This might be true from a third person perspective. Not from a first person perspective. — neomac

Yes. First person use of "know" is different from the others, because there is no difference between justification and truth. In the case of second or third person uses, they are. That was the point of the last sentence of my last post.

But it seems to me that the paradigm use has to be second or third person uses, because there is no real difference between "I know that p" and "I believe that p", except emphasis.

Concerns for knowledge is not separate from concerns for the knower. — Fooloso4

Ah! I was hoping you didn't mean Dr. Pangloss's belief that all is for the best in the best possible world. I think you may be right in suggesting that knowing p is good for the knower. Believing that p may or may not be beneficial. Thinking that p is usually harmful - because "he thinks that p" suggests that he is wrong.

I substantially agree but what I find more interesting to notice is the following: while the falsity of p implies that "I know that p" is false, the epistemic "withdrawal" from a belief that "turns out" to be false (as opposed to "unjustified") might correspond to different epistemic conditions: e.g. "I don't know that p", "I know that non-p", "I believe that non-p", "I don't believe that p", or "I doubt that p". Yet only "I know that non-p" would make sense to say to me in that case. In other words, knowledge claims defeated out of falsify are not just "withdrawn" but "replaced" by other knowledge claims. — neomac

I think you are on to something here. I hadn't thought of it. The difference between "I don't know that p" and "I know that not-p" is particularly relevant here. And you are right, of course, that only "I know that not-p" is the contradictory of "I know that p". The relationship of those two to the other three is clearly complicated. In this example, it seems plausible to say that Al doesn't know that p and that he doesn't know that not-p. I'm inclined to say that he believes that p. I would also say that "I doubt that p" implies "I don't believe that p" and "I don't know that p".

But all of that gets more complicated if you consider "s/he knows that p" etc.

I'm afraid I don't know what to make of these two messages.

Some of it I understand and agree with, though I'm not sure I'm interpreting it in the same way as you are.
Some of it I don't understand.

It seems as if you are a platonist. Is that fair?

I feel I want to ask you where you are going with this?

It is in light of the good that the difference between opinion and knowledge can be seen. — Fooloso4

Yes, that is persuasive. Opinion is like knowledge, but deceptive and turn out not to be knowledge. Something pleasurable can be deceptive and turn out not to be good.

I say it is only persuasive because someone who wants to resist the conclusion will simply question the comparisons, and I'm not sure there are compelling reasons to say they are valid.

Something reliable can fail once or twice and still be classed as reliable. But if something certain turns out wrong, it is no longer certain.

I prefer "defeasible" because "fallible knowledge" can be taken to mean that If I claim to know something on good grounds but it still turns out false, it is nonetheless knowledge. So I'm anxious to insist that knowledge doesn't fail - people do. So a claim to knowledge that p must be withdrawn if p turns out to be false.

Well, it was a good thing I checked. What the Gorgias says is rather different from my account of it. You will find that at 463 he characterizes rhetoric as "flattery" and then as "experience and a knack". He contrasts those things with skill or art (techne (and not episteme as I thought. Many examples of techne are discussed. The skill of kubernetike ("navigation" in my translation - which calls the navigator "pilot") apparently includes knowing its limits, in which respect it is contrasted with rhetoric. But then, Socrates calls swimming an episteme at the beginning of the same speech.

See what you make of it.

1. "knowledge" claim is a principled based or procedural form of certainty. And principles/procedures can validate our "knowledge" claim to the extant they are reliable. — neomac

I think I accept that. A lot depends on what you mean by "certain". On some interpretations, that might conflict with reliability, or least, the standard of reliability needs to be compatbile with the standard of certainty.

My feeling is that the question of reliability is indeed important, and that's what justifies the J clause and indeed the infuriating (so some) vagueness about what it means.

Given a choice between the two, I would prefer truth to reliability, but that conflicts with the idea of a definition. But then, I don't think that definition is as all-important as many people seem to think. We seem to manage quite well without water-tight definitions for many of the words we use.

Condition one makes "knowledge" claims legitimate. Condition two makes knowledge" claims fallible. — neomac

It depends a bit on what you mean by "fallible". I prefer to call knowledge claims "defeasible" because I think that if a knowledge claim fails, in the sense if the proposition that is (claimed) to be known is false, the claim to knowledge loses any legitimacy and must be withdrawn. The same applies to any assertion we make, so it isn't as radical as one might think.

