Presentism seems the only one with anything even approaching any evidence behind it. The rest are entirely speculative, or interpretive - meaning not empirically interesting.

Have read the thread and that's somewhat why I say the above.

But that would mean that the simulation is a reality of its own, independently of the "real" reality. — Ludwig V

I think is entirely dependent on S's use of the word 'reality'. The way i use, it is expressly apt to delineate between a simulated, and a non-simulated 'reality'. The former would not actually be able to come undert this label. I think the term is complete incoherent if it isn't doing this job. I realise others use it differently.

they wouldn't really be algorithms if they were simulated. — Ludwig V

I think algorithms are simulations of behavioural matrices. I can't understand the above claim, really.

but it needs to be built from and in the real world. — Ludwig V

Which is why the previous two claims seem fishy to me. It is patently obvious they are not analogous or parallel scenarios to be in, for any given S.

If this world is simulated, the "real" world must be very like this one — Ludwig V

I'm unsure that's true. The fine-grained nature of the world we live it might just be a function of adaptive creative algorithms which feed off of past events, in the simulation. This would also explain the wildly increasing complexity across time.

Havent recently jumped back into the Hobby (though, think "autistic obsession") of analyzing, noting and systematizing the ranges and catalogues of various singers in all areas (opera, pop, rock, avant garde etc.. etc.. )

It's an extremely fun and satisfying game. www.therangeplanet.proboards.com

The asshole being the deceased?

Everything in this response further entrenches the clear fact you are confusing cognition and experience. They are patently separate events.
The charge that I'm invoking some mysterious unobservable is risible, in that context. The causal link between cognition and experience is unobservable, as all causal relationships are. I have not posited that cognition is unobservable. Again, betraying your clear lack of comprehension of what's been said. I am unsure why you're bothering with length replies at this stage.

Very much so. It would be ...bizarre... if we weren't. Huehuehue

The Sun's formatting is too bizarre to make the page readable, unfortunately.

But Murray rarely misses, despite being a bit of a dick.

This explains so much about your comportment.

I think, Vera, you are for some reason insisting that what people say about God is all there is. Given you've acknowledge the wide breadth of what's said about God, it seems entirely irrational to simply ignore that in almost all other cases, there is something empirical behind that swathe of (potential) nonsense. Thunder/rain Gods are one.

The idea that because people are necessarily limited, you're allowed to rationally reject, wholesale, the concept of god (not God) is bizarre to me. Its patently not rational.
This is weird wording though - obviously you're allowed to do what you want intellectually - I'm pointing out the hilarious irony in trying to rationally achieve a position which is irrational.

I don't particularly care to, personally.

Literally nothing he said indicates this.
A grift can be in service of a legitimate cause. And it does undermine the credibility of the movement.
If it doesn't to you, you're short of a full deck. And yeah. No surprise if so. This isn't even moral - it's based on the fact that this is what it has done

You didn't understand what I was saying — Apustimelogist

False. Much of this response confirms.

Not one of these is not something you are not directly aquainted with by experience. Perception? Obviously experience. Attention? Obviously attending to experiences. Imagination? Bring up mental images, talk about narratives. Intelligence? Do an intelligence test, you have the experience of doing it and coming up with the answers. Memory? You experience your recollection of a fact or event. Judgement? You experience yourself looking at something and experiencing it and then making the judgement or reporting it and how you feel. Problem Solving? you experience yourself thinking and engaging with a problem. Language? You experience yourself reading or bringing up words. — Apustimelogist

You do not understand what you're talking about given the above. You're conflating the activitiy in the brain with the (abstract) experience which is not of that action. We are blatantly speaking past each other and you are, unfortunately, flat-the-heck-out-wrong.

I was talking about dualism being incoherent, i.e. conscious experiemce arising out of and separate to something elae. — Apustimelogist

Which makes it all the more clear that you're confusing not only the concepts you're discussing, but yourself in the process.

I tried to end this exchange to avoid having to get this 'dirty' but its just blatantly obvious you're protecting positions that are wrong on every level.

Again, appreciate the time - but at this point I really don't care. This is stupid.

as at present conducted, the debate will not be resolved, because the two sides talk past each other. On that assumption, agnosticism is the only rational possibility. — Ludwig V

Ah ok, this clarifies. Thank you.

