I'd not do it if you'd give what I consider to be straightforward answers to questions, with some detail to them, when I ask something like "anything goes in what regard?"

What you typically do is respond with something in the vein of, "You (should) know what regard." — Terrapin Station

But you should, because a) it was obvious from the context (I'm pretty sure others aren't having the problem that you're having here), and because b) I've clarified multiple times now. It's not that you really don't get it enough to respond properly. That's just a ruse, a tactic. You're just basically trying to shift the burden like you always do, and red herrings which insistently press me for unnecessary detail regarding the point I'm raising to you is one way of doing that.

I don't like repeating myself, so just refer back to my previous posts regarding what I've said about that. The clarifications I've given are sufficient for someone of average intelligence to figure out what I'm getting at, so the way you're responding is effectively just playing dumb, unless you really do have below average intelligence, which I don't believe.

The whole point is this:

Say that Joe claims, "There should be no crimes about actions normally named by words beginning with the letter 'm.'"

Someone chimes in, "But that would make murder legal!" (Ignoring the conventional definition of murder being illegal killing.)

Joe says, "Yes, obviously. That shouldn't be a crime in my view."

So Joe knows something about the consequences. Joe is expressing his view that that situation--where murder is legal--should be the case.

So for Joe, it does no good to simply say, "You're wrong! You're incorrect!" Joe is aware of the consequences and it's something he doesn't have a problem with. Presumably he has a problem with the alternate situation instead. — Terrapin Station

Wow. How many times? That is not the whole point at all! How on earth can it be the whole point? So the whole point is an irrelevance I've already accepted multiple times? No, I don't think so. You seriously need to rethink what your whole point is. You would need to take the above and lead it somewhere logically relevant.

So are you using my (1) or my (3) for how something can be "correct"/"incorrect" in this realm, or are you appealing to something I wasn't able to imagine? — Terrapin Station

Neither (1) nor (3). That would-be false dichotomy made me chuckle. The "crowd" has got it right (again) because the "crowd" doesn't accept that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "m". That's a stupid view which should not be accepted. You don't accept it yourself, yet you totally undermine that by saying that you'd indirectly allow it to pass your test through knowingly putting it through a useless test that lets anything through so long as the persons feelings match.

So you're arguing that argumentum ad populums are not fallacious because? (Maybe because they're commonly accepted? But that itself is an argumentum ad populum.) — Terrapin Station

No, you don't understand the fallacy of appealing to the masses enough, so you misidentify it in cases like this, as everyone hereabouts knows. And you're proving immune to correction.

So would you posit some sort of real (extramental) abstract for it?

Maybe I'm remembering this wrong, but I thought you didn't buy the idea of nonphysical existents. — Terrapin Station

I'm not engaging your nonsense about the extramental. I don't have to. I've refuted the stance that reason is subjective based solely on my earlier argument. You would need to deal with that instead of trying to distract me.

I think part of the problem is the terms being used, some baggage on a few that seems to be causing confusion.
You are essentially talking about referencing a standard, right? You accept the initial subjectivity of whether or not someone values morality or reason, but once they do there are certain standards they are agreeing to operate from that do not change based on l subjective whims?
Is that right? — DingoJones

Yes. An example of this would be earlier on when Terrapin revealed that he has got the nature of reason completely wrong, in that he thinks that it's subjective, when it isn't, it's objective. His view on the matter is subjective, but reason isn't. I refuted that position earlier. He can of course stick with his subjective view on the matter, but whether affirming the consequent is unreasonable isn't a moot topic. The right answer is that it's unreasonable. That he might have a different opinion won't change that.

"Sensible" is simply "something not too far removed from my own or from the consensus view" --that is, something not too different. Where the only thing motivating that is whether it matches oneself or the norm (which are more or less the same thing if one tempers one's views to the norm). — Terrapin Station

No, that's not what it is by definition. But yes, if something not too far removed from my own view happens to be sensible, then it's sensible. And if something not too far removed from the consensus view happens to be sensible, then it's sensible.

