It's not so much about censoring it - there's no prohibition on discussions of it, it's more that there's a kind of tacit disapproval because of its association with religion and or with cultic ideas. — Wayfarer

I take it that tacit disapproval is a kind of soft censorship; censorship as suppression. Or at the very least, this is what it necessarily effects.

My view is that the process of secularisation in the West is a major factor in many of these debates. But it's like a tectonic plate movement - hard to detect on the surface but still capable of producing violent effects. I'm still working through it, and will probably never succeed in coming to a conclusion, all the more so as I'm very much a product of the very forces that I'm critiquing. :yikes: — Wayfarer

Yes, but is secularization inherently tied up with strong notions of egalitarianism? If not, then where does the strong egalitarianism come from?

I want to drop "nature" in the account, but I'm thinking that what is natural -- what the seer sees as the natural place of the object of perversion -- is what helps understand perversion in this very general sense. — Moliere

I think a perversion is a kind of privation, and a privation is an absence of that which is due. What is due depends on a thing's nature. So for example, a shark with a missing fin has a privation, but a man with a missing fin has only an absence. Without some notion of what should be, we cannot distinguish privation from absence, and "nature" supplies this notion.

But that a perversion is a kind of privation does not tell us overly much. There is still something unique about the special variety of privation that is a perversion.

In a similar way we might say the hammer becomes perverted when it's used as a weapon — Moliere

Yes, it is perverse to use a hammer as a weapon. But perhaps it would be even more perverse to strangle someone with a stethoscope, for then that which was fashioned to cause health is being used to cause death. I think perversion is something like that.

I’m not sure quite what I’m saying here. I’m trying to find a way to make the consensus question ahistorical, I think – not simply something that waxes and wanes depending on time and place – but this may not be the way to do it.

There’s no doubt that what you describe is accurate, and different eras do develop consensus relative to prior history, and then, perhaps, lose it. Could there be any progress to this dialectic? As to this possibility, Rorty puts the question well: “Even when we have justified true belief about everything we want to know, we may have no more than conformity to the norms of the day.” — J

That's fair. My original idea wasn't to promote a form of historicism, but rather to shift the constituents of consensus from individuals to cultures. I want to say that a culture's belief is in some way more stable and more reliable than an individual's belief. So for me personally the question about consensus-between-cultures is more interesting than the question about consensus-between-individuals, but maybe it is clearer to simply speak about individuals, as the OP does.

Yes, but. I tried to walk a fine line in the OP. I was trying to put the idea “There ought to be consensus based on rational argumentation” in brackets, so to speak, acknowledging its attractiveness but also holding it up for consideration and critique. What is the status of our concern for rational consensus, for “something to which we can appeal which will or ought to command universal assent” (Bernstein)? How should we view it? Is it the same thing as a desire for some unattainable, foundational objective truth? Or should we carefully examine other understandings of rationality? I guess I would summarize this as: Objective rational consensus may be the great unrealized dream of philosophy, or its nightmare, from which we struggle to awaken. — J

I keep thinking of the two sentences I wrote that followed the one you quoted:

If truth exists and truth is knowable, then it should generate consensus. If there is no consensus, then it would seem that either truth does not exist or else it is not (generally) knowable. — Leontiskos

Thus a very fundamental case for consensus is: <Individuals are able to know truth; truth is one; therefore individuals should agree in what they hold to be true>.

But there may also be reasons why we see consensus as attractive or concerning.

I take the “Habermas gap” question to be a way of asking, “What would it take in order to be able to realize the consensus dream?" — J

This is an interesting practical question, which comes at it from a different angle.

It may be worth pointing out explicitly that this is all about a meta-question, a kind of bird's-eye view of rationality. It seems to me that, with a few exceptions, everyone does accept that there should be consensus, and in their day to day lives they try to convince others of the things they hold to be true. Every time the average person enters into an argument they are working for the "consensus dream."

But the "Habermas gap" question has something like a God's-eye view in mind, and I think this is where the contradiction arises. It is a search for a programme that will ensure consensus, but no programme that ensures consensus is ultimately able to respect the autonomy of reason. That which is reached by a programme can only ever be a pseudo-consensus. The assumption that we could answer the question "What would it take?," seems to be an overreach in itself. We simply work towards consensus, and if it ever happens it will be the result of billions of individual arguments doing the hard work on the ground. I don't know that there is any special key. I don't know that there is any answer to the question posed at that level of abstraction. But perhaps I am misconstruing the question.

