All of the approaches I suggested come down to "This is what I do!" (Wittgenstein) or Hume's version (in response to the problem of induction), that even though the objection is irrefutable, we are going to continue in exactly the same way anyway. I think he thinks that means that the objection is trivial or futile.

The objectivity of fact only requires justification if one intends to maintain the separation between fact and value. A practice can be held up as evidence in an attempt to justify a fact as objective, — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought that's what you meant. Alternative strategies are 1) to find a way of "desubjectifying" values or 2) undermining the distinction between objective and subjective. Which one is best, I'm not sure.

The means cannot be truly "factual" if this is supposed to mean objective, because the means are justified by the end, and the end is justified as being the means to a further end. — Metaphysician Undercover

If "if p then q" can have a truth value, does that not mean that it is objective. It is certainly true that if want to catch a train, you should go to a station. Why is that not factual - and objective?

A tyranny? Can you give me an example of what you think their main complaint might be? — universeness

Loss of freedom. Being forced to do what they don't want to do.

Interesting. The challenge is how do we determine what is intrinsically worthwhile and what is not? This has to be based on a value system which is open to challenge. — Tom Storm

I don't know what people say now. I think in Peters' time it was thought that an activity would qualify if there was universal agreement. That is weak because you can pursue the same activity both for its own sake and for some further end. I see two possibilities, which are the explanations offered in math and logic. First, there is the medieval view that axioms should be "self-evidently" true, as in Euclid. That's less popular nowadays. Second, they are arbitrary, but in effect justified by the usefulness or interest of the system they produce.

Can you think of anything available to humans that is not natural? I don't know how far this gets us in practice. I tend to think that if we can do it or make it, it's natural... Whether it is 'good' or not is a separate matter. — Tom Storm

That's a perfectly tenable view. I'm no fan of the idea that certain practices are "unnatural". What I had in mind is the idea that we have certain motives built in and will therefore pursue them come what may. The idea is that these are the things that we need to do to survive (or reproduce). It is hard to reject the idea that for an organism to pursue it's own survival (and, by extension, flourishing) does not require justification. Whether it is rational for other organisms to allow that, is another question.

I don't think the 'continuous battle' you seem to be suggesting MUST be a permanent state of life for most humans due to some obscure dictate that humanity is too inherently flawed. — universeness

I don't disagree with most of this paragraph, including this sentence.

I wasn't suggesting that the continuous battle MUST be a permanent state, just that our past experience suggests that it will be. Things might change. But I don't see how. World government based on human rights with effective enforcement? As things stand, many people would experience that as a tyranny. But perhaps we wouldn't care?

Nor did I mean to say that the battle with psychopaths has always involved everyone. But it seems to me that there has always been someone involved in it. Sure, it doesn't follow that there always will be someone fighting. But I do think it will always be dangerous not to be willing to battle (which means suspending normal life!)

So to support this division, the objectivity of "fact" must be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

From the context, I'm guessing that you think that's problematic. Depending what you mean by "justified", that's true. For example, one could argue that our practices, which define "rational" as well as "fact", themselves are not exempt from the challenge of justification, hopefully of a kind different from the justification that they define. The only alternative is some kind of foundationalism.

But if the objectivity of facts is in question, it follows, doesn't it, that the subjectivity of values is also in question. But the means to a given end is already subject to rational justification, so it is presumably "factual", if a conditional can be factual. So it all turns on the status of ends.

As a preliminary, I observe that individuals are what they are within a society, which develops the rational capacities they are born with and, in many ways, defines the world in which they will live and do their thinking and make their choices. I'm happy to agree there is no reason to assume that what we are taught is a consistent or complete system, either for facts or for values.

There are four possibilities that I am aware of:-

1 God's commandments do not help us. The Euthyphro problem is one difficulty. The question which god is another.

2. What is comprehensible as a final end in the context of human practices and ways of life. Martha Nussbaum uses this criterion in "The Fragility of Goodness". This one is particularly interesting because it adopts the Wittgensteinian approach of rational justification as based on practices and ways of life, and so would be either identical to, or parallel with, the concept of rationality.

3. The idea that some activities are "intrinsically worth while". This is a popular concept in philosophy of education. I learnt of it from R.S. Peters' work, but I don't know if he originated it. This amounts to declaring that some ends need no justification, though if you look at the examples (art, music, philosophy &c.), there is a widespread fondness for turning them into the means for other ends. Perhaps those are intrinsically worth while. I think the idea is that these are axioms, from which it is rational to deduce means. So this too amounts to incorporating means into a rational framework.

4. Naturalization of values. By this I mean argument from what are posited as human needs or instincts, shaped by the natural and social context. This has the merit of being very likely true, but suffers from all the arguments that established the fact/value distinction in the first place. It could be a variant of either of the other alternatives.

I don't know whether these approaches amount to abolishing the fact/value distinction and I don't suppose for a moment that they would abolish the issues you and @Jamal are discussing. But I think they might help.

I DO NOT claim that all horrors humans face are caused by religion BUT I DO list it in the top 5 of the biggest barriers to human ability to individually 'be all you can be!' whilst we still have the very short lives we do. — universeness

I realize that you've had a long dialogue about this already. Perhaps you're bored with it. But if I'm right that psychopathic behaviour is part of the human condition, removing religion may reduce the opportunities, but won't cure the problem. Those personalities will just find other ways to wreak havoc on the rest of us. I'm not saying there's nothing we can do about them, just that it's will be a continuous battle. Remember the slogan that freedom is not a place you arrive at and relax. It always needs defending.

Does that logic work as a 'theism'? — Paine

It depends on your god.

I detached from the god, but kept the people and dogs. — Vera Mont

I'm always in favour of people and dogs (and I've nothing against cats, rabbits and horses).

This is a new feature of dogmatism that hasn't been mentioned yet: dogmatism as a tendency to protect a belief. Maybe to combine two theories put forward, yours and Wayfarer 's -- dogmatism is a tendency in human beings to protect the regular form of an accepted principle. And dogma is whatever is being protected. — Moliere

I don't have an issue with that. But there is another point to take into account. Some people talk about "hinge" propositions - ideas around which the debate turns, but which are never the focus of debate. I don't understand the ins and outs of this idea. A related idea is that of conceptual or grammatical propositions. Most people are happy to talk about analytic or a priori propositions. These relate to the language in which debate is carried on or to the ideas that frame the debate.

However that may be, for a debate to occur, there needs to be an agreement about what is at issue and what isn't and what counts as evidence or argument. These things are not dogmas merely because they are not at stake. They can be challenged at any time, but that amounts to changing the subject and that's the difference.

