Thanks! That's interesting, although the polemical point I was attempting was to challenge the idea that material objects have mind-independent reality. In that, I've been influenced more by Buddhist philosophy, which says that particulars are absent 'own-being' (svabhava) but exist dependent on causes and conditions. (There's also a Buddhist philosophy called Yogācāra which is comparable to Western idealism.) Whereas scientific empiricism tends to regard the sensory world as real in its own right. That said, I can see a (tenuous) connection with 'occasionalism'. — Wayfarer

Okay thanks, that's interesting. You're right that Buddhism is a rather different question. I think Yogācāra could subscribe to something approximating Occasionalism with it's alternative notion of Sunyata, but the stricter Madhyamaka progeny could certainly not do so, nor the Theravada stream.

We've agreed that perversion in general presupposes nature -- or at least that I can't think of another way of talking about perversion in general. And, yes, I still include the appeal to nature because that's what Epicurus does, and it's from this ancient nature-paradigm. But I wanted to explain why I prefer to avoid explanations from a things nature (not that it's forbidden, only preferable to avoid to the extent possible) — Moliere

Okay. :up:

I'd say that this is precisely what is controversial about interpreting Darwin in philosphical terms: creatures don't have an innate, fixed nature that makes them what they are, and in fact they are always morphing and changing and responding to the environment they find themselves within. The reduction of life to mechanism rather than teleology is a very strange and controversial, but rariefied, thought in the background for me. — Moliere

Okay, you are right that this is a second issue. I think it will be best to avoid it within this thread.

So while I've gone some way to explain why hesitancy with respect to the justification by appeal to a things nature, I think we agree that these are two different controversies -- one deals with how to describe sharks and the other deals with how we should judge ourselves and others. — Moliere

Yes, agreed.

Here my comparison is to ideas, and so there's historical work I'd need to do to further up this point, but at least with respect to the ideas: notice how the art of philosophy is not for the slave in Aristotle. It's for the master who will take care of the slave so that the slavish souls flourish within the social order. But for Epicurus even the philosopher is only a doctor, rather than at the height of the social ladder influencing the leaders of tomorrow such that society is good. Epicurus takes on the slavish souls and turns them into master souls, thereby directly countering Aristotle's theory that there are slavish souls by nature. — Moliere

Would it be right to call Epicurus a psychologist?

It's in the ideas that I mean (though there'd be more historical work that needs to be done if I were to make a factual demonstration between the person's Aristotle and Epicurus, or the institutions that competed for students) — Moliere

I would be interested to know if Epicurus was responding to particular philosophers or schools or ideas. That seems like a fruitful avenue for investigation.

But what I now wonder is: Exactly what would the alternative be? — J

If so, then in such a case "you ought to believe," even though it seems to be a good English sentence, is meaningless, since I already do. — J

I think there are two basic philosophical questions at stake in this. The first is how to account for error and false opinion. The second is how to account for learning. Both are quite difficult. The paradox of learning is set out in the Meno:

I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater's argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for. — Meno, 80e, (tr. Grube)

Exactly what would the alternative be? Does the phrase "disbelieve a truth" make sense? [...] We want a situation in which I understand and acknowledge the truth of statement X, but also claim that I don't believe it. — J

I think we could recast the statement, "X is true, therefore you ought to believe it," with, "X is true, therefore you ought to see that it is true (and then you will believe it)." If someone is capable of learning, then they are able to see that something is true which they did not previously believe to be true (whether or not they believed it to be false). We could then equally say, "You ought to learn that X is true."

Is this thinkable? If you then asked, "Why not?" what could I reply? This hypothetical situation is meant to evoke a rational response. And if I've excluded any personal, subjective reasons for disbelief, then we seem to have hit bedrock. What more can I say except "I just don't"? — J

The first thing we would do is assess the argument, and this goes back to my thread on "Argument as Transparency." If I assert and you counter-assert, Monty Python-style, then there is no hope for understanding. But if I give an argument, then, instead of counter-asserting, you ought to point out where and why the argument fails. Recall that our initial question regarded arguments, not truths, and this is because we persuade via argument.

If so, then in such a case "you ought to believe," even though it seems to be a good English sentence, is meaningless, since I already do. Or, more accurately, its only meaning would arise in urging me to investigate and overcome whatever non-rational, psychological reasons are preventing me from believing what I acknowledge to be true. Does this make sense to you? Is this what you have in mind when you imagine saying to someone, "You ought to believe X"? If so, I can certainly go along with that. — J

If I tell you that you ought to attend your friend's wedding, you might respond with several questions. "Why should I go?" "How would I get there?" etc. Telling someone that they ought to believe something is a bit like that, where we are prescribing an end point and prescinding from the means needed to get there. In fact in the usual course of things we do not give an isolated injunction, and instead provide reasons or arguments for the injunction. If I gave an order, "Believe that the sun is at the center," you could only respond by saying that you already do so believe, or else you cannot so believe (in your current state). Such an order is pointless without an argument to accompany it.

Do I have direct, introspective knowledge of what I believe and don't believe? — J

I want to say that we do, but this all hangs on the various debates concerning the nature of belief. That is, I think different camps actually define belief differently. In our context I think we are just thinking of assenting to explicit propositions presented in arguments, and that sort of assent is directly and infallibly known.

I'm not sure I understand your question. Let's take an example: the final cause of an acorn is an oak tree. Presumably you are positing that there is some "initial cause" which makes this final cause superfluous?