If God did turn up in some way, I would have a great many unanswerable questions to discuss with them. — Ludwig V

LMAO yes - this might be the more intractable issue.

My actual position is that the concept of God is incoherent, which means that I can neither assert not deny that such a person exists — Ludwig V

Perfectly reasonable, IMO. It does seem to exist by definition, rather than anything else (conceptually).

Atheism, then, would be the adoption of the non-existence of God as an axiom — Ludwig V

I don't quite understand why this would be the case? There's no commitment at all behind atheism, on my account (and the one i'm importing into the above table of possible positions.. feel free to just not use them though. That' sjust my account).

What could I do to bring matters to a head? — Ludwig V

I think what I'm highlighting here (and in retrospect, is not likely to be part of your position) is that many agnostics (on the account given above) take that position to avoid the discomfort of either anticipating, or failing to find, the evidence required (the latter would be your religiously-inclined atheist, the former, the neutral atheist) for God. A girl/woman (dunno what she'd prefer) from my class last night was outlining why she thinks objectivity is impossible, but it boiled down to just not liking uncertainty. I think this the case for a lot of agnostics - they can just leave off the issue entirely by claiming that looking for the evidence is a fools errand.

That means that the proposition that God exists is not empirical, but is a principle of interpretation. — Ludwig V

Do you not think this could just be a result of 'mistake'?
That there really is possible 'evidence' for God which is 'true' regardless of how any particular human sees it? This is essentially my position. I don't know why we would somehow attribute an ontological free lunch to the concept of God simply to avoid having to resolve the issue.

I have made it clear in this discussion that I am not a dualist so why are you interpreting my words in a dualist fashion? — Apustimelogist

I'm not. This follows from what i take to be your (rather extremely) misguided conception of cognition in relation to phenomenal experience. It seems quite clear to me your monist conception is arbitrary and counter to what's presented to you. The line of yours I quoted should make it sufficient clear that your objection here is not apt, at all, in any way, to my objection/s.

there is no way that what I have said in the last post could "explain [my] entire rationale". — Apustimelogist

And yet, it does. If that quoted line is incorrect (it factually is incorrect) then your position fails to cohere with anything in reality.

Is therefore in no way contradictory to anything that I have said. The issue is you are interpreting what I have said as some kind of dualist would even though I am not one. — Apustimelogist

Suffice to say: No. This is squirming away from your position, as supported by the quote I responded to. It is wrong, and it pulls the rug from you reductive position. Nothing I have said intimates any kind of dualist position on your part. It categorically precludes your monist position. If this isn't sufficiently clear, I really don't know what to say. I simply have not inferred what you're getting here - and it seems you're doing it on purpose at this stage.

We can think of cognition as latent models created to explain this empirical data in the flow of experiences and behavioural responses. — Apustimelogist

No we can't. We can understand it as an underlying organisational structure that informs experience in some way, but given we already know 90% of our cognition has absolutely no noticeable effect on our phenomenal experience, this is just not plausible. Experience is irrelevant to the explanations and organisations of cognition. There is nothing in cognitive science that would lead us to predict conscious experience from the underlying structure of, lets call it awareness, which is in turn strictly tied to (theoretically) the underlying physical relational structure of information processing in the brain. This is so much more fine-grained than you're allowing for, while simultaneous so much simpler than you seem to think it really is. Cognition has no per se relationship to experience. This is, in fact, in what that mystery largely consists in. Even if we are to grant a 100% reductive concept of 'consciousness' there is no current, plausible way to connect cognition with experience beyond some vague, uninteresting correlates that amount to 'vibes'.

So I don't see any fundamental difference between "conscious" and "unconscious" cognition. — Apustimelogist

One is conscious experience, and one is not experience at all, the way we understand experience. We simply have no experiential correlate to the majority of our cognition. This isn't really controversial. And so..

They are both embedded in experience and have the same fundamental explanation. — Apustimelogist

They are empirically not. I will leave further comments on this point alone. This may seem glib, but i am of the view you are woefully, willfully ignorant about hte nature of cognition->experience. Feel free to think the same. Either way, there's no good reason to continue debating it on that view.

perception involves our experiences and behavioural responses. — Apustimelogist

As above.

