Legal interpretation is conceived of by many, including some legal theorists as a strictly logical, syllogistic enterprise. One applies general rules to a concrete state of affairs and the outcome follows: it is either conforming to the general rule or it is not and if it is not it should conform to another general rule, or not. If not we have a problem and according to HLA Hart it is up to the judge's discretion nd if so the general rule applies.

In practice though the matter is far more complex. The law may be contradictory, judges have biases, there are certain legal principles that function not as hard and fast rules, but as 'rules of thumb', markers for the right direction without indicating some sort of outcome automatically. There may still be some kind of super judge, judge Hercules (Dworkin) who reaches the best legal outcome, but this judge has to be able to know all of the law, be versed in its principles and history and free from bias. In practice we do not have a judge Hercules, that is why there are more judges in a court than one usually.

Most legal scholars that I know of see legal interpretation more as a hermeneutic practice. One enters into legal interpretation from a range of presuppositions and assumptions one is only dimly aware. Textual interpretation, historical interpretation, systematic and teleological interpretation (the exact terminology is different in US systems but is not different in its operation) will result in an an outcome that seems the right interpretation in the case at hand and may bring one's own assumptions to light. However, if this picture is accurate, the integrity of the legal process is aided by the inclusion of multiple perspectives in order to make the background from which the law is interpreted as broad as possible. These different perspectives may inform one another. Now every lawyer is versed in the legal system and certainly a supreme court justice is. However, we cannot exclude the notion that a black woman may bring slightly different assumptions to the table enriching the process.

In conclusion Biden's preference is defendable from a legal point of view I would say, not primarily from the point of view of equal representation but because it enriches the background horizon from which the judges operate. @Ciceronianus point is well taken, they are not Herculeses, they are lawyers aka people with knowledge of the law. their task is still human all too human.

By the way welcome back @Benkei :p

Well, if you can contrive to turn up at the same time as Tobias, perhaps he will allow us to make a night of it. — Banno

That would be a truly joyous occasion! Talks and drinks... smokey, non-smokey... smooth and sharp...

The principle, and hence freedom, is found, then, not in thought or in will but in action. And action occurs in the public sphere, not the private.

It does seem odd that frank agrees with Arendt agrees, only to say that she is wrong. — Banno

Interesting indeed. It was also the point nicely put by @Joshs However, than we are faced with the question why action occurs in public space but not in private. I am actually inclined to think that for Arendt freedom manifests itself in collective action, well, in individually being able to take part in collective action. Another interesting turn looms actually: the relegation of the private sphere. She accepts that apparently without any hesitation. I have the idea though that currently this notion is being critiqued (though I do not know enough of the subject).

This suggests a community is incapable of promoting individual freedom or inclined against it by its nature, absent law--which I suppose may be deemed communal. We can't give up the law, though. But retirement beckons, so perhaps soon. Regardless, the law's certainly an expression of sovereignty, so that won't work. — Ciceronianus

By its nature, or perhaps, by the way we have bundled together ideas of community, sovereignty and freedom as Arendt suggests. However, that for me is also perhaps a tad overestimating the power of philosophy and conceptualization. It is a bit of an empirical question, how are communities that followed a different trajectory of development doing in terms of allowing everyone a place?

Law is an expression of sovereignty but also a relinquishing of it. The state also binds itself by law. However, I agree with you that sovereignty is central to law. Maybe legal anthropology is of help here. I do know that a lot of sociologists of law question the centrality of the state for law, following John Griffith. However I tend to hold on to a more classical centralized conception as well. How Arendt conceives of law I do not know. She certainly uses the discourse of rights, which according to me are also an expression of sovereignty... A lot of rethinking to do before you may retire Ciceronianus ;)

"Freedom needed, in addition to mere liberation, the companyof other men who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them a politically organized world, in other words, into which each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed." — Garrett Travers

In other words, freedom requires first the experience of being liberated from the forces of nature or man's arbitration, then to conceptualize and value it, to thereby be enacted in word and deed. So, she actually concedes my position, oddly enough. — Garrett Travers

Yes, one needs first 'liberation'. In slavery one is not free. However, you hold on to some 'true requirement', as if that is enough. For her that is not enough. That is where her essay gets interesting.

The nature of this insufficiency can be approached from many different points of view. Kierkegaard said that freedom was the ability to do things. Living as an individual requires more than setting up a boundary.
The matter of capabilities and resources appears immediately when enough people associate with each other to share or not share them. Declaring all to be equal may be one way to begin but hardly is adequate for the struggles such a life must engage with. — Paine

Exactly, but I think Kierkegaard would not go far enough for her. Indeed one needs to ability 'to do things', but also to have a voice in setting the rules of the social game so to speak. Ahrendt asserts the 'right to have rights' in The Origins of Totalitarianism which she seems to divide the right to action and the right to opinion. Her point, at least the way I take it, is that you have a right to matter, in the sense of being taken into account. One is only free if one can matter politically. If not, if a group is marginalized and becomes politically outcast, it will lose all other rights. For that, you need a space in which you deal with others on an equal footing. Quite Habermassian this all seems. Therefore, liberation by itself is not enough.

There Cic's point comes in:

I think a community can, as a community, as a nation, assert its commitment to the freedom of all its members/citizens. The U.S. does that and has done that since its foundation; so have other nations (France, most notably, since the Revolution). So that in itself is quite "thinkable." It's apparent, in fact, so I assume that's not what she refers to, and this of course raises the question--what does she mean? — Ciceronianus

Yes it can, but this assertion as a kind of motto is not worth anything. It has to provide that ground in practice. The USA in her time nominally supported freedom but there were many social groups disenfranchized even more so than now. I guess in her view, the thinking in terms of sovereignty prevents this politically free space to emerge, because politics is not a free space in which 'free men can insert themselves by word and deed', but an arena, to use a common sociological term, in which one wins and loses. Whether she is right I do not know, it is what I gather from her texts.

And when the forces of tyranny do gather their capacity to cancel freedom, the strength to resist comes from those capabilities being alive and well. That work doesn't happen by simply establishing a set of rules. — Paine

Indeed! It requires a rethinking of 'setting rules' to begin with.

Additionally, her point is not that freedom is not thinkable, she is trying to rethink freedom so that would be as silly assertion, but that it is unthinkable in the terms we have hitherto been using. Then she says, will you end up in contradictions. I do not know if that is true, but quite frankly I do not care, because if I get hung up there I miss the rest of her essay. Perhaps it is hyperbole, god knows.