The view that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "m" isn't sensible, whether it's not too far removed from my view, or your view, or the consensus. If you were to say, "But it's not too far removed from my view, so it's sensible!", you'd just be wrong. And pretty stupid, to be honest.

That view, and all others like it, shouldn't be put to a test which would pass them. That itself is actually a test for a bad test: whether or not your test passes all kinds of nonsense.

There's nothing else to talk about, though. Again, there are no factual normatives.

This means that it is not correct/incorrect to not have (seemingly) inconsistent dispositions, feelings, etc. — Terrapin Station

No it doesn't, it means only that you're choosing to go by an interpretation which leads to that conclusion. You're the cause of your own problem, namely the problem that you reach the wrong conclusion, because it flies in the face of what we see and hear and feel and the behaviour all around us. If you were an extraterrestrial and you observed a society of humans, you would conclude that there are rights and wrongs. You would observe that people who say outlandish things are told that they're wrong, mistaken. Your metaethical theory fails in terms of explanatory power. Your theories often do, generally speaking. You really need to work on that.

I addressed different senses you might have had in mind, because I wasn't sure. Again, it's being charitable. If I were to just ask you what sense you have in mind, I'm guessing you'd not just straightforwardly answer, because that keeps happening. So I addressed multiple senses to avoid having to ask you. — Terrapin Station

Please stop doing that. Again, it's not helping. It's just an annoying distraction. I've made my meaning clear enough to you. Go with that, not something plucked from your imagination.

I'm not sure how you think they can. The only things I can imagine are that you're either (1) egotistically asserting your view as correct and anything too different from it as incorrect, (2) appealing to common or consensus opinion and equating that with "correct," which is the argumentum ad populum fallacy, or (3) saying that it either matches or fails to match what the world is like, but factually, the extramental world (extramental because otherwise then we either have (1) or (2) above) doesn't contain moral stances--hence why objectivism is wrong (it fails to match what the extramental world is like). — Terrapin Station

To get to the right conclusion, you need to work backwards. That's something that you should do more often. That's something that a lot of members of this forum should do more often.

We know that, ordinarily, we call things like this right and wrong. Then you just think of a way to fit that in with your metaethics. If your metaethics can't do that, then your metaethics is inferior.

I don't need a single, rigid way of counting something as right or wrong with regard to the kind of statements we've been talking about. With the example I gave earlier, that it's wrong could be explained in light of the consequences. If all you have in response to that is, "But someone might have a different opinion about that!", then that's no argument, or if it is, it's got to be one of the weakest arguments imaginable, so my point stands.

Seriously? You think that I'm going to go, "Proper conduct? Alrighty then" ? — Terrapin Station

I know that, to your discredit, you sometimes express a disregard for proper conduct in debates. That isn't entirely contrary to my expectations. But it's something that I consider pretty awful and shocking, hence why I return to it. So I just want to be clear:

Do you accept that you have a burden of attempted justification?

Do you value intellectual honesty?

And do you value logic?

Then support it better. — Terrapin Station

Do I really need to elaborate on why a test fit for purpose would need to rule out stuff like my example?

Answer the question.

So yeah, you are just kowtowing to the crowd again. ಠ_ಠ — Terrapin Station

So yeah, you're still clueless enough to keep confusing any explanation referencing what a large number of people think with "kowtowing to the crowd". For the millionth time, it doesn't matter that my views are in accordance with "the crowd" in the sense that that in no way detracts from my views. The "crowd" has got this one right (again), so I would rather my views match theirs then someone who is wrong, such as yourself. In this case, it's worse to be a crackpot who clashes with the good sense of the "crowd".

You are just referencing back to the subjective premiss. Sure, if you dont want to be consistent, or be rational, or operate within reason then there is nothing that forces you to do so. These are things that are subjective, choices based on how you feel about something if that's the way you want to put it.
Im not talking about that, and I dont S is either. — DingoJones

Yes, that's more or the less a problem we've been having. I'm saying, sure, metaethical subjectivism, but let's be sensible. He's basically saying, no, that's not metaethical subjectivism, metaethical subjectivism must not be sensible. Some people aren't sensible, and a test fit for purpose should pass those views, not reject them as sensible people would.