On further reflection, it occurs to me that an Aquinas would not endorse the notion of a 'mind-independent object'. Why? Because in his philosophical theology, particulars derive their being from God — Wayfarer

Accordingly, in Aquinas, the ontological status of material particulars is contingent, dependent on God's creative and conserving act. My argument is that materialism grants material objects inherent existence, sans any 'creating and conserving act' of God. — Wayfarer

the classical view of divine concurrentism is going to explicitly stop short of Occasionalism — Leontiskos

I actually stumbled upon something that fills the historical gap. The sort of Occasionalism you are tending towards does have a premodern patrimony, but such an idea gained more momentum in the Islamic world than the Christian world:

With these three theses in hand, I turn now to a broad description of the empiricist alternative. To begin with, it is worth noting that so-called ‘empiricist’ accounts of causality did not in fact originate with Hume or Berkeley or Kant or even with Malebranche, who, though usually classified as a ‘rationalist’, influenced both Hume and Berkeley in their reflections on causality. Malebranche was in fact following the lead of those medieval Islamic and Christian occasionalists who had perceived a ‘heathen’ threat to God’s sovereignty over nature, as well as a spiritual danger for believers, in the Aristotelian attribution of causal powers and actions to natural material substances. The medieval occasionalists made a strict distinction between causality as attributed to God (and to spirits subordinated to God, such as intelligences and human souls) and ‘causality’ as attributed to material substances. God and other spirits are genuine agents exercising genuine causal powers, but they are the only such agents and their powers are the only such powers. In contrast, our ordinary and ubiquitous attributions of power and action to material substances are strictly speaking false; whatever truth they might embody is best captured, according to the occasionalists, by a reductive analysis that replaces notions such as causal efficacy, action, causal power, and causal tendency with metaphysically tamer notions such as constant conjunction or counterfactual dependence, which do not presuppose agency on the part of material substances. — Alfred J. Freddoso, Causality and Ontotheology: Thomistic Reflections on Hume, Kant, and their Empiricist Progeny

So although Hume came after Aquinas, in his own day Aquinas (and others) rejected the Occasionalism that Hume was reviving. This is not unrelated to the point that got Benedict XVI (Ratzinger) into so much trouble in his Regensburg Address.

Freddoso writes a fair bit on this topic (link).

Chat GPT, thou art a woman. — unenlightened

Aye.
()

2. That "elemental" parts are, in ways, more fundemental than wholes. The elemental parts must exist before the wholes, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I had the same thought, but when I re-read the OP I realized it doesn't commit itself to this. With the exception of p5, the OP is entirely negative: it is all "cannot". "Must exist prior" is no part of the OP.

Geographical or cultural pride is becoming an altogether opaque notion, and this is unfortunate. I am not from the South but I have no quarrel with "Southern Pride," nor do I see geographical/cultural pride as pathological. It's quite natural, human, and healthy. The true pathology may have more to do with universalizing everything and pretending that one has no roots.

The South has a certain character, and it is informed by sin, suffering, ostracization, and an imputed inferiority (as this thread demonstrates). That sort of thing tends to create a rich cultural identity. I have nothing against it.

Obvious? I think the OP has tricky premises which are interesting to discuss. I do not see it is so obvious that A - apple pie - is existentially dependent upon C - apple trees -, unless I am missing something 'obvious' in those premises... — javi2541997

I think you are mixing up sufficient and necessary conditions. This is how I read the OP: If A is existentially dependent upon B, then B is a necessary condition for A, but not (necessarily) a sufficient condition. Apples are necessary for apple pie, but they are not sufficient.

I agree with others that it's wrong to say "Science pursues truth", since science has no will of its own. — Judaka

This is just another quibble. When someone says, "Science pursues X," they are not claiming that science exists apart from scientists.

Isn't your argument with me just semantics? — Judaka

The problem is that you are using false statements to support your claim that not all truth is scientific truth. You already admitted that the first sentence of the OP is false. Here is another:

science isn't "the pursuit of truth" but "the pursuit of truth under a particular set of circumstances", and these circumstances are what we call science. — Judaka

That's like saying, "Science isn't Y, but Y under Z, and Z is what we call 'science'." The sentence isn't even coherent. Science cannot simultaneously be "Y under Z" and "Z". I think your faulty theory of language is leading you to try to separate science from truth. Science really is "Y under Z" and not just "Z", so to speak. Y cannot be separated from science.

.

What makes you insist that there are multiple "kinds" of truth? To be clear, I was just humouring you earlier. — Judaka

Oh, is that right? So you don't think that some truths are scientific truths and some truths are not? You're all tied up in knots. :wink:

I don't think it is necessarily different. There is universal intersubjective agreement that 2+2=4, and no room for disagreement (excluding insanity or perversity), for example. In fact, I would say "no room for disagreement" is equivalent to saying, "necessary intersubjective agreement". — Janus

But "necessary intersubjective agreement" is also different from "intersubjective agreement," so the difference persists. Some intersubjective agreements contain room for disagreement.

I'd agree that in one sense purely subjective and completely intersubjective would count as contraries, but in a different sense all intersubjective agreement consists in agreement between subjectively held opinions. Or in other words the intersubjective is comprised of the subjective. — Janus

Well first you claimed that ends are subjective, and not intersubjective. I pointed out that some are intersubjective, and you responded by saying that that doesn't make them non-subjective. Again, if nothing is non-subjective then "subjective" has no meaning.

Perhaps not all people seek pleasure, some may prefer pain or enjoy being depressed. You might object that then those are sources of pleasure, but if everything people do, whether painful, depressing or whatever is stipulated as being pleasure-seeking, then it will be tautologously true, but uninformative that all human activity is pleasure seeking. — Janus

The hedonist's claim is synthetic, based on experience and data.

So, it depends on how broadly you define 'pleasure'. Anyway, to be honest, I'm not getting much sense of where you want to go with this discussion; what conclusions are we supposed to draw from the idea that all human activities are pleasure-seeking in some sense of other? — Janus

You made an implicit argument with a crucial premise that ends are subjective and not intersubjective. You haven't spelled out what that argument actually is, but given that some ends are intersubjective, the argument must have failed.

The other question that comes to mind is whether you think there are other ends which are not subjective. — Janus

Sure, but we are discussing your argument for why we can't argue about ends. Your argument was something like, "Ends are like tastes. They are subjective, not intersubjective. Therefore they cannot be argued about."