Else, my answer to the practical question would include things like, "Make philosophy part of the core curriculum in high schools and colleges," but I realize this is not at all what Habermas has in mind.

Possibly I just misunderstood; I thought you had confused two kinds of indifferent people. The first kind, Ms. Nihil, can tell the difference but doesn't care, so chooses randomly. The second kind, Mr. Ignorant, can't tell the difference and so also chooses randomly. This guy, to me, is the roulette wheel: The wheel not only makes "choices" at random, it also has no idea what the difference is between red and black. A model for Ms. Nihil might be a person who's asked to select an assortment of candies she likes, and there are only two choices. Turns out she likes both equally, so while she knows perfectly well the difference between caramel and chocolate, she decides to make random choices because she doesn't care. — J

Yes, good explanation. I was thinking of Ms. Nihil. I was thinking of the indifference that attaches to your (1) (). Because (1) represents a hypothetical imperative, and hypothetical imperatives only function when one has knowledge of the ends/goals, therefore we must be talking about Ms. Nihil rather than Mr. Ignorant.

So the "they" in question in this statement is Ms. Nihil:

They would consider foundational principles like the principle of non-contradiction false as often as they considered them true. — Leontiskos

I happen to agree regarding her marital status. :grin:

Well, true, it's a magnet for abusers of all kinds, as we seen amply and tragically demonstrated many times over. But as Rumi said 'there would be no fool's gold if there were no actual gold'. — Wayfarer

Yes, and I think this is the serious danger in censoring that sort of language for fear of abuse. If we pressure people to stop talking about gold because of the danger of fool's gold, then we deprive many people of the search and possession of real gold.

But there is also a lesser reason, and it has to do with inquiry. Propositions have a material sense and a formal sense. For example, the material sense of "2+2=4" is strictly mathematical. Yet capitalists could co-opt the expression as a rhetorical response to socialist economics, in which case it would become vaguely associated with capitalist economics. At that point someone might respond to a use of the expression by saying, "This is not your intention, but that does sound like capitalist propaganda." Well, the material sense has nothing to do with capitalist doctrine. The formal sense depends on the speaker's intent, but if there is no reason to believe that the intent is capitalist-inspired, then raising the spectre of capitalist propaganda is not only going to be a distraction, but it is also going to prevent people from discoursing about mathematics.

That is the practical effect: we are not able to discourse about higher truths, virtue, specialized knowledge, etc. Or rather, in order to discourse on these topics we are forced to overcome a great deal of resistance, even when there is no good reason for putting up such resistance.

So clearly you are missing the point. — Tom Storm

I think you are missing the point, but my last post is clear enough so we can leave it there.

- Ah, okay. Gotcha.

A divine mind is a premise or endoxa not a conclusion. — Fooloso4

So I thought you were giving that quote in favor of this claim. But the quote is from Plato, not Aristotle, and therefore it seems you have not given any evidence in favor of your claim.

The interesting thing to me is that Aristotle himself answers many of your objections, which is what leads me to believe you have not read him at any length. It is also hard to believe that you are reading him with sympathy. For example:

If it were a matter of reasoning then, as is the case with mathematics, Aristotle could reach clear, definitive, undisputed, and necessary conclusions. — Fooloso4

Aristotle complains about the modern mathematization of philosophy (Metaphysics, 992a33); he speaks specifically about the differing precisions of different sciences (Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b12); and he even speaks about those who incessantly question authority and require demonstrations ad infinitum (Metaphysics, 1011a2).

He continues the quote above: — Fooloso4

I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best.

My translation by Ross contains no such thing. What translation are you using, and what Bekker line are you talking about?

One question here asks what relation equality mongering has to modernity. Why have we become obsessed with equality in modern times? Even to the point that we feel obliged to assert that people are equal in ways that they are manifestly not?

For me the answer lies in secularization. The older Judeo-Christian culture had an anchor for equality, namely the imago dei and a "balancing" afterlife, which was thought to reestablish justice. The religion and the anchor were lost, and at that point equality became an all-or-nothing affair. E.g. A Rawls-or-Nietzsche affair.

