From a deontic point of view the moral end is "the good" which deserves unconditional preference over "the bad" or "the evil". This is not a state of affairs but a value-in-itself which may appear to be represented by a state-of-affairs or some action. But as is always the case with mere appearances one can be oh so wrong about their true nature. — Heiko

To be meaningful don't we have to define what is good as a state-of-affairs?

The greater point is that all moral decisions except the one I mentioned have an element of harm, so that’s inescapable in this universe. — schopenhauer1

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is a non-zero-sum game. This produces many opportunities to increase the benefits of cooperation without harming others.

Can you please describe a moral end? Why not simply describe it as a state of affairs rather than “moral state of affair” (or moral ends as you put it) — invicta

Increased well-being (or flourishing) for all, and lessened suffering are common moral 'ends' in moral philosophy.

So I think if you keep clear that ends are ideas, and means are behaviour, your separation will work. But you need I think to give priority to behaviour, as the law does – eggs are broken, someone has died. — unenlightened

Thanks for the supportive comment.

Interesting that you suggest giving priority to behavior.

Past and present cultural moral norms are all about behavior. Aside from philosophers, few people worry about ultimate moral ends. Cultural moral disputes are almost always about moral ‘means’, not moral ‘ends’.

As I have described elsewhere here, it is mind-independent truth that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies. That is, what moral behaviors ‘are’ appears to have an objective basis which is not much affected by what we argue moral ‘ends’ (goals) somehow ought to be.

↪schopenhauer1
What if you were doing the deed for recreational purposes and the new born was unintended…what then ? Abortion ? — invicta

All,
The antinatalism and abortion topics you have brought up deserve their own threads. I'd appreciate it if discussions here were kept more relevant to the OP.

The moral mean to prevent a murder would be to murder the would be murderer*

In the context above judging them separately would be incoherent as murder is universally wrong/immoral but taken together the moral ends and means are both justified. — invicta

Moral ‘ends’ (goals) are a state of affairs, or perhaps an idea about a state of affairs as unenlightened suggests. Moral ‘means’ are actions. Murder is an action, not an idea about a goal.

The point is that rules of thumbs and heuristics are meant to spare us cognitive load in our decision making. When a problem is too complicated for us to process an optimal solution, then we rely on rules of thumbs and heuristics to approximate that solution. So we have to be able to define the decision problem before talking about heuristics and rules of thumbs. Gert’s rules (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm) may be seen as an answer to the question: what is default behavior that would more likely lessen the harms of all those who commit to them? In this case those rules would be more rule of thumbs. Gert's assumption that "morality is for fallible biased people" could support that reading. My impression however is that Gert's argument is stronger because he wants to talk in terms of rationality and not just make an empirical general claim approximately true. — neomac

I agree with your reading of Gert described here and why heuristics are so useful. And the ten rules are Gert’s answer to “what is default behavior that would more likely lessen the harms of all those who commit to them?”

My arguments have been to illuminate Gert’s moral insights rather than contradict them. That illumination starts with understanding the ten rules as advocacy for initiating or maintaining reciprocity strategies which are powerful means for solving cooperation problems. Solving cooperation problems is the default behavior most likely both to lessen harms (Gert’s and negative utilitarianism’s goal) and, as I argue, positive utilitarianism as well. The same 10 moral rules support both positive and negative utilitarianism equally well because the same cooperation problems must be solved.

Imagine you have 2 parents with 10 kids, they can afford to provide each of them with minimal means of subsistence or kill five of them to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence. Now consider 3 scenarios:
(A) Both parents agree on providing each kid with just minimal means of subsistence
(B) Both parents agree on killing 5 kids to let the other five have more than just minimal means of subsistence
(C) Parents disagree
In case A and B we do not have a cooperation problem between parents while in C we do, right? — neomac

As you describe it, the cooperation problem is just between the parents. But alternatives A), B), and C) could each be ‘rational’ (depending on the parents' values) ONLY if the kids have no independent moral worth. If the kids have independent moral worth, then any of the options would be a cooperation problem for the kids plus the parents.

You may want to say that they are instrumental to solve or support the solution of cooperation problems. If that’s the case, there are 4 issues with that:
1 - maybe you explained that in your past posts and I missed it, but so far you didn’t offer to me a concrete example where a cooperation problem would likely have no (suboptimal if not optimal) solutionunless we adopted Gert’s moral rules. — neomac

It is not Gert's moral rules that are key. They are just heuristics for solving cooperation problems. Examples of cooperation problems that cannot be solved without those strategies could be useful for presenting my case. A response would take at least 500 words. That might be better presented as a separate thread.