Shortness of time is making me want to find a stopping point, but at this point you're not even standing behind your arguments. You made an argument that depends on the contrariety of 'subjective' and 'intersubjective', and then you met an objection by claiming that there is no contrariety to be had. If there is no contrariety to be had, then your argument has failed. But you are trying to get off scot-free, as if it makes sense to give such an argument while simultaneously holding that the contrariety does not exist.

You ask whether I believe such things rationally. The conviction, if not based on empirical evidence or strict logic might not be counted as rational, but then it might be pragmatically rational for me to believe those things I find intuitively to be true, even if I cannot give empirical or logical reasons for that intuition. — Janus

It seems like you're not quite sure whether your beliefs are rational. To be blunt and pithy, I would say that if your beliefs are rational then they can be argued about. If they are not rational then you should not believe them.

True it is a form of consensus, but in relation to simple observations of phenomena and mathematical and logical truths there is really no room for disagreement. — Janus

Well to say that "there is no room for disagreement" is different from saying "there is intersubjective agreement."

I wouldn't say they are contraries. Obviously subjective opinion is a component of all intersubjective agreement, although where there is no scope for disagreement as I indicated in my previous response, one might want to say there is no subjectivity at all involved. — Janus

My conclusion that they are contraries comes from your own words. For example, "[it's] a spectrum from purely subjective to comprehensively intersubjective." The poles of a spectrum are contraries. Or, "if something can be shown to be universally valued or agreed upon then we could say that it is as close as possible to being objective," where objective is the contrary of subjective. Presumably your point about tastes is similar, where tastes are subjective because there is no intersubjective agreement.

The point here is that if intersubjective is the contrary of subjective, then the intrinsic value of pleasure is not subjective, and this is what your words seem to imply. If this is not correct, then you should present the alternative contrary of 'subjective', so that we can understand what that concept means when you use it. From what you have said so far, I am forced to believe that the intrinsic value of pleasure is "as close as possible to being objective."

(Note that if nothing is not-subjective, then the claim that something is subjective can have no force or meaning.)

I think we've already been over this. If by "intrinsic value" you mean "universally valued (to some degree) by all humans" then I would agree. — Janus

Okay, good. It seems that we have discovered an end which is not subjective. Remember: I asked why ends cannot be argued about, and you replied that ends are subjective. But the end of pleasure is not subjective, and therefore not all ends are subjective.

I don't find that I need to believe that something is universally valued by humans in order to value it myself. But even if I did need to believe that in order to value something, humans believing something has intrinsic value and something actually having intrinsic value (whatever the latter could mean) are two different things. — Janus

Here arises the question of whether there are universal human ends. If one answers negatively then they will say that we should not argue about what those ends are, whereas if one answers affirmatively then they will say that we should argue about what those ends are (or their priority, or how to achieve them, etc.).

I don't believe in context-transcendent truths if that is what you mean. — Janus

Well above you spoke about points on which there is "no room for disagreement," or that "all humans are bound to agree about." Surely not all intersubjective agreement is like this, and therefore there are at least two different kinds of intersubjective agreement. The stronger kind apparently points to a notion of truth that transcends intersubjective agreement, because in that case the intersubjective agreement is merely derivative on some other, more foundational, fact.

This confuses me because I cannot see how I would be justified in claiming that something has intrinsic value, as opposed to my claiming that it seems to me to have intrinsic value (which is not arguable), unless I could show that it was demonstrable or somehow could not fail to be self-evident. — Janus

Well, look at it this way. You speak about what you are justified in claiming. I am wondering what you are justified in believing. Are you allowed to believe things that you are not justified in claiming? (Apparently you believe things that you cannot demonstrate. What is the status of these things? And do you believe them rationally?)

The argument over ends, it seems to me, will of course be inevitable and necessary in human life, since some peoples' ends (and the means they use to achieve them) may have consequences for others or even for the whole of humanity. So, it would not be the purported intrinsic value of the ends being argued over, but their likely consequences, and this is where it becomes an empirical, pragmatic issue, and good evidence for and/ or against the end in question might be presented. — Janus

Okay, so you are saying, a la Liberalism, that we will inevitably end up arguing about individual ends, and the arguments will be presented in terms of means. That's not actually an argument for the thesis, "Ends are not a proper object of argument," but let me respond.

I am thinking of humans as a communal species, with common ends. For example, the curriculum of a school will reflect certain ends, but more than one child attends a school, and therefore the parents (and society) will need to argue about which ends the school should favor. Some parents will think that the end of education is better represented by the liberal arts, others the hard sciences, others religious teaching, others a community that prepares for civic life and civic involvement. These educational ends reflect the parents' ultimate ends. This is only a microcosm, and the first sentence could also have been, "For example, the policies of a nation will reflect certain ends, but more than one citizen belongs to a nation."

So maybe we agree that arguing about ends is inevitable. Let me say that I think it is also good. It is good that a school argues about its curriculum, or a nation about its ideals and laws. It is good that religious people argue about their religions. Then thinking of discourse rather than just argument, it is good that a grandfather introduces his grandson to the music that he believes to be intrinsically valuable. It is good that a coach teaches children how to play basketball, or piano, or chess. The idea that we spend our time and effort discoursing only on means and not on ends is backwards. What is most important deserves the most attention.

- Unfortunately my time is a bit short, so I am going to try to move the conversation towards our main disagreement as I see it: "Ends are not a proper object of discourse." Or more specifically and practically, "Ends are not a proper object of argument."

My initial argument is simple: Ends are the most important things in human life, therefore they should be the object of discourse and scrutiny (and argument). I am going to try to construct your own argument to the contrary in my post following your next reply, but feel free to set it out yourself if you like. You've already given a number of the pieces of that argument.

I don't at all believe that everything needs to be publicly demonstrable; what I would count as the most valuable things in life cannot be. My point is only that if you want to argue for something, then you must appeal either to evidence or logic.

