Yes, I address that here. — Michael

I understand the intuition you use to affirm that argument, I imagine others do too. At t=1 the sequence has ended, and the lamp must be either on or off. You use the same premise on it:

The status of the lamp at t1 must be a logical consequence of the status of the lamp at t0 and the button-pressing procedure that occurs between t0 and t1 because nothing else controls the behaviour of the lamp.

People disagree with the premise because we are not confident we can use such intuitions when the — unintuitive — concept of infinity is involved.

You are interested in exploiting that to define metaphysics. Perhaps that works, perhaps it doesn't — Ludwig V

It was more of taking the phrase "metaphysically (im)possible" to mean "there is (not) a possible world where" and seeing where that leads. And if it leads anywhere is that maybe the definition of metaphysically possible is «that which follows the rules of the game». That seems abusive of the meaning of the words, or the words are not well-defined (many would say so for "metaphysics").
One of the first replies of the thread is this:

By Chalmers, logical = metaphysical; by Shoemaker, metaphysical = physical. — jorndoe

If jorndoe is representing the view well, I am confident both have good reasons to make such equations; I was exploring ways to make the semantics of "metaphysical" not fully overlap with "logical" or "physical".

Given that in C2 X cannot be defined as either "0" or "1" but must be defined as either "0" or "1" then C1 is necessarily false. The supertask described in C1 is impossible. — Michael

Me and fishfry have insisted that this is a case of missing limit. I saw your post here, the only reply to it is noAxiom's, to which then there was no reply, only a mention by fdrake. I haven't checked your post with the "refutation" of Benecerraf yet, neither do I think noAxiom's post addresses it fully.

When it comes to this post,

Given that in C2 X cannot be defined as either "0" or "1" but must be defined as either "0" or "1" then C1 is necessarily false. The supertask described in C1 is impossible. — Michael

Is the failure of C2 really the consequence of the impossibility of C1, or is there an unstated premise?

In all cases the definition of X at t1 must be a logical consequence of what occurs between t0 and t1. — Michael

What so many people disagree on is that. You think that the end of the sequence at t=1 is a temporal/logical consequence of what happens before. Others don't think so, because the lamp is being infinitely redefined until t=1.

Who's to say humans are worth more than cockroaches? — BitconnectCarlos

Among many other things, cockroaches are disgusting.

If time is continuous then supertasks are logically possible. — Michael

Time being continuous is necessary but not sufficient for any given supertask being possible. Supertasks being impossible (especially the specific one you brought up) does not imply time is not continuous.

Any given example does not prove that supertasks in general are necessarily impossible. If the common necessity among all supertasks is time being continuous, the only way to prove the impossibility of supertasks is to prove time is not continuous.

(a and b and c and d) → supertask
not supertask does not imply not a

Therefore I cannot start. — Michael

True. And that implies time is discrete how?

Going back to the first page of the thread, such a "recitation" for the state of Thompson's lamp, or just isolating the "state", could be construed by taking a time period and associating it with the states the lamp takes in that time period in order. If Thompson's lamp has states in a time period, they'll be picked out by that. However, the function which generates the values of Thompson's lamp has the property that for every time period X, there exists a time period Y such that max( Y )>max( X ) contains at least two states (on or off). You get those by going further toward the completion time. That property implies there is simply no "state" of the lamp at limit of 2 minutes. So it having a state is logically impossible.

What makes Thompson's lamp a paradox, then, is a physical or metaphysical intuition about the concept of the state of the lamp. There needs to be a beginning to the process, and it needs a unique isolable end state. Both the geometric series and Thompson's lamp have no unique isolable end state. — fdrake

Good post

All of your premises are wrong except for number 1.

St Faustina Helen Kowalska saw apparitions of Jesus Christ in the 1930s, which have served as the basis for a popular devotion. — Hallucinogen

Meanwhile children dying from cancer:

Neologismos Indispensáveis e Barbarismos Dispensáveis (Dr. Castro Lopes,1909)

Lost my v-card to it.

a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief — Bob Ross

The first part of the above quoted is what you are setting out to prove, the second part I can't figure out what it means. What is the part that can't be coherently evaluated? "One ought not to kill"? All the parts of the phrase are well-defined and refer to outside things, even "ought", which is that a course of action is preferrable over another. Janus expressed the same feeling above. The MS evaluates the proposition according to whether he believes it or not. Yes, the belief includes the proposition, is your argument that this goes in a circle?

I tried reading 's post to understand but, unless you are referring to MSs that do explicitly convert moral propositions X to «I believe X», I don't see how the view is inconsistent, and P1 will still beg the question.

He believed that Japan had lost touch with its cultural heritage and traditional values — Alkis Piskas

He was 100% right. And it is even truer 50 years later.

no phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is a measured phenomenon — Wayfarer

Where did he say that?