Perhaps a community which fosters a desire for it, instead. Free from, would make more sense than free with, I think. I find it hard to conceive of a community which fosters freedom as we think of it now--or at least as I think of it. Perhaps those damn Romantics, with their emphasis on individuality, bear some responsibility for this perspectives. I like to poke at them now and again, as well. — Ciceronianus

I think that is exacly the point. You equate freedom immediately with 'free from'; free from interference, free from those pesky other people. That is whatthe whole of western tradition was geared towards, freedom became 'free from'. As a lawyer that idea is immediately appealing, we hold our human rights in high regard and a community making demands is suspect. Her challenge to that I think is to rethink this notion. She asks how a free community is thinkable, in which you ar efree with others. We think of a free community in terms of isolated individuals free from interference by others.

She specifically mentions a number of logical challenges to the idea of volition. Her approach is: this crap is taking place in the realm of philosophy, and this is why: people became ensnared by theology and so fail to see the wisdom of the Greeks (which is actually a Hegelian insight, not Greek, but anyway,) — frank

I always like Hegelian ideas, but here I am not sure what you mean. I can follow it to some extent, but what is the Hegelian insight you speak of? Not to quiblle, an honest question for some clarification. Which of course you are under no obligation whatsoever to give... ;)

How do you not read this as saying the Greek view was superior and the concept of will was a mistake? — frank

Well she surely thinks the connection to the will was a mistake. Perhaps she thinks the Greek view is superior in the fact that they saw freedom as political. However, what she actually thinks about it is not very clear to me. She does not dwell much on it.

She's wrong because the arguments against freedom of the will (nobody tops Schopenhauer there) are all purely logical. All you can do with a purely logical argument is map out the way we think. You can't use it as an ontological proof. Those arguments can't be used to reduce our everyday experience to "nothingness" as she says. — frank

Does she intend to do that? As someone steeped in a phenomenological tradition I doubt that really is her wish. I read it as follows: when we look at ourselves in the first person we see freedom and choice an experience them as such. However, when we take a step back and see ourselves as a body, a third person view, we seem to be under the sway of all kinds of causality. Therefore it is thought itself that leads to tis antinomy. Her approach seems to me to be phenomenological, not logical.

↪Tobias Tobias, I essentially said the same thing several pages ago that you said here. I expect Banno to give you a sophisticated and cajouling answer... and my thoughts earned from him this: — god must be atheist

I do not know. I address that paradox here, but I agree with Banno that it is of little concern to the text as a whole. I like the paradox Banno referred to and it might be considered in its own right, but detracts from the text. Probably Banno did not answer you because he saw so many points being made about free will, most of them having nothing to do with the text, that he did not answer you. Do not get worked up over it, people choose what they engage with. My argument on the paradox is for me also a side note, as I think it is for Banno. I think it has to do wit the way the thread went instead of with your argument.

One day... one day I will learn how to properly spell the referred-to author's name. — god must be atheist

No harm done I assure you. ;)

Well spotted! This was indeed a thought that occurred to me while reading the text, rather than one found in it. For your efforts in making such a close reading of the text, you win a bottle of Laphroaig, which you may collect when next over this way. — Banno

I am sure to take you up on that offer when I will finally arrive once in the land down under! :100:

The line that urged the thought upon me was "it must appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom". Asking if one is free to act against one's own will is a way of bringing out the contrary relation between will and freedom that is Arendt's starting point. Indeed, as you say, the question presupposes a notion of freedom Arendt rejects, and hence in disagreeing with the question folk are agreeing at least in part with Arendt, that freedom is not consequent on will. — Banno

Ahhh, yes. That is indeed her starting point and actually, her end point. Freedom and will have become conjoined in a way that is on the face of it logical but has historical roots. Nonetheles... the notion of free will only asserts that the will is free, not that it itself cannot make unfree. In other words, I might not be able to act against my own will, that would require a second will, also being mine, and that would be rather absurd, but that will that commands me, is indeed free in a sense. It is free to choose to choose the objects of its desire. I believe such is Sartre's view, but I might be wrong. I would still argue against that notion, because I think it is determined by all kinds of societal and biological processes, but strictly speaking it does not follow from the fact that will is about commanding, that it itself cannot be free.

Come to think of it, the opposite may also be asserted I thin with an equal amount of credibility: the will must itself be free because it determines the structure of dictating and commanding. It follows from her characterization of the will.

So a free will, in the sense of being uncontrolled by something else, would be possible if we accept her assertion. It is trivial of course because what most people ask is actually not whether they have 'free will' but whether they have control over their own will, so precisely if their will is not free ;)

She's pretty throughly wrong.

The Greeks abhorred the idea of being free from a community, one assumes because it meant vulnerability. Therefore they didn't explore the idea of an inward locus of control and the moral responsibility that is dependent on that idea.

There's nothing superior about the Greek outlook. And "freedom from" requires context for meaning. — frank

Why would she be wrong if we also accept your statements as correct? I do not think you are in disagreement. Maybe about whether the philosophical life as an inward life started with the fall of Rome or whether it is older. I think it is older, because of Aristotle's rumination of some unmoved mover, thinking only itself. So the philosophical circle as something going on inside thought is recognizable, but even if it was indeed your sociological explanation... is that deadly to her argument? I do not think she holds the Greek conception to be superior, if only because according to her the Greeks had no philosophical problem of freedom. We do.

↪Tobias Yes, there are so many threads...for me the issue is undecidable, and thus of little interest. I only took it up because I thought the attempt to deny free will was somewhat lame; it is not freedom which is hard to understand, it is will.

One thing I am certain of is that here is no freedom without constraint, so there is no absolute freedom. The idea that my freedom trumps, and thus can cancel, yours is unjust; I don't think it's hard to see that. — Janus

For me the issue is undecidable as well and therefore interesting ;) Many, if not all philosophical issues are undecidable and dwelling on them is only enriching when it opens up different perspectives on the topic at hand. The strategy of taking a different 'tack' so to speak is actually also true for the analytic tradition, that attempts to dissolve philosophical questions by demonstrating they are products of 'bewitchment by language'.

I agree with your conception if freedom as only possible with constraint and therefore not being absolute. In the philosophical language I embrace, thinking through freedom leads to a dialectic because it brings into view the necessity of constraint. I do not think Arendt would isagree with you per se though. Sartre might... but Arendt I think not as she locates freedom inside a community, which automatically brings constraints into view. Her point seems to me to be that unmooring freedom from community leads to all kinds of paradoxes, one of which being that my 'will to freedom' clashes with yours. This problem has been the problem John Rawls eventually tried to deal with.

Banno introduced the issue of free will in the OP — Janus

Yeah, I know. All latched on to it. Which is fine of course, but I think the essay is richer than that. Besides, there are so many threads on free will...

