Should the West be unable to deal with even one major military challenge, this will no doubt embolden other actors, and reduce sharply the ability of western, primarily the European, nations to affect international trends. — Echarmion
I don't have a problem with that. I have no problem with characterizing Russia as an imperial state with a very strong nationalist block.
I have a problem of using nationalism in Russia to excuse nationalism in Ukraine. — boethius
Nationalists there definitely are in Ukraine. But please demonstrate there are groups that honour Nazi collaborators and are clearly organized around an explicitly Nazi ideology, not just have a few "bad apples". Now, if you want to say the nationalism is a different flavour, not explicitly Nazi, but just as bad, sure, I don't have a problem with that. — boethius
Wagner is recruiting hardened criminals from prison. — boethius
Now, on the point you are responding to, my point is exactly that Putin can make a simplistic argument!
Doesn't matter how complicated you think it is, a lot of Russians will be sympathetic to Putins justification they are fighting Nazi's in Ukraine. You're saying regular Russians hold your view that it's more complicated, that of course Russia has just as many Nazi's?
Think about it, obviously not.
I focus on the symbolism these groups use in that statement just because that's what will be used by Putin to communicate this to the public. I specifically explain that this factual based motivation is going to be even stronger with propaganda. — boethius
Anyone who knows anything about Russian history and then considers this situation where literal Nazis, both proud and openly advocating the destruction of Russia, are shelling ethnic-Russian civilians in the Donbas for 8 years, would not conclude that the Russians would be unmotivated to teach these Nazis a lesson in proper estimation of an opponents strength. — boethius
Your position, and that of ↪ssu
↪Echarmion
and all the previous war and Zelensky proponents here (as in the Western main stream media) is essentially the cry baby approach to geopolitics and international relations. You essentially whine about the fact that Ukraine can't get what it wants (can't be in NATO, can't get Crimea back, can't have Nazi's without criticism, can't get the weapons it wants, can't compete with Russia militarily, can't have nuclear weapons now, can't just disappear Russia somehow) and then whining about Ukraine's situation somehow directly connects to justifying repudiating peace negotiations, repudiating neutrality and committing to a long war of attrition that is incredibly destructive for Ukraine and Ukraine has little hope of winning. — boethius
You're basically explaining how Ukraine could have avoided this destructive war by committing to neutrality ... but!! that won't remove Russian influence from Ukraine!!!
So what? Ahah, it's better to fight to the last Ukrainian?
Russian influence in Ukraine is far less destructive and far easier to deal with than a giant war if you're any normal Ukrainian citizen. — boethius
Again, "what neutrality mean according to your own clear criteria of a neutral country"? — boethius
List of formerly neutral countries: Ukraine: After Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine's parliament voted to drop non-aligned status on December 23, 2014. — Neutral Country - Wikipedia
"Co-operation" with alliances such as NATO does not fit the definition of neutrality according to the above definition. Co-operation could exist between NATO and a neutral country if it was for some clearly humanitarian purposes, but no one would claim that "cooperating" with a military alliance is a country that "holds itself as permanently neutral". — boethius
Nevertheless, this ambiguity of intentions, playing footsie with NATO, is sufficient to avoid a Russian annexation of Crimea.
However, you get rid of the person that made this ambiguous "maybe NATO, maybe not, neutral but cooperating with NATO" policy in a coup and it's reasonable to assume that the policy is likewise gone.
You're basically arguing: Ukraine was neutral because Yanukovych made it neutral!
Ukraine was not neutral, but the status was at best ambiguous: declaring simultaneously non-alignment ... but not excluding cooperation with NATO, which is basically a contradiction: "We're not choosing sides, but we're allowed to choose this particular side" is not a constitutional declaration of neutrality. — boethius
The actual reality, as I've described, is that Ukrainian society is divided on which way to go, so elects a compromise candidate. Once there is a CIA backed coup, it is clear pretty clear which way things are going.
So Russia annexes Crimea to hedge the risk of a completely belligerent Ukraine. — boethius
The argument that Russia would not be satisfied with neutrality since 2008 is an extremely weak one. Even a vague neutrality does not cause any Russian annexations, much less a full scale invasion. — boethius
Which does not satisfy the criteria of a neutral country.
