@Count Timothy von Icarus

For instance, if I cling to the expression 'the sun rises and sets' as some truth about 'how the world is' I would be in error. Still, in a sense, is a 'valid' statement: it correctly describes some experiences (but not all) and has some practical utility. The same goes for, say, newtonian mechanics. — boundless

To expand on this...

I believe that 'the sun rises and sets' might be called a 'provisional truth'. It is valid in some contexts but if we cling at is it were a 'true description of the world', what we might call an 'ultimate truth' about the 'external world', we would be in error.
So, in a sense, yes, we can make 'true judgments' in the sense they are coherent, at least in some contexts.
But at the same time, 'experiences and inferences from experiences' alone cannot give us true knowledge. Provisional, pragmatic 'truths' yes, but these 'truths' are not truths in the 'classical' philosophical sense. Accepting these 'provisional truths' is not really the problem, the problem seems to be clinging about them.
Without additional assumptions we are not justified that we can know 'truths' which are 'higher' than 'provisional truths'. And IMO it is up to who upholds these additional assumptions to give a justification of them. BTW, I am not saying that such assumptions cannot be 'reasonable', so to speak, but 'reasonableness' might not be enough to be a philosophical justification, in the sense that of a rationally compelling justification. And, also, as our progress in science revealed to us is that even the most 'reasonable' ideas human beings have had about the world turned out to be incorrect, incoherent with observations (which ultimately are experiences, after all, if one thinks about it). And these 'reasonable ideas' were supported by equally 'reasonable assumptions', which themselves were found incorrect.
Note that I am not saying that all our reasonable assumptions are necessary false and will necessarily be found false but simply that we seem not to be able to justify them in a 'rationally compelling' sense and also that clinging about them have been a source of mistakes.

BTW, actually more than Pyrrhonism, my view of knowledge is mostly inspired by some versions of the 'theory of two truths' that I encountered in some schools of Indian philosophies/religions (especially some Buddhist schools). At the same time, similar ideas are also present in some western thinkers and philosophical schools, e.g. Pyrrhonism, which maybe is actually close to my own views on epistemology as I don't make any claim about 'ultimate truth' (after all, even in Indian philosophies/religions, positive claims about the 'ultimate truth' were made in a religious context and often had a religious 'justification', not a philosophical one, at least not completely philosophical one. But I am digressing...).

Well, on the error point, I don't think someone like Berkeley has the same problem here. For Berkeley, we see the world as it is under normal conditions, although of course we see it from our individual perspective. Error is its own category. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok, Berkeley was an ontological idealist, so yeah, I agree with this. After all, ontological idealism is actually more similar to realism than some forms epistemic and transcendental idealism, skepticism, phenomenologies etc. After all, ontological idealism is, well, a metaphysical theory of 'how things really are'.

The problem comes up only when it is assumed that it is impossible to see the world as it "really is," because such knowledge would require "knowing the world without a mind." The problem is not only that both experience under normal conditions and conditions of error share in unreality, but that we have no means of saying which is closer to "what things are really like." If the way things "really are" is inaccessible, if even space and time are the unique products of the mind, then there is no possible comparison of experience and reality. Correspondence is out. Nor will an identity theory work. We can't say that there is an identity shared by experience and reality—that, as Aristotle says in De Anima, the "mind (potentially) becomes all things," because this possibility is also excluded. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But note that if one accepts that experience is the starting point of knowledge and if one accepts that experience is also the way we 'validate' our judgments, then corrispondence is difficult to maintain.
I can infer something about the 'external world' from my experiences but how can I 'prove' that my inferences are correct? How can I have a certain/true knoledge** of them?
Induction is not compelling. Even if all my experiences were to be consistent with some of my inferences about 'how the world out there should be', then I would still not have a certain, true knowledge. All I can have is a 'best guess'.

But I can still detect errors in judgments. I can still determine that some of my inferences are incorrect if they contradict some of my experience. In other words, while I cannot determine 'truth', I can determine (at least some) 'falsity'. Induction might not be a solid foundation for truth but it is still able to determine the falsity of some judgments.

But of course, this validation that we get from experience doesn't give us true knowledge and so it is not enough for truth (I reject 'coherence theory of truth', because a judgment that is coherent with all experiences is not enough to be called 'true'). So what? I think that, at least philosophically, we should 'suspend judgment' about the 'external world', i.e. the world outside experience. There is no denial here about the 'external world', or how it might be.

For instance, if I cling to the expression 'the sun rises and sets' as some truth about 'how the world is' I would be in error. Still, in a sense, is a 'valid' statement: it correctly describes some experiences (but not all) and has some practical utility. The same goes for, say, newtonian mechanics.

On the other hand, I believe if you actually think that we can have true knowledge about 'how the world is' that we can discover by inference from our experience, we need some other assumption which is IMO unprovable.

Personally, I think I am closer to Pyrrhonism than Kantianism in epistemology.

Now, if the intelligibility of things and the intelligibility of our experiences and our knowledge of things is the same, there is no problem. Reason is perhaps the glue that holds things together (rather than a sort of "bridge between them" that we must build). On this view, we are never separated. But on this view it isn't true that we don't see things as they are. To be sure, we don't see things perfectly. There is a difference between discursive human reason and simple divine apprehension of all truths. Truth, with being, is inherently bound up in intelligibility though (e.g. St. Thomas' disputed questions on truth). — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you say that 'we can get true knowledge, at least in principle, from inferences from our experiences because the world is intelligible' this is IMO an assumption. It might be correct but we cannot prove it.

Counterfactual definiteness? Yes, I guess; but again, when people talk about counterfactual definiteness, they are usually talking about the wavefunction and perhaps things like collapse. Stochastic interpretation would be talking about definiteness in regard to something else, so the concept has arguably changed. — Apustimelogist

No, CFD (counterfactual definiteness) simply implies that physical quantities have definite values at all times. de Broglie Bohm's interpertation is a perfect example of an interpetation which has CFD. MWI violates CFD because it assigns multiple values to hypothetical measurements, so it can be realistic and 'local' (although in a weird sense... after all, what is more nonlocal than a 'universal wavefunction' split at each measurement?).

If your stochastic interpretation accepts that there is a definite configuration of particles at all times, then how can you explain Bell's experiments without non-locality? In de Broglie-Bohm's interpretation, in the case of entangled particles, the velocity of each entangled particle (which always has a definite value) depends instantaneously on the positions (which always have a definite value) of the other entangled particles. That's how the interpretation 'explains' (or at least 'gives a description of') Bell's experiments.
But this implies that you need some kind of 'simultaneity' (a long time ago, I read of some versions of this interpretation which are Lorentz invariant. So, I guess that this kind of 'simultaneity' doesn't necessarily imply a rejection of special relativity. I don't remember however the details)

So, in your view, if the particle configuration is definite at all times, how can you describe non-local correlations without a non-local dynamics/kinematics which involves some notion of simultaneity?

Well, either the state of relative perfection or the state of suffering. Which one do you pick? By nothing I didn't mean permanent death. — MoK

Of course I would pick the 'better' choice. But none of them seems 'desirable'. Also, why do you think that death is impossible?

During the expansion of space-time most emergent Actualities result from natural energy exchanges. But, since the recent advent of homo sapiens, some novelties in the world have been caused by human choices. That's what we call Culture as contrasted with Nature. Therefore, you could say that Cultural Evolution has been "co-determined" by rational agents. But I would not say that all actualities, or all phenomena, or all "actual histories" are determined by the "demi-gods" of the world. — Gnomon

Neither did I want to say that, in fact. Even the 'co-determination' of some actualities is enough. It is something like Tolkien's concept of subcreation, in a sense.

