Which is fine, I've just been avoiding committing to some major difference between the natural sciences and the human or social sciences, because I've been trying to clarify ― or insist upon or defend or something ― that there is some genuine continuity, that the political scientist is as much a scientist as the physicist. — Srap Tasmaner

But look at this argument: <One scientist is as much a scientist as another; therefore all sciences are equally scientific>.

I have been trying to raise the elephant in the room: Does "scientific" mean anything at all? (Or else "more scientific" and "less scientific"?) Does "pseudoscientific" mean anything at all? Is there any strategy for learning that is not scientific?

I think you've given those questions short shrift, to say the least. In fact you've mostly just ignored them.

Note too that the descriptions of science you have given seem to contradict your claim that there are non-scientific ways of knowing. For example I asked:

Do you think there are non-scientific strategies for learning? — Leontiskos

You responded:

Surely. Given the distinction between knowing that and knowing how, it stands to reason there's a difference between learning that and learning how... — Srap Tasmaner

And then a few sentences later, you effectively contradict your, "Surely," and seem to say that science is a(ny) strategy for learning what can be known (and therefore there are no non-scientific strategies for learning):

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known, and I also want to say it is something like the distillation of everything we have learned about how to learn what can be known. — Srap Tasmaner

If you think this account is mistaken I would challenge you to begin with my question, "Do you think there are non-scientific strategies for learning?," and try to find a clear answer in your responses.* Namely, a clear example or description of non-scientific strategies for learning.

This manner of confusion is indicative of the sort of pro-pluralism I find on TPF. Someone really wants pluralism among the sciences, but then it turns out that they have enormous trouble giving a meaningful definition of science. What I find is that the pluralist has a tendency to make the words they use meaningless. My thesis here is that pluralism will begin to fail insofar as 'science' begins to mean anything substantial at all.


* That same question was asked again towards the end of . Both questions did not seem to receive a clear answer. Else, if a non-scientific strategy for learning is one which is non-reflective or non-critical, then apparently there are some sciences which are less scientific than others. It looks to be uncontroversially false that each science is equally capable of recognizing its own mistakes.

I don't think that's true. You've inferred something I didn't imply. — T Clark

Did you read the third sentence?

Unless we want to say that science has an end which has nothing to do with determining what is "ontologically" true? — Leontiskos

- :up:

- :up:

In math we can form an induction which is valid by starting with a particular case and then proving that it holds for all cases so that the individual number, say n=0, holds for all n +1, and so on. — Moliere

Well, it's not that a number holds for the iterative set, but rather that a relation or function holds for the iterative set. But yeah, that's close.

But with Aristotle I think of his categories more like trees in set theory where the trees are increasingly wider sets that encompass the lower sets as their species — Moliere

I think that's right but it seems different from mathematical proofs from induction.

so there are individuals, but then sets become individuals, and we can make inferences about the world because these sets aren't just a means for us to organize our thoughts, but rather are depictions of the world as it is — Moliere

Right, though a species is not a set if we wish to speak more carefully.

so that the induction which takes place from an individual — Moliere

Here is the crux of what I question. "Aristotle places an individual into a species via induction, therefore he is involved in a mathematical proof from induction."

Why do you see what you describe of Aristotle's method as "mathematical induction"? Because I could give a very simple argument, using your own premises, to show that it is not: <Mathematical induction is logically valid; Aristotle's induction is not logically valid; therefore Aristotle's induction is not mathematical induction>. Hence you are simultaneously claiming that Aristotle's induction is and is not mathematical induction (because you keep saying that it is, and yet you deny that it is valid in the way that mathematical induction is valid).

Does this make any sense at all? — Moliere

It's an argument, which is exactly what I've been asking for. :up:
So yes, it makes sense, although I am not convinced that it is correct.

Agreed. Given that, I guess I don’t see what you were trying to say in your previous post when you wrote “…once we understand the meaning and also etymology of "method," we find that the idea doesn't make much sense.” — T Clark

Well, a method without a goal would be like fishing without fish. Or , "no true ontological positions, only methodological ones," seems to posit methods without goals or ends. Unless we want to say that science has an end which has nothing to do with determining what is "ontologically" true?

Great post. I will have to come back to this when I have more time. Let me say just one thing:

I think the above is largely correct. However, the question then is: "why do people now think truth is incompatible with democracy?" A very robust appreciation for democracy existed in the United States in the early 20th century without an embrace of this sort of pluralism, without any apparent conflict.

...

There is, up through the early Cold War, a "cult of the Founding Fathers" that tends to present them in terms not unlike how the ancient Greeks saw figures like Solon. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Could part of it be that the United States was explicitly formed as a republic and not a mere democracy?

After all, what does Benjamin Franklin say when he emerges from the Constitutional Convention, which moved the U.S. from the Articles of Confederation to a Constitution?

• Powel: "Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?"
• Franklin: "A republic, if you can keep it."

The Articles of Confederation were a more thoroughly democratic form, and the natural question asks whether the move away from that can manage to be a republic without falling into a monarchy. Thus, arguably, the recent epoch you identify is more bound up with democracy than the former epoch. I think we have seen a resurgence of democratic thinking in the last few decades.

When I was talking about method, I meant something consistent with this definition: Method - a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of inquiry employed by or proper to a particular discipline or art. — T Clark

But disciplines and arts have ends; goals. There are no methods without ends and goals.

it's when I found I could make mistakes that I knew I was onto something — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, good. That could sum up my thread, "Argument as Transparency."

but I think we know they are, and have to be, braided together continually — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, there is a very old Aristotelian tradition which holds that speculative and practical knowledge are intricately intertwined.

