisation usually take testosterone and people after feminisation usually take oestrogen.
— NHS
Then, surgery. — Amity

I hope not to oversimplify. If anything the issue of gender identity is not simple.

However I think that these complexities arise at exactly the time my notion would predict -- if it's the transition from childhood to adulthood which is the defining time, then puberty is the time when differences between gender identities (for whatever causal reason) would become more prominent.
While I'm astride the gender dichotomy, I am cisgendered, so I don't want to speculate too much on the psychology here. It's complicated, but I think the heady mixture is only in the minds of those who don't understand -- if anyone is certain of their gender identity, it's the trans person willing to undergo social scrutiny just to be who they are.

What do you mean by 'except when it gets ugly'? — Amity

I'm thinking of toxic masculinities here which are built around resentment of female power over a man -- real or imagined. Hence, ugly.

Regardless of whose lives are relatively better, we're all worse off. Men are not better off by being marketed a masculine ideology from a young age. The whole society is sick and we all suffer from it. — Baden

Yup.

The realities of class overrun our educated chatter about sex, gender, men (masculinity), and women (femininity). Educated, professional workers are just not in the same boat as blue-collar / gray collar workers. I've been both. The latter is definitely more pleasant than the latter. — BC

I think bringing class into the mix only heightens the notion of patriarchy, rather than downplaying it. The reason it's convenient to say that women do woman occupations and men do men occupations due to their nature is that it provides justification for the pay-gap -- they all purportedly had a choice in what they were to become (as if families don't pressure children to fit roles, or schools, or workplaces) and freely chose the professions where men are paid more and women are paid less, on whole.

The professions that need unions are often female dominated, by the numbers. Working class politics works hand in hand with feminism rather than being in opposition.

This caught my attention. I’m conscious of the effort to not explain ‘maleness’ in opposition to the notion of ‘female’, and I recognise this is a personal reflection, but it’s difficult not to consider answers such as these without asking ‘as opposed to…?’ Especially when reading it as a woman. — Possibility

I agree that these questions come up, and that asking "as opposed to...?" is a good avenue -- and I'm offering childhood as opposed to feminity as the contrast-class. So that. . .

Aggression, for instance, is traditionally considered a masculine trait - yet young women these days, freed from learned expectations of passivity as ‘feminine’, are often (not always) more openly aggressive than their mothers and grandmothers were. They no longer need to appear ‘ladylike’.

...is a perfectly acceptable form of femininity. Appearing ladylike isn't the feminine, but being an adult is. And isn't it the truth that women find ways to express their aggression when they aren't allowed?

So I suggest that it's a mode of expression rather than a trait which makes the difference (and, further, it's both pscyho-social, so the topic is naturally vague, making these conversations difficul for more than just because people are attached to them, but also because they aren't clear)

Protection to the vulnerable, too, without these learned expectations, is increasingly recognised as a human trait, rather than a particularly masculine one. As a woman, it isn’t that I have no intention to protect the vulnerable, only that in many (but by no means all) situations I recognise a lack of physical or political capacity to individually eliminate a threat. That I have and make use of other means to protect the vulnerable rarely registers as action on my part, or is dismissed as ‘underhanded’ or ‘manipulative’ because it lacks this physically or politically overt individual action. I gather the support of relationships, adjust the circumstances, lend my capacity to others…

The ‘maleness’ described here appears to prioritise individual agency and attributable action - a sense of identity and ownership found in isolating one’s self from the world as the subject. Competitiveness and conflict over collaboration - my life, my decisions, my honour, my family, my desire, as opposed to others and their (dis)agreement, vulnerability, etc.

When we use this kind of language, the frustration as a woman is that it isn’t as important for me to be recognised as the subject behind every event as it is for the event to occur. I, too, want protection for the vulnerable, I want less conflict, I want change, I want reliable and intimate relationships, and I’m willing to do what I can to achieve this - but this ‘maleness’ seems more about consolidating identity through attributable action than intentionality.

I think that's the sort of thing I want to highlight as being a very partial part of masculinity -- the part of the masculine identity that's close to the imagination of one's self and what one expects from oneself. The man, in his imagination, wants to be the provider of values to the world (what a lucky world it is!) such that even he isn't dependent but rather allows others to depend upon him. The man in his imagination can subdue even the world itself to his will. But the man in his reality shares a lot with women, even if the story gets told a certain way to make him happy.

or step back to critique the settings of social system that is seeking to over-simplify us. — apokrisis

Exactly! :D That's the spirit of this thread, or at least what I aimed for in my opening.

