That's very clear.

I see enough generalities that I think the discussion holds together -- we work for money, we want more money and rewarding work in various ways, the establishment of individual property adjudicated by states and courts gives a general social structure -- between a worker and a peasant, as I alluded to earlier, I'd say there's not much to compare.

But it seems our disagreement is whether one can speak in general about "working conditions" at all, which I clearly think we can.

Makes sense. Though I'm wondering about notions of environment here. "Hydrophobic" and "hydrophillic" relate to general structures of molecules, however those structures change at different Pressure-Volumes: tap water dissolves more salt when it is boiling, for instance, than when it is ice-water.

Does the language of properties map at all to scientific discourse? Would a three-part predicate cover the variability of salt concentration with respect to pressure-temperature? (and what of the other things we may measure?)

EDIT: Tho this is more phil-o-sci than a comment on in/direct realism.

Hmm... Not in this discussion, no, as it violates the premise being asked about (though, i do intuit that this is by way of the OP being very imprecise in its aim). "the work environment" imports nothing to be discussed, ethically. You have to import some detail to get anywhere. You're basically not disagree with me, but still arguing that my position is off.

Can you just directly address why you think the abstract concept of 'work environment' without any indication of detail is apt for ethical discussion (and this, specifically in opposition to "a work environment, X")? — AmadeusD

Does "the work environment" import no detail?

I think it's apt for ethical discussion probably because of my own personal history, of course. It seems to me that there are some environments which are better or worse than others, which means there's an evaluative element, which means -- well, if not ethics, at least aesthetics. Value theory.

You are leapfrogging over the discussion into one which I am not having. Though, I have very, VERY clearly stated that once there are details(i.e an example of), that discussion is apt and important. — AmadeusD

Cool.

My guess, here, is that we're just beginning from such philosophically different places that we're talking past one another.

This could be said, and It would be hard to argue against, but there are millions of examples within capitalism where this is not the exchange. Exploitative trade is very much a thing (and imo, a good thing) which doesn't involve any direct relationship with value per se, and instead, value per individual. — AmadeusD

heh. I'm happy to have earned "hard to argue against" :)

Though surely you can recognize that labour-time is appropriate to bring up in a discussion about work environment, in spite of counter-examples?

There is no universal relationship between employer and employee beyond the "fact of" (which doesn't, on it's face, involve any interaction or disposition at all) — AmadeusD

The relationship between employer and employee has no relationship beyond the fact that they have a relationship, and yet that relationship doesn't involve any interaction or disposition -- ever?

I give time for money. Unless you're talking something like feudalism or before then I think it holds: under capital it's a time-for-money system. That structure is what makes "working conditions" coherent.

Surely you're not going to claim to have no knowledge of what people who are employees want? "Less work for more money" sounds like a good reasonable guess to me.

Hah! OK maybe you'd like it!

If you ever get to chance pineapple, I recommend it with spicey things -- my favorite way to have the "forbidden" fruit is with pepperoni and jalapenos. The sweet-acid adds just the rights amount of counter-balancing flavor for me.

I don't like BBQ cuz it's too sweet for bread-cheese, for me -- no matter how much meat is there. If I'm hungry of course I'll eat what's presented, but it's just not what I'm looking for in the combo. (though many of my loved ones like it)

I think I'm fine with a "whose-who" -- cuz I think of art as a collaborative process between at a minimum an artist and an audience (at least 1 person in each category).

I don't think it's Public Relations, though, because it's more like Peer Review -- at least as I imagine it, though of course you can't be held to the standards of my unexpressed imagination. While I know there are counter-examples to this categorical definition of art, I think the notion that there is a creator-audience manages to capture a lot of the examples we'd consider up front.

I think the "institutional" theory serves more as a demarcation of examples than a description -- but I'm trying to extend it from the usual notion of "institutions" to something a bit more anarchic, but still reasonable. (at least I hope)

Pizza - anything from Margherita, to seafood - clam, scallops, shrimp, to goat cheese sun dried tomatoes and asparagus, to chicken tikka masala, to apple — Fooloso4

Sounds like you'd accept pineapple, on some occasions.

White pizza too, I think.

But have you tried Barbecue Pizza?

(to be clear, this is an abomination to me that many people i know love lol)

I prefer Nelson Goodman's suggestion that instead of defining what is art we look at when something is art. — jkop

Re-reading this, I'm not so sure we're off there -- the debate gets shifted to "which institutions?", in a way, although I'm clear at this point, I think, that I'm open to many institutions (some of which I'd classify as "paradigmatic")

My initial guess has something to do with an audience and an artist. "artworld" can sound all-encompassing, but I prefer to think there are artworlds. Ones that dissipate and form and are momentary, but I think they count as art at least.

So that's why I disagree it's an HR theory -- depends on what we mean by "institution" I think, though I'll give preference to institutions for paradigmatic examples, which are also important -- just not categorical.

I disagree!

For instance, I'd say that a person sharing a personal poem at a local poetry reading that won't go anywhere is art.

Your first attempt looks plastic enough that I could make it work somehow. — Moliere

Let's try applying the pragmatic maxim. A short version of it suggests we consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive art in this case to have. Our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of "art."