So he has a misunderstanding of what metaethical subjectivism entails, and he isn't really making any sense regarding his views on a test fit for purpose.

Descriptively, at least potentially anything could go. In other words, someone could have just about any imaginable stance. — Terrapin Station

You're talking past me again, and that's a problem. I agree with that, but that's beside the point. I wasn't using the phrase "anything goes" in that sense. Are you even trying? It's like you're doing this on purpose.

I am of the position that what's required here is a test which doesn't pass just about any imaginable stance. I'm against 'anything goes' strictly in that sense, not some other sense you can come up with. And I know that that's possible, because my own position doesn't go by a test like that. The example I've given fails that test.

Evaluatively, no one thinks "anything goes," because people always have preferences. Our preferences can't serve as a test of correctness for other people unless we're unbelievably egotistical/self-centered. — Terrapin Station

The results are all that matter, not your opinion about how egotistical it is. If the results include stuff like the example, then that reflects poorly on the test.

In terms of correct/incorrect, we could say "anything goes," but the realm of "correct/incorrect" is the wrong realm for this stuff. That's the whole idea of noncognitivism. — Terrapin Station

You would need to successfully argue the point that those terms can't apply in the way that I think they can. You haven't provided any argument at all for that in this discussion from what I recall.

Based on . . . .? — Terrapin Station

Based on proper conduct relating to the burden of attempting adequate justification (more commonly known as the burden of proof, but I know how easy it for you to get distracted) or of being intellectually honest enough to admit that you can't provide a justification, and based on logic, and things like that.

Do you value intellectual honesty? Yes or no?

The test you proposed above has no motivation or support behind it aside from the fact that you find the idea of that stance too different. — Terrapin Station

That's not true. Do I really need to elaborate on why a test fit for purpose would need to rule out stuff like my example?

So what's the beyond? Is this just you kowtowing to the crowd again? — Terrapin Station

Why would you think that it's not a problem just because a single person is wilfully blind to it? We call things problems if they're generally considered problematic based on a number of things a large enough number of people have in common. You're doing that thing again where you act as though you haven't a clue about ordinary language use. Your default assumption shouldn't be that I'm speaking Terrapinese, it should be that I'm speaking normally. The former would be idiotic and will cause a lot of problems.

Another way to look at it is that I think that the idea of a "test" for one's moral stances is incoherent if one is a metaethical subjectivist/noncognitivist. — Terrapin Station

It's not. That suggests that anyone who is a metaethical subjectivist or noncognitivist must adhere to the senseless 'anything goes' version which you yourself adhere to. That suggestion is false. That is very much not the case at all, otherwise I wouldn't be a metaethical subjectivist.

Or it's incoherent aside from "testing" that one's stances are really how one feels. — Terrapin Station

That was a really unhelpful and distracting aside which you shouldn't have even brought up. There's no disagreement here that one can check how they feel about something. The next time you have one of those thoughts, maybe keep it to yourself.

So why should I believe that there's some sort of "test" for moral stances where the idea of that would be coherent, if you don't even know an example of one? — Terrapin Station

I do, and that should be obvious by now. A test which fails to rule out the proposition that crimes beginning with "m" should be legalised is not a test fit for purpose.

You have a burden to either argue against that or concede, and if you only respond with red herrings seeking additional unnecessary details, then I will be justified in taking that as tantamount to you conceding.

All this is amounting to is that some stances are really, really different than anything you'd think, and you can't accept that someone might think something, feel some way, that's really, really different than how you are. — Terrapin Station

No, that's a fundamental misunderstanding on your part. I've already made it crystal clear that I understand and accept that there are different stances, including those which are really, really different.

In response to that, I repeat that that in itself is not the problem. Why are you making me repeat myself?