Your argument that Ukraine was neutral in 2014 is basically explaining that it wasn't neutral but was "vaguely promised" to join NATO and then some bureaucratic hangups: tada! neutrality!! — boethius
We were discussing what Zelensky could do to avoid the invasion in 2022. — boethius
But let me get this straight, your counter argument is that the war was guaranteed and committing to neutrality would have changed nothing (in 2022, or anytime before) ... because Russia annexed Crimea after an illegal coup by CIA backed forces? — boethius
My argument is that declaring neutrality would make the Russian invasion far more costly diplomatically.
The reason the annexation of Crimea (as you note, there's no fighting or invasion as Russian forces are already there) was not difficult diplomatically is because Russia has a giant military base there so partners such as China and India understood the reasons for it.
I.e. neutrality would have real leverage in the real world and significantly increase the diplomatic cost to Russia of an invasion while removing the critical justification (even to the domestic audience) for it. — boethius
There's then a coup in 2014, and Russia annexes Ukraine and separatists in Donbas try to separate following this coup. — boethius
Ukrainians legally elect someone who is a compromiser with Russia, perhaps because a majority of the Ukrainian people understood at the time, as they have been made to understand all too clearly since, that antagonizing Russia by trying to join NATO does not benefit Ukraine and will cause exactly the war that the point of joining NATO would be to avoid.
The "will of the people" on this point is completely irrelevant to the "pro-democracy" NATO proponents: when the coup is "pro-West" then the will of the people is whatever the West says it is; elections certainly don't matter ... and yet the very same people will accuse Trump rioters in Washington of sedition?!?!? — boethius
'Neutrality clause' while NATO says it is going to incorporate Ukraine into its ranks and the US is funneling billions of dollars into Ukraine to support a coup d'etat — Tzeentch
It's truly incredible. — boethius
And you think that somehow this is an acceptable arrangement for Russia, that Russia would start a war over nothing but a formality? — Echarmion
Okay— so Russia didn’t plan on conquering Ukraine. Glad you don’t think so. — Mikie
As long as it’s not right next door in Ukraine. NATO had already expanded at the time of this quote. The worry wasn’t about Lithuania or Estonia — although there are reports that this was hardly celebrated. — Mikie
First, any Russian government would be concerned to assure that the initial expansion was not the first step on the way to subsequent “evolutionary enlargements” that would include the Baltic States and Ukraine. [...] As President Kuchma of Ukraine has said, NATO expansion would place Ukraine “in the front lines” between an expanded NATO and Russia, and the same would be true of the Baltic States and Belarus. — Should NATO grow
The Act does not address two aspects of expansion which cause the greatest concern to the Russians, namely the scope and pace of expansion. NATO's current plan is open ended. It clearly contemplates inclusion of the Baltic states. But Russia has made clear that inclusion in NATO of any members of the former Soviet Union is unacceptable. — Opposition to NATO Expansion
Which we apparently can’t say about Russia— because Putin is a madman bent on conquering Ukraine with 190 thousand troops. — Mikie
No, you’ve provided one. The others were shown to be complete garbage. Easy for anyone to go back and check.
Do I’m glad you see you’re sticking with “one second hand reference” versus the entire documentary record and analyses by the US’s own experts. Predictable.
Too bad Burns, for example, wasn’t around so you could educate him with your cute narrative.
It’s amazing how quickly you devolve into nonsense when confronted on your fictions. Pity. — Mikie
Russia's opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia is both emotional and based on perceived strategic concerns about the impact on Russia's interests in the region. It is also politically popular to paint the U.S. and NATO as Russia's adversaries and to use NATO's outreach to Ukraine and Georgia as a means of generating support from Russian nationalists.
Well I'm sure the word Putin would use is not "corrupt" but "loyal". But yes that is what I read as well, and also that he was a bit of a blank slate politically. Noone knew what he really stood for. At the time, he might have simply been considered an interim solution. Someone not offensive, who would make sure the Yeltsin family got off free, and then make way for someone with more of a political profile. But Putin quickly made his mark by taking a hardline stance on Chechnya and is to this day suspected of having orchestrated terror attacks to have a pretext for a second Chechen war. That brought him into his own as a political figure in his own right.