Many things get their rational support by consensus, by the fact that whatever the claim is commands wide or even almost universal support. I think this is the case with valid phenomenological claims. I see phenomenology as being the attempt to explicate how things seem to humans in general. It is reliant on assent not on strict public demonstrability. The point is that even such claims as enjoy virtually universal assent may nonetheless be mistaken or superceded.

Obviously, this goes for science too. The truth or falsity of scientific theories is not publicly demonstrable. As I keep repeating only direct observations and mathematical and logical truths are strictly demonstrable.

When it comes to metaphysical matters, we find ourselves even further away from anything that can be demonstrated or even find any kind of universal consensus. — Janus

Okay, that is helpful. :up:

What's interesting here is that your theory of truth seems bound up with intersubjective agreement, which is nothing more than a form of consensus, but I leave this aside for now.

Ends are subjective because they are based on what is valued. Some people value some things and others other things. There may be some intersubjective agreement of course; a lot of people like the Beatles or Mozart for example, heavy metal not so much. So, it's not an all or nothing thing but a spectrum from purely subjective to comprehensively intersubjective as I see it. — Janus

If you conceive of intersubjective agreement as the contrary of subjective, then it seems to me that the intrinsic worth of pleasure is not subjective (because it possesses intersubjective agreement). Thus the end of pleasure is not subjective, according to your theory.

I would answer that if something can be shown to be universally valued or agreed upon then we could say that it is as close as possible to being objective. But even if all humans valued something that still does not show that the thing valued has intrinsic value, it would only show that is has universal human value. — Janus

So given the way you define reality, intrinsic value cannot exist. That is to say, it is tautologically true that on your system nothing can have intrinsic value, no?

Hedonism explains not only my own actions but the actions of others. It seems that all organisms seek pleasure or comfort or ease or whatever you want to call it, but it does not seem to me that pleasure seeking is generally, or at least universally, considered to be the most important aim in life. — Janus

Okay, but something can surely be intrinsically valuable without being the most important thing in life. Again, it seems to me that on your own system the intrinsic value of pleasure has as much a claim to objectivity as anything else.

You say that instrumental acts have no value if nothing is intrinsically valuable, but I don't see valid reasoning in that. If something is a means to an end I value, then that means has value to me. — Janus

Only because the end is believed to have intrinsic value.

It doesn't need to be shown to be intrinsically valuable in order to be valued by me. — Janus

Rather, it doesn't need to be shown to be intrinsically valuable in order to have intrinsic value, because by "shown to have intrinsic value" you mean to denote something that is literally impossible.* Further, you believe things have intrinsic value, even though you do not believe they can be proved to have intrinsic value (see my post <here>). This means that you yourself implicitly accept that things have intrinsic value, even though you cannot show it. Is that a contradiction?

I don't even say you have to value public demonstration, but if you want to rationally convince someone of something being unquestionably true, then you need to appeal to public demonstrability in either empirical, mathematical or logical form. That is not to say you cannot convince someone to believe that what you claim is unquestionably and universally true by rhetoric; it seems obvious to me that that happening is commonplace. — Janus

I rather doubt that we will arrive at the "unquestionably true" as opposed to merely arriving at intersubjective agreement. Do you have a notion of truth that transcends intersubjective agreement?


* This is more or less the knot, as I see it. When I say that something is intrinsically valuable, I am saying that it is an end in itself. When you say that something is intrinsically valuable, you are saying that it is an end in itself, and it is able to be demonstrated that it is an end in itself. But I would maintain that this is confusing things, and that "intrinsically valuable," and, "demonstrably intrinsically valuable," need to be kept conceptually separate if we are to avoid question-begging.

Three years later... another attempt to generate interest... — creativesoul

The OP seems fairly obvious. I think you need to follow through on this:

Let's see what happens when we 'plug in' something a bit more interesting/compelling.. — creativesoul

What was the more interesting/compelling application you had in mind?

- Yes. :up:

---

Why not just say that science is the pursuit of "scientific truth" and not truth? — Judaka

Science pursues truth. It does not pursue expediency, or the promotion of special interests, or the winning of the arms race, etc. (and yet many are deeply confused on this point today).

Scientific truth is one kind of truth, and therefore scientists pursue truth. Apparently you ran into someone who thinks that only scientists pursue truth, and you reacted by claiming that, "It's incorrect [...] to understand science as a 'pursuit of truth'." The person you ran into is wrong. So are you. You overcorrected. Science is not the only pursuit of truth, but it is a pursuit of truth.

You have to see that something is either publicly demonstrable or it’s subjective. Intellectual honesty demands it. — Wayfarer

I've grown fond of that bricklayer analogy given in the post above. The problem comes up in so many different areas nowadays, with relative value being mistaken for absolute value. It also applies to the epistemologies of scientism, which have no way to ground themselves or provide a foundation. But that's another tangent. :grin:

Here is something I jotted down last night after shutting off my computer:

Public demonstrability is not an end in itself. For this reason, the person who always responds with, "but your claim is not publicly demonstrable!," is not being rational. Not everything needs to be publicly demonstrable. Indeed, some things need to not be publicly demonstrable, and included in this group are the most important things of all.

The idea that everything needs to be publicly demonstrable is a bit like a novice bricklayer’s idea that every brick needs to rest on two other bricks. But this leads to an infinite regress, for there must be a foundation which itself supports the lowest bricks. "Every brick needs to rest on two other bricks," and, "Every claim needs to be publicly demonstrable," are false presuppositions which represent the generalization of a useful but limited rule.

Sure, since means are pointless, they are not even means, without ends. — Janus

Okay, agreed.

I see the pointlessness of arguing about ends as being entailed by the fact that ends are subjective; it depends on what we care about. It's like taste; if I prefer to listen to Beethoven than I do Mozart, and you prefer the opposite; what could be the point of arguing about it. Not to say we might not get something from hearing each other's reasons (if we have reasons) for preferring one or the other, but ultimately, as the old saw goes "there's no accounting for taste". — Janus

I don't know why you would think that ends are subjective like tastes.

