I guess I'll just visit Srap if I need a more accurate record. :lol:

I had meant to contrast improving personal outcomes, from drastically improving or solving them. — Judaka

Sure, that makes sense.

What I mean by "unfixable factors" is that any solution would fall outside of what can reasonably be construed as self-help. — Judaka

So the idea is that an "unfixable problem" might have a solution, but that solution would fall outside of the competence of self-help.

By impersonal, I meant, advice produced for mass consumption, or non-personalised. "How to Improve At X - for anyone" vs "How to improve at X - personal plan for Bill". — Judaka

Okay, so when you speak about self-help you are referring to the sort of resources which are not tailored to a particular person's unique situation, right? That's a helpful clarification.

All of this helps get at the question of why we would focus on unfixability. We would focus on it because by it we are led to understand that some of the solutions to problems labeled "fixable" are not accessible to those who are using self-help methods, where "self-help methods" are those methods that utilize resources produced for mass consumption. Therefore the people who are facing these problems should aim for improvement rather than a complete fix, at least if they are limited to self-help methods.

I have contended that there is no mechanism for knowing our limitations for influencing our personal outcomes. No matter what is done, there will always be something else that can be done. Do you disagree with this? — Judaka

I still think my disease example serves as an analogy. The 100th victim who is dying in old age on his deathbed has not, in a logical or empirical sense, exhausted all possible interventions. But he can still have good justification for his claim. Strictly speaking, I agree that failure never proves that the task was impossible, but I also think that claims and estimations can be made with respect to what is impossible, and they can be made with reasonable justification.

But where are you going with this? If I agreed, where would you take us? I assume you are going to say that claims of fixability are unfalsifiable, and that optimists who focus on the fixable can never be deterred because we can never prove that something is unfixable.

We will always assume improvement is possible... — Judaka

I see this as a cultural assumption which is therefore contingent. In general I think the assumption is much less common in non-democratic societies and historical eras.

I believe certain conceptualisations of free will are a primary source of the issue, I imagine that you would agree. — Judaka

Yes, I think so.

If a person is in control of their personal outcomes, then they should take responsibility for them, and they should take the blame for them. I view this as a logical connection, it seems you don't agree. — Judaka

Oh, I would agree with that. Wherever responsibility exists, blame can exist. That's part of what "responsibility" means. In my example of the person who had a cocaine addiction from infancy there is neither blame nor responsibility. In that case the person is not in control of the personal outcome of cocaine addiction.

As I said previously, the "truth" is not a feasible option... — Judaka

I think this is probably where we disagree. I would say that even if truth is only something that we approximate, it is still crucially important. I think that seeking "good outcomes" goes hand in hand with truth, in part because it implies that some outcomes are good and others are bad. I also think that true "conceptualizations" correlate to good outcomes.

Although it was earlier on in this discussion, where you undoubtedly had a different understanding of what we were talking about, you said the self-help context should exclude unfixable factors. Do you stand by that? — Judaka

Interesting question. To be honest, I am still fuzzy on what you mean by 'unfixable'. Apparently by 'fixable' you mean that a full solution is possible, such that we do not need to be satisfied with mere improvement. Logically speaking I want to think that 'unfixable' does not exclude improvability, but I don't know for certain how you view the relation between unfixability and improvability. Can what is unfixable be improved, or not?

Is it accurate to say that you think we should be able to proceed as normal, and just educate people to get rid of their irrational interpretations? — Judaka

No, and thanks for asking for clarification. Here is what I said earlier:

This is the question of whether we ought to combat false societal beliefs with education and argument, or with societal conditioning. I imagine that both are necessary, but I prefer the former. — Leontiskos

I stand by that. Both are necessary but I would give greater weight to education. The same would apply in general to the way that we address problematic phenomena in a society. Both would usually be necessary.

That passage about Pierre Hadot makes the point that philosophy in the classical sense was a matter of practice and (I suppose) self improvement (although I don't like that term much) rather than just arguments about concepts. — Quixodian

Also included is the idea that without praxis, one's theory will be limited and stunted. Hadot thus points to a deep interrelation between the two in the world of ancient philosophy. Here is a nice quote:

The Stoics made a distinction between philosophy, defined as the lived practice of the virtues of logic, physics, and ethics, and "discourse according to philosophy;" which was theoretical instruction in philosophy. The latter was in turn divided into the theory of physics, the theory of logic, and the theory of ethics. This distinction had a quite specific meaning within the Stoic system, and it could be used in a more general way to describe the phenomenon of "philosophy" in antiquity. Throughout this investigation, we have recognized the existence of a philosophical life—more precisely, a way of life—which can be characterized as philosophical and which is radically opposed to the way of life of nonphilosophers. On the other hand, we have identified the existence of a philosophical discourse, which justifies, motivates, and influences this choice of life. Philosophy and philosophical discourse thus appear to be simultaneously incommensurable and inseparable. — Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, p. 172

Unfair in what sense?

That was a minor suggestion, though. I realize the forum already fought just to get the ability to edit, so tinkering with that ability is probably not a high priority.

Is there a philosopher (or more than one) from the Orthodox side you see as a counterpoint to the western Scholastics? — Paine

There is an interesting book by Martin Laird that grew out of his dissertation. It is called Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith. I think it strikes a counterpoint to Augustine, and to my knowledge it is characteristic of the Cappadocian Fathers as a whole (Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus).

Perhaps another way to ask that is, was there a parallel equivalent of the Renaissance on the other side of the Schism? — Paine

There very much was. The Palamite or Hesychast controversy took place the 14th century and began with the disagreement between Gregory Palamas and Barlaam of Calabria. Barlaam was one of many renaissance thinkers in the East who were hearkening back to Greek philosophy and learning, and encouraging a more syncretistic approach.

A common Eastern narrative would say that the West accepted the renaissance of Greek and Aristotelian thinking in the medieval period whereas the East rejected it, and this deepened the schism. I think that is simplistic, but there is some truth to it.

If we were talking about some sort of absolute rules, we don't need to prioritize consequences, and, thus, one could just throw out premise (6). — ToothyMaw

As far as I can tell, premise (6) is a tautology. Is there some significant difference between an 'outcome' and a 'consequence'?

Okay, that's fair enough.

Okay, thanks, I will do that. I had tried searching for a space, which didn't work. That's all the farther I got with hacky workarounds. :grin:

I wanted to offer some observations as a new member who has a lot of familiarity with different forum softwares. Take them for what they are worth. I should begin by saying that I am pleasantly surprised with the forum software and the uniqueness of PlushForums' approach. Here are some feature ideas:

1. There should be the ability to search for all of a single user's posts within a thread. Technically you can do this but for some reason the search never returns any results. (PlushForums bug)

2. This UI feature is unintuitive because it is not symmetrical:

Double-click on the left-hand side of the page to go back. Double-click on the right-hand side to move one page forward. — Jamal

If double-clicking on the right-hand side takes me one page forward, then double-clicking on the left-hand side should take me one page back. All browsers have a back button; recreating it is redundant.

3. Posts should only be editable for X minutes.

4. BBCode for the <hr> tag would be useful for this forum (horizontal rule). I often see folks responding to multiple users in a single post and separating each reply with an arbitrary number of dashes or underscores. An <hr> tag is just a horizontal divider, and it would be helpful for formatting posts. Most of the forum software written in the last ten years includes this feature.

5. The BBCode "code" tag should not use code highlighting. All of the text within a code tag should be of the same color.

6. I have seen others suggest that there should be a limit on the number of a user's posts or threads per day. I agree, but often the easier solution is to provide a feature where, "Number of minutes between a user's posts/threads," can be specified. PlushForums might buy into that more easily.


My other suggestions have already been proposed, but do not yet exist:

In "All discussions" it would be really nice to see the category each discussion belongs to (without having to hover over the title). — Jamal

(And it would be nice to have an indicator on the thread page as well.)

Distraction-free mode when writing a post. Imagine the preview modal but with editing facility. — Jamal

(This is a standard feature nowadays. PlushForums should implement this to keep up with competition.)