Apology accepted. Now can we address my arguments? — Garrett Travers

:cry: :rofl: :cry: :rofl:

My guess is status and position were more important in Graeco-Roman times than freedom. Julius Caesar was assassinated because he usurped the authority and honors, the imperium, of the Senate, not because the people of Rome longed to be free. His much wiser grand-nephew created a new form of government, the Principate, in which the form of the rights and privileges historically held by the Senate was preserved and honored, while actual authority was held by Augustus and his successors. — Ciceronianus

Yes, but also you work with a notion of freedom that Arendt at least contends did not exist as a problem for ancient philosophy. However, the concept of imperium is I think important. We have a kind of model of what rulership, sovereignty and imperium consists in. We have copied this model (just as we copied a model of the senate) in the history of our political concepts. I think Arendt would agree with you. There was no concept of freedom or liberty and of liberal autonomy. There was a concept of honors and rewards, that was what justice consisted in, giving everybody his due meant, give everyone the honors and rewards due to the role they play. I am curious of what Arendt makes of freedom as a political concept for the ancients, she says it was antithetical to a philosophical life, might well be, but she does not inform us of the political in which it then presumably still plays a role.

What strikes me in the essay as interesting, is that the concept of imperium (as sovereignty) and freedom become intertwined. It becomes married to Plato's conception of the soul that consists of base desires, spirit (in the sense of a spirited, impetuous individual) and the highest faculty, reason. In Plato's conception ratio ought to rule the other two faculties. In the Christian version this becomes a bit of a problem. Conversion means a willed 'act of fate', more an act of spirit than of ratio. We beget a new problem the problem of will as the source of freedom and knowledge as the source of freedom.

It becomes a thorny issue in all of western philosophy since then and up until a century or so ago, how to reconcile knowledge and faith or knowledge and will. Kant seems to hold a very Platonic sense of freedom still, it is ratio that should rule nature. The utilitarians choose the opposite, it is after all 'pleasure and pain' that rule us. Both though have something in common, namely they are both individualized. What I think Arendt wants to do is reconceptualize freedom in a non individualized manner. how exactly I do not know but she is making the point that freedom can only exist within a community that fosters it, that gives you something to be free with. Individual freedom is not interesting for her, it is communal freedom.

I think what she does is hard because she wrote at a time before the onset of the debate on political freedom, on comunitarianism and liberalism. However, I agree I am filling in a lot, but that is how I can engage with the text and gather something from it.

what it has to do with sovereignty and why giving up sovereignty will make us free. — Ciceronianus

I do not think she thinks giving up sovereignty makes is free, but it is a step in a direction. If we assume freedom rests in sovereignty it follows that we need to establish that sovereignty and that means gain control of others. It transforms freedom into a zero sum game (I thought I read it before, I do not anymore who said it) if I am free, you are not. Freedom, seen from this perspective, leads to a war of all against all, the exact opposite of it.

That began to change, though, and my guess is that concerns regarding freedom as we understand it now began to arise in the conflict among nations and sects that arose when theocracy failed. Just a guess, though. — Ciceronianus

Well, that conflict between nations may also have been (partly) caused by our conception of freedom and sovereignty. Just remembered the beef between France and the Holy roman Empire over the sovereignty of the emperor of the HRE. Lawyers have written libraries about the position of the king vis a vis the emperor.

I don't find him interesting, I'm afraid. I confess I find it very hard to read his work--his student, the young woman he seduced while her teacher, who wrote the essay being discussed in this thread, was a model of clarity in comparison to him. I find him, to the extent I can understand him, to be romantic, mystical, muddled; inclined to obfuscate if it suits his purposes, inclined to pontificate, a "self-infatuated blowhard" as it seems Don Idhe called him in reviewing his rhapsodic musings on the Parthenon while ranting about modern technology (Heidegger was apparently not content with merely likening the manner in which the Jews were killed by the Nazis in the camps to the mechanisms employed in modern agriculture in his critique of technology--his only mention of the Holocaust, apparently).

H.L. Mencken used to call William Jenning Bryan "the Great Mountebank." I feel much the same about Heidegger. — Ciceronianus

I do not have shares in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. His reference to the concentration camps is in very bad taste, even criminally offensive, seeing that he lend his support to exactly that regime for so long. He does make that equation in what I think is a masterful piece of thinking on the nature of technology and the 'technification' of the world. A point which Arendt in this essay makes but with different words and a different target. The ;point being is that 'will to power' has usurped the way we view the world. For Heidegger this was a 'sinking' into an epoch in which we would appropriate everything and lost our ability to 'let things be' Arendt thought to operationalize this notion politically I think and took the concept of freedom as a target, a concept that became equated to 'will to power' as well.

To me it is interesting, but we all have our personal endeavors and interests, one no better than the other. I also do not like the name dropping, I am a child of my time too. However, in the continental tradition that was and (unfortunately) still is common practice. It is doable but it take time to get to know the discourse. In defense of it, it is a deeply historical, rather scholastic take on philosophy, not unlike law in that respect. For me though I have the same problem with the analytic tradition, the logic chopping is abhorrent and when they explain it to me in lay terms I think "óhh but could you not have said that clearly?"

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But to be frank I like to poke at sacred cows, and there's none more sacred in philosophy. — Ciceronianus

Ohh you, poking at all those poor cows! Imagine how they must feel.... ;) nahh, keep kicking against the pricks Ciceronianus!

I welcome any contribution to engage with the content of Arendt's essay. I find it worthwhile and interesting. Unfortunately it has been completely buried under all kind of mud slinging. I apologize for my part in it.

Freedom is individual human action, as is demanded by your nature, independent of interpersonal coercion. — Garrett Travers

This was your definition of freedom. Kant disagrees. For him freedom is a victory of ratio over nature. It s not being compelled by your desires but choosing the moral law freely. So no, they do not agree with you, nor with a dictionary definition.

And no Arendt does not agree with Kant or you either. I find what Arendt says interesting, you do not. That is fine.

You have not presented anything worth my time, really. I think you just do not like to hear that. Please go on doing things your way, but do not compel me to read it as I find philosophy by dictionary simply boring.

Foucault's not a philosopher, dude. He was nihilistic child predator who hated the world and everyone in it, especially the people he could confuse to the point neurotic derangement. And Heidegger was fucking Nazi. The idea that you would even remotely have an urge to critique my philosophical approach, without providing even a single argument against my position, when your ideological leaders are the most immoral, disgusting specimens among men imaginable, is next level self-myopia. And yes, it actually is the case the clearly defined terms are a elemental in philosophizing. Foucault has abused you, as well, it seems. — Garrett Travers

Perhaps you forget I am under no obligation to engage with you at all. In the above statement your true colors show. Whoever does not do philosophy your way is no philosopher. You are fond of fallacies right? Look up 'no true Scotsman'. While you are at it also read up on the argumentum ad hominem and please stop annoying me.