I think he is expressing a genuine type of skepticism. We do know what knowledge is but in trying to say exactly what it is and is not, it alludes us. — Fooloso4

Well, that is the classic conclusion of the early dialogues. So you are probably right about that.

I'll look up the Gorgias and give you a reference. It gives you the opportunity to see for yourself. You would probably want that even if I wrote my account of it.

Where is your car?" is a question that doesn't do justice to the scenario as described. How is Al or Betty supposed to answer it? — Agent Smith

Yes. Exactly.

_I don't really understand what your point is and how this is relevant to our Scientific Epistemology of the brain...Care to elaborate? — Nickolasgaspar

I'm afraid I can't provide much elaboration. I assumed that if something is done by the my unconscious self, it followed that I was doing it. Actions done by me are normally done consciously. But there are occasions when we say that something is done unconsciously, so that is not a cast-iron rule. Some habitual actions, some reflex actions and maybe others fall into that category. Still, unconscious actions are, I think, exceptions to the norm. Normally, I am held responsible for what I do, but this is not so clear in the case of unconscious actions.

On the other hand many automatic processes are not classified as actions performed by the self. Heartbeat, digestion are examples. Breathing and swallowing are sometimes performed by the self and sometimes not. On the face of it, brain activity seems more like heartbeat and digestion, but it could be more like breathing and swallowing.

Scientists will do whatever they want to do and work out their own justifications. I have no problem with that. But philosophy has its own agenda and may need to work by different concepts. I doubt, for example, whether questions of moral responsibility figure prominently in the discussions of the unconscious self. Those questions need to be addressed in their own way.

The paradox is best visible when we ask a question other than "do you know where your car is, monsieur/mademoiselle?" — Agent Smith

That puzzles me. I was suggesting that the paradox is best understood when we move away from that question and begin to ask others, like "Where did you park your car?". Simply asking "Do you know where your car is?" presents a limited choice of answers and masks the complexities of the situation. These are revealed when you start to ask other questions.

Is that what you meant?

If we let go of the false belief that knowledge is JTB the dilemma is dissolved. In both the Theaetetus and Meno mathematics plays a key role. Socrates KNOWS how to solve the geometric problem in the Meno, he does not just have an opinion, true or false, about how to solve it. — Fooloso4

I'm very confused by what you say about the dialogues. I would have to look up the dialogues to comment intelligently.

But what I collect from the passage I quote is that you think that the difference between knowledge and true belief is that one has the skill to establish the truth that is at stake. (I'm not sure that's an adequate formilation, so I hope that's reasonably close.) That's a theory and it fits well with what Plato says in the Gorgias about episteme. It's a very demanding criterion, but that also fits well with Plato's ideas about philosophy and common life.

That is a description of an observable phenomenon. The quality of helpfulness follows. — Nickolasgaspar

The observable phenomenon is the brain activity and its apparent connection to what we consciously do at the conscious level. The description "unconscious self" is a decision about how it is appropriate to consider the phenomenon. "Unconscious" applied to "Self" seems contradictory to the normal idea of the self, so it needs more justification than it is getting here. Other descriptions may be more appropriate. I would prefer to say that the various calculations take place, without committing to the idea that anybody is doing them.

I think the application of "material" or "immaterial" in an imagined absolute sense to computations is a category error. It's like saying, for example, "the tree is or isn't spiritual". — Janus

Yes. That's a better response than mine.

My contention is that it is the misuse of Plato, based on a misunderstanding of the dialogue. — Fooloso4

I'm glad we agree about that.

I have read it. It is actually Gettier himself who drags Plato in. He says in a footnote: — Fooloso4

Yes. "Drag Plato in" is exactly right. And his footnote, though it shows a certain respect for him, doesn't help matters.

Actually, given that he actually cites three different versions - all modern - and explicitly claims that his argument will refute all of them, we might guess that citing Plato recognizes that to cite just one version of the definition may mean that he (Gettier) only refutes one version. But then, he should perhaps have included Plato's version in his collection and added it to the list to be refuted. Perhaps he didn't believe that his argument does refute Plato's version. I think he may be right. But then, Plato refutes it anyway. So it's all a bit of a mystery.