Another allegation is that Putin was essentially always a KGB trojan horse, who played the role of the loyal vassal long enough to get into power, and then started to enact the kind of policies his KGB clique had wanted to employ since the days of the USSR.
Do note that all this is based on somewhat hazy rememberings on books I read / listened to. So it's quite possible I muddled something, Perhaps Jabberwock can correct any glaring mistakes, since they seem knowledgeable. — Echarmion
If that’s all you have — and apparently it is, given you can’t find another one — then that’s pretty weak indeed. But yeah, that definitely contradicts everything I provided above. — Mikie
Yeah, in the same way Trump has provided evidence of a stolen election.
So far, 3 “quotes” shown to be complete garbage.
So I’ll repeat: the Russian position on US turning Ukraine into a western puppet never changed, including Ukraine joining NATO. Hence why you can’t provide a single quotation that says otherwise. — Mikie
And yes, the NATO-Russia council context works exactly against your thesis. That you somehow think it doesn’t is hilarious. — Mikie
Russia has been clear about NATO involvement in Ukraine for decades. — Mikie
Needed for what? To remain in power? — frank
I think if the invasion was just a land grab, Putin's timing is a little strange. Why wouldn't he have done that a few years earlier when Trump was president of the US? Trump would have cheered him on.
Waiting until Biden, a hawk, to become president, makes it seem that he wanted to engage the US military somehow. Since he also declared some sort of new world order after the invasion, indicating that the US was no longer in charge of global affairs, it seems like he thought he was going to easily conquer Ukraine and flaunt this win in spite of Biden's public threat to punish Russia for interfering in US elections.
In other words, I don't believe the invasion was about NATO, but I think it may have partly been about demonstrating Russian military strength and simultaneously demonstrating that US supremacy was over. He just miscalculated his own military capability? — frank
Translation:
(1) You cannot, and have not, provided one quote supporting your claim that the Russian stance on Ukraine and NATO has changed. — Mikie
I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will not shy away from the processes of expanding interaction with NATO and the Western allies as a whole. Ukraine has its own relations with NATO; there is the Ukraine-NATO Council. At the end of the day the decision is to be taken by NATO and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners. — Press Statement and Answers to Questions at a Joint News Conference with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma
(2) You completely ignore the historical record.
Oh, so years of military training, supplying weapons, conducting military drills — not decisive.
I suppose the tens of billions of dollars spent on Ukraine these last two years — also a minor role. After all, Ukraine is an independent nation that makes its own decisions and can defend itself. — Mikie
You literally can’t even find one quote without the next sentence contradicting your bogus claims.
No, Russia was never fine with the US turning Ukraine into a western puppet. NATO is a big part of that. Easy to understand why, if you do the uncomfortable work of putting yourself into someone else’s shoes. Apparently you’re incapable.
China forming a military alliance in Mexico or Canada wouldn’t go over well in the US. I wonder if the US’s response would be so confusing. Or perhaps the explanation would be that they wanted to conquer Canada for decades and would have attacked anyway. — Mikie
Not one word about NATO. Just more vagueness. Apparently you mistook the title of the article for something Putin actually said. — Mikie
For those following along with any interest in history or nuance: Russia has been clear about NATO involvement in Ukraine for decades. — Mikie
Yeah, the US has only a minor role to play in world affairs, politically and economically. How ridiculous to claim it’s responsible for things it’s clearly responsible for. — Mikie
I’ve gone over that at length. You want to jump around in time and then claim the story is full of holes. It’s just a boring game of whack-a-mole.
Maybe it would have been better to have laid it all out at once, from 1991 to 2022. But I can’t do that every time someone replies. — Mikie
Post 2014 invention, actually. I mentioned 2008 because of the Bucharest summit, and whether Russian imperialism was given as a reason for expansion. It wasn’t, of course. True, Crimea gave the US a nice story to tell.