I think this rather misses the point. — Tom Storm

No, I don't think so. Wayfarer made a very obvious and rational comment. Do you actually disagree with it? If not, why are you objecting?

The "dogma" here seems to be on your part. Someone says there are "insights that require virtue and reason to obtain; not commonly found amongst the uneducated or untrained," and you object. I don't see how yours could be a rational objection. Usually such knee-jerk reactions have to do with quasi-religious or ideological indoctrination, where any time anyone says that <some people are better than others in some way>, the secular ideology requires the adherent to object to the claim, no matter how rational and true it is. And yes, the reactionary comment tends to include the vague charge of 'elitism'.

If this is right, then this is just the Theosophical community in a new key, where instead of being "less developed" the one who has spoken contrary to the creed is an "elitist." Neither charge is able to be substantiated; both are identity markers.

I am outlining how certain elitists can employ an elusive criteria of value to exclude certain folk from being seen as fully human or fully sentient. — Tom Storm

I am outlining how Wayfarer's words imply no such thing, and that to read them in such a manner is cynical. I don't think such an interpretation is defensible.

Mind was a well know and frequently discussed topic in the Academy and Lyceum. It is not as if it was a reasoned discovery. — Fooloso4

No, "thought thinking itself" in chapters 7 and 9 of Metaphysics 12. It's what Dfpolis spoke of <here>. It is Aristotle's famous description of God's activity.

Why doesn't he teach it to us? — Fooloso4

I would suggest that you try actually reading him. As in, beyond the first few sentences of the Metaphysics. :wink:

Not your intention, but that does sound like elitist, status seeking dogma. — Tom Storm

That seems like a rather cynical take. Are you of the opinion, then, that everyone is equally virtuous? Equally reasonable? Equally knowledgeable?

So when of comes to deep causes you disagree with the first premise? — Fooloso4

No. Knowledge of deep causes comes through experience, but mediated by a fair bit of reasoning. As I said, not through "direct experience." But the point here is that Aristotle's theological claims, such as the one about thought thinking itself, are conclusions and not premises.

- This feels a bit Buddhist!

Thanks for your responses and your quotes from Mill. They have helped clarify things. We seem to be pretty close, even though it would be possible to quibble over this or that. I am going to step away from this thread due to a shortage of time. I will keep an eye out for Brandom's work. Your quotes from Sartre have also been interesting. I wasn't aware of his "non-continental" work, so to speak.

No, not at all. I simply do not make what has become a common assumption, that Aristotle rejects Plato. We should give some thought to the significance of Aristotle staying in Plato's Academy for 20 years. — Fooloso4

No, I agree that it is an error to read Aristotle against Plato. This doesn't justify a conflation.

It is through experience that men acquire science and art.
No one has experience of the arche of the cosmos.

What is your conclusion? — Fooloso4

The conclusion is that knowledge of deep causes comes through reasoning, not direct experience.

If you do not understand that Aristotle's art of writing requires an art of reading Aristotle, then we will not get very far. In large part that requires that we not read passively or expect him to tell us what is true and what to think. Like the good Socratic skeptic we must ask questions and make connections, look for contradictions and try to reconcile them. — Fooloso4

Yes, but I think you conflate Plato and Aristotle in this way. You are accustomed to reading Plato and then you apply the same hermeneutic to Aristotle, despite the fact that the genre and medium is different.

Does he or anyone else have experience of the arche of the cosmos? — Fooloso4

I think Dfpolis already pointed out your error of confusing a conclusion with a premise (link). Relevant here is Aristotle's distinction between what is better known to us and what is better known in itself. We only come to the latter through the former.

Yes, and I have no trouble making sense of the kind you go on to list. Where I'm starting have doubts concerns statements like "You ought to believe that water is H2O because it's true." Surely all the persuasion would take place at the prior claim of "Water is H2O." Once you're persuaded that this is the case, what more am I asking you to do if I say to you, "Now, believe it, because it's true"? — J

I think you are right about this. When you <originally> used that formulation I thought you were trying to bring out something which usually remains implicit ("...because it is true"). We don't usually speak that way. But yes, truth is sufficient grounds for belief.

I initially thought there was some conceptual (not psychological) space between "acknowledging truth" and "believing," but now I'm wondering if this is an illusion. If you know X is true, then you need no further reasons to believe it. — J

It seems to me that everything which one holds to be true is believed, but not everything that is believed is held to be true. We can believe things with all sorts of different levels of certitude, and many of these relate to evidence and truth, but some seem to be related more to things like fear, hope, or desire.