Otherwise how else you would know about these things? — Apustimelogist

This is the entire f-ing point my dude. We dont. And this is a known fact. We have no idea about most of our cognition. Because "as above.."

experience or behaviour, — Apustimelogist

These are completely different things and confusing them has wasted the vast majority of your time typing about them.

You experience your losses of attention. — Apustimelogist

No. You cannot 'remember to forget'. This is a nonsense. By definition.

Unfortunately, the rest of that paragraph is pretty hard to grasp. Nothing represents anything i've said though, so I'll leave it given it was mostly questions.

I don't think my view is waving it away in any sense because as I have already said, I believe there is very good reason to think that we cannot have access to the fundamental nature of reality in any objective sense while what we perceive and the beliefs about them we come to are obviously constrained by the informational processing of a brain. — Apustimelogist

This has literally zero to do with the disagreement we've had here. I am indirect realist, and as such I can assent to all of this and maintain my position both as a positive position, and all of my objections to yours go through. I have no idea what you thought this was addressing? It doesn't touch on the 'nature' of experience (particularly vs cognition).

On the other hand, you seem to think the problem of irreducibility can be solved when arguably irreducibility by virtue of its meaning means it will never be solved. — Apustimelogist

This is so incoherent I have no idea what to say. You're charging me with dualism (yes, but you're wrong about how property dualism works - it still posits consciousness arises from cognition in some way, but is over-and-above it) and then pretending I think the apparent irreducibility issue could be solved. Woo! But no.

Stands to reason that if dualism is true and we have a complete explanation of both "mental" and "physical" stuff, there would still be a problem of consciousness — Apustimelogist

It seems you simply have no idea about hte arguments in this area. If property dualism were true, we could formulate and test psychophysical laws the same way we test physical laws, and come to the same levels of causal, relational and phenomenal certainty about them (what level you take that to be is not tied to the theory, but your view on scientific objectivity in general).

I believe such a view is incoherent. — Apustimelogist

You think a reductionist account is incoherent? Then what do you think is happening? You've rejected dualism fairly clearly, but you are not positing a reductionist account is incoherent? Slippery.

The basic stipulation of two substances / properties is really as far as you can get; the irreducibility hurdle cannot be overcome because thats what irreducibility means. — Apustimelogist

Ha....ha??

There doesn't seem any way to get away from Chalmers' paradoxes without getting rid of dualism — Apustimelogist

There is though. I think i'll just leave you to discover the discussions on your own, at this stage. Chalmers himself deals with these issues in the work we're referring to.

If you recall the Mary's room knowledge argument against physicalism — Apustimelogist

Chinese Room*. Chalmers deals with it head-on aimed at Searle.

in principle there are reasons we think or perceive things in the way we do which are constrained by physics in the same way a car runs in ways constrained by physics — Apustimelogist

This, again, has literally nothing to do with the discussion we're having.

I am happy at this stage to just eat the shit and say I've entirely misunderstood you, but on your key points you're simply empirically wrong.

I see no reason to continue. THank you very much for a long, thoughtful exchange! Rare.

For me, both theism and atheism are irrational, even if they are empirical claims. Which leaves agnosticism as the only rational position. — Ludwig V

Not to re-bump that extremely frustrating argument from earlier this year but this is a common problem with misusing the word 'atheist'(or, at least, not adequately paying attention to it). There are four words we can use to adequately, discreetly and clearly delineate the four positions of relevance:

A. Theism=I know there's a God;
B. Atheism = I do not know whether there's a God;
C. Agnosticism = I cannot know whether there is a God; and
D. Anti-Theism = I know there is not a God.

Given all discussions that refuse to accept an adjustment such as the above all turn out into the same mess of bollocks every time, It doesn't matter to me that others might disagree on the format. The above solves the semantic issues and makes it quite clear which position makes the most sense given any S's particular perspective. From my perspective B. is the only rational take. For others, the other three may meet that benchmark based on what they believe.

God the posters that pass for 'moderators' on this site is a real, real blight on the face of it.

Looks a bit silly, organisationally speaking.