Normal paging in "Comments", "Following", etc., instead of the "More comments" functionality — Jamal

Likes for posts (but not reputations) — Jamal

(Likes should be separable from the reputation system ( ).)

Retain the formatting when quoting highlighted text — Jamal

True AI is machine learning such that the computer advances it's programming without a human programmer. Simulated AI is clever human programming made to simulate independant thought... — LuckyR

Hi Lucky. Where are these definitions coming from? I would say that what you label "True AI" is just intelligence, and that what you label "simulated AI" is artificial intelligence, and that it is therefore not incorrect to say that we currently possess machines which are artificially intelligent. The disagreement with respect to 'artificial intelligence' regards whether the intelligence is itself artificial, or whether there is genuine intelligence which is the result of artifice. I favor the former, both philosophically and according to colloquial usage.

Elaborating on my first post...

It seems to me that a core issue with respect to the "paradox of predictability" is the question of whether the Laplacian demon is himself deterministic. Presumably the determinist would claim that the demon is deterministic, in which case we would have to admit the possibility that there is a third universe where a different demon is "causally isolated" from the first two universes. This demon would be able to predict the behavior of the first demon as well as everything which occurs in the first universe. And then we would need a third demon and a fourth, unto infinity.

Now perhaps this isn't a vicious infinite regress since it isn't causal in nature, but it does help reveal an incoherence in the determinist's claim. For the determinist the demon both accounts for determinism via his predictions, and is accounted for by determinism via his deterministic nature. This contradiction was already present in the human being, who in a similar way both transcends determinism in her ability to conceive and espouse it, and is contained by determinism ex hypothesi. The determinist claims that the human being who herself theorizes determinism is at the same time entirely encapsulated by determinism, and it is in this that the contradiction begins to take life. This is similar to the "Argument from reason."

"Why must the demon be deterministic?" Because the human being has already been claimed to be deterministic, and the demon is only different from the human being in accidental ways. The demon's mind is really just a human mind with additional memory and processing power. The mode of knowledge is exactly the same. If it weren't, then there would be an equivocation between the demon's 'prediction' and what we understand by 'prediction'. The key idea here is that something cannot be simultaneously predicting and predictable, and this is what gives rise to the ad hoc idea of an "embedded system." But to outsource the problem of prediction to an "external system" is no answer at all if the external system suffers from the exact same predicting-predictable problem that the embedded system suffers from. The problem arises not primarily because the system is embedded, but rather because the determinist independently claims that the system is deterministic. The idea that the system is embedded is only a consequence of the claim that the system is deterministic, and if embedded and external systems are both deterministic then such a distinction is surely in vain.

The inference to embeddedness was already problematic from the get-go. Of its very nature, the determinist's claim is not constrained. It is not limited to a subset. It is not merely a claim about "this universe." It is a radically inductive and metaphysical claim that applies to all universes and all minds. The embedded/external distinction is then a failure to understand the radicality of the determinist's claim, as though there could be some non-deterministic vantage point. In theorizing determinism,* the determinist is literally claiming to do something that they purport cannot be done, and when this is pointed out the only recourse is a string of ad hoc responses that kick the problem down the road, inch by inch.


* I submit that there is a sense in which the theorizing of determinism parallels the proving of determinism, or being able to predict everything as the demon does. Just as the hypothesis that the demon is able to predict all events brings with it the notion that the demon is not one of the things predicted, so, in a lesser sense, does the act of theorizing bring with it the notion that the theory does not encompass the theorizer. The absurd result of determinism is that the determinist is simultaneously observer and observed, predictor and predicted, theorizer and theorized, agent and patient.

So, I would describe the two examples you gave as equally absolute and relative, and equally neither. — Matt Thomas

I think the easiest way to have evidence for ' thesis is to admit that despite the ambiguities surrounding the concepts of relative and absolute, some things are more relative and some things are less relative. For example, the location of a trailer that is attached to a truck is more relative than the location of a trailer that is unattached and at rest; because the location of the first trailer is relative to something which is itself more variable. It is obfuscation to claim that the second trailer is relative to the movement of the Earth, and that they are therefore equally relative. It is obfuscation because the location of the first trailer is also relative to the Earth, but it is simultaneously relative to another variable body (the truck) and is therefore more relative than the second trailer.

I would say it requires obstinacy to deny that some things are more or less relative than others, but it also involves an inability to look at things from a different frame of reference or paradigm. The claim that 'relative' and 'absolute' are tricky concepts is understandable. The claim that they do not signify anything meaningful at all is unserious.

Fair enough. I had imagined when writing this thread, an impersonalised, generic approach to self-help, distinctly different from the personalised advice a psychologist would offer. An explanation of an issue that impacts millions of people, such as the obesity epidemic, in terms of fixable factors, would talk about what is within an individual's ability to control. Their choices, actions, habits, decisions and so on. It would understand the obesity epidemic as being a product of bad choices and solvable by smart choices. — Judaka

Okay, that's helpful. So we are engaged in something like epidemiology? That makes sense. As I was thinking about it I concluded that a very crucial aspect of this discussion is philosophical anthropology, which we could pragmatically define as the study of what humans beings are and what humans beings are capable of. I think it is the various different forms of philosophical anthropology that different interlocutors bring to the table which produce such divergent views on these issues.

The distinction between improvement and solving a problem is an important one. If self-help limited itself to simply improving personal outcomes, rather than identifying the determinative factors as fixable ones. If it didn't promise to solve problems, but just improve outcomes. Then it could focus on fixable factors without emphasising their importance beyond what is compatible with acknowledging the importance of unfixable factors. — Judaka

I only recently realized that the thing you are contrasting with 'fixable' is 'improvable', and that is a more subtle distinction. But let's be careful with language, because these are the sort of ambiguities that have thrown me off the trail. You should have said, "Then it could focus on improvable factors..." The focus is now on improving rather than fixing.

Earlier I thought you were saying, "We think these things are fixable, but they are unfixable because they are systemic, and therefore we should not try to address them at all." Instead you seem to be saying, "We think these things are fixable, but in fact they are only improvable. So we should not expect anything beyond improvement."

It's also a question of when the self-help conceptualisation is to be applied. If every time someone brings up an issue or a personal outcome, it automatically established a context of self-help, then this will have a social conditioning effect. When can a person talk about a personal outcome outside of the context of self-help? Is that even possible? — Judaka

I suppose it would depend a great deal on their audience and their intent in sharing. But these paradigms can certainly overlap. For example, a social scientist could sit in on AA meetings to gather data for their field even though all of the participants are participating in self-help interventions.

I appreciate your questions though, I'm not sure if I had a thorough answer to them before thinking about it. I am starting to see some nuances, like... — Judaka

Okay, good. I am glad that the conversation is bearing some fruit. I am now beginning to see a lot of nuances pop up as well, especially with the improve vs. fix distinction.

I didn't actually realise that the personal vs impersonal distinction mattered when I wrote the OP... — Judaka

It's an interesting distinction. How important it is, I am not sure. When I speak about the 'psychological counselor' I don't mean to exclude self-counseling. There are some people with remarkable self-knowledge, and many of them are also well-read in the psychological literature. Some of the great psychologists and psychiatrists of history have been able to address many of their own problems in an "impersonal" way. If that counts as self-help, then self-help need not be intrinsically unattuned to the difference between what is fixable and what is only improvable. But it seems to me that you are thinking in terms of aggregation, where societal trends will reflect the average person's capacity and "self-help" will therefore be amateurish. That's not a problem; the term surely has that connotation.

Exhausting all conceivable and available solutions seems impossible to me. — Judaka

Suppose someone is born into a wealthy family and contracts a rare disease at a young age. They are especially averse to the disease and this motivates an extremely high level of effort. They spend their entire life and their considerable wealth trying to cure the disease, they fail to do so, and they die at an old age. Now suppose there are 100 others who go through the same process. This does not offer proof—and there may be no such thing as strict proof of incurable diseases in medicine—but it is the best sort of evidence possible for the claim that the disease is incurable. If the 100th person, on their deathbed, concluded that the disease is incurable, it would be folly to tell them that they have insufficient evidence for that claim. We could tighten this up a bit if we qualified the claim to be, "Incurable at this point in history."

