There only has to be one substance with the "stable property" of "change". — Benj96

"Change" is incompatible with "stable property"

No. The object of perception is that which is perceived. It is external to the senses, and is merely that by which they are affected, depending on the mode of their presence. Technically, empirical representation is an object of intuition, which is called phenomenon. Herein lay the proverbial “veil of perception”, from which arises indirect realism, and in which much ado is made of nothing. — Mww

Ok, so we'll say that the object of perception is that which is perceived. So the question is what chooses the aspects of reality which will be represented by a given sense organ at a given time. Why does hearing give us a representation of some sort of waves, for example? The "what" here is what we understand as sound waves, and the "how" is the actual image of the sound, the perception, phenomenon.

That there is a vast quantity of objects possible to perceive, and therefore become possible phenomenal representations, is true, but irrelevant. — Mww

How can you say this is irrelevant, when it is the crucial point? Since there is a a vast quantity of possible objects, and only some of these are represented by each sense, then there must be a choice (implying judgement) as to which possibilities will be represented. That is the "what". Furthermore, there must be other judgements as to how the object will be represented, because there is also numerous possibilities here as well.

That which determines the possibility of being represented, is the type and structure, the physiology, of human sensory apparatus. No decisions need be made; if an object is present to perception and a sensation follows, there will be a representation of it. And the need for decision for mode of sensation is already determined by the physiology itself, in that it is impossible to see with the ears, and so for each of the senses. — Mww

You are wrong here, decisions are required to create that structure. The "human sensory apparatus" is structured in such a way that decisions would be required for its creation. Do you really think that a complex sensing apparatus like that could have been created without any decisions made? Do you not recognize that such a construction project requires decisions? How would that construction process proceed without decisions? Would bits and pieces just come together by chance, and create that highly complex apparatus, just by random chance? Something is clearly amiss with this type of thinking.

True enough, but the question of how an object is composed in such and such a way is not possible from the mere fact it has a certain extension in space, which is all that can be represented in a phenomenon. The questions of the how of composition require conceptions relatable to the object, and intuition contains only two conceptions of its own, space and time. — Mww

The fact being considered here is the fact of sensation itself. What is given is sensation, and I am asking how is it possible that there is a being which senses. And the question is being asked in the context of the concept of judgement, or decision. The question is, is it not a necessary requirement for some judgements or decisions to have been made in order for a body which senses to be created, or to simply come into existence, to become?

The example was, suppose we take evolution as a sort of trial and error process. Is it not necessary for decisions to be made for a trial and error process to proceed?

True, but that doesn’t say trial and error occurs in intuition, which is the source of phenomenal representations, or that there is trial and error going on in the first place, anywhere. — Mww

The process being discussed is not necessarily a process of trial and error, that's an example. It could be a different sort of process, but it would still require decisions.

What you say here, if I understand correctly, is that the decisions, or judgements are not necessarily "in" the act of intuition itself. I respect that perspective, and that's why I've been arguing that these judgements are required for, as logically prior to intuition, and not necessarily an actual part of the intuition process itself.

There's an example which some TPF participants used in the past, of a thermostat. The thermostat switches the power off and on according to heat or lack of it. Out of all the available possibilities, it takes temperature, and out of all the possible ways of representing, it switches. We would commonly say that the thermostat doesn't make these decisions, it doesn't do any judging, yet judgement of these parameters is necessary for its existence, as having been made prior to it being created. And this would be how we understand the required judgement in relation to the existence of that sort of tool.

That seems to be an acceptable solution to how we understand the role of judgement in the existence of that sort of thing. But when we look at evolving life forms this way of looking at it becomes extremely problematic. That way, that the judgement is prior to the construction, would be the archaic way of looking at God's creation. God would have made the judgements or decisions required for creating each separate type of being, with each of their specific capacities, and God created these species accordingly, from all these different judgements. But the science of evolution shows us that things are not like this.

Evolutionary theory provides us with no reason to remove the requirement of judgement or decision though. It shows us that the judgements, or decisions, are not prior to the existence of the being, like in the case of the thermostat, so we are left with no other place for the judgement except within the being itself. This ought to incline us to look at "intuition" more closely, to see if perhaps there is judgement inherent within it.

Rather than an object having its composition somehow represented, trial and error then suggesting attempts to find out what that composition entails, why not just attribute properties to objects in conjunction with its representation, in which case the object’s composition conforms exactly to our understanding of its representation. If this is the way it works, this certain thing of this certain composition, is called a sun comprised of hot burning gas only because we say so, hence how that thing is to be known by us. — Mww

The issue here is error. Error is very real, and we must account for it. If we all, every single one of us, sees the sun as the sun, and we all agree to call it that, then there would be no problem. But as soon as one person disagrees with this, or hallucinates and sees it in some other way, then we cannot say "the object’s composition conforms exactly to our understanding of its representation", because someone is left out by this use of "our". Now we want to say that this person is simply in error, but that opens a whole can of worms, because if there is the possibility of error, this negates the necessity "conforms exactly to our understanding". We can't say that because we must allow for the real possibility of error, to be able to say that the person who does not agree is in error.

Judgement isn’t defined by the necessity of conscious thought; it is conditioned by it. That conscious thought is necessary for judgements regarding phenomena, says nothing about what judgement is or does in this regard. — Mww

Come on Mww. If you say that conscious thought is necessary for judgement, that clearly says something about what judgement is. You are stating that conscious thought is a necessary property of judgement, just like if you said animality is a necessary condition of being human. To state a necessary condition is obviously to say something about what the thing is.

And this is the perspective which I am trying to demonstrate to you as backward. From what I've been explaining, judgement is necessarily prior to conscious thought, therefore conscious thought must be understood as conditioned by judgement, not vise versa. This is why our conscious judgements are often overwhelmed by biases and prejudices. Prejudice is base in prior judgement which may not have involved conscious thought. It is imperative that we turn that perspective around, and understand how judgement is prior to thought, in order that we can overcome the harms of prejudice.

We can take deductive logic as an example. Deduction proceeds from premises, and valid deduction will maintain truth or falsity in its conclusions according to its premises. In this way, valid deductive logic cannot be mistaken, if it is valid, error is eliminated. So if there was something like "pure deductive logic", just the formal aspect, with no content, this valid logic would provide us with "pure truth". However, without any content there is nothing there, just the form of the logical process, and this provides us with nothing true about the world.

So we can take the premises as providing content. However, the premises could be wrong. And so we have a source of error. But notice that this source of error involves judgements made concerning the premises, and these judgements are prior to the logical process. Now we can understand that the source of error in unsound premises is these prior judgements. So if we look at the bigger picture, and instead of just looking at the process of logic specifically, we look at conscious thinking as a whole, we can see by analogy that the major source of error in conscious thinking in general, is the prior judgements which are prior to the conscious thinking.

No. There are possibilities and selections from them, but they been examined and selected by the time judgement intervenes. — Mww

See, you are putting judgement after judgement here. You imply that something 'examines and selects' and that is what we call an act of judgement. And you say that this act of judgement has already occurred before judgement intervenes. Do you understand the need to confirm things, to recheck, retest, etc.? That conscious judgement comprises one level of judgement does not exclude the likelihood of numerous other levels of judgement.