Maybe under the modern label of libertarian socialism there is "total equality" ... — 180 Proof

Well, naturally, that's where this all leads for me. :D

So let's get off the idea that men and women are just the same but for a few anatomical differences, and that it makes sense to respect some amount of gender behavior is in fact caused by basic genetics, — Hanover

I agree with your first sentence, but I disagree with your last one. The cause is social I think, primarily, though I'm not a priori refusing genetic causal influence. Attributing social causes doesn't mean that it's not-real, or somehow lesser. Also I'll note that the language of causes differs from the language of intent, and with respect to how we self-identify or understand the identity of others then the language of intent is also important.

If we were talking genetics, though, we'd be referencing papers about such. But the truth is that we don't have enough knowledge about our biological makeup to construct something as complicated as an identity. That's kind of the mind/body problem in a nutshell.

So, given that scientific knowledge is incomplete, I propose that we "get by" through accepted social forms which can be understood by looking at their respective histories. But histories don't boil down into scientific fact very well -- they contain too much of the emotive aspect of living to do that. Which means that this genetics is, in fact, a pop-biology that's not looking at the wide range of expressions which are possible.

For instance -- I think that focusing on what a man's occupation does, that's the part that our culture generally takes for granted as being an important part of one's masculinity. But why should our occupations even be attached to our gender? I think that's because of our cultural notions of real manhood being tied to being breadwinners from the traditional roles of man/woman within a nuclear family household.

I don't usually do hot takes but here's one: it's about risk. I doubt it's entirely a social construction, but if I suggested that male mammals are more, shall we say, disposable, that would be a just-so story. Vaguely the right place to start though, to find the material social construction has to work with.

The roles men are expected to take on -- with the usual caveats here -- that neither women nor children are, are risky. Men go to war, not just because of their aptitude for violence, but also because there is considerable risk.

The Pony Express used to run this ad: "Wanted. Young, skinny, wiry fellows. Not over 18. Must be expert riders. Willing to risk death daily. Orphans preferred." As a group essential but individually disposable.

I won't multiply examples, but I'll add that it might make sense for a society to arrange itself partly in terms of risk. There have generally been dangerous things that need doing, so you probably don't want everyone doing them. Obviously today we have women soldiers, fire fighters, and so on, and we have child soldiers too. Yay. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this gets at why men are easy to coax into risky roles -- and also gets along with my notion that men are deeply passionate, rather than emotionless. I think men are deeply passionate about all kinds of things which others don't particularly care for, which is why men don't bother to share what they are passionate about -- the silence is preferable because others won't understand why I take this risk or push that boundary anyways. Something about men makes it easier to have them be attached to this aspect of life. In fact I'd say it's the deeply felt emotions of men that are their most attractive aspect.

Of course my thought is that the cause for men's masculinity is more social, but that's a causal description rather than a description of manliness and why men are masculine in their various capacities. Your answer is exactly what I'm looking for -- at the very least to let things sit beside one another.

Also why I didn't want to seem like I was emasculating. I think that masculinity is a sensitive topic, and it's good to let the views live together even if they contradict.

Why would you say that you are not interested in being/becoming a 'real man' in the sense of growth you describe? — Amity

Asking this is sort of like asking me why I'm not interested in being or becoming something I'm not. I grew up into something but I don't think it fits with "real men", whatever that is. If I happen to fit the social traits of "real man" then that's not reason to keep my expressions the same, and if I happen to not fit the social traits of "real man" then that's no reason to change myself or feel shame about myself or who I am.

Interestingly, given the prior expressions of apathy towards turning masculinity into words this fits with notions of masculinity and real manliness put forward.

But this kind of goes to what I'm trying to do with the distinction between boyhood/manhood and feminine/masculine -- our adult selves are differentiated from our childhood selves more than they are differentiated from the other gender. We look for differences between men and women because that's part of the gender game is to find differences to confirm that we're different but complementary to one another. But in coming to understand masculinity I'm suggesting that the coming-to-age story is more relevant than the game of gender differences.