But presumably your opinion has no textual warrant — Leontiskos

You of course disagree, but it is not the case that there is no textual, and I might add, scholarly warrant. — Fooloso4

Well, you certainly haven't presented any. You claimed that Aristotle makes use of theological premises while at the same time holding that these premises are not true. Then you presented all sorts of quotes and sources that have nothing to do with your theory.

- Great, will do!

But as I interpret him these are not premises he holds to be true. — Fooloso4

But presumably your opinion has no textual warrant, and can therefore be safely ignored. In short: eisegesis.

So, how do thought and matter interact? They don't -- because the question is ill-formed. What we have is being, with different beings having different capabilities. Some beings are extended and can think, some are extended and cannot think, and possibly, others are unextended and can know and will. This is no more surprising than some bodies being able to interact electromagnetically and others not. — Dfpolis

Indeed. :up:

Great OP. Your paper also looks interesting.

- :up:

The "pro" side calls it being realistic or pragmatic. The "con" side calls it being cynical or pessimistic. But it's more of a judgment than an argument. Things like realism, pragmatism, cynicism, and pessimism are therefore not fallacies. At worst they are bad dispositions based on false judgments.

From a utilitarian point of view, you could say the sympathiser is worth less on the basis that they hold more negative utility, and from a deontological point of view, you could say that the sympathiser is less deserving. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Yes. Another route is to say that the strong sympathizer is a quasi-combatant, and thus presents at least less collateral damage than a non-sympathizer would. Hamas has been known to boast about their "desire for death" (in relation to their cause), and a sympathizer of that caliber would rather alter the landscape.

Hi , good post.

Leontiskos Thanks, that helps. You’ve raised some complex and difficult issues here. — J

Yes, it's a bit haphazard, but it's one way in. :smile:

Here, “indifferent” is being used in the sense of having no preference, overall, between truth and falsity. Aside from a certain former president, I agree that it’s difficult to imagine such a person doing this continually. But I don’t read you as describing a person who doesn’t know the difference between truth and falsity. Indeed, you speak of them as intending truth when speaking truthfully, and falsity when not. So that’s one sort of indifference: I can tell X from Y but have no preference or allegiance or “ordering to” one over the other. — J

Right, it's a bit like the roulette wheel which is indifferent to odd or even outcomes.

Let's first look at this idea of indifference. You are presenting the idea that there are two different kinds of indifference at play. The first sense is statistical or preferential indifference, where outcomes do not provide evidence of a pattern. The second is indifference to two options in the sense of ignorance of these options. If I attend to truth as often as falsity then I am indifferent to them in the first sense. If I do not know truth or falsity then I am indifferent to them in the second sense (but probably also in the first sense).

They would consider foundational principles like the principle of non-contradiction false as often as they considered them true. — Leontiskos

Here, I think, “indifference” is being applied in a new sense. Now the speaker doesn’t know the difference. They’re not merely indifferent as to their choice; they can’t tell them apart. Here I’m with you and Aristotle and Nagel: I can’t believe in a person who can explain the law of non-contradiction but not acknowledge its validity. — J

But I am using it in that same statistical sense. "They would consider [them] false as often as they considered them true." You speak of "validity," but I think we should speak of truth. You presumably believe the principle of non-contradiction is true, and that's my point. We know that it is true, and we believe it on that basis.

Perhaps you are thinking, "But it's not possible to believe the principle of non-contradiction is false, and therefore we are ignorant of such a counterfactual." I would say that in one way that's the point, and what is necessarily false is never possible. It's just easier to see in this instance. In another way people can and do act contrary to the principle of non-contradiction, but they end up paying a price of one sort or another and often amend their thinking or acting.

It’s not that one might “just as well” desire to be unhealthy because one is indifferent to health, or can’t tell the difference between good health and illness. Rather, one has made a choice to value something else more. — J

I think you are pointing to a hierarchy: "I prefer to be healthy more than I prefer to be unhealthy, but I prefer the taste of candy more than I prefer to be healthy." I don't have a problem with this, but I don't want to descend into your more complicated questions just yet...