So, the Whole determines all the possibilities/potentialities. Natural processes - either random or deterministic - co-determine most actualities. Then, humans (and maybe other beings) co-determine some actualities with some degree of autonomy. I use the 'co' prefix because, after all, this kind of determination is not from 'nothing' but both from previous actualities and potentialities themselves. Is this now an accurate assessment of your view?

Still my question is: how can we have some degree of autonomy if we are not separate from the Whole?

Would Spinoza disagree? :smile: — Gnomon

Yes, to some extent. And to some extent he would agree. For instance, I think he would ask the previous question, I think.

Interesting. There is a revised version of Gödel's ontological proof of God that entails modal collapse because of the given definition of God. — Lionino

Thanks for the reference. Anyway, for the sake of completeness, some scholars disagree with the 'necessitarian' interpretation of Spinoza. However, IMO necessatarianism is the consistent way to interpret is thought.

This idea of gradations of being allows for a richer metaphysical framework, one that resonates with pre-modern views like Aristotle’s, where being is understood in terms of potentiality and actuality. — Wayfarer

To be fair, I do not, in principle have a problem with this understanding. Problem is, however, that the 'collapse' of the wavefunction is observer-dependent, i.e. it takes place in the perspective of a given observer (whatever an 'observer' might be). In this view, the collapse is a process of actualization, so actualization is observer-dependent.

So in other to be consistent, I think that this kind of understanding has to treat both the potentialities and the actualities as observer-dependent. No matter how Heisenberg saw these these things, I really doubt that Aristotle or Plato would have liked that potentiality-actuality is something that is perspectival.

The observation ‘manifests’ or is actualised in a particular outcome. I can’t help but feel that it is at least a pregnant metaphor. — Wayfarer

With this I agree.

The whole point is why would a perfect god create this kind of game of hide-and-seek of his "blessedness" and "good and evil"? — schopenhauer1

I wanted to elaborate on this point, again.

Let's assume, for the sake of the argument, that God exists and created the world and humans as finite rational agents who have an essential desire to be united with the Good (i.e. God if some kind of theism is true), even if they are not aware of fully aware of it.

Now, as I understand it, the philosopher Thomas Talbott makes a very interesting argument: maybe it is impossible to come into existence as fully developed rational beings, maybe in order to fully develop as self-aware rational agents we need some kind of contrast and frustration. For instance, I need to be aware of the distinction between 'me' and what is 'not me' in order to develop a rational mind. However, this awareness might only develop due to some kind of contrast: what is 'not me' doesn't respond always to my wishes. So, the frustration I experience is actually a way to learn, to be more self-aware. Also, at least the awareness of the possibility to make evil or bad choices makes me aware of the distinction between good and evil, good and bad. Also, seeing bad outcomes of evil/bad choices is actually a way to learn why bad choices are bad. And so on.

So, maybe some amount of suffering as well as at least the possibility to do evil and to make bad choices, is inevitable in order to develop into truly rational beings.

Note, of course, that this argument doesn't say that all suffering and the evil we experience in the world is 'necessary' or 'meaningful'. Also, it's not meant to be a complete 'theodicy' but only a possible explanation to why a 'learning process' might be actually necessary.

If we can never see the world "as it really is," then how shall we explain things like mistakes? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that you are raising here a very good objection, but it is not 'decisive' IMO.

I believe that a 'mistake' or an 'illusion' can be interpreted as an interpretation of a given experience that is inconsistent with his inconsistent with other related experiences.

For instance, consider the case where you see a circular table from a certain distance and angolation. It doesn't appear as circular but as elliptical. And as I move around, its apparent shape is still elliptical but different and it continues to change. So, I conclude that the 'elliptical shape' is a mere appearance, an illusion if you like, because the fact that the 'apparent shape' changes as I change my position means that it is not an intrinsic property of the table and assuming naively that it is makes my judgment mistaken.
On the other hand, saying that the table is 'really circular' does accomodate all these observations and, therefore, it is 'more correct' than saying that a particular elliptical shape that I saw was the 'real one'. But of course, we know that the 'circular shape' itself when examined more closely is not true either etc.
BTW, I used the example of the physicist David Bohm (see e.g. this video).

So, I think that you can't detect a mistake even if the 'world as it really is' is inaccessible to us.

Also IMO this doens't imply that the world is not intelligible or our experience is not intelligible. In fact, at least up to a certain point we can say that there is intelligibility.

I think it really depends on what you mean by all these terms which I often find confusing. Yes, realistic in terms of there are particles in definite configurations all the time. But it will also have all the statistical properties in the wavefunction that are responsible for violating contextual realism generally in quantum mechanics. However, the wavefunction isn't a real physical object in this interpretation. — Apustimelogist

Ok, I see. The wave-function is interpreted as an 'useful' fiction but at the same time the theory also adopts Counterfactual definiteness. How is non-locality handled in this interpretation?

It is realist, but I think he really does say there are degrees of existence:
.... — Wayfarer

I can see the appeal but IMO this view leads to some problems (some serious, some not).

First, if the wave-function is given any kind of reality, then non-locality is inescapable. If I make a position measurement, then QM literally says that the wave-function can contract instantaneously from a 'very large space region' to a 'point-like space region'. Of course, you can say that it has a 'different' degree of reality, but I'm not sure how a truly physical non-local effect can be avoided. This is not per se a 'damning'* problem (after all, I know that even the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation can be formulated in a way that is consistent with special relativity) but it is still IMO a problem for one who wants to present it as 'local'. BTW, I know that Kastner argued that the interpretation is local because the measurement only 'destroys' possibilities, not actualities but at the same time the 'actualities' do, well, become actual and if they do not come 'from nothing', something 'real' must be there before.

Second, the wavefunction itself can be changed before the measurement. In fact, the wave-function contains the information of the experimental set-up, which can be modified by the experimenter. In some ways, then, if the wavefunction is interpreted as having some kind of reality, it somehow interacts
(in some cases nonlocally) with the experimental setup and/or the experimenter.

Third, in a Wigner-friend type of scenario, some actualities seem to have become 'actual' only to an observer and not to the other. If one wants a realist interpretation, this IMO leads to an inconsistency.

I believe that this shows that the wavefunction does indeed represent 'potentialities' but only epistemic ones, i.e. gives probabilities that some experiences or observations occur.

*Regarding non-locality, Einstein (probably influenced by the 'principium individuationis' of Schopenhauer) thought that undermines physical realism by itself (and this is the reason why he didn't like Bohm's interpretation, which is realistic). As he said to Born in a letter written in 1948:

I just want to explain what I mean when I say that we should try to hold on to physical reality. We are, to be sure, all of us aware of the situation regarding what will turn out to be the basic foundational concepts in physics: the point-mass or the particle is surely not among them; the field, in the Faraday - Maxwell sense, might be, but not with certainty. But that which we conceive as existing (’actual’) should somehow be localized in time and space. That is, the real in one part of space, A, should (in theory) somehow ‘exist’ independently of that which is thought of as real in another part of space, B. If a physical system stretches over the parts of space A and B, then what is present in B should somehow have an existence independent of what is present in A. What is actually present in B should thus not depend upon the type of measurement carried out in the part of space, A; it should also be independent of whether or not, after all, a measurement is made in A.