My point is that these are also protected, but legitimately. On the other hand, they can be challenged at any time, and to refuse such a challenge would be dogmatic.

Following this a little further, "dogma" used to mean simply doctrine or principle, but it now has a a value built in to it, so it means something like unreasonable resistance to a reasonable challenge (where what is reasonable can itself be open to challenge). That's my basic point. Unfortunately, one person's dogma is another person's evident accepted truth. So I wouldn't necessarily feel upset if someone called me dogmatic. I might just feel that the discussion was over and about to degenerate into abuse.

(We can speculate on religion in the area if the Nazis hadn't lost; I'm guessing (pure conjecture on my part) that there'd have been some moves toward occultism or Germanic paganism of sorts.) — jorndoe

No need to speculate. The Nazi party was very keen on occultism and especially German paganism and actively promoted it. To be fair, paganism is still around; I have a friend who describes himself as a pagan. He is a perfectly decent, liberal, nice guy. There's a good deal of information about this (including about the Nazis) at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_paganism

The claim is an authoritative yet wholly unsubstantiated opinion, no? — 180 Proof

Not if you count the witnesses described in the Gospels. Of course, those are not unbiased sources.

But one of the awkward issues around these old and significant stories is that they are sometimes contain a nugget or two of truth. Homer's epics are an example, as I'm sure you know. The line between history and myth is not clear.

Even if you accept the witnesses, it would not prove the resurrection. It seems not impossible that Jesus might have been in a coma when they buried him. The Resurrection was just a recovery from coma. Not that that explains everything, but it shows something about how the argument might go. And that's the point. If it's dogma, argument is not allowed or frowned upon.

I'm not sure that I'd put dogmatic atheism with science -- usually my feelings on dogmatic atheism is that it's anti-scientific. — Moliere

I'm glad you like "tendencies" - it's helpfully vague. I'm sure there are many varieties of dogmatic atheism and one of them may be anti-scientific. But I think science is not exempt from dogmatism quite apart from the atheistic variety. Dogmatism is a tendency (!) in people, including scientific people to protect what they believe in, and there is a temptation to rule difficult questions out of court because they are inconvenient and to confuse that motive with more respectable justification for rejecting a question. I would agree that it's not part of what science should be. But then, one needs agreed starting-points to start any research. Is temporary or provisional dogmatism ok?

These are all 'not true'. But they tell important truths in story form. — unenlightened

Quite so. Truth is not just facts.

Does that make it clear how truth, while important, isn't at issue? — Moliere

I'm afraid I don't quite understand what you mean. Is it something like "the importance of truth is not at issue" (which I agree with)? But surely it's obvious that what is true - whether a particular proposition is true or not and even which propositions are capable of truth or falsity - is often at issue?

It seems to me that the distinction between religion and science is usually over-simplified. Religion often includes claims that are supposed to be facts about the world which provides what is most important to it - an account of the world that provides purpose and meaning - I prefer structure - to life. Science includes ideas about what is valuable, primarily truth, of course, but a great deal about how to live life, what is worth pursuing and how it is to be pursued (which, of course, is the stock in trade of religion). Incidentally, how far modern capitalism is an outcome of science is unclear to me, but I would like to think that alternative outcomes of the primacy of science are available.

But anything that provides a basis for a way of life and justifies certain practices and is available to large numbers of people, is going to find lots of different kinds of people amongst its followers. So whatever was originally proposed or recommended is going to find different tendencies developing. So all religions have fundamentalist tendencies, liberal tendencies, intellectual tendencies, practical tendencies, missionary tendencies, quietist tendencies, and on and on. That includes the way(s) of life that exist around science. So I'm inclined to see dogmatic atheism as a tendency within the practice of science which is bound to develop.

I find grand narratives like the conflict between religion and science very difficult. They tend to evaporate when looked at too closely.

If you look at it that way, the dogmatic atheist and the religious fundamentalist can be seen as dual symptoms of an imbalanced/asymmetric form of progress. — Baden

I would go along with that. But let's not be too pessimistic. Perhaps progress happens by over-correcting imbalances.

Maybe we can have one president or prime minister that is either or - male or female. — Benj96

Well, it's certainly true that we can't ensure that a member of every group - sex/gender, race, class, religion, profession etc. etc. can be in the role of supremo, even if a committee is appointed/elected to take that role. We can't even ensure that every group has proportionate representation in the body of representatives - parliament, council or whatever.

It's essential that everyone learns to take sympathetic account of everyone. I realize that's a big ask and requires consistent educational effort. The good news is that any progress towards that goal is good news.

Excuse me for butting in, but may I ask whether there is a reason why you only recommend scepticism about powerful large entities - not that that's inappropriate. But surely we also ought to be sceptical about individuals as well?

I would suggest that one at least reins in the scepticism about people one loves. Love surely means trust means minimal scepticism. It's about the amount of evidence needed before one switches off the trust and switches on the scepticism.

Certainly, we need sensory input to develop a self. I wonder how much we need it to remain a self. — Patterner

I can't see how we would ever be able to find out. On the other hand, being regarded as a person and, in my opinion, learning to be a person both require the ability to interact with others. So one does not need only the senses, but the entire sensori-motor system.

Would seem rather an awkward case for neural reductionism. — Wayfarer

There doesn't seem to be any major effect on normal life. I'm sure that neural reductionists would be happy to accept that brain function can be preserved even under these circumstances. That's what is so surprising about these cases. The only symptom that could be identified in the case of the person I knew is that they seemed to get a lot of headaches.

Man with Tiny Brain Shocks Doctors — Wayfarer

I'm surprised that the doctors were shocked. I've heard of this phenomenon before. Indeed, I once knew someone who had this condition diagnosed. There were absolutely no evident symptoms of abnormality. The brain is an amazing thing.

the issue of what constitutes the self. — bert1

The answer is that what constitutes my self is me. There's no need to reify the self as some part of me. Indeed the question whether some part of me is my self creates some questions that are very hard to understand. If that part of me were to be damaged or destroyed, who would I be?

It does seem, however that most physical damage does not affect who I am. It is mental damage, such as the various dementias or the phenomena of multiple personalities, that creates the issue. I don't see a clear borderline there. Note, I'm not saying that mental damage doesn't have a physical basis, just that what interferes or prevents the various functions and activities that we classify as mental can lead us to feel that this is not longer the same person or even not a person.

Both of these are important and complicated issues. But daunting. It would be interesting to undertake it, but if I ever do, it will have to be later. But if you want to make a start, I would be happy to discuss progress with you.