My point about indifference is meant to exclude the option you prefer, "You ought to believe this sound argument if you care about such things as holding beliefs that are based in [truth]" (). It seems to me that the prima facie reading of that claim (call it "(1)") implies that we are indifferent to truth. "Believe this sound argument if you like truth. Disbelieve it if you don't. It's up to you." That notion of indifference is my first target.

Now I'm not really sure how to address the rest of your post, because there's a lot of interesting things to respond to. I will probably have to leave some for another day, returning to them later. But I think this is the general argument you are making (again, taking (1) and (2) from above: ):

"It depends on the case. Some cases align with (1) and some align with (2). The former are indifferent or hypothetical, whereas the latter are necessitated."

Now I see a spectrum rather than an either-or, where there is a middle ground between (1) and (2), but that should be obvious. In any case, my primary response here is that it is not legitimate to use this case-based logic. Consider our initial inquiry: “This is a sound argument, therefore you ought to believe it” (). This is a uniform claim which applies to all cases of putatively sound argument. It is not a bifurcated claim about two different case-models. The simpler formulation is even more obvious, "This is true, therefore you ought to believe it." This is a uniform claim which is intended to apply to both sorts of cases (e.g. self-evident truths and obscure truths; necessary truths and contingent truths; etc.).

...So I'll just leave it there for now so that you can respond, lest I have assumed too much.

Another central argument you present is the idea that, if it is not necessitated, then it must be hypothetical (if it is not (2) then it must be (1)). Obviously this will need to be addressed, but for the sake of length I will just make a preliminary observation:

The nonbeliever can always reply, “I quite agree that humans have evolved this way, and I certainly practice this most of the time. However, I am not hardwired to do so in non-apodictic truth-claim situations, and in this case, I will choose not to.” — J

I concede that the nonbeliever can do this. “If duties could not be ignored or argued against, then they would not exist” (). Similarly, people can deny the principle of non-contradiction, or that 2+2=4. Our argument surely must ride on something more than what human beings are capable of doing.

To say a tiny bit more, a normative case for truth must be more than evolutionary. I think Nagel's point holds true in light of our ordering to truth, the only difference is that the "gravity" of a self-evident truth is so strong that it cannot be ignored. But on the other hand there are people—even (especially!) professional philosophers—who will attempt to deny things like the principle of non-contradiction. Maybe that fact presents the more productive route for our discussion, because you seem to agree with Nagel that such people are not at their rights to do such a thing.

I want to fess up to something that has really started to puzzle me, though. I’m starting to think that the whole “you ought to believe X” thing is kind of unreal, a philosopher’s thought-experiment. What exactly would it mean to “not believe” something, if you also thought it was true? What are the actual examples of this? — J

I think at a very basic level we are simply considering instances of disagreement and/or persuasion, which are common. For example:

• "You ought to support the war in Ukraine."
• "You ought to vote for so-and-so."
• "You ought to accept a middle ground between (1) and (2)."
• "You ought to get the answer of 67 for this math problem."
• "You ought to accept that the Earth is not flat."
• "You ought to propose to your girlfriend."
• "You ought to abide by the speed limit."

(It is of course possible that this is a haphazard mixture of the speculative and the practical, and maybe that's just another can of worms. But we usually think of practical advice being grounded in truth. For example, the first example is predicated on the claim that Ukraine is deserving of support; the second on the claim that so-and-so is the best candidate, etc. Those are the truth-claims that end up being argued about.)

As you say, the “ought” question is huge and deserves its own thread/book/library. So does Kant’s view about imperatives. I appreciate the light you shed on the possible nuances between categorical and hypothetical oughts, and for what it’s worth, I find some nuances in Kant as well. I’ll watch for the next Kantian ethics discussion. — J

Sounds good. I realize we are only scratching the surface, and that the questions you are asking are fairly obvious and deserve answers. As for Kant, I am familiar with his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and his treatise on lying, but I haven't read his other ethical works.

That power is possibility. I perceive an apple tree, and I understand the possibility of [ a future experience of ] fruit, given certain conditions. If I nurture the tree, if it's not cut down, then I can hope to enjoy fruit. — plaque flag

This is exactly right, and it raises the point that Mill's definition of objects is parasitic in a problematic way. Usually when we talk about the possibility of perceiving, we are talking about the possibility of perceiving some object. Defining "object" as a possibility of perception thus throws this into confusion.* It would be like saying that there is the power-to-produce-apple-fruit apart from any tree or substance/substratum. Thus it is quite different to talk about objects as things perceived rather than as possibilities of perception. Talk of "[permanent] possibilities of sensation" elicits the question as to why these possibilities are permanent (or semi-permanent).