Is it that Wittgenstein tends to bring out these personality-types that like to gatekeep when discussing on a forum setting? — schopenhauer1

No one understands Witty because he makes extremely little sense. It takes a certain level of gatekeeping to maintain a character that think it understands something that makes no sense. Its akin to conspiracy theorists saying "you just don't get it" when its blatant nonsense.

I just ignore it, mostly, because its so laughably dumb.

I think all of what we call cognition is things we observe ourselves through experience. — Apustimelogist

Forgive what must appear a quite glib response, but this line, to me, explains your entire rationale. This seems plainly, empirically wrong. Ants, cilliates and even slime molds are examples which make the vast majority of what you're saying, which basically relies on the assumption above more-or-less moot arguments. There are extant examples of complex behavioural outputs from complex reaction and adaptive cognition without any hint of anything like conscious experience.
In the cases where this isn't what defeats your points, I think my previous comments are adequate to outline my thoughts. If they are not convincing, so be it :) Such is life. I may be dead wrong.

Probably worth noting. cognition is not 'things', it is not 'experience' - cognition is the processing element of perception. thinking. Experiencing that cognition is a separate, and i posit, further element of our world and this is, in fact, in what the mystery, such as it is, consists. Even on the reductionist account, the missing piece of the puzzle is still how consciousness arises from any level of cognition. It clearly does, though. Which is why it is such an enduring problem for thinkers of the bent to approach it. It is patent, inarguable and fundamental.
And yet, all the fun starts here.. how to solve the problem. Waving it away wont do.

So, Hume aye.

Should I just be ignoring this weird tangent?

What? And this is also in relation to your next post?

Infinite regress is fine. Trying to escape it is where trouble arises, in the absence of relevant information.

You made the assertion. Beginning to think you don't understand half the words you use.

antelope to die in agony — Vera Mont

If you have some conclusive proof of the phenomenology of antelope agony, that would be interesting!

muscle growth doesn't hurt, either. Damage does. — Vera Mont

I see you've entirely ignored the necessary relationship between the two, again.

Such scientific studies are not difficult to find. Examples; — Hallucinogen

1. Is inconclusive, and somewhat indicative that this cannot be done for self-reported pain. THe correlations are weak, or antithetical viz. :

"No correlations were observed between self-reported hot or cold pain quality and thermal hyperalgesia on QST. Self-reported abnormal skin sensitivity has a high sensitivity to identify patients with DMA, but its low specificity indicates that many patients mean something other than DMA when reporting this symptom."

2. This is specific to patients experiencing schizophrenic hallucinations. This is not apt for this thread at all.

3. "The present single-case study" - really my dude?
"There are a number of limitations to the present study. "
"Statistical power was obviously limited in this single-case study..."
"Clearly, replication is required..."

These present no reliability at all. There are not functional ways to assess private phenomenal claims beyond structural awareness - whcih says nothing for their 'actuality'.

Those two things aren't mutually exclusive. — Hallucinogen

The arguments are each, more or less, are, though.

It's irrational for a few reasons. — BitconnectCarlos

What are they? Your next lines were simply states of affairs without any argument about whether or not it should be. It's certainly rational, on average, to prefer flourishing of humans in the sense that we are far more apt to assist one another, for example.
It would need to be a very, very strong set of reasons to reject that bias. Singer barely gets close - his arguments are more akin to Parfit's in that they fairly soundly refute self-interest theory on it's own terms, but don't establish any reason to adopt either a total change in stance, or what other stance could be considered more rational in the actual world.

Hilariously, I initially wrote the post this way:

You continually mistake 'state of affairs' for 'moral fact' and respond with Emoji's when this is pointed out.

I await something interesting from you. Given your constant need to deride those you think are incorrect, isn't it just delightful that you're wrong.

You're not, though. You're just asserting certain values/disvalues not based on anything.

I've put forward: We have biases towards other humans (as opposed to cockroaches, in your account). This is rational.

You now need to either point out why it is irrational, or give a more rational reason to try to lose the bias. You haven't attempted either.

Probability still has a truth to it. — BitconnectCarlos

I'm not quite sure what you mean here, but probability seems to be the functional and rational response to Hume. Unsure how that plays out here, as Im not entire getting what you're trying to do.