2 - most importantly, cooperation is itself instrumental to some goals, which goals? If the answer is: reducing death, pain, disabilities, etc. of some people by some people engaged in the cooperation then we are back to Gert’s rules. The payoff of the cooperative strategies will be defined as a function of death, pain, disabilities, liberties, etc. reducing the evils and/or increase the goods — neomac

Cooperation is instrumental to obtaining whatever benefits of cooperation that people agree to pursue. I am not sure what you are asking here.

3 - Gerts’ “descriptive” definition of morality suggests that also the “normative” definition of morality is focused on reducing evils (“lessening of harms”) and not increasing the goods (indeed “do cause pleasure” is missing among the rules). While the notion of “cooperation” is not focused on lessening the evils. — neomac

Cooperation is the best means we have for both reducing harms and increasing positive benefits (for both positive and negative utilitarianism).

4 - I’m not sure that Gert’s 10 moral rules are necessary and sufficient conditions for a “normative” definition of morality. Indeed, Gert concedes that there are reasons for disagreement even if we accepted the 10 rules (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/010.htm). So Gert’s 10 rules may not suffice to support the solution of cooperation problems. — neomac

I agree. The normativity of moral 'means' can be based on the normativity of morality as cooperation strategies, not Gert's ten rules. The normativity of moral 'ends' (such as positive or negative utilitarianism) may have no mind-independent answer (contrary to Gert's position). I have not seen the idea of separately judging the normativity for moral 'means" and moral 'ends'. I've been working on a thread on that topic and will post when it seems ready.

P.S. I'm giving answers based on a charitable understanding of Gert's position. I don't assume that my understanding is accurate nor I'm committed to Gert's position as I understand it. — neomac

A charitable understanding of moral claims (how can a moral claim be interpreted as rational) is the more intellectually challenging approach and the one I also try to take. It is much easier to interpret moral claims in the dumbest way possible. The “dumbest interpretation” approach may be more likely to ‘win’ arguments by the advocates for new ideas giving up in exhaustion and frustration. But in the end, the charitable approach is more likely to produce genuine progress in understanding morality. I hope you can take the charitable approach with me as well as with Gert.

Here Gert is even more explicit about this “it is important to use these (ten) rules as moral guides, it would be disastrous to regard them as absolute, that is, to hold that it is always immoral to break any of these rules no matter what the circumstances were. ” (https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/006.htm)
Yet I wouldn’t call them “heuristics” or “fallible rules of thumb” because these are more epistemic than moral notions. I prefer to talk about them in terms of “default” social norms, that may be exceptionally reconsidered depending on some compelling circumstances. — neomac

Humm… I don’t get what you mean by “more epistemic than moral notions”.

I do know, empirically and independently of any of Gert’s claims, that the ten moral norms are fallible heuristics for reciprocity strategies. So at least we agree they are not moral absolutes.

But if they are not moral absolutes, in what circumstances would following them be immoral? The heuristics for solving cooperation problems perspective provides a simple answer. It would be immoral to follow them when doing so is more likely to create rather than solve cooperation problems.

When would you say it would be immoral to follow Gert's ten moral norms?

Even though I don’t think we can take Gert’s 10 rules as a case of “utilitarianism”, yet I think they are more about “collective” ends than means to achieve them. — neomac

I agree that Gert’s 10 rules have no necessary connection to moral goals such as utilitarianism. But that is because they are moral norms about behaviors (moral means), not moral ends (goals). They are collective in the sense of rules advocated in the group that solve cooperation problems.

I have a question regarding moral codes: Aren't or shouldn't they be based on some theory or ethics system and/or fundamental principles regarding the nature of ethics ? (I prefer this term in general over "morality", but I use both words "moral" and "ethical" according to language requirements.) — Alkis Piskas

I hope we can agree that:

Cultural moral codes have existed quite comfortably for all of history without a unified theory or fundamental principles.

The theories or principles you refer to are moral philosophy’s answers to the big ethical questions “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?” Proposed answers include positive and negative utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and Kantianism.

Then, Gert’s approach and my Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) differ in that, rather than answering the above broad ethical questions, we both take on the simpler task of understanding the function of past and present cultural moral norms.

I understand Gert to be proposing that the function (the principle reason they exist) of cultural moral norms is lessening suffering. He sees lessening suffering as the goal of moral norms - the defining principle for what is moral based on the goal of moral behavior.

MACS proposes that the function (the principle reason they exist) of all cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems. I see solving cooperation problems as the ‘means’ by which moral norms enable people to accomplish whatever goals they agree on, one of which could be “lessening suffering”. Solving cooperation problems is the defining principle for what ‘means’ are moral. In contrast to Gert’s proposal, MACS is silent about what ‘ends’ (goals) are moral.

Then Gert proposes a useful definition of what is normative which I interpret as what all well-informed, mentally normal (not delusional), rational people would advocate.