It reminds me of the way some people like to cite Epicurus' atomic theory as in some sense a predecessor of modern atomic theory. Which it isn't. Why would it be? I think it is an attempt to give modern theories respectability. But they would do better to let their own theory stand on its own feet. Indeed, I haven't seen that trope for quite a while, so perhaps it isn't done any more.

But the questions of knowledge that Plato raises far exceed the narrower cases that Gettier addresses. In addition, for Plato the issue is not "are you justified for believing" in the sense of having some reason, however insufficient for believing, but "can you defend the belief" in such a way so as to demonstrate its truth. — Fooloso4

Quite so. For me, that's a dilemma. My problem is I haven't been able to develop a third alternative. But I haven't given up hope.

What you say reminds me of what Hume says about radical scepticism - he calls it Pyrrhonic. Everybody will continue on their merry way, despite not being able to disprove it. Indeed, he recommends everyday life as a good cure for it.

Is lived experience not itself a process of continual construction or construal, even prior to the creation of narratives? — Joshs

Yes, certainly. I just wanted to clarify that giving the narrative is an additional process of construction on top of the processes involved in living what the narrative reports.

If recognizing others as selves is an integral part of learning to be a self, then isn’t it going too far to say that individuals do not recognize themselves? — Jamal

I may have been a bit hasty here. "Recognize" can mean "acknowledge" as in "recognizing (or not recognizing) the court". That's quite different from "recognize" as "knowing again". I took what you said in the latter sense.

But crucially, I wouldn’t say that this irreducibility entails immateriality. — Jamal

I agree with that. Indeed you put the point very well, better than I did.

In Cognitive science, there are two types of "Self". — Nickolasgaspar

Well, if that is helpful to cognitive science, it would be churlish to quibble. I wouldn't say, however, that I carry out the processes of the Unconscious Self. I would say that they occur. For one thing, I don't think that I can be held responsible for those processes when they go awry. But if it wasn't my conscious self that carried them out, I suppose it'll work if it is convenient.

Everything responsible for this mental concept is a product of brain function interacting with the environment....hence its Material. — Nickolasgaspar

I wouldn't say that the calculation performed by a computer was material, even though it is the result of a physical process. Indeed, it seems to me to be rather misleading.

The reason, I think, he introduces it is not to provide a model of an account but to address "certain persons". — Fooloso4

Good point. That seems very likely. Thanks.

it is helpful to the extent that it says what knowledge is not, that is, JTB. — Fooloso4

It doesn't disprove JTB. It disproves that the model he proposes isn't appropriate for JTB (or anything else very much).

That's helpful if anyone has proposed such a model, as you point about "certain persons" shows. But I don't think anyone since Plato has.

Are you referring to anyone specific? — Fooloso4

I wasn't. But I can cite Gettier as an example.

You didn't drag Plato into the discussion. Banno did. He was bemoaning the fact that philosophy was still discussing JTB without any results. As I said at the time, my post wasn't directed directly at him, but was an excuse to vent about the use so often made of Plato in discussing JTB.

But I've benefited from the opportunity to discuss it with you. If you can check out Gettier's original article, you can decide for yourself about my complaint.

Why would he use this as the model of an account if it is not helpful? — Fooloso4

That is the puzzle.

More specifically, extracting things from the dialogue, as if they were stand alone arguments. — Fooloso4

It seems to me that what the citations I'm complaining about are doing. They ignore the conclusion that Plato draws, without refuting his refutation.

Socrates human wisdom, his knowledge of ignorance, is in a limited sense knowledge of knowledge. — Fooloso4

True, knowing what one doesn't know may be wisdom or at least the beginning of wisdom. I can see that the dialogue could then be an object lesson. But I don't see that justifies citing the dialogue and then ignoring it.

"I" is a kind of name. What it refers to is defined in the context in which it is used. So it identifies exactly what my name identifies, which is not a part of me, material or immaterial. It is the whole of me.

I recognize the importance of everything that you've packed in to

The self is the overarching temporally extended narrative construct of a necessarily embodied and social consciousness which turns the animal acting in an environment into a subject. — Jamal

But I have to take issue, or perhaps quibble, with

It is that through which the individual recognizes that it is one of many, i.e., an individual in a society of individuals, which are also selves. The self is that which recognizes itself as a self in a world of selves.* — Jamal

Individuals do not recognize themselves. They learn to be themselves in interaction with other selves. There is no process of recognizing others as selves, or rather that skill is an integral part of learning to be a self.