The idea that a word's usage must be accepted by all, is a standard you are simply fabricating for no other reason than you do not want to contend with the clear rebuttal that I presented against the argument of this psuedo-philosopher. — Garrett Travers

I hold no such view. I just hold the view that philosophers does not need to accept a working definition, also not when that definition is held by many other philosophers. She enters into a genealogical exploration of a philosophical concept and finds different meanings. What is wrong with that? The analytic tradition and continental tradition also may have a different definition of freedom. This I got from an article on Kant: "Kant formulated the positive conception of freedom as the free capacity for choice. It asserts the unconditional value of the freedom to set one’s own ends. Autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality and a necessary condition of moral agency." here

Hegel's definition of freedom: "So a philosophy of right is necessarily a philosophy of freedom that seeks to comprehend freedom actualized in how we relate to each other and construct social and political institutions." here

And here Heidegger on freedom: "In Heidegger's late thinking, human freedom is determined not any more by the obligation of choosing oneself but by the necessity of clearing the truth of Being." taken from here

All different articulations, none of which correspond to your working definition whatever that may be. In any case I am sure I can find many others and a google search like assert is no sound basis either. On such concepts such as freedom even if definitions seem alike, there may be worlds of difference. In political philosophy the term freedom is still hotly debated even though there may be definitions that are more or less dominant. I do recognize your definition, that is not the point, there are many others though and Arendt's essay might well be insightful even if she does not share your definition.

And I don't know what Objectivist leanings means. What about might Stoic leanings? Or, my Virtue Ethics leanings? Or, my Utilitarian leanings? Would any of those dictate whether or not I could read a definition clearly defined and clearly expounded upon within the philosophical tradition over the course of thousands of years? Seems a strange thing to toss into a question about reading comprehension. — Garrett Travers

I do not know which one of those makes you incapable of engaging with a philosophical genealogy of the concept of freedom. I suspected objectivism, that is all. It is not about reading a definition, it is about thinking that that is what philosophy is.

By not seeing arguments that are "not worth my time," you mean to say, "you have clearly refuted the original claims of the essay in question, using both modern cognitive neuroscience, logicical argumentation, and clear definitions of a word that has long had the same basic understanding informing its description, thus I would rather not engage with you and instead insult you, even though you've done no such thing to me." — Garrett Travers

No, apply your own definition: not worth my time, means not worth my time. I am not saying that assessment is necessarily correct. Maybe I am missing a brilliant rebuttal of Arendt, might be. But your responses have not given me any new insight or made any contribution to my understanding of it.

Yes, by clearly defining terms, because to not do so would be a fallacy of ambiguity - that's something you learn in introductory logic, supporting those definitions with a description of how the brain operates as per cited academic journals provided by frontiers in science, and actually addressing every single critique of my assessment sent in my direction..... How do you do philosophy? And tell me, when you describe said methodology, will you please do me the favor of just showing me how you do it, while leaving the insults to yourself; it's kind of not a philosophical approach to discussions, it's actually a fallacy, which makes it unphilosophical. — Garrett Travers

No, philosophy is not 'clrearly defining terms'. I had a class on introductory logic, all well and good. It is by no means the only approach to philosophy. Not even the dominant approach anymore, it seems. How the brain operates has never been a philosophical topic, but one for neuro-science. I take my bearings in philosophical methodology from Michel Foucault, who stands in a Heideggerian tradition. I conduct genealogical enquiries in the history of concepts mostly. Moreover, I also tend to take an approach taken from G.R.G. Collingwood, namely the identification of absolute presupositions. But in any case, do it as you want it, try to get published. But again, that is not an insult but a statement of fact, you have not said anything I find worth my time. Take that statement from the perspective of ordinary language philosophy.

And yes, you do insult me. You do not engage in dialogue, you merely wish to set the terms of it and expect everyone to agree. You do so in a very condescending way. That I find insulting and indeed provokes counter barbs, from which I should and will refrain.

There is no working definition of freedom accepted by all in philosophy. Moreover the word freedom is bandied about by all and everyone in different ways. We see a likeness in the usage, but not at all a common usage accepted by all as in the word table for instance or doorknob.

Can someone tell Garrett Travers that just because he states there is some sort of definition that does not make it the case? Philosophy does not do dictionary. Maybe it is just your objectivist leanings, but not in any tradition worth its salt is a concept such as freedom off limits because there is some sort of definition of it.

"well, Garrett, what fallacy could you be talking about, given you're so pompous as to assert such a thing about a respected philosopher?" — Garrett Travers

No I I would not ask such a question because it is of no interest to me in the least. I am actually not asking you any questions, nor am I engaging with any of the points you made in the thread accept those directed at me, because I am not seeing anything in there that are remotely worth my time. Perhaps a discussion of whether your definition is viable might be interesting in itself, but I have to admit I find Arendt's approach a lot more interesting then the analysis of some kind of definition.

And the topic of that essay, and by extension the topic of this discussion - as described by the title of this discussion - is on the nature of freedom, sovereignty, and by ambiguous extention, purposely asserted in the essay, will and it's associated degrees of freedom. I changed no terms, I merely have upheld them. — Garrett Travers

Indeed those are the topics of the essay, apart from free will, which in my opinion is not. However, you refuse to engage with the essay because it does not play by your rules aka your working definition of freedom. However, no one gave you any authority to set those rules.

Never said to take my word for, but now that you bring it up, trust me, take my word for it, you'll thank me, there are far more interesting and less destructive people who have graced the field of philosophy; a lot more interesting, too. — Garrett Travers

The way you do philosophy, actually the way you not do philosophy, gives me no incentive to trust you on just about anything remotely related to the subject.

Please o lord deliver us from evil....

Yes, I do, in fact. It's called the working definition: the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint/absence of subjection to foreign domination or despotic government/the state of not being imprisoned or enslaved — Garrett Travers

There is no such thing as 'the working definition'. Philosophy is not an excercise in dictionary writing. There might be working definitions of philosopher x or y, or in the context of Kantianianism, utilitarianism and so on. Arendt opens the discussion on what freedom is, then telling her, here I have 'the working defintion, does not make any sense.

To say, "I don't care," doesn't make sense within the context of this specific conversation. We are having a discussion ABOUT that. — Garrett Travers

No, we are having a conversation about Arendt's essay. You have a tendency to want to set the terms. However, why would I be playing along? You also have a tendency for using capital letters I see.