I see that I misunderstood your idea. You are counting time backward. Ok I'll respond to that. But just wondering, when you realized I misunderstood you earlier, why didn't you point that out?

Ok. Suppose that I start at 1 and count backward through 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, ... — fishfry

It is Achilles' run but with time reversed: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-supertasks/#MissFinaInitStepZenoWalk

Whatever we do to keep ourselves happy, are we doing it to mitigate the suffering that is life? — Arnie

I am enjoying a banger protein shake right now without any reference in my mind of suffering.

the fact that number is real — Janus

Many people will ignore that too because they will say that numbers aren't real (Field, Azzouni).

by saying that numbers are real beyond our recognition of number in the world — Janus

The dualist will say that they are abstract objects (not spatial, not temporal, causally inefficacious).

They should begin with Plato and only descend to Russell if they feel the need. — Leontiskos

You mean I can't jump head into philosophers 3 thousand years deep into the dialogue? Jeez...

Can you state just why you think that incompatibility obtains? — Janus

He outlines his argument clearly in this post:

So instead of questioning why it is we can understand numbers, how about interrogating the claim that we are, in fact, 'physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies?' Or is that such an important principle in our 'best epistemic theories' that it has to be saved at all costs? That seems the point of the sophistry of the 'indispensability argument'. — Wayfarer

Putting into silly-willy terms:

We learn things through senses
Mathematical objects, if they exist, are abstract
Abstract objects can't interact with senses
So if mathematical objects exist we can't have knowledge of them

The nominalist will agree with the argument above. Wayfarer instead will deny that "we learn things [only] through senses".
I think it is clear as such, but it is his words so he can correct me anyway.

The Nazis also had their own rationale to do what they did — everybody does and everybody did, the exception are psychopaths but those get arrested after the first few murders. This conversation about international law degenerates into "what is the right thing to do?" and people want to bring mutable laws signed by nameless (often ignorant) politicians instead of actually proving their case — instead, they paint whoever as evil and go from there.
This mode of thought is very particular of the Anglosphere, and by the site's userbase we see why it manifests so often in the lounge. The French are evil, the Germans are evil, the Japanese are evil, the communists are evil , the Russians are evil, the Arabs are evil, and now we see lots of "the Chinese are evil" talk. It is only them who are good, and the good guys always win (except all the times their side got beat, but it was more of a "strategic retreat"). And from there every sort of wickedness follows. It is a very anti-philosophical and pernicious mode of thought.

???

Japan often has deflation instead of inflation.
In 2023, eleven countries had negative GDP growth rate.

Sorry, I am not acquainted with internet-debate vocab, so I have no clue what that means. But what I am gathering is that you (and many other people here) don't care about refugee children in Bangladesh. Why is that?

"Can you please leave so I don't get the hypocritical evil of my ideology thrown in my face?"

If committing war crimes against people that use war crimes as an everyday weapon is the only viable method of stopping them from continuing their evil ways, then fucking well stop them. — Sir2u

Is throwing a plane into Wall Street and the Pentagon justified by the evil ways of Yankees in the Middle East then?

which is self-evident when they rewrite "one ought not torture babies" as "I believe one ought not torture babies" — Bob Ross

Do they though?

α: Within MS, the first seems to be the moral proposition and the second the justification, to me therefore they seem distinct but dependent.

β: But let's say they do rewrite it, to mean that "one ought not torture babies" is "I believe one ought not torture babies" — and it might as well be, as it is a A↔B relationship.

Being that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is "one ought not torture babies", "I believe one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition (if it is not, there is no such thing as moral propositions, the moral nihilist position) — this is the matter you were approaching in the rejoinder. That being the case, what justifies "I believe one ought not torture babies" is that I believe in it. As you can see, that would end up in an infinite regress. By itself, that doesn't entail logical contradiction of the belief, but it is untenable and the MS will want to simply default back to α.

I guess still no...

My question is....are there any stupid questions?? — Gingethinkerrr

A dumb question to some is a smart one to others. Someone who never studied math past high school will be in awe at the integral proof of the sum of a convergent/divergent series, though in many countries 18 year olds breeze through that. A quick look at the threads on the first page now will show that there different threads of different levels.

Since any putative "director" logically must exist outside the system to be directed, and thus beyond our capacity to detect it, I think the more relevant question is as to whether we have any good reason to think evolution is directed. — Janus

:up:

And it is not like the sample size is really one. We have hundreds of different, isolated, ecosystems in the world where evolution took its own course.

The matter of convergent evolution, and thus the difference between morphological analogy and homology in zoology, is important to note.

then your belief that it is true is independent of the truth-value of the proposition itself; otherwise, you have to concede that the proposition is not distinctindependent from the belief — Bob Ross

Yes. The moral subjectivist will concede that because that is their view.