I suppose one would have to first do some sort of literature search. I don't suppose much has been written about this, but there might be something.

The only part of you that you cannot lose, and still think of yourself as you (and, for that matter, still think), is your brain. If you could no longer walk and type and wave, and see and hear and taste, you’d still be you. (Though you might wish you were not.) — Patterner

I agree, of course, that If I lose my brain, I cannot think of myself as me. But it would be a very delicate balance to produce exactly the right brain damage to achieve loss of self without immense collateral damage up to and including death.

However, I do think that more than just a brain is needed to maintain a sense of self. It's not quite the same issue, but you did say earlier:-

We certainly need sense-data for our brains to form connections and pathways, and for consciousness to form. (Anybody think an infant born with no ability to sense anything will become a thinking person?) — Patterner

There's a constant temptation to identify this or that feature of human beings to this or that physiological component. Often, that's possible. But not always, and being a person is a case in point - or so it seems to me.

And I don't think it's accurate to say that Hume intended to show that Newton was wrong. I think that his intention was completely different. — Jacques

No, it isn't. I didn't intend to say that. Especially as he admired Newton. Apparently his ambition was to become the Newton of psychology. It's much more likely that he intended to supplement Newton by placing psychology on a firm foundation, just as Newton placed physics on a firm foundation.

Where does he portray reason as infallible? — Fooloso4

He doesn't. I assumed it was an error.

Can't imagine the mind exists independent of the brain. Seems to me the mind is the brain, doing... mind things. — Patterner

It's complicated. My heart pumps blood; I don't. My kidneys filter my blood; I don't. My muscles move my arm, fingers, legs; but I (and not my brain) walk and type and wave. My brain is clearly a key part of seeing and thinking, but I do those things, not my brain.

We can only say that, as far as we know, they have held true without exception up to now, and that we hope they will hold true tomorrow. — Jacques

It's inescapably true that scientific theories can be replaced, and very likely that the ones we know will be replaced. That's progress, so worrying about it seems inappropriate.

But I don't think that it's really accurate to say that Newton showed that Aristotle was wrong or that Einstein showed that Newton was wrong, it was just that Aristotelian physics only works in restricted circumstances. Einstein didn't show that Newton was wrong, just that Newtonian physics doesn't apply near the speed of light. The idea that the earth is flat is just wrong, but the idea that it is a sphere is compatible with Ptolemy (with the earth at the centre of the universe). But the resulting astronomy would be very complicated and inaccurate; Copernicus/Kepler is simpler and more accurate.

Knowing the speech to text and swiping make a lot of errors, I try to proofread. I obviously do not always succeed. — Patterner

It's a common error. I was educated on texts that were derived from manuscripts, which meant that I had to deal with the science of variant readings. It's just part of the way things are.

Can we program consciousness into them, because consciousness is nothing but particles following rules? Why are we not as they are, collections of particles following rules, not noticing, and thinking about, what we're doing? — Patterner

I don't know whether we can program machines to be conscious or not and I don't know why or how we are conscious. Maybe there'll be answers some day. In the mean time we are making a philosophical mistake that was first made by Plato - thinking that the latest scientific development is the answer to everything.

But it's not only the sense-data and physics. — Patterner

It depends whether you mean that it is the addition of some thing (not something) else. I don't think a disembodied mind can exist, although it seems that people can not only imagine such a thing, but believe in it. A physical dimension or substrate is necessary. But a rock doesn't have a mind and is not conscious. It doesn't have the equipment. The equipment required is more than brain. As you say, sense-organs are not optional, although their capacities are variable. The brain is pretty useless unless it is attached to a the spinal column and indeed the entire nervous system. But even that is not enough, I think. It needs a glandular system, which gives us much of our motivation, and a skeleto-muscular system that enables action. But the body is not the mind. I'm not confident to articulate anything beyond that, but I know that I am a person, a human being, a living body and conscious. And I know that I am not four distinct entities. Now I'm rambling because I don't have anything coherent to say.

But I have an impression that we are, after all, on the same page, at least.

I've had Op 127 in my head since your first response to me. Finally listening to it right now. — Patterner

Good choice.

I don't see this. Right from wrong is a judgement made by reason. If reason is fallible so is that judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. I didn't mean to imply it was anything but fallible. So long as we get it right sometimes and can correct our errors when we become aware of them. I'm afraid total security is not available.

If we look at human activities as fallible, such that this is necessary, or essential to all human activities, then we can conclude that reasoning, or "reason" is necessarily fallible, through deductive logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are some complications here, but that is at least close to what I’m trying to say. I think we are already agreed on a similar argument in relation to the senses.

Fortunately, “fallible” means “sometimes wrong”, not “always wrong”. Fortunately, also, the argument relies on the fact that we can tell wrong from right. So between the senses and reason and a suitably critical attitude, we can achieve some knowledge.

I think consciousness is casual. — Patterner

I’m puzzled. I think “casual” here may be a typo. Is that right?

Our consciousness, our awareness, is nothing more than lumps of matter noticing what’s going on. — Patterner

I don't disagree. But there are different kinds of lumps of matter. Some of them are conscious. Others are money. Others are people we love.

I’m still puzzled.

Are numbers, words, logical variables, musical notes, lumps of matter? What about shadows, rainbows, surfaces, colours, boundaries, sub-atomic particles?

Votes, contracts, insults, punches, all involve lumps of matter, but are they lumps of matter?

Pictures are lumps of matter, but are they just lumps of matter like any other?

Card games all involve lumps of matter, but does that mean there is no important difference between them? Banknotes are all lumps of matter, but it doesn't follow they all have the same value.

Let me try an analogy. There used to be a popular philosophical theory – sense-datum theory. This argued that everything that we know, including our concepts, comes from the senses. Many people took this to mean that everything can be reduced to sense-data. Hence, physics can be reduced to sense-data. So what would you say to them?

Love your quartets, btw. — Patterner

I'm glad to hear it. I love them too. I wish I had written them, but glad I don't have to live that tortured life.

I would say that a computer is constructed such that, in a (weakly) emergent sense, the computer behaves as if it were governed by mathematics/software. However, it would be suggesting overdetermination to claim that the behavior of the computer is governed by mathematics as well as physics. (I'm not sure what "governed by mathematics" would mean.) — wonderer1

Well, you're not wrong. My use of "governed" was not satisfactory. But your introduction of "emergent" is part of what I'm trying to say. Emergent properties, in my understanding, do not reduce to, for example, physics. But physics is still what I would call the substrate of them. If the calculations of a computer are to be regarded as reliable, we need to believe that they (non-accidentally) coincide with or represent, or are, mathematics. It's a similar relation to the one that exists when we make the calculation by writing symbols down and moving them around in accordance with certain rules.