If one adheres to this program, then one can hardly view the quantum-theoretical description as a complete representation of the physically real. If one attempts, nevertheless, so to view it, then one must assume that the physically real in B undergoes a sudden change because of a measurement in A. My physical instincts bristle at that suggestion.

However, if one renounces the assumption that what is present in different parts of space has an independent, real existence, then I do not at all see what physics is supposed to describe. For what is thought to by a ‘system’ is, after all, just conventional, and I do not see how one is supposed to divide up the world objectively so that one can make statements about the parts. (Born 1969, 223–224; Howard’s translation)

(source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/einstein-philscience/#ReaSep)

Edit: by this I don't mean that those who think that 'non-local realism' is possible are wrong. But it would be still a quite strange form of realism where we cannot 'separate' the elements of reality by using a spatio-temporal separation.

In other words, are you saying that God/Whole determines all the possibilities but the actualities are determined or co-determined by the rational agents?
And maybe also by other phenomena?
In other words, God 'fixes' all thepossible histories but the actual one is co-determined?

I'm not sure how this doesn't lead to a theistic or theistic-like perspective (i.e. that God creates and sustaines but at the same time the creatures maintain an identity that is distinct from the Creator), but I'll wait your answers before delving into this.

Correct. Life becomes boring if it is eternal. — MoK

To be fair, I should have added that boredom would not the only one reason that after a certain point such an endless life would be unbereable. But in any case, I'm not sure how you have not conceded my point, i.e. that such a 'relative perfection' is undesiderable. We seem to agree that an endless life with only finite goods becomes after a certain point unbereable. Yet, you seem to say that a state of 'relative perfection' is 'better than nothing'. How can an 'endless unbeareable life' be better than 'nothing'?

In other words, every possibility is a necessity, modal collapse? Good post btw, keep it coming. — Lionino

Thanks!

Yep, but note that in Spinoza's philosophy such a necessity is not an 'intrinsic characteristic' of the modes, but when considered as 'modes-of-substance', i.e. when seen 'under the perspective of eternity' (sub specie aeternitatis), all modes are actually necessary 'manifestations' of the attributes of God. In other words, when seen as themselves - i.e. abstracted from the Substance/God - they are contingent. But this perspective is ultimately illusory and therefore, ultimately, according to Spinoza, it is true that even the modes are necessary (but seen in this perspective, they are not individuals anymore).

My take on the 'observer problem' is not very complicated. The answer to the question 'does an electron exist prior to being measured?' is that it just is the wave-function, which is a distribution of possibilities, right? So it doesn't definitely exist, or exist as a definite object - there really is just a pattern of probabilites. It is the observation that reduces all the possibilities to zero (collapsing the wave function.) What's 'spooky' about it is mainly that the act of measurement is not itself part of the equation. And also the ontology of the purportedly fundamental particles of physics. A realist would rather hope there was a definitely-existing point-particle somewhere along the line. It's like the measurement 'makes manifest' something that was previously only potentially existing. (This is something that Heisenberg said, referring to Aristotle's 'potentia' (source). — Wayfarer

Yeah, I sort of agree, but maybe with a qualification. If one interprets the wave-function epistemically, i.e. as a quantitative measurement of knowledge/degrees of beliefs (i.e. probabilities as interpreted in a Bayesian way), then the 'collapse' is simply an update of knowlege/degrees of beliefs. However, if one wants to interpret the wave-function epistemically, then such an approach should be followed to the end, in a consistent way: QM doens't allow us to make any ontological commitments.

Unfortunately, sometimes what is presented is a 'mixed' approach. For instance, my problem with saying that "the 'measurement' makes manifest something that was only 'potentially existent'" is that it can be misleading: if one attributes some kind of 'reality' to those 'potentialities', wehave a 'realist' view. After all, if it is supposed to describe 'what is really happening' when a measurement is done, then how is not a 'realist' interpretation?
If it is interpreted as a 'convenient way of speaking that should not be taken literally, then one remains faithful to an epistemic approach.

Of course, a truly consistent epistemic approach doens't deny that there is 'something' before a measurement/observation (or whetever word one might prefer) takes place. However, that 'something' cannot be described/known and is not an object of the theory. Indeed, an epistemic interpretation is actually like saying 'there is a limit of what I can know and what I can represent mathematically'. That's why instead of 'non-realist interpretations' I prefer 'non-representationalist interpretations'.
When one understands this IMO, all the talk about 'what is an observer' becomes irrelevant. The theory should be silent about such a question. But, of course, I can say that 'I' can be an observer - this and only this is self-evident apparently - and since I am a conscious being, every other conscious being might be an observer. Maybe only conscious beings are observers, maybe something else can also be. But how can I know that? How can I know that a computer might be an 'observer'? What can I have are speculations, maybe reasonable speculations. But real knowledge? IMO the best if we follow an epistemic/'non-representationalist' interpretation, we should admit that QM itself simply doesn't tell us what an 'observer' really is. It's silent.

Also, this 'epistemic interpretation' is not really restricted to QM. It can IMO be used also for other physical theories (after all, as I said in an another thread, nobody takes the 'forces' in newtonian mechanics as literally existent physical entities... they are useful fictions).

If on the other hand, one prefers a 'realist/representationalist' view one apparently is forced to accept non-locality (a weird kind of non-locality where non-local effects are 'hidden'*), many-worlds or something else (and weirdly enough, even if one accept a 'realist' interpretation, the epistemic interpretations can be still be used to make correct predictions...).

*non-local effects are hidden because in an experiment with, say, two entangled particles, Alice can discover that the 'non-local' effects have taken place only when she gets access to Bob's data on his particle.

Nelsonian stochastic mechanics seems a valid interpretation that is both realistic and non-deterministic, as far as I know. Not sure why ChatGpT seems to say that a stochastic and realistic interpretation is impossible (it must have some kind of non-locality)

↪Wayfarer The key here is what is to count as an "observer". You presume mind. That's down to you, not the physics. Alternative include "We don't know - shut up and calculate" and "whatever collapses a wave function". — Banno

I actually see this as irrelevant regarding the 'independent reality' of cups and other physical objects. Even if an observer is a generic 'physical object' as the relational interpretation of QM says, how can we be certain that another physical object has a definite position (e.g. being in a dishwasher) outside of the 'interaction/observation'?

IMO assuming that the observers are not necessrily conscious beings doesn't really change much about this issue.

Well, the state of relative peace is better than nothing. The better you understand life it becomes easier to achieve relative peace. — MoK

But if there is nothing that guarantees that I may not fall from such a state of 'relative peace' (assuming that it is a positive state), then such a state is not possible (for instance, in traditional theism, God is the foundation of the stability of the beatitude of the blessed).
Also, if it is too similar to the present life - after all, if it is seen as a perpetual struggle, the comparison is IMO apt - I am not sure how it is better than nothing. If I really think that this life will last forever, well I think it will be at a certain point unbereable (due to boredom... after all, finite goods can give finite happiness).

Is there a downside to accepting that "feeling" of change in the objective world and the practical effects of willful behavior? I feel older and wiser than I did at 18. Am I just naive, or deceiving myself that I can be an agent of change in the world? When I imagine that I'm driving my car to the grocery store, was that destination destined by God or Fate 14b years before I was born? If my free agency is a mirage, will I go hungry waiting for the world to bend to my will? :snicker: — Gnomon

The problem IMO is that you seem to want it both ways. On the one hand, the Whole, i.e. God in your view, is ultimately changeless. On the other hand, you seem to think that change is ultimately real for us and that we are free.