In any case, your accusation doesn’t even make sense. I’m “blissfully unaware” of “other forces at play” — other forces apparently being my view on Russian imperialism? Just a muddled paragraph.
Anyway— I’ve discussed Russian “Internal politics” a great deal. You gave 3 irrelevant quotes when asked to discuss what you meant by it. Yet the claim stands: Russian positions on US involvement in Ukraine, including NATO, was stated explicitly for years, was known by the US, and was done anyway. If you want to claim this was a “minor factor,” so be it. I have no time machine and no window into Putin’s mind, so I obviously cannot falsify your unfalsifiable argument of what might have happened if everything were different. — Mikie
Hence why you provide none. — Mikie
So US involvement was a factor, but a minor one. That’s supposedly the big difference here. The major factor was Russian imperialist ambitions — and you point to Georgia and Crimea as evidence— I say these were reactions, and round we go. — Mikie
Ah yes, the one quote you come back to over and over again, even after it’s shown that Putin says the complete opposite in the very same quote. But you’ll hang on to that forever, apparently, even against a long documentary record and quotations from the US’s own cabinet members/ ambassadors.
No, the position hadn’t changed. It was the same in 1995 as it was in 2002, as it was in 2004, as it was in 2008, etc. Russia was not going to allow Ukraine to be turned into a western bulwark, a “liberal democracy,” or (especially) a member of NATO.
But yeah, one poorly documented (and contradictory) quote from Putin in 2002 definitely negates all that. Give me a break. — Mikie
Russia has NO CONCERNS about the expansion of NATO from the standpoint of ensuring security — KREMLIN!
Ukraine is an independent sovereign state, and it will choose its own path to peace and security — When Putin Loved NATO
Ignorance of what, exactly? I think it’s quite clear we’re talking passed each other. — Mikie
You don’t seem to acknowledge the role of the US, or at best minimize it. Hence why you always talk about what “Ukraine” wanted — as if that’s an easy picture, given the internal divisions. — Mikie
But suppose we take all that to be true. It does not for a moment negate the fact that Russia would view any support from the US as hostile interference. Even assuming best intentions to spread democracy and helping an ally stand up against oppression and imperialism.
Our own people knew this and said so outright. I won’t go through the quotes again. So again, were they wrong? Or does it not matter because Russia has been bent on conquering Ukraine all along? (According to you.) — Mikie
And what is my unconventional view, exactly? — Mikie
The danger of pushing NATO was known long before Putin. That never changed. Russia was weaker at some points, but the position on NATO — particularly Ukraine — remained the same.
But don’t take my word for it. Or the Kremlin’s. Take the following — from 1995 (quite a while before 2004): — Mikie
NATO expansion was the most direct cause of this war. Doesn’t make Putin a good guy, as simpletons will surely interpret this as saying, but it’s at least worth being honest about.
Or we can pretend the US isn’t the world superpower these last 30 years, and that its intentions are mostly benign. That there was no plan for Eastern Europe beyond spreading democracy, if those countries chose to join. Etc etc
A nice story. Conventional. Easy. (Which is why it’s so common.) But ultimately dead wrong and ignorant of history — and nuance. — Mikie
Russian elections expected in Mar 2024. — jorndoe
Yeah, and coming from a guy who makes statements like the one above— that cuts deep. — Mikie
Demanded more independence— like EU and NATO membership. Which clearly has nothing to do with the United States influence. Got it. Never mind what Russia was saying about this for years. — Mikie
No, that’s the Ukrainian perspective. You don’t even seem to know what the Russian perspective was. Which is striking— and exactly the point. — Mikie
Right or wrong, there was no way Russia was going to allow Ukraine to be turned into a “Western bulwark,” and it was clear about this for years. Especially regarding NATO. If Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 weren’t evidence enough, fine. But then further funding, training, and supplying (all with US backing) — all while Russia warned against it — eventually leading to war, just as our own diplomats and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, et al., predicted, shouldn’t have been a major surprise. — Mikie
To write it off as “well it would have happened anyway because Russia turned nationalistic and imperialistic” is less than great analysis. It’s the conventional view, no doubt— but I repeat myself. — Mikie