I can't speak for what others are thinking when they say that "a computer is performing a calculation", but what I am doing in that case is taking pragmatic advantage of speaking simplistically in terms of the emergent properties a computer was designed to have. — wonderer1

When the machines in a supermarket shout "Unexpected item in the bagging area", are we justified in saying that the machine said something? No, and yes. I interpret the sounds as speech (which they are designed to be) and treat that speech as if someone has said it. But when it sounds like speech and I react to it as speech, why is it wrong to say that something was said?

I'd say physics left to itself produced stars, which produced the elements of which the Earth is composed. Physics occurring on the Earth through evolution produced brains, and brains can reasonably be considered computers. (Though not digital computers.) The operation of brains is still physics and resulted in the production of digital computers. So in a roundabout way physics left to itself did produce digital computers. We just don't tend to think of ourselves as being aspects of "physics left to itself". — wonderer1

Oh, yes, we are indeed star-dust. But not simply star-dust because we can do things that star-dust cannot, like understanding and manipulating physics.

But I'm arguing the fallibility of science in general, because of its reliance on sense data, so this is just circular. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fallibility of science is just a facet of the fallibility of human beings. I'm guessing, but I guess you are taking this line because you want to escape Hume's problem.

I agree with Hume's criticism of induction, as indicated. I just don't agree with how he proceeds from there. That the problem exists is really quite evident, but I think that Hume moves in the wrong direction, toward portraying it as unresolvable rather than toward finding principles to resolve it. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you put your faith in reason because a rational principle would resolve Hume's problem? But reason has two facets. One facet is the theorems and deductions, which give transcendent certainty. Tempting. But the other facet is human beings who try to follow the rules of reason. When things go wrong, we cannot blame the rules which are by definition immune to mistakes and error. So we blame ourselves instead. In other words, reason has success logic. You can trust reason in the abstract sense, but human attempts to apply it are not immune from mistake. When you think you have the rational solution, you may be mistaken. I think of reasoning as a human activity, rather than an abstract structure, so perhaps I have a slightly different perspective from you.

You misunderstand. What goes on in our brain is the physical basis of awareness, so if what goes on in our brains were any different, we would not have awareness. As to the causal effects of awareness, it would be contrary to physical laws if there were none. We just don't know what they are yet.
— Ludwig V
I don't know what you mean here. — Patterner

Neither do I. It's a problem and I don't know the answer. I was responding, not well, to you saying:-

The physical events - which we think of in terms of neurons and brain structures, but which are ultimately reducible to particles movements and interactions - would still take place without our awareness. And our awareness doesn't add anything, because awareness has no causal ability. It's all physics. — Patterner

Let me try again. The physical events in our brain - let's say - cause (or maybe underlie) our awareness, so although they are not dependent on our awareness, they can't take place without our awareness. I can't imagine why you think our awareness has no causal ability.

That's all there is, — Patterner

I don't know what that means.

If something other than physics is producing computers - if something other than physics exists at all - it had to have come about other than by physics. — Patterner

This is not false. But it is simplistic.

You may have noticed what many people have pointed out, that one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. There's no physical difference. So what makes the difference?

It's also a common problem that one person's music is another person's dreadful row. There's no physical difference. So what makes the difference?

Pleasure and pain are sometimes physical phenomena, sometimes not. All pleasure and all pain is produced by physics. So what's the difference between physical pleasure and physical pain? And what the difference between physical pleasure/pain and non-physical pleasure/pain?

Physics is a human construction - a representation, let's call it - of the world. It is the result of human activity. Do we conclude that physics made physics? Or that physics doesn't exist?

Not to say there aren't a lot of unknown details to how consciousness arises, but doesn't information processing seem likely to be the substrate on which consciousness is built? — wonderer1

That's not untrue. But philosophers and other academics tend to forget that the nervous system not only passes information to and fro, but also controls action. Life is about information, but not only about information.

If I understand physical reductionists (and that's an "if", and I guess not all agree with each other), physics' recognition of the things you mention is irrelevant. — Patterner

You are quite right that reduction is a complicated topic. But one thing it clearly means is leaving out what's irrelevant - and that means "irrelevant to physics". I accept that in some sense everything has a substrate in the physical. But that's not as simple as you might think. The obvious case is mathematics, which is the basis of physics. But do we think that physics reduces to mathematics?

What goes on in a computer doing a calculation is, no doubt, entirely governed by physics. But it is also governed by mathematics - that's why we call it a calculation. Of course, humans have organized the computer to ensure that's the case. So the basis of the physical processes in a computer is mathematics and the basis of that situation is that humans have arranged it. Yet the basis of human activity is physics. But physics left to itself does not produce computers.

I'm referring to the idea of a category. Physics explains everything in the category of the physical and nothing in any other category. So most radical reductionists are making a category mistake. The best way I can think of to explain this is by quoting the Wikipedia entry "Category mistakes":-

The term "category-mistake" was introduced by Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (1949) . . .
The phrase is introduced in the first chapter. The first example is of a visitor to Oxford. The visitor, upon viewing the colleges and library, reportedly inquired "But where is the University?" The visitor's mistake is presuming that a University is part of the category "units of physical infrastructure" rather than that of an "institution". Ryle's second example is of a child witnessing the march-past of a division of soldiers. After having had battalions, batteries, squadrons, etc. pointed out, the child asks when is the division going to appear. "The march-past was not a parade of battalions, batteries, squadrons and a division; it was a parade of the battalions, batteries and squadrons of a division." (Ryle's italics) His third example is of a foreigner being shown a cricket match. After being pointed out batsmen, bowlers and fielders, the foreigner asks: "who is left to contribute the famous element of team-spirit?" He goes on to argue that the Cartesian dualism of mind and body rests on a category mistake.

You said:-

The physical events - which we think of in terms of neurons and brain structures, but which are ultimately reducible to particles movements and interactions - would still take place without our awareness. And our awareness doesn't add anything, because awareness has no causal ability. It's all physics. — Patterner

You misunderstand. What goes on in our brain is the physical basis of awareness, so if what goes on in our brains were any different, we would not have awareness. As to the causal effects of awareness, it would be contrary to physical laws if there were none. We just don't know what they are yet.