But my question is: how can our perception of change be veridical if the Whole (of which we are mere aspects or maybe 'parts') is changeless? how can we have free will, i.e. a degree of autonomy, if we are mere aspects/modes/parts of God, who is changeless?

Why should humans care how much BALANCE of suffering occurs in the universe, when it is him/her that is being subjected to suffering in various amounts, perhaps on the more negative end of the equation? In other words, for humans, why should it matter how the "overall picture" looks from their point of view, if they are the ones suffering!? — schopenhauer1

Sorry I think I misinterpreted your questions. But I won't edit my previous post because I am actually curious to see your answers to my questions that I made before about the 'basic desire' and the best hypothetical state.

Anyway, well... I am not sure how to respond to these questions and also I am not sure how they are related to the point I was making. I was merely saying that at least in the 'universalist' view, all the suffering might be seen as part of a non-ideal process that was necessary to complete in order to arrive to a result that we 'really' want. This doesn't imply that every instance of suffering is seen as a necessary of the process... in other words, a learning process is necessary but this particular process we experience isn't inevitable (unless one is a rigid determinist, I guess).
Sorry in case if also this answer is unstaisfying.

Well, I can imagine a state of peace and harmony (what I call perfection) as well but our current state of affairs is not like this. — MoK

Ok, fine. But the 'relative perfection' you mentioned earlier didn't sound as something desirable, something to seek etc if it is a constant struggle.

I don't make any claim to be a "Spinozist". That would be absurd, since I have never read any of his work first hand, and I don't regard him as my Guru. I merely identified with his break from traditional religion without rejecting the logical necessity of a non-empirical preternatural First Cause of some kind. Since my "critic" did claim to be a Spinozist, I just noted that my personal worldview seemed to be generally compatible with Spinoza's, yet making allowance for advances in historical and scientific understanding since he wrote his "radical enlightenment" manifesto. :smile: — Gnomon

Ok!

Regarding Free Will, I can only agree with Einstein's comment on past-present-future Time --- that it's a "stubbornly persistent illusion" --- which 99% of humans accept as a pragmatic assumption. :joke: — Gnomon

Ok, what worried Einstein, however, is that such an illusion seems so 'persistent' that it strongly suggest that change is real and not only perspectival? As I said before, I stopped to dis-believe in free will and the supposed illusory nature of change, when I decided to take what my experience suggested to me at face value. Of course, I am not saying that I am necessarily right. But, after all, science is an empirical subject and in order to refute something that experience so strongly suggest there must be a 'sufficient evidence'. To date, I don't think I found one.

Since, unlike Einstein, I am incapable of imagining omniscience, I would say that an ever-changing world is not an illusion but an empirical Fact of human understanding. To deny real world Change might be a sign of dementia, or of extreme Idealism. :cool: — Gnomon

I disagree. One can say that change is illusory and at the same time admitting that he experiences change. I can still experience an optical illusion even if I suspect or know that my experience isn't veridical.

Evolution and FreeWill are only illusory relative to Omniscience. Relative to mundane human understanding it's an undeniable verity. Since I have almost 8 decades of personal experience, I can't deceive myself that Aging & Death are figments of imagination. From my imaginary personal perspective, Death looks like a skeleton in a black hoodie holding a mean-looking scythe. :wink: — Gnomon

But note that as I said, something can 'feel' very real but at the same time can be illusory.

For instance, in a dream I might go to a city. At the level of the dream, I went to that city and I had that experience. But the experience was illusory.

So, the experience of change might be 'dream-like' but for us can seem real.

That's the GAME then.. training, learning, etc. It doesn't have to look like Chess or Monopoly or Basketball! It's an obstacle course of choosing between options, and sometimes the game puts participants in vicariously tragic positions, despite seemingly good decisions. So, it's a game of obstacles, suffering, learning, etc. — schopenhauer1

Ok, I see. Well, normally we do not call, say, school as a 'game'. But, if you want to use that word, ok.

Let me rephrase your question, then: why God created this 'learning process' (or 'learning 'game'' if you prefer)?
An answer might be: "well, considering that we are created as finite and imperfect rational beings, the 'learning process' (again, you can use the word 'game') is what is needed to such a being to be able to know God"

So, at this point, you can make the following question: "why did God created us in the way we have been created, as finite and imperfect rational beings that need such a learning process in the first place?".
Well, actually, I am not sure how to respond to that. But again, is it really important to have an answer to that question? Let's say that we can't find an answer. Does this invalidate the hypothesis 'creator, personal God'?

In other words, for humans, why should it matter how the "overall picture" looks from their point of view, if they are the ones suffering!? — schopenhauer1

Because that, maybe, it's part of what humans really want? For instance: what do you think that is the most basic desire? What do you think would the best hypothetical state of affairs to you? See, for instance this post or this other post.
Given that our present state of affairs is not the 'best', the search of a final, positive state might be what is really important.

God's nature? That makes it seem like God himself is following a rule he cannot escape. There goes the all-powerful part. Again, do you see why this God looks very human to me? And as with my question to MoK, are we talking the Biblical/Abrahamic God or some personal notion? — schopenhauer1

Yes, I was thinking about a Personal God.
Anyway, God's nature is not an imposed 'rule'. So, I cannot see how God would be following a rule, if God's activity is not constrained by something external.

There is no guarantee that we don't lose it. It is a constant challenge to stay in a state of relative peace. — MoK

An unending challenge is not IMO a state that we should hope, but I'm going to leave at that.

I don't equate a state of peace with a state in which we experience more pleasure than suffering. A state of peace is neutral. By neutral I mean you neither suffer nor have pleasure. — MoK

Well, in any case, your conception of 'relative peace' cannot be a real 'peace'. If we have to continue to struggle to maintain it, it inevitably involves suffering.

Correct. But you ask whether we can make any progress without suffering. I mentioned that there could be progress without suffering if there is no experience. I then mentioned that change is not possible without experience. Progress is a change. Therefore progress is not possible without experience. I also don't think that you can make progress without suffering. That is how life is! — MoK

Well, at least hypothetically/logically I think that it isn't true. I can imagine an interrupted continuum of neutral and/or positive experiences. At least I do not see a logical impossibility here.

I didn’t mean that; I said consciousness is a capacity, understood, in accordance with a particular methodological system, as a necessary condition of intelligent agency. That being given, it can be deduced consciousness doesn’t unify; it is that under which unity occurs. — Mww

Ah, sorry. Thanks for the clarification. I think I am ok with that!

Me neither. Didn’t really understand it either. Although I can see the connection with QBism. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree. There is at least a structural analogy between his 'interface theory of perception' (ITP) and QBism.
But, on the other hand, the main prolem is that he not only notes the analogy. But (1) he insists that he is basically saying the same thing as some contemporary research in quantum gravity (!) for instance say and that (2) as the review remarked his own theory of 'conscious realism' contradicts his IPT, if the latter is followed to the end.

ITP after all doesn't make ontological commitments about the 'reality as it is' and, therefore, strictly speaking isn't compatible with any kind of ontological theory. It's a form of epistemic idealism which also tries to explain why we more or less 'see' the same 'interface'.

(regarding the review, I found it ok, but some objections are IMO questionable... for instance, in the chapter where Hoffman evokes contemporary phisical theories, the main comparison is with ITP, not conscious realism. So when he says that 'non-realist' theories are incompatible with conscious realism, it should be noted that Hoffman discussed them when he was speaking about ITP, if I recall correctly)

‘Meta-conscious awareness’ is the term, I believe. — Wayfarer

Ah, ok, thanks. But I think that also 'self-consciousness' is valid for that.