If that's so then it's actually a non sequiter to bring up that women can be tough, for instance. Of course they can! That's because masculinity and feminity don't have to be defined by one another -- they can co-exist with the same traits and acknowledge that the difference is more of how we express than who we are. It's partly a social dance, but then the social dance becomes a part of who we are too so things get confusing.

So, yes, I'm good with being an adult. But whatever my notion of adulthood is this idea of real manhood doesn't really do it for me.

Perhaps a more probative inquiry:
What are the functions, or duties, normatively expected of men at (this) historical moment and by (this) culture / in (this) society? And what does such an expectation 'to be a man' mean to (for) each concretely situated person?
A socio-psychological topic, however, rather than philosophical aporia, no? — 180 Proof

Somewhere in-between, I think -- "in the wild" there's a difference between what we say and what we do with respect to gender roles and gender identity, which is what makes room for philosophical reflection to have a place. At the very least to demonstrate that the topic isn't clear cut, that it "needs further research" and what a real man is isn't so clear-cut if what we mean is some singular definition of masculinity. It's too dependent upon social context.

Thus emasculating you respondents. — Banno

I hope not!

I have a mate who owns a property near Wangaratta, drives a John Deere all day, keeps his cigs tucked in the shoulder of his singlet, and always has a half-smile on his face. He saw the title of the book "Real men don't eat quiche", and murmured quietly "Real men eat whatever they fuckin' want."

:D

Perfect.

There are certain characteristics I have that I am confident about - that are part of how I think about myself, my identity. These include that I am my three children's father, I am intelligent, I write well, I am a Clark, I think like an engineer, I see the world in ways that not many other people do, I am loyal, and I am a man. My maleness manifests as intellectual aggressiveness; an ability to deal with conflict in an honorable way; competitiveness; a strong drive to make and take responsibility for decisions that affect my life sometimes without waiting for other's agreement; a desire to protect my family, friends, and people who are more vulnerable than I am; and a desire for emotional and sexual intimacy with women. That's what being a man means to me. — T Clark

Wonderful reflection. Thank you for sharing. Responsibility, action, loyalty, aggression, providing protection to the vulnerable, and sexual attraction to women are perfect explications of a masculinity.

If I'm reading you correctly you're making a hard distinction between the biological and the social in how you treat the two nouns -- a man is biologically defined, and masculinity is defined in this more psychological, spiritual, ontological, or social sense.

Heh. Maybe he is :D -- I identify as an androgenous man, though my presentation is very masculine. Once upon a time I cared about living up to the expectations, but I've let go of that now. I think it's a masculine trait to be able to claim whatever one does is manly -- or maybe a better way to say that is that the expression is a masculine expression, though other genders can certainly feel stubborn in that similar way.

Ask a reductionist question and you get a reductionist answer. Masculinity gets defined as being the kind of matter which possess a certain collection of properties or essences.

So a problem is created right at the start. We have to identify a set of characteristics that are then arguably just accidents and which lack any contextual justification.

This is not a good way to proceed. — apokrisis

Great response apokrisis. Much to think through and on.

Hopefully the general reflection addressed some of this. I'm still bundling, I'm just not bundling characteristics, essences, or properties.

As a holist, I would ask what does masculinity seek to oppose itself to? What does it dichotomously "other".

Of course, that would be the feminine. Well perhaps. We might start down this road and start to think that the masculine~feminine dichotomy isn't that massively useful after all. It kind of gets at something, but lacks strong explanatory value.

Logic demands we get down to useful dichotomies – polarised limits that capture a critical axis of difference. And the truth of biology is that male and female involves considerable overlap. The truth of culture is that humans are remarkably plastic.

How are we telling the truth of the world when we allow dialectical argument to drive us to opposing extremes that are mostly about just putting small tilts one way or the other under a giant magnifying lens? — apokrisis

I think there are masculinities which pit themselves against the feminine, absolutely. It's a darker masculinity, in that it can feed into misogyny, but feminist theory has pointed out that misogyny comes from hating that women have the power to emasculate or masculate, that their worth as men is in the hands of women who get to say whether or not they are real men -- an obviously toxic identity, but one which does occur.

There's masculinities which are softer than that ugly look, though, which still puts a hard distinction. I think I'd say my upbringing and @Hanover's exposition is along these lines.