Yes, but the source of the pleasure cannot be of universal value, and that is really my only point. — Janus

Do you have any arguments for these claims you are making? That ends are subjective, or that a source of pleasure cannot be of universal value, or that intrinsic value does not exist?

I don't think this is true; I think we all seek things that we find valuable to ourselves. Maybe we are simply talking at cross purposes, since you seem to have quite a different notion of "intrinsic" value than I do. — Janus

I have been very clear about what I mean by it: .

This is a good example; the hedonist only needs to argue that pleasure is valuable to her in order to justify, or at least offer a rational reason for, seeking it. — Janus

Hedonism is a theory that aims to do more than explain one's own actions. It is a moral theory of human action, not a theory of a single human's actions. The intrinsic value of pleasure is an axiom of hedonism.

What I would say is that instrumental acts have no value if nothing is intrinsically valuable, and I think we agree on this. Further, public demonstration is an instrumental act, a means to an end. So if nothing is intrinsically valuable, then public demonstration has no value.

- But it's more belief than sight. "I believe things are valuable," not, "I see/construe things as valuable." That's why we act: because we believe things are valuable. So then when someone asks us if anything is valuable, the honest answer is 'yes', because that is what we believe to be true. Yet if someone asks if we can prove with scientific rigor that something has intrinsic value, we are of course within our rights to say 'no'.

People often claim that nothing has intrinsic value while simultaneously believing that things have intrinsic value. What they mean to affirm is, "Nothing can be publicly and scientifically demonstrated to have intrinsic value." Yet the conflation is serious and problematic, for the honest point of departure for reasoning is always what we believe to be true, even though provability also has its place.

The perversion of desire is this "building up" of desire. I'm not sure how else to say it, but the desire for food differs from the desire to eat a particular kind of food in a particular kind of way and to feel disappointment for not being able to eat that kind of food even though you have access to food, it's just boring. There's nothing wrong with variety, the wrong is in allowing your desires -- which "naturally" lead to an ataraxic life -- to lead you to an anxious life. Desires push and pull the organism towards its natural ends but the human desires are such that they can become greater than what an organism wants, and become what a human imagination wants and thereby become unsatisfiable. — Moliere

I think that's a good description of the problem. :up:

Another highlight on the appeal to nature: I hope this shows how much Epicurus is responding to the Aristotelian conception of human nature, especially with respect to the ethical. Rather than biological creatures which can only become ethical at the height of the social ladder where every possible human capacity can be experienced and pursued and perfected you have every human creature which can live a tranquil life regardless of the place they find themselves within the city-state. Rather than greatness within a social role such that ethics isn't really what the many can pursue you have tranquility, a state of mind, which anyone can pursue. If the appeal to nature is alethic then which of these is true? For Aristotle you had slavish souls and master souls, but for Epicurus you had the master who performed the cure such that you became equal in his eyes. — Moliere

Right, there is a disagreement about human nature occurring here. Granted, Aristotle does not think that flourishing is impossible for a slave, but rather that they flourish in a different and inferior way. For Epicurus the goal of life is (more or less) equally accessible to all. In our modern day we would prefer Epicurus to Aristotle on the basis of egalitarianism, yet Epicurus' own account is presumably not based on a desire for egalitarianism. Presumably egalitarianism is just a happy accident of the theory which he sees to be true on independent grounds.

This is a very interesting and multi-faceted thread. I haven't been able to give it the attention it deserves, and I probably won't have time to do that, but hopefully I can circle back to it at some point.

That is a thread-worthy question.

"Nature" is one of those concepts like "Freedom" -- it seems to explain a lot, but then it seems to explain a lot for a lot of people who disagree on what it is that it's explaining, and what it even means for us to explain something by reference to its nature. A lot of times we can get by with stipulation when it comes to the ambiguity of concepts, but "nature", like "freedom", does so much work in philosophy that even stipulation doesn't ward off confusion, miscommunication, and frustration. — Moliere

Okay, I sort of see what you are saying, but I have never experienced this problem. Granted, there are so-called "philosophers" who try very hard to misunderstand things, and such a person would probably claim that they do not know the nature of a shark. Mostly, I think they do, I think they are being contentious, and I don't argue with them. If someone can differentiate a shark from a whale then they have some understanding of the nature of sharkness. At bottom it's really that simple. The understood nature of sharkness is that thing you use to differentiate sharks from whales.

I'd say that to judgethe judgment that a shark needs to have fins is true or false is relative to a system of judgment about what a shark ought to be.

Nature, in the ancient world, is prior to the is-ought distinction or the naturalistic fallacy. It's interesting for this very reason, but it's also ambiguous. The appeal to nature is, I think, basically an ethical appeal -- or at least aesthetic. And further I'd say that there are no true ethical statements. "The shark ought to have fins" is false with respect to a judgment on its truth, though with respect to a system of beliefs about what ought to be we could judge it true -- but not in the same way that we judge "Sharks have fins" to be true. — Moliere

I don't think this is right. "Sharks have fins" is not an ethical 'ought'-statement. It is a scientific statement, a matter of understanding the characteristics of a certain species. Now if a shark is born without fins then it will be a bad (and perhaps perverse) shark. It won't be able to do the things that sharks need to do (swim, hunt, feed, mate, etc.). But I don't see anything moral going on here. Even if we said, "That shark ought to have fins," we would not be making a moral statement. Neither is perfect exactitude required for the concept of nature to function.

This gets more contentious when it comes to things like human nature. Epicurus' appeal is to human nature, but I'd say that the appeal to human nature is a kind of fib that allows the game of ethical justification to get started. It's important to us, it's just not truth-apt. — Moliere

Okay, I definitely agree that it gets more complicated when claims about human nature meet the moral sphere. Maybe I haven't been properly contextualizing the "nature" idea within the context of your thread on perversions. But I do think we have both agreed that perversions presuppose natures, and Epicurus is very much situated within that ancient nature-paradigm.