With respect to specificity, I rather think, assuming an interest in such matters despite the absence of sufficient empirical facts from the scientific method proper, little remains but to fall back on logical constructions, the certainty, hence the explanatory value, of which is our own responsibility. — Mww

I meant that you described a type of consciousness. For instance, if I can be just 'be aware' without having thoughts, I would be conscious without any kind of conscious interpretative activity. But maybe I misunderstood you.
If you meant that consciousness is an 'unifying' activity, in a sense yes, I agree.

BTW, there are some psychiatrists that try to apply pheonomenological concepts in their practice. For instance, the concept of 'self-disorder'/ipseity disturbance employs the distinction of 'narrative self' (any kind of conceptual description about ourselves) and the 'basic self/ipseity' (the sense that experiences are our own). They argue that some psychotic experiences (like the experiences where one feels that his thoughts are inserted by some other agent) are actually a strong expression of a disturbed 'basic self', i.e. that the content of the experiences are not one's own (but a lower level of 'privateness' remains, after all...if a content of our experience doesn't feel 'ours', after all, we still have the sense of 'privateness').
The reason I brought about this is because I think that these kinds of study might be useful to study the structure of our experience. For instance, these kind of studies suggests to me that these kind of disorders can only happen in sentient beings that are 'self-conscious', i.e. beings that are conscious to be conscious.

Maybe also @Wayfarer finds this kind of thing interesting.

I'm finding Donald Hoffman's book alternately interesting and frustrating. His formula of 'fitness beats truth' makes me want to ask what is the ‘truth’ that is ‘beaten by fitness’. He says that we don’t see ‘objective reality’ but that we see what evolution primes us to see. But at the same time, as we all have the same evolutionary heritage, then why that can’t also be ‘objective’? We’ll all share a very large pool of common objects of experience, so if I call a tomato an orange, or measure a meter to be 80cm, I’ll be objectively mistaken. — Wayfarer

More or less I had the same impression. I found his 'interface theory of perception' (a form of epistemic idealism) fascinating and also the basic idea that we might not know 'external reality as it is' because, after all, our perceptive and cognitive system is at the service of fitness, i.e. our own survival and the survival of our species. And a 'non-literal' respresentation of external reality might be far more useful than a 'faithful portrait' of it.

I actually didn't like his excursus in speculative idea of contemporary physics. After all, when he did that he was trying to argue for his speculative idea using other speculative ideas (so that chapter was IMO unhelpful). Also, the final chapter about 'conscious realism', where he tries to define what a 'conscious agent' might in general be and concludes that the external reality might only be other conscious agents, might be an interesting speculation but leads to a confusion between it and the interface theoty (to his credit, however, he is clear that the two theories are separate).
Finally, regarding the theorem, well, I think that he uses a weird definition of 'reality'. So, I think that it is a good book, has interesting and provocative ideas, but also I get the frustration and in some cases, his 'wilder' speculations, so to speak, might obscure his more 'reasonable', 'down to earth' ideas.

Thanks for the link, I'll read it.

If suffering is endless then we cannot reach the state of absolute peace but we can reach the state of relative peace. — MoK

Ok. But if this peace is 'relative', as you say, what guarantee we have that we do not lose it?
Also, is this scenario desirable because suffering is less than pleasure in this 'relative peace'?

Well, it depends if experience is necessary for any sort of dynamic progress. If progress can be achieved without experience then there would be no suffering otherwise there would be. Change to me however is not possible without experience. The argument for this is very long and technical. If you buy this argument for the sake of discussion then it follows that suffering is involved in any sort of dynamic progress. — MoK

All I see here is an assertion that change always entails 'suffering'. For instance, the reason why I believe that transience entails suffering in this world is that there isn't an unbroken continuum of pleasurable/positive experiences. Sooner or later, the 'continuum' of positive experiences will have an end, due to illnesses, other kinds of suffering, and death. On the other hand, if there were only positive experiences and the succession of these experiences would continue forever, I would say that there would be no suffering in this case. This is to say that I don't think that logically change necessary entails suffering.

Yes. I'm aware that Spinoza's 17th century worldview predated both 19th century Darwinian Evolution, and 20th century Big Bang theory. So I have updated my own worldview to include those challenges to the standstill world of Spinoza-God. — Gnomon

Well, that's not Spinozism anymore IMO, lol. But of course, you still have a right to call your philosophy a modification of Spinoza's (there are after all analogies) or even say that it is 'Spinozist'.

Perhaps God's omniscient view of the world is like Einstein's Block Time*1, in which all possibilities exist concurrently, yet unchanging. — Gnomon

Well, the problem of 'omniscence' is, indeed, a difficult one. If God (whatever S/He or It is) already knows everything, how we can avoid an 'block time' and also the conclusion that free will is a mere illusion? It's indeed a quite difficult question.

But humans, observing only from inside the world system (limited perspective), can only see one snapshot at a time, then merge those stills into an ever-changing illusory movie. For all practical purposes, I assume the "persistent" illusion of ever-changing Time is true. — Gnomon

Einstein maintained that the distinction between past, present and the future is an illusion, albeit a persistent one, but nevertheless considered the 'now' as the main problem of physics. If the passage of time is illusory, why we do have such a 'persistent illusion'? Our immediate experience is a strong argument against the block time, after all.

Again, this is a matter of perspective. From God's perch outside the physical universe, all things, including humans, are totally dependent on the Source, the Potential, the Omnipotent. But, from a human perspective inside our little world bubble, rational creatures have developed some independence from Absolute Determinism. We "little gods" are indeed dependent relative to God/Omniverse, but independent relative to our local environment, as indicated in image *3. That doesn't make us Autonomous substances, but Relative instances. We are Free only relative to other creatures. :wink: — Gnomon

So, you seem to agree that free will is an illusion, after all. And also the cosmic evolution is merely pespectival and ultimately illusory. If so, your philosophy is closer to Spinoza's than I thought before.
I thought that you asserted that the cosmic evolution is 'real', not illusory. Apparently, I misinterpreted.

The whole point is why would a perfect god create this kind of game of hide-and-seek of his "blessedness" and "good and evil"? It doesn't matter if the game ends in eternal damnation/bliss, or temporary purification/purgation, or whatnot. The idea of eternal damnation or temporary (the rules of the game) don't matter here, just that THERE IS A GAME. — schopenhauer1

I don't understand why you continue to use the 'game' analogy. It is more like a training or a learning process in my opinion.
The reason why I brought Christian Universalism here (a view that lately I feel drawn to BTW), is that ultimately in that view the end result is positive*.

But anyway, for your first question... well, I don't know. Maybe a 'loving, perfect God' creates because it is an expression of its nature (this doesn't imply that God is ontologically dependent on created things but creating is an expression of God's nature...). If this is the case, then, creation doesn't come from a 'need' or a 'lack' in God but it is simply an expression of the nature of God.
But also you might ask, why such a God created a world structured like ours and not another. Well, I don't know how to answer that, to be honest. Did God create other worlds, different from ours? Well, I don't know and I don't know how a universalist might respond to that (same as before).