I agree with you that the truth of biology is that male and female involve overlap, and that human beings are remarkably plastic. It's part of the difficulty in trying to put the notion to words: there's something there, but it's not crisp. (as if biology was crisp... no. It's just even more fuzzy than biology)

So sure, we could give an accurate answer about maleness as biological identity and masculinity as cultural trope. We can put the small statistical differences under a spotlight. That is an interesting game, especially when you are a masculine male wanting an easy check list to confirm what you suspect.

But philosophically, we have to start by realising how the current gender wars are a cultural symptom more than a metaphysical question. — apokrisis

Oh yes. We're in agreement there. I put this in ethics for that very reason -- it's more a reflection on norms than a question of knowledge or ontology.

I still believe that gender identity is a real thing, though -- in spite of the culture wars. It took me a minute to get there, because I like all the second wave feminist stuff which is more about gender abolition and I like my Marxism which is impersonal rather than personal. Again, a line I've said in my general reflection, just too many people care about their gender identity and express it in various ways to dismiss it, even if it's not ontological. Maybe not quite ethical, but certainly close to value-theoretic thinking.

The right of politics has turned its aggression and frustration outwards on migrants and liberalism because the political realm is simply stalled when it comes to addressing humanity's real problems of climate change, food insecurity, etc. And likewise the left has followed its own inbuilt dialectical tendency by turning its frustrated rage inwards on the question of identity within the social collective.

One others to construct the outsider. The other others to deconstruct the legitimacy of leaving anyone out. The right promotes over-exclusion. The left promotes over-inclusion. And for both it is the only political game left to them as real world control has been taken off the table.

To join in with a reductionist analysis is not going to help solve anything. Male~female is already a marginal kind of dialectical difference, not worthy of cashing out in the language of substance ontology – what is the "right stuff" in terms of a set of metaphysical-strength properties.

What we should be more worried about is how left~right became such a politically neutered debate in terms of actual economic and institutional power, even as it became such a fevered debate in terms of gender politics and other superficial identity issues.

Personal identity counts for shit in the world of real politik. Because real politik has now institutionalised the impersonal flows of capital and entropy. — apokrisis

The one thing that keeps me in favor of exploring these is that I think social organisms only change because "regular" people come together to force them to -- the people who purportedly the whole organization is about. Because of that we're taught various things which dissuade people from engaging their governments.

I see the issue of gender identity coming to light because of the efforts of regular, marginalized people kept speaking up about their problems. And the whole social-movement approach to understanding the change of social organisms is pretty much my orientation.

The real politik is what the nationalists practice. And it has real effects, so it's worth paying attention to. But so do social movements, and they are likewise worth paying attention to.

As always, I'm threading needles between competing thoughts. I don't want to dismiss the realpolitik, but I think that personal identity has more influence on the real politik given how regular people speaking up have become a prominent topic by doing nothing but talking about their identities and what they need. (feminism counts here, too -- not just the recent trans stuff)



I think that's a good expression of a masculine self-image from the perspective of a man. It's the thing men often like to look up to and act towards in the sense of fully Being the Man I should be. Thanks for sharing.

Where's your thoughts now?

What differences are magnified? Who does this and for what purpose? For whose benefit? — Amity

Here I'm riffing from @Hanover's thread but into a separate topic to see what the differences are between the thread on defining "Woman" and a thread on masculinity. Different emphasis because of our respective beliefs, but I thought it'd be interesting to explore this notion given my various commitments.

So -- it's for my benefit. Naturally. :D

I agree with this line of questioning:

"As opposed to what?" — Amity

However, I think the patterns point out that there is an oppositional notion -- the boy who couldn't become man. For many masculinities the oppositional point, to speak to @apokrisis's point, isn't feminity as much as boyhood. To journey to manhood is itself a story, and the question of what a real man is is a way of differentiating one's childhood, immature, or adolescent self from one's responsible, grown-up, and mature self.

It's a Bildungsroman more than an opposition to the other sex, except when it gets ugly.

I haven't been around, so have missed this. Also, I haven't read much about philosophy and gender issues, so thanks for this thought-provoking thread. More interested now as I begin to appreciate the political implications — Amity

Cool :). I call myself a feminist because I've read the feminist works and agree with them. (I don't call myself a feminist because most people have ideas about what a man calling themself a feminist is, and it doesn't correspond to why I like feminism)

How many still think in absolute terms of masculinity/femininity?
Talking about being a 'real' woman or man...the extremes. Is that where we want to go, to be? — Amity

Worldwide? Many.