What's special about bad parenting, that one couldn't argue any nature or nurture influence couldn't be used to resolve a person of responsibility for anything they did? — Judaka

One can argue anything they like, and many people do argue whatever they like, but the question is whether the conclusion follows of necessity.

I think the easier case is the addict. Suppose someone inherits a cocaine addiction from their mother. Now suppose that he cures his addiction later in his 40s, and stops using cocaine. The claim was that, "If he fixes his problem, then he was responsible for it in the first place." But in this case the claim is false, is it not? He was not responsible for his cocaine addiction. (Feel free to modify the claim in question if you like. We have been talking about the simplified version that I glossed.)

If the cause has been a problem that was within Bill's power to fix, even if it wasn't of his making, that can often be enough to put the blame on him. — Judaka

I agree that it "can often be enough," but this is different from the claim that he is necessarily culpable. This is important because if we do not have sufficient knowledge then we are not justified in drawing the conclusion that Bill is at fault. If we do have that knowledge then of course we can draw the conclusion.

Can his habits even be differentiated from him, that we could blame them without involving him at all? Well, I'm not sure how much these questions matter to the overall discussion, you can be the judge, but I don't understand your thinking here. — Judaka

The grounding moral principle is that we are responsible for the things that we do, but we are not responsible for the things that are done to us. This of course gets tricky because often the things that we do flow from the things that were done to us, and the things that are done to us flow from the things that we have done. So responsibility can be altered in either direction, but always with respect to that grounding principle. Habits are one of the tricky areas because they involve what we do (actions) and what is done to us (passions). Thus the culpability which relates to a habit varies depending on how the habit was formed.

Cocaine addiction is an example of a habit. If the addict's own free actions caused the addiction, then he is responsible for the problem. If the addict's mother passed on the addiction to him in the womb, then he is not responsible for the problem. ...Of course he might culpably exacerbate the problem and become partially responsible, but I am trying to keep it simple lest we get lost in distinctions.

But yes, we are a bit off topic. If you and I disagreed on moral responsibility then it might be necessary to work this out, but I suspect that we do not disagree.

I'm not sure it's a false belief, it's an interpretation, there is no real right or wrong here. Whether it's better to blame Bill or not for his spending habits... I feel overwhelmed here. This question goes far beyond the scope of the topic. Our answer would have ramifications across a diverse range of contexts. — Judaka

Okay, sure. I shouldn't have used the word 'false' (although I myself do believe that it is false). My point was that if it is suggested that a focus or emphasis on fixability conditions a society towards a culture of blame, then one option is to introduce a different focus or emphasis which also conditions the society, but in the opposite direction. But there is a second option if the blame is a consequence of irrationality, and the second option is argument and education.

My OP contends that by emphasising fixable factors, we're necessarily going to put the blame on people for their problems. I still believe that is true, but are you disagreeing with that? Is your solution to rethink the way blame and responsibility function on a conceptual level? — Judaka

Let me try to disambiguate a little bit:

1. Emphasizing fixable factors will cause us to blame people for their problems.
2. Emphasizing fixable factors will cause us to unjustly blame people for their problems.
3. Overemphasizing fixable factors will cause us to unjustly blame people for their problems.

My answers would be:

1. Yes
2. Perhaps, but not necessarily
3. Yes

But I would answer the exact same way if we replace "fixable" with "improvable" in each of the three propositions. For me the bad (unjust) outcome will always flow from the faulty analysis or "conceptualization." Unjust blame occurs because there is an overemphasis on fixable factors, or because unfixable factors are being mistaken for fixable factors (which amounts to the same thing). There are also other ways unjust blame can manifest, such as when citizens have faulty ideas about moral responsibility. (To be clear, I am not claiming, nor do I suspect, that you yourself have these faulty ideas. I tend to think that we are talking past one another on that topic.)

Anyway, I'll hand it back over to you since I may be raising more questions than I am answering. :grimace:

The first paper that you cited makes an important point about predictability right in the abstract, by drawing a distinction between external predictability and embedded predictability: — SophistiCat

The distinction does save the logical coherence of determinism in the short term, but at what price? Does it rise above the level of an ad hoc response to the paradox of predictability? Is the determinist doing more than merely defending their theory by saying, "Oh, well in that case we stipulate that our observer is not part of the universe"?

rightly makes the claim that the demon must be "causally isolated from [our universe]." But is it really coherent to envisage a being who is outside of the causal universe in this manner? And even if it is coherent in general, upon closer inspection we find that in this case the "causal isolation" is odd, and also appears to be ad hoc. After all, knowledge is commonly understood to be causal, and therefore if the demon has knowledge of what occurs in our universe then how could he be causally isolated from it? At this point does the determinist just make another ad hoc distinction and say, "Oh, well the demon is causally isolated except for his knowledge, which is caused by the events which occur in our universe"? The demon begins to look more and more like Dickens' Ebenezer Scrooge, as he traverses time with ghosts, than the sort of thing that philosophers are concerned with.

I tend to think that predictability really is a problem for determinism, and in precisely the way that Rummens and Cuypers set out (i.e. it is a problem in principle, which remains even when the demon is granted unlimited knowledge and computational power). Theism has struggled with a similar problem for thousands of years, but in the reverse direction, where God is causally distinct except for what he causes within the universe. God has an outbox but no inbox; the demon has an inbox but no outbox. Neither thesis is easy to make sense of, but presumably the determinist will be even more bothered with paradox than the theist.

suggests that determinism without in-principle predictability is a meaningless idea. Whether or not that is right, such a form of determinism is a great deal more meaningless and toothless than the sort of determinism which brings along with it the intuitive consequence of in-principle predictability.

That is a hilarious bastardisation of what I said. — Matt Thomas

Compare:

• "If I had no knowledge of maths, I couldn't tell you anything more about [x = 1] than you have told me there."
• "If I didn't understand the words then I wouldn't know what they mean."

If I had no knowledge of maths, I couldn't tell you anything more about example (1) than you have told me there. — Matt Thomas

But you do have knowledge of math, so why pretend otherwise? I chose to give the example in mathematical terms because I knew you had knowledge of math, and I was correct. To Vera's point, if I didn't have knowledge of English then the words you are writing would make no sense to me and we would not be able to communicate. But I do have knowledge of English and that is why we are able to communicate.

Saying, "If I didn't understand the words then I wouldn't know what they mean," is a tautology. It isn't an argument against the meaning of any word, including the word 'relative'.

Well let's try a third example just to be precise:

1. x = 1
2. y = z + 1

The question is whether the value of y is more relative than the value of x; whether example (2) involves more relativity than example (1). To say, "example (1) requires additional knowledge of maths" does not answer that question. The simple fact is that even if you want to say that the value of x is relative, it is still true that the value of y is more relative than the value of x, because the value of y varies relative to the value of z.

Even if we grant that the symbol '1' is relative, it is still true that the symbol 'z' is more relative than the symbol '1'. This is because 'z' is relative in the same sense as '1', but it is also relative in an additional way because it is defined as a variable as opposed to a constant, and it is therefore relative to the numerical domain in a way that '1' is not. Thus example (2) is clearly more relative than example (1). If you can't see this then I'm not sure what else to tell you.

So, I would describe the two examples you gave as equally absolute and relative, and equally neither. — Matt Thomas

1. x = 1
2. y = z

So you would say that example (1) and example (2) are equally absolute and relative? The value of x and the value of y are equally absolute and relative? Example (2) is not more relative than example (1)?

I struggle to see the sense in defining anything as relative. You could say something changes in relation to something else, but that relation is defined in absolute terms. — Matt Thomas

Math is a good place to start:

• Absolute: x = 5
  
  • (The value of x is absolute)
• Relative: x = y * 3
  
  • (The value of x is relative to the value of y)

There is a qualitative difference between the first example and the second example, is there not? When children are introduced to algebra they must make quite a leap from what they have known previously.