The traditional answers, such as

The experiencer or perceiver. In one sense it seems to be immaterial but it could be something associated with the brain. — Andrew4Handel

are based on the mistake of thinking that because I undergo or initiate various changes, there must be a changeless essence. Theseus' ship is in the same boat. I am different from the boat because change is of the essence, as your emphasis on story shows.

But, a further quibble, my narrative is not constructed. It is lived. Afterwards, narratives may be constructed.

It is immaterial in the sense it is not correlated with anything physical — Andrew4Handel

It might be misleading to deny that my body is part of me. If you mean "immaterial" in the sense that Parliament is immaterial, even though it consists of people organized in a certain way and usually meeting in a certain place, I could buy that. But then, a car or a house is also immaterial because its' constituent part are organized and the organization (design) is immaterial.

What seem important is to have a unified locus of perception/awareness that keeps us aware of a continuity between all these internal things and unifies our incoming data from the external world. — Andrew4Handel

That's not a problem. I am the unified locus. Nothing distinct from me is needed to keep me aware of what I need to be aware of.

Socrates pursuit of knowledge of knowledge is part of his desire to be wise. Abstracted puzzles fail to catch what is at issue in the question of knowledge. — Fooloso4

That is certainly an interesting question. But Plato seems to veer away from it when Socrates says

Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is.

I'm not sure what you mean by "abstracted puzzles". Perhaps you mean the thumbnail sketches that are used as examples? I'm not very fond of them myself, I admit. But they seem to focus attention and discussion better than abstract statements.

And, what is at issue in the question of knowledge. Do you mean wisdom? Then by all means, let's discuss the relationship between knowledge and wisdom.

That certainly seem to be true.

Years ago when I was still somewhat active in the research community I published a paper on an unexplored topic. — jgill

Yes, that would be a good example.

Gödel's results are reflected in only a very small number of research themes. — jgill

I'm not surprised. Those results, in my uneducated view, are pretty devastating for mathematics as we know it. Philosophers are probably more inclined to take his theorem seriously. But most of them are inhibited because they don't want to grapple with and are not qualified to grapple with mathematics (or should that be metamathematics?)

The point that I've not forgotten is that the orthodox philosophical claim that logic provides arguments that everyone will agree to is false. Yes, there is a penalty, supposedly. If one withholds assent from a sound argument one is guilty of inconsistency or something. Which is true. But that professor did not seem to be suffering any serious ill consequences.

I'm not really clear what ChatGP is. But if you think it has some special access to what's going in Al's head, there's no harm in hearing what it says. There's a good chance it would be amusing and an outside chance it might be helpful.

It's the measurement problem. Looking at it changes it. — frank

That's very good. :smile:

If it was me, I'd say that I'm VERY aware of it and glare at you knowingly. I don't know what Al would do. — frank

Quite so. But this is philosophy, which Has great difficulty recognizing irony except in Socratic dialogues and Kierkegaard, where it is officially allowed. Al would undoubtedly do whatever the author of the story makes him do; he doesn't have free will, or any will.

What counts as justification depends on what the justification is of. ....... How does one justify that one possesses self-knowledge? What would count as justification of ethical knowledge? — Fooloso4

There are ways of justification available in both those cases. Not that I can write down a rule book, but I'm sure you are familiar with both practices. The question how to justify one's knowledge of knowledge is one thing, but not the same as what Plato has been discussing, which is knowledge of everything else.

Do you think Socrates playing a mid-wife is withholding something from us? — Paine

You mean that Socrates is offering a wrong, or at least incomplete, account in order to stimulate Theaetetus to come up with something better. I guess that's a possibility.

But I have the impression that when he made that remark he meant to compare the process of cross-questioning someone with being a midwife. So I would expect Socrates to cross-question Theaetetus to elicit the alternative. That's more like his usual procedure, isn't it?

The awkward thing about Plato is that he never speaks in his own voice (except possibly the Seventh Letter). I think he's only mentioned once - a walk-on part present in Socrates' death-cell. So we never know for sure. It is possible that when I criticize the Theaetetus I'm going beyond what we can be sure of.

So our difference of opinion probably cannot be resolved. The issue at stake was whether I was justified in thinking that citation of that dialogue in the context of our discussion about knowledge was helpful or not. I'm saying that I regard that dialogue as irrelevant because the notion of justification that is considered is obviously inadequate and the dialogue recognizes that. More than that, no-one nowadays is suggesting an account anything like that one.