??? That's the whole nut of whether they'd think it's a problem or not. This is just the same as the discussion we've been having with schopenhauer. There are plenty of people who don't see hunger as a moral problem. schopenhauer doesn't care about that. It's a moral problem simply because HE says it is. That's the same thing you're doing here. Whether something is a problem to someone depends on how they feel about it. — Terrapin Station

Something can be a problem in different respects, and all I'm saying in the case of you merely pointing out a disagreement is that the disagreement that you're pointing out is irrelevant in this case because it's a problem beyond the disagreement you're pointing to. It doesn't even have to be objective for that to be the case. Come on, surely you're capable of seeing that.

I didn't say that's what you had in mind. I said that that was the only thing that I would think would work as a "test." — Terrapin Station

But it very obviously wouldn't work as a test, because it would allow all kinds of nonsense, such as no crimes beginning with "m". And if you're taking what I said out of context and talking instead about a test of whether that matches someone's feeling, then you're committing a fallacy of relevance. That's not the purpose of the test.

So what the heck would a "proper test" be? — Terrapin Station

Obviously something other than a "test" which passes literally anything conceivable, so long as it matches someone's feeling. That's a minimal requirement that you're failing on. I don't have to provide you with a more detailed proposal of how a test should be performed to be right about that. This is what we're arguing over for now. Are you going to concede or try to defend your absurd position? Those are your only two options. Red herrings don't count.

A person who believes there should be no crimes starting with the letter "M" wouldn't agree that the objective facts re consequences are undesirable. — Terrapin Station

Irrelevant.

That's just like I don't agree that the objective facts re consequences of not banning speech, or not having crimes based on psychological harm are undesirable. — Terrapin Station

Also irrelevant.

Anything goes when it comes to opinions not being correct or incorrect. That doesn't imply that I agree with them all. My disagreement, that I feel a different way, that I prefer something else, doesn't amount to me being correct.

It could pass the test of really being how an individual feels. That certainly wouldn't be impossible. — Terrapin Station

You're completely missing the point, and going back over our discussion, I think I've found where the problem originated. It should have been very obvious from the start that with my talk of tests, I wasn't merely talking about whether a statement, such as, "There shouldn't be any crimes beginning with the letter 'm'", matches someone's feeling that it's right. That's a really stupid way to interpret what I was getting at. What's wrong with you? I'm talking about a proper test, and one regarding the acceptability of the proposition. A test which passes anything at all, no matter how barmy, so long as it matches a feeling, is no test at all. It's clearly not fit for purpose.

There's no correct claim re "This is a problem." It's a subjective opinion whether something is a problem. Different people think that different things are a problem or not. They can't get that correct or incorrect. It's not a matter of rationality. It's a matter of someone's disposition, how they feel, what they prefer. — Terrapin Station

Those are just unfounded assertions, whereas I can easily point to the overwhelming evidence of how much mayhem the implementation of legalising all crimes beginning with "m" would cause. Again, you'd need an argument against that, not just irrational denial.

It implies that you know what is hate. — TheMadFool

Anyone who doesn't know what hate is is a moron. And anyone who says they haven't ever felt hatred is a liar.

I'm not saying anything like "all opinions are equal." I'd say that they're objectively equal, but that's a category error. Nothing objective evaluates opinions.

They're subjectively unequal. But that doesn't make one subject correct versus another subject when it comes to opinions. — Terrapin Station

You suggested that they're equal when you suggested that anything goes. And you suggested that when you said that the view that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "m" would pass the test, along with all kinds of nonsense.

They'd have a different opinion than you about the consequences. That's the whole point. — Terrapin Station

Their opinion wouldn't matter. And that's the whole point. It would cause problems in terms of the consequences whether they recognise that or not. They'd need an argument against it, not just irrational denial.

I have a different opinion than you do about the consequences of not having any crimes based on "psychological harms," and I have a different opinion than you do about the consequences of not banning any speech. — Terrapin Station

I already know that you have a different opinion. The problem isn't that I don't understand that we have a difference of opinion.

But the problem is now apparently that you don't understand that that in itself is not the problem.