If you think it can be construed as a single issue, then what would that issue be? — Leontiskos

I think that conceptualisation of the issue itself should acknowledge a broad array of factors influencing the outcomes, without providing a conclusion. — Judaka

But you are still presupposing that there is a single issue (you are still speaking of "the issue"). I am asking what that single issue is supposed to be. Again, I am concerned that there is more than one issue at stake, and that multiple issues are being conflated. What is the purpose of the conceptualization you speak of? It seems like the purpose you have in mind is that of the speculative scientist, who is trying to understand which causal factors influence an outcome. This is an issue, but it is not the issue of self-help. That end and that conceptualization will be different from the end and conceptualization that the psychological counselor uses. The end of the psychologist is to make a useful intervention, and their conceptualization will reflect this. Depending on the issue at hand we will utilize different conceptualizations.

Though, I hadn't intended psychologists to be the focus of my critique, as getting help from a psychologist is well, not representative of self-help, since it entails outside, professional help. — Judaka

As I see it, the type of the psychologist is a personification of the self-help paradigm. It is useful because it is professional, for it allows us to look at the paradigm itself instead of accidental features. That is, it helps preclude strawmen. Psychological counseling is the strongest form of self-help, and the people who are most serious about helping themselves will be reading psychological material or will submit themselves to professional counseling. If we want to talk about self-help, then I assume we want to talk about the strongest form of self-help, lest we strawman the notion of self-help.

Do you have a mechanism for knowing when fixable factors can be considered less important than previously thought? How many times does a person need to fail, or in what manner, that we could conclude the problem wasn't with the particular method, but in the assessment of fixability? — Judaka

I think the mechanism would be success or failure as they relate to effort. This mechanism is then catered to different contexts, such as particular approaches or interventions. This is a problem in the psychological literature as well, and it is why some of the newer schools are keen to set explicit and measurable goals.

So if someone is working by themselves to try to fix a problem using a set of X interventions, and they fail, then they are justified in saying, "I am unable to fix this problem using X interventions." The justification for this claim will vary with the level of effort. If they receive outside help, then instead of "I am" it would be "we are." If they exhaust all of the interventions of a particular school, such as Freudian psychology, then it would be, "I am unable to fix this problem using a Freudian approach." If all conceivable and available interventions have failed, then there is justification for the claim that the problem is unfixable tout court.

Note that these sorts of practical conclusions can never be reached with scientific exactitude or logical necessity. We must be content with the level of justification that pertains to practical conclusions, and this level of justification is not insubstantial.

I conceive of the status quo of self-help as emphasising fixable factors, so, to me, striking a balance would be accomplished by promising less from fixable factors and making a greater effort to acknowledge unfixable factors. Especially the former, self-help should aim to improve personal outcomes, not relentlessly promise to be the difference between failure and success. — Judaka

You seem to be saying that we should focus on improving rather than fixing, because most problems are improvable but not fixable. Ergo, we need to take a more pessimistic approach. I am not opposed to this idea.

That's outside my comfort zone because I imagine psychologists do acknowledge unfixable factors, likely more than almost anyone else... — Judaka

I also think psychologists acknowledge unfixable factors. If this is right, then the criticism only pertains to low quality forms of self-help. I would agree that low quality forms of self-help, which routinely mistake the unfixable for the fixable, are problematic.

But this also raises the question of whether the thread is exclusively about self-help, or whether it is also about the societal conditions and the societal thinking which gives rise to excessive optimism.

If Bill improves his spending habits and has an improvement in results, what is that he would be fixing? His literal spending habits, right? — Judaka

Sorry, I should have been more explicit about the error. That Bill fixed his spending habits does not imply that he is responsible for creating the problem in the first place. The problem may be due to bad parenting, for example.

Disagreeing with the statements is fine, but are you claiming that as statements, these sentences would be unreasonable? — Judaka

I disagree that they are logically sound, which is to say that the conclusion does not follow of necessity. "Bill fixed his spending habits, therefore he was responsible for creating the bad spending habits in the first place." The conclusion does not follow from the premises. It is possible that Bill created the bad spending habits, but it is not necessary. It may be that his parents engendered his bad spending habits in a way that was out of his control.

It's not about whether it's true that "Bill should've known better", it's about whether it's true that many will think it, and we already know the answer. — Judaka

This is the question of whether we ought to combat false societal beliefs with education and argument, or with societal conditioning. I imagine that both are necessary, but I prefer the former. I would prefer explaining why the conclusion does not follow and helping others to understand this.

If you agree that others would conclude that way and that emphasising unfixable factors is a solution to counter this, then is there something else that you'd argue could fulfil that role instead? — Judaka

I see the "emphasizing" as a form of conditioning, and I think the alternative is argument and education. A form of conditioning I favor can be seen in the section of my first post which is about the Greek proverb.

We can ask people to be kind for kindness' sake, but when pairing free will + emphasising fixable factors, there is little reason not to blame people for their outcomes, right? — Judaka

Sure, I would agree with that, but I think the sort of emphasis you are talking about is an irrational overemphasis. That is, these people falsely believe that unfixable things are fixable.

What about the argument is uniquely consequentialist? It seems like the argument will apply generally, and not only to consequentialists. This is a problem if you are specifically aiming at consequentialists.

If I am aware that another is referring to a broad range of contexts, I can try to avoid making assumptions, but that will make everything said more generic, and less meaningful, so if I think I can interpret what's said through the lens of a context, then I will. — Judaka

That sounds good to me. I will probably ask for a clarification in the future. It's just that I don't always like to bog down complex threads with clarificatory questions.

However, we can't treat these two contexts you've set up, of the speculative scientist and the psychologist as being entirely separate, especially in terms of conceptualising the issue. — Judaka

That's true, and I tried to acknowledge this in an "Edit:" above. But I'm still not convinced that we can talk about "conceptualizing the issue." It seems to me that there is more than one issue at stake, and that the social scientist is speaking to a different issue than the psychological counselor. If you think it can be construed as a single issue, then what would that issue be? At the very least it must encompass self-help, a causal analysis of outcomes in general, and the interest of the social sciences in systemic factors.

I'm not saying there is no nuance possible to avoid or lessen the above, but since striking a balance on fixability is the topic we're discussing, I'd want you to explicitly outline how you'd approach the issue. Do you agree that we can't just do whatever we want within a self-help context, and not expect it to spill over into other contexts? And do you agree how we conceptualise within the context of self-help will influence the impact of this spillover? — Judaka

As a preliminary point, context spillover is the central reason why I think that proverb is important, and the proverb only makes sense once it is understood that actions spill over into other contexts.

Secondly, here and in your title you idiosyncratically speak about a balance between one thing, fixability. As I understand it, a balance must always be struck between two or more things. Throughout and in different ways I have been trying to raise the question of what that second thing is and how it should be incentivized. Or if there are several, then what those several things are.

Generally speaking I think spillover can and should be managed, because it is often a result of loose thinking and erroneous inferences. As an example, when a sociologist speaks on a systemic issue, we should not automatically draw inferences with respect to other disciplines. We should acknowledge their statements within the sphere of expertise and allow broad leeway for our epistemic ignorance in the inferential space between disciplines.

One might want to say that the expert should constantly be guarding against false inferences. For example, maybe the psychological counselor who helped Bill needs to constantly remind him that although they have conceptualized his life in terms of actionable factors, not all factors are actionable. There is some truth to this, but I also think it needs to be taken for granted. A psychological counselor shouldn't need to always offer reminders that they are a psychologist and not a social scientist, especially in a world with so many specialized disciplines. But maybe we need improved education in order to take this for granted.

(The same thing applies when someone is working out these issues on their own, apart from experts and authorities. They need to recognize that there are different issues/ends at stake, and try to keep them separate.)