The "practical effects" art has must be its effects on us, or what takes place when we interact with a work of art--the result of what we see, hear, read etc. when experiencing it. So, art evokes feelings; it doesn't explain or analyze existence, or reality, or knowledge, or indeed anything and isn't intended to do so. As part of its evocation, it may lead to insights about ourselves or the rest of the world, but that isn't its purpose. It's not philosophy, in other words. — Ciceronianus

Found and browsed How to Make Our Ideas Clear -- there's a lot there so I've only skimmed at this point.

We agree that art and philosophy are not the same.

I think I'd push against the notion that art shows and philosophy says, though -- I think both the artist and the philosopher show themselves in their activity, whatever that happens to be.

(EDIT: To be clear -- the say/show distinction was the first distinction I thought of as a possible difference and then decided against it for various examples I thought of)

Cool, then I don't have a ready-made response in that case. :D Your first attempt looks plastic enough that I could make it work somehow.

It's tough to get a grapple on the differences between art and philosophy because both are so large that a comparison/contrast is difficult, and there are some crossovers we can point to, but I think I'm still inclined to say there's a difference.

Are they the kind of questions Wittgenstein spoke of, regarding which we must, or should, be silent? — Ciceronianus

I don't think silence is needed, I just think it's a hard question to answer. I've read a little bit of aesthetics before, but didn't decide much. I'm pretty sure art cannot be defined, but I still think there's room for a philosophy of art.

Another way to think about what art is is its place within an institution. Objects become art through the artworld participating and dubbing them so. Then philosophy of art would be that branch dealing with how we conceptualize art and classify it, but only after art has been dubbed by the artworld for consideration (while recognizing that one of the roles within the artworld, that of artist, is to bring in new works of art)

Now I'm inclined to think of this institutional theory of art as in opposition to theories of art which rely upon defining art by our feelings, at least, but I can't say I'm certain you do -- you're attempting to apply the pragmatic principle in defining art, and then offering "feelings" as a possible effect, but would still include institutional acts and effects?

More directly:

Art is not definable, because it's creative

Even so -- there is at least a possibility, to my mind, that philosophy can be art, and vice-versa.

Camus and Sartre seem like good examples here.

Hah. Yes.

Weird that freedom is opposed in the face of property. I'm hoping my kiddos get better than I.

Oh, sure. Just casually ask the hardest questions there are in philosophy. Why not? ;)

I think Plato counts as art, though, given its dialogic form. That's exactly what makes it timeless -- it can be seen from many angles.

Looks good!

"Hedging" on whether the work environment is subject to ethical scrutiny, is what I was thinking -- that the environment can't be judged on ethics, but the person in the environment is ethically informed. It seems backwards to me to not judge an environment on ethical grounds but to hold a person to ethical standards regardless of the environment. That's surely an important part too?

The fact is the concept presented for discussion differs from case-to-case-to-case in such wildly intense degrees that this is not a coherent concept in and of itself. Not really apt to be discussed other than....

Giving up your biases and personal desires/offenses in response to OP seems to me the exact opposite of what would be helpful to the poster. — AmadeusD

I'm not so sure. There's a structure that holds between jobs: the employer and the employee exchange time for money, and people often want similar things out a job. The specifics, mind, can't be ironed out in the clouds -- but the generalities hold, and they hold in such a way that makes organizing a tried and true method of improving working conditions.

It's the organization that's similar between jobs that make "working conditions" coherent.

1st/2nd/3rd is how the US splits it up, at least colloquially -- since there are also 12-hour, and even more, shifts. Divide 24 by 3 and you have three 8-hour shifts, but they vary quite a bit.

I've learned the shifts I can do and can't do. I'm no night owl.

Those are the sorts of things I like to discuss. Hopefully I haven't poisoned the well too much.

I prioritize money, then insurance (as an USsian), then city, then shift. But I would like a world where these things aren't "individual choices" in light of clear institutional power. (that is, I'm something of a socialist)

At base, I vehemently disagree with Moliere there - fundamentally 'the work environment' is not an object of ethical value. It is functional, to my mind. What one does in that environment, though, is obviously ethically-informed and in that sense I'd need some detail about what behaviour or structure you're having a go at.. — AmadeusD

Seems to be hedging your bets -- what one does in the environment changes the environment, such as when one builds a house. The work environment is not a neutral thing that will always-and-forever exist -- it can be changed, and has been changed.

What ends up being "functional" depends upon what we want.

Ever ethical?

Never has been. ;)

The work environment can be fixed and improved through organizing with your fellow workers, because that's all workers really have to gain power. i.e. unions.

But that won't address international inequality, for instance, and given that capital -- work -- is internationally linked that's an important part of judging whether it's fair with everyone.

Now... how to convince my younger me that this is so.... :D

It's pleasing to me to have some consonance between us.