That kind of does the trick. It's a bit like reading Lenin; sure, it's interesting, but was it woth the bodies? Many more interesting philosophers than both. — Garrett Travers

I see it as totally unrelated. What they argued about philosophy is for me removed from their politics. A good argument is a good argument irrespective of the political views of the one who brings it forth. It may be a warning and invites thorough investigation of the work in question to see if any ideas within it prefigured mass murder. If anything it is a reason to read both very carefully, something I doubt you both have done. And no, I am not taking your word for it that there are more interesting philosophers. Why would I?

I'm under the impression that she speaks of "individual freedom" or "inner freedom" as if it's a kind of "sovereignty" over oneself, which it would seem is consistent with what appears, to me, to be a tendency on her part to believe in a kind of inner dialogue or conflict between one me and another me, one me being the will, one being desire, another me being acting-me, yet another being acted-upon-me; I don't know, it gets confusing (not enough mees in me to comprehend this, perhaps). But I may be wrong. I find it difficult to follow her thought, distracted as I am by the names she so relentlessly drops throughout the article. — Ciceronianus

I do not think that that is what she is after. I rather think that this is what she considers freedom defined in the Justinian and Christian tradition, amounts to. We find it playing in the history of philosophy as well. There is a dychotomy between will and knowledge where knowledge is supposed to be in control of will, or, one has to will in accordance with knowledge. That would be rather Kantian. It all makes freedom an inner experience, one aligns one's knowledge and one's will and is free from desire. (remember the old Gala song?) Her point is that freedom is not an individual experience, but a political category. One is free within a certain system. I read in the essay a more communitarian critique of a liberal conception of freedom, but I might be wrong of course. Streelight seems to have a different take on it.

I rejoice in any criticism of Heidegger, but frankly wish he had spent far more time "in conversation with himself" than he did. — Ciceronianus

:rofl: I do know he is a national socialist and that is, of course, uncomely. However, I do wonder why you always react so strongly to him. He is also a very interesting thinker. He really is, despite his unwelcome affiliation with some of the most heinous villains in history.

How is this so? Freedom is dependent only on the non-advance of univited interaction between peoples. Meaning, respected sovereignty between people is tantamount to freedom for all those participating in the respect of boundaries. Where does the unfreedom of others come in? I suspect you're going to introduce one of a number of different perceptions of freedom to explain this, that have nothing to do with the working definitions of the word that I have published here in this thread. But, in the importance of being fair to you, I shall give you the benefit you need to properly answer that question, if you so choose to freely. — Garrett Travers

I do not care what you have published in the thread Garrett, I was reading Arendt. You are already working with some kind of definition of freedom. Apparently the non-invited interaction between peoples. God knows why, but you might have a reason for it. However, I am reading Arendt's genealogy of freedom and was commenting on what she tried to do. I do not need any benefit from you to answer any question you might have. Out of my sight, shu.

"Free" will, doesn't exist. 99% of our cognition is subconscious. — Garrett Travers

As if that explains something....

But, we do have executive function that works in tandem with cingulate cortex, amygdala, basal ganglia, and the hippocumpus to form the emotion processing network. — Garrett Travers

Ohh great we have a medical doctor in the room. I am doing philosophy not neurscience. I suggest www.theneuroscienceforum.com

The quote is from Hana Arendt's essay on Freedom. I came across it in an article from the Ethics Institute, Freedom and disagreement: How we move forward. The article makes the obvious point that
When debates are being waged over freedom, we must begin with the acknowledgement that we (as individuals) are only ever as free as the broader communities in which we operate. Our own freedoms are contingent upon the political systems that we exist in, actively engage with, and mutually construct.
This is obviously in tune with the point I've found myself obliged to make a few times recently, that ethics begins not when one considers oneself, but when one considers others.

Anyway, I'm linking to the Arendt essay in order to ask again her question: What is freedom?, and to give a space for considering her essay. Given the "freedom convoy" that trickled into Canberra yesterday, and the somewhat more effective equivalent in Canada, It seems appropriate. — Banno

Thanks Banno, for the chance to consider this essay. So many here take it as a stepping stone to discuss free will. That is not what the essay is about. It is indeed about the history of the notion of freedom and raises the question what political freedom, philosophically understood, looks like.

I also do not see the paradox you bring up and over which so many of the writers here trip. The question you ask presupposes a notion of freedom Arendt rejects, namely freedom as a kind of faculty of the will. The paradox she highlights is another one in my opinion and one that reveals itself when one views the concept of freedom in a historical light. Freedom for the Greeks was political, a concept which played in political life, contrary to philosophical life. Arendt apparently sees as philosophical life as singular, lonely, a-political. I think here she follows Heidegger, but also a lot of the Western tradition as seeing philosophical knowledge as self knowledge.

When freedom became a problem, in Christian philosophy in the context of conversion and the ability to embrace Christ, freedom was 'married' so to speak, to this lonely philosophical life and became seen as a kind of mastery, mastery over oneself. Mastery requires power and so freedom became drawn in a register of power, control, subordination and sovereignty. So much so that freedom became equated with sovereignty as it still is apparently for @Judaka.

The paradox here is that freedom as sovereignty immediately distorts the notion of freedom. Only the soveriegnty is truly free, but that means my freedom is dependent upon the unfreedom of others. It has become antithetical to the communal, reciprocal life of a community. So I think her idea is to rethink freedom and locate it less into a discourse of singular mastery and in the political realm of communal relations. Only if we establish relationships towards others that are free, might we be free. That requires relinquishing sovereignty. (I read the Arendt essay, not the article you also linked to).

For those of you who get all horny about free will, it is not unlike Strawson's concept of it, who is firmly rooted in the analytic tradition. However also for him free will resides in a relation to the other, not in some sort of mastery over oneself. I am not going to dwell further on it, because it detracts from the topic of freedom in a broader sense.

@Ciceronianus might be happy to note the essay can also be read as criticism of Heidegger, who still holds on very much to an idea of freedom and authenticity in conversation with oneself. Arendt invokes the political.

Nancy Cartwright, Ian Hacking, Isabelle Stengers, Peter Galison, John Dupre, Bruno Latour, Lorraine Daston, Alexandre Koyre. — StreetlightX

:up: :100:

Both ends of the spectrum seem to magnify my existential angst. At one extreme, 'I need to live much, much longer because all of this so far has been a bit boring and rubbish, or even painful at times' and at the other extreme 'please don't take this away, this is just a blast, I need it to last hundreds of years' :D — Yvonne

Yes, but isn't this volatility exactly the tension between knowing and feeling? You jump into the feeling and you want more and more, either because it is boring and rubbish or because it is too much of a great time. Is not the bottom line of these feelings that you experience a need to be alive? Now if that is the bottom line and you are also living, isn't that a sign of grace? ou are actually having what you are demanding, namely life. Why worry so much about the end of it? You know basically that life is worth living. I think that knowledge is someting to hold on to.