Right. There's a thing where a news broadcaster asks if you know where your children are. — frank

You're right. Asking the question changes the context, which can change one's attitude to what one thought one knew. That's inherent in the example, which is constructed to exploit it.

So it looks as if we expect knowledge to be proof against changes in context. That's a tall order.

Suppose I asked Al whether he is aware that there is a non-zero probability that his car will be hit by a falling meteorite. Do you think he would change his mind then?

'm trying to point out that the notion of justification is vague and that judgement in particular cases that beliefs are justified is therefore more or less arbitrary, so as a general principle justification fails at its purported task of providing a criterion for differentiating between what is knowledge and what is not. — Janus

I agree that the notion of justification is vague. It follows that judgements about it are not as crisp and clear as they hopefully would be if there were clear criteria. But that's not the same as being arbitrary

The game of giving a formal definition is quite difficult. Fortunately, we manage to function, linguistically speaking, perfectly well with concepts that we have learnt, but never learnt to define. Formal definitions have their place and their usefulness, but they are not an absolute requirement, as they are, for example, in logic and mathematics.

The thought of being wrong in an interesting way has a charming appeal — jgill

It certainly stuck in my mind. It also gives on another target to replace the ever-elusive Truth and helps with destructive anxiety.

So let me offer you another insider remark that I've never forgotten. A professor well known for his contributions to logic once confided in me that he understood Gödel's famous argument, but didn't believe it. (!) Thst's a consolation for people like me who find logic very difficult.

It's the situations when someone holds false belief unbeknownst to themselves that the practice is found lacking, because it is during these times that the person cannot even tell you what they believe. It is impossible to knowingly hold false belief, and/or be mistaken. — creativesoul

Yes, quite so. I think that these cases are one kind of embedded belief, in that we (but not everyone) think that beliefs are also appropriately attributed to animals that don't have language. For the record, my belief (!) is that beliefs are reasons for doing something, and are essential to the language practice of attributing rationale to certain actions. One art of this is that we find that sometimes people act as if p were true when it isn't. So if a rational agent acts as if that piece of cloth were a cow, I believe that agent believes it is a cow. Another part is that sometimes they act without taking into account some p that is clearly relevant, and it can be the best explanation that they do not believe that p. I think that "know" does the same job, with the addition that p is true. This contributes to the language practice of passing on information. It may all sound a bit wacky, but I find it very satisfying.

citing these yet to have been disclosed verbs as what interests you in lieu of whatever aspect was being discussed at the time. — creativesoul

You seem to want an exhaustive list. Is it not enough for me to give examples and then say "and other verbs like those"? It's only a kind of ostensive definition. If you think of a case you are doubtful about, we can consider it and decide. I don't have any reason as things stand to work through such a list, unless I find an interesting problem amongst them. The ones I've thought about seem to be pretty straightforward. I refer to them because I assume that the kind of explanation one gives of "know" and "believe" should apply to the other words mutatis mutandis.

In addition to that, I'm reminded of the blanket theory that you mentioned as a preference to piecemeal answers to Gettier, after saying you weren't interested in a theory. — creativesoul

I can't remember what I meant saying I wasn't interested in a theory. This is philosophy, after all.

I mean, if you parked your car somewhere, would you say you know where it is? Or just that you know where you parked it? — frank

That's really interesting. I don't know which I would say. It might be one in one situation and another in another situation.

But most people would regard it as indifferent which I said, because, they would assume, that one follows from the other.

Which reinforces the view that I'm developing, that many of these problems are created by the bad habit of saying more than we need to. If I say I know where it is, I'm making assumptions that I'm not making if I say I know where I parked it.

That's why I suggest holding off being pushed to decide whether he knows where it is or not until all the evidence is in.

So, it is held that when we say someone believes "X", we are saying that they have an attitude/disposition such that they hold "X" to be true.

That's most certainly an accounting practice at work. — creativesoul

I think I understand what you mean.

There's no doubt, for example, that Gettier writes as if he believes that a belief maps to a proposition which maps to a sentence. He doesn't feel any need to clarify that, no doubt because it is so widely believed.