I'm concerned primarily with the experience of it all - if a direct realist says "I see things as they really are", I don't see that as some opportunity for a semantic argument, to me it looks like an unambiguous statement about their visual experience - my visual experience matches reality as it really is. And, for entirely non-semantic reasons, I think it's false. I don't think I'm saying it's false because I mean some obscure thing by the word "see", I think it's false because I think our visual experience is simply not reality as it really is. It's something else. It's a construct. It's a construct that's causally connected to reality, but it's not just reality-as-it-is. — flannel jesus

Either you're experiencing reality as-it-really-is, OR your experience is something subjective and crafted for you by your brain. — flannel jesus

Why not neither? Must we choose one or the other, or could we suspend our judgment here?

The process of smelling, or seeing, or whatever, involves physical interactions with real things, and I'm a realist so I think those things are real and those physical interactions really happen. And then I think when that becomes an experience, that experience isn't just raw-reality-as-it-really-is, it's an experience concocted for you by your brain. — flannel jesus

I think, in order for this to make sense, you must at least be able to talk about real things in addition to experience. Perhaps, in a round-about way to grant the point for philosophical purposes, we could say individual experience does not have an accessibility relation to reality, but language does and this is what allows us to speak truly on the matter -- that is, through language use we have a direct realism through successful reference.

That's not raw-reality-as-it-really-is -- but it's real, and one step, and it's what allows us to talk about real things and real experiences as distinct categories in the first place.

On my view friendship is of a higher value than sex, and it would be helpful if we valued friendship more than we do. — Leontiskos

Yup! I make friends for life -- some of them have even been lovers where we've parted ways because we weren't good lovers, but we continue to be good friends. It seems that the love of friendship and familial love has out-endured romantic love, and where romantic love flourishes friendship seems to be a strong part of it.

Thinking now it seems a bit silly to exclude romantic love. My thought was more with respect to a broadening of the notion because of how wonderful my connections have been -- they are the people I love and they love in turn, and it's not romantic or sexual at all.

Lately I've been going through a tough patch and they've been very supportive, and so I was thinking about how this kind of love is valuable and wanted to pay my respects to it in a way.

I call it anarcho-Marxism.

I suppose what I like about Valentine's Day is how it's only slightly attached to the old traditions, while being "unserious" enough to be reinvented. I'd prefer another holiday for friends and family, since I think love is more central there, while a romantic holiday could be something else. Something like every Saturday.

And bearded men on clouds don't work on me either. — Jamal

yet ;)

In a highly technical sense I'm Morman because I was baptised at the age of True Responsibility and Knowledge of Good and Evil: 8, and have yet to bother excising my name because it's just a hassle.

But I certainly don't believe their stuff, and haven't really found another religion that seems much different except that it's older and so the motives of their founders are harder to discern.

For the most part I think religious sexuality is so far out of date that it's not worth salvaging, because for the most part I think the family form and proper sexual etiquette are the main things preserved in churches.

"speak my language" was pretty careless on my part, among other things :).

Mostly it was an off-hand thought about language and animals and W.

Heh. Naw, dolphins and whales.

For boys, not so much. — ssu

:razz:


Love is important.

I am a man and like the idea of a holiday celebrating love.

We ought not bring it to the level of the nonsensical politicians? They have other objectives than love.

As long as they speak my language, sure.

Just hasn't happened yet.

The aliens in the ocean seem to be speaking, though.

From a tower, perhaps, but what if the ball hits a number of pegs along the way?:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8713/causality-determination-and-such-stuff/p1

I think it's at least reasonable to suppose that the reason we can predict such things is that we're really really close to knowing what's going on in a general sense, but every particular has more to it than a generality. That is -- it's statistical, just 99.99999999 etc whatever you want to say close.

EDIT: And, to be fair, in practice I don't think I've seen anything beyond 5 or 6 sig-figs. Statistics are regularly a part of science in practice, even though the textbook problems give this impression of analytic certainty. That's mostly for the students benefit, whose already learning too much.

Oh yeah. I liked that paper because it gave me something to think through weaknesses in the parallel -- I also made the comparison fairly early on and came across that paper in an effort to push against it and feel out its dimensions.

There's a lot in common: the centrality of ethics, for instance, as well as the limitation on knowledge in light of the ethical and logical, ala

That makes sense to me -- The purposes of philosophy differ between them.

I couldn't find a free version -- I wish I could because when I read this I had access, but no longer do. Alas, as a counter-point to the notion I enjoyed this paper: On Interpreting Kant's Thinker as Wittgenstein's 'I' -- would have read it before posting but there's a possible clue for thinking through the thought from the opposite side.

Found an interesting paper that, according to the Izmirli definitions, would count as a Modernist philosophy of mathematics that is simultaneously social constructionist:

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS:RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM REHABILITATED?Paul ErnestUniversity of Exeter

OK so it's more specific than anything I've laid out.

I accept a distinction now, but I don't think I'd follow Heidegger in saying normal science is not-thinking, and revolutionary science requires philosophical thinking -- or something along those lines. "What is the difference between these crafts?" is hard to answer.

Sometimes philosophy and science works in concert, but sometimes they're orthogonal to one another such that a change in philosophical belief will not result in a change in scientific belief, or vice-versa. So not so much at odds as simply different in what they do.

The stick is bent.

But it's not really bent. in that way.

For reals, you can pick up the stick yourself!