Any appeal to nature will bring up these sorts of thoughts for me. There's a sense in which the appeal to nature is just to beg the question with respect to a tradition and disagreement over it is just disagreement over what beliefs we like others to have and enact. But in the ancient world this wasn't as explicit and so you get interesting uses that are not easy to untangle. So, if I can help it, I like to avoid using concepts like that which both lend themselves to confusion, and lend themselves to simply begging the question with a different phrase. (another reason to insist that the Epicurean is dogmatic on the ends of human beings being to live in a state of ataraxia) — Moliere

Fair enough. But to be precise, I don't think there is anything strange or controversial about the idea that a shark has a nature (a determinate form). The controversy only arises when it comes to human nature and moral claims. I don't think we should throw out the idea that sharks have a determinate form because of that controversy.

What about pop music, or heavy metal? — Janus

Sure.

Also, is music chosen as an end in itself or a means to enjoyment and/ or elevated feeling? — Janus

A reductive hedonist might say that only pleasure is sought and all pleasure is commensurable. My point here isn't to get into that debate, but to note that the enjoyment represents an end in itself. Ultimately, we act for ends in themselves. Or at least we should if we are rational.

Yes, I've said the same about appreaciation of art and literature in general. I say the same thing goes for appreciation of religion or metaphysical ideas. — Janus

Okay, sure. It seems to me that this fact will significantly undermine an overemphasis on public demonstrability, as well as the idea that ends are not proper objects of discourse (or that ends cannot be argued about, for example).

I don't see it. I think people value things because the things them pleasure, inspire, them, uplift them or whatever. This could be art, music, literature, going to the gym, a spiritual discipline, watching sport, reading phislsophy etc,. etc. — Janus

In this case the pleasure is of intrinsic value.

How could intrinsic value be determined? — Janus

But you are back to this question of public demonstration, are you not? I don't see why people are so obsessed with this question (well I do, but that's another story). As humans we all believe in and seek intrinsically valuable things. Whether or not these things can be "proven" to be intrinsically valuable is beside the point. To deny the existence of intrinsically valuable things makes no sense to me. If there are no intrinsically valuable things, then you must only ever carry out instrumental acts. Instrumental to what end? None, apparently. For example, if the hedonist denies that pleasure is intrinsically valuable, then their account of action collapses.

So, apart from the interpretations of altered states by individuals who experience them, and the prevailing prior cultural accretions of such interpretations that might influence new interpretations, what else do you believe explains metaphysical beliefs? — Janus

Metaphysics: reason. Religious doctrine: revelation. But this is for another thread.

Science pursues truth, namely scientific truth. It does not pursue non-scientific truth, such as philosophical or political truths.

But can they be subject to philosophical discourse? — Wayfarer

Right. :up: This gets into Liberalism debates, such as Peter L. P. Simpson's "Political Illiberalism." It is similar to 's point about political philosophy vs. political science. The English philosophical tradition is reticent to discourse about ends, and especially political ends.

(Links to Simpson's <website>, <academia page>)

Right, but appeal to authority is universally regarded as a philosophical fallacy. — Janus

A relatively weak argument, not a fallacy. This is a rather important distinction, even though the argument from authority has little to do with the topic at hand. One needs no argument from authority to see that music is intrinsically valuable, or that ends are "higher things" than means.

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But let's explore this in a more appropriate place some other time. Thanks for the chat. :up: — Tom Storm

Sounds good. :up:

Yes, I would agree with tthat. — Janus

Okay, so that's where I think we would end up disagreeing. I don't think that phenomenon is absent from religion, but I don't think it explains all metaphysical beliefs. I am also not convinced that such is Hadot's view, but that is somewhat arguable.

There are people, perhaps not many, who don't like music. If we accept that almost everyone likes some kind of music, althought their tastes may vary considerable, then I would say that for those people liistening to (their preferred) music certainly has value for them. — Janus

Okay good, and I conclude that listening to music is intrinsically valuable (for some, or most). Obviously this also exists at a cultural level, from Gregorian chant, to Beethoven, to Radiohead. Such composers aim to produce something that is intrinsically valuable, and which will be chosen as an end in itself.

Music, then, becomes a value and an object of discourse, even when conceived as an end:

So take for example the end of appreciating music. I think we can speak about this end, argue about it, learn about it, teach it, seek it, honor it, etc. Once we understand this end we can then speak/argue/learn/teach/seek/honor the proper means, such as technical proficiency, discernment of quality, etc. Nevertheless, the act of music appreciation is not publicly demonstrable in any obvious way, largely because appreciation is not the sort of thing done for the sake of demonstration. It would be incongruous to try to demonstrate appreciation (because demonstration pertains to means and appreciation pertains to ends). — Leontiskos

The idea here is that there are two kinds of human acts: acts which are instrumentally valuable (means), and acts which are intrinsically valuable (ends). So if someone tells me that there are no intrinsically valuable things, I must infer that there are also no instrumentally valuable things.

I think this is actually what is happening on a large scale: the culture tells us that there are no intrinsically valuable things, and the logical conclusion is that there are also no instrumentally valuable things (and this leads to a form of nihilism—more or less the form that I have been discussing with @Tom Storm).

I guess in your "not only that" space you might come at this from a more platonic perspective? For me The Good is an artifact of human experience and reasoning and can only be contingent, even if there are large intersubjective communities of agreement. The experience of being human doesn't differ all that much in terms of most people wanting to flourish and avoid suffering. — Tom Storm

"Not only that" in the sense that good is not man-made. For example, food is good for man, and this truth is not man-made. But I realize you disagree with this and that it will lead us off on a tangent, which is why I bracketed it.

The primary point is that good relates to psychological motive. Maybe it could be put this way: if someone believes that there is no reason to do this or that or anything, then they will be without purpose. That is the separation of reason from the good.