Is this a joke? — Mikie
The US had a plan for Eastern Europe. That plan is not exclusively NATO. Your inability to understand that isn’t my problem. — Mikie
That’s not the question. It’s not about hypotheticals. It’s about the facts, of what actually happened. And US influence is all over it, from the billion + spent on social influence to NATO expansion to supporting the overthrow of the government to economic influences to supplying military training and arms. — Mikie
The question is whether we — the US —should have taken the Russian perspective seriously. I think we should have. We didn’t. And that’s why we have the war. — Mikie
What the Ukrainian people have wanted has varied greatly. We see from polls about NATO or EU membership that things change, and especially in different regions. So to treat Ukraine as a monolith is incorrect. But it’s also irrelevant to the point about US influence, which is all over this war and all over Ukraine for decades. — Mikie
Can you even cite where we've even discussed Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries joining NATO? — boethius
What I notice about your view, and this also goes for Tzeentch to a different extent, is that in your "myth", or perhaps we should use a more neutral term like "narrative", noone has any agency. Decisions are ultimately just reactions to the shadowy machinations of an abstraction like "US imperialism" or "the neocons". Hence why Zelensky must be manipulated by a myth. Perhaps he is even entirely a puppet. The russian actions, too are ultimately just a reaction to the actions of the masterminds. — Echarmion
So for the benefit of anyone following that does not already think you are a complete fool, that is called moving the goal posts.
You literally "can't find", despite an honest search, anything other than residential areas on the outskirts of the city being shelled.
I explain the "outskirts" is exactly where industrial zones are situated, provide the most reported shelling on an entire industrial zone, then literal "military facilities" being shelled. — boethius
Anyways, here's more evidence: — boethius
Casualties would be low if Russian focus is on shelling industrial facilities, such as factories for advanced weapons manufacture mentioned above, rather than residential areas.
It's called propaganda. Western propaganda only reported when shells landed on residential areas, but since there wasn't all that many civilian casualties you then conclude that therefore Russia must not have shelled all that much after all.
Truly marvellous specimen of someone who is willing to believe anything that fuels their preferred narrative. — boethius
Anyways, it was widely reported when Russia got into artillery range of the remaining Southern road, and as you note yourself rail was suspended due to the risk of air attacks.
In other words, Russia is significantly hampering supply roots into Kiev, also known as blockading the city, also known as a siege. — boethius
This is so stupid it is almost not worth responding to at all.
Actual fighting is going to absorb more troops, more resources, more amunition, more C&C reaction and planning capacity, than just sitting on the other side of a border and there being no fighting. — boethius
Again, as actual experts have already informed you, Russia did not have the troops to effectively occupy a large city such as Kiev, much less the other major urban centres, and even if Russia took major urban centres without costly and long Urban combat (which unlikely) that would not end the war due to there being zero reason to believe Ukrainian partisans won't continue fighting from elsewhere in Ukraine. — boethius
Russia apparently intended to rapidly seize Kyiv, with Spetsnaz infiltrating the city, supported by airborne operations and a rapid mechanised advance from the north. Russian Airborne Forces attempted to seize two key airfields near Kyiv, launching an airborne assault on Antonov Airport, followed by a similar landing at Vasylkiv, near Vasylkiv Air Base south of Kyiv, on 26 February. — Northern Ukraine campaign
The Northern operation obviously had the military effect of aiding Russia's conquest of the South, because that is what literally happens. Certainly the Kremlin would have preferred the pressure was enough to pressure Kiev into a peace agreement, but if that doesn't happen the Russians take also shell targets of industrial and military value while they are there. — boethius
First, there is zero evidence that the battle at the airport was some sort of "massacre" — boethius
All the analysis that concludes the battle was a failure for the Russians presumes their goal of capturing Kiev, which doesn't happen so the argument goes that failing to completely secure Hostomel is the critical event that prevents taking Kiev.