If you ask what the differences are, given its cultural dimension, you'll find contradictory accounts.

But I don't think the simple demand to abolish gender roles works because it's too central for too many people. At least, so it seems.

What do men do? They build, they toil, they manipulate their environment, they brave the elements, and they protect. The vehicle that got you to work was likely designed by a man, built by a man, driven on a road laid down by a man. The building you walked into was likely designed and built by a man, the sink you used, the toilet you flushed, all built and maintained by a man. The HVAC, the elevator, the electrical system, all installed by a man with dirt on his hands and his name on his shirt. The desk you sit in front of, also built by a man. And most, real men I propose, do this less so because of the great rewards that might or might not follow, but it's because what real men do.

This is meant as a celebration of the man. The celebration of the woman is just as real, but looks much different. Their hand rocks the cradle and therefore rules the world.

Such outdated thinking I know. But I also know that someone here reads this and says "Thank God there are still people who say this." I wrote this for you. — Hanover

I accept your panegyric to manhood. Obviously I'm more on the other side, but it accords with much of my upbringing, and my commitment to masculinities makes room for this kind of masculine identity.

Ask a woman. Ask Science Fiction. Don't ask the dicks round here, they'll start talking about their genitals and how they can lay bricks with them. — unenlightened

:rofl:

That's a wonderful image of the masculine imagination. :D

A "female man" is a woman with a man's mind, her body and soul still female.[2] Joanna's metaphorical transformation refers to her decision to seek equality by rejecting women's dependence on men and mirrors the journeys made by the other three protagonists.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Female_Man

Or if you prefer your critique less angry, The Left Hand of Darkness.

On Gethen, the permanently male Genly Ai is an oddity, and is seen as a "pervert" by the natives; according to reviewers, this is Le Guin's way of gently critiquing masculinity.
— wiki — unenlightened

More books on the list, now. I agree with you that asking a woman or science fiction is a great method, if one is ready for the truth.

:D

OK, funny -- I laughed. There's too much interplay between the sexes, and cross-support (especially in a family structure) to define men by their occupation. The men may build things, but they don't do everything (there are women at the worksite who are just as capable), and they rely upon the network of women in the more traditional set-up.

One thing I'd note, though, is that you're equating men and women in terms of ability -- which I agree with -- but you're not setting out what it means to be a man, unlike @Hanover. We may disagree on masculinity, but he answered the question. Do you have an answer?

The strictly biological answer could be about how a man is an adult human with XY chromosomes, and that is easy enough. But the more one thinks about it 'being a man' is an abstraction... it's a personal identity, a social identity, and the biological answer is only the starting point, not the end point. So, there is no definitive or all encompassing answer for what masculinity is. If I tried to take a stab at it, I'd say masculinity is a set of behaviors biological males tend to exhibit and society expects men to have, both good and bad. Since men often exhibit these behaviors and also are expected to, it forms a closed circle of selective reinforcement. — GRWelsh

I'm hesitant to accept "behaviors" for the reasons I've already mentioned. What men exhibit, yes -- but I'm more inclined to parse masculinity in terms of social or psychological terms rather than behaviors.

That's a perfect example of toxic masculinity. Force your son to become a real man by getting them killed in a senseless war!

I definitely don't think there's a point to providing a strict set of requirements. However I'd say that gender identity, and especially masculine gender identity, isn't oft discussed and it's worthwhile to explore.

Are not the "masculine" attributes of e. g. aggressiveness and competition generally privileged in contemporary societies? Isn't social success primarily presented as being about dominance / status / material gain rather than e. g. caring / protectiveness / cooperation etc? — Baden

Yup!

Most of us know particular men and women who are not typical of men and women - in general. Take 1 million women and 1 million men and there will be significant differences. — BC

Oh, sure. "significant" being determined by the measurer, but I don't deny difference. It's a plastic difference, in light of @apokrisis's comments, but a difference that seems to persist in our perceptions at least.

But the topic isn't difference, unless masculinity is defined by the feminine. I don't think it is. I think men have various attachments, expectations, feelings, and modes of expression.