Gert and MACS provide two perspectives on the function of moral norms. Both have something to contribute to understanding what is morally normative.

Gert's "descriptive" notion of morality tries to capture what would characterize normative systems as "moral" cross-culturally, independently from the geographic or historical latitude, in short rules/ideals protecting a group from harm is what counts as moral [1]. — neomac

Right, but referring to “normative systems” rather than something like “cultural moralities” could lead to confusion about when a system is normative – “when it would be advocated by all rational people”.

Also, being cross-culturally “moral” does not necessarily imply something is normative. Being cross-culturally moral only suggests that something is a good candidate for what is normative.

I interpret Gert to be saying as a descriptive claim about all cultural morality:

What morality is: “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.”

This only becomes normative if it is what all rational people would advocate as I understand Gert’s arguments.

Gert's “normative” notion of morality requires that these rules/ideals be acceptable by all rational agents. He identified 10 rules (and 4 ideals, if I remember correctly) that satisfy this normative constraint (they do not seem to include e.g. rules against cannibalism or prostitution but they seem to exclude rules about human sacrifice or slavery). — neomac

But Gert is not advocating these 10 rules as moral absolutes. Rather, they are heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for the goal of “lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system”. And “human sacrifice or slavery” would violate that moral behavior goal.

Conclusion, even if I see why you might be interested in integrating Gert’s definition with a reference to cooperative strategies, I don’t think it would be an improvement, because Gert’s definition belongs to a greater level of abstraction (once again compare “rational animal” and “rational animal with genital organs“) and results from a philosophical investigation about the notion of human morality (independently from its continuity wrt animal behaviour). — neomac

Am I correct in taking your understanding of

“An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.”

to be the claimed negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior?

In this case, I agree that adding the phrase “increasing the benefits of cooperation and” does not make sense.

I have been thinking of Gert’s above claim as a claim about moral ‘’means’ (lessening of harms) not moral ‘ends’ (the negative-utilitarianism goal of moral behavior). Your interpretation seems more likely.

Thanks for persisting in your objection.

Tom, you did not address your question to me, but briefly:
1) Gert provides a useful criterion for what is normative - what we ought or ought not do. If you have a better alternative, don't keep it to yourself.
2) Understanding the underlying universal function of cultural moral norms as parts of cooperation strategies provides a well-grounded candidate for normativity by Gert's definition.

Sorry for the delay in responding. I had immediately composed my reply but then did not hit the post comment button.
You are misreading Gert.
He says:
"There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions.One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either
1) descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or
2) normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."

In the article, he goes on to describe the rarity of definitions of moral normativity and why he thinks defining it is important.

But perhaps our miscommunication is due to different understandings of what descriptively moral and normatively moral refer to. What do you think they refer to?

I’d like to keep this thread focused on the cultural usefulness of Gert’s approach to normativity and what ‘is’ moral.

But perhaps some contrast with Hegel can usefully illuminate Gert’s approach. I’ll respond specifically to what you have said about Hegel.

For Hegel, morality is the abstract understanding of "the good," held by rational subjects. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The question “What is good?” has no definitive answers, rational or otherwise, so far as I know. Of course, you could simply prefer Hegel’s definition of good and advocate it on that basis. Your preference may not make it culturally useful however because it has no objective basis. Having no objective basis means it is unlikely to be universally shared and therefore less useful than moralities that have a objective basis. Your preference alone is not necessarily a culturally useful basis for a morality.

In contrast, Gert focuses on what he sees morality ‘is’. And then, as I understand him, Gert claims, based on what morality 'is', that lessening harm is objectively moral based on it being what all rational persons would advocate. Gert’s approach (with its stated limits) has the advantage over Hegels in that it is claimed to meet (again as I understand him) his criterion for normativity – what all rational persons would advocate.

The modern science of morality (which studies the origin and function of our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms) has moved beyond Gert’s understanding of what morality ‘is’. As I argue elsewhere, we can still follow Gert’s general approach using the science-enhanced understanding of what morality ‘is’ to define a morality that all rational people will even more strongly advocate.

Besides the more I think of your definition and the less I find it clear. I think cooperative behavior can be found also in animals. The partnership, dominance and marker proto-rules (or patterns of behavior) can be found also in the animal world. Am I wrong? If so and animals showing cooperative behavior are not moral agents, then cooperative behavior must be conceptually decoupled from morality. Now, if morality increases the benefits of cooperation, there must be something in "morality" that can not be reduced to those patterns of behavior constituting cooperation the increases the benefits from such patterns. — neomac

I hear you complain that my definition of what is descriptively moral is not normatively moral. Perhaps you are confusing what is descriptively moral with what is normatively moral?

What do you understand descriptively moral and normatively moral to refer to?