Now, if the Northern operation was a fixing operation, makes sense anyways to attack the airport to destroy the AA and other assets that are there, which Wikipedia informs us were destroyed in precision strikes, prevent Ukraine from making use of the airport, but also make it seem right off the bat that Russia is committing to taking Kiev, which the whole narrative around Hostomel definitely served to establish. — boethius
Furthermore, your objection that this would be too cunning for the Russians to try to solicit over commitment from Ukraine to defending Kiev, while the entire South is conquered, is just bizarre. These are extremely banal and standard military ideas that are literally thousands of years old. If you want to take position A then if you can you will try to get your enemy to be at not-A. — boethius
This was the most widely reported and only one example is required to disprove your assertion that Russia did not shell anything of military / industrial value. — boethius
But let me get this straight, shelling is cheaper than missiles, Russia has artillery with a range of up to 30km, Russia is in position around Kiev where we now agree much of the industrial capacity will be outside the city ... but you are arguing Russian forces elect not to use this opportunity to shell targets of military value, such as industrial zones and literal military facilities?
Your argument is Russia didn't shell much of anything? Or only shelled residential areas of no military value?
In any case, my point that the Northern operation allows Russia to shell targets of military value and that's one advantage of undertaking such an operation is obviously true even in a bizarre scenario where Russian forces simply elect not to shell anything of military value. — boethius
A siege, how the word is usually employed, starts when an army gets to a city or fortification and starts the process of assaulting it or then starts the process of blockading it.
There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful, the defenders manage to prevent complete encirclement, or then were always partial with supply roots in and out of the city (for example a coastal city being under siege from the land) but nevertheless the siege succeeds. — boethius
Even the term blockade does not require the blockading force to "isolate and completely detain" the defending force, but simply disrupting supply roots is still a blockade. Indeed, most sieges and most blockades in history are not perfect for obvious resource reasons that perfecting something takes exponentially more resources and resources are needed for other things; restricting most supplies to a city is perhaps sufficient and obviously still blockading said city; likewise attacking a city, aka. besieging the city, does not require a perfect blockade of the city nor any blockade of the entire city at all. — boethius
Saying a city is under siege is conjures up a different idea than saying a battle took place near a city, a much better idea to describe Russia's approach to and process of encircling Kiev. Obviously the siege of Kiev is not successful in terms of taking the city by force or then pressuring a peace deal, but no where in the definition of a siege is need be successful. There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful and the attacker failed to completely encircle the city, failed to starve the city into submission or then failed to storm and take the city by force.
You seem to be living in a world where we should only use the word siege if the attacker perfectly implements a blockade. That is not how the word is used. — boethius
That map you post shows Russians blockading, to use your definition, essentially half of Kiev and due to the range of artillery able to significantly disrupt traffic on the remaining roads and rail into Kiev, which is a perfectly sensible siege of a city. People are literally living in subways at this time and you're telling me that if you were there you'd be willing to go down into the subway system and explain to them that Kiev is not under siege? — boethius
The Russians do conquer the strategically critical land bridge to Crimea so overall the initial invasion is a military success and the Northern campaign played a critical military role. — boethius
Where cities simply capitulated obviously Russia did not have to besiege the city and take it by force. If there was fierce resistance in Kherson then either Russia would have needed to commit the troops required to take the city or then not take it.
I'm not sure what your point here is, that the Russian plan was based on assuming Kiev would just capitulate without a fight? — boethius
Actually you often do send your best troops on the fixing operation since it is a more difficult mission that requires greater skill and discipline and military wisdom and also greater bravery knowing one is in fact facing superior numbers. It is a much more sophisticated operation than just busting through with overwhelming force. If you send your worst troops they risk just getting completely destroyed or captured immediately and then the enemy can anyways reinforce where you are actually attacking.
Indeed, that is exactly one purpose of elite forces in conventional warfare, is to go and deceive the enemy of where the main attack will take place.
So if indeed elite troops were committed to the North that is not unusual.