I think evolutionary explanations are useful from time to time. But to think they are THE explanation is to fall for the myth of origins (Derrida? or someone else?). We are equipped with ears, and their evolutionary usefulness is the best explanation (short of an account of the evolutionary process) that I can think of. But what we make of them is a different matter. — Ludwig V

Cool. I think we're pretty close in our understandings then.

It took me a long time to even acknowledge evolutionary forces on the human psyche because of how awful evolutionary psychology is. Or, at least, what I encountered of it. But simultaneously I didn't believe we were created by God as a distinct ontological category, so that's the needle I thread in thinking through.

It wasn't that I want to tear us away from our evolutionary heritage as much as I'm suspicious of Bad Faith, in Sartre's sense -- I do such and such because evolution being a perfect example of Bad Faith. (in the language of causes it may be true, but in the language of intent it's a way to defer responsibility)

Yes. I once read "Origin of Species" all the way through. The biggest takeaway for me is that he spent vast amounts of time arguing that species are not hard and fast; he argues it every which way he can think of. It is the foundation of evolutionary theory. What's more (as Darwin points out) we mostly know it already. Evolution takes our practice of selective breeding and pushes it through centuries and millennia. — Ludwig V

I'm impressed! I've only done selections, though I always feel that's a failing. I learned about evolution in the text book way rather than the proper, historical way.(well, proper to me)I was persuaded by the information provided, though. Due to my background I didn't know the theory of evolution when I went to college, and being an inquisitive sort I'd ask questions after class to make sense of it all.

But yup! "Natural selection" was a metaphor for what we've been doing for a long time, but then noting how nature can act in a similar fashion over a long period of time.

I don't know enough about them. Bees and ants seem to have rigid practices which do not need enforcing. Mammals are more complicated and do seem to need to enforce the rules - which are made and enforced by the alpha dog/lion/chimp. Are they sufficiently like laws to count? I'm not sure whether it is important to give a definite answer. Perhaps noting the similarities and differences is enough. — Ludwig V

Fair. To really answer the question we'd have to do more research. One thing I'd push against is bees and ants, though -- they have rigid practices, but since they do not need enforcing then that's not an example of law. Laws are made to punish people who break them. And, in a more general sense, we frequently prioritize our social life over our basic needs life. People wouldn't go through hazing rituals, among other things, unless they cared about what their fellow homo sapiens would say or think about them -- it's not their immediate needs that matters, it's how the other members babble that is prioritized.

And you're right to point out that social hierarchies are established by other species. That's similar to law, but not quite the same I think because we can dig up old laws, re-interpret them, and people will prioritize that re-interpretation for whatever reason (sometimes material, sometimes spiritual). That dance among the ideals which turns a homo sapien against its own happiness -- well, it seems like a strange thing in the animal world to me.

Still: noting the similarities and differences is probably enough.

This has been quite a range of responses! I'm going to start with a general reflection.

One is that I think the lack of really caring about one's masculinity is itself a masculine trait. Who are you to tell me what kind of man I am? I can get by on my own without your approval -- like a man. This isn't intended as a criticsm of the mindset. As I said in the opening, I'm aware of the patterns. This is a common one I come across, though not universal. Which gets to something which is probably important to acknowledge and I should have started out with it -- there isn't so much a masculinity as there are masculinities.

I don't think that undermines the phenomena, though.

Another is that in my experience of masculinity I'd say that men tend to be deeply passionate. The notion that men are without emotions or somehow less emotional than women is false. It's the mode of expression which is different, not the actual emotional life of the person.

Another is a memory, which is sure to annoy. However in the military I recall that it was the women who tended to be "tougher" than the men (especially those in leadership positions). I believe this is because of self-selection among other reasons. But what this shows me -- I know it's anecdote so I don't expect to convince here, only sharing -- is that sexual difference doesn't account for some of the cliche's associated with men like toughness and strength. I've known too many people who do or do not live up to the cliches across the sex line to think sex is very determinative of one's traits or abilities. So I try not to look at gender identity as a collection of traits at all as much as a collection of attachments, expectations, feelings, and modes of expression. We can all be tough, but a tough man expresses differently from a tough woman, even though they are both tough.

Lastly, in light of there being masculinities, I fully expect there to be some competing notions of the masculine. I think it best to look at these in concert -- an individual will probably have a masculinity, but in thinking through masculinity in general it's OK that there are different ways to express the gender identity.