We understand how the properties of particles that we are aware of give rise to the macro properties.  Physical properties like liquidity, as well as physical processes like flight. There is no macro property that is not, ultimately, due to properties of the micro, even if we don't think about it that way. — Patterner

That's true. The problem is that physics defines itself in such a way that it cannot recognize anything else. So friendship, love, hatred, tyranny, democracy cannot occur in a theory in physics. One can sometimes "reduce" things to physics, like the aurora borealis or heat. But the beauty of the aurora borealis is not reduced, but eliminated, and there is an argument about whether heat is the motion of molecules or a sensation, which is not something that can be recognized in thermodynamics. That doesn't resolve the problem, but perhaps does something to explain why it exists.

If you do not see that reason is far more reliable than sense, and when the two disagree it is far more reasonable to accept reason over sense, then I think you're right when you say further progress is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

1) If you show me some statistics, I'll consider your hypothesis. 2) The rejection of the irrationality of the square root of 2 by the Pythagoreans was not because of the senses but because of their reason. You will say that they were not rational. So reason guarantees success because failure is labelled as something else. 3) Many people (some theists and some atheists) have believed, and some still do, that belief in God is rational. Many others (including some who believe in God) do not. It certainly is not a matter for the senses. Who's right? 4) The belief that the sun goes round the earth seems to me to be an error in reasoning, not in perception. 5) Reason requires premisses to function at all. Where do they come from? Either they are axioms or they are empirical. 6) Have you never made a mistake in reasoning about something? If so, congratulations. You may be unique.

Seems to miss the point. We don't have to give up either. Reason is pretty useless without the senses, at least to any empiricist. IOW the senses are, for example, the foundation of science: in observations. — Bylaw

I appreciate your support.

Reread my post, I said "when the two disagree". It seems like you misunderstand the nature of science. The senses are not the foundation of science, science is based in hypotheses, theory. Your empiricist theory has misled you, another example of how human beings allow their senses to deceive them. — Metaphysician Undercover

You did indeed. My mistake. However, I thought, as said, that the foundation of science, and the ultimate arbiter of truth, was observation and experiment. Hypotheses and theories are critically important, but when theory and data conflict, it is theory that needs to be changed. I have the (no doubt misleading) impression that a key battle in the establishment of modern science was that principle. Have things really changed that much?

Why do you think that the sun appears to come up and go down, when this has been proven to be false? — Metaphysician Undercover

This illustrates the depth and complexity of our disagreement. The sun does go up and down, from the point of view of the surface of the earth. It could not be otherwise. The cues that normally allow us to know when we are moving are missing, just as they are missing in an aeroplane. Or better, we are not moving in relation to our immediate surroundings, so we interpret everything from that point of view. When we identified the evidence and interpreted it correctly, we changed our belief. The situation of being spun is quite different because we are being spun in relation to our immediate surroundings.

.....moving forward into the realm of what logic dictates, even though this may appear contradictory to sense data, is to fall for that deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Senses and reason are both capable of misleading us and are our only resources for finding the truth. Junking one in favour of the other is incomprehensible to me.

I have a feeling that the conditions are not such as to provide a basis for progress in this debate. Do you?

In reality life is not simple, so all we're doing with this type of notion is facilitating the deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by "this type of notion". But I am sure that the senses do not systematically deceive us. I'm also sure that simplicity is not an option, but a necessity. When someone throws a ball at us, we cannot apply Newtonian mechanics to work out how to catch it. The fact that we can catch it in the time available is amazing; but we can only do it by simplifying. Equally, to do the washing up, we need to know that hot water and detergent will help us to do this; if we had to consider the molecular interactions involved, we would starve before we had clean plates. If we had senses that perceived everything that's going on at the level of electrons, we would be unable to grasp the bigger picture that we need. It's not about deception; it's about pragmatics.

Look, we see the sun as rising and setting, when logic tells us the earth is really spinning. . . . Do you think that living beings are incapable of 'feeling' that the planet they are on is spinning? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a classic example of what I mean. There's a story - I don't know if it's true - that someone observed to Wittgenstein that it is easy to understand why the ancients thought that the sun goes round the earth, because that's the way it looks. To which Wittgenstein replied "How would it look if it looked as if the earth was spinning?" The answer is, exactly the same. There's no deception, just a misinterpretation, based on the assumption that we are not moving. We make that assumption all the time, except when we know we are moving. In this case, there's no easily available perception that would bring it into question, so we interpret our perceptions in that way. Eventually, having paid attention to other perceptions, we work out that the earth is spinning and interpret our perceptions accordingly. Where's the deception?

As to electrons, we are simply not equipped to perceive electrons directly. I'm cautious about pronouncing on the sub-atomic world; I don't understand the physics well enough. I am clear that our senses give us the information they are equipped to gather. By paying attention to our perceptions more closely, we work out that physical objects are very different at small scale. Our perceptions did not deceive us, any more than a normal microscope deceives us when it does not reveal electrons. We misinterpreted them, but now have a better understanding because we paid closer attention to the information they give us.

"Mundane" was perhaps a poor choice. I agree that sometimes the truth is amazing. But I also think that it is sometimes mundane.

There is a fundamental incompatibility between the perception of reality as a persistently changing continuity, and as a succession of separate but contiguous discrete instances. This is an incommensurability which mathematicians have not been able to resolve. Therefore, one of the ways of representing the world must be wrong, either the way of sensation, as a continuity, or the way of logic, as a succession of discrete instances. — Metaphysician Undercover

This goes way beyond my criticism of Hume for his atomistic idea of experiences. Logical atomism is a different issue, and I'm not aware that anyone thinks it is viable. Your conclusion is that:-

So to allow for the possibility that reality is intelligible to us, we must assume that the senses deceive us — Metaphysician Undercover

Your conclusion has a certain paradoxical appeal. I agree that sometimes we draw the wrong conclusions from what our senses tell us (that's a bit over-simplified, but it will do for now); but surely we sometimes get it right. Similarly, reality is partially intelligible to us and partly not, and we work hard to understand the latter part. You seem very fond of comprehensive statements, but the truth is more mundane than that. For example, you say:-

We say things like "this was the situation at time1, and this was the situation at time2. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I say "Don't we also say things like "between t1 and t2 this process was going on?"

I'm not at all sure what you are getting at in this post.

I'm afraid I got confused by your post.

In the beginning, you say:-

Hume described the experience of sensing as a series of static states which may change as time passes. This implies a break, a divide between each state. Then he moves to address the problem of how the mind relates one state to another. The distinct states being what sensation gives us. But i think that in reality, sensation is an experience of continuous activity, which we produce breaks in through withdrawing our attention, either intentionally or unintentionally. — Metaphysician Undercover

But by the end, we have:-

From this perspective we can apprehend the continuity which is given by sensation as manufactured, created by the apparatus which produces the sense experience, and therefore there is the potential that this is not a true representation. Now we would have the proper platform for inquiring into the possibility of true divisions, the true separations in time, which the experience of sensation, as a continuity, hides from us in its deceptive ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with the first quotation, but not with the second and, although I accept that we often get things wrong, I'm not at all sure that it is because our sensations deceive us; it may be that they neither deceive nor reveal. The problem may like in our interpretations.