Over 390 bodies have been discovered at Nasser and Al Shifa hospitals, including of women and children

390 bodies? Including women and children? That is horrible.

Does anybody want to talk about the half a million child refugees settled in Bangladesh with no rights or support? No? Ok...

I tried and it didn't help.

my “seven” is a real object (from materials existing in space and time) inside my brain — bioByron

In connection with numbers, one strategy is to take numbers to be universals of some sort — e.g., one might take them to be properties of piles of physical objects, so that, for instance, the number 3 would be a property of, e.g., a pile of three books — and to take an immanent realist view of universals. (This sort of view has been defended by Armstrong (1978).) But views of this kind have not been very influential in the philosophy of mathematics. A more prominent strategy for taking number talk to be about the physical world is to take it to be about actual piles of physical objects, rather than properties of piles. Thus, for instance, one might maintain that to say that 2 + 3 = 5 is not really to say something about specific entities (numbers); rather, it is to say that whenever we push a pile of two objects together with a pile of three objects, we will wind up with a pile of five objects — or something along these lines. Thus, on this view, arithmetic is just a very general natural science.

definitely disagree that 'all heterogenous societies are chaotic.'... — Shawn

Can you name one?

Protestant barbarians came up with their own blood libel mythology against Catholics, all the while defending hormones for children, worshipping rabbis and Zionism for decades until Twitter and CNN changed their Python-scripted opinion, shielding Islam against criticism, and pushing the normalisation of sodomy.

They don't hate child abuse, they just hate Catholics, hate Europeans, especially Latin and Greek who they hold so much jealousy for, hate stable families and marriages, hate tradition, hate culture.

That doesn't make a lot of sense. No one wants pimps or organ traffickers around, society doesn't value that. It is the corruption of a few that creates that.

I love Gaudí.

My favourite architect.

Wanna see some soul-crushing, ugly building?

Edifício Copan, São Paulo. Fitting for such an ugly city. I remember watching a documentary on it years ago, subtitles are not that bad.

Niemeyer, one of my most disliked architects.

The problem wouldn't be that these beliefs are arbitrary, but rather that they are determined by a biology, social and personal history, etc. that can be completely explained without any reference to "goodness," — Count Timothy von Icarus

In this case, we would be working already outside the scope of moral subjectivism¹.

1 – Not the view that morals are subjective (as the name would suggest), but that what makes a moral proposition true is whether we believe in it.

I interpret these to mean the same exact thing: am I missing something you are trying to convey? How have I changed it? — Bob Ross

Yes, they mean the same thing, I rephrased it.

then your belief that it is true is independent of the truth-value of the proposition itself; otherwise, you have to concede that the proposition is not distinct from the belief — Bob Ross

Does it follow from A not being dependent on B, that A is not distinct from B?

The point you--in my opinion, correctly observed--supports, for me, the conclusion that the "reality" we are trying to decipher, is as it turns out, "causily connected to itself," a "loop," all of it, the "thing," the proposition (about thing)and the belief, taking place as a single process "appearing" as separate, giving rise to more propositions about subjects, objects, Beings and Truths. — ENOAH

The issue is not that the belief circles back to itself, but that it is caused by itself. So we have that A→A. In logic, this is tautological. In metaphysics, this either implies creation from nothing or causa suis (pantheistic god). Obviously, in either case it becomes nonsense when we are talking of beliefs.

"it seems you lack the intellect that others don't to even make a valid contribution to this."
it-subject seems-verb [you lack the intellect that others don't to even make a valid contribution to this]-object
you-subject lack-verb [the intellect that others don't to even make a valid contribution to this]-object
the intellect that others don't to even make a valid contribution to this (others don't lack the intelligence, the purpose of the intelligence is to make a valid contribution to this).

:up:

The second one is undeciphrable however.

Every job that exists exists for a reason — finarfin

Pimps and organ traffickers too?

If this description is accurate, could this result in a mathematical realism that is not platonic but physicalistic? — bioByron

Psychologism states that mathematical entities are constructions of the human mind. Under a physicalist reductive program for psychologism, I guess it could be defined as mathematical realism. Psychologism is typically classified as anti-realist, so it becomes a matter of semantics whether we want to classify this mathematical reductivism as realist or not.

The objection that the sevens are different between people is unproven and if proven, how exactly that is a problem is still unexplained.

For an actually physicalist ontology of mathematics, see immanent realism.

what role does education have in society and perhaps more importantly in our daily lives? — Shawn

To have a collection of shared values and concepts to be used as instruments in understanding one another. Shared values are fundamental to harmonious societies, hence we see that not all homogenous societies are peaceful, but all societies that are peaceful are homogenous, and all heterogenous societies are chaotic.