The added “increasing the benefits of cooperation” defines the ‘means’ by which harm is to be lessened - cooperation. That knowledge is needed to accurately encompass what morality descriptively ‘is’. Morality descriptively is NOT simply lessening harm as Gert’s version implies. Morality descriptively is lessening harm by increasing the benefits of cooperation.

Consider:
(A) “slaves must obey their masters”
(B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
(C) “homosexuality is evil”
....
If A, B, C can be explained by both BGD and MSD then how is MSD more accurate than BGD and not just more redundant wrt BGD? — neomac

Humm…

How does Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral based on “lessening of harms” explain, as you claim:
(A) “slaves must obey their masters”
(B) “working on the sabbath deserves death”
(C) “homosexuality is evil”.

I don’t see that it can. My "Morality As Cooperation Strategies" (MACS) definition of what is descriptively moral does explain them because it includes cooperation strategies. It explains them as marker and domination strategies, strategies for increasing the benefits of cooperation in ingroups at the expense (always for domination norms and sometimes for marker norms) of outgroups.

BTW can you clarify better what "marker norms" means and why it is to be distinguished from dominance and partnership norms? — neomac

I have described marker strategies as:

“Marker moral norms – Markers of membership in and commitment to a more cooperative ingroup. Preferentially cooperating with members of an ingroup can reduce the chances of being exploited and thereby increase the benefits of cooperation. These markers include “eating shrimp is an abomination”, “masturbation is immoral”, and other food and sex taboos.”

I can add that these markers of membership and commitment to an ingroup are parts of indirect reciprocity. By limiting the number of people deemed worthy of cooperating with, the chances of being exploited are reduced and the potential benefits of cooperation increased for members of the ingroup.

As to how marker strategies differ from partnership and domination moral norms, see
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13929/what-if-cultural-moral-norms-track-cooperation-strategies/p1

Briefly, partnership moral norms such as the ten rules proposed by Gert, are ingroup norms where all people are assumed worthy of full moral regard.

Domination moral norms such as "slaves must obey their masters" and "women must be submissive to men" are examples of ingroups (men or slave owners) cooperatively enforcing the exploitation of outgroups (slaves and women).

No, he does not. Nowhere does Gert claim that the imperative of lessening of harm is (a) descriptively moral and (b) scientifically justified. — SophistiCat

You are correct that Gert does not mention science. My parenthetical “(a subject within science's what 'is' domain)” was meant to be my own clarifying comment. I should not have included it.

Are you thinking “An informal public system applying to all moral agents that has the goal of lessening of harm suffered by those who are protected by this system” can be a definition of what is normative?

This definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then the exploitation of slaves with the goal of lessening harm to their masters will be consistent with the definition. This makes sense if the definition is what is descriptively moral as I understand Gert to the saying. But thinking it is a definition of what is normative would be offensive to modern ears, right?

Also, I disagree that for something to even be recognized as a moral code, it has to be acceptable by all moral agents ("rational people"). That is much too restrictive for a definition. — SophistiCat

I understand your concern about all rational people advocating for a moral claim as criterion for normativity. I don’t share that concern for the normativity by Gert’s criterion (or something close to it) of Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) regarding moral ‘means’ due to its basis in objective science.

But no problem, you don’t like Gert’s criterion for normativity. What criterion do you prefer?

But perhaps your preference might be better discussed in a fresh thread? I’d like to keep the focus of this thread on Gert’s perspective.

To me, Gert’s definition of “morality” is descriptive. What I think Gert takes to be a normative definition of morality is the set of rules and ideals he discussed later in his lecture. — neomac

Right!

Both your descriptive definition of morality and Gert’s descriptive definition of morality can account for the fact that “slaves must obey their masters” can be taken as a moral rule. Can’t they? If so, this example doesn’t show us in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. — neomac

Yes, “slaves must obey their masters” has too often been a cultural moral norm enforced by an ingroup to exploit an outgroup.

The reason that "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral is that 1) it adds explanatory power, particularly for marker norms such as “working on the sabbath deserves death” and “homosexuality is evil”, and 2) it directly follows from the ultimate source of morality - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

Without "increasing the benefits of cooperation" you can’t say you have a definition of what is descriptively moral that explains past and present moral norms. And you can’t link cultural moral norms to their ultimate source - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

In other words, allusions to cooperation strategies should be part of a lower level wrt Gert’s general descriptive definition of morality and a more oriented toward an empirical investigation. — neomac

As I described above, adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" is necessary for a descriptive definition of moral means that applies (as a claimed empirical truth) to all past and present cultural moral norms. That cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is the highest level claim we can make about moral 'means'.

This formulation departs from the meta-ethical question of "what morality is". Stating that the goal of moral precepts is "lessening of harm" tells us what we imperatively ought to follow: we ought to lessen harm. It is morally good to lessen harm and morally bad to increase it. — SophistiCat

You did not ask a question, but I will try to clarify what I have said that is relevant.