In science, the intent is to get the hows right so that you can produce thats reliably; — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, very good. Science is the reliable procedure for producing thats.

Yeah I think there's a trick to that story, that it does mean it's too hard to sight-read. — Srap Tasmaner

You could say that we know how to play Coltrane's solos simply in virtue of recording and replaying them. But of course humans can also reproduce them. Asian musicians seem to be very good at that sort of reproduction. Jazz musicians might be characteristically bad at that kind of reproduction.

in jazz, the intent is to take the thats you can get your hands on to improve your ability to how. — Srap Tasmaner

The difference of artifice does come into play, here. Think about a new musician who learns "blue notes" (such as a ♭5 or a ♭3 in a major key). Or else think about the cultural transition to blues when those forms of dissonance became popular. In such cases the "theory" that is being studied is in many ways a theory of cultural appreciation, and this applies to jazz a fortiori.

As a 20th century guy, I find this worrisome and downright offensive. But I can't deny what my ears are telling me. — J

I'd say the trick is played when we dissociate the music from the source. For example, before recordings you could only ever listen to music live, and at that time there was no possibility of dissociating the music from the source. The source and the music were inseparable, and the source was relatively well-understood. There is a qualitative philosophical difference between sound-patterns produced by humans and sound-patterns produced by machines, and we might just want to call the first music and the second sound-patterns. Of course at the end of the day the machine is produced by a human who wants it to produce music, and so the gulf will never be complete. And none of this means that you will always be able to tell the difference with your "eyes closed."

I think the article misses how appeals to pre-modern tradition also figure into this though. The crowd around Trump really likes their ancient Rome memes. So does Musk. There is "Red Caesarism," etc. These elements tend to be far more communitarian, and are openly critical of libertarianism, and even sometimes critical of capitalism. Tariffs are and a push for autotarky are actually not out of line with this way of thinking. This is a tension within the Right that is out in the open, not something that is ignored.

Movements like Generation Identity in Europe are in some ways more grounded in national epics like the Nibelungenlied, the Poetic Edda, the Iliad, and ancient political theory than in modern liberalism/libertarian ideology. More Beowulf, less Ayn Rand. Certainly, they rely heavily on these sources for aesthetics, and these are romantic movements where aesthetics is given a very important role (e.g., a film like 300 might have more currency than many political dissertations).

It is certainly true that these movements often cannot abandon certain classical liberal precepts, and that this arguably makes them incoherent, or at the very least opens them up to grifters and abuse. But I do think there is more there than simple opportunism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is spot on. :up:
In the first episode of Tom Holland's podcast, "The Rest is History," he points to the same parallels between pre-modern political regimes and a number of 20th and 21st century figures, including Trump.

I think what is happening is that libertarianism is being blown out of proportion in order to produce a larger target. I could buy Musk as a libertarian, but not Trump or Peterson. I think the leftist tends to fasten upon libertarianism, given that it is the most potent antagonist on his horizon. Other antagonists then get lumped under that label.

Which is just to say maybe that this internal contradiction actually seems to me to be more of an open civil war in the Right (also one that tends to pit the young communitarian traditionalists against the older individualistic liberals), and these figures, being broadly popular, are just nexus points for this conflict. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would only add that this is a fault line which overlaps many different political identities. The individualist/communitarian bifurcation is something that most Western political identities wrestle with to one extent or another.

Good post.

And you're quite sure that rhetoric is sincere, in light of the acts? — Vera Mont

At this point anyone who thought Musk's rhetoric about the national debt was insincere has been proven wrong beyond any shadow of a doubt.

An interesting thing is that if you look at hit pieces on Peterson, the things he is being criticized for (e.g. obscurantistism) are precisely the things that made him a successful academic and could easily make him a "brilliant theorist" if he held more orthodoxly (in the context of the academy) left wing positions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wouldn't accuse Peterson of obscurantism on the whole, though he does lapse at times. He's basically an academic Jungian who has answered a cultural need and in the process become exceedingly popular. As he ventures further from home and gets further out over his skis his errors become more noticeable. The content he is engaged in is done better by others like, say, Charles Taylor. But figures like Taylor do not engage or possess the popular culture in the way that Peterson does. If we compare Peterson to figures like Taylor then Peterson loses, hands down. If we compare him to other figures in popular culture, especially in the long-form video world, then he is far above average.

Peterson is one of those who are forging a new path or Type, namely that of the academic who abandons their post and becomes a cultural commentator within the popular culture. In the ancient sense these cultural commentators and movers should be called politicians, for they are primarily concerned with political (and ethical) life and redirecting the interests of a democratic population. I suspect that we will see more individuals move into that sphere. They are reminiscent of the academics who stopped publishing academic books and started publishing popular books, but in this case platforms like YouTube make the lecture and dialogue format distributable at scale.

Another:

God is equally near in all creatures. The wise man says in (?) Sir­ach: God has set his nets and lines out over all creatures, so that we may find Him in any of them: if this net [full of creatures] were to be cast over a man, he could find God there and recognize Him. A master says he knows God aright, who is equally aware of Him in all things. I once said, to serve God in fear is good; to serve Him in love is better; but to be able to grasp the love in fear, that is best. For a man to have a peaceful life is good, but for a man to have a life of pain in patience is better; but that a man should have peace in a life of pain is best. A man may go out into the fields and say his prayers and know God, or he may go to church and know God: but if he is more aware of God because he is in a quiet place, as is usual, that comes from his imperfection and not from God: for God is equally in all things and all places, and is equally ready to give Himself as far as in Him lies: and he knows God rightly who knows God equally [in all things]. — The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, Sermon 69

In fear? Yep. In pain? Yep. In Genghis Khan? Yep. In Nazism? Yep.