That's a lot to respond to in your posts. It's an impressive extended argument. I don't pretend this is comprehensive. This is just a series of comments.

If deductively accessible logical laws do cause progression, then seeing the rock break a window IS seeing causation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with the consequent, but I don't understand the antecedent. If the antecedent is false, then the project of understanding the world is hopeless. Or is there an alternative approach?

If the universe follows laws, if it is deterministic (even in a stochastic way), then it seems possible, maybe even plausible given the successes of attempts to identify such laws, to define the root rules by which the present always evolves into the future. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's an ambiguity between "follows" in the sense of "comes after" and "follows" in the sense of "is constrained by". It doesn't make any sense to me to speak of the universe being constrained by natural laws. Natural laws are what the universe does given that it is not constrained. Actually, it is neither constrained, nor not constrained; it just does what it does.

There's a similarly weakness in the idea of causation. There's an idea that a cause somehow forces its effect. But that's a category mistake.

This supports the essentialist picture. If a thing’s identity depends on what it is made of, its microstructure will necessarily determine its disposition to behave in particular ways, i.e. its causal powers.

Unfortunately, although the idea that a thing's identity depends on what it is made of seems plausible, I can't accept essentialism, particularly not the variety that derives from Kripke.

The problem with that argument, for me starts from:-

Identity statements between rigid designators are necessarily true if they are true. Each term independently picks out the same thing in every possible world.

So far as I can see, Kripke's argument proves that for every statement capable of truth or falsity, if it is true, it is necessarily true. But doesn't it follow that any statement that is not true in every possible world, is not necessarily true in every possible world. I find this unhelpful.

Because seeing events follow from one another is somehow not seeing how events follow from one another. But this is true only if you don't accept that events follow from one another in the first place. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's right. The difficulty is to see exactly what "how" means and to understand that asking such a question means rejecting Hume's idea of atomistic idea of experience (which analytic philosophy largely inherited from Hume). That requires understanding Wittgenstein's reasons for abandoning his logical atomism - that is, the colour-exclusion problem and his remark to the effect that a single proposition is never "compared to reality" but a system of propositions. Similarly, we do not experience the world as a succession of atomistic, independent events. We need to pay attention to the idea of a "Gestalt", to understand the part/whole relationship in a more complex way.

Either of these routes then leaves Hume open to all the arguments against radical skepticism, my favorite being from Augustine's "Against the Academics," because they're witty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't read the Augustine book. I'll make a note of that. Thanks.

Therefore the skeptic wins out in the end, because each such expectation is unique, and therefore must undergo examination through the skeptic's microscope, in a way unique to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid I disagree with both of you. You misunderstand Hume. His position is that scepticism is right if it recommends careful and judicious examination of the facts and judicious decisions based on them, wrong if it is applied excessively. I think that's about right. It's not a case of radical scepticism (Pyrrhonism according to Hume) or nothing.

So we would need to isolate and analyze this specific UP as to its own peculiarities and uniqueness, in order to determine whether your expectations about particular aspects of the future are well grounded. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume's position is that even though our inferences are not well grounded, we will continue to make them, as a result of what he calls "custom or habit". He then makes a sequence of moves, as I outlined in an earlier post, to arrive at a non-sceptical position that "uniform experience" is proof. One may or may not think that's legitimate; it's certaintly dubious. There is also the problem that experience is not uniform, unless we select among our experiences. Which, as you are indicating, we do, and in the process notice differences as well as similarities.

but only the ones which prove themselves to be useful (and this is itself an inductive method) are accepted into convention. The usefulness is what inspires the "firmly held dogma". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's exactly what Hume says, in the end.

Please tell me what your rationale is for believing that the future will resemble the past. — Jacques

Wittgenstein, as so often, has it right when he says:-

If anyone said that information about the past could not convince him that something would happen in the future, I should not understand him. One might ask him: what do you expect to be told, then? What sort of information do you call a ground for such a belief? … If these are not grounds, then what are grounds?—If you say these are not grounds, then you must surely be able to state what must be the case for us to have the right to say that there are grounds for our assumption….-Wittgenstein

I would only want to add:-

First, it's not just about the future and the past. There is much about the past and the present that we do not know. What we normally do is to expect that what we do not know will resemble what we do know. It's about the known and the unknown.

Second, it's not a simple either/or. It would be quite unreasonable to expect that the future will totally resemble the past and to expect it to be totally different. We actually do is to expect that the future will resemble the past in some respects and to expect that it will be different from the past in other respects. That seems reasonable to me.

But we also have no choice but to continue to use the same language to describe the present, the past and the future. We can and do adapt our language in the light of unexpected events as they occur. What's the alternative?

Does that help?

It is this understanding of "the reason why" the two events are related, which validates the necessity of causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid I do have a problem here. I don't disagree with this, but I don't understand what "validates the necessity" means.

we can say that when the cause occurs, the effect must occur. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's fine, except that I want to ask why "must". What if it doesn't?

If you say "Oxygen is necessary for life (except for anaerobic bacteria)", I understand that if there is no oxygen, most living things die. So I understand that most living things must live in an atmosphere that contains a certain percentage of oxygen.

So, for example, if a temperature of lower than zero Celsius is said to cause water to freeze, then we can say that whenever this temperature occurs, water will freeze necessarily. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not clear what the last word adds to the bald statement "water will freeze."

The best that I can offer is that if the prediction fails, I will not abandon the generalization, but treat it as a problem that demands an explanation that will preserve as much as possible of what I thought I knew. So if a sample doesn't freeze at that expected temperature, I will research until I find an answer - such as that the water contains too much salt to freeze at the normal temperature. Again, having learnt that fire causes burns, when I find burns occurring in the absence of fire, I will research until I realize that it is heat, not fire, that causes burns and amend my causal law accordingly. Admittedly, my belief that when a causal law fails, there must be an explanation, and my treatment of such failures as not just a fact, but a problem, is a matter of faith, (this may not be the right expression, but something along those lines is needed). Strictly speaking, when what we think is a causal law fails, that disproves the law (cf. Popper). But I can postpone abandoning the law until I'm convinced that there is no explanation for the exceptional case. There is no time limit on the postponement, so I am never compelled to abandon it and if my law is useful, I will classify the falsification as an unexplained event and continue to rely on it. Necessity is a matter of the status of "water will freeze", and not a straightforward question of truth or falsity.