As you know, what morality descriptively ‘is’ and what morality normatively ‘is’ are separate questions. In traditional moral philosophy, an extreme version of this idea is that “science has nothing to offer moral philosophy”, implying that what is descriptively moral is irrelevant to what is normatively moral.

Gert contradicts this view by claiming that the "lessening of harm" component of what is descriptively moral (a subject within science's what 'is' domain) is also normatively moral by his criterion “what all rational people would put forward”.

My proposed Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) follows Gert’s line of thinking by arguing that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies that exist because they produced benefits and reduced harm for our ancestors.

Since MACS only describes moral ‘means’ (solving cooperation problems and not creating them), it is complimentary to consequentialism whether those consequences maximize happiness or minimize harm as Gert prefers.

Hence, I see MACS as illuminating and providing a stronger foundation in descriptive morality for Gert’s negative utilitarianism.

It's not clear in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. Can you give concrete example to clarify that? — neomac

I see Gert’s definition of “What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” as a descriptive definition of morality, not a normative one.

He has not justified stating this as a normative (ought) claim as you (and perhaps others here) are interpreting it. As he argues in the SEP, any normative claim would be “what all rational people would put forward” - an argument he has not made.

For example, the definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then this repulsive moral norm would be included under Gert’s definition of what morality ‘is’. This makes no sense to modern sensibilities as a normative claim but is sensible as a claim about what is descriptively moral.

Also, Gert’s claim that “Morality is an informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” appears to be based on Gert’s carefully considered, armchair observations and intuitions. The modern science of morality says he is close, but not quite right, about what morality ‘is’.

My suggested revision, “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” more accurately reflects what science tells us of morality’s function – the principal reason what we call descriptively moral behavior exists.

That said, I am frustrated by Gert’s ambiguity in his lecture about whether he means the definition to be descriptive (the only way I can make sense of it) or normative (which he has not justified).

Perhaps Gert did intend it as a normative claim. Then I would argue it cannot be justified as “what all rational people would put forward (advocate)”.

I am a fan of Gert's approach to morality - starting from what morality 'is' and then, given those circumstances, asking, "What would all rational people advocate as moral for their society?"
It is the same approach I take but starting from what I consider a more solid foundation than Gert's about what morality 'is'.

However, I had not seen the video lecture Banno provided.

In case others also prefer to read philosophical arguments rather than hear them, here are the slides and text I found of this lecture Gert gave elsewhere at about the same time. https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/001.htm

I see MACS as most useful when applied in societies with "pluralist worldviews about values and morality". By explaining what the cultural moral norms 'are' as parts of cooperation strategies rather than mystical entities, people have an objective basis for resolving their disputes.

I've used MACS as moral guidance for about 15 years now. It has worked well for me. It has given me, for example, a different slant on the morality of telling the truth and obeying the law. Neither are moral absolutes. We all know that, but MACS provides a judgment criterion that I find more useful than simple intuitions.

Here's a video you can watch to see what Bernard Gert actually thought about morality.
https://youtu.be/enVFjAUTfI8
He does give a definition of morality (at 15:28) as "An informal public system applying to all moral agents that has the goal of lessening of harm suffered by those who are protected by this system". — Banno

All,

Nice video by Gert. Except for some quibbles, I agree with his points.

Are any of you wondering how Gert’s morality can be so concrete?

He can be concrete because his subject in the video is what morality ‘is’ – the same subject as Morality As Cooperation Strategies (MACS). I don’t hear him making direct claims about what morality we somehow imperatively ought to follow (the standard focus of traditional moral philosophy).

I hear him talking about what morality we rationally would advocate given what morality ‘is’.

Can we all agree that morality ‘is’ something?

In the video, Gert asserts that

What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.

With the new insights from game theory in the last few decades, it would be more correct to say something like

What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.

This definition of what morality 'is' is empirically true, according to MACS. It explains all past and present cultural moral norms, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange.

This definition does not tell us what is morally normative. For that, we can apply GERT's SEP definition of morally normative: “… the term “morality” can be used … normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.”

Gert’s ten moral rules are standard cultural moral norms. Why these moral norms? MACS explains that they are all examples of rules advocating initiating reciprocity strategies. These are highly useful heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for MACS.

What does Gert say about when to not follow them?

He says: Moral Rules Require Impartiality - To be justified in violating a moral rule one must be willing for all to know they can break the rule in the same circumstances.

Fine, but what circumstances are those? MACS suggest that those circumstances are when following the rule will predictably not solve cooperation problems and may create them. And this criterion is just what is empirically observed when cultures condone abandoning moral norms.