I wonder if there are really no true ontological positions, only methodological ones. It's not what is real, it's where and how do we look. — T Clark

I would say that once we understand the meaning and also etymology of "method," we find that the idea doesn't make much sense in light of thousands of years of linguistic development. It would be a bit like saying, "There are really no fish; there's only fishing." If there's nothing to see then there's no need to look.

In short, I tend to think social scientists are doing the best they can, and if we are right to have less confidence in their results than in the results of physics or chemistry, it's not because their work is less scientific, but a basic issue, first, of statistical power (lack of data), and, second, of the enormous complexity of the phenomena they study. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, this looks like a great overview. It seems like you are building on what you said earlier, namely that the natural sciences are easier and the social sciences are harder. Specifically, we might say that they differ with respect to the difficulty required to achieve an equal level of certitude and reliability. You say that the difference is accounted for by the fact that social scientists lack data in comparison with natural scientists, and that they study more complex phenomena than natural scientists. You also imply that the social sciences which study the present are studying moving targets, which is harder. All of that makes good sense, even if it is not incontrovertible.

Would you say that the natural scientists are also doing the best they can? Because someone might say that if we expend an equal amount of effort in two different fields, and the first field yields much more knowledge than the second, then the first field must be more scientific than the second (thinking all the while in ceteris paribus terms, of course).

The pluralism I'm inclined to defend is twofold: one is Goodman's point about the sciences that are not physics getting full faith and credit; the other is the communal self-correction idea. The latter rests upon the simple fact that others are sometimes better positioned to see the flaws in your work than you are. That presents an opportunity: you can systematize and institutionalize scrutiny of your work by others. Two heads are better than one; two hundred or two thousand heads are better than two. There are some practical issues with this, well-known shortcomings in the existing peer-review process, for instance, but the idea is deeply embedded in the practice of science as I understand it, and I think it has proven its worth. — Srap Tasmaner

I would not object to the idea that two heads are better than one, but I could very well object to the idea that every "scientific" field should get "full faith and credit." Still, I would have to know more about what you mean by those two claims.

Why might we not have as much faith in "soft" or social sciences? Because the ROI is not as reliable. Why might we not give as much credit to "soft" or social sciences? Because where it is harder to demonstrate correctness, it is easier to fudge results. I really do think the social scientist requires more intellectual virtue than the natural scientist, given the fact that laziness and malpractice will be harder to detect in the social sciences. Peter Boghossian's remarkable experiment comes to mind.

Now someone might say, "If a science is less reliable and certain than mathematics or physics, then it is not reasonable to expect the same level of reliability and certitude from that science. Faith and credit therefore need to be adjusted for the social sciences." This is true, but I would make two points. First, this might in itself be enough to justify a claim that the social sciences are less scientific. Second, this does not invalidate the objections to faith and credit. Both considerations must apparently coexist.

By now it seems obvious that we must ask what we mean by "more scientific" and "less scientific." This is a particular problem in our age because "scientific" has become an honorific, and we tend to see discrimination in allocating honors as undemocratic. So what do we mean by "more scientific" and "less scientific," or just "scientific" in general? As a foil: the extreme pluralist might say that every discipline is equally scientific and we are not allowed to question anyone's scientificity. That looks like a dead end where "scientific" comes to mean nothing at all. And if we are to admit that "scientific" means something, then we run the risk of acknowledging that some things are more scientific than other things.

My instinct on this front is to link science with knowledge and to say that where there is more knowledge—quantitatively or qualitatively, potentially or actually—there will be more science. Or that where there is more potential for knowledge there is more potential for science (or else that where there is potential for knowledge there is a scientific domain simpliciter). This is also etymologically apt given that scientia was the highest or strongest form of knowledge. Of course this approach requires holding several different criteria in balance.

I think honestly the similarities are only skin deep, and the processes of knowledge production in the two approaches differ dramatically. — Srap Tasmaner

This would be one ready way of exploring what is meant by "more/less scientific," at least if we agree that pseudoscience is less scientific. I myself don't think it is that easy, and your earlier point that some disciplines will uncontroversially check all of the "science" boxes whereas other disciplines will not seems to jibe with the fact that what counts as a pseudoscience will vary a bit from person to person.

Surely. Given the distinction between knowing that and knowing how, it stands to reason there's a difference between learning that and learning how. Acquiring a skill is a kind of learning that might here and there overlap with a scientific approach ― experimenting is what I'm thinking of ― but we would expect plenty of differences too, and the intended "result" is quite different.

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known... — Srap Tasmaner

So to be clear, are you saying that science has to do with knowing-that, and non-scientific strategies for learning have to do with knowing-how? Even though there is some minor overlap?

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known, and I also want to say it is something like the distillation of everything we have learned about how to learn what can be known. Science itself is a how, not a what. And that also means that we can learn more about how to learn things, so there's no reason to think the methodology of science is fixed. — Srap Tasmaner

"Thus, a science is primarily the habit of soul, a speculative virtue of the intellect... Secondarily, a science is expressed in words and written down in text books" (Paraphrase of Aquinas).