(*also, I don't think that an universalist must say that all suffering has a 'purpose'. In my previous post, I was speaking about the concept of 'punishment' in this kind of view)

But this is quite evasive of the question I am asking and putting on the human. Why would God give a shit to have creations that need to go on a journey? He's perfect right? He has needs to see this VERY HUMAN STYLE game play out? This isn't very lofty. Kinda what a human would make up if playing a game of "do good" variety. And GUESS WHO IS THE CENTER OF ATTENTION IN THE GAME- HUMANS!! OF course! We truly are images of God, who is a reflection of us, that is. — schopenhauer1

Well, if oneaccepts a Personal God with Whom a person can have a relation, I would say that, yes, persons have a special relation with God - it seems obvious to me. BTW, the 'journey' is not something God needs but something that people/human need (see above).

Of course, if one doesn't accept the existence of a Personal God... but, even if this is the case, I think that religions with a personal God have a lot to teach about human beings as persons, how they relate etc.

The only way to get around this is to define God as everything that ever exists in every possible mode that can ever happen. It is akin to the Many Worlds hypothesis in physics. We are playing out one mode of existence out of an infinite array. — schopenhauer1

This is more or less the Spinozist solution (although, I would say that if the MWI were corrrect, it would describe an infinite mode of the Substance/God). Everything that can exist, does exist necessarily and it is a mode of God. 'We' are also modes, not really 'created things'.
Interestingly, in MWI the only thing that really exist is the 'universal wavefunction'. We, our particular world are convenient abstractions. That's why calling MWI a theory of 'parallel universes' is incorrect, BTW. At the same time, even if MWI were true, it would hardly describe 'everything'.

But as an analogy for pantheism/acosmism where the Deity is an impersonal 'source', I think that MWI is apt (of course, all analogies are limited etc).

I think that, if one adopts the view of an 'impersonal God', yeah I would think that this is a good way to get around.

To be conscious is to unite conceptions in thought, an activity with a vast plurality of representations; consciousness is that by which conceptions can be so united, all under one singular, irreducible representation. — Mww

I think this is somewhat too specific. IMO, I would more or less equate 'being conscious' as 'having a subjective/private experience', without necessarily being aware of that (this would rather be 'self-consciousness', a specific kind of consciousness).
But maybe even 'having a (subjective/private) experience' is too much. Maybe 'consciousness is experiencing' or even only 'consciosness is a synonym of (subjective/private) experience' is better (and maybe we can drop the qualifier subjective/private...after all, I am not sure it makes sense to speak of an experience which is not private).

Sorry for the 'maybes' but it is notoriously difficult to define what is most immediate to us, after all.

I found a good website where are presented the definitions and the axioms of Spinoza's Ethics, which I think you'll like to read. For instance:

By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
...
By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.
....
By mode, I mean the modifications ["Affectiones"] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

Ok, I see. But I would not say that 'consciousness' is a capacity, but an activity.

You can IMO say that 'sentient being' are those beings that can be conscious even if they are not in a given moment (for instance, if one consider someone in a state of general anesthesia...). Of course, the term 'sentient' taken literally would imply that someone unconscious is not sentient, even if alive. But IMO, we can take the liberty to use the phrases 'conscious beings' or 'sentient beings' to indicate all those beings that are conscious or can be conscious.

>>Consciousness is the capacity for experience<< — Wayfarer

What about 'consciousness is the activity of having an experiece' or 'consciousness is the activity of having experiences'?

Well, that is unfortunately not completely up to us. If perfection is boundless then we suffer eternally since we cannot possibly achieve it. If perfection is bounded then we can achieve it hence there will be an end to our sufferings. — MoK

Ok, I see. But if suffering is literally endless, how can such an endless effort be something desirable to us?
For instance, IIRC, Kant's view was that the progress to ethical perfection is endless but I don't think that after a certain point, it involves suffering.

This leads to me to another question. Do you think that any kind of 'dynamic progress', so to speak, necessarily involves suffering? If so, why?

Well, if we achieve perfection we won't suffer anymore. That is the goal of our lives! — MoK

But if such a goal is utterly unachievable and suffering cannot be eliminated, why we should seek it?

That is of interest to me. Especially because, on this forum, the harshest critic of my personal worldview, Enformationism, also claims to be a Spinozist. I wouldn't call myself a Spinozist, since I only know of his ideas via second hand accounts. I told him (the critic) that my philosophical world model is, like Spinoza's, more akin to Science than Religion, but it also assumes that cosmic Evolution is not aimless & accidental, but governed & directed by logical/mathematical internally-coded laws similar to a computer program. — Gnomon

Ok, I think that your view shares some similarities with Spinoza's but isn't compatible with it. After all, there is no 'real' cosmic evolution in Spinoza's view. Change is an illusory appearance that we percieve because of our limited perspective. In the highest way of seeing the world, there is no change.

Since at least one species of gradually evolved creatures has developed a somewhat objective & rational understanding of world events, I conclude that A> the ability to stand outside our emotion-driven animal nature, and B> the power to generate unique personal ideas (abstract representations, images, models, goals) of our own, allows us to become local centers of Will within the universal "Willpower" (motive force) of the universal thermodynamic system, otherwise dominated by destructive Entropy. Which, in effect, makes us humans the "little gods" of the world. Hence, we have begun to create sub-human creatures of our own, such as complex machines and artificial intelligence, that execute the will of their programmers. — Gnomon

I see your point here. But Spinoza would deny any kind of autonomy for human beings. He would say that if we have free will, we would have some kind of independence from God and, therefore, we would be individual substances (after all, a 'substance' in classical metaphysics means something like 'a truly existing individual/entity'). But he would argue that if we were substances, we would be totally independent and therefore be like God, which is absurd. Our ontological dependence forbids our free will, according to him.
He would ask you to prove how we can be autonomous if we are 'modes' of the One Substance. He would only grant an illusion of free will, not a true free will.

In brief, how can be free will in human beings, if human beings are not separately existing entities?

How do you think Spinoza would judge such a 21st century update of his own 17th century worldview? :smile: — Gnomon

See above.

There is another contrary claim about God that deletes the "omni" prefixes, leaving God with only some power, some knowledge, and some, limited, presence. This God is still a creator, but not the manager of the expanding universe. This God is profoundly loving, but doesn't have perpetual patience and isn't above getting very angry with us paragons of animals, us crowns of creation, and smiting us when He just can't stand us any longer. — BC

I think that this view would, in a way, solve many philosophical conundrums of the traditional picture of God. For instance, if God is not omniscent and not omnipotent, it is easier to accept that God might intend to save everyone but, at the same time, his wish is not realized, despite his best efforts.
But the 'price to be paid', so to speak, is that this kind of God seems to be in a way limited and too much 'human'.

The ultimate expression of this very loving God is that He became man in Christ. God ceased being God.

This theogony hasn't been very popular, because among other things, if God isn't God anymore, Who is in charge and to Whom have we been praying to for the last 2000 years? What about the Holy Ghost? Is the Holy Ghost the ghost of God, hovers over the world? — BC

I think that the main problem here is that if God ceased to be God, it cannot save anymore.

So, God didn't create a perfect world — BC

Yeah, Ok. But what if we could not exist in a perfect world?