I see MACS as illuminating and expanding on Gert’s perspective, not contradicting it.

In your experience, who else, aside from Gert, uses morally normative to refer to "a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.”
I know of no one who uses it this way except people that refer to Gert as their source. Gert is providing a useful definition of morally normative.

Defining morality is only one function of religion.
— Mark S
Just the main one, without which the community would tear itself to bits, arguing over what's right and wrong, and nobody could be comforted. — Vera Mont

That is not what I have observed, but I understand that it could be your experience.

Such a religious person could understand that morality exists independently of religion.
— Mark S

I very much doubt that. If it didn't set out moral precepts, what good would a religion be? — Vera Mont

In my experience, it is not unusual for religious people to be able to think rationally about morality. Examples include changing minds within the Episcopalian church about the morality of gay marriage, abortion, women in the priesthood, and homosexuality.

Religions have continuously refined their moralities regarding whatever moral norms become offensive. Read the Old Testament for some strikingly evil things commanded by God. Most of that load of nonsense has been abandoned. It was done so by religious people thinking rationally.

Are all religious people so flexible? No, of course not.

Defining morality is only one function of religion. Religions also provide supportive communities, purpose in life, and the comfort of thinking a supernatural being is looking after you. Those are the more powerful reasons religion exists. Not having a monopoly on morality does not prohibit those functions from maintaining religion.

to rally a community around a rational moral decision about abortion, assisted suicide, gender reassignment or even equal marriage, we always have to deal with people who present as rational - except in their moral belief. — Vera Mont

To what extent can religious people be rational about their religion-based moral beliefs?

Consider:

A person who delusionally interprets their religious experiences, even including conversations with gods, as real could ‘rationally’ hold that their religion’s moral beliefs are true, must be advocated, and enforced regardless of information to the contrary.

Also, a mentally normal person who is poorly informed could believe that gods are the only sources of morality and, therefore, rationally hold that their religion’s moral beliefs are true, must be advocated, and enforced.

So, we might ask:

To what extent can well-informed, mentally normal, religious people be rational about their religion-based moral beliefs?

Such a religious person could understand that morality exists independently of religion. Then if they have their doubts about the morality of a religious moral norm, or if they come into conflict with people about if those moral norms should be advocated, they may be able to enter rational discussions about those moral norms.

They may be able to rationally discuss those norms to the extent they understand that morality exists independently of religion.

I can't quite work out how your system would apply to an individual in their day to day choices or how we would involve a community in discussing or implementing it. — Tom Storm

The first thing to understand about how individuals can apply MACS in their lives is that well-intentioned people around the world already practice heuristic versions of MACS. Remember that past and present cultural moral norms empirically are heuristics (flawed rules of thumb) for MACS.

Normally, MACS practitioners would act according to their existing cultural moral norms just as they always have.

However, two circumstances may arise that would lead people to question if they morally ‘should’ follow a particular cultural moral norm. MACS can then be called on to help resolve their questions.

The first circumstance is that the person may know what the heuristic says to do, for example, versions of the Golden Rule, but intuitively feel doing so would not be right. Such ‘wrongness’ intuitions about following the Golden Rule arise, for example, when dealing with criminals, in wartime, or just when tastes differ. By revealing that versions of the Golden Rule are heuristics for solving cooperation problems, MACS provides an objective criterion for not following the Golden Rule when doing so does not “solve cooperation problems”, but instead creates them. MACS does not tell us we morally should abandon the Golden Rule, but instead informs us about the rare occasions when it might be immoral to follow it.

The second circumstance is that people disagree about the morality of a moral norm, for example, “homosexuality is evil”. MACS reveals that this moral norm has two components 1) a marker norm of membership and commitment to an ingroup which can motivate increased cooperation, and 2) a norm by which an ingroup can exploit an outgroup as a supposed threat to the ingroup, also thereby motivating increasing cooperation in the ingroup. Since the second component creates cooperation problems for homosexuals, it is objectively immoral on that count by MACS based (I argue) on fulfilling Gert’s definition of morally normative.

MACS also is silent about the ultimate goal of moral behavior. When MACS's explanation of moral ‘means’ alone cannot resolve moral disputes (perhaps about abortion, euthanasia, or animal rights), people can try to agree on the ultimate goal of moral behavior in their society. Even if that goal is unique to their society, it can still help promote cooperation to achieve that goal within their societies.

Based on the above description, MACS appears to be easier to apply in one’s life than any other available moral theory I know.

:up:

I still struggle to see how a cooperation strategy is of itself useful or even entirely comprehensible to a diverse community, where cooperation is understood differently and where society is understood differently. A Muslim culture, for instance. Or an atheist culture. When we get to issues like abortion or capital punishment or gay rights, or whether creationism should replace evolution in school learning - how do we determine what is right? — Tom Storm

MACS would assist in refining cultural moral norms the same means cultural norms are refined now - by a chaotic system influenced at least in part by ethicists. The difference would be that ethicists would have available an objective definition of moral 'means', in addition to their concepts of moral goals, to add to their toolkit for resolving moral disputes.