If the source of the problem is systemic, and Bill isn't at fault, then why are his outcomes completely within his control? If believing that fixing one's inability to manage their money properly would produce such a substantial change, then isn't that issue largely responsible for creating the problem in the first place? Even if it wasn't, an adult should've known better, and Bill's failure to fix this problem up until now would make him responsible for it. — Judaka

I disagree with all three sentences here. I don't think systemic factors and personal responsibility are mutually exclusive, although the popular mind and political parties very often reinforce the idea that they are. I don't believe that having the ability to fix a problem implies that one is responsible for creating the problem in the first place. And I don't think failing to fix a fixable problem necessarily means that one is at fault for the persistence of the problem.

With respect to that third point/sentence, ignorance is a very complicated reality, and it is not always easy to understand when ignorance implies culpability and when it does not. "Bill should've known better" is a philosophically contentious claim which may or may not be true in any given circumstance.

Granted, there can be ways in which the spillover is more unwieldy. To take one example: the social sciences foster a deterministic paradigm while the self-help disciplines foster a free will paradigm, and—compatibilism aside—this creates a tension between them. This isn't only a matter of spillover. It is also a matter of intentional inferential claims. The social scientist might actually affirm determinism and they might actually assert that personal responsibility does not exist. But mediating this tension is difficult because it is a difficult philosophical problem.

I'd also argue that a psychologist - or oneself, shouldn't just focus on what's actionable. Psychology has a lot to do with the impact of thinking about and conceptualising problems. While it's not good to tell someone everything is unfixable and there's nothing they can do to improve their situation. It is important to emphasise the importance of factors outside of one's control to relieve stress, improve self-image, help build realistic expectations and so on. — Judaka

That's right, but this would be leveraging a focus on non-actionable factors as an actionable intervention. It is the idea that some problems are fixed simply by remembering that not all problems are fixable. So in this case the unfixable does pertain to self-help.

I can understand what you're trying to say, and while I do have some other ends I'm concerned with, I am happy to focus on these two outcomes and agree they are important. Fixability is just a factor that influences them, and we don't actually care about fixability beyond its role in influencing other factors, I agree with that. — Judaka

Okay, great. I think that section lost some of its applicability once I realized that you were also interested in the non-self-help paradigm of social science and systemic issues, because it limits itself to the self-help paradigm. Still, I'm glad it was useful.

At the end of the day it may be that that monstrous question of "the truth" is unavoidable. :grin:

The point I wish to make is that the tension between the natural order and the truth of religion that occupied the Scholastic philosophers did not exist for Plotinus. — Paine

Good point. It's interesting, though, that in Eastern Christianity the nature/grace and reason/faith distinctions are not as stark as they are in the West. There does not seem to have been as much of a focus on Pelagianism in the East, and Augustine does not occupy such a central role.

This was a very interesting passage from Plotinus. Thanks for sharing.

The contexts are so different that I would read the same words differently based on whether I thought the context was personal outcomes, societal-level outcomes or both. — Judaka

Sorry, I can see why that would be deeply confusing. :blush: My words are often intended to be applicable to multiple different contexts or layers, but this is not apparent to someone who is not familiar with me.

Looking for that which is attainable is itself a bias, and this topic requires us to choose between competing narratives, that can't be separated simply into right and wrong. — Judaka

Before I read your reply I wrote a post to try to explain why I think the fixable-unfixable antinomy starts us off on the wrong foot. Although some of it may no longer be applicable, I will attach it at the bottom of this post for reference because I think it is still helpful.

To be honest, this is a rabbit hole within the thread that I am somewhat wary of. There may be deep disagreements about the genus of discourse and the legitimacy of certain contraries. But the short summation of the attached post is this: I don’t think ‘conceptualization in terms of unfixableness’ is a competing narrative, because I don’t think it is choice-worthy. We need to find a competing narrative that is choice-worthy if we are to talk about a balance between two narratives.

From the perspective of self-help, conceptualization in terms of unfixableness does seem to be wrong, for the purpose of self-help is to find actionable ways to improve oneself. What we need is an alternative which is not inherently wrong, and which has an intrinsic appeal. (Note, too, that a bias with respect to self-help will be qualitatively different than a bias with respect to a speculative science, for self-help is a practical science. More on this below.)

A focus on actionable factors wouldn't cause feelings of inadequacy within the appropriate context of "doing", only emphasising the importance of these factors would do that. — Judaka

This is a worthwhile distinction, but in your defense an exclusive or near-exclusive focus on actionable factors will automatically emphasize the importance of these factors. That is how I was reading the OP’s language of ‘focus’, and I think it is an important issue to consider.

While there's nothing wrong with a bias on what is attainable within the context of action, there is something wrong with it within the context of conceptualisation. To think of fixable factors as being largely determinate of outcomes due to one's biases or as a conscious choice is what creates feelings of inadequacy and many of the other issues I described in the OP. — Judaka

I would say that we leverage different conceptualizations for different ends, and here there are two ends in question. The first end is speculative; it is the desire to understand the causal factors of outcomes. In this case the dispassionate scientist is analyzing a personal outcome and determining which causal factors contributed to it. The second end is practical; it is the desire to shape someone’s life in an optimal way. In this case the psychological counselor is attempting to show someone how they can act in order to improve their situation.

A subtle “metabasis eis allo genos” occurs when these ends and conceptualizations get mixed unreflectively. The speculative scientist’s conceptualization will not be a proper fit for the psychologist, and the psychologist’s conceptualization will not be a proper fit for the speculative scientist. They are doing two different things, and their conceptualization needs to reflect the thing they are doing. Ideally they should not borrow conceptualizations from foreign fields.

Looking for that which is attainable is itself a bias... — Judaka

Returning to this recurring claim, I would say that it is a bias for the speculative scientist but not for the psychologist. Biases are not absolute. They are relative to one's end.

I have a lot of criticism towards the conceptualisation that maximises fixability, and if I had to choose, I'd prefer something far more ambiguous. — Judaka

If your thread is about self-help, then the conceptualization will do more than maximize fixability, it will presuppose that the domain of inquiry is limited to fixable issues. The psychological counselor (and the person interested in self-help) is not laboring under the impression that most all personal problems are fixable. They are intentionally and consciously focusing on those factors that they believe to be fixable, because their end (or goal) demands this focus.

We'd admit that we don't know how possible it is for someone to accomplish their personal goals and that one should just seek to improve as they can. — Judaka

This seems reasonable. It seems like a broad approach to the problem that occurs when someone mistakes unfixable problems for fixable problems. The other approach would be to correct the analysis so that this mistake does not occur, or occurs less often.

I think the issues you're talking about are more closely related to nihilism than individualism. But I won't say too much about it... — Judaka

Let me say just two things. First, your OP seems to involve the idea that there is an important interrelation between societal expectations and one’s self-assessment of their own personal life, and that these societal expectations with regard to fixableness are part of the problem. So it’s hard to altogether isolate the discussion from societal realities and the societal expectation that we should focus on fixability and self-improvement.

Second, the reason I like that proverb is because it provides a concrete way forward. It is very abstract to claim that we should alter our conceptual scheme. It seems to me that one of the most reliable ways that conceptual schemes are changed is by partaking in a new set of concrete acts. Planting trees for future generations (and other such actions) really will alter one’s conceptual scheme, and it will be altered even if one does not comprehend why or how or that it is being altered.

Edit: Perhaps an overarching point is that the average person, who indiscriminately mixes together the roles of the speculative scientist and the psychological counselor, needs to remind themselves that even when their focus is deeply enmeshed in self-help, they must still be cognitive of the fact that not all personal problems are within their control to change. There are many factors which are out of their control.

---

Here is the attached post:

Let me adopt a more critical approach to try to show why the OP could come across as unwieldy. The groundwork of the OP feels something like this dialogue that one could have with themselves:

• Me: It feels like a lot of problems flow from our strong focus on fixability.
• Myself: Well, what is the opposite of fixability?
• Me: Unfixability?
• Myself: Yes, unfixability. So we need to mix in more unfixability to find the right balance, just like you would mix water into a solution that is too salty.
• Me: That makes sense.

In general there is nothing wrong with this method, but it is important to find the right opposite or contrary. In this case I would say that unfixability is not the contrary, for fixability and unfixability do not belong to the same genus vis-à-vis self-help. They seem like contraries because one is the etymological negation of the other, but with respect to the topic of self-help they are not contraries.

If we are trying to find a balance between two extremes in the context of self-help, both extremes need to possess an intrinsic goodness and an intrinsic allure for the person seeking self-help, such that they might be tempted to overindulge in either one. But this is not the case for “unfixable.” Pathology aside, there is no intrinsic allure in the notion of unfixableness, for all it means is that there is a problem that will never be solved. A psychological counselor would never give the advice, “You are thinking of yourself too much in terms of fixability. Instead, try to think of yourself as unfixable.”

So in my opinion the OP is confusing because it leads us into these false contraries and leads us off on the wrong foot, trying to balance conceptualization in terms of the fixable with conceptualization in terms of the unfixable. My suggestion is that the contraries which need to be balanced are a focus on improvement and a focus on adequacy. These are contraries in a material sense, but they also fulfill the criterion of intrinsic goodness and allure, and are therefore contraries with respect to self-help. A psychological counselor might plausibly give the advice, “You are thinking of yourself too much in terms of improvement. Instead, try to think of yourself as adequate, as ‘good enough.’” Adding a greater emphasis on adequacy really will help relieve an obsession with improvement, just as water reduces the potency of a solution that is too salty.

If ‘improvement’ does not sufficiently capture the idea of the OP, then we would still need a better contrary for ‘fixable’, with sound rationale for why that contrary is worth pursuing on its own merit. ...Perhaps the balance is found by simply counterweighting the various other causal factors which are not in our control.

(Note that my first post contains an error where ‘unfixable’ is conflated with ‘uncontrollable’. I was trying to adhere to the language of the OP and I ended up fudging the logic. Unfixableness is not a proper motivation for self-help.)

Sorry if my OP was unclear, but I had been talking about an individual's capability in influencing personal outcomes, not societal-level outcomes. — Judaka

No worries. There was an ambiguity that I didn't quite understand, but I wrote my posts in such a way that they would apply both to personal outcomes and to a wider scope. Everything I have written should apply to personal outcomes, with the exception of the clause, "or we might replace them with someone who is more skilled."

Again, the reason I focused on adequacy is because I wanted to provide a realistic route to the balance that you seek between focusing on the fixable and focusing on the unfixable. If you seek such a balance, then what reason would you offer for focusing on the unfixable?

I had thought the last part of your previous comment strange but I failed to make the connection that we were talking about different things. — Judaka

The last part of my first post which regards the proverb about old men planting trees is related to personal outcomes because our horizon of possibility is shaped by our environment and our general beliefs. The concepts must be analogized to a personal context. For example, the tree could signify a long-term solution that is beyond one's personal reach; the seeds could signify a contribution which seems inadequate, but which might bear fruit in time with good fortune and help from other causal or personal inputs. To simplify, the individualist takes a short-term view and tends to restrict their consideration of agency to themselves, whereas non-individualists do not.

The old man planting trees has hope even though he cannot foresee or guarantee that his efforts will bring success, and his hope is not limited to societal outcomes, but also overflows into his personal goals and difficulties. That sort of society becomes great not because there are lots of literal trees providing shade. It becomes great because the citizens have selfless, cooperative habits, but also because they have hope, they have patience, they do not narrow their horizon of possibility to what the individual can accomplish, and they do not limit the time horizon to their own lifetime. If an overemphasis on fixability produces feelings of frustration, incompetence, impotence, inadequacy, and despair, then this remedy is to the point.

Me too, but we happen to be in the ethics sub-forum, and that's why I am talking about ethics. :wink:

Because we are talking about moral acts. If we want to define the act that someone has carried out for the purpose of moral evaluation, then the primary defining characteristic is their intent. It defines precisely what they have done.

So if Einstein earnestly believed himself to be presenting a theory of relativity, then that is what he was doing, and that is the first point of reference for any judgment that occurs with respect to that act.

What is your alternative here? That we morally assess acts primarily according to factors unrelated to the intent of the agent? Morality is deeply connected to intent and volition. If you wish to contradict this then at some point you will have to offer your alternative.

(Sometime in the next week I hope to write an OP on moral acts. I am sure that thread will get into this in more detail.)

The role of Duns Scotus and the eclipse of scholastic realism is also central to John Milbank's 'Radical Orthodoxy' as I understand it... — Wayfarer

Yes, Milbank takes the thesis into new frontiers. My sense is that almost all Medievalists accept the thesis with qualifications, and modern philosophers don't know the medieval period well enough to consider the thesis. When Milbank brings this up in those circles he is often met with blank stares rather than incredulity. Rowan Williams is another outlier who supports the thesis. And most any Thomist philosopher will support it to one degree or another, because the shift away from Aquinas' form of realism in the late middle ages is undeniable.

Incidentally you'll find a breakdown of Anscombe's criticism of Lewis' argument in Victor Reppert's essay (Reppert authored a book on the argument.) — Wayfarer

Great, thank you!

It goes against the spirit of the trial and error process, setbacks in a context of a fixable problem should be responded to by promoting a positive outlook and perseverance. Such a move of switching to emphasising unfixable factors would draw a lot of criticism for many different reasons. Is that something you can also foresee, and do you agree it's a problem for your proposal? — Judaka

Here I would want to distinguish between what is perceived to be fixable and what an agent is actually able to fix. The second important distinction is whether we are focused on the agents or the problem. Are we looking to maximize the contribution of the agents and promote their general well-being, or are we looking to solve a problem irrespective of agent-considerations? Once both of these distinctions are taken into account I think the murkiness clears up.

If the inadequacy is produced by an emphasis on the fixable factors, and one perceives a problem as fixable, then switching to blame unfixable factors upon recognising their feelings of inadequacy will be damned. — Judaka

Recalling the first distinction, the problem is perceived to be fixable, but the agent is not able to fix it and thus experiences inadequacy. This of course gets at the fact that not all problems are equally fixable by every agent, but the second distinction also comes into play: are we solicitous for the agent or the problem? If we are solicitous for the agent we might help them fix it, or let them take a break, etc. If we are solicitous for the problem we might drive them harder and hope they figure it out, or we might also help them fix it, or we might replace them with someone who is more skilled, etc.

But the main point is that one must take into account whether a particular agent is able to fix a problem. If not, then calling it 'fixable' is a fiction vis-à-vis that agent.

Perhaps we can agree that it does manifest differently within individualist vs collectivist societies though... — Judaka

My point was that individualists tend to limit their horizon to what an individual can produce, and since an individual can produce less than what a collective or multiple generations of a collective can produce, individualists will perceive long-term fixable problems to be unfixable. Indeed, they are unfixable if the individual must do it themselves.

Natural human biases seem sufficient to me to explain why we're largely focused on fixable factors. Unfixable factors also tend to be highly complex, requiring a sophisticated understanding, while fixable factors are generally simple, and one naturally has familiarity with the relevant concepts. — Judaka

Applying one's energies to what is attainable is not biased, it is rational and realistic. I tried to give a reason to focus on the unfixable, namely adequacy. What would be your reason for focusing on the unfixable? If you think we focus too much on the fixable, then what reason do you offer for why we should focus on the unfixable instead?

Both individualistic and collectivist cultures will involve comparing people to each other and focusing on personal outcomes. I wonder whether such a philosophical approach can ever represent the average person's mentality, though I feel that yours is a healthier approach than many of the others. — Judaka

Consider a long-term project: carving Crazy Horse Memorial. Are you of the mind that an individualist society conceives of the feasibility of this task in the same manner that a collectivist society does? Remember that many of the laborers and donors will never see its completion.

Why think the intention is the primary defining characteristic of all acts? — wonderer1

Because according to the two primary spheres in which we judge acts, law and morality, the assessment is first and foremost guided by what the agent believed themselves to be doing. This belief is a proximate intention, and specifies the act itself.

