The real is rational and the rational is real. That's the 'faith' of philosophy — plaque flag
From the dawn of philosophy through Kant's noumena, we see a strong tendency to posit a distinction between the word we live in and something more real, and naive realism itself posits an external world that is distinct from us. — Count Timothy von Icarus
‘Tis vain hope, I must say, although you are nonetheless welcome to take that point. — Mww
Philosophy gets us clearer on empirical reality perhaps, and I think that is the only reality that plaque flag allows. — Janus
Prima facie, it doesn’t. However, upon investigation, there are strong inductive arguments for our (1) at least our representative faculties using logic and (2) I would go so far as to say that reality has logic, as a Platonic form, which conditions the universal mind. The ‘realm of appearance’ is informationally-accurate (enough for survival purposes) and, consequently, is an indirect window into the world-in-itself. — Bob Ross
First what? — Bob Ross
We couldn't recognise a conceptual scheme that was radically different to ur own, as a conceptual scheme. — Banno
If the pre-cognitive world is at worst altogether non-existent and at best totally "dark" and totally blind, what if we and the other animals are expressions, manifestations of that darkness, blindness and ignorance as much as we are the expressions, manifestations of newborn knowledge (in every sense of the word)? — Janus
I want to add that I've often heard it said the we humans are the world coming to know itself, and in that sense, it didn't exist until it came to be known by us. But then what about the other animals, whose cognitive umwelts are (mostly) hidden from us? — Janus
I there has to be a conception of levels or modes or domains of being. — Quixodian
No, I don't think so. I there has to be a conception of levels or modes or domains of being. Traditionally that was cast in terms of the chain of being, but it survived even into the 17th Century: — Quixodian
:up:I love the "divine ignorance" of humanity as much as I love its knowledge. Divine ignorance is the dialectical counterpart of knowledge and a profound source of creativity. — Janus
:up:but it seems reasonable to think that they somehow do exist independently of humans grasping and recognizing them as mountains. — Janus
For me the phenomenologically (and spiritually) important thing is precisely our not knowing. If we knew everything, or even in principle could know everything, then there would be real mystery, only things yet to be known, and thus no room for faith. — Janus
Nonetheless, if I wanted to find a nuance that allowed me to avoid the performative contradiction, it would be doubtless easy. Such is the fickle nature of logic and reason, after all. — Judaka
didn't take myself to be articulating the structure of reality there... I had imagined something broader, something closer to the "whole truth", as you say. Something overarching. Was I wrong? — Judaka
Surely the dog is what it is absent the concept or more precisely name, "dog". — Janus
that is all that is required (i.e., an objective world being represented) to prove that there is a 'brain-in-itself'. — Bob Ross
But, regardless, the brain is a informationally adequate representation of a vital aspect of oneself, as a product of oneself representation an aspect of oneself to oneself. — Bob Ross
Oh I see: are you arguing that the only thing one can directly know is the result of their brain’s processes (and thusly are immersed in ideas)? If so, then I would say that is epistemic idealism and not a form of solipsism; but I could be misunderstanding you. — Bob Ross
But the brain-for-us is not the brain-in-itself, exactly because it is a representation of it. — Bob Ross
:up:That's actually what I think. I think what David Chalmer tries to express rather awkwardly as 'what it is like to be...' is, really, just 'being'. — Quixodian
:up:Furthermore that we universally assume that we know what 'being' means when actually we don't. — Quixodian
The experience that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not experience.