I think that you think you're objectively correct just because you think something, even though intellectually you realize this is a problem. It's still something that's pretty deeply ingrained in you. "Problems which arise," for you, amounts to, "having different opinions (about what's okay, what's acceptable, what's the case, etc.) than I do." That's very transparently the case with you. — Terrapin Station

But what I'm saying doesn't have to be objectively correct for it to be right over and above the opinion of someone who says something completely barmy, and in addition to that, erroneously suggests that all opinions are equal, when they're not. I don't even need to think that, or to make that claim.

The problem clearly isn't that the opinion of someone who thinks that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "M" is different to mine. I don't believe for a second that you can't see what the actual problem is. Think about the consequences! That would cause a lot of problems. And that it would cause a lot of problems is the problem. Wilful blindness to the problem isn't a justification.

Within the context of simulation hypothesis I often hear an argument that the high level being simulating us can do that for reasons that we cannot even comprehend. As an argument one can show that no matter how hard a modern human would explain differential equations to a monkey it would never understand. Is there a way to point out that our mind type is capable of understanding any concept of any complexity given enough time? — IuriiVovchenko

There are degrees of understanding, and I don't think that it's controversial to say that we wouldn't be capable of fully understanding a concept to the degree that a being of greater complexity or a being that's "built" differently would.

Yes, that which has that funky beat must exist in entirety before one can boogie woogie thereof.

I'm going to drive a metaphysical wedge between music and dancing to music. They're not the same!

Huge turn of events, not only Brexit but for UK history. The Supreme Court, just 10 years old, has never intervened in politics to this extent. — NOS4A2

Since you mention UK history, it's reminiscent of King Charles I dissolving parliament against its will, and we know what that lead to.

What I'm doing here with the odd claim is attempting to drive an existential wedge between reports of things and what's being reported upon. — creativesoul

What you're attempting to do here is redundant. What you're doing here is once again pointlessly bringing to our attention another distinction of which we're already aware. It's very odd indeed that you appear to have made this your life's work. Here's a suggestion: wait until someone is stupid enough to say something like, "There's no difference between reports of things and what's being reported upon", and then what you're saying might actually be of relevance.

Men would rather be down the pub. — unenlightened

Philosophers would rather be in their study on their own writing a lengthy treatise on something that doesn't matter. Conclusion: philosophers aren't men. Conclusion: philosophers must be women. Or cats. No, cats would rather be curled up asleep. Gerbils?

You're discouraging us from being logical, and honest, on a philosophy forum of all places. No, in answer to your question, certainly not. And to top it off, you're the one who began the thinking which lead this way.

Obviously. — Shamshir

That's my line. Please don't use it without my permission.

And that's precisely why they're all depressed — Shamshir

So they're all depressed because they're not all depressed, because some of them are content enough with life and are just lying to themselves? No, that makes no sense.

Alternatively, you weren't actually referring to anything I said, and so you shouldn't have worded your response that way.

They're obviously depressed, and if not outright suicidal, apparently self deprecating. — Shamshir

No, I don't think you can lump them all together like that and jump to that conclusion. Like I said, in some cases, they're largely lying to themselves. You know, like an armchair philosopher who does this as a sort of hobby, content enough with life. The sort where it has just become the norm to come out with this kind of rhetoric. Note also that the real Schopenhauer himself was a massive hypocrite.

There is not much feminist discussion here on the forum. I hope you find enough positive reaction to make it worth your while to hang around. — T Clark

This isn't exactly helping. I would welcome sensible discussion on feminism.

As a passing note, I do wonder how does the antinatalist not succumb to depression or suicidal tendencies if the world is really that terrible as to not procreate. Any thoughts about this? — Wallows

Yes. They're lying to themselves. They'll come up with elaborate answers to avoid having to admit that life ain't that bad. It's all misdirection: smoke and mirrors. For example, he'll bring up that it's not easy to commit suicide. True, but then according to World Health Organisation statistics, approximately one million people commit suicide each year worldwide, which is about one death every 40 seconds or 3,000 per day. So lots of people can and do kill themselves. Every day. So even that is kind of misleading, given what he's arguing for. It would be alright to say that in an ordinary context, but not really when you're saying that life is so much worse than non-life.