The questions are really endless and this last perspective seems close to nihilism to me. There is a total disengagement between making a decision to do good as opposed to following some instruction which you don't even know to be true. But yes, I get that there is still rudimentary reasoning happening, even if it is fallacious and, perhaps, complacent. — Tom Storm

Well, there is reasoning occurring and generally in this case the good and reason will not be divorced. That said, fideism does separate reason from the good, and some divine command theorists are fideists.

My claim is that those altered states and their various cultural interpretations underdetermine the various metaphysical beliefs associated with them. — Janus

I agree with this. Are you not also saying that the altered states are primary or prior, and the metaphysical beliefs are derivative or posterior?

This is where we disagree because I see no reason to believe that there are any intrinsically valuable things. — Janus

I gave the example of music, and the appreciation of music. Do you hold that this is not intrinsically valuable, and is instead only a means to an end?

I guess it does. But from my perspective this isn't actively engaged with the good as such and is merely following orders. — Tom Storm

Yes, but this is an argument about what is good, and presupposes a desire for the good in both parties. You are saying to the divine command theorist, "You see divine commands as good, but they are not truly good. This other thing is truly good, and it is this that you ought to seek instead." Now if the divine command theorist had truly separated reason from the good then you would not be able to reason with them about what is good. You are right that the divine command theorist will reject a certain form of reasoning, but nevertheless they will not reject reasoning per se. They are liable to try to convince others that divine command theory is correct, and that divine commands are good (i.e. worthy of observance and honor).

(I will respond to the rest later.)

True, but I think there is also an inverse correlation between public demonstrability and intrinsic value. That which must be publicly demonstrable tends toward utility, as a means rather than an end. — Leontiskos

As Hadot says in Philosophy as a Way of Life, the ideas in those kinds of ancient philosophies were not to be critiqued or discussed... — Janus

It seems crucial to assert that the intrinsically valuable (ends in themselves) are a proper subject of argument. I think that is where we disagree. I think we must argue about the highest things.

So take for example the end of appreciating music. I think we can speak about this end, argue about it, learn about it, teach it, seek it, honor it, etc. Once we understand this end we can then speak/argue/learn/teach/seek/honor the proper means, such as technical proficiency, discernment of quality, etc. Nevertheless, the act of music appreciation is not publicly demonstrable in any obvious way, largely because appreciation is not the sort of thing done for the sake of demonstration. It would be incongruous to try to demonstrate appreciation (because demonstration pertains to means and appreciation pertains to ends).

So at the end of the day you seem to subscribe to the idea that we can argue and discourse about means, but not ends. That is a very common modern approach, but it is also precisely the point of disagreement.


(This also relates to Hadot's project in different ways.)

Can you say some more about why? — Tom Storm

I don't know if I can... The separation of reason from the good is something like the snuffing out of practical motive. It leads to the idea that, ultimately, there is no reason to do anything. There are only hypothetical imperatives. We could argue about whether that results in nihilism per se, but in any case it seems to come very close.

But this idea must first be understood:

Basic to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is the desire for and pursuit of the good. This must be understood at the most ordinary level, not as a theory but simply as what we want both for ourselves and those we care about. It is not only basic to their philosophy but basic to their understanding of who we are as human beings. — Fooloso4

Once that is understood then it becomes clear why separating reason from the good entails that there is no ultimate reason to do anything at all. "The good" is the psychological motive force for human beings, if you will (but not only that).

But by this account then quite a range of people who believe in transcendent entities, such as gods, might qualify as nihilists - [those who] do not have any conception of the good but only a divine command theory — Tom Storm

Divine command theory has a conception of the good. It conceives of the good as that which is divinely commanded.

Heh. I can get along with this, but I'm anxious about relying on the concept of nature. — Moliere

But why?

When speaking of perversion in general I can't think of a way without the concept... — Moliere

Agreed: a perversion is a falling away from some standard or norm. If standards do not exist then perversions also do not exist.

A shark missing a fin is only a privation with respect to some way of conceiving the shark. Else, it's an absence. It depends upon how we judge sharks. — Moliere

I think that to judge that sharks need not have fins is to judge falsely. Fins are part of what a shark is; they are part of its nature. I think that if someone says a finless shark is just as much a shark as a normal shark, then they have very poor judgment, haha.

Or perhaps the same thing: "Nature" supplies the notion, but we are the ones who fill out what "nature" consists of. "we" being the judgers. — Moliere

I could get on board with this, just so long as the nature of a shark is not conceived merely as a matter of our own invention. It is discovery, not just invention, and it then follows that we can be wrong in our judgment about what constitutes a shark's nature.

Interestingly this inversion is not of the form of negation, like "A v ~A", but the concepts of saving a life and killing a life are semantically opposed: you can't do both at the same time. — Moliere

Right, they are contraries but not contradictories. A stethoscope is meant to produce a certain kind of effect, and its perverted use produces the exact opposite kind of effect. This is a teleological notion, where the stethoscope is "ordered to" health, or "meant for" health, or "intended for" health, or that health is its "purpose."

That's perfect! Not only using something for which it's not intended, like the hammer, but using it in a way that's in conflict with its intent. Also I'm finding thinking in terms of tools a little easier than the general account. Rather than dealing with the concept "by nature" the tool can be seen as having an intent. Like in the stethoscope example rather than saving lives the person is taking a life, which strikes me as an almost perfect inversion of the intent.

[...]

I want to re-think Epicurean desire on this line, but I didn't have the time today. But I felt I owed you a post. — Moliere

:up:

Yes, I agree with that. The important aspects of life are precisely those which cannot be publicly demonstrated. The aesthetic dimension in architecture music, literature and the arts is of more value, or at least consists in a different kind of value, even though aesthetic quality, like any form of "direct knowing" cannot be rationally demonstrated or couched in propositional terms. — Janus

Right.

I think it also needs to be acknowledged that if such transformations are ever achieved it is exceedingly rare, and mostly (perhaps always) transient, and given that those most likely to achieve such altered states are renunciates, I think it has little practical significance for general human life apart from possibly being a relatively minor (compared to the arts and popular religion) enriching aspect of culture. — Janus

Okay, interesting. This is a fairly large topic. We could phrase it as, "Are deep transformations accessible to the laity?" I don't want to get into that here.