Your <quote from Hobbes> is a propos. It is precisely the object that impresses itself upon the sense organ. To talk about sensation apart from an object sensed is a very different approach to the senses and perception.


* On Mill's account the substantial and 'synthetic' claim that, "There is a possibility of sensing such-and-such an object," is reduced to the vacuous and 'analytic' claim that, "There is a possibility of sensing such-and-such a possibility of sensation."

As you should be. The theory is interesting because it challenges some vague sense of their being more to physical being. It 'sounds wrong.' But what then does one mean beyond such possible perceptions ? — plaque flag

Given our fast-paced conversation, I would submit that an object is something like an existent thing (a wholeness or unity). Unperceived or even imperceptible objects are therefore possible.

For example, maybe someone believes in an imperceptible ghost or spirit that nevertheless possesses causal powers to influence the world which we are able to perceive. On my view this putative ghost is an object. For Mill it cannot be, having no possibility of sensation. (The notion at play here is object-as-causal-agent.)

I could just say 'fruit' instead of 'experience of fruit' if I wasn't reacting against what I'd call the metaphysical fantasy of aperspectival reality. — plaque flag

Then perhaps this is the starting point for where we differ, which is probably rather subtle. I don't actually know very much about this view you are reacting against, but I am of course wary of defining objects in terms of perception.

I don't think objects are very well defined, and it would be sub-philosophical to avoid challenging popular understanding. — plaque flag

I think my single sentence about the common opinion has ended up being a distraction.

Note that most of the objects in the world are not currently perceived. I've never seen the Eiffel Tower, but I think I could see it, given certain conditions. — plaque flag

Mill's point holds of every physical object. It is a proper accident. But it's not what objects are. Objects are not defined in terms of perception. From the book you cited in your other thread:

"Things-in-themselves? But they're fine, thank you very much. And how are you? You complain about things that have not been honored by your vision? You feel that these things are lacking the illumination of your consciousness? But if you missed the galloping freedom of the zebras in the savannah this morning, then so much the worse for you; the zebras will not be sorry that you were not there, and in any case you would have tamed, killed, photographed, or studied them. Things in themselves lack nothing, just as Africa did not lack whites before their arrival."
-Bruno Latour — The Democracy of Objects, Chapter 1, by Levi R. Bryant

(link to book)

Sure, we start in the world of things, not as philosophers. — plaque flag

I don't think philosophers who try to reverse engineer the natural order of knowing end up being coherent.

But I object to 'non-perceptible properties.' What's that supposed to mean ? This is where 'substance' starts to seem like a magic word. — plaque flag

Yes, I realize that. A power is an easy example. An apple tree has the power to produce fruit. It possesses this power, we can know this through inference, and nevertheless the power is not perceptible.

That's just a rephrasing, it seems to me. — plaque flag

Right, and that's why I said it is subtle. I don't think anyone on the forum has grasped the point Kit Fine is making in that thread, largely because it is foreign to contemporary philosophy.

I would have to think about how to make it more apparent.

Come on though, that's presumption, as you say. Uncharitable. And Mill is dead. So please just try to understand me, and then defeat my position. — plaque flag

I am explaining why I disagree with Mill. I don't know how closely you follow him.

Respectfully, you still haven't met my challenge, unless I haven't got to that part yet.

How do you understand the existence of physical objects ? — plaque flag

The challenge of how to understand the existence of physical objects in a way that differs from Mill?

...So the point for me is not sensation (though sense organs are involved) but perspective. The object is always situated in a field of vision, and we understand it in the first place as something that could be looked at. — plaque flag

This seems pretty close to Mill. I think what we understand in the first place is a thing, and secondarily that the thing has perceptible properties, and then later that the thing likely has non-perceptible properties.

What previous definition ? People most use words like tools with pre-theoretical skill. Concept-mongering practical primates. Making it explicit is hard work. — plaque flag

I think someone like Mill is saying, "Objects are this and not that. Your pre-theoretical view was mistaken." I don't think he is saying that "this" unfolds from "that", such that both are secure.