Attacking Hostomel with elite troops and making it appear that the plan is to take the airport and then fly in reinforcements to take Kiev is exactly the kind of plan special forces would come up with if they are tasked with a fixing operation. — boethius
So, is 20 000 troops in Norther Ukraine really Putin ignoring the "risks and costs" and believing he can completely conquer Kiev and all of Ukraine with 20 000 troops from the North ... or is the purpose of the Northern operation something that makes sense and is feasible to achieve with 20 000 troops of a fixing operation so focus is on Kiev and away from the South-East? — boethius
As I already pointed out, industrial zones are usually beyond the residential zones, and artillery can have up to 30 km, so your point that Russia gets to the residential zone of Kiev should indicate to anyone familiar with "cities" generally speaking that the Russians would have a position to shell industrial zones (that have military value in terms of producing, or being retooled to produce, military hardware), that it would be one thing the Russians might do ... and indeed the Russians do shell industrial targets and so that it one positive (for the Russians) of their Northern operation. — boethius
Which is even more directly contradicted by the Wikipedia authors themselves paraphrasing the colonel with the word " — boethius
Your complaint is that the siege is not entirely complete or not entirely successful, which is fine, a siege does not require perfection or then a siege must be successful to be a siege. Which is simply not the case. — boethius
The Russians are definitely blockading Kiev by the process of encircling it and cutting off most roads to Kiev. — boethius
But I guess this is the "sensationalist press" that wants to sensationalist an army encircling most of a city as "a siege". — boethius
It's honestly a strange obsession of yours to refuse to characterize something that is so obviously a siege as a siege. — boethius
1. The Russian military operation as a whole secures the land bridge to Crimea and the Northern operation clearly contributes to the military success in the South by diverting Ukrainian resources and attention. — boethius
2. Russia does not commit the troops necessary to conquer Kiev in Urban combat and occupy the city. — boethius
From this we can conclude that insofar as the Northern operation was designed as a fixing operation to be sure to take critical strategic targets in the South, it is a success. — boethius
The article in question reported both shelling and missile attacks ... perhaps because there was both shelling and missile attacks. — boethius
Clearly the Russians shelled industrially valuable targets during their Northern operation and this would clearly be one positive outcome for the Russians in conducting said operation. Shelling is much cheaper than standoff air attacks, cruise missiles or drones. — boethius
You have the wikipedia article citing a military expert (assuming intelligence chiefs have some expertise) using the word siege to describe Russias operation.
Now, if you want to say the siege is not entirely successful and not very long, I have no issue with that, but the word siege is still perfectly suitable to describe Russia getting to and then attempting to surround the city. They are sieging the city. — boethius
It is not sensationalist to describe an army getting to and nearly entirely encircling a city as "a siege", which the same Wikipedia article defines as:
A siege is a military blockade of a city, or fortress, with the intent of conquering by attrition, or by well-prepared assault. — boethius
I'd have no problem accepting that the Ukrainian resistance is indeed more effective than the Russians expect, and especially the impact of the most advanced Western shoulder launched missiles flooding into the country that equip extremely effective harassing units, and they retreat due to being unable to maintain the siege with the forces they commit. — boethius
The siege lasted "lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022" (to cite Wikipedia), so lasted more than the entire month of March, but true it is closer to 1 month than 2, however the context of the point was simply that the incursion allows Russia to shell many things around the capital and is one "pro" of the operation. — boethius
And therefore, if the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal as well as divert Ukrainian forces while the South is being taken, then the time line of the Russians retreating from the North essentially immediately following the largest Urban centre in the South falling is pretty good support for my argument. — boethius
Speaking about de-escalation in the Kiev and Chernigov areas, Peskov said it was a goodwill gesture, intended to create favorable conditions for continuing negotiations. — TASS
Neither I nor Tzeentch are arguing it's some brilliant military move, but rather a very ordinary military move. Occupying the enemy with an attack in one place in order to advance in another place is extremely banal military tactic. — boethius
It's quite usual that large military operations accomplish several things.
It's honestly remarkable how committed people are to believing the initial Russian invasion that conquered 15% of Ukrainian territory of critical strategic importance to the long term security of Crimea, itself of critical strategic importance to the Black Sea and already housing a large Russian military base, as some sort of military catastrophe for the Russians and brilliant victory for the Ukrainians.
The Ukrainians won some battles but on the whole lost significant territory. — boethius