Does that make any sense?

The point is not whether our predictions are guaranteed, or one hundred percent certain, but that we can have success in a consistent way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think Hume would agree with you. But he does say something to the effect that we discover from experience that there is a "pre-established harmony" between our predictions and what happens in the world. He doesn't explain himself. I think I see the finger of God there, but I'm speculating. (Hume (in the chapter on miracles) says that he does believe in God, but on faith, not reason, and he says that this faith is a miracle (i.e. caused by God).) If I'm right, this would probably be taken as a guarantee by believers.

Now, we can see that Hume tends to conflate these two types of successful prediction, the one based in statistical analysis, requiring no concept of causation, and the one based in causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say that's exactly right.

We might inquire whether this type of prediction based in simple memory, and developed into an application of mathematics in statistical analysis, is a form of reasoning, or another type of habit or custom. — Metaphysician Undercover

It all turns on the question of justification. Statistics can identify correlations, but cannot justify them. I believe that statisticians do recognize the difference between correlation and causation, but I don't know how they deal with it. Certainly, statistics can't provide what you are asking for.

And I really don't think we can relate two types of events as cause and effect, in the true and necessary way required to produce consistently successful predictions, without some form of reasoning. And this is why it is necessary to understand "the reason" why they are related as cause and effect, in order that the relationship proposed be the true and necessary relation required for consistently successful predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would agree that there is a valid question why correlations hold, when they do. Much science provides answers, in the form of explanations, which are defined (in philosophy) as deductive-nomological arguments. (That is, a syllogism that deduces the phenomenon to be explained from a law, or generalization) I don't find that particularly helpful, and it walks straight back into the arms of the argument against induction. I prefer to think of theories as mechanisms, showing how the effect is produced. In any case, theories put a given correlation into a larger context and so get round Hume's atomistic approach - taking each correlation on its own.

I have to say that I don't understand what necessity means here. I assume you don't mean the "true in all possible worlds" kind of necessity. That would be ambitious for an explanation of empirical phenomena.

He needs to explain what other types of mental customs we have, which are other than reasoning, and how those other customs might result in successful predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not trying to defend Hume, just to understand him. All we've got is what he wrote and I don't think those texts have the answers to your challenges, except that I don't think he ever claims that there is any guarantee that our predictions are always successful. That would be inconsistent.

Look at it this way. He argues 1) that all our ideas are drawn from experience 2) that experience provides no justification for making predictions based on past experience and 3) that we are going to go on doing just that. He also says that we have found this practice useful. Whether this counts as a justification or merely a cause is debateable.

So far, I don't think that's inconsistent. What is odd is that he changes the definition of "proof" (in a footnote, perhaps thinking that no-one will notice) and then ends up saying that "uniform experience amounts to a proof" - which, to be fair, is not quite the same as saying that it is a proof. The only defence I can think of for this move is a Wittgensteinian move along the lines "This is what we call proof in this context."

Does that make sense?

I think this is interesting as a response to scepticism that does not attempt to refute it.

Hume's statement that "uniform experience" provides a proof which leads no room for doubt is very unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. One of my points was precisely that he ends up ignoring the sceptical argument that he has so vigorously defended. However, his actual policy is to ignore it. He says, for example, that scepticism cannot be refuted and recommends a return to normal life and everyday occupations as a cure for it.

Hume response to scepticism is what I would call robust. (I think he would have liked Dr. Johnson's response, but he doesn't mention it.) Moore and Wittgenstein are similarly robust as well.

But, it is through the use of memory, comparison, and inductive reasoning that we identify consistency through distinct events, to conclude uniformity. — Metaphysician Undercover

You outline a standard account. But I don't accept that it is Hume's. But he is very clear a) that he accepts the sceptical argument (on the grounds that our experience provides no basis for rejecting it) and b) that we make our predictions because of association of ideas and custom or habit. He is careful to say that our understanding plays no part in this, which I think means that no process of reasoning is involved. I think his account is best classified as a causal one.

However, I have to admit that interpreting what he says is not straightforward because he never uses the word "induction". (I think it was introduced by J.S. Mill long after Hume wrote.)

We just naturally assume that things will be the same, rather than having derived this idea from experience and inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry if this is a bit off-topic and I promise not to pursue it. What you say is true. But I can't resist pointing out that Hume makes a lot more of his similar point.

In Enquiry V, he repeats again that there is "no secret power or process of reasoning that leads us to expects similar results" from similar initial conditions and then points out that we are still "determined" to draw the same conclusion, even though we are "....convinced that .. understanding has no part in the operation". He concludes that "There is some other principle which determines (sc. us) to form such a conclusion. This principle is Custom or Habit." Then he says "By employing that word, ..... we only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects". So it is essentially a causal explanation of why we continue in the same way despite the sceptical arguments.

So far, so good. But he goes further in footnote 1 to Enquiry VI.

"Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition"

And then in X.1."... it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life ; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; … Enquiry X. 1

So Hume really ought to be classified with G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein in as an opponent of sceptical conclusions.

I didn't mean to be too dismissive because I hadn't read the article carefully enough to be sure. I was very surprised that the homunculus turned up. It's such a cliché.

It's quite simple, really. We think of the box on the wall that contains a thermometer and a switch and think that controls the heat. Which it does, in a way. But when you take the box apart, you find, to your dismay, that no part of the box controls the heat. It's the system that controls the heat, not any part of it.

A different kind of example is in the orbit of the planets, etc around the sun. No part of the system that produces that effect is in control of it. It is the balanced system as a whole that keeps the planets in line.

Easy problems can be quite elaborate and even proven accurate, but still don’t actually touch upon the hard problem itself. — schopenhauer1

I haven't worked out my approach to the problem. It's on my list of chestnuts that I would like to get my head around one day. But I would start by making sure that the problem isn't in the way it is formulated. My suspicion is that it is not capable of solution and merely demonstrates that Wittgenstein was right about subjective experiences (which is what, I think, "qualia" are supposed to be). I will concede, however, that his response to the expostulation that there is a difference between you experiencing a pain and me experiencing the same pain. He asks what greater difference there could be. I don't think that's enough.

I apologize if I seem dismissive. I don't mean to be. People who deserve respect take the hard problem very seriously.

Very interesting.

The idea that feedback loops are critical to understanding what goes on seems absolutely right to me. Certainly they make all the difference between a reflex and an action, and seem to explain the phenomenon of blind sight.