Well language isn't necessarily moving, for starters. That would be an odd way to describe language, so not the best description of what language is. But then it's not necessarily doing things with words, either. In fact, that's more like a description of talking or writing. So I think you need to try again, @Banno, maybe with less words. But the right ones this time.

The generosity of the posters in this thread to your solution that women should eat pussy in order to alleviate societal male dominance is either (1) heartingly progressive, or (2) evidence of lack of critical thinking. I choose (2), not at all because I'm challenging your thesis that men have certain societal advantages, but because sexual activity is simply not Rosa Parkesque civil rights activity. — Hanover

Damn. You win this one. I wish I'd have thought of putting it that way. :lol:

I think that that's a totally ridiculous and unnecessary way to tackle problems to do with the stereotypes of gender roles, problems in the bedroom, unfair aspects in relationships, and so on, but people are in control of their own lives, I'm from a liberal democracy, and if they really want to take such needless and farcical extreme measures, then it's not like I can stop them, even if wanted to.

And yes, as others have said, you can't choose your sexual orientation. That's mistaken and offensive.

No teacher, no sarcasm! I really do think you're full of shit and insecure as fuck! — Noble Dust

Well how noble of you. Whatever my shortcomings may be, I at least can correctly identify a red herring.

Hmm. You wouldn't just be telling me what you think I want to hear, would you? :brow:

And I hope that's not sarcasm I detect.

See me after class!

No, I'm not valuing it at all. Again, it's fine if something is usual. I'm just not going to speak for anyone else and claim that anything I do is usual. — Terrapin Station

I just don't believe that. I think that you often fail to recognise the problems which arise as a result of your unusual premises, and you compound the matter by seeing value in their unusualness.

Correct. I'm sorry to have elicited these harsh feelings in you. — Noble Dust

Well don't be. You're a big boy now. Just learn from your mistake and move on.

Yes. The novel reports the thought, belief, and ideas of [Melville]... — creativesoul

Yes, but that's irrelevant. It obviously didn't exist in it's entirety beforehand. An entire novel of that size consists of hundreds of pages, and it's not possible that the entire novel, which would include every single detail, existed in the form of ideas, thoughts, or beliefs, before he had written it all down. You're the one who used the words "in its entirety".

Hold on. The novel existed before the first REPORT of it. That is, if you consider a school report, or a critical analysis, or even a library index card as REPORT, then the statement can't be criticized. The book, whether in manuscript form or in printed form, existed before anyone could report it.

There is no contradiction here at all what I can see. — god must be atheist

I suppose the statement is ambiguous enough to result in different answers. I was assuming that in this example, the "report" would be the novel itself. Otherwise it's just as obvious that, for example, the entire novel could exist before it's reported in the news.

:sad: I'm sorry to have elucidated these harsh feelings in you. — Noble Dust

You mean elicited, not elucidated.

I too care not. — Noble Dust

Okay. You should look up what a red herring is, though. Because giving an example of why I believe what I do alongside my explanation of why I believe what I do, in response to Janus's false claim about why I believe what I do, is very clearly not a red herring, so you're both very clearly wrong to accuse me of having commited that fallacy.

Coriander.

You overvalue being unusual.

I'd say that if someone's philosophical position is at odds with how they behave at times, they have problems with their philosophical position.

So I don't actually ever behave as if I think my moral stances are correct rather than simply how I feel about things, what I'd prefer, etc. — Terrapin Station

Like I said before, that's probably because you interpret things differently. I think your interpretation is the more unusual.

Would there be a way to express preferences but convince you that one doesn't think they're correct at the same time? — Terrapin Station

Yes, I suppose so, in a sense, but now you're moving away from my point, which was about how we behave when we're not conscious of some philosophical position we're committed to, in contrast to consciously expressing ourselves in accordance with that philosophical position.

The novel existed in it's entirety prior to the first report of it. — creativesoul

:rofl:

It's not possible for anyone to have an entire novel of that size in their head! Your title is spot on.

(And no, a rough outline or collection of ideas is not an entire novel).