I'm just running with your version of truth here. — BitconnectCarlos

You're not. Because I didn't put one forward. Everything you've responded with is a little bit out-of-place given what i've posited. The bolded above is all that should be responded to, here. I suspect your appeal to Divine sacredness is what's underlying the resistance. Happy to be wrong, if you're willing to actually elucidate..

I agree with that. I wouldn’t say unfortunately. It’s more like, unfortunately, we humans ruminate about and dramatize every little spark of the nervous system. — Fire Ologist

My inability to sleep due to hairs standing on end, dust landing on my eyelids, the tiniest excitation of my ear drums, a skin cell detaching etc.. says "fucking yes dude, this". LOL. It's an awful reality.

Pain need not have anything to do with God, and need not be seen as better or worse than any other state - pain is change measured by the one undergoing the change. — Fire Ologist

I think I/we may have misinterpreted what Vera was doing/saying in those exchanges - but I would say she simply made up a lot of the context, in that regard. Nevertheless I am quite sympathetic to her position. Just htink her discussion here betrays a lack of focus (and perhaps a faulty commitment to an emotional response).

Nothing in this is moral. You continually mistake 'state of affairs' for 'moral fact'. It will be an extremely interesting post when you come up with something non-circular to support the morality part of the position.

Sorry I missed all this - It wasn't in my notification list!

feel like you have this strong preconception that any kind of phenomena is necessarily internal to some kind of external physical things, because you are dualist. But I don't see how this view is strictly necessary and how other kinds of views of phenomena as ontology are not at least conceivable. — Apustimelogist

I have explained why (it is irrelevant what Kastrup or Chalmers think - though, as far as I;m concerned you are seriously misunderstanding what is entailed by 'mental only' and perhaps not reading that into the theories presented. Or, i could be wrong.

So if physical theories are defined purely functionally or relationally and say absolutely nothing about the intrinsic nature of what is beyond our personal experiences, I think you have to give an argument to rule out the idea that what is beyond our personal experiences can conceivably be more experiences and nothing else. — Apustimelogist

I have. "What are the experiences of" is a good enough question to at the very least, put the position you're driving at on the rocks, if not infer a position that requires externalities (in a 'proper' use of the word - not the economic one) to inform any type of experience. Otherwise, we have infinite regress - at what point would content be involved, if it's experience all the way down? Seems a massive gap here.

Again, we have established that you have no idea about the intrinsic nature of what is going on beyond your immediate experiences so I don't see what standard you are using to judge that what is going on beyond cannot be experiential — Apustimelogist

Its incoherent, on my account. You don't need a standard. It's logically unsound..As noted a couple of times, and apparently ignored: Experiences must be OF something(if you do not accept this, we may be at an end of the road we travel together). Sure, an experience can be of another experience, on (the surface of) an idealist account but this cannot explain anything about content. That we have experiences of 'things' that must have come from somewhere, even if it isn't 'actually there' in any particular instance (given regress is a fine method for establishing this, to a point). The basis for its invocation cannot be a further, necessarily empty, experience.

What we think of as physical objects can still exist, just they have to be made of phenomena. — Apustimelogist

IN.CO.HERENT. I'll leave that there, adding that I think this ridiculous claim is why Kastrup is alternatively considered a genius, and a total idiot.

I haven't seen justification. — Apustimelogist

You have.

what physical things intrinsically are? — Apustimelogist

not-mental. This is the exclusion you seem to just straight-up ignore. Something cannot be physical and mental at once. Mental objects do not exist outside of mind, by definition. What's not getting through?

The question of "why do experiences exist?" would be no different from the question of why any other different kind of intrinsic stuff were to exist — Apustimelogist

You seem to have completley ignored that this raises the exact same problem of 'why experience'. All you have done is removed the difference between 'why anything' and 'why experience'. They are both still live questions in an Idealist world. This is not displaced by the removal of physical objects in an account. We could equally say, in a world with no mentation whatsoever(obviously, this is metaphysically impossible) "why does anything exist?" "why isn't anything conscious"? The latter is not irrelevant, in the discussion we're having.