But any theory that requires positing a "mental representation" which implies an internal observer (visible in the diagrams of the brain after the paragraph beginning "The key to acquiring phenomenal properties..."} is postponing the hard problem and for that reason seems implausible to me.

I'll have to read this more carefully.

Language is very complicated indeed. But if philosophers don't pay close attention to complexities, they will develop distorted and partial views. But paying attention to complexities usually makes it more difficult to get a debate that can be decided for or against on each side. There's a very fine line between clarity and misrepresentation.

There are two approaches to language. One treats it as a definite structure; the other treats it as a complex activity. I prefer the latter.

I'm not tempted by scepticism. But I am puzzled and fascinated by the enduring appeal of sceptical views, and the confidence of sceptics in their approach. The odd thing about it is that philosophers who try to respond to scepticism and dismiss it are often remembered as sceptics. Descartes, Berkeley and Hume are all examples. Cavell was right to think that refuting it is not enough and that we need to try to understand it as a phenomenon.

I think some skepticism is just incredulity which is more of an attitude or emotion than reason. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, and I find myself in the grip of incredulity when confronting some sceptical writing. The complication is that incredulity and, indeed, attitudes and emotions may well be irrational, but can have a rational basis. My idea (starting from Cavell) is that we would benefit from a deeper, less dismissive examination of scepticism on the basis that it is more like an attitude or emotion than a hypothesis that is true or false.

I think language allows us to talk about things that may not exist but are based on things that already exist. It seems impossible to talk about things that have no basis in preexisting structures. — Andrew4Handel

The peculiar magic of language is that it allows us to talk (and think) about things that do not exist and even things that exist but are absent or things that cannot be perceived at all. But to talk about them, we need to start where we are. That's not a limitation because there's no alternative.

It goes something like this, I can imagine I am being deceived by my senses that there is a real world out there but what it could be is [insert what you can imagine] like a dream, brain-in-vat, simulation, etc. Then the philosopher goes on to say because this is possible will have no reason to believe we know anything. Radical skepticism is born. — Richard B

I agree with this. You are right that we are far too casual about what it means to imagine something. These situations are never articulated fully and I'm not at all sure that they can be. I don't think either of them is remotely possible unless the real world is pretty much like the one we know and love.

Those cases might persuade me that the "world out there" might be very different from what I experience. But then, I know that already - the physicists remind me of it every time I hear about their work. No brain in a vat or simulation hypothesis could be more unimaginable that the world as seen by relativity or quantum physics. Developing a philosophical understanding of that situation would be more useful than speculating about brains.

Then there is the second move from imagine to possible, neglecting the possibility the we might be capable of imagining impossibilities. (The logic of that is a bit complicated, but still.) The third move is to confuse possibilities with actualities, neglecting the fact that many possibilities are not actual.

There's an issue of human psychology here. Once one focuses on the real possibility that a meteorite might fall on my head or my house at any moment, a feeling of insecurity can develop. Most people, I suppose, reflect that there is nothing I can do about that, and if it happens, I may be dead; if I am not, I'll have to cope with it. Then, after a while, they get bored with that thought and forget it. After all, it hasn't happened yet; I am certain of that.

There is an issue it seems however concerning how we describe our experiences without language. It seems we need language to catalogue our experiences. It depends on what kind of knowledge we want and what we want to do with it. — Andrew4Handel

It is too easy to imagine possibilities that aren't possible and the possibility that language is not meaningful, in my book, is among them. Which is not to deny that misunderstandings are not uncommon. What matters is that we have many ways of dealing with them - when they make a significant difference.

We need language to describe what we experience and there are many things that we can't know without language. But we don't need language to know some things. Animals that don't have language show what they know by their behaviour. The difficulty is to express accurately what they know.

Not all beliefs are reasons for doing something. That pretty much sums it up... broadly speaking. — creativesoul

I didn't mean to imply that everyone will necessarily act on every belief they hold. I meant only that a belief is available to the believer to act on as and when they find it appropriate to do so.

One of the actions stemming from a belief may be expressing it in words, which is not doing anything in one sense, but is doing something for my purposes here.

Though doing nothing can be an action. If I know that there's a bomb under your car, doing nothing would count as an action.

I have forgotten most of what we said. So I'm looking forward to seeing what you dig up.

In this sense I think quite a lot of philosophy might be based on false doubt. — Andrew4Handel

I agree, except that I pretty sure that the "might" is definitely over-cautious. But that thesis needs more detail, which I can't at the moment provide.

language transmits facts and not that all language is up for interpretation. — Andrew4Handel

I'm not sure what you mean by "not up for interpretation". Do you mean something like "has a clear and definite meaning"? My qualification would be that that applies in specific contexts and usually between people who have a relationship within that context. I don't think it is possible to construct a meaningful sentence that cannot be interpreted in different ways in different contexts.

In this sense we know words successfully transmit accurate, veridical meaning that we successfully use to negotiate the world. We tend to understand most of what people tell us unless it contains technical jargon. — Andrew4Handel

There's nothing wrong with what you say, so far as it goes. But language has other important uses, admittedly always in communication, but still...

There is quite a list, but consider the importance of communicating and negotiating values - which, after all, are the basis of action, and co-operative action is at the heart of being a social creature. Speaking of which, establishing friendship - even love - and trust is just as important, though that may be done indirectly rather than in the way we communicate facts. And so on.

But, If I am receiving that data from someone, there can be a lot of subjectivity and connotation bias. I mean, the words do exist themselves, yes. Yet, we can make a twisted use of them and lie to others. So, I see the opposite of your point: we have to believe others to make decisions and keep up the communication. — javi2541997

I agree that it is almost impossible (and the "almost" is probably wrong) to communicate facts and nothing else. Neutral data is very rare. I do agree that trust is a very important factor in living a social life - that's why we tend to believe others unless there is a reason not to. Which is why it is so easy to deceive people.

I think I'm trying to say that language is not just for communicating data, but is critical to nearly everything about the way we live, because we are social animals. That brings a weakness, that it is possible to deceive us. But, in my book at least, that doesn't justify radical scepticism.

I've also been inactive for a while. but you certainly had a better reason for being inactive than me. My reason was that I got fed up with some of the downsides to this game and switched to off-line activities, such as reading a book. It's quite simple, really. What keeps me going is an interesting conversation:-

So, while I agree with saying that beliefs are reasons for doing something (Witt sets this out nicely in a manner that you've continued here), I do not think that beliefs are equivalent to reasons for doing something, and you've said much the same thing a few replies ago. — creativesoul

I don't understand the difference between the first sentence in the quotation and the second. What does "equivalent to" mean in this context?