- What do you mean when you say "mathematical induction"?

- Interesting. :up:

This ecstatic reorientation is the very essence of the "movement" toward divinity, for, as Meister Eckhart says again and again, the more we are here in this world of constructed values (one may care very much about General Motors, say, invests, works for, manages affairs for, and so on: but does GM really "exist"? Not really. It was conceived in a pragmatic desire, entirely abstract in the Real events of people's affairs. — Astrophel

On the contrary, Eckhart would say that God is in General Motors, and that the one who says otherwise does not understand God. The one who cannot find God where they are has mistaken God for something else:

God is in all things. The more He is in things, the more He is out of things: the more in, the more out, and the more out, the more in. I have often said, God is creating the whole world now this instant. — The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, Sermon 18

But, yes. I wouldn't bother to say something here unless I had at least some reading, experience, or knowledge that relates. — Moliere

Okay, well I'm glad to hear that.

Fair questions.

The posterior analytics deals with induction, by my memory. And I want to add that I think Aristotle's notion of induction is not the same as induction today. But I grant you that I didn't give the specificity you asked for: My reading is certainly rusty.

I feel we're getting closer here now, though, in terms of not talking past one another. — Moliere

Yes, well in general when you use a term like, "Aristotle's induction," I need to know what you mean by that if I am going to respond in an intelligent way. That information could be supplied by a reference to a primary source, a secondary source, or by your own explanation of what you mean.

I think Aristotle's method -- Lavoisier I think didn't invent a method as much as adopted one -- is to review what has been said, demonstrate its strengths and weaknesses, then show his conclusion.

And, on top of that, Aristotle had empirical verification for his conclusions. — Moliere

Okay, fair enough.

For his "view of induction" -- I listed the sources I did because I thought thems would explain it... but maybe not. I can tell you in my own words, though, since that's more relevant to our conversation: Aristotle views induction about objects in the same way we view induction about math. — Moliere

Eh, well how do we view induction about math? When you say that I think of inductive mathematical proofs, which do not remind me of anything in Aristotle. So I'm at a loss again.

Since there are no other categories he is able to say "this is what that thing is. this is its being" -- but over time we've found that his methods are, while a good guess, not quite right either. — Moliere

What is wrong about them? If you aren't specific about what is wrong about his method, then I don't see what use it is to claim that his method is wrong, especially when talking to an Aristotelian.

He thinks that the world is harmonious. As I read the metaphysics, at least, all of being is within the mind of God thinking himself. Being is God thinking himself into being by thinking, and the categories apply because we can, through empirical research that climbs up, discover the essence of things. — Moliere

This sort of stuff is too vague for me, Moliere. That last sentence is a doozy.

Now, I could be very wrong in my interpretation, but since you asked for how I understand Aristotle's notion of induction I'm giving an attempt at answering that more clearly. — Moliere

Okay, and that's a good starting point. Thanks for that.

When one critiques a thesis it is crucial that they give a clear exposition of the thesis they are opposing. Here is an example from Aquinas:

Objection 2. Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit. Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above (II-II:24:1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.

Reply to Objection 2. To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is not denoted by goodwill. — ST II-II.27.2.ad2 - Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?

Rewritten:

• Objection 2: Acts belong to the same subject as the habit. The habit of charity is in the will, therefore the act of charity is in the will. But the will tends only to good. Therefore the act of charity tends to the good and is in the will, and is therefore an act of "good-will."
• Reply to Objection 2: It is true that the act of love is an act of the will that tends to the good, but love involves a union that goodwill does not denote (i.e. love involves a sort of mutual communion, whereas we can act with goodwill towards someone with whom we have no communion or friendship). Or: Where there is love there is goodwill, but where there is goodwill there is not necessarily love.

Do you see how the objection that Aquinas presents has its own clarity and logic? That it can be followed and understood? That it possesses a coherence that allows room for a proper reply in turn? That's exactly what needs to happen when someone critiques a position, such as Aristotle's. They need to set out a clear and reasonable account of Aristotle's position, and then critique that position in turn.

I'm thinking about the physics, the metaphysics, on the weather, the prior analytics, the posterior analytics, parts of animals, and de anima.

The prior and post analytics serve as his epistemology -- how he goes about making inferences. One by deduction and the other by induction. His treatises on weather, the soul, and the parts of animals too serve as examples of Aristotle applying his epistemology to the world at hand. The physics serves as a precursor to the metaphysics in that it is both a particular and general science since it deals with the topic of change, itself an entry into the study of the most general categories. — Moliere

I mean, that's impressive if you've read all of that. I sure haven't.

I know you've read him and know him -- that's why I thought him a good example for us, and didn't think there'd be anything controversial in comparing his method to modern scientific methods and noting that they are different in what they are doing and arguing. — Moliere

Different in what ways? And what is his method? I asked for your source for your ideas about "Aristotle's view of induction," and you literally pointed to seven different works without giving any specific references. That doesn't help me understand where your ideas about "induction" are coming from.

Yes. Aristotle I'd say I'm most familiar with, and the bit of Kripke we've been referencing in this conversation is something I've read here on the forums. Lavoisier's contribution to science is his meticulous work on making precise instrumentation, which I gather is a clear difference between what both Aristotle and Kripke are doing.

Now, readings get rusty and I make mistakes. But I'm not just using these just because -- Kripke got added to the mix, but Aristotle/Lavoisier is one I've just often thought through as a good comparison for finding a difference. — Moliere

Okay, fair enough. I am not familiar with Lavoisier so that reference isn't informative to me. So you are saying that Lavoisier worked with precise instruments and Aristotle did not? That is the difference I see you pointing to.