To say 'I wonder at such and such being the case' has only sense if I can imagine it not to be the case. In this sense one can wonder at the existence of, say, a house when one sees it and has not visited it for a long time and has imagined that it had been pulled down in the meantime. But it is nonsense to say that I wonder at the existence of the world, because I cannot imagine it not existing. I could of course wonder at the world round me being as it is. If for instance I had this experience while looking into the blue sky, I could wonder at the sky being blue as opposed to the case when it's clouded. But that's not what I mean. I am wondering at the sky being whatever it is. One might be tempted to say that what I am wondering at is a tautology, namely at the sky being blue or not blue. But then it's just nonsense to say that one is wondering at a tautology. — Wittgenstein
Note that such direct realism doesn't pretend to infallibility or omniscience. Reality is profoundly horizonal (we know the mountain has another side, that we could definitely get clearer on Hegel, etc.) We can be wrong, confused, see things at different levels of clarity. The physicists sees the chair in the kitchen in ways that the child can't, for the physicist has learned to enrich the object by weaving it into the scientific image. A philosopher will also see the chair in more complex and complete way than the child. — plaque flag
So even a word like "truth", I don't think a dictionary definition helps that much, we need to ask, what does it mean to refer to something as truth, and what are the rules for it? What does it mean for something to be truth and how should we treat something upon knowing that it's the truth? All of these questions are relevant to understanding the word, though context can influence this greatly. — Judaka
That's far from a comprehensive explanation, and I could've written this much better but it should be enough that you understand my perspective, maybe. — Judaka
A characteristic distinguishing feature of linguistic practices is their protean character, their plasticity and malleability, the way in which language constantly overflows itself, so that any established pattern of usage is immediately built on, developed, and transformed. The very act of using linguistic expressions or applying concepts transforms the content of those expressions or concepts. The way in which discursive norms incorporate and are transformed by novel contingencies arising from their usage is not itself a contingent, but a necessary feature of the practices in which they are implicit. It is easy to see why one would see the whole enterprise of semantic theorizing as wrong–headed if one thinks that, insofar as language has an essence, that essence consists in its restless self–transformation (not coincidentally reminiscent of Nietzsche’s “self–overcoming”). Any theoretical postulation of common meanings associated with expression types that has the goal of systematically deriving all the various proprieties of the use of those expressions according to uniform principles will be seen as itself inevitably doomed to immediate obsolescence as the elusive target practices overflow and evolve beyond those captured by what can only be a still, dead snapshot of a living, growing, moving process. It is an appreciation of this distinctive feature of discursive practice that should be seen as standing behind Wittgenstein’s pessimism about the feasibility and advisability of philosophers engaging in semantic theorizing…
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[T]he idea that the most basic linguistic know–how is not mastery of proprieties of use that can be expressed once and for all in a fixed set of rules, but the capacity to stay afloat and find and make one’s way on the surface of the raging white–water river of discursive communal practice that we always find ourselves having been thrown into (Wittgensteinian Geworfenheit) is itself a pragmatist insight. It is one that Dewey endorses and applauds. And it is a pragmatist thought that owes more to Hegel than it does to Kant. — Robert Brandom
Do you associate subjective with unjustified? That would be unfortunate, it's sad how this word has been butchered.
As I've already explained, and you seemingly agreed with, my argument is the result of my creative effort, it's got my biases, my choices, my views attached. "Articulation is inherently subjective", that's my understanding of articulation, my understanding of "inherently", my rules for applying "inherently", my understanding of "subjective" my rules for applying "subjective". I chose the words and not some other words. I sequenced them as they are. It's my creation, and its construction is tied to my thinking. — Judaka
Only if they were a rationalist — Moliere
Though your mention of heroism is a point of difference between us. I've come to a place in my life where I don't want the heroes journey. I'm just me doing my things trying to be happy. — Moliere
I think I'd say that your expression is that embodiment, worldhood, and language are equiprimordial, to use some Heidegger. — Moliere
That sits well with me. It's the foundationalism that I'm questioning more than the ontology. — Moliere
I'd side more Kant when it comes to the questions of ontology or metaphysics: knowledge requires a justification, and there are no justifications when it comes to ontology. Ontology presupposes its own justifications from the outset. — Moliere
Couldn't you do so from an emotive base? — Moliere
I'm tempted to become a parody of myself and just say "It's the ethical!" :D But I actually don't think rationality is an ethical matter. I think of it as instrumental to whatever it is the human heart wants. — Moliere
Possible objection, your honor. From what perspective can someone claim there are two rationalities ? Only (I think) from a higher and truer 'actual' synthesizing rationality.
Can a unified subject believe in two, truly opposed 'rationalities' ? In opposed inferential norms ? — plaque flag
(math is clear and certain, but knowing-how to play jazz piano is not as clear) — Moliere