You could ask the same question about "How would it work?" regarding utilitarianism or virtue ethics. There is no magic answer machine for everything we might want to know about what we morally ought to do. We have to do some work.

Another take is that it provides retribution and consequences for a bad deed, which people seem to find psychologically satisfying in a way which may not be easy to measure - psychological wellbeing might be one approach. But I understand your position here. — Tom Storm

Like past and present cultural moral norms, our psychologically satisfying inclination for retribution for evil deeds such as murder is part of cooperation strategies. Specifically, our feeling or righteous indignation motivates the punishment of violation component that is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Indeed, our moral senses’ judgments and our other moral emotions of empathy, gratitude, loyalty, shame, and guilt are also explained as parts of cooperation strategies.

In these three threads, I was trying to simplify my argument by not mentioning the shared origins of the biology underlying our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms.

How do you determine which of these it does? How would a state set up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices people could make in society? — Tom Storm

I don’t foresee states “setting up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices”.

MACS’s principles can be additional criteria for judging how to refine cultural moral norms to meet human needs and preferences better.

Banno, no I don’t see the joke and I expect neither would Bernard and Josuha Gert who have maintained the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the definition of morality for over 20 years. All I see is your assumption of bigotry.

Tom,

You bring up important issues about my adaptation of Gert’s definition of morally normativity – how to judge the normativity of moral claims.

Are Gert’s definition and my adaptation perfect? No, they are just the best I know of.

Without them, I am left with personal preference regarding which moral claims I adopt and advocate. Personal preference is not so culturally useful making that choice method less preferred.

But attempting to resolve such issues about normativity is too complex and important to try to append to the end of this thread.

How about I start a new thread only about Gert’s definition? People can share what they think about normativity.

Can you tell me how would you assess capital punishment as a penalty for, say, killing someone? Is capital punishment morally sound - how do you go about answering or contextualizing this using your method? — Tom Storm

MACS’s claimed universal moral principles about moral ‘means’ are:

• Act to solve cooperation problems.
• Do not create cooperation problems.

The morality of capital punishment can be a mixed bag depending on circumstances.

Capital punishment is part of a strategy that solves cooperation problems. It punishes reciprocity violations about not killing each other with the intended outcome of reducing future killing. Capital punishment can thereby increase or maintain the future benefits of cooperation in societies. This is why it has commonly existed.

But capital punishment also creates cooperation problems by 1) itself being a reciprocity violation about not killing each other and 2) potentially reducing trust and its resulting cooperation in the society by motivating revenge or other bad behavior by friends and family of the executed person.

The morality of capital punishment comes down to if it will, on balance, increase or reduce the trust needed for a cooperative society.

In advanced societies, I expect the answer is that capital punishment is immoral – on balance it reduces trust and cooperation in society. Other remedies, such as long prison sentences, are morally preferable.

A simpler answer would have been nice, but morality is complicated.

We keep coming back to the idea that cooperation is not of itself a sound or neutral moral position, but may be used to dominate, subjugate and murder. Are there not ethical considerations or questions that need to be asked before one can get to morality as a cooperation strategy? Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell? — Tom Storm

Tom, please read my above response to PhilosophyRunner on the same topic.

And consider MACS's actual proposed moral principles rather than some kind of "Cooperation is Moral" idea which I agree would be poor moral advice. MACS's principles are short on exploitation and bad behavior:

Act to solve cooperation problems.
Do not create cooperation problems.

You ask a relevant question "Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell?"

That question I answer in "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies" as

“What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.”

Cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems in the in group. — PhilosophyRunner

This may be true in a sense but is not relevant.

You are still focused in the weeds of our diverse, contradictory, and strange past and present cultural moral norms. You will find all sorts of cultural adaptations such as cooperating to exploit outgroups, markers of membership ingroups, and respect for authority and sacred objects. None are innate to what morality ‘is’ at a its most fundamental level.

Cultural moral norms are only signposts to MACS’s source in the cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.

It would help to briefly describe how those cooperation problems, which can be understood as cooperation/exploitation dilemmas, arise in our universe.

Cooperation is commonly beneficial everywhere in our universe. However, cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation because exploitation is virtually always the winning short-term strategy and can be even in the long term. Unfortunately, exploitation destroys motivation to cooperate in the future and its potential benefits. These circumstances create the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

Our ancestors chanced across reciprocity strategies that can solve this dilemma. The solve the dilemma by motivating punishment of people who exploit others. In this way, our ancestors chanced across morality.