When you say this it seems like I must not know how to make a real argument, to your mind. — Moliere

Yeah, given the number of invalid or altogether absent arguments, I don't think you are very strong on argumentation.

I'd rather say that arguments don't reveal truth as much as serve as a check to ourselves -- ah, yes, there I messed up, that inference can't be quite right. — Moliere

So arguments don't reveal truth and we just go around throwing seeds "and see what happens"?

My advice would be to try to understand argumentation better. An argument has a starting point (premises), an ending point (conclusion), and a path from one to the other (inferences). If you aren't providing those to your interlocutor, then there's simply no way for them to engage your philosophical beliefs. For example:

But neither he nor we can make induction a valid move that secures knowledge. — Moliere

That's an assertion. It contains no premises, no inferences, and no conclusion. It is opaque. It is probably just a reference to Hume, but if you want it to be more than an opaque assertion, then you have to explain why you think it is true, or where it is supposed to come from.

- Gotcha. I think there are pretty significant differences, to the extent that equivocations may be occurring (between "knowing that" and "knowing how" or "experiencing"). For example:

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? There's factual knowledge of the objective world, which Mary in her black and white world can learn, and then there's experiential knowledge of the inner world (of what it's like to see red), which Mary, in her black and white world can't learn. Is experiential knowledge a JTB? — RogueAI

Why think that perception is knowledge at all?

I would say that intention should guide us, such that if someone purports to know something, then we can treat it as a knowledge claim. Someone might claim to know via perceptions, but claims of perception are not the same as claims of knowledge, because perception is not the same as knowledge. "I perceived that the house is red," is not the same as, "I know that the house is red."

Of course we can say that someone does not, "Know what it's like to see colors," but this is a semantically varied sense of "know."

...but I am digressing:

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? — RogueAI

I think you are basically correct. I would phrase it this way, "Even if we consider know-how a kind of knowledge, it does not follow that all knowledge is of this kind."

Science is also generally thought of as universal knowledge. But in complex systems, it is often the case that what seems like a universal relationship is subject to change after passing various tipping points. We deal in "moving landscapes" in more complex fields. For instance, several "laws of economics," revealed themselves to be merely tendencies which existed within the economic, political, and technological environments that existed in the first half of the 20th century. We discovered that they were not truly universal towards the end of the century—that sort of thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, very true. :up:

For another example, with biology, we have to consider the possibility of extraterrestrial life, life based on a molecule other than DNA, perhaps even non-carbon-based life. This throws a wrench into claims to universality.

This is a problem, although I think information theoretic approaches shed light on a solution by way of returning to the conception of science primarily in terms of unifying principles that explain (and virtually contain) many particular causes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and therefore upon encountering non-carbon-based life we might recast our findings as relating to carbon-based life.

But, my particular opinion is that these issues... — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's interesting. I think you may be right in an academic sense. But I would want to lay a lot at the feet of democratic culture. I think most people like pluralism because they like democracy, and truth is always a threat to democracy insofar as we accept the modern notion of liberty as liberty to follow one's passions.

On the other hand is the idea that truth brings with it coercive imposition, which threatens the dignity of each human to choose for themselves. Either way, I tend to view the motive as moral more than speculative, especially for the non-academic masses. ...Of late the forum has been ringing with threads relating to liberalism.

That's pretty much the point. Institutions brought them fortune, power and fame and they're busily attacking and tearing down those institutions, in order to deprive other people of the protection they offer. — Vera Mont

It's hard to see how a focus on three non-philosophers who the author dislikes amounts to anything more than ad hominem. A philosophy essay needs to avoid such strong reliance on ad hominem. The piece is more than that, but it is bogged down by it.

I tend to think what matters most is that the enterprise is self-correcting — Srap Tasmaner

So is that what you see as the core of science?

you seem to be saying that the natural sciences check more of our "science" boxes than the social sciences — Leontiskos

I was trying not to say that, in fact, — Srap Tasmaner

But do you think it is true? It seems a basic fact that cannot be brushed aside in favor of a theory that would prefer it otherwise, hence my question to you:

Why do you suppose the modern holds that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences? — Leontiskos

I think we have to actually grapple with the now-common belief that that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences. Indeed, I don't see how it is possible to construe what you said about box-checking without admitting the interpretation I gave. Our colloquial understanding of "science" does seem to prefer the natural sciences to the social sciences.

Roughly, I'm trying to say that I think it's a mistake to identify science with the methods that worked for the low-hanging fruit. — Srap Tasmaner

And I'm wondering if there is an argument for that sort of claim. What makes it a mistake? Because the contrary position is pretty easy to represent: <Science pertains to knowledge of the natural world, and where our knowledge of the natural world is more certain and reliable, there science is more present>. That actually strikes me as the default position, and it accounts for the current consensus that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences.

Consider the fact that a very common objection to science-pluralism is that it would be unable to distinguish true science from pseudoscience (and the proponents of science-pluralism really do struggle with this objection). A pseudoscience is basically just a "science" which produces uncertain and unreliable "knowledge."

That's quite interesting. Mathematics is particularly troublesome, but I want to defend the view that there are approaches to the study of atoms and mountains and lungs and whale pods and nation states that are all recognizably scientific and scientific because of some genuine commonality, despite the differences which are unavoidable given the differences among these phenomena. That commonality might be more "family resemblance" than "necessary and sufficient conditions," but I lean strongly toward the mechanism of communal self-correction being required. I guess we could talk a lot more about all this. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay. Yes, I think this would be worth talking more about, namely the essence of science.