To take the example I already gave, you might see someone cutting into a man's flesh and conclude that he is a murderer. We might learn that he is actually a surgeon. Suppose instead we learn that he is a layman attempting to perform a surgical operation under duress. If the patient dies the layman will not be charged with murder, because murder requires a particular kind of intent and that kind of intent was not present. He might be charged with involuntary manslaughter, but this is a different crime than murder, and a different act than murder. "Good Samaritan Laws" are related to this, and are intended to limit the liability of acts which are performed with a particular kind of intention. The "insanity defense" is another way to see that acts are judged primarily according to intention.

Blinking and breathing are not acts in the philosophical sense.

It's a shame his work is not more approachable, because I think his central thesis - that Platonism basically articulates the central concerns of philosophy proper, and that it can't be reconciled with today's naturalism - is both important and neglected. — Wayfarer

That's true, but at the same time Gerson is opening up the can of worms within his own discipline and therefore providing a stepping stone for someone to do the work of translating it into the world of modern philosophy. I am fairly certain that this will happen.

I've long been interested in various aspects of scholastic and platonic realism, i.e. the view that universals and abstract objects are real. There's precious little interest in and support for such ideas here, or anywhere, really. But I'm of the view that it was the decline of scholastic realism and the ascendancy of nominalism which were key factors in the rise of philosophical and scientific materialism and the much-touted 'decline of the West'. But it's a hard thesis to support, and besides, as I say, has very little interest, it's diametrically at odds with the mainstream approach to philosophy. — Wayfarer

In the Catholic world it is just the opposite! That thesis is so prevalent that it is thought to be trite. That line says that the nominalism that was conceived with Duns Scotus and came to maturity with William of Ockham is the crucial error that fueled the loss of realism and set the stage for the modern period. I think there's a lot of truth to it, although there is nuance to be had.

Some of the sources I frequently cite in support... — Wayfarer

Thank you for all the sources! I am especially interested to read the essay by Maritain.

Let me find some time and get back to you with more sources regarding this thesis, including at least one popular adaptation of Gerson.

The current form of the argument from reason was popularised by C S Lewis in 1947, subsequently revised and reformulated after criticism from G.E.M. Anscombe. — Wayfarer

Regarding the OP, I have always found Lewis' argument to be sound. I would be curious to read Anscombe's criticisms beyond the footnote he gives. She is a very competent philosopher.

Thanks for the clarification. That's what I figured--I just wanted to make sure. To be fair, Aristotle's metaphysical account of proximate matter always struck me as a little wobbly, so Plotinus' critique makes some sense.


Yes, Paine pointed me to the same thread. I am a layman, but I do look forward to reading it. :smile:

Gerson has been discussed numerous times here... — Paine

Thanks for the references. I just reread Phaedo last week so I will be curious to have a look at the thread.

I realize that I am not up for rekindling those debates right now. It is summertime and the living is easy. — Paine

Fair enough. :smile:

The problem with Gerson is that he does not distinguish between the different roles Matter (ἡ ὕλη) plays amongst the 'Ur-Platonists' he assembles to oppose the team of 'Materialists' he objects to... — Paine

Okay, that is an interesting difference between Aristotle and Plotinus. I am much more familiar with Aristotle than Plotinus. I found a source which corroborates what you say, and may also relate to what you say about Aristotle and Plotinus' disagreement on the soul in the other thread:

The anti-Aristotelian conclusions [in Ennead II.5] are two. While sensible reality, according to Aristotle, involves continuity of change based on the actualisation of proximate matter, Plotinus breaks this continuity by defining matter only as prime matter which can never be actualised. While Aristotle mentions in De Anima II.5 a certain potentiality in the soul, Plotinus argues that it is rather active power than passive potentiality. — Sui Han, Review

For myself, the many points Plotinus and Aristotle may agree upon are not as interesting as where they clearly do not. — Paine

The article that has already been referenced in this thread is Gerson's "Platonism Versus Naturalism." There he gives this definition of anti-materialism:

Anti-materialism is the view that it is false that the only things that exist are bodies and their properties. Thus, to admit that the surface of a body is obviously not a body is not thereby to deny materialism. The antimaterialist maintains that there are entities that exist that are not bodies and that exist independently of bodies. Thus, for the antimaterialist, the question "Is the soul a body or a property of a body?" is not a question with an obvious answer since it is possible that the answer is no. The further question of how an immaterial soul might be related to a body belongs to the substance of the positive response to [Ur-Platonism], or to one or another version of Platonism. — Lloyd P. Gerson, Platonism Versus Materialism | cf. From Plato to Platonism, 11

Are you then of the opinion that either Aristotle or Plotinus are not "antimaterialists"? That Gerson has not categorized them correctly?

Interesting OP, @Judaka!

That for those who maximise fixable components in their conceptualisations, anyone's circumstances are always thought of as drastically improvable, and nothing ever inspires any change in that assessment. — Judaka

I see two questions here: motivation and adequacy. The first concerns whether one is motivated to change; the second concerns one's sense of self-adequacy.

Regarding emphasizing either the fixable or the unfixable, if we are concerned with motivation then the fixable emphasis will be optimal, whereas if we are concerned with adequacy then the unfixable emphasis will be optimal. If someone needs to be motivated to act, then they should focus on the fixable because this will bolster the sense that their actions will not be in vain. If someone needs to be reminded of their adequacy, then they should consider the unfixable and further realize that not everything is their fault. Many of the bad things that have happened to them are beyond their control, and are therefore not an indication of their inadequacy.

Of course avoidance of despair will involve all of these things, because hopelessness can come from the listless absence of motivation and from a crushing sense of inadequacy. There are certainly other ways to address despair, motivation, and adequacy, but I wanted to stick to the OP's notions of the fixable and the unfixable.

Factors beyond one's ability to control can be enormously influential, even if it's unpalatable for people to hear. — Judaka

At other times, I'm not sure. I generally lean towards problems being systemic and difficult to fix, and I find the explanations given for maximising fixable factors unconvincing. — Judaka

I see individualism as a large part of the problem here, because it tends to overemphasize personal responsibility. I still prefer individualism to a strong collectivism, but it has its dangers. The proverb comes to mind:

A society grows great when old men plant trees in whose shade they shall never sit. — Greek Proverb

In this case rather than looking at problems as fixable and unfixable, we should look at them as short-term fixable and long-term fixable. Those who believe in quietly contributing to long-term solutions with patience will also tend to view their own long-term problems with patience, rather than despair. They will be more willing to inherit the burden of entrenched problems. They will be more appreciative of the slow, steady progress that has already been accomplished which no one seems to notice (e.g. the ancient oak trees surrounding them). Some realities are very difficult to change, and in order to appreciate these changes we must set aside our measuring tools which measure web responses in milliseconds. Focusing too heavily on the individual undercuts the fact that the causal nexus which shapes our life extends thousands of years before our birth, and this focus also deters us from planting trees in old age. "One sows and another reaps" (John 4).

Okay, thanks for explaining that to me. I understand now. I agree about these "effects of morality in a social context."

A law against murder for me, would not be a good example, because I think even an amoral society would have such a law, merely for the sake of preserving order. — Judaka

I found this comment interesting, but I think I will write a new thread rather than create a tangent here.

A good point. I think of them as untheorized hedonists - they are more likely to be using the term in an undifferentiated fashion to describe 'pleasure seeking' despite the consequences. Dissipated voluptuaries tend to have a limited shelf life. — Tom Storm

Yes, I think that's right. And of course there are unreflective individuals who do seek pleasure in an undifferentiated fashion, but this would be 'hedonism' as an unreflective way of life rather than 'hedonism' as a moral philosophy. I think it would be hard to find a moral philosopher who advocates for undifferentiated pleasure seeking.

What I've liked about Epicurus is the setting of achievable standards for hedonism... — Tom Storm

That's a good point. I have been lamenting something of the opposite in Aristotle, who is in some ways elitist. Epicurus provides a way of life which is universally accessible and which can be enacted in greater or lesser ways.

