@Banno
Notice that despite this, it's not the case that just any words will do. You choose the words for your posts with great care. — Banno
I hope I did choose the words for my post with great care. From a Wittgensteinian perspective I'm obligated to ensure that my choice of words respect the language game that I wish to participate in - I did the best I could.
The arbitrariness of word meaning, however, is revealed only when we look at how word meaning changes across different language games. Enough said.
I've seen a lot of posts still assuming "reality" or some placeholder--"consciousness", "meaning" (metaphysical, logical, internal, behavioral, scientific, etc.)--as if Kant hadn't already made a sufficient argument that we can't know the Thing-In-Itself (though he thought we could, through rationality, accomplish the same goal without an objective world). — Banno
Yes, we (probably) can't know the thing-in-itself but that doesn't imply, to my reckoning, that the thing-in-itself lacks an essence.
Language, in my humble opinion, was designed to field signs (words) that were then linked to referents (the essences of the things-in-themselves).
Now for some reasons, one possibility being people
misusing/abusing words (using words incorrectly i.e. assuming a flexible attitude towards definitions), a single sign (word) began to apply to more than one referent (thing-in-itself) and we get
family resemblance. At this juncture, it becomes imperative that we distinguish
family resemblance from
polysemy (one word having different meanings; puns) for the latter was a well-known feature of language but the former was introduced later by Wittgenstein.
Family resemblance is distinct from
polysemy because unlike the latter,
it creates an illusion that a word
has an essence to it. The reason for this is simple:
Word: Definitional features
A: w, x
A: x, y
A: w, y
Because there's an overlap (partial/incomplete) with respect to definitional features of the word A, we make the mistake of thinking there's an essence to A but on further/deeper analysis, we discover there is none. This
illusion of essence does not occur with
polysemy (puns).
It would indeed be a grave error if someone were to philosophize on the word A in terms of its essence (a fixed referent) because, like it or not, there is none. I believe Wittgenstein claimed that most philosophical problems were of this type - philosophers fooled by
family resemblances and the
illusion of essence that comes with it. Off the top of my head, I can't think of an example. Perhaps you can help me out here.
Essence is expressed by Grammar. — Banno
After reading a few articles here and there about Wittgenstein, I have come to the conclusion that what he has to say about language and philosophy is of consequence but to say that essence is about
grammar is going a bit too far for my taste. It feels like Wittgenstein has created this language box for philosophy and he's trying just too hard to fit philosophy into it - what's inside the box isn't philosophy but Wittgenstein's own distorted notion of philosophy. I even feel justified to level the charge of sophistry against Wittgenstein. This is just
my opinion though.
Wittgenstein seems to be making a point on language - that words don't possess an essence or, positively speaking, meaning is use, and we could be, given that is so, talking past each other but language and philosophy are entirely different subjects.
— TheMadFool
I suggest thinking about our entire way of life. How do we feed ourselves? Raise children? Punish criminals? Get to work in the morning? Then think of talking as making conventional noises which help us coordinate practical action (including mating.) What's the meaning of a pheromone ? Of rattlesnake venom? — hanaH
If there's a point to your post, sorry I didn't get it.
An essence to my understanding is anything that sums up the true nature of a thing whatever that thing is.
— TheMadFool
There's way too many arbitrary word-uses in this statement for it to make sense. Existence before essence (i.e. forms-of-life contextualize language-games) – or didn't you read the memo? Plato / Aristotle (... Husserl) might say you fail to (com)prehend the essence of essence, Fool. Wtf are you talking about anyway – what does "the essence of Wittgenstein" even mean? :confused: — 180 Proof
If X has an essence, then that implies X has a set of qualities (a, b, c,..) that makes X X. These qualities (a, b, c,..) help identify X as X. I'm sorry I can't make it any clearer than that.
How essences relate to Wittgenstein is that though a word lacks an essence, it doesn't imply that that which the word refers to lacks an essence.
This is ultimately true, by which I mean objectively true, but words do have an onomatopoeic quality, even if they are not used onomatopoeically, which yet imparts to them a subjective essence. For instance, there is a definite essence, surely subjective in nature, by which I mean that said essence exists as the word is percieved by the human mind, to the English words "teeny-weeny" and "itsy-bitsy", and a rationale for why these words describe smallness, the "slenderness" of the vowels within them producing a feeling of spareness within the mind's eye. Could one possibly concieve of "itsy-bitsy" as referring to the grandiosity of a thing? In like manner, there is a rationale for why the Old Irish word mor describes bigness/largeness/greatness, with it's "thick" vowelization, and so this word can be said to have a subjectively discerned essence, itself. I wouldcontend that words which have an onomatopoeic quality, do so because they have a subjective essence. If you look carefully, you will notice that there is far more onomatopoeia in the word stock of language s than you might initially surmise. — Michael Zwingli
Excellent!
:up:
Indeed, this is what makes mathematics so beautiful. It can create arguments without the intrusion of linguistic uncertainty to cloud meaning, or otherwise bollocks things up. — Michael Zwingli
There is no such thing as
family resemblance in math.
I believe so too. How could I have goofed up like that!