At every moment, you experience things: sensations from the world, and sensations from yourself. These are facts of experience. — hypericin
You outlined facts about the teletransporter and said they obtained in those terms. If that wasn't the claim, i suggest that was incredibly unclear. But fair enough. I don't argue with the above.
one still experiences, still maintains a self concept, — hypericin
I do not think this is correct, and explains some of what I see as dead-ends in your discussion.
The facts are that
you(a) walk into the machine, and
someone(b) walks about.
Someone experiences. The point is to figure whether you think "still" even applies to (b). Or whether the same "one" applies to (a) and (b).
Within the way the experiment is written, that
someone
does have the same autobiographical sense as the one who walked into the machine - that's already a given, and not something we are supposed to ascertain. The point is is sort out whether that matters. Parfit says yes. I say no for the same reasons you have outlined: MY mind stops having those experiences, even if
a mind doesn't. The fact that
someone thinks they are me doesn't mean they are. I gave a possible example of why that could be the case (the atom identity issue) which was unsatisfactory. I agree, it was just to point out that you can solve the issue by saying that person cannot be you for physical reasons, and ignore the mind part. But again, I also find that unsatisfactory.
The point of all this is to say that I think you've slightly misunderstood the thought experiment becuase you're not addressing certain aspects which are written in. Maybe the branch-line case is a better one for your purposes.. seems so to me.
I have just realised I've addressed much of this to Mijin, recalling their posts in kind with yours. Sorry about that - points remain, but you can ignore references to things "you" have said before.
The comic: The answer the Devil gives is not satisfactory and does not answer my potential response, despite my not being satisfied with it myself. Unless we have reason to think that each time we sleep, we are disassembled and reassembled, its a totally misconceived response, changing nothing about the intuitions involved.
The man is utterly perplexingly stupid to me, and is making wild moral miscalculations. More importantly (and demonstrably) the comic seems to ignore the biggest issue people have: "he" is not a given on the other side of the machine. There is no guaranteed "me". There is just
someone, and our job in the thought is to decide
what we think of
that. Not whether we disagree with it. If the psychological relation is enough, that's fine. If it's not, we have work to do. I think this is fundamentally being misunderstood by a lot of people. Parfit just gives an answer I don't like, but runs the same avenues to get there as I have.