Also, there is a tendency to only use words with negative connotations in contexts that one disagrees with, and this is something I advocate against. If something is coercive only when the intention is malicious, or effect undesirable and not, for example, motivated by morality, and the desire to do good, then the term merely becomes its connotation and loses most of its meaning. If something is disqualified as coercion when you like the effect it produces, well, that's quite insidious indeed. — Judaka

I agree wholeheartedly with this. I call it 'pejorification' (of a word). In fact, it seems to happen most frequently with the concept of morality, where one's own moral claims are considered 'moral', and the moral claims of others are considered 'moral meddling.' We saw it most recently, I aver, in your thread about "personal morality."

You can find things coercive without the negative consequence beyond physical threat. It could be financial damages, loss of respect, loss of friendship, social ostracisation, humiliation, shaming and any number of other things. — Judaka

Yes, I understand the gist of what you are saying. The classic example of this comes from Aristotle, with the captain of a ship who must throw his cargo overboard if his ship is to survive the storm, or a tyrant giving an order under threat:

That is generally held to be involuntary which is done under compulsion or through ignorance.

“Done under compulsion” means that the cause is external, the agent or patient contributing nothing towards it; as, for instance, if he were carried somewhere by a whirlwind or by men whom he could not resist.

But there is some question about acts done in order to avoid a greater evil, or to obtain some noble end; e.g. if a tyrant were to order you to do something disgraceful, having your parents or children in his power, who were to live if you did it, but to die if you did not—it is a matter of dispute whether such acts are involuntary or voluntary.

Throwing a cargo overboard in a storm is a somewhat analogous case. No one voluntarily throws away his property if nothing is to come of it, but any sensible person would do so to save the life of himself and the crew.

Acts of this kind, then, are of a mixed nature, but they more nearly resemble voluntary acts. For they are desired or chosen at the time when they are done, and the end or motive of an act is that which is in view at the time. In applying the terms voluntary and involuntary, therefore, we must consider the state of the agent’s mind at the time. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III.i (1110a)

I am happy to agree with Aristotle in his treatment of the voluntary and involuntary. What concerns me is the possibility that your definition of coercion is too lenient:

It is difficult to see how one could abandon this traditional definition while at the same time holding that there are any acts which are not coerced. — Leontiskos

Here is the definition of coercion (or compulsion) that I would adopt, which comes from Aristotle:

• LeC: "An act is compulsory when it has an external origin of such a kind that the agent or patient contributes nothing to it"
  
  • (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III.i, tr. Thomson).

I wonder what your definition would be? I assume it would reflect these things you have said:

There are a vast array of consequences that one may desire to avoid, and can thus be a coercive influence. — Judaka

As I said earlier, where a reasonable person would conclude that their failure to act in a particular way would result in negative consequences, then there is a coercive element at play... — Judaka

When one's action was taken to avoid some negative consequence that has been established, then we can call that environment coercive. — Judaka

Does this allow us to say that "there are any acts which are not coerced"? My act of eating chocolate ice cream is at least in part taken to avoid the negative consequence of not-having a delicious treat. My act of eating lunch is taken to avoid the negative consequence of hunger, etc. Or is the key to distinguish between those consequences that have been established by natural causes and those consequences that have been established by human causes?

The case which pertains to this thread is as follows. Presumably we agree with Aristotle that in the case of the tyrant there is a mixture of voluntariness and coercion, but I do not yet agree with you that there is a non-social element of morality which is coercive. That is, your claims in this thread for the idea that morality is coercive seem to be twofold: morality is coercive in both a social and non-social way. I agree that it is coercive in a social way, but I do not agree that it is coercive in a non-social way. I suppose I agree with @Pantagruel in this matter. For example:

A moral defence is a necessity, not a choice. — Judaka

Having an acceptable moral defence for one's actions or stances is necessary and therefore coerced... — Judaka

To say that one is coerced to have a moral defense is different from saying that one is coerced to observe a social moral code. Under what definition of coercion is one universally coerced to make a moral defense? Are you claiming that the need to make a moral defense is precisely a matter of social conditioning, or something...?

Thanks,
Leontiskos

Further Epicurus' theory gets at something fundamental about desire -- that our desires can be the reason we are unhappy, rather than us being unhappy because we're not satisfying those desires, and so the cure of unhappiness is to remove the desire rather than pursue it. — Moliere

Indeed. Good post!

Which is a very different kind of hedonism from our usual understanding of the word since it's centered around limiting desire such that they can always be satisfied and you don't have to worry about them rather than pursuing any and all of them. — Moliere

True, but 'hedonism' as it is often used is more of a philosophical punching bag than something which anyone actually adheres to. Hedonism as a moral philosophy invariably distinguishes between good pleasure-desires and bad pleasure-desires, just as Epicurus does. Even the hedonists who hold that all pleasures are commensurable still hold that there are praiseworthy and blameworthy decisions when it comes to seeking pleasure. In short, hedonism as a moral philosophy must still be at least a prescriptive theory, and not merely descriptive.

I think the misunderstanding arises in no small part from amateur hedonists who, while trying to defend their theory, end up falling back into something which is so safe as to be merely descriptive. Having thus fallen back, they have successfully defended themselves from being wrong, but they have at the same time failed to put forth a theory which says anything substantial, and they also lead onlookers to believe that hedonism is a flat, one-dimensional beast. ...So maybe Epicurus is odd to us in part because we are surrounded by such lazy hedonists. :grin:

In other word, intellection is some sentence... — Charlie Lin

The first thing to remember is that intellection and ratiocination are intellectual acts, not sentences.

When trying to understand intellection I think the modern mind must begin with that last sentence of my post, "We must hold that intellection exists if we are to hold that ratiocination is possible." Ratiocination without intellection is like a house without a foundation.

In other word, intellection is some sentence that I understand immediate when I get the meaning of each composition of them —— meaning of 'bachelor', 'unmarried' 'table'. In your terminology 'presupposed term and concept'. — Charlie Lin

The apprehension of simple concepts is only one form of intellection, but it is perhaps the easiest to understand. So yes, apprehending the meaning of a term such as 'bachelor' is an instance of intellection. This is not to say that we automatically understand what a bachelor is without experience, evidence, arguments, etc. Yet two people could be presented with the exact same evidence and arguments, and one might make the jump to understand what a bachelor is while the other does not. The first has intellected the meaning of 'bachelor' while the second has not.

For one thing, the truthness of such propositions seems too trivial to be a souce of evidence. The proposition 'bachelor is married .' despite its trueness takes me to no further belief. — Charlie Lin

Syllogisms are built up piece by piece. If you do not understand what a bachelor is, then you will be unable to understand every argument which makes use of the concept of bachelorhood. Furthermore, every single argument presupposes a number of atomic concepts. Thus if you have no atomic concepts to work from, every single argument and conclusion in the world will be inaccessible to you. Because of this it is a grave mistake to suppose that the intellection or understanding of concepts has no epistemic value.

It is sometimes helpful to note that arguments have, at minimum, two premises and one conclusion. Think of modus ponens and modus tollens, which are two of the most basic kinds of arguments. But if you drill down and try to defend each premise of an argument with a set of second-order arguments, and each premise of the second-order arguments with a set of third-order arguments, and so on, you will have arguments (of ever-increasing cardinality) unto infinity and your conclusion will never ultimately be justified. Arguments themselves presuppose a non-argument (non-composite) foundation, and just as arguments presuppose terms, so too does ratiocination presuppose intellection. This is especially relevant to foundationalists like BonJour.

...It would be like saying, "I am going to build a house out of bricks, and every brick will rest on two lower bricks!" For some reason it never occurs to our age to ask the question, "Won't the bottom bricks have to rest on something other than bricks?!"

But after all what exactly is intellection, after removing all inference reasoning (inductive,deductive,abductive)? — Charlie Lin

A lot of philosophers do think that intellection is a kind of induction, and I am sympathetic to that idea. But induction is a very mysterious and ill-defined thing. It is not even clear that it ought to be called inferential reasoning.

And I am quite curious the history of these notions in philosophical discourse, since I have rarely encountered them in readings. — Charlie Lin

I am currently deprived of my physical books, but one philosopher who tackles this with BonJour in mind is Dr. Michael J. Winter. If memory serves, he has a chapter in a book or edited volume devoted specifically to this topic, and he grounds the account in a form of induction.