I can accept existential meaninglessness because I can imbue my own meaning. But I cannot avoid my own death and it will come well before I am even close to "done" exploring life. That cannot be right, can it? Are these philosophies of finitude's bringing purpose/meaning just platitudes or wishful thinking? Isn't terror the natural and most justified human condition? — Yvonne

I think that death is indeed unacceptable. I also think the philosophies of finitude are erely balms for the soul. They sooth us to sleep but cannot takethe unacceptabilty of death away. They actually know they cannot.The philosophers of finitude argue against traditional metaphysics that they do have a way of embracing finitude. that is a lie. Providing a diagnosis is something else than providing a cure. The only cure here is a certain kin of 'grace'. The grace 180 Proof and T Clark speak of and maybe Ciceronianus, an acceptance of death because you accept life is done. I very much share your sentiments though.

Those philosophers of finitude do however, point out one thing, they show the ineluctability if that experience and its cencessity as a backdrop for life to be enjoyed. We know that now, so rationally it should be possible to accept death as a part of life. You know Nick Cave has a point.

So we are caught in a bind: our experience fights death, it is a limit experience, or a limit to experience an as such abhorrent, unacceptable, mindless meaningless annihilation. And your knowledge, wisdom or rationality tells you that death is unavoidable and therefore better accepted than fought off, and that mortality is a necessary condition for this thing we do called living.

What to do? Well in such conflicts I think faith comes to the rescue. Not faith in a traditional sense, I am not theistic, but faith in everyday sense, faith you have when biking that you will not fall, faith that your beloved won't just leave you, faith that when you are kind to someone, probably the other will also be kind in return. The language of faith works here. How do we acquire such faith in bucycles, love, and other people? By practicing, learning and watching others do it. Engage in it.

Apparently grace is available. There are peoople who mmanage to lift the fear of death. Study them and learn, watch and emulate. What I have seen is that fear of death seems to fade when people actually feel fulfilled in life. The people least afraid of death are actually happiest with their living. That is an interesting and telling contradiction. It suggest that the way to grace does not lead through dealing with death but to make sure you live happily. So the only way to avoid death is to live...

(And welcome to the forum. Study those who know how to live, they tend to be the best writers on the forum as well).

That's very interesting and I did not know. But in the Netherlands isn't the country's Parliament sovereign? I mean, the law-makers can decide that it's legal in Netherlands to apply e.g. Turkish civil law in those circumstances. Turkey cannot make that decision for the Netherlands. But if the two jurisdictions were operating in the same State, I don't understand where sovereignty would lie. Perhaps that's why it's a modern problem and a democratic problem. If a monarch can say 'OK, Church, you can do whatever you want in these aspects of law', then so be it. But where law-makers are democratically accountable then it looks more complicated. — Cuthbert

Well in our current system the state, whether democratic or otherwise, is considered sovereign in the area of international law. The rules of Private International Law are usually laid down in treaties. Turkey cannot decide it for the Netherlands but Turkey and the Netherlands can engage in a treaty on the matter.

It might be more complicated in a democracy... but I do not see any principle dificulties. There are many different inds of states, some more unitary some very decentralized. If everybody (or a majority)thinks it is a good idea that law making is devolved to lower administrative bodies, also under parliamentary sovereignty they can engage in this form of self restriction.

A pretty big if. I'll opine that the question of principle and practice yields to the question of how much torque the agreement can stand. And whether in principle or practice, I think not a lot. A consideration that comes to mind is the greater interest of the community. If either of B's or C's differing practices harm the community, the community may move to end or modify the practice in question.

Anyway, I think you've made your case. I merely suppose that at the extremes of stress and tension, cooperation breaks down. — tim wood

Sure, that needs empirical work to find out. There is empirical work done in this field by legal anthropologist and legal sociologists. They study such systems and its difficulties and interrelationships. Sometimes actually it may also build trust between communities that have been in conflict. Establishing one legal order may then prove to be very difficult as it may be seen as colonizing or oppressive. So for the time being the communities in conflict might settle their differences by allowing forms of legal pluralism, in order for each community to keep its own identity.

I am sure having citizens living under two separate codes would present difficulties but is there any reason in principle why it is wrong for there to be two (or more) legal codes in effect in one nation state. — usefulidiot

In short my answer to the question would be no, there is no reason in principle why it is wrong for there to be more then one legal code, unless you hold on to the notion of law as the command of some leviathan like sovereign who cannot be limited. A bit of a Hobbesian view. That view is rarely held though nowadays, at least not among sociologist of law. There is though an ongoing debate as to how much law needs to be tied to state institutions in order to be called law. The two separately existing legal orders would both be bound to the state though so that problem is not in view here.

What might a good rule be in case of disagreement on jurisdiction? This would seem to matter. It goes to the question of the OP. Which imo is answered by observing that there cannot be two separate systems, but that one yield to the other, or both to a third. — tim wood

It is a good question. Well consider this: There is a Country A. In country A two ethnic groups live, Group B and group C. Group's B and group C. have a different system of inheritance law. For instance: In group B children may be completely disowned. In group C. the children are protected and cannot be disowned from at least a portion of their inheritance. This is only a simplified example, maybe there are many different regulations in their inheritance law, maybe in their family law at large, and perhaps also in other areas of law, but let's keep it to inheritance. Now, we have two different legal systems. What do we we need to have to make this system coexist? In any case we need rules about who belongs to group B or group C, because that determines the regime of inheritance law. Moreover, we need a court that decides on conflicts arising about the law of being part of group B and C. But for every conflict internal to group B and group C, different courts may be established. Let's call this court that determines whether one belongs to C or to D, court E. Now is that court E more powerful? Not really, it does not deal with matters relating to inheritance law of C or D. It only has competence over determining whether one belongs to group C or D. These courts may be comprised of judges of both group C and D for instance.

You might say, well that is still one legal system because both have to submit to court E. However, notice how court E does not deal with anything substantive. It just decides on procedure. What I do grant you is that both C and D have to agree to settle their disputes over jurisdiction to court E. That is where they are connected. Nonetheless, people in the same state are subjected to different inheritance laws, maybe different family law, property law and what not. We have two different systems of law, not totally unconnected. I am thinking about what it would look like if they would be totally unconnected. That might be possible, but than the state has to devolve de facto law making to these different groups C and D. It is well thinkable still. Then the two systems will have to establish their own rules for what people they have competency. It might well be less stable than the previous system discussed above, but I see no objection in theory.