There have been absolutely no discoveries in science that suggest some kind of inherent metaphysical separation between mental and physical stuff in any sense. Such a dualism is incoherent. — Apustimelogist

We cannot explain plenty of non-physical phenomena, and the fact that apparently the expectation of a physical explanation is the only way to get past this just ignores the problem. The explanation wont be physical. And given we have absolutely failed to do anything whatsoever with our physical theories to explain consciousness, I'm just not interested in ignoring that problem. Discovering that the consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical is a discovery that literally discounts a fully physicalist account of mind (if it holds).

The problem is that consciousness is rendered causally irrelevant not only to our behavior but to our own knowledge of consciousness. The absurdity suggests that dualism is an illusion and that there is no dual-aspect. — Apustimelogist

This is not a problem, and it does not suggest this. I would recommend reading all of Chalmers, if this is where you're going.

I think this is less mysterianism than the fact that if you endorse kinds of scientific and metaphysical deflationism / antirealism, then the need for inherent dual-aspects is not pressing. — Apustimelogist

Not for scientific reasoning, but for understanding consciousness it remains the central issue. I wont address your other Chalmers-related comments other than to say he's predicted them and responded to them. He wouldn't agree; you're right. He would posit that nothing you've said changes the fact that Consciousness is irreducible. In that sense, property dualism is almost a given (whether hte premise holds is the big Q).

Because this view doesn't rely on falsifying phenomenal experiences — Apustimelogist

Property dualism doesn't either. Can you explain why this would have any weight in displacing the (potential) property dualist account?

Your latter definition only accounts for direct realism, not indirect realism. Also, scientific realism is not about positing an external world per se, it posits that our theories about the world are true. Doesn't seem very different from the idea of perceptions being true representations or giving true access to the world. — Apustimelogist

I'm beginning to think you're confusing yourself. It applies to both, but you must reverse the onus of the sentence. Your final sentence betrays the failure of your attempted delineation.
You would need scientific realism to hold to ever establish this position. This is because they are relevant to separate questions, as noted.

Bold: Do you know any idealist scientific realists?

The difference between "conscious" and "non-conscious" cognition essentially comes down to differences in this flow of experience. — Apustimelogist

But we know, for sure, that cognition happens sans any experience. How could you posit that experience is included in non-experienced cognition?

I had extremely little to work with. You can't blame a man for the tools he's given.

Mocking doesn't happen on this forum. — Shawn

To the end above, avoid Banno and 180Proof :P Great guys, but they do like to mock here and there.

My question is....are there any stupid questions?? — Gingethinkerrr

Not to me. But I am probably scantly above the level you're espousing you're at. Perhaps I have a bit more confidence though.

The value of a single human life? — Gingethinkerrr

Value, seems to me, a construction. I don't think it makes any sense to ascribe brute value.

Ah okay, fair enough. Thanks. I am back to following the exchanges now :P

(aside) you may be interested in a book called DMT: The Soul of Prophecy. You can disregard the intention of the book, as its subtext - and simply read a psychiatrist's take on Jewish Patriarch's hallucinatory experiences ;)

Can you outline what you intend to be up for discussion?
I have thoughts, but your thread appears to sort of engineer its own success. Not much room to discuss here...

No.

Thanks Carlos - I would have disagree prior to this post, that you're discussing it. Onward...

It's like if I were to say "well humans naturally have confirmation bias, what's the problem?" Well, we naturally try to unlearn that to get our thinking more in line with objective reality. — BitconnectCarlos

Why? What's the basis for unlearning it? (i realise this is now not at all a religious discussion, so happy to leave off if it feels too out-of-place in the thread). This is why non sequitur has been invoked. If there's no rational reason for the bias, there's no rational reason to try to remove it (though, in reality, it is rational to have an in-group bias. That doesn't require an objective basis for such and I would content it irrational to try to unlearn the bias. If you ahve to make that effort cognitively to overcome your actual reality (hehe, below..) then you're not doing God's work or employing rationality, on your terms).

I seek to act in accordance with objective reality and if that gets you mad then anger is derived from an irrational source. — BitconnectCarlos

This, once again, entirely and completely refuses to engage the question:

What bloody objective reality are you talking about? The one in which we actually have biases towards other humans??. Sounds like you're literally trying to overcome reality.