, @BC,

I am not sure how this response relates to Christian Universalism. Please, do not get me wrong, it was a very interesting. The first part was very informative about the Jewish background.
But, as I said, I am not sure how is relevant to Christian Universalism. Did you intend to show that it is inconsistent as a view?*

That is to say, God is STILL suspiciously all too human. He wants suffering so that "holiness" (himself basically in material form) can be revealed to his own creation. It reads too much like a game designer that wants to see his cool creation play out. It is especially odd when adding in elements like "reward and punishment" for these players.. wiping people out, condemning them, exiling them, cursing them, rebuking them.. etc. etc. This seems again all too human...To WANT punishment and reward, let alone meeting it out as divine dispensation. YOU get the World to Come, YOU get the World to Come, not YOU though.. The little creations ENDURE the negatives, because I'm curious to see how you overcome them... All too human. Obstacle course for the piddling creations. A game. Is it divine boredom then? Does BOREDOM, yet again rear its ugly head? — schopenhauer1

I see, but note that Christian Universalism has a quite peculiar 'take' on this. As I understand it, these thinkers see the whole history as a sort of educative process and the whole creation is seen as a pure act of love. Punishments are not seen as retributive but as remedial, educative, purifying, i.e. a corrective punishments. So, the suffering that human beings endure is seen as having a purpose, a particular aim.
Also, human beings are rational creatures and choose what they think is good for them. The 'corrective punishments' are, as far as I understand, seen as a way to learn what is really good for them (i.e. that God is what is really good).
Considering that the aim is an 'eternal blessedness' and that we finite creatures cannot have it by our own efforts and merits, according to these christians (on this point they agree with the traditional view), suffering, endurance etc have all an ultimately good purpose for all human beings (although the 'corrections' can be very long, hard etc according to them). Also, in my understanding, they see Jesus' (and therefore God's) own suffering as a necessary step for salvation.

Of course, I guess that you can retort that God may have chosen to create human beings in an even different way, where even these corrections are not necessary. But, again, how can we know that it is even possible to do that?

Finally, regarding the whole thing being being 'all to human', I don't know. On the one hand, I do understand why you would think so. On the other hand, I think that, after all, if one accepts a Personal God, the relation between he/she and God must have some kind of analogy with the relation with another human being. So, the spiritual 'journey' and the relation between humans and God might necessarily be framed in an apparently 'too human' way in order to be useful to humans.

*Regarding this point, as an aside, I think that the universalist position can be argued for from a scriptural basis (again, I am saying this because I am not sure if your point was that the universalist view is completely incompatible with the Bible). For instance, 1 Timothy 2:1-6 and 2 Peter 3:9 say that God 'wants all people to be saved' and does not want 'anyone to perish, but everyone come to repentance'. If one assumes that God's will will be realized, these two passages support the universalist view. Of course, for instance, the Catholic view accepts the eternal hell doctrine, despite agreeing that God doesnt want anyone to perish (e.g. here) - I cannot see how this wish can be realized if the fate of human beings is 'sealed' at the end of this brief earthly life (after all, putting such a brief time limit seems to me quite an obstacle to that wish, especially when we consider that during this life our knowledge is limited, as Saint Paul says).
But, again, this is not a discussion forum about Christianity and I think I'll end my digression here.

Mainlander has a darker version of this. The boredom leads to creation, but not so that it plays out in some game-like fashion, but because of a sort of the need to break out of its own boring unity.. He had to individuate himself to carry out a sort of suicide, akin to the "Heat Death of the Universe". Oddly, the ideas of entropy play much more into that notion. — schopenhauer1

Well, I have no arguments against this view. If suffering is intrinsic to any kinds of 'existence', clearly seeking a total end to suffering leads to an end of existence. But, honestly, while I can agree that it can be argued for, I think in us there is also a deep desire, a deep hope that existence is not so meaningless, that suffering is not so intrinsic to existence etc... now it would be quite a paradoxical desire/hope if the best we can desire/hope is pure non-existence (while the desire/hope itself is also an intimate hope to be 'free from' death). Of course, I reckon that this is not a compelling philosophical argument, but our existence would be very absurd if the best we can hope is non-existence. (BTW, I do respect philosophical pessimism. I agree, for instance, with Schopenhauer's view that a true satisfaction/happiness cannot be achieved by seeking satisfaction in the 'pleasures of the world'. But IMO it is incomplete...also, it could be argued that Schopenhauer's pessimism doesn't invalidate the hope that we can transcend suffering - after all, in the Part IV of the World as Will and Representation, he does argue for that, albeit in a bleak way. Mainlander's pessimism, on the other hand, simply leaves no room for any kind of 'freedom from suffering' that is not non-existence as I understand it. He is more radical than Schopenhauer)

Thanks for the response. I'll answer you tomorrow.

It depends on what the state of perfection is. If the state of perfection is boundless we will ever suffer. If the state of perfection is bounded then we will soon find peace. — MoK

I don't think that it is necessary that a 'boundless' state of perfection contains suffering. But IMO, why seek it if suffering is literally endless? Seeking an end to suffering seems to be the most natural thing to seek (even if it would be impossible).

Fortunately or unfortunately, suffering is an inseparable feature of life! Fortunately, because we have a way to evolve. Unfortunately, because we have to suffer. — MoK

I see your point, but IMO everyone desires to be from suffering in a very intimate level. Why should I seek a state of perfection if I will still suffer?

I saw your response as I was typing. I'll answer tomorrow to you too!

A God who wants evolution in life. Suffering is an inseparable feature of life, without it we don't learn many things, and without it we don't evolve. — MoK

Do you think that this 'evolution' has an 'end'? Or is endless?

Yes, suffering can teach many things but I would hope that life is not an inseparable feature of life. Why should I want to suffer if I have no chance to somehow find an escape from it?

Then back to my points earlier about a god that can’t create a universe where joy and no suffering exist. God wants this universe to have suffering. And he could make a universe without it. That’s all the info you need. — schopenhauer1

What if, something like Christian universalism is true? Do you think that in this case suffering is still unacceptable if God exists?

I like to drop in a Latin phrase every now and then too, but it's helpful to provide a translation or English definition, especially when one's Latin gem is NOT common knowledge (like et cetera). — BC

'Sub specie aeternitatis' is a technical phrase coined by Spinoza and it can be translated as "under the perspective of eternity". According to him, the 'world' could be contemplated in two ways:

- sub specie temporis (under the aspect of time): this is the 'usual' way we contemplate the world, from our limited perspective. Our perspective is, however, partial and our knowledge is incomplete. This 'partiality', according to Spinoza, causes feelings of anxiety, grief, loss (i.e. mental suffering) etc because we do not understand the 'great scheme'. We also believe that the events are not inevitable, according to him.

-sub specie aeternitatis (under the aspect of eternity): this is the 'higher' way of contemplating the world. According to Spinoza, this kind of way of 'seeing' the world could be attained by philosophical reflection*. Once this insight is obtained, everything in the world is seen in relation to the whole and, instead of interpreting the world as a collection of separately existing entities (substances), the 'world' is actually seen as an unique substance, an unique entity, which is absolute and eternal. All particular things in the world are seen as 'modes' of the Substance (i.e. God), not individual substances themselves (in the first Part of the 'Ethics' he argued that a 'substance' must be eternal, ontologically and conceptually independent). At the same time, all the 'modes', our finite mind included, are seen in a way eternal, not because they are eternal in themselves but they participate in the eternal Being of God/The Substance - that's why he says: "The mind is eternal in so far as it conceives things from the standpoint of eternity" in Part V of the 'Ethics'. Since the mind is seen as eternal, it is also in a sense free from death and therefore, and for a mind that understands this, it becomes fearless and free from suffering (i.e. 'salvation' as he understood it). Also, any kind of judgement that arise from the 'lower' perspective is transcended. So the world is neither just or injust, neither imperfect nor perfect (at least as we usually understand the terms)

*This kind of thought that a 'higher' way of contemplating/knowing/understanding the world wasn't introduced by Spinoza. Nor Spinoza was particularly 'original' in his metaphysics. Parmenides for instance IMO argued for more or less the same metaphysics and the same view that a 'higher perspective' is salvific/liberating. Spinoza, however, was maybe original in his conviction that philosophical reflection could lead to 'salvation'.