In any case, also in the system discussed above, we have two different legal systems, coexisting in the same territory. Sure some arrangements need to be made. It does not necessarily lead to civil war, if both agree on the rules of procedure to determine the jurisdiction of the different legal systems.

As to civil - as to any law - the underlying issue is what I can force you to do, whether to pay a fine or a judgment, perform or not perform an action, or send you to jail. And, subject to correction, I cannot see a how a society works if it supports contradictory legal systems. The US an example: where laws contradict, society doesn't work, and remains broken until the issues of law are fixed, requiring legislation, the US Army in a high school, or even a civil war. — tim wood

Well, in the Ottoman Empire different courts existed from different societal denominations. There can be different codes of inheritance law for instance for different ethnic groups. As long as the state guarantees both and there are good rules in case of conflict between choices of jurisdiction there is no problem, as long as it is clear which jurisdictions are chosen. Like I mentioned above, the Netherlands has two different highest courts of law. It works because of the 'una via' principle. When you bring your case through the administrative law courts, you cannot submit it again under civil law. There have been contrary decisions on a similar case now and then, that is interesting, but also that can be dealt by, for instance via the 'lex posterior' rule, a later verdict supercedes and earlier one. I do not know if that is what you mean, but there might be different codes of law for different people, even if there is one supreme court. That court must then be versed in the law of denomination A and denomination B.

And, it is not accurate to say that some Muslims want someone dead. It's called a fatwah, and that's not some Muslims. it is Islam itself. — tim wood

Huh? Last time I checked islam itself had no voice. A Fatwah is a religious verdict. In Turkish society and under Turkish law for instance such verdicts are not recognized. The official stance of the papacy is against anti conception, so do all Catholics have sex without a condom? Moreover there are different branches of Islam. So 'Islam itself' is another silly generalization.

To be sure, nearly as I can tell, Islam itself is evolving, and many evolved, but not so much in many places, or within many authorities — tim wood

I do not even understand what you mean. What do you mean with 'many authorities'? There is no Islam itself just like there is no Catholicism itself or Protestantism itself, let alone 'Christianity itself'.

Reducing this to the behaviors of a few, "some," wackos speaks ill of your cognitive abilities. (If you want to take just this on, I prefer PM; because it's an ugly topic all the way 'round.) — tim wood

Ohh no need for a PM, but rest assured my cognitive abilities are perfectly in order. Indeed this discussion detracts from the topic at hand, but hey, I did not start making ill informed generalizations about swathes of people having little in common but a religious belief.

Are you quite sure they're distinct? Are they civil, criminal, both? I have a tough time believing that while I cannot do something to you because it would be a crime for me to do it, that I can summon my bro.-in-law to do it because it is not a crime for him to do it. — tim wood

Usually civil law arrangements. On criminal law I have less knowledge, because as a branch of public law it is much closer tied to the state. Differences are thinkable though, though probably not on violent crime, also because there is not much controversy about violence being prosecuted. However, some laws concerning blasphemy or libel, insult, for instance may be treated differently, though I do not know myself of any country that does so.
However, criminal law is in comparison to civil law a small branch of law. Most law you are dealing with every day is contracts, tort, family law, tax law etc.

Edit: in criminal law for instance I could see for instance laws against male circumcision being applied differently because of religious grounds. Usually, in a rather unitary country, some exception will be taken up in the article that prohibits assault, but it is in principle thinkable that there are different criminal codes. States will be reluctant to have it, because criminal law is seen as a competence of the state par excellence, but it is by no means unthinkable.

And this snark simply won't do as being hopelessly ignorant of and inadequate for whatever it is you have in mind. E.g., is Salman Rushdie still in hiding? (Ans., I find this online dated 2020: "Rushdie was given police protection, adopted an alias and went into hiding, on and off, for a decade. He still lives with the fatwa, which has never been revoked, but now he lives more openly. He has said this is due to a conscious decision on his part, not because he believes the threat is gone.") — tim wood

Sure, but the fact that some muslims want Salman Rushdie dead is for you an indication that muslims will not do well in a country that has freedom of speech. That is just a silly generalization. There are people who want Pelosi dead because of her ideas, unfortunately. Do you conclude that Republicans will not do well in a country with freedom of speech? Of course not. Many people unfortunately face death threats because of their ideas, from a lot of different corners, far left, Islamic radicalism, extreme right. If we start equating everyone on the left with far left and everyone on the right with far right, than, by your logic we will soon run out of people for whom freedom of speech is acceptable. Protestants are generally against gay marriage, do you think they will not do well in the Netherlands, a country where gay people may officially marry? The snark is unfortunate, but deserved, because you simply made a rather ignorant and offensive remark. Your last post was not and so I will not give a snarky reply, but, I hope, a reasonable one.

By the way many muslim countries actually prohibit membership of extremist religious groups under anti-terrorism laws, because they might well be perceived threats to the order of the state.

Just for example, I don't see Muslims doing well in a society that embraces free speech, for the simple reason that recent history shows that at least some Muslims even think they have a duty to abuse and kill anyone espousing ideas they don't like. — tim wood

Because like, sure, all Muslims are the same you know and there are no countries with a predominantly muslim population but also a secular legal systems and like the muslims that live in Western countries all secretly want to abolish free speech, yeah man, haven't you seen it on Fox new?

Let me write it down in two line so even the less than useful idiots on this forum can gain an modicum of comprehension:

A: no, not every secular society agrees on the same legal principles. Contentious issues like the death penalty and 'good Samaritan' laws attest to that.
B: There are indeed countries that offer distinct legal systems to different segments of the population, it is called legal pluralism.

No appeal to highest authority. Legal disputes can be taken to higher courts. In the case of dual systems, there would be two authorities. each the highest court in its own system. There would be no way of settling disputes between these two authories - unless there is some authority higher than both. Which then re-creates a single system. — Cuthbert

Not necessarily. In the Netherlands there are two different distinct highest courts and there have been different rulings on the same substantive subject though rarely. One just needs to delineate competencies very carefully or allow a choice of legal system upfront, but prohibit 'forum shopping'. It happens in the world of international business quite often that they choose a certain jurisdiction. There is no reason that should not be possible inside country.