But I don't see any interesting different between "Smith believed the proposition that p" and "Smith believed that p", so I prefer to cut out the middle man. I feel that there's an ontological idea going on that there must be some object that is believed, just as there's a feeling that there must be some object that is true or false. It seems pure assumption to me and I find it annoying. But I don't pretend that I'm clear about it.

I don't have a list of the interesting words. I seldom get much beyond know, believe, think, say, assert, but I would include suppose, imagine, fear, hope, wonder (both that.. and whether... and why... ). I'm sure you could go on.

I'm hoping you overlooked.... — creativesoul

I don't even remember overlooking anything, so I suppose I must have overlooked it. It certainly wasn't a problem. So no worries.

there is a significant amount of trusting the truthfulness of the source material inherent to our daily lives — creativesoul

That's right. Our problem, I think, is that since the development of mass media, it has become more difficult to trust, because the weaknesses of those we must trust are much more difficult to hide, and yet those who want us to trust them try to build an image of perfection that is very easily shattered. There should be some happy medium of accepting human weaknesses as inevitable without a reaction of disproportionate mistrust.

If he lived in a universe where cars never move once you park them, he'd be justified in his belief. — frank

This is the problem. A complete justification would consider every possibility (except, perhaps, the purely imaginary ones), including the possibility that it might be struck by a meteorite. Theoretically doubtful, practically impossible. So the question is, what possibilities can he not cover and still count as knowing?

What then could be the general criteria to justify thinking there is or could be justification for belief in any particular case? — Janus

I'm sorry, I'm not ready to venture on articulating general criteria. It's a very complex topic and I have never seen anything more helpful than very general remarks.

Do you have something specific in mind?

I've looked at some sources and I agree that I was wrong to be so confident that he believed in reincarnation when he wrote the Theaetetus. I still think it likely that he did when he wrote earlier dialogues. Presenting an idea as a myth, I suggest, is evidence that he could not prove what he was saying, but not necessarily evidence that he does not believe it. As I'm sure you know, mythos in ancient greek just means story, not necessarily false story.

the Greek term logos, is much broader than analysis. — Fooloso4

Yes, I was aware of that and pointed it out in what I wrote. But the example he presents in the Theaetetus is as I describe it. My point is precisely that the model of account is not helpful for the problem he is considering. He was quite capable of presenting a different kind of logos which would have been less obviously unhelpful.

He's lacking justification, so JTB doesn't work here. — frank

He's lacking conclusive justification, that's true. But I'm not sure that justification must be conclusive. If that is the case, the J clause and the T clause will have exactly the same content and it's clearly a presupposition of the JTB account that they will be different.

I'm still puzzled about this.

Note the irony. Elsewhere Socrates tells the myth of recollection, but here in the dialogue about knowledge, where we might think we are most likely to find it, he is silent. Rather than recollection there is the problem of forgetting. — Fooloso4

Yes. I found that puzzling, given that, so far as I know, he never abandoned the doctrine of reincarnation. But perhaps we can see it buried in the discussion of memory, since, for Plato, all knowledge is really memory.

He doesn't mention the theory of recollection in the Gorgias either. But again, perhaps it is buried in his mention of philosophical "understanding".

Plato's idea of an account in the Theaetetus is what we might call an analysis of whatever we are giving an account of in terms of its elements. (I would look up a quotation, but I don't have much more time for philosophy right now.)

That's true, but did I suggest it was a necessary fact.

Certainly, I would happily agree that the location of his car is contingent and that his knowledge of the location of the car is contingent. But that's because they are different facts, as demonstrated by the fact that they are contingent on different circumstances. Yes, it is true that his knowledge is partly but not entirely contingent on the location of the car.

reply="creativesoul;780722"]

You're right. I'm sorry.

What stops you from agreeing with the accounting malpractice charges I've levied against the historical and current conventional practices of belief attribution(including believe that approaches), belief as propositional attitude, and treating naked propositions as if they are equivalent to belief? — creativesoul

Two answers.

First, I don't understand what you mean by "accounting practice" or "malpractice" in this context. You seem to think that philosophy is a kind of accountancy. Perhaps it is, in some ways, but it seems clearly different in other ways.

Second, after our exchange, I decided that it was simpler not to talk about propositions in this context, but simply about beliefs. That way, the amount of confusion in the discussion might be reduced.

This involved accepting that "propositional attitude" was not a helpful way of describing the group of verbs that I was interested in.