Explication (unfolding) is not redefinition. — plaque flag

An "unfolding" which contradicts the previous notion is redefinition.

Of course. But most people aren't philosophers. — plaque flag

Also, I have always thought this would be an interesting study in itself. What does it mean for a philosopher to redefine a commonly used term? For instance, what does it mean when Mill comes along and redefines objects as possibilities of sensation? Is this not equivocation?

Presumably what he is trying to do is convince the world that an object is not what they suppose it to be, but this is too seldom explicit. My favorite philosophers are very careful to avoid this sort of redefinition.

Of course. But most people aren't philosophers. — plaque flag

I see it in the way you see Kant, albeit much more subtle and less pronounced:

It may be hard to see because radical indirect realism is so sexy. I watched a Donald Hoffman Ted talk, and it was gripping. I knew it was fallacious and confused, but I still enjoyed it. I felt the pull of the sci-fi. I could be one of the those in on the Secret, while others were lost in the shadow play on the cave wall. — plaque flag

The non-sequitur is that, just because we know objects through sensation, it does not follow that objects just are possibilities of sensation.

derivative on the thing that exists in itself

Can you unfold this ? My bias is that you won't find more than what Mill described, but perhaps you'll surprise me. — plaque flag

I think Mill's whole construal of "possibilities of sensation" is a non-starter:

These various possibilities are the important thing to me in the world. My present sensations are generally of little importance, and are moreover fugitive: the possibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, which is the character that mainly distinguishes our idea of Substance or Matter from our notion of sensation.

This is subtly off. A substance is not a possibility of sensation. That is an accidental characteristic of a substance, not its definition. That characteristic is crucial to human epistemology, but that doesn't make it the definition. Further, no one actually thinks about objects in such a way. Objects are things that we encounter through our senses, not possibilities of sensation. This is the same reversal of metaphysics and epistemology that occurs so often in modern philosophy.

The object itself and not some representation of it is known. — plaque flag

Mill is close to talking about a representation (sensation) rather than the object itself. He is defining the object in terms of sensation-representation.

In fact this sort of move is what strikes me as odd about so much of modern and contemporary philosophy. Again and again, a proper accident is mistaken for an essential property, and the error is always grounded in a shift towards the epistemic subject. The forlorn formal cause sneaks in through the back door, unnoticed and not critically attended to. In this case Mill has an epistemological problem before him, and as a consequence he ends up defining objects in terms of epistemology. ...So I suppose I am beginning to understand Kit Fine's modus operandi (link).

@Wayfarer, I think you would enjoy section 1.4 of Joseph Ratzinger's Introduction to Christianity, entitled, "The boundary of the modern understanding of reality and the place of belief." It represents a somewhat different approach to these questions of Scientism than the ones we have been considering.

Towards the end of his argument, he says:

So the conviction was bound to spread more and more that in the final analysis all that man could really know was what was repeatable, what he could put before his eyes at any time in an experiment. Everything that he can see only at secondhand remains the past and, whatever proofs may be adduced, is not completely knowable. Thus the scientific method, which consists of a combination of mathematics (Descartes!) and devotion to the facts in the form of the repeatable experiment, appears to be the one real vehicle of reliable certainty. The combination of mathematical thinking and factual thinking has produced the science-orientated intellectual standpoint of modern man, which signifies devotion to reality insofar as it is capable of being shaped. The fact has set free the faciendum, the “made” has set free the “makable”, the repeatable, the provable, and only exists for the sake of the latter. It comes to the primacy of the “makable” over the “made”. . . — Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, Section 1.4

An easy answer would just be that sometimes humans are vile. That strikes me as a useless condemnation, though. I don't think they're actually any more vile than a flock of birds or a school of fish. The only way to begin understanding human behavior is to start by looking at it through an amoral lens. — frank

It sounds like you want to call good acts moral and bad acts amoral, such that immoral acts do not exist. You've defined immoral acts out of existence.

Relevant here is Elizabeth Anscombe's point:

All human action is moral action. It is all either good or bad. (It may be both.) — Elizabeth Anscombe, Medalist’s Address: Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’

Yes, it's syncretist, and definitely unorthodox but there is a thread. — Wayfarer

That's fair. There are definitely different ways to go about it, and it sounds like you have some good sources to work from.

- True. For some reason my nephews are never deterred!