Note that I am not saying that the things we call "sciences" have nothing in common. That would be a strange thesis. I am basically saying that science is a genus; the various sciences are species within that genus; and that there are differences between the various species which bear on their "scientificity." The claim that some sciences are paradigmatic is more conservative, whereas the claim that some sciences are more scientific than others is more daring. But if I wanted to defend the second thesis I would begin by noting that sciences are more scientific than pseudosciences, despite the fact that we never quite know where to draw the line. The deeper point here is that if the science-pluralist cannot consider the idea that there might be a hierarchy of sciences (or multiple hierarchies depending on our criteria), then it's not clear to me that their thesis has risen to the level of philosophy.

I'm going to hold off talking about pedagogy, but I'm glad you brought it up, because I think "learning" (as a concept at least) should be far more central to philosophy. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay good, and I agree. I think that if we considered pedagogy, development, and parenting more often we would have more serious discussions.

This is my 30,000-foot view of science, and why I mentioned the importance of specifiable plans for further investigation above: science is a strategy for learning. That's the core of it, in my view, and everything else serves that, and anything that contributes to or refines or improves the process is welcome. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, wonderful. I like that better than your notion of self-correction. For Aquinas science is, "an organized body of knowledge following in a demonstrative manner from certain premises which are either immediately known to be true or which are proved in another science" (paraphrase).

Do you think there are non-scientific strategies for learning? For an Aristotelian science has to do with discursive/inferential knowledge, and so it would encompass any true strategy for learning, despite the fact that different sciences have different objects and methods. But obviously our colloquial understanding of science is much narrower than that.

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? There's factual knowledge of the objective world, which Mary in her black and white world can learn, and then there's experiential knowledge of the inner world (of what it's like to see red), which Mary, in her black and white world can't learn. — RogueAI

Can you give an example of "factual knowledge" that is independent of "experiential knowledge"?

I'm having trouble imagining a reason to ask. — Srap Tasmaner

I ask in order to try to erect a second erroneous extreme within which to situate the question. So that rather than saying, "Monism bad; pluralism good," we can begin to identify two errors and then try to find a mean between them. I think this is helpful in understanding things, such as science. It also gives different perspectives or considerations their due in a way that a one-dimensional approach cannot. And even where we fail to find common ground, that too is helpful. Maybe you will disagree with my answers to the questions I asked.

What if we left out "paradigmatically" in your question: are some disciplines "more scientific" than others? — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, that's workable, although I will revisit the difference below.

If you take "discipline" reasonably broadly, the obvious answer is "yes": writing poetry, for instance, is a discipline that, for the most part, does not even aspire to be scientific. Are you asking if some sciences are "more scientific" than others? Is physics more scientific than biology? Is biology more scientific than sociology? — Srap Tasmaner

I think it is helpful to consider all disciplines, but I did add an elliptical comment in an edit, in which I tried to emphasize those disciplines that are generally seen as scientific. So yes: both questions are on the table.

I'm having trouble imagining a reason to ask. It's clearly possible to make up an answer, to make a long list of characteristics of "science" and then count how many boxes each discipline checks. I think most of the natural sciences check whatever boxes you might come up with, and it wouldn't be surprising if the social sciences checked fewer, but it doesn't seem like a helpful exercise. It suggests that there is a difference due to the domain, when it's the approach that matters. — Srap Tasmaner

So you seem to be saying that the natural sciences check more of our "science" boxes than the social sciences, but that's not because natural sciences differ from social sciences, but rather because, "it's the approach that matters."

Is that what you are saying? And when you say it's the approach that matters, are you saying that we approach the natural sciences differently than we approach the social sciences (and that this is not due to a difference between the two sciences)?

I think not in principle ― not on account of something "especially scientific" about any given field ― but for pedagogical reasons, probably so. What would the students already have some familiarity with? What would most engage their attention? What would give them opportunities to participate and see for themselves ― to, in a fundamental sense, do science themselves? — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, and therefore it seems like you would say that if the students are equally familiar or unfamiliar with all of the "scientific" disciplines, then neither one discipline nor another would be a more appropriate starting point for the pedagogue?

For Aristotle (and myself) it is not right to disentangle the domain from the approach. Put differently, the reason we approach different things differently is because they are different things. The reason we approach physics differently than mathematics is because of the difference between physics and mathematics. Similarly, if humans were equally familiar with the various objects and methods of each of the sciences, then the pedagogue could start wherever he likes, but the crucial point is that humans are not equally familiar with all domains of study. Note that this is not an idiosyncrasy depending on the student, for there will be commonalities between all students and all humans. For example, Aristotle thinks mathematics or physics is a much better starting point for humans than political philosophy, and that this has to do with the objects of study as they relate to the human mode of being and development.

Maybe this is a variation on your question: isn't it the case that some domains are simply less suited to scientific study than others? Suppose you wanted to teach science and chose to begin with "the science of beauty", for instance ― how far would you get? I expect most of us would agree, not very far, but I don't think we have to dismiss the idea out-of-hand: why not explore and see if the process itself reveals the limits of what we can do here? ― Maybe this is the right point to mention that Goodman, in particular, insists that literature and the arts are not competing with the sciences and are not failing to meet a standard that is set by the natural sciences, but offer alternative frameworks for knowledge. (The word "knowledge" looks slightly odd there, but he would probably be fine with it.) — Srap Tasmaner

Right. Classically science pertains to natural realities and artifice pertains to man-made realities. In that way science pertains to knowledge (scientia) and artifice pertains to know-how (praxis). And then each would also include the specific ordered body of knowledge/know-how as well as the learning involved. So classically aesthetics is the science of beauty.

Maybe this is a variation on your question: isn't it the case that some domains are simply less suited to scientific study than others? — Srap Tasmaner

At this point it depends a great deal on what we mean by "science." In what way might an Aristotelian say that mathematics (or physics) is more scientific than political philosophy? Probably in the way that mathematical reasoning is more certain than political reasoning, and that our mathematical knowledge possesses more certitude than our political knowledge. At least on that criterion mathematics will be more scientific, but on other criteria it need not be. Similarly, Aristotle will chastise the political philosopher or the metaphysician for desiring the same degree of exactitude and certitude that is available in mathematics; and yet given that mathematics possesses this greater degree of exactitude and certitude, it forms a better introduction to the very notions of inference and knowledge. It's a bit like starting a student reading with big letters rather than small letters.

This hearkens back to my original point about paradigmatic sciences, and what is paradigmatically scientific is a bit different than what is most scientific. Presumably Aristotle would say that something like geometry is paradigmatically scientific, but not most scientific.

Why do you suppose the modern holds that the natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences?

I don't know ― is any of this in the ballpark of what your were looking for? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, thanks. :up:

I don't really understand the question. "Appropriate" in what sense? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm just asking if you think some disciplines are more paradigmatically scientific than other disciplines (including especially those disciplines that tend to be dubbed 'sciences').

I don't understand this question either. "Justified" in what sense? — Srap Tasmaner

You're a teacher. You have a student. You want to teach them about scientific reasoning. Will one discipline provide a better starting point than another discipline, or not?

These are actually fair points. Note though that they can be made private again after @hypericin finishes his meeting. If someone submitted under the expectation that they would be private and therefore publishable, that strikes me as a better reason than anything to the contrary.

There is, on the contrary, no real reason for treating other sciences as "second class citizens" that might someday qualify as the real deal if you can show how they are consequences of physics. — Srap Tasmaner

Do you think it is appropriate to treat certain disciplines as paradigmatic sciences, such as physics or geometry? Along the same lines, would the pedagogue be equally justified in starting with any discipline they like, if they wish to teach their pupil about scientific reasoning?

- I would suggest allowing his entry but exempting him from consideration for the $10,000 grand prize. :grin:
And then delete these three posts to make the submission semi-anonymous.

If you want an example of a true proposition, that's not too hard. That is to say, the proposition is true. Now separate the true from the proposition as something separate from and not a part of the proposition. You cannot do it. And that which you might try to separate is usually called truth. So what is it? What is truth - beyond being just a general idea? All day long people may argue that truth is a something. They don't have to argue, all they have to do is demonstrate it - show it. But that never has and never will happen. — tim wood

If we continue in your Analytic route we would simply say that a truth is a true proposition. Truth itself, apart from individual truths, could just be a general idea, sure. None of this seems problematic. We regularly appeal to general ideas, such as justice, mathematics, politics, sports, etc.

To systematically exclude sound and smell is to abandon a motive of "common sensibles." — Leontiskos

Seems to me they were excluded for a practical reason - sounds and smells don't generate easily measurable properties. — T Clark

That's right, and the motive for "easily measurable properties" is different from the motive for "common sensibles." Hence my point.

I don’t mean to interrupt — Fire Ologist

On the contrary, your input seems like it might be helpful in making progress.

Amadeus seems to be saying no more judgment is needed to carry out the course of action.
Leon is saying there are more pivotal moments requiring more judgments. — Fire Ologist

I think that's right. I tried to get at the difference by talking about a "subordinated judgment" <here>.

I happen to agree with Leon, and don’t see how you can follow directions blindly, and skip adjudicating between when a step is completed and when the next step begins. When I am following directions, I know that I could misunderstand the direction and go astray and end up lost and not at my destination. I also know that Google maps is wrong and has led me to the wrong destination. So at each step, I have to decide “Is the last step completed yet? Can I move on to the next step? Is where I am driving what is meant by this next step? Is Google still correct of should I switch to Apple Maps?

Often these interim judgments are easy and immediately made, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t judgments. — Fire Ologist

Yes, these are good points. :up:
Pointing out the fact that error can occur both in our own judgments and with navigation applications is quite helpful.

I am happy to distinguish between, say, hard judgments and easy judgments, but I think both are judgments.

Btw, truth I dismiss. True I do not dismiss. — tim wood

I distinguish between the adjective, "true," and the noun, "truth," the one an accident, a quality, the other a substance, or should be. — tim wood

Suppose you said, "There are true [somethings], but there are no truths." I would just respond, "What are these [somethings] that are true?" The ontological problem attaches to propositions as much as it attaches to truths, or to whatever [something] the "adjective" modifies.

Here is a good, concise account of faith:

Acceptance of truth on authority is something we do all the time, as in medicine, where we trust the authority of doctors, or in schools, where we trust the authority of teachers. In these cases the truth that we do not know ourselves but accept from others is a truth we could come to know ourselves if we went through the right training. In the case of divinely revealed truth, we can, ex hypothesi, never know it directly for ourselves (at least not in this life), but only on authority. The name we give to acceptance of truth on authority is “faith.” Faith is of truth; it is knowledge; it is knowledge derived from authority; it is rational. These features are present in the case of putting faith in what a doctor tells us about our health. What we know in this way is truth (it is truth about our health); it is knowledge (it is a coming to have what the doctor has, though not as the doctor has it); it is based on authority (it is based on the authority of the doctor); it is rational (it is rational to accept the authority of one’s doctor, ceteris paribus). Such knowledge is indirect. It goes to the truth through another. But it is knowledge. The difference is between knowing, say, that water is H₂O because a chemist has told us and knowing that water is H₂O because we have ourselves performed the experiments that prove it. The first is knowledge by faith, and the second is knowledge direct.

Knowledge by faith, while it exists in the mind, is attained by an act of will. We must choose to trust our doctor or the chemist, and only because we do so do we have knowledge about our health or about the chemical composition of water. The choice must be rational, in that it must be based on adequate evidence. The evidence will not be about the fact known (we would not then need to trust anyone to know it); it will be about the trustworthiness of the authority. We are rational in trusting our doctor, because we have evidence that, say, he went through the right training, that he is licensed by a known medical authority, that he is acknowledged as an expert by other doctors who went through the right training and are licensed by the same authority, that what he told us about our health before turned out correct (we or people we know were cured of this or that ailment by following his instructions), that he is not a liar or corrupted by bribery, that he has an upstanding character, and the like.

Such faith is rational, but it is also an act of choice. The evidence, because it is about the trustworthiness of the authority and not about the things the authority says, does not convince the mind of the truth of these things, but only of their trustworthiness. To believe their truth, the mind must be moved to do so by an act of trust. But an act of trust is an act of will. We can, if we like, refuse to believe the doctor or the chemist, however convincing the evidence of their trustworthiness may be. We cannot, by contrast, refuse to believe that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles once we have seen the proof, though we can contradict it in words if we like, for speech is an act of will. Where acts of belief dependent on acts of will are involved, coercion can be legitimate—not to force the act of will (an act of will cannot be forced), but instead to facilitate it by the suppression of opposed irrational desires and opposed irrational contradiction. The force is used to facilitate the act of trust, not to prove its rationality (which is done instead by the evidence). That there is such force with respect to belief, and that it is legitimate, is ignored by liberalist doctrines of tolerance (even though, if truth be told, they have to rely on something like it to justify their own coercive acts of rule and self-protection). — Peter L. P. Simpson, Political Illiberalism, 108-9

So many things fell into place, so much begins to make sense where previously there was a patchwork of ancient philosophies and myths. — Wayfarer

Yet in fact Galileo's theory was empirically inferior to the geocentric model, which is why it was not adopted by the scientific community. It was Kepler's elliptical orbits that made heliocentrism plausible. Galileo wanted circular orbits due to their perfection and elegance, and this error was in fact based in Galileo's more ancient approach to the Heavens.

So the story is more complicated. The geocentric model was in many ways much more mathematically sophisticated than the heliocentric model. The desideratum initially had more to do with elegance than predictive power. Before the findings of Tycho Brahe's superior telescopes were compiled, the predictive power question was moot. The myths that have grown up around Galileo are legion.

This absolutely ignores what I've said. You haven't addressed it. I can wait, but its also not entirely needed - your definitions are your definitions. They don't matter much to the discussion. I made a point about your definition which has been glossed over. That's fine. But not my problem. — AmadeusD

What point have you made? Spell it out. Here is what I see:

I said:

L1. To judge is to affirm something as true or false {Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy}
L2. To believe that I have arrived at the end of my trip I must affirm as true that I have arrived
L3. Therefore, to believe that I have arrived involves a judgment

You responded:

A1. Suppose every mental act counts as a judgment
A2. If so, then L3 would be true
A3. But not every mental act counts as a judgment
A4. Therefore, L3 does not follow

And my response was that I have never claimed A1. A1 is a strawman. Thus your counterargument failed, and now you must decide whether to accept argument L1-L3 or else offer a different counterargument.

By recognizing it and making no judgement. If all that happened was a green light lit up on a HUD, all i've done is seen something and exited the car. You'll not get me to say this is a judgement. This is what I wanted to avoid - I thikn your definition sucks, you probably think so about mine. — AmadeusD

You haven't given a definition at all. You want to say that you see a green light lit up on a HUD and determine that you have arrived at your destination, but that you in no way judge that you have arrived at your destination. That doesn't make any sense, and you have provided no definition of 'judgment' to make sense of it.

I gave you several. I also gave my own. — AmadeusD

Where is it? It would have been much easier to simply quote yourself giving the definition rather than write a long post of nothing-burgers.

And it's odd - peculiar - how difficult it is. — tim wood

I would say that it has something to do with the idea that truth is the water we swim in, and it is hard to identify that sort of thing. Probably only in the presence of two apparent and conflicting truths does the notion of 'truth' emerge more clearly.

At a much more general level, I would be very wary to discount a word/concept that is so ubiquitous throughout human civilization. Those sorts of words/concepts tend to have a meaning, even if the meaning is difficult to pin down.

I'd say the study of mystical experience as one aspect of human experience is as much a part of phenomenology as the study of any other aspect of human experience. — Janus

Okay, but doesn't that mean that the study of mystical experience broadly possesses the same sort of "quasi-empirical" nature that you ascribe to phenomenology? To deny this would seem to require that some parts of phenomenology are not quasi-empirical.

- I think religious claims are truth apt. That may be the elephant in the room here.