Don’t kill, steal, or lie are moral norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. Why? Because they are violations of reciprocity within a society. That unstated reciprocity agreement is “I will not kill, steal, or lie (even when I really want to) and I expect no one will kill, steal, or lie to me”.

Solutions to this innate to our universe cooperation/exploitation dilemma are the ultimate source of MACS’ moral principles:

Act to solve cooperation problems.
Do not create cooperation problems.

Exploitation (of an outgroup by an ingroup) cannot be part of those principles because that would contradict the function of what morality at its most fundamental level ‘is’ - preventing exploitation.

So the foundation of your theory, is based on observing past societies. And in this observation we see that total cooperation including the outgroup is not what is the moral norm, rather the moral norm includes domination of the outgroup.

And so your pruning of the domination moral norm is not justified by the method you use. You claim that the "is" excludes domination moral norms. But the "is" that is observed includes domination moral norms.

If I were to base my morality on past societies, it would be to form an in-group and then dominate the out group - that is what many of the great past civilizations did. — PhilosophyRunner

You are not recognizing the innate pruning of domination norms by MACS’ ultimate source. The ultimate source of MACS is not past and present cultural moral norms. Past and present cultural moral norms are only a signpost pointing to MACS’ ultimate source.

We find MACS’ ultimate source by answering “Why do cultural moral norms exist?”

As I have been saying, cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems. Domination norms which exploit outgroups are creating cooperation problems for the outgroup – the opposite of MACS’ function and therefore automatically excluded (pruned) from the start.

MACS’s moral principles are not based on the morality of past societies. MACS’s moral principles summarize solutions to cooperation problems that are present everywhere in our universe from the beginning to the end of time. That is a much grander and more insightful view of morality,

Observation of past societies show that domination moral norms are just as effective at cooperation. However you are pruning away the domination moral norms by using some other "ought" based morality, but then presenting it as if it were an "is" observation. — PhilosophyRunner

Thanks for posting again, I think I understand you better this time.

Yes, I must show how domination moral norms are pruned (nice turn of phrase) to not be a part of MACS. And there must be no hidden moral oughts involved in that pruning.

From my OP,

... the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims become:

“Behaviors that increase well-being by solving cooperation problems are moral” and

“Behavior that minimize suffering by solving cooperation problems are moral.” — Mark S

Here, I am claiming that “solving cooperation problems is moral ‘means’". (Note I also claim the implied “creating cooperation problems is immoral ‘means’".)

What may not be obvious is that these principles innately exclude domination moral norms – no sneaky separate pruning required. Domination moral norms are excluded because their goals of exploiting outgroups are excluded. Exploiting outgroups creates cooperation problems for the outgroup and are therefore immoral (even while solving cooperation problems for the ingroup).

What is the objective source of the moral claims:
• Solving cooperation problems is moral and
• Creating cooperation problems is immoral?

That source is the observation that the function of past and present cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems. These cooperation/exploitation dilemmas are present everywhere in our universe and must be solved to enable forming highly cooperative societies.

What is the objective source of their imperative bindingness? There is none. This is a claim about what moral behavior ‘is’ in our universe, not a claim about what it ought to be. What ought to be moral is 1) a different category of thing and 2) the focus of traditional moral philosophy.

means to show or investigate protomorality — Agent Smith

Understanding MACS as “protomorality” sounds like a helpful perspective. It could help bridge the intellectual framing gap between how understanding what moral behavior ‘is’ is culturally useful (my topic) and traditional moral philosophy’s focus on what ought to be moral, a different category of thing.

No, the two claims are not contrary.

Does MACS define what we imperatively ought to do? No, of course not. I have no reasons to believe such imperative oughts ever have or ever will exist.

Does MACS define what all (or virtually all) well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral in their society? I argue it does, and is therefore normative, in my post “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”. — Mark S

Your theory does not tell us what we ought do — Banno

As I argue in this thread, MACS is useful for resolving many disputes about moral norms (disputes about what we ought to do) despite lacking arguments for any kind of normativity (and especially imperative ought normativity, which I expect exists only in our delusions). So, yes, MACS, even with no normative claim tells us about what we ought to do.

Being culturally useful without any normativity makes MACS an excellent candidate to evaluate for normativity, as I do in “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”.

By Gert’s definition of normativity – “what all rational people would advocate under specified conditions” MACS is normative in the sense of defining right and wrong. But there is no source of imperative bindingness in Gert’s definition – hence no imperative ought; it can be rational to act immorally.

MACS without normative claims helps resolve many disputes about cultural moral norms. When shown to meet Gert’s definition of normative, MACS tell us much more (but not all) about what is moral and immoral.

Cultural moral norms (cultural norms whose violation is commonly considered to deserve punishment) are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.