It is not all that difficult. I have been married under Turkish law. When we moved to the Netherlands, it remained a marriage according to Turkish private law. If we would have been divorced in the Netherlands it might well be that the Dutch court would need to settle the matter by Turkish private law. That could have well have been important for the division of assets and so on. It was not an issue, but could have been. Actually there is a whole area of law called private international law that regulates such matter. Still, we might end up demanding national courts to practice the laws of another nation. I would find that a lot more complicated than allowing for a different code of laws in another area of the country or for a certain ethnic group. The hang up over this is actually quite recent. In Europe's past they allowed all inds of different sources of law, local custom, clerical (canonic) law, Roman law etc.

There is no reason they cannot do so. It happens and is known as legal pluralism. It can be found in some countries, countries for instance running a centralized legal system but also accepting the verdicts under customary law of some indigenous communities. I believe the UK ran an experiment with shari'a courts. There is no reason in principle, but for the state wanting to determine the content of the law and extending its centralizing and unificatory force. The fear may be that that communities will start to live separate lives not feeling themselves part of the same nation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_pluralism

If a man and a woman were in a fight and the woman was kicking ass, well, in this man's world that would just not be okay. Sure we can all cheer to the call for women's empowerment, but when you get your ass handed to you by a woman, that's too much. Equal perhaps, but not more powerful. — praxis

In my line of work you will not get very far if you do not accept that there are women having more success and wielding much more power than you do yourself ...

There is still much to do everywhere. The Netherlands is quite conservative when it comes to the participation of women. Probably there are no mono-causal explanations. Institutions and cultural values are skewed against the participation of women. Maybe there are also biological differences I do not know. However you see more and more traditionally male professions being entered into by women, like the judiciary. Therefore I think it has much to do with culture expectations and institutional set up.

Though if you look at professional philosophers today, there are more men writing than women. It might be related to the constant arguing and competition, as you point out. — Manuel

Well, and to the uneven division in the higher ranks of academia. Even though women generally perform better, in the Netherlands at least, the majority of profs is male. The work of full profs is most often published and cited, so you will notice more males noted as philosophers than females. It might change though. For instance there are more female judges now in the Netherlands than there are males.

On a serious not, though, it is true that even today (not even mentioning the Western tradition), women tend not to be too interested in these kinds of subjects. Not that most men are either, but proportionally it's still very skewed to males. — Manuel

I do not think women are uninterested in philosophy. When I studied philosophy the balance was more or less 50/50. I taught philosophy courses at some private institution and the balance was 50/50 as well. When I look at the balance of the Philosophy and Law Group I am in at my faculty it has slightly more men than women, but it is nothing like I think the gender balance that is found here on this forum. I think rather that women are more focused. If they do philosophy they will do so at a career level or they take a course instead of the jousting that goes on here. Contrary to say fiction writing, this forum is quite competitive, women might not find that sort of environment worth their while. The pressure on women to spend their free time caring for children or do house work is also (unfairly) higher on women still. So in other words, women just have better things to do.

"Don't Give Up" (6:33) album version — 180 Proof

:up:

This is one of my favorite song. It is a Turkish song. I heard it for the first time when I was reading philosophy in a water pipe cafe in Istanbul. I was reading N's Zarathustra. For me the song fitted the mood perfectly. Of course I could not make out anything of the lyrics at the time, but slowly my Turkish improved and eventually I could. The song recounts a man travelling through mountains. The song is a bit hard to translate, because my Turkish is not great, but also because Turkish is a totally different kind of language, so some of the meanings and metaphors lose some force. For instance Turkish is very precise in the use of different tenses for verbs and in using adjectives to words conveying a slightly different meaning. Anyway, you may find the lyrics below.

The song struck me as well because the lyrics have a double meaning. It is first and foremost a love song and recounts the longing for a loved one. The band is very political, critical and leftist. It is also about political struggle and the sacrifices made for it. One might even conjecture a religious / philosophical interpretation. In our travel to come to knowledge and discover the world we will eventually fall, but be taken up in the cycle of life. The ambivalence is strengthened because Turkish is a gender neutral language.



When this city is overcome by solitude
A bird dies silently in its sleep
you wish to get up and leave it all
the dark streets blind, deaf and mute

Hey, you who sets out wrapped in love
You should know these roads wind through mountains.
And if you fall before you reach her (him / it),
the echo of your longing will still ring tomorrow

Hey you who sets out wrapped in love
You should know, these roads wind through mountains.
And if you fall before you reach her,
the echo of your longing will still ring tomorrow

At dawn and new day breaks
your heart is sharpened by longing
A small stream springs from you
The river will grow
and flowers will bloom at your banks

At dawn and new day breaks
your heart is sharpened by longing
A small stream springs from you
The river will grow
and flowers will bloom at your banks

Hey you who sets out wrapped in love
You should know, these roads wind through mountains.
And if you fall before you reach her,
the echo of your longing will still ring tomorrow



Bu kente yanlızlık çöktüğü zaman
uykusunda bir kuş ölür ecelsiz
alıpta başını gitmek istersin karanlık
sokaklar kör sağır dilsiz

Ey sevda kuşanıp yolara düşen
Bilesin bu yollar dağlar dolanır
Yare ulaşmadan düşersen eyer
Yarin hasretinin yankısı kalır

Ey sevda kuşanıp yolara düşen
Bilesin bu yollar dağlar dolanır
Yare ulaşmadan düşersen eyer
Yarin hasretinin yankısı kalır

Gecenin ucunda gün aralanır
Yar sevdası ile yürek bilenir
Sızılı bir ırmak uğurlar seni
Su olup akarsın
Kır çiceklenir

Gecenin ucunda gün aralanır
Yar sevdası ile yürek bilenir
Sızılı bir ırmak uğurlar seni
Su olup akarsın
Kır çiceklenir

Ey sevda kuşanıp yolara düşen
Bilesin bu yollar dağlar dolanır
Yare ulaşmadan düşersen eyer
Yarin hasretinin yankısı kalır

However is this far, and what "logic is being suspended". If we are parts of a whole, why can't Schopenhauer view be "logical"? — KantDane21

I have not read 'the knot of the world', so I can only go on what you describe here and what I otherwise know from Schopenhauer and his relationship to German Idealism / Kant. I guess Schopenhauer would not be convinced that knowing subject and willing subject are part of a whole. It is the knowing subject that knows itself as willing subject as well, but there is no transcendental subject that perceives itself as willing subject and as knowing subject, as aspects of itself. That transcendental subject is equal to the knowing subject for Schopenhauer, because such knowing is what the knowing subject does.

If knowing subject and willing subject are not parts of a whole than their identity becomes inexplicable. Like you, I am not so convinced they are not parts of a whole, but I guess we need to get more out of Schopenhauer to know why he thinks this is not convincing.