Anyway, as I said, I was presenting Spinoza's thought (as I understood it). I was actually a Spinozist in 2011-2013, but now my views are quite different. For instance I am neither convinced by his metaphysics (especially I quite disagree with his complete denial of any kind of free will) nor by his convinction that philosophy is 'liberating'. I do find his views fascinating and they did left a strong impression in me.

edit: @Gnomon, I think that this post might be of your interest too.

I was not familiar with Spinoza's concept of a "Sage". Apparently it's a human who "participates" in the divine nature. Is that something like the "wisdom" that philosophers seek? Does such wisdom allow a Sage to find ways to work around fatalistic Determinism, in order to exercise Free Will? Does that semi-divine willpower make us the "little gods" of this world, who break free from physical limits and animal urges? :chin: — Gnomon

To be fair, I think that more than 10 years passed since I last read his 'Ethics' (but he did have a strong influence in my life) and right now I don't have his work available. By 'sage' I meant a person that contemplates sub specie aeternitatis.
Anyway, no the 'liberation' of the 'sage' doesn't lead to some kind of autonomy of the will but 'simply' an understanding that leads to the cessation of any kind of suffering, according to Spinoza. For instance, if one sees things 'sub specie aeternitatis', one cannot grieve for any kind of loss because he understands that such an event is part of the necessary expression of God (and this 'understanding' is not simply an 'intellectual understanding' of the doctrine). This 'insight' brings peace and serenity, according to him.

Yes. The hypothetical all-encompassing source of all possibilities is assumed to be transcendent and Holistic : more than the sum of its parts. This is in contrast to the immanent deity of reductive PanTheism. Moreover, the notion of PanEnDeism, although metaphorical, is intended to be amenable to rational science & philosophy, although its transcendence makes it inaccessible to empirical evidence. :halo: — Gnomon

Ok. But if its parts are totally depenent on the Whole - and not distinct to it - and the viceversa is not true, how can we say that they are not 'illusions'? I mean, if the Whole exists and it is ontologically independent and there is absolutely nothing 'outside' it, the 'parts' seem more like an useful abstraction of our intellect. If ultimately, there is only 'the Whole/God', I cannot see how this isn't acosmism.
If 'reductive pantheism' affirms that 'God' is 'nothing more' than its parts, then 'God' is dependent. Being dependent, it cannot be called 'God'.

So, from God's timeless perspective, human suffering is inconsequential? The Christian "solution" to suffering is to give some humans a remedial do-over (second life) in a timeless heavenly Paradise. For non-Christians though, maybe Stoic acceptance is the best we can hope for? :cool: — Gnomon

As I interpret Spinoza, in a sense yes, it is 'inconsequential'. The world appears to be 'injust', we get frustrated by the 'unfairness' that we see etc, but all these judgments are transcended in the highest perspective (and the same is valid for their opposites). They simply do not apply.
BTW, Spinoza has been dubbed 'the Stoic of the 1600s' by some, so yeah there are some similarities.

Anyway, what's the 'solution' in your view? And, also, what is the problem about which we should seek a solution?

IIRC, Spinoza's 'solution' was a state of blessedness/peace of mind that according to him came with the 'understanding' of the 'sub specie aeternitatis' perspective. The 'problem' was 'mental suffering', i.e. the suffering due to fear, grief, despair etc which he believed we could solve by 'adopting' the aformentioned 'transcendent perspective'.

I may have to add Causa Sui to my lexicon of First Causes and Prime Movers. Some Forum posters don't believe in ultimate causes or principles ; preferring to think in terms of observable serial Effects rather than a hypothetical (imaginary) unique self-existent Ultimate Cause. I guess that's the main distinction between the worldviews of practical Science and theoretical Philosophy. :nerd: — Gnomon

I am somewhat conflicted about the idea of a 'First Cause'. I don't believe that it is something that is amenable to empirical research.

Hmmm. That sounds like Fatalism --- or as Spinoza might put it : Necessitarianism. If so, did he also deny that introspective rational philosophical humans have some degree of FreeWill, not completely driven by innate animal urges? :chin: — Gnomon

I don't think so. But he would not say that a 'sage' is like someone 'driven by innate animal urges', for obvious reasons.

There is another version of Cosmic Holism --- PanEnDeism : all in god --- which views what humans call "God" as merely the Whole of which we humans are minuscule moving parts — Gnomon

Is this Whole eternal and not dependent from its parts?

For instance, a dog's body is composed of cells. Even if one adopts a 'holistic' view of the 'dog', the dog is still dependent on its cells. But this cannot be the case for the 'Whole' if it is to be called 'God', even in the most liberaly way. Otherwise, why use the word 'God' in the first place?

If you feel & act as-if you are morally free, then you have some degree of FreeWill. But that's a whole n'other thread. :nerd: — Gnomon

Actually, the denial of free will is quite pertinent for the thread, at least with respect to the 'moral' evils. If there is no 'free will', can we still speak about moral evils?

Also, IMO Spinoza's 'solution' to the problem of suffering is to see everything sub specie aeternitatis and thus transcend every individual perspective. In the distorted individual perspective the world might appear 'unfair' but when the world is seen sub specie aeternitatis, such a judgment is transcended.

The philosophers of his time were just beginning to depart from the party line of Catholic theologians. So Spinoza's deistic deity must have seemed radical to many fellow philosophers. Was his causa sui not deemed to be the First Cause of all material things? :smile: — Gnomon

'Causa sui' means uncaused and yes it is deemed the ultimate 'cause' of all material things like everything else, as said in other posts.

So God is a concept to define temporal existence, not a mundane material creature like ourselves. — Gnomon

? I would say that Spinoza is far more closer to classical theism than this kind of view.

But Holistic philosophers find such concepts necessary for their quest to probe the limits of reality : the General, the Principle, the Whole, of which all real things are mere specks of dust. — Gnomon

Yes, but note that for Spinoza and for many of the 'holists' the 'Whole' is, in fact, ontologically independent and its existence does not depend on its 'parts'. This is why IMO a fully consistent pantheism might necessarily lead to some kind of acosmism, where the 'parts' are merely illusions.

BTW, Spinoza also, if I recall correctly, believed that absolutely everything was inevitable. This is a form of 'determinism' which is stronger than Laplace: Laplace's determinism doesn't fix the initial conditions. In Spinoza's way it is even impossible to think that things could have been different, even in principle. When I was a sort of committed 'spinozist' (back in 2011-13), for a while it lead me to have a sort of calm acceptance of the events in my life. But then I couldn't deny the appearance of my own 'free will' and I accepted that my choices weren't all 'inevitable'.
To return to the topic of the thread, Spinoza's surely believed that justice and fairness were human constructs and the world could only appear 'unfair' or 'imperfect' due to a deluded perspective (a perspective which according to him was to be understood in order to be transcended, paradoxically).

Do you think Spinoza would agree with the label : "god of the philosophers", as contrasted with the God of theologians, and the godless-but-fecund Material World of scientists? :chin: — Gnomon

Yes. But note that he viewed his God as a refinement of the 'God' of the philosophers and theologians of his time. Certainly not a 'material source' of everything.

:up: