Let’s say that we take Popper’s model of good scientific method as our basis for determining non-dogmatic thinking. Applying this criterion, Schindler would have to base his claim for the truth of the resurrection on objectively measurable, verifiably repeatable evidence, that was capable of being falsified. And even after being validated by the consensus of a community, it found not be assumed to be true in any absolute sense, since for Popper we can only falsify. Something tells me Schindler would not accept such a criterion. — Joshs

I'd say this is actually the claim that any non-Scientistic methodology is dogmatism, which is a remarkable claim. Ironically, these varieties of Scientism are very often themselves forms of dogmatism.

I don't think Popper even believed that. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Me neither.

(@Wayfarer)

I think this is partly an accident. There are still a large number of Catholic universities with large philosophy programs, and that's where a lot of this sort of work gets done and where it is more popular/not met with disapproval. So you get a system where Catholics are introduced to it more and where non-Catholics go to Catholic settings to work in the area and become Catholic. Either process tends to make the the area of study more dominated by Catholics. Given trends in Orthodoxy, and podcast guests I've heard, I would imagine we would see a not dissimilar phenomena in Eastern European/Middle Eastern Christian-university scholarship but for the fact that they publish in a plethora of different languages and so end up more divided. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'll back up @Wayfarer on this. It's no accident that Catholic universities tend to have large philosophy programs, nor that these philosophy programs tend to be Platonic or Aristotelian in nature. Indeed, Catholic clergy are required to have what is the equivalent of an undergraduate degree in philosophy, and this education leans into Platonism and Aristotelianism. You won't find this at all in Protestantism. Orthodox are warmer towards philosophy than Protestants, but they don't come near Catholics. There was a point in the Medieval period when the Orthodox Church turned a corner, rejecting Barlaam and opting for Palamas, and that decision cemented a distrust in philosophy and eclecticism. For my money the two most philosophically robust religions are Catholicism and Hinduism.

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Once reason is made "a slave of the passions," it can no longer get round the passions and appetites to decide moral issues. Aristotle's idea of the virtues as a habit or skill that can be trained (to some degree) or educated has the weight of common sense and empirical experience behind it. We might have a talent for some virtues, but we also can build on those talents. But if passion comes first, then the idea of discourse in the "good human life," or "the political ideal," loses purchase on its ability to dictate which virtues we should like to develop. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, this makes good sense to me.

The separation of reason from the will, and the adoption of Hume's bundle of drives ("congress of souls" in BG&E) makes it unclear exactly who or what is being freed, and how this avoids being just another sort of tyranny... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. Still, I would maintain that Hume and Nietzsche are more consistent than the undergraduate, and therefore the misology problem and the consistency problem come apart.

The identity movements of the recent epoch run into similar problems. I recall a textbook on psychology that claimed that a focus on quantitative methodology represented "male dominance," and that the sciences as a whole must be more open to qualitative, "female oriented," methods as an equally valid way of knowing. The problem here is not that a greater focus on qualitative methods might not be warranted, it's the grounding of the argument in identity as opposed to reason. For it seems to imply that if we are men, or if the field is dominated by men, that there is in fact no reason to shift to qualitative methods, because each sex has their preferred methodology grounded solely in identity, making both equally valid. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree.

Rawls might be another example. In grounding social morality in the desired of the abstract "rational agent," debates become interminable. We might try to imagine ourselves "behind the viel of ignorance," but we can't actually place ourselves there. Thus, we all come to it with different desires, and since desires determine justice, we still end up with many "justices." The debate then, becomes unending, since reason is only a tool, and everything must circle back to conflicting desires. Argumentation becomes, at best, a power move to try to corral others' desires to our position. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As noted above, I think Rawlsianism only works if Rawls' cultural intuitions are granted as premises. So I wouldn't lump him into the same camp as Nietzsche. Hume could arguably fall into this Rawlsian mold. I think Hume has more respect for cultural intuitions than is sometimes recognized.

Rawls might be another example. In grounding social morality in the desired of the abstract "rational agent," debates become interminable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not a Rawlsian all down the line, but I do think you're being unfair here. — J

Some months ago I was reading Peter L. P. Simpson.* His view is that Rawls' thought leads inevitably to cultural relativism, and that when this charge was brought against Rawls (by Hare), Rawls simply claimed that none of his work was ever intended to overcome cultural relativism. Simpson holds that it is quite possible to read Rawls' early work in this way, but that it was interpreted and received as being intended (or at least capable) of overcoming cultural relativism. Such an interpretation remains to this day.

For Simpson the proximate problem was not the desires of the "rational agent" (this was an ongoing problem beginning as early as Machiavelli, which Rawls inherited). The problem is that Rawls' starting point is intuition, and the intuitions with which he begins happen to be cultural intuitions. So for a culture which adheres to the intuitions that Rawls develops, his moral system is appealing, but because Rawls' approach is not aimed at universality, many cultures do not so adhere.

* See, for example, "A Century of Anglo-American Moral Theory," by Peter L. P. Simpson

Compared to not existing, it’s inarguably a burden to be, do or know anything — AmadeusD

According to Aristotle the depraved man does feel this way, so I will take your word for it. :joke:

My simple example above demonstrates that indirectness does not imply inaccuracy. — hypericin

Well, perhaps I should have said that I don't believe that indirectness entails inaccuracy, because there is a correlation. On average, the more players we add to the telephone game, the more distorted will be the final result, but it is nevertheless possible to achieve an accurate result even with a large number of players.

Maybe so. "Indirect" describes the relationship between sensation and the world. Just like the number on the meter, sensation is correlated to features of the world, casually connected to features of the world, potentially accurate informationally. And yet, it is at a casual remove from what it measures, and completely unlike what it measures. — hypericin

(I assume you mean 'causally'/'causal')

First, to echo Banno's question, what would the correlate to indirect, "direct," mean in the context of your claims? Apparently knowledge of the sandpaper without fingers, nerves, and brain processing would be direct?

Second, if the direct realist agrees that fingers, nerves, and brain are involved in sensation, then what is it about your argument that makes us draw the conclusion of indirect realism instead of the conclusion of direct realism? Is it primarily that word, "potentially," along with that final sentence?

- I don't believe that indirectness implies inaccuracy.

So, it only makes sense to say we feel the sandpaper, but feeling/sensation is indirect. — hypericin

I would say that I feel the sandpaper with my fingers. My knowledge of the sandpaper is mediated by my fingers.

It seems to me that your word here, "indirect," is being asked to do far too much work. My guess is that you think the subject is removed from the sandpaper by the four steps you gave such that a kind of temporal data transfer occurs at each step, like a game of telephone. If so, then all of the contents of indirect realism come into view. Is that your theory, or is it something else?

- But you are importing a homunculus theory. Most obviously you are doing this by conflating mediation with indirectness, and this goes back to the same idea that reality could not be accurately mediated by sense organs. Less obviously you are making Cartesian assumptions about the ontological and temporal relations between the homunculus and the various apparatus he is using to interact with the world. Although this latter assumption won't bother materialists, it is not derivable from your argument or from experience.

We don't feel our nerves, but neither do we interact with brain signals. The fact that a functioning nervous system is necessary for sensation does not prove what you seem to think it proves.

Now... how to convince my younger me that this is so.... :D — Moliere

Ha!

It's pleasing to me to have some consonance between us. — Moliere

Well let me bring up religion to rectify this... ;)

On the Catholic view that which unifies a friendship defines its quality (and at least this much is largely drawn from Aristotle). So the friendship between two people who go out and commit murder together is of a low quality given that that which unites them (murder) is diminishing for themselves and for the community. Their relationship is bound up with that which diminishes both of them as persons, and their mutual effect on one another is negative. On the other end of the spectrum would be a friendship between two people who, say, go out and play high quality benefit concerts where all of the proceeds go to St. Jude's Children's Hospital. This is a friendship of high quality given that that which unites them is ennobling for themselves and for the community. Their consort is associated with beautiful and skillful music, joy for themselves and the community, and aid for struggling children. Their mutual effect on one another is positive and ennobling, as is the effect of their friendship on the community. Most friendships are more mundane, and consist in things like shooting pool, or going to the beach, or talking philosophy.

Of course an important part of a friendship is the mutual sharing of life (joys, sorrows, boredom, and all the rest). Aristotle says that we come to regard our close friend as a second self. So even if you only see someone on Tuesday night when you shoot pool, the friendship is much more than just pool, and the conversation, banter, and other interpersonal elements may be truly primary. Nevertheless, in the Catholic tradition the most important things for understanding the quality of a friendship are the activities and experiences that are shared, and these will also come to define the nature of the friendship over time. Conversation itself is a very versatile activity, such that there are some friends who like to gossip, others who like to talk philosophy, others who like to party, others who are liable to provide emotional support, etc. A particular friendship always has a kind of form which distinguishes it from other friendships.

Then—long story long—comes along the activity of sex, easily one of the most intense pleasures that humankind has ever known. Sex is more than capable of overpowering and dominating a friendship to the point that one or both of the friends begin to use the other for the sake of this end, and even when the embers cool there can be a sense of loss and nostalgia for the overwhelming power of that initial romance. Although any activity can invert a friendship such that the friend becomes a mere means to the end of the activity, this is more common with intense pleasures like sex or drugs.

The second danger in sexual relationships is a kind of self-sufficiency and immanentizing of the friendship, such that instead of playing benefit concerts for the community the couple becomes ensconced in their world of two, eventually falling into ennui. If Narcissus became lost in his own reflection, this sort of couple becomes lost in the immanent gaze of one another. In this case it becomes hard to say what exactly unifies the friendship apart from this self-love. There is no transcendent aspect which takes them out of themselves and allows them to be ennobled, moving deeper into life. Of course childlessness and birth control are for Catholics central to this predicament, for not so long ago children were the inevitable consequence of sex, and to have a child is to be drawn out of oneself into the care of an other and care for the community.

I don't mean to nag on sex. The friendship of marriage is surely a friendship with the highest potential given that it allows you to share such profound parts of your life with someone else. But as Aristotle says, "The corruption of the highest is the lowest." And as you say, in the end it is not the pleasures of sex that are most cherished by romantic couples. The best cases are proof that there are possibilities of friendship that transcend even the most intense bodily pleasures.

Too long - I agree. :grimace:

(I will use your term "burden" rather than "harm's way")

So deontologically, if one believes that others should not be used as means to an ends, it would be wrong to put others in a situation whereby they have to be put in harms way in order to "grow". — schopenhauer1

The Kantian deontological maxim is something like, "Do not use others as a means to your own ends." If a parent teaches a child a skill, then arguably, according to your ideas, they are "burdening" the child. So when Honest John teaches and forces Pinocchio to perform, he is taking advantage of him and using him as a means for his own selfish ends. But suppose that Geppetto teaches Pinocchio to make toys in order that Pinocchio might make a living. In this case he is using Pinocchio as a means to Pinocchio's own ends, and it is actually a parent's duty to educate their children in this manner. A relation between a parent and child is different from a relation between two adults. Thus your means/ends analysis is flawed.

Your distinction between example 1 and example 2 does not hold water given the fact that example 2 also fits your definition of "necessity" (). In example 2 the burden was not created "just to see that person overcome the burden," but rather to provide the child with skills of survival and independence. Further, the duty of the parent to educate includes more than helping the child survive. If a parent teaches their child to dance for the sake of the child's happiness, they are not violating Kant's morality. It doesn't matter that dancing is not necessary for survival.

Kant's maxim does not include a dispensation for cases where the end is necessary for survival. The maxim is not, "Do not treat others as a means to an end unless the end is their own survival." Your Kantian argument and your survival argument are therefore two different arguments, but neither one succeeds.

(Another odd presupposition here is that everything a parent subjects their child to is necessarily a burden.)

What the two share is not general "irrationality," but the claim that rationality has no authority or cannot be trusted. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, and I was not saying that the common irrationality is unrelated to misology. I should have used the term misology, but I did specifically speak about "distrust of reason." My question was: does this scale up from undergraduates? Or is it only to be found in amateurs? My suspicion is that misology can be found in developed thinkers, but that the rational inconsistency dissolves as we move away from amateurs. If this is right then misology does not necessarily involve the inconsistencies (e.g. trusting medicine, opposing conservatism, etc.).

Many influential thinkers have attacked reason: Martin Luther, Rousseau, Hume, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is their error the same as the undergraduate's error?

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Incidentally, you may enjoy the essay/chapter from Peter L. P. Simpson, "On Doing Wrong, Modern-Style," found in his book, Vices, Virtues, and Consequences: Essays in Moral and Political Philosophy. It begins with this same illustration of relativism in the classroom, but moves into moral philosophy, including the ancient view of the common ("shared") good that you speak of elsewhere.

The argument is that the validity or reason and argument is discarded selectively, and that this is a commonality in unquestioned dogmatism and relativism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It seems that until 'dogmatism' and 'relativism' are better defined, the claim reduces to something like, "Dogmatists and relativists are irrational in a similar way." The jumping-off point seems to be undergraduates. I do think this is right, for the inability to challenge or question one's own positions tends to involve a distrust of reason, and the belief that reason cannot suffice to establish firm conclusions also involves a distrust of reason. Yet if we are talking about undergraduate types, then we are from the outset restricting ourselves to an investigation of amateurs. Would the points still apply to well-developed thinkers? At the very least I think the inconsistencies would dissolve as we move away from a consideration of amateurs.

I dont agree with this assessment. — Joshs

Which assessment in particular?

I don’t necessarily disagree. I should have posted the youtube link right away , since I think it is relevant to the OP that Schindler’s arguments are supposed to represent a bulwark against dogmatism, and yet he presumes as fact the appearance of god in the world, and presumes the manner of his appearance. I don’t understand how that isn’t dogmatic. — Joshs

I think this is all wrong, but let's just assume for the sake of argument that D. C. Schindler is a giant hypocrite, and you were able to conclusively learn this by scrambling after short YouTube videos. Who cares? What does it have to do with the arguments of the OP? Is this not more ad hominem? The antipathy towards religion on this forum crosses a line at some point, impeding philosophical discourse.

To be honest, I had no idea who he was either till you mentioned him, and then I scrambled... — Joshs

:lol:

But he does say that liberalism is the political form of evil, and defends this by arguing that god has already revealed himself in history , so for liberals to deny god is to deny this real history as the foundation of the Good , regardless of their intentions. — Joshs

This is a caricature. Schindler's argument there is two-pronged. The first prong is historical/cultural, and even Nietzsche would agree with it (namely that we cannot pretend to go back to a pre-Christian era). The second prong is that liberalism as Schindler defines it requires a denial of the ontological impact of the Incarnation, and that this is objectively evil (as privation) regardless of any good intentions involved. The second prong requires Christian premises, namely that the Incarnation had an ontological effect, and Schindler is not unclear about this fact.

(Relatedly: no, I don't view you as "a threat".)

But, as my posting history will reveal, I’m perfectly happy to get into detailed and respectful discussion on such issues. — Joshs

Ad hominem "provocation" would be an odd way to initiate such a thing.

I believe that when someone writes a serious and thoughtful OP the initial posts have a particular responsibility to respond in kind if the thread is to succeed. Ad hominem quips intended to provoke are particularly pernicious at the very early stage of a thread. At best they derail.

There's a window of decision between receiving data and having an experience of the data. — AmadeusD

Decision does not precede the registering of sense data. 's quip about hypericin's "homunculus" was more pithy and effective in communicating the point at issue.

We experience representations, not objects, in terms of sight. — AmadeusD

Then you've acceded to the option I gave where one speaks about light/sound instead of objects of sight/hearing. In <this post> you seemed to associate sight with objects and hearing with sound (representation), and I was pointing to the incongruity.

- If you can't carry the 1 then I guess that's that. If I were quoting you I would have used the quote function.

- I made a point and you ignored it, so I was thinking the same thing. (Your either-or model is untenable.)

- That's cute.

Is anybody saying something to the contrary? — flannel jesus

"Either you're seeing reality as it is, OR your sight is something subjective, crafted by your eyes."

Really? D.C. Schindler? I didn’t realize you were that conservative. — Joshs

Another top-rate contribution from Joshs. :roll:
At least this time your ad hominem doesn't have such elaborate wrapping paper.

What decides when reason can be dismissed? In misology, it certainly isn't reason itself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good post. I have been discussing a similar matter with @J, who may find this interesting. Schindler is on my list to read.

If we read Socrates in The Republic as saying that reason must be the ruler of the soul, then when someone is deciding when reason can be dismissed, their soul is not being ruled by reason. For Socrates this is tantamount to a tyranny within the soul.

In a consequentialist era the notion that reason is per se authoritative is elusive. On a Platonic metaphysic of participation, acting reasonably flows from the inherent authority (ex-ousia) of reason, just as warmth flows from the inherent heat of the sun. With consequentialist (and sophistical) thinking a strange reversal occurs, where acting reasonably is valued but reason is not; where the warmth is appreciated but not the sun. Viewing reason as inherently instrumental really is a sort of tyrannical move.

Either you're experiencing reality as-it-really-is, OR your experience is something subjective and crafted for you by your brain. — flannel jesus

I am reminded of David Oderberg's quip:

‘We have eyes, therefore we cannot see’ would be almost too much for a Pyrrhonist to swallow. — David Oderberg, Hume, the Occult, and the Substance of the School

Our eyes are what provide us with sight, not what prevents us from seeing reality. One could say the same thing about subjectivity.

Yeah, I don't think the phrase "perceive the world as it actually is" is a meaningful sentence as well... — flannel jesus

Then the indirect realist who says that "We do not perceive the world as it actually is" is talking nonsense, and this has of course already been pointed out in this thread (namely that many indirect realists presuppose the coherence of the "view from nowhere").

- Yes, exactly right!

- That's fair. I think it's an interesting topic, both culturally and philosophically. It is often noted that the Greeks had three or four words for love rather than just one, and it seems to me that differentiation would be helpful. I find it unfortunate that large parts of our cultural understanding of relationships have become sexualized. There was a generation or two that was exceptionally interested in sex-related matters and the fallout of that emphasis has been problematic. On my view friendship is of a higher value than sex, and it would be helpful if we valued friendship more than we do.

They are all ways that your brain presents sense data to you, the conscious decision maker, so that you can then act on it if you decide it's necessary. — hypericin

This is a fiction. The sand is not encountered as a report presented by the brain which we then decide whether or not to act on. This is a story that some like to tell, not what is actually experienced. The confluence of the senses ("common sense") and their registering is not preceded by any form of decision-making. Others have pointed to the infinite regress at play in this.

But, using sound as an example, you're right in that 'sound' consists in the sound waves which enter the ears and physically affect parts of the head resulting in an experience. Objects don't consist in the light bouncing off them, on any accounts i've seen. — AmadeusD

A sense which is plausibly more indirect will better support indirect realism, but here you have conflated the medium with the object. Presumably if the eye sees objects, then the ear also hears objects. Or would you say that the eye sees objects and the ear hears sounds? It seems to me that we should be consistent and either talk about media (light/sound) or else mediated objects (the object which is seen/the object which is heard).

If 'seeing' is defined as the entire process, then it's a useless term in this discussion because there's no difference between a 'direct' and 'indirect' version of 'seeing'. — AmadeusD

Distinguishing direct from indirect realism is not a matter of terms, and is instead a counterfactual matter. The two camps tend to see one another's views as incoherent, and I don't see any truly stable neutral ground from which to examine the two views.

I think the romantic is involved with exclusivity... — Paine

This is interesting, and it raises the question of whether the OP is speaking about non-romantic love or strictly non-sexual love.

I actually take quite a number of statements throughout the thread, on the indirect side, to be attempting this claim. — AmadeusD

Yes, of course. :up: Schemes which emphasize representations or phantasms always come up against this problem. In my opinion Kant's positing of the "noumenal" is more than just historical contingency. That sort of move is always relevant to strongly representational schemes.

The virtues are the skills and talents needed to attain eudaimonia. There are many, so speaking of "attaining virtue," singular, would be similar to saying one needs to "attain skill," or "talent" to be a good musician. The English-language history is interesting here because if MacIntyre's sources in After Virtue are to be believed, speaking of a single "virtue," as in "the singular skill of being good," didn't enter English discourse until 18th century. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For the Greeks the term would be kalos as applied to human beings. For the Latins, beginning at least with Cicero, the term would be honestas. If what you say about MacIntyre is accurate then he seems to be missing these fairly obvious historical examples.* It is true that there is a simplification of moral vocabulary around the time of Hume, but I don't think it is at all correct to claim that before the 18th century there was no conception of virtue in the singular sense.

Plato does attempt to unify the virtues in the Protagoras, but in the sense that all virtues are born of knowledge, not that there is a single excellence required for "the good life." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would submit that in Plato's Republic justice is presented as the excellence of excellences, the keystone virtue that underlies the flourishing of the city and of the individual.

What gives aptness and force to justice as "doing one's
own business" is that so understood it becomes the excel-
lence of excellences in a world under the rule of the Good.
For that the Good rules can only mean that in its light each
being is both good in itself and good as a part of the whole.
But that is precisely what justice accomplishes in our work-
ing world, which is a reflection of the realm of being: To be
just according to Socrates is to be both good on one's own
and good for others. — Raymond Larson, Introduction to the Republic, p. xlv

The point is not that the virtues are wholly dependant on one's vocation or social status; Aristotle's analysis applies across these distinctions. It's that they are seated and expressed within a context on an entire life, which necessarily includes these things. . . — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, that's fair.

The polis shows up most robustly in contrast to thinkers like Hume, for whom morality must be about the concerns of the individual. For both Plato and Aristotle, there is a strong sense of a "shared good," e.g., Socrates' claims that it would make no sense for him to make his fellow citizens worse. The point here is that there is nothing like the tendency to think in terms of "trade offs," the way there is in modern ethical discourse, where we are always concerned with how much utility an individual must give up to obey some precept and "shared good," is just defined as "every individual benefits as an individual from the same good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is right.


* Unless your claim that "virtue in the singular is a modern innovation" is not drawn from MacIntyre.

But the idea of "virtue," singular, as opposed to the "virtues," is a modern innovation. The virtues were those excellences a person needed to fulfill their social role, and they might vary depending on the sort of person you were. The virtues required of a knight are not necessarily the same as those required by a nun, or a teacher, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well here is what Aristotle says:

If this be so the result is that the good of man is exercise of his faculties in accordance with excellence or virtue, or, if there be more than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a15

This is the central piece of his rough outline of the good of man (happiness).

This is the sort of analysis where the virtues were originally intended. Aristotle sets out the "life of contemplation," as the highest sort of life, but maintains that one may be virtuous and flourish in other types of life. — Count Timothy von Icarus

On my reading Aristotle believes that phronesis is the staple virtue for the active life, for it includes the other virtues necessary for action, such as justice, temperance, fortitude, etc. It seems to me that these virtues will be necessary for the knight as well as for the teacher.

I don't think it is wrong to say that the entry point for a study of virtue is that of professions, and secondarily, social roles, but I wouldn't say that the ancients spoke only about virtues and not about virtue. Plato and Aristotle consider this problem explicitly, and of course Socrates is constantly interested in the unified sense of a predicate.

Your entire OP is based upon a false definition followed by an unending stream of equivocation between goodness and perfection, which are manifestly not the same thing... — Pantagruel

What is the relation between goodness and perfection?

The primary historical meaning of goodness is not perfection, it is virtue... — Pantagruel

Is virtue (arete) unrelated to perfection?

So maybe wonderer1’s mention of a “connotation of animism” was quite relevant. — Jamal

Yes, somewhat, but there was still a recognition of the difference between the animate and the inanimate, and according to Aristotle the inanimate does act. To say that @fdrake's dumbbell is heavy is, for Aristotle, to say that it acts in a certain way. A star "presents itself" to the eye via light and a dumbbell "presents itself" to the hand via shape and weight. Still, animism might be a very natural setting for this idea.

Because our age is so focused on subjectivity it has become difficult to imagine a way of viewing the world which does not place subjectivity at the center. For example, to speak about things like animism or realism or projection already presupposes the centrality of subjectivity.

I’d read that Barfield essay if I could find it. — Jamal

Yeah, I see that it is still as elusive as it was years ago. It is contained in Rediscovery of Meaning, which I found in a physical library some years ago. A concise summary of the idea can be found here. Barfield is comparing an aeolian harp to a camera obscura. I should try to find the essay and revisit the idea.

Why do you and I want to say, and why do some phenomenologists say, that the things we perceive present themselves to us? I feel I’m missing something obvious.

What even is that way of speaking? :chin: — Jamal

I think this idea of objects "presenting" is primordial. Aristotle systematized it with his ideas of act and potency, but in a less reified form it could be construed as a kind of fundamental attraction, resonance, or eros. For Aristotle a central theme of science and philosophy was movement or change. For example, what moves a plant? Sunshine, rain, soil, etc. What moves an animal? Primarily hunger and the sexual drive (both of which are forms of desire), and any objects which present themselves as that which will satisfy these desires. What moves a human being beyond these vegetative and animal forms of motion? Forms of reason, including inference, suspicion, suggestion, etc.

For instance, when a female peacock encounters a "peacocking" male, is it more apparent that the male is exerting an attracting force on the female, or that the female is exercising agency in moving towards the male? I think the more obvious phenomenon is the magnetism of the male, and, generalizing, the magnetism of objects. We might say that this is the primacy of the "being acted upon," as opposed to the "acting upon." Movement never occurs except for that which beckons.

So Aristotle simply took this scheme of passivity and incorporated humans: if a thing is defined by the manner in which it moves/changes, and an animal moves in an animal way, then a human moves in this same animal way, but with the additional infusion of reason (i.e. a human is defined as a rational animal, one whose movements require the additional explanatory element which we call 'reason'). This is not implausible, for just as the eye does not move itself but is rather moved by what attracts or "catches" it, such as the male peacock, so too does the mind not move itself but is rather moved by what attracts it qua rationality (e.g. coherence, cogency, utility, explanatory value, etc.).

Now of course there is an antinomy when it comes to humans, but our age is so suffused in notions of agency that we fail to see the obviousness of the "presenting" idea. If we must choose between the agency of the subject's choosing and the agency of the object's attracting, which is more apparent? Contemporary man says, "Why hold to the primacy of the object's attracting or presenting?" Ancient man says, "Why hold to the primacy of the subject's choosing?" In the modern world we have refashioned our situation such that the prima facie answer shifts, and yet the older and more primordial view is always glimmering in the background.

A great essay on this topic is Owen Barfield's, "The Harp and the Camera," where he contrasts these two different ways of human being.

@Bob Ross, Antonio Rosamini's thought has been recommended to me as something of a resuscitation of ancient ethics. I have not read him in detail, but you may find his Principles of Ethics helpful, especially chapter two (beginning on page 28).

Everybody speaks of good as ‘that which is desired’. It is impossible to call
good what is detested. Good, therefore, is anything that moves enjoyably the
faculty of desire which draws us to enjoy good. Everyone agrees about this.
There is no need to demonstrate the absurdity of the contrary. For people in
general, good means a relationship between things and the faculty of desire. But
what are the things we call good because they can move our desire?
Answering this question will lead us to a fuller, more precise notion of good... — Antonio Rosamini's Principles of Ethics, p. 28

That's pretty close to how I think. — Moliere

:up:

Though I'd extend the range to include all forms of Christianity. — Moliere

Christianity says, "Love your neighbor as yourself," not, "Love your neighbor, not yourself." Without self-worth sacrifice is unintelligible.

It's a nice thought, but for the wrong species. — Moliere

I actually don't think it is a nice thought for any species.

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Acting truly as if the two partners are one organism isn't how marriage usually works in practice. — Bob Ross

I don't think our culture takes marriage very seriously, so this is no surprise. But the point is that humans simply aren't forced to choose their own good at the expense of others, nor are they barred from promoting the good of others in a symbiotic manner.

That's fair enough. Aristotle and Aquinas also had a much more nuanced understanding of "experience." Cf. "An Essay on Experimentum."

Any thoughts on this complex area of philosophy and; how it may be approached subjectively or objectively? — Jack Cummins

I think this idea is best addressed historically, as someone like the historian Tom Holland addresses it. In the West what is usually meant by theism is Christianity, and what is usually meant by atheism is some form of opposition to Christianity. The historical hinges where Christianity has been opposed by secularly oriented movements thus form the basis for Western atheism.

First, in a softer form, one must consider general movements such as the Enlightenment (and its counterpart, Romanticism). Secondly, one must consider the more aggressive forms, in terms of individuals. Start, say, with Auguste Comte, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche. In my opinion (western) atheism is a product of thinkers such as these four, and it also has more subtle influences in the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Looking at these factors will yield thick, interesting differences of philosophy and ethics. Looking at Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, et al., will not.

However, the more I have thought about egoism, I would say that you are absolutely right that egoism and altruism blend together when properly understood; because being purely selfless is to just take advantage of oneself—to not see one’s own worth—and being purely selfish in a narcissistic way generally is incoherent. But being both egoistic and altruistic, in a balance, allows for optimal flourishing. — Bob Ross

Right.

Truly overcoming egoism, in all its forms, requires the individual to transcend their own good and do things for the sole sake of the good of something which is not themselves. If one does something for someone else for their own sake, then they are not doing for that person’s sake. — Bob Ross

This is where we disagree. Take marriage, for example. In the traditional Judeo-Christian understanding of marriage, the two become "one flesh," thus becoming one (quasi-)organism and acting simultaneously for themselves and for their spouse (at least in large part). It is the idea of symbiosis, or of symbiotic organisms. Such a metaphor comes from the sexual act, which is itself a symbiotic act. The idea that I must act for the other's sake and not for my own is a largely Kantian idea, and it is problematic. It is not impossible to do this, but it is difficult and rare, and such an idea should not form the basis of realistic ethics. I think that, more than anything, it has confused us.

It's a common misapprehension. Many folk think Gettier "broke" a central idea in philosophy, but as so often, the situation was much more complicated. — Banno

Yes - thank you.

Which is the same as what I'm saying — Wayfarer

Yes, I think that is fairly close to his claims. :up:

Here's a snippet from the essay which drives the point home. — Wayfarer

I think much of this is correct, but what I find is that usually, at one point or another, these interlocutors have a tendency to overstate their case. It's pretty easy to fall into an excessive subjectivism when you are pressing hard against modern "objectivism." It's like when you are driving a motorcycle in high winds, leaning hard just to stay straight, and then the wind drops away and the bike swerves. Often these authors write their arguments and perspectives in the midst of the high winds of modern empirical science, and they have the proper corrective force when they are in conversation with modern empiricists, but yet their force is not properly calibrated for speaking to those of us who are not coming from that perspective.