Altered states of consciousness are to be realized not by argument and critique but by praxis. — Janus

I tend to think there is a complex interrelation between ideation and experience.

To repeat, the point of such philosophies is about practice and not about proving any metaphysical theory. — Janus

Like , I do not read Hadot this way. I think Hadot sees discourse and practice as two poles that mutually influence one another, and he critiques the undue emphasis on discourse in modern philosophy, but I don't see him claiming that practice subsumes or displaces discourse. Or in other words, forms of philosophical practice are in some ways as vulnerable to argumentation as philosophical discourse is. The renewed emphasis on practice creates a more holistic philosophical environment; but it doesn't make argument futile.

In more general terms, how severing reason from the good is nihilism can be seen in the ideal of objectivity and the sequestering of "value judgments". Political philosophy, for example, is shunned in favor of political science. — Fooloso4

I think this is more or less correct. :up:

I think this is a good point. I wonder where the line is. — Tom Storm

I think it's <here>. :wink: For example, Merriam-Webster: "2: The selectivity of the elite, especially: Snobbery. 3) Consciousness of being or belonging to an elite."

I think that if one does not believe oneself to be superior, then they are not an elitist. Such a condition is necessary, but not sufficient. Not everyone who believes themselves to be superior is elitist, but you need that aspect to be an elitist.

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Competence in many areas is, at least in principle, publicly demonstrable. For example, technical proficiency, if not aesthetic command, is demonstrable in music, the arts and literature. Competence in science and mathematics is demonstrable to one's peers, if not the public. Competence in the trades, crafts and all kinds of practical pursuits is easy enough to demonstrate. Competence in religion or spirituality is not, and hence there is no way to determine whether a purported master or man of God is the real deal or a charlatan. — Janus

True, but I think there is also an inverse correlation between public demonstrability and intrinsic value. That which must be publicly demonstrable tends toward utility, as a means rather than an end. That which is not publicly demonstrable tends toward intrinsic value, as an end in itself rather than as a means. For example, the technical proficiency you speak of is a means to the end of aesthetic enjoyment and aesthetic contemplation. The former is publicly demonstrable while the latter is not, and it is the latter that is the truly valuable thing, the reason why the technical proficiency exists in the first place.

So an overemphasis on public demonstrability tends to invert means and ends, and this is a very deep error. If a musician possesses technical proficiency without the ability to enjoy or contemplate music, they end up in futility as a circus monkey. ...Or perhaps they are a mercenary musician who simply plays for the money, and uses money as a means to X. But the same issue immediately arises, for if X is another means and not an end, then the futility persists. There must ultimately be a recognition of, valuing of, and ordering towards, ends in themselves. This will simultaneously represent a decreased focus on public demonstrability.

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The last two comments illustrate what I've been saying. As soon as discussion turns to the qualitative dimension, the domain of values, then the response is 'Ah! You're talking religion.' Next stop: Televangalism! Fake gurus! It's highly stereotyped. Not saying anyone is at fault - it's more fault lines. This is what I mean by the cultural dynamics. — Wayfarer

Right, and this seems especially pronounced in America, not only because of current religious aberrations, but also because of past religious aberrations (e.g. Puritanism and an excessive emphasis on work ethic and utilitarianism).

How do you use the word? — Tom Storm

I think the word must at least convey a sense of superiority, and generally a form of superiority that implies an unbridgeable gap, such that the elitist is a person who considers themselves superior in a definitive way.

So I don't think that merely forming comparative judgments of persons implies elitism. For example, if I think Michael Jordan is a superior basketball player when compared with Scottie Pippen, this does not make me an elitist. I think everyone believes that there are hierarchies of competence, but I am sure that not everyone is elitist.

I use the word the way critic Robert Hughes used it. I’ll fish out a quote later. — Tom Storm

Okay, sounds good.

I am egalitarian in believing that every individual should be treated equally by the law. The issue I was getting at was the denial of what I described as the 'vertical dimension', the axis of value (as distinct from the horizontal axis of quantitative measurement). That is required to make the sense of the idea of there being a higher truth, as without such a dimension, there could be no higher or lower. — Wayfarer

Okay, so the idea is that secularism denies this vertical dimension?

I'm not mentioning that as an exhortation to a specifically Catholic philosophy, but as preserving what I think of as a kind of universalist insight. Firstly the idea that there's a kind of understanding which also requires a transformation in order for it to be meaningful. Secondly that this is not easy or painless. I don't see an equivalent of that in much of secular philosophy. — Wayfarer

Yes, great point. And this touches on that idea of askesis.

I agree that secularism presents a flatness, and that this flatness results in strong varieties of egalitarianism. But there seems to be an additional element at play, which is egalitarian in itself and not only as a result of the flattened secular space. This additional element seems to be much more intentionally ordered towards strong egalitarianism.

Case in point - an excerpt from an article on the Catholic philosopher, Joseph Pieper, apparently very well-known (although not to me) — Wayfarer

Good quote. Pieper is great. Well-respected in scholarly circles and simultaneously accessible, which is rare. Ratzinger was the same way, although Pieper was a Thomist and Ratzinger was not.

So you would say that elitism means believing that there is a hierarchy of competence? Would not the person who believes there is a hierarchy of competence, and that they are at the very bottom of that hierarchy, then be an elitist?

Just saying Dan Brown is not as good a writer as George Elliot, say, may be seen by many as elitism, rightly or wrongly. — Tom Storm

Well do you yourself think they are right or wrong? I'm wondering what you mean when you use that term, 'elitism'.

I am an elitist when it comes to art, literature and movies. I consider that there are better and worse texts... — Tom Storm

But when you say you are an elitist with respect to literature, are you only saying that you think there are better and worse texts? Because I don't think that's elitism.