Here it becomes clear why the presence of an object removes possibility for it, but still leaves possibility for what it is. This moves possibility to being considered in thought, which is not that there is an object, which is never questioned, but what possibilities are there for how the object is to be cognized such that it accords with its sensation. Turns out, judgement is that by which the relations are validated. — Mww

The possibility of whether or not there is "an object" is questioned though. What process philosophy does is deny the reality of the object saying that all is process, as did Heraclitus' philosophy of "becoming" in ancient times. Once we see that a coherent philosophy can be produced which denies the reality of "the object", then the "possibility" of an object must replace the "necessity" of an object. Now we must consider that sensation gives us only the possibility of an object, because "that which sensation gives us" can be represented purely as activity, without any objects. And cognition which "accords with its sensation" need not consist of any objects. And the object cannot be taken as a given, it may be created by the cognitive act, as a sort of judgement imposed on the possibility of an object.

I hear a loud boom, so it cannot be denied I heard something, from which arises a mere phenomenon. — Mww

Your premise presumes what you claim, that is known as begging the question. When you state "I hear a loud boom", that premise dictates that you actually heard something. But we cannot start with that assumption unless we are certain that it is correct. We may start with your claim, or proposition, "I heard a loud boom", but then we must allow for the possibility that this proposition is false, therefore it is possible that you did not hear anything. It may have been all in your imagination, or you may be lying, or have faulty memory or something like that. So this example is useless. The presence of an object cannot be taken for granted, it must be approached as a possibility.

So it is that I have been given the phenomenon via sensibility... — Mww

Yes, you have been given the phenomenon via sensibility, but there is no necessary relationship between the phenomenon and what it relates to. You assume "an object", but that itself must be taken as a possibility. So we are left with the question of why does sensibility give us only possibilities, never any necessities. And the further issue is why do we assume actualities, necessities. That is just a judgement we make, that there is something actual behind all these possibilities.

I never said every judgment required conscious thought, but only those judgements having to do with empirical cognitions. Those judgements concerned with knowledge of real physical objects. The reason I wanted us to get away form perception, sensation and implied deceptions thereof.

Hence the question back on pg 6, hinting at the domain of judgements grounded on how a subject feels about that which he thinks, and while conscious thought is still present, it is no longer a necessary antecedent condition and judgements of this aesthetic form are therefore not validations of it. — Mww

I don't see the point here. Isn't "how a subject feels" just a matter of sensation? You want to get away from sensations to talk about feelings, but feelings are just another way, (other than through conscious thought), that sensations affect us. So judgements based in feelings concern real physical objects just as much as judgements based in conscious thought do. And this is not a useful distinction.

But no, I reject the notion of free will as a conjoined conception. There is freedom and there is will, but it is the case the will is not free in regard to the objects representing its volitions in accordance with laws, but in another, absolute autonomy, which is a type of freedom, by which the will determines the laws by which it shall legislate itself. — Mww

I can't comprehend this. Are you saying that the will is free in so far as its volitions must be in accordance with laws, but also that the will determines these laws? Isn't that absolute freedom then? What's the point in saying "in accordance with laws", if the will is free to state whatever laws it desires?

And this part, "the objects representing its volitions", what are these objects here? Are they just possible objects, or the possibility for an object, as described above?

You say "getting close" here, but really our vocabularies are so far apart, and that's why we can't really get close without very lengthy discussion to understand the way each other talks.

Now it should become clearer that discursive judgements concern themselves with the condition of the intelligence of the subject, but aesthetic judgements concern themselves with the condition of the subject himself, his intelligence be what it may. Under these purely subjective conditions, judgement validates that which the subject does, in accordance with his inclinations, which are therefore contingent, in relation to what his obligations prescribe him to do, in accordance with his principles, which are therefore necessary. — Mww

So you make a distinction between discursive judgements and aesthetic judgements. But I don't see what an aesthetic judgement could possibly be, under the precepts you've described. Are these judgements which are done without conscious thought? If so, then why not allow that all the different animals, insects, plants, etc., also make some sort of aesthetic judgements or judgements of another sort? These judgements would validate what these living beings do.

Are we done now? — Mww

To tell you the truth, I don't think so, but we could quit anytime you want . You haven't convinced me of your perspective, nor have I convinced you of mine. We may be on the road to compromise with your proposal of two types of judgement though. Would you be open to the idea of numerous types of judgement?

What the representation will be of? Hell, that’s a given: an intuitive representation, a phenomenon, can be nothing other than whatever is an object of perception, or a manifold of objects. — Mww

That's what the representation is, an object of perception. The "object" is not what the representation represents. The object is the phenomenon, the representation. The question is how is it possible to produce a representation without some sort of decision as to what will be represented. Of the vast possibilities available to be represented, there is a specific representation which is produced which represents a particular portion of the available possibilities. Obviously it is not random as to what will be represented, so don't you think there must be some sort of decision as to which possibilities will be represented?

Phenomena represent only what the senses provide, regardless of what that provision is. Hence…..imagination. That we make mistakes is also given; just that we must be conscious of them in order to know them as mistakes, which makes explicit we don’t make them right here right now. — Mww

So consider what you say here "phenomena represents only what the senses provide". There must be something which determines "what the senses provide". Of course the obvious answer would appear to be that the physical composition of the body makes that determination. However that is not a real answer, unless you can say why the body is composed in that specific way. You see the body is composed in a specific way, so that the various senses provide particular portions of the vast possibilities, but the question is how could the body get composed in this way without some decisions, judgements. Take the process of trial and error for example, this process can only proceed through judgements.

That conscious thinking is a necessary condition for the activity of judgement, does not serve as definition of it. — Mww

I think that is exactly what an act of definition is, to say what is essential of the thing being defined. It's just that the definition is not yet complete. Therefore it cannot serve as a complete definition in that sense, because there would be other requirements as well. The proposition "human is necessarily animal", is an act of definition. So for you to say judgement is necessarily thinking, is also an act of definition. You have not been able to complete your definition because this is the point which I dispute. So there are two ways in which this cannot serve, one is that it is incomplete, and the other is that the evidence which I presented indicates that your generalization is produced from faulty inductive reasoning.

Ok, fine. All those are still judgements. We don’t care about kinds; we want to know what any kind is, what all kinds are. What is it that makes any kind of judgement, a judgement. How did this kind come about; how did that kind come about, which inexorably reduces to how does any kind come about, or, how do all kinds come about. Only then can sufficient reason be given for why a self-contradiction might disappear, which would seem to require from you a proof that thinking is not a requirement for any kind of judgement, in spite of at least a logical proof I gave that conscious thinking is a necessary requirement for at least one kind, that being with respect to phenomena. — Mww

OK, now we're getting down to the point, the matter of exactly what a judgement is. Instead of being distracted by the idea that a judgement is defined by the necessity of thinking, we can put that requirement aside, and look at what "judgement" really consists of. Would you agree that judgement requires possibilities, and is in some way a selection from possibility? With this basic definition, would you agree that no thinking is required to select from possibility? Then if you can put the requirement of thinking aside, and start with the requirement of selecting from possibility, as the essential requirement, we could build a more complete definition from this starting point, instead of your proposal.

So you’d have it that, e.g., an irrational judgement, is that judgement entirely divorced from thinking, but I would maintain that an irrational judgement is that judgement concluded from improper thinking. — Mww

I used those examples to demonstrate the possibility of judgement without thinking, so that you might allow this as a possibility. I didn't mean that every irrational judgement is necessarily a judgement without thinking, but that it is possible that some irrational judgements might be judgements without thinking. So this is why I mentioned numerous possibilities for judgements without thinking. I also said emotional judgements, and judgements which appear to be random. I wanted you to consider these as possibilities too. And though you might say that some emotional judgements, and some judgements which appear to be random are actually based in thought, I wanted you to accept the possibility that some of these might be made without thought. Once you allow that this is possible, then your proposition that judgement necessarily requires thinking is unjustified.

As an aside, do you believe in free will? If so, do you see that a true, freely willed act would necessarily be free from the influence of thinking? This is what Augustine exposed, that the will is a distinct aspect of the intellect, distinct from reasoning. Then Aquinas showed that while the will is subject, subservient, to the reasoning intellect in common acts of judgement, ultimately the will must be free from this subjection to reason, in an absolute sense. This is how we can explain the problem exposed by Plato, of how it is possible for a human being to do what one knows is not good. Judgement sometimes goes contrary to the thinking.

Your way cannot explain the irrationality itself, whereas mine stipulates it necessarily. You, therefore, haven’t alleviated a methodological self-contradiction, but in fact enforced it. — Mww

i don't see that you have a valid point. Irrationality is fundamentally not explainable, that's what constitutes being "irrational", that it cannot be explained rationally. It must therefore remain unintelligible. So the fact that I leave irrationality as unexplained is consistent with what irrationality really is. That you think you can stipulate, necessarily, what irrationality is, indicates that you misunderstand irrationality.

The survival of the pattern is its persistence. We reason back from this. What kind of patterns persist ? — plaque flag

But this is inconsistent with what evolution actually is, as evolving, changing patterns. That certain aspects persist is not the same as saying that the pattern persists, because "the pattern" must encompass the whole, not just a part. So the fact that a part persists is not the same as "the pattern persists".

So instead we get those that replicate. In biological cases, we have variation, and this explains increasing complexity. — plaque flag

This is the problem right here. Variation is not replication. Therefore "replication" is a faulty, 'false' principle. It is not suited for describing evolution. What is essential and fundamental to evolution is difference, not sameness. That's why there is such a wide range of different living beings in our environment.

All of reality is a prison. The question is, what is outside of that prison? — an-salad

I think the more appropriate representation is "the belief held by most people, as to what constitutes 'all of reality', is a prison". Once we dismiss this belief, to see that reality is much different from what most people believe it to be, then we are released from that prison.

Personally I reject the thesis that signs have private immaterial referents. — plaque flag

I'm talking about meaning. Do you accept that the same physical thing, the sign itself, might mean something different to me as compared to what it means to you? To me, that would indicate "private immaterial referents". "Referent" here implies what the sign symbolizes, or is associated with, for the individual.

Instances of the pattern will only need to survive long enough to replicate. — plaque flag

Yes, this is exactly why reproduction and survival, as ends or goals, are completely different. If a particular instance of a pattern only needs to survive long enough to replicate, then survival is simply a means to the end, which is to replicate. Survival is only necessary so far as to replicate, and if replication could be accomplished instantaneously survival would not be necessary at all. So if replication is the goal, we can dismiss survival as not the real goal at all. Survival is not necessarily consistent with replication.

The problem with your presentation though, is that "replicate" is not a good word for you to use here. That is why I used "reproduce" instead. "Replicate" implies the production of a replica, a copy, but that is not what living beings do, they change through the course of reproduction, they do not replicate. This change is an essential aspect, as necessary for evolution. So we ought not call reproduction replication, because replication is not conducive to evolution, but reproduction is.

This difference is why it is important to separate reproduction from survival. If maintaining the very same being was what is important to life, then survival would take precedence over reproduction. But if change is more important than staying the same, then reproduction takes precedence over survival. The latter is what is the case. If you model reproduction as replication then you negate the importance of change, and you are left with little if any difference between survival and replication. Then you have no principle for the reality of evolution, which is change.

And there it is. Right in front of you the whole time. I wasn’t going to use the word until you did, which sooner or later you must. No silver platters for you, though, nope, no way. Get there on your own, only way to the possible epiphanic moment. — Mww

Well, are you going to explain, how something can make a representation without some sort of decisions or judgement as to what the representation will be of, and how it is to be produced, so that I can have that epiphanic moment, or are you just going to continue with your unsupported assertions that judgement requires a conscious mind?

Been telling you all along how I think judgement as you use it could NOT be done, which presupposes I think how it can. It could NOT be used as you’ve been suggesting because eventually it leads to methodological self-contradiction. — Mww

All you've told me is that you believe that judgement necessarily implies conscious thinking, as a logical requirement. I've shown you how the existence of illogical, irrational, emotional, and seemingly random judgements, demonstrate that what you belief is not the case. The evidence shows your belief is false.

The "methodological self-contradiction" which you refer to is the result of your faulty definition of "judgement", which makes conscious thinking a necessary requirement for judgement. This leads to multiple levels of "thinking" within the same being. If you would divorce judgement from thinking, as the evidence of illogical, irrational, emotional, and random judgements necessitates, then this "methodological self-contradiction" would disappear. You would no longer be confronted with multiple levels of thinking because you would accept the reality of what the evidence indicates, that the act of judgement does not require any thinking at all.

Anyway….editorializing aside…..I’ve posited some boundaries/limitations on it, but I’m going to wait til you work on bringing out what you think it is, before going further. I’m sure you’ll bring along your own necessary presuppositions in support, cuz you’re gonna need ‘em. — Mww

We're going to have to discuss these boundaries. I think your proposal of a purely logical system is untenable. There is no way to free ourselves from content in an absolute way. Some types of formalism attempt this task, but what happens is that the content gets hidden within the form and this leaves the logic less reliable.

Another unwarranted deductive inference. Excepting perception, no concept used thus far in this dialectic can be associated with a material system. In fact, I stated for the record I’m working with abstract conceptual analysis, which makes explicit an isolated metaphysical system. — Mww

I have no idea what you mean here by "metaphysical system".

In a closed physical system, it is the material that is necessary cause for metaphysical effect. But in the metaphysical system itself, any faculty contained in it is necessarily related to, but may not be caused by, some other faculty in that same system, re: cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical inconsistency. — Mww

It makes no sense to me, to talk about a faculty which is contained within a metaphysical system. A metaphysical system, to the extent that this makes any sense, would be the product of the faculty which produces it.

Not in so many words, no. Given a purely logical metaphysical system, the consequence of judgement is determined by its antecedents. Cause/effect doesn’t say enough, and there is an argument, perhaps too obscure for this particular discussion, that because cause/effect is a category and the categories are only applicable to empirical conditions, cause/effect does not apply to purely logical systems, which are concerned merely with rational form without regard for empirical content. — Mww

You've gone off on some strange tangent. What the heck is a "purely logical metaphysical system"? These assertions you are making are not based in anything. There is no such thing as "purely logical systems, which are concerned merely with rational form without regard for empirical content", because even a logical form requires expression through the means of symbols which demonstrate the method, and these symbols are empirical content.

No. The agent is not in the judgement, the agent is of the judgement, although you might get away with agency is in the judgement. Judgement relates to an agent, insofar as the one belongs to the other, but an agent does not relate to a judgement, insofar as the agent does not belong to the judgement. Judgement relates to agency as the one is only possible from the other, and agency relates to judgement as the one is necessary for the other. — Mww

Yes, this is the point, the agent is necessary for the judgement. So my point was that the agent, as cause, is something other than the conditions which make judgement possible.

As I said….they are inescapable. It is impossible that there be no judgement. Again, in accordance with the predicates of a particular speculative metaphysical system. Which of course, has absolutely NO WARRANT FOR BEING RIGHT. Logically coherent and internal consistent, yes; correct….not a chance.

Take a hint, fercrissakes!!!! — Mww

I really do not understand what you are saying here. I'm not good at communicating through hints. If there are judgements, as you assert, then there is necessarily right and wrong. Right and wrong are the necessary presuppositions for judgement. If right and wrong are not presupposed, then there is no will to judge, therefore no judgement.

So, in you own words, you are being incoherent, and inconsistent, to say that it is impossible that there be no judgement, but also claim in the same statement that there is no warrant for being right. If judgement is necessary, then right or wrong is also necessary.

You've dug yourself into a hole, because in reality judgement is not necessary, it is freely chosen. Therefore it is possible that there is no judgement, and this is the first principle of some forms of skepticism, to suspend judgement. Once you allow that judgement is voluntary, rather than necessary, then you see that it is possible that there be no judgement, and only from this perspective could you conclude that there is "no warrant for being right". But the way you presented it, where judgement is necessary ("impossible that there be no judgement"), it is logically inconsistent or incoherent to say that there is no warrant for being right.

There is no mistake in sensation. Determinism from human sensory physiology grounded in natural law.
In a strictly representational cognitive system, on the other hand, in which the natural determinism of sensory apparatus, re: Plato’s “knowledge that”** or Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance”, Kant’s “appearance”, is translated into purely logical explanations immediately upon loss of empirical explanatory knowledge, the loss of which occurs as soon as consciousness of the operations of the physiological system is lost, leaves the human being to fend for himself, but still legislated, not by natural law, but by logical law in the form of the LNC.
(**quotation marks here indicative of attribution to the respective author’s terminology, to nip that in the bud) — Mww

As I said, "purely logical explanations" is fictional nonsense.

The loss of consciousness of operational conditions and therefore empirical knowledge in fact occurs, but only at the faculty of intuition, an altogether abstract conceptual device, which is the point where real physical objects become represented as mere phenomena. We are not the least bit conscious of this activity, however physiological it still is, re: peripheral nervous system constituency, hence can say nothing about it with respect to empirical knowledge. Even more importantly, without this conscious awareness, we can say nothing whatsoever about the effect the real object has on the subject himself, which in turn reflects on the absence of subjective agency, which in its turn, eliminates any form of judgement being present in the faculty of sensibility. — Mww

You describe a situation here, in which judgements are being made (objects are being represented as phenomena) without conscious activity, then you make the inconsistent conclusion that there is no form of judgement present. If the object is not present in sensibility as the object, but instead there is a representation, or phenomenon, then we must conclude that something decides how the object will be represented. How do you not understand this? How do you think that something could make a representation without some form of judgement as to how this will be done?

'Hurt' doesn't refer to immaterial pain here. I mean instead damage to our ability to thrive and replicate. — plaque flag

The problem though, is that what is real, and present to us, is the feeling of pain. So when you talk about "our ability to thrive and replicate", this is just an interpretation of the real hurt, the feeling we get when we suffer such damage. And since this hurt may be interpreted in many different ways, this is why it is appropriate to understand these sensations as symbols.

It's hard to see how a 'mind' (control module, tribal-individual software) will persist if it tends to ignore what is likely to harm it in this way. Patterns that don't tend to avoid harm (their destruction) and seek help (what they require) tend to vanish. — plaque flag

This is but an initiation to the problem. We all die and vanish, so that's not the issue. The purpose of the hurt therefore is not to incline us to avoid the harm so that we do not vanish. Vanishing is already inevitable. So what is the real purpose of the hurt? Is it so that we might continue to reproduce? Surviving and reproducing are two very different purposes. The former promotes a continued existence of the same. The latter promotes difference.

Sound familiar? For me it sounds like relativity. — Benj96

Of course it sounds like relativity. Your premise is an equation derived from relativity, so your conclusion will be relativistic as well. To get a different conclusion you'd need to start with a different premise concerning the relationship of matter to energy. The problem is that "energy" is a concept which is manipulated to conform to how we understand the movement of mass. So you'd have to relate matter to something other than energy, like relate matter directly to time and space. But that would leave something out, "substance". So it's like attempting to take the substance out of matter, which is the essential aspect of matter anyway. Therefore it's a misguided attempt in the first place.

Thought and memory can then be rectified with one another relativistically. And so the hard problem dissolves.
But it means space and time relationships must change for this to happen. — Benj96

Actually, the fact that the relationships must be altered indicates that these cannot be related relativistically.

It's a singular "substance" that has the capacity to phase transition between stability (memory) and instability (active thought, imagination, creativity). — Benj96

This exemplifies the problem. "Substance" is itself stability. So treating substance as if it could loose it's stability is to take the substance out of substance. So if way say that there is something else, which transitions from stability (substantial) to instability (non-substantial), then we have to account for the occurrence of stability. We would need to analyze what "stability" implies, and determine what type of thing could pass from being stable to being unstable, and see if this is even a coherent concept.

In line with the title of the thread, we could call this the hard problem of mass.

The idea that science give a view from everywhere is wrong. The scientific view is from anywhere. — Banno

What Wayfarer shows is that this proposal, the view from anywhere, does not make any sense. It is incoherent, an oxymoron, because a view must be from somewhere or else it would not be a view. Therefore your understanding of science, as being a view from everywhere, is wrong as incoherent, it does not describe what science really is.

You could alter that proposal, and say that science attempts to be a view from everywhere. But that makes no sense either, to say that science would attempt to do something which is illogical, as incoherent. So the proposal really just shows a misunderstanding of what science really is, or aims to do.

As you imply, what hurts us is real for that reason. — plaque flag

The deeper metaphysical issue here is that in order to say that what hurts us is real, we must assume that the hurt itself is real, because the hurt has logical priority. So the conclusion that what hurts us is real is derived from the premise that the hurt is real. Now the metaphysical question is what does it mean to be hurt.

This is where the icon analogy is relevant. Hurt is simply a meaningful sensation representing some sort of damage to the living system. We could say it's a symbol The base tactile sensations are all like this, pleasure, pain, soft, rough, firm, etc., they are simply symbols of meaning, significance. The higher senses like hearing and sight, or even taste and smell, are able to discern many finer differences, so they can build much more complex structures of meaning, through these many different symbols produced. But they all can be seen to be like icons, fundamentally, as symbols of significance.

Where the analogy is limited, is that unlike the icons we really do not adequately understand the underlying significance. And despite the claim of 'fitness" we really do not understand the value structure, upon which all these feelings, pleasure pain, etc., are supported. reproductive fitness really does not suffice here. Furthermore, we do not adequately understand the system which constructs the symbols either. So the real problem turns around this value structure which creates these symbols of significance, sensations. It must be a structure of value because the basics are grounded in the categories of pleasure and pain.

There you go again. We’re not talking about the location of a system, but only the location of a faculty within it. — Mww

It's you who is creating the problem by saying that this faculty is 'within" the system. By doing this you are necessarily confining the possible location to 'within" the system. Now "the system" refers to something physical, the material body, so you've restricted us to a materialist premise by saying that this faculty must be within the system. This excludes the possibility that the faculty is related to the system, as cause to effect. In the case of freely willed, intentional acts, the system is the body, and the faculty moves the system. By Plato's analysis it is incorrect to say that the soul is "in" the body.

Using your parlance, the reality of any judgement just is that judgement. Even basic understanding grants judgement to be merely a conclusion of some kind, which immediately presupposes that which makes it possible. So not all that is necessary is the reality of a conclusion, which wouldn’t even occur without its antecedents. Besides, we don’t care about the reality of judgements, insofar as we cannot possibly escape them. What we care about, is their validity, which cannot be determined by the judgement itself. — Mww

I agree with the first, the reality of a judgement is the judgement itself. Further, we can consider the effects of a judgement, and we might consider the causes of a judgement. Do you agree?

You say, that a judgement presupposes "that which makes it possible". By using the word "possible", this does not necessarily refer to the cause of the judgement, but more like the physical conditions which allow for a judgement to occur. Would you agree, that as well as "that which makes it possible", there must also be an actual cause, that which makes the judgement actual, and this we could call the agent in the judgement? So we would have the physical conditions which make a specific judgement possible, and also an agent which makes the actual judgement.

Why do you think that we do not care about the reality of judgements? Isn't this the debate of free will vs determinism, the question of whether judgement is real. Do you not apprehend the ramifications of this question, in relation to validity? If judgement is not real, and that which appears to be a judgement is causally determined simply by the passing of time, then there is no difference between valid and invalid. The apparent "judgement" is what it is, by causal determinism, it can not be otherwise. Any supposed further judgements like valid or invalid are completely unnecessary, and irrelevant, because the judgement simply is what it is.

I think that we are back to the principles of the argument against mistake in sensation. If sensation is simply a determinist cause/effect relation, then there is no mistake in sensation, it simply is what it is. But that's what I see as clearly wrong, because it leaves the human being without free will, and completely determined. Then judgement is not real.

Odds are I’m going to regret this, but it might be helpful to know what you think judgement is. — Mww

That's what I'm working on bringing out. It seems you might already regret being involved in this.

All you’ve said here most recently, makes no mention of that which I take particular exception, that being where in the system this “judgement”, where that which “decides for me”, resides. You’ve maintained its residence to be in intuition, subsequently broadened its residence to sensibility in general. Hence, my objection that whatever you think this “judgement” is, sufficient for it to “decide for me”, being necessarily a conscious activity insofar as unconscious or subconscious decision making is inconceivable in accordance with the human intellectual system, the business of both this ambiguous form of “judgement”, and proper judgement itself, do not belong to sensibility, said objection expressed as “tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks”. — Mww

Ok, I'll be clear. I do not know exactly where, within me, this system lies. I know it must exist because the premises I've presented produce the logical conclusion that it must be. Secondly, I did not say that it "decides for me", simply that it makes some form of decisions or judgements.

And, your unjustified assumption that it is impossible for any type of unconscious or subconscious decision making, has been shown by me to be wrong.

Imagination is the thing I found in the analysis of your term in your context. I analyzed “judgement” and rejected it as philosophically ambiguous. Of course I would be unfamiliar with “judgement”, given the established abstract conceptual system to which judgement necessarily belongs. To use it, or any of its derivatives, no matter how disguised, other than as that system demands, is to destroy it altogether. — Mww

Ok, your analysis leads you to "imagination". Now, further analysis of "imagination" itself, will demonstrate that there is judgement inherent within imagination, as my example of dreaming demonstrates.

Your assumption that "judgement" necessarily belongs to abstract conceptual structure has been proven wrong, with the evidence of real cases of irrational, illogical, emotional, and even seemingly random judgements.

Nahhhh, you don’t. You’re presupposing I have no idea what you’re talking about. I say that because at the end of our first set of comments here, pg 6, there’s a question for you left unaddressed, which would have given a different perspective entirely for what was initially a general agreement between us.

With that unanswered question, combined with my mentioning something about a form of judgement related to intuition and you changing that into a form of “judgement” contained in intuition…..we’ve digressed into irreconcilable differences.

All else is superfluous. — Mww

I don't recall the unanswered question. If it is the question of where does this faculty of judgement reside, I do not see how this is relevant. When there is evidence that judgement has been made, the evidence is posterior to the judgement. The particular instrument which makes the judgement is very rarely evident in the effects of the judgement. This is why we cannot look at what was done, and know for sure who did it. Furthermore, we do not see the intention in the intentional act, nor do we see free will in the freely willed act. All of these conclusion can only be brought from a logical procedure.

So the question of where this faculty is, which makes the judgements, is not even relevant at this point. All that is necessary now is that we recognize the reality of those judgements. This is first and foremost the requirement we need before proceeding toward determining any further feature of that source of judgement. That is how we work with acts of judgement, like intentional acts, we first determine that there was intention involved, then we can proceed toward specifying the agent.

Aren't 'things' periodic patterns of ("indivisible")^ events? — 180 Proof

A "thing" is what is involved in the event, as what engages in the activity. There is not matter to a described event unless an independent thing (a thing independent from the description) is signified.

Let's say "X moved from A to B" is a description of a simple event. This description is not itself an event, it is simply a description. But if "X' represents a real thing, which is involved in a supposed real event, then we have a representation of the "matter". However, "X" as representative of the matter, is not the event itself, but something which is implied to have existed before the event, and persist after the event. Therefore the matter is independent from the event.

These are declarations, mere assertions, with no detailed explanation accompanying them. — Mww

The explanation is in the earlier exchange with you, in my response to your claim that one cannot be deceived by one's own feelings. The gist of what I said was that since some sensations strike us directly as beautiful, pleasurable, or painful, without conscious classification to that effect, it is necessary to conclude that the "decision", or "judgement", that these sensations are of such a character is performed at a level prior to conscious judgement.

The example was when I eat something which tastes "good", but isn't really "good" because it makes me sick. The result is that we have two completely Incompatible senses of "good" here, one according to the subconscious judgement inherent within the sensibility itself, and one according to the rational thinking. To understand this more clearly, look at any so-called "bad habit". The person is directly inclined toward a specific type of act because at the subconscious level it is judged as "good" by that "judgement" performed at this level, yet the rational mind judges it as "bad".

Instead of addressing this explanation which I provided for you, you simply responded with: "This is tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks ,,, Have it your way". I addressed the "sensibility thinks" issue by stating that this is not a form of thinking, therefore we must conclude that there is "judgement" without thinking, and I took the "have it your way" as implying that you had no reasonable rebuttal to what I presented.

Now you pretend to have rebutted.

And I reject anything needing quotation marks that merely substantiate its ambiguity. It’s judgement or it isn’t, such a thing as “judgement” just doesn’t say enough to be taken seriously. — Mww

OK then, let's just call it judgement and get on with the show. That's how most philosophers write, using words in ways that other people might not be too familiar with, without special quotation marks to indicate special usage. I thought it might assist you to understand, if I used the quotations to indicate that my usage might be one which you are not very familiar with. That would be the case if you haven't done the analysis required to find the thing which the term refers to in that context. I think of it as a courtesy which I afford for you, but if you dislike it and it appears to you like a bad habit, let me know clearly, and I'll try to refrain in future discussion.

Everything in general about what you call the form of “judgement” inherent in intuition, inasmuch as your exposition of it has entailed, has already been rendered in the pertinent literature as imagination, which meets the explanatory criteria for the human intellectual system as a whole in much more satisfactory manner, and, first, eliminates such notorious ambiguity as “judgement” altogether, and second, serves as sufficient reason for not realizing you are right. Like…..my employment of methodological imagination is much right-er than your employment of methodological “judgement”. — Mww

Incorporating this form of judgement into the more general conception of imagination does not eliminate the need for the use of the term "judgement" in reference to the various aspects of imagination. Do you understand that there is judgement, which is inherent within imagination as fundamental to it? This judgement must be independent from conscious judgement.

Take dreaming for example. Do you see that there is judgement, which is not conscious judgement, that is foundational to the dreaming process? Decisions must be made as to what will occur within the dream, otherwise the dream would be random in an absolute way. Of course dreams appear to the conscious mind as somewhat random in many ways, but not in an absolute sense. What the appearance of randomness indicates is that the judgement process involved in creating the dream is very inconsistent with the judgement process of the conscious mind, so it appears to have many random aspects.

This is analogous with the conscious judgement that something is "illogical". When one person judges another's judgement as illogical, this does not imply that the other's judgement is judged as not a judgement, it means that the judgement is not logical. Likewise, when we judge a dream as random, this does not mean that the judgements which created the dream are not judgements, it only means that these judgements are judged by us as random.

.

This is an unwarranted presupposition that the nature of all living beings is imbued with conscious mental activity, all that being completely irrelevant anyway, for all I care about properly understanding, is the living being that is me. I for one, have no problem restricting judgement to conscious mental activity, for I assert without equivocation that is impossible for me to judge anything whatsoever, if I am not conscious of what is being judged. — Mww

This is why you are wrong, and I am right. If "to judge" is defined by the capacity to judge which your own conscious mind possesses, then no one else can judge in any way other than the way that you judge . So, evidence of differing judgements induces us to allow that others judge in different ways. There are judgements, and ways of judging which are inconsistent with mine. Therefore to recognize a judgement as a judgement I need to allow that judgements are not necessarily consistent with my way of judging.

So, your assertion that it "is impossible for me to judge anything whatsoever, if I am not conscious of what is being judged" says only something about your own judgements. It says nothing about other judgements which are not made by you, judgements which may not be consistent with your judgements. And, it is clearly wrong to exclude judgements made by someone other than yourself, from the category of "judgement", just because you did not personally make that judgement, and the judgement is inconsistent with yours. And, an inconsistent judgement implies that the mode of judgement is inconsistent with yours. Therefore it is very clearly incorrect to say that since your mode of judgement is conscious judgement, all modes of judgement must be conscious judgement.

Furthermore, when we allow that there are judgements made by others, we not only encounter the problem of judgements which are inconsistent with our own, but also judgements which appear to be "illogical". Further, we see judgements which appear to be completely irrational, immoral, unprincipled, rash, irate, emotional, and even random (like in dreams).

Therefore your grounds for 'all judgement is conscious judgement' is unjustifiable by the means you propose.

Sure. But my point wasn't about truth as such, it was about the nature and validity of science and empirical data, which surely has a compromised status if human senses are not able to apprehend reality. — Tom Storm

It's not that "truth" has a compromised status. That would be a backward way of looking at things. We can still hold truth up to the highest standards. We simply need to recognize that empirical data and science are insufficient for truth.

This means that if science does not maintain truth as its goal, and receive guidance from other sources (metaphysics) its results will be less than truth. So for instance if capacity to predict replaces truth as the goal of science, it is not truth which is compromised but science which is compromised. "Truth" would only be compromised if we lowered it to what empirical data, or science provides us with. That's why I said it depends on how you define 'truth".

Fermions & bosons. — 180 Proof

These particles are what Nick called activities. I need an explanation as to how an activity is "matter".

What?....sir, "matter" describes a specific type of "activity" responsible for structure low level and high lever features (basic or advanced properties). Not all activities are matter. Its an equivocation fallacy based on a beef you have with the word "matter"! — Nickolasgaspar

I would say that "matter" refers to whatever it is which is involved in the activity, what is doing the activity. An "activity" without something performing the activity is just a description of an activity, an abstraction. There is no substance without something performing the activity, therefore no "structure". A "structure" requires substance, and "activity" is not substantial, the substance is what is doing the activity. "Matter" is responsible for structure, by being that substance which is engaged in the activity. Without the matter performing the activity there is no structure.

No, I said that specific glitches(with specific properties) are responsible for the phenomenon of matter. — Nickolasgaspar

I've never heard that proposal. I find it very strange. Specific "glitches" produce matter. A glitch is a malfunction. Are saying that all material existence is a malfunction of reality? Everything is a composition of mistakes.

That's an interesting "ontology of matter"; not one I'm inclined to respect though. If it is "glitches" which produce matter, and glitches are malfunctions, what was supposed to be happening? If the malfunctions had not occurred, which produced matter, and the activities operated smoothly, what would the world be like then? I suppose there would be no life without these malfunctions. And of course that would be a better reality than the one we're in, which is the product of malfunctions.

From your questions I understand that you are not ready. I did my best to describe you the ontology of matter with really plain words and metaphors but you keep asking the same questions again and again as if nothing was said. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, your ontology is 'matter is "specific glitches"'. For me, that equates with "nothing was said". Care to try again?

This still doesnt answer what this "matter" is in itself. Its just saying how the appearance arises.
It just says how the icon on a computer screen arises not what it is. — TheMadMan

Do you mean, what the icon signifies? Simply put, it has meaning, like a word or a symbol. The meaning of "matter" is as I explained, it signifies what we observe as temporal continuity. It's not like this particular icon, "matter" has a thing which it corresponds with, like a proper noun or something, it has meaning which allows it to be used in many situations. So it's more like a word than an icon. And that word relates to an "appearance", the appearance of temporal continuity.

If we want to understand the meaning here, we need to address this appearance. What is the reason for the appearance of such a temporal continuity in the world?

I'm not sure how science can lead to truth when Hoff says we are hardwired by evolution to be unable to recognise reality. — Tom Storm

The position of truth would depend on how you would define "truth". If truth is correspondence, then truth is possible, but the problem is in knowing when truth has been obtained because human judgements are teleologically based, based in purposefulness (predictability etc.) rather than judgements of truth.

I think that the position is best understood as a form of pragmaticism. The way we sense the world, consequently the way that we understand the world, has been formed or shaped by some type of purposefulness. That's what Banno states as "fitness beats truth". Here "fitness" which is commonly associated with "survival" in accounts of evolutionary theory is reduced to reproductive capacity. Strong evidence for how reproductive capacity affects sensation is found in the sensual pleasure of sexual intercourse. We can understand this as a form of pragmaticism because the way that the human being perceives and understands the world is directed overall, by usefulness. And pragmaticism is based in natural teleology. The overall purpose or end for life in general (the meaning of life), escapes our grasp, but the purposefulness inherent within living systems implies that this perspective is not misdirected.

From the pragmatist perspective truth is possible, but it needs to be given priority as something which is useful. So truth does not come naturally to us because "fitness beats truth". So we must shape our priorities through moral training etc., (the classic God is Truth for example), in order to direct ourselves toward the usefulness of truth. The usefulness here being communion and social interaction, propagated by truthfulness, which in turn produces a higher knowledge and greater usefulness overall. The desire for truth has a place in the rational mind, bit it is commonly suppressed by irrational desires which are natural to living bodies, so it does not obtain a place of priority without culture.

So if all of our mistakes are always behind us, in the past, then there's nothing we can do to change them. Thus, there is no reason to dwell on them/live in guilt or shame due to them. — Benj96

I think the Christian idea of confession of sin is probably worth assimilating. — green flag

I think this is the idea behind confession, confess to one's mistakes, be forgiven, and move forward, released from guilt and shame.

What I wanna ask is how does this assumption arises from mind. — TheMadMan

I think I provided an initial answer, here:

Traditionally it's the concept Aristotle used to account for what was observed as the temporal continuity of sameness. As time passes it appears like some aspects of the observed world do not change. "Matter" was proposed as the concept which relates to the real unchanging features of the observed world. What does not change as time passes is matter. So, simply put, we see that some features remain unchanged as time passes, we figure there must be a reason for this, and we posit 'matter' as the reason for this. That is how "matter" arises from consciousness. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't assume "particles" in the sense you understand it. Its NOT an existential claim of an entity in the classical sense! Particles is the label we use to name an observed and quantified activity. — Nickolasgaspar

Right, there's no "matter" there, in those "particles", just activity.

Sure we don't observe " crystal marbles" if this is what you mean. Energetic glitches is what we observe, quantify and predict. This is what we call "particle" part of Matter.
Did anyone tell you that particles are some type of rocks? What is your argument here.??? — Nickolasgaspar

"'Particle' part of matter"? What does that mean? You already said that a particle is just an activity.

You (I mean anyone) can not get in a conversation about Matter and mental properties without understanding the known ontology of matter. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm ready. What is the known ontology of matter? You've said a few things about energy, also about activity, and you've said that energy relates to matter. So let's have it, where do we find this matter that is related to energy?

The validity of the one does not necessarily follow from the validity of the other. There is no necessary relation between a form of subconscious “judgement” in intuition, merely from judgement as a given conscious mental activity in understanding. — Mww

I explained in detail why it is necessary to conclude that there is some form of "judgement" occurring at a subconscious level. You said: "This is tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks". I said that there is no need to restrict "judgement" to conscious thinking. I didn't suggest a necessary relation, only that the inclination to restrict "judgement" to conscious mental activity is a misunderstanding of the nature of living beings.

Because they are!!! We observe fundamental particles interacting with each other and producing — Nickolasgaspar

Not really, we observe activity, and assume that there is particles involved in this activity. The "matter" which is supposed to substantiate the existence of the particles is just an assumption.

Empirically regular properties that we can observe , quantify and predict. — Nickolasgaspar

See, the properties are observed, not the particles.

Matter is "cosmic energy" at a specific energetic state. Fundamental subatomic particles are registered as energetic glitches with a set of properties (charge spin etc). Since we are well in the quantum scale our empirically evolved language has limited explanatory power. — Nickolasgaspar

I haven't the faintest idea what you might mean by "cosmic energy", and how this might relate to "matter". Can you just leave that aside please, and stick to the subject, "matter".

Are you expecting a definition like " milk from a cosmic cow"? Its a freaking label we put on this specific phenomenon that appears to be the sole enabler of everything we can interact and detect.
You can google "matter" you know!. There are definition and descriptions (analysis of its parts). — Nickolasgaspar

Again, I haven't the faintest idea what you are talking about here with your metaphors. Can we just stick to the subject?

Yes I agree. I don't see a question. — TheMadMan

Doesn't this answer the question of the op then: "How does matter arise from consciousness?". "Matter" is an assumption which the conscious mind makes. We could then proceed in a method similar to Berkeley, and inquire as to whether this is a necessary assumption. Berkeley concludes that it is not.

Anyone can search the internet for material to back up one's biased opinions. Your referenced "academic material" was off topic and not interesting to me. Sorry Nickolasgaspar. (Now I apologize, so I am somewhat affected by your suffering, or maybe just being polite).

I guess we both know why you are avoiding this challenge and to be fair when I lay facts on the table...nobody really want's fight for a lost cause.
Its your right, enjoy whatever this is (but its not philosophy). — Nickolasgaspar

The more you beg the less I am inclined toward submission. I will enjoy, while you suffer, but I'll make it perfectly clear, in all honesty, my enjoyment is derived from what I am doing, not from your suffering. There is no "shared experience" here (to quote Janus), because you've had no success in your attempt to communicate.

Thats what we know on the scientific front.
Im asking philosophically and even experientially. — TheMadMan

As I said in the first post we assume "matter" as the reason for the observed temporal continuity, consistency, in those observed properties and measurements.

No, I see that you are extremely biased and opinionated, you pay no attention to reason, therefore I have no inclination to give you what you beg for. Your suffering has no emotional affect on me.

What you are describing as matter is just the physical properties, observed and measured. My question is for all levels of matter that we know, to the quarks. — TheMadMan

Isn't all we know, at all levels, "physical properties, observed an measured"? So, what more are you asking for?

By studying our world we observe properties of matter giving rise to the everything around us...not the other way our. — Nickolasgaspar

Why do you say that these are properties of "matter"? If all we observe is properties, and "why" questions are fallacious teleology, how do you get "matter" here?

Correct , the diversity of properties emerging from different arrangements of matter is the amazing thing. Asking "why" this is possible its like a kid asking his mum ....why the sky is blue as if there is a purpose behind it. — Nickolasgaspar

Again, if we observe arrangements, what is this "matter" you assume here?

I beg you to prove unfair. — Nickolasgaspar

Beg all you want, it just doesn't move me.

How does matter arise from consciousness? — TheMadMan

Matter is purely conceptual. Traditionally it's the concept Aristotle used to account for what was observed as the temporal continuity of sameness. As time passes it appears like some aspects of the observed world do not change. "Matter" was proposed as the concept which relates to the real unchanging features of the observed world. What does not change as time passes is matter. So, simply put, we see that some features remain unchanged as time passes, we figure there must be a reason for this, and we posit 'matter' as the reason for this. That is how "matter" arises from consciousness.

Like….the only possible analysis of the one reduces to the other? If I made such a preposterous deduction, I would not be so inclined to admit to having a degree in philosophy. — Mww

You actually made an even more preposterous reduction Mww. I explained very clearly why there must be some form of "judgement" inherent within sensibility, and you then reduced this "judgement" to a faculty of "thinking", deducing that only an act of thinking could produce a "judgement".

Surely you must understand that subconscious mental activity is just as much a part of the human psyche as conscious mental activity. Why not acknowledge that this subconscious activity involves some form of "judgement" just like conscious mental activity involves judgement?

Or, we could have it your way, and insist that "judgement' implies "thinking", so that we would have 'conscious thinking' and 'subconscious thinking'. But 'subconscious thinking' really doesn't make sense because thinking is considered to be the act of the conscious mind. And that\s why you were right to suggest that we should have it my way. And in saying that, you are just as right as I am.

I think MU needs a "reality check". — Janus

That's rich, coming from the person who insists on something called "shared experience". And when asked to explain how this makes sense, you refer to a shared plate of food as an example. Reality check: a plate of food is not at all the same type of thing as experience.

If you would have explained how we share our experiences through language and communication, I would have accepted this as a valid justification of "shared experience". Instead, you wanted to pose "shared experience" as a necessary requirement for language and communication, instead of accepting the reality that language and communication are a necessary requirement for "shared experience".



I've been arguing honestly, but you and I are speaking in completely different ways. That is the honest truth, and it's been obvious since the beginning of this exchange, when you asserted that there is no such thing as a specific scientific method, and insisted that there is a specific method which constitutes the philosophical method. We obviously have contrary opinions as to what constitutes "science" and "philosophy". Whether the ideas you express are what you honestly believe, or not, doesn't really concern me, I simply recognize them as fiction.

This is tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks, from which follows that given that understanding is the faculty of thought, there are now two thinking faculties in the same system. What a mess that would turn out to be. — Mww

Yes, and what a mess the human being is. We're torn apart by the difference between rational thought and bodily desires, such that we are sometimes overwhelmed by emotional feelings, anxiety and stress. Plato found many examples, (of what you crudely express as "two thinking faculties in the same system"), such as the thirsty man who knows that the available water is not potable. This man is torn by the two "faculties" in the same system. Therefore the evidence supports what I said, two distinct sources of "judgement" inclining us toward contrary actions.

You tell me. Something tastes good, turns out to make you sick, so……what, it really didn’t taste good?

Have it your way. — Mww

Of course, because you realize I'm right. How would you define "good"? Or would you simply equivocate with two senses of "good", one for things that taste "good", and another for what is beneficial to your survival, or "rationally good"?

I'm not wasting further time on your distortions. — Janus

Of course not. Like Mww above, it becomes overwhelmingly obvious that I am right. When the meaning of what you say is actually analyzed, it is revealed to be an absurdity.



That a principle is useful in application, and therefore can be used in making predictions, does not imply that the principle is "scientific". The axioms of mathematics are very useful in making predictions, but they are not scientific. Do you recognize the difference between a scientifically proven hypothesis and an axiom? Any way that you might formulate the principle of relativity, it is always an expression of an ontological principle, an axiom, not a scientific theory. Consider the following formulations;

The principle of relativity states that there is no physical way to differentiate between a body moving at a constant speed and an immobile body. It is of course possible to determine that one body is moving relative to the other, but it is impossible to determine which of them is moving and which is immobile. — https://www.tau.ac.il

In physics, the principle of relativity is the requirement that the equations describing the laws of physics have the same form in all admissible frames of reference. — Wikipedia: Principle of relativity

Notice that the first formulation is a statement of what is impossible. it is impossible to differentiate between an immobile body, and a body moving at a constant speed. How do you think that this, if it was presented as an hypothesis rather than as an axiom, could be tested in experimentation, so as to confirm it as a scientific theory?

The second formulation is a derivative of the first. It affirms that any body moving at a constant speed can serve as the grounding for a frame of reference, a point of rest (rest frame), and the laws of physics will be equally applicable from each. Notice how this is a grounding principle for the laws of physics, as stated in the quoted passage, describing how the laws of physics may be applied. It is expressed as a "requirement" for the laws of physics, thereby separating the principle of relativity from the laws of physics. It is not itself one of the laws of physics, but an ontological principle, an axiom, which dictates the applicability of the laws of physics.

Because you seem to misunderstand the difference between axioms and scientifically proven hypotheses, Nickolasgaspar, I suggest that you look a little more closely into the difference between what is derived from science, and what is derived from ontology. That ought to improve your understanding.

Two experiences of the same thing at the same time qualifies as a shared experience in my lexicon. — Janus

That your "lexicon" describes two distinct, but similar experiences as one shared experience indicates that it is not logically rigorous.

f we shared a plate of food that would not entail that we ate exactly the same items on the plate: that would be impossible. — Janus

If you do not understand the difference between two people sharing one plate of food, and the two distinct experiences that these two people are undergoing while sharing that one plate of food, and you conclude that because it is one plate of food being shared, the two experiences must be one shared experience, then I'm afraid that I am at a loss to dispel your misunderstanding of this matter. I'll give it a try anyway.

Let's start with this. Do you understand the difference between an event, and the participants in the event? Do you agree that the fact that the participants share in the event, does not imply that what is the property of any of the participants, is shared by the event, as property of the event? That would be a composition fallacy.

So here's an example of this fallacious way of thinking. Suppose someone gets raped, and one of the two participants in that event has a very enjoyable experience. And you conclude that since this person who has the enjoyable experience, is a participant in a shared experience, the other participant also has a very enjoyable experience as well, being a participant in that shared experience. Do you see the problem with your fallacious "shared experience"?

No it isn't. Its a scientific theory that ticks all boxes. It provides a sufficient narrative, hasdescriptive power non extreme conditions and it offers accurate predictions allowing us to producetechnical applications. — Nickolasgaspar

It's incredible the way you just make things up. Are you a professional fiction writer?

If we both see the same kinds of things in front of us that qualifies as a shared experience. — Janus

No, it means that we are each having the same kind of experience. Two distinct experiences which are both of the same kind does not justify the claim of one "shared experience".

This is definitely true for the quantitative infinite, but I'm not so sure about the qualitative. — spirit-salamander

I do not see how "infinite" could be anything other than quantitative. I don't see how to conceive of an infinite quality. What would that even mean? Notice that the "omni" prefix sometimes used to describe God's qualities, does not mean "infinite". In fact it's more like the inverse of infinite, as the limit to the quality, whereas "infinite" means unlimited.

Certainly, what you say has never been uncontroversial:

"In VI. 4. 2 Plotinus connects the problem of soul's presence in body with a larger issue, that of the presence of intelligible reality in the sensible world. He is aware that in doing this he is confronting one of the most difficult problems facing any Platonist. Among the difficulties presented by Plato in his Parmenides concerning the theory of Forms is that of the presence of a single Form in a multitude of particular sensible objects (131ac): how could one Form (for example, the Form of beauty) be present in many (beautiful) things without being divided up among them?
The presence of the Form in a multitude seems to mean destruction of the Form as a whole, as a unity. This cannot be right. But to save the Form's unity, one must abandon its presence in many things. This too is unacceptable. Plato himself gives no clear indication as to how one is to resolve this dilemma. Aristotle considered it as yet another decisive reason for rejecting Plato's theory of Forms (Metaphysics, 1. 6). The problem remained unresolved, lying deep, as a possibly fatal flaw, in the heart of Platonic philosophy. The Middle Platonists were aware of it, but they contented themselves with references to the ‘mysterious’ relation between intelligible and sensible reality. Plotinus' Ennead VI. 4–5 is the first Platonist text we have which faces the issue squarely." (Dominic J. O'Meara - Plotinus - An Introduction to the Enneads)

Plotinus' own solution is also considered controversial by some. — spirit-salamander

The theory of participation is flawed, and Plato exposed this. I believe that Aristotle did provide a workable resolution by placing actuality as necessarily prior to potentiality, his so-called cosmological argument.

The concept of individual parts partaking of the whole, makes the whole passive, as being partaken of, without changing. But the active parts must receive their actuality, or activity from somewhere, as cause, and the somewhere cannot be the passive whole. This is why Aristotle proposes a further actuality, which is properly an immaterial actuality, like the soul, which therefore cannot be described in spatial terms, like the activity of parts.

Plotinus does not provide a solution, because the One which is proposed as the source of all, is said to be an infinite potentiality. But this meets the problem which Aristotle expressed, an infinite potentiality could not actualize itself. So there is no means (cause) whereby everything could proceed from the One.

Great example commonly used in favor of this argument is Albert Einstein's approach in developing the Theory of General Relativity. Something that is also important is that the Theory was "Verified" and accepted a over a night after a historic observation without having the chance of any falsification period! (so falsification is not always important too!). — Nickolasgaspar

Instead of using Einstein's relativity as an example of how science is tainted, you ought to simply realize that this theory is unscientific. The principle of relativity, upon which Einstein's theory is based, is unverifiable, therefore not science, it's ontology.

After all if I ask you to describe the scientific method...you will end up naming a bunch of actions.
The same is true for Philosophy.
1. epistemology (first learn what we know and how we know something -on a specific subject).
2. Physika (reevaluate or update your epistemology through empirical evaluation).
3. Metaphysics. reflect on that updated knowledge and use it to construct hypotheses reaching beyond our current knowledge
4.5.6. What are the implication of those hypotheses in Ethics , Aesthetics and Politics.
Restart...project your conclusions on our current body of knowledge ...etc. — Nickolasgaspar

That's strange, I have a degree in philosophy and I was never taught any of this. it's very fictional, and not at all representative of how philosophy is actually taught, in my experience.

I know that most philosophers are shocked when they hear these things for the first time, but I find them to be far more important than any other aspect of Philosophy...if our goal is to become good Philosophers. — Nickolasgaspar

Right, most philosophers are shocked when they hear of your "philosophical method", because it's absolutely foreign to them. Why do you call them "philosophers", when the philosophical method is foreign to them?

There is a form of judgement regarding intuition, or, sensibility itself, which describes the condition of the subject, as such, in his perception of real objects. Best represented as how he feels about that which he has perceived, as opposed to what he may eventually know about it. That the sunset is beautiful is empirical, how the subject reacts to the mode or manner in which the sunset is beautiful, which are given from the sensation alone, is an aesthetic judgement by which the subject describes to himself the state of his condition. — Mww

This is close to what I was suggesting, but let me take a slightly different aesthetic example, to make things clearer. Suppose it's a nice summer day and I walk past a garden of flowers, and notice a vast array of different shades of colour, and I think about how beautiful all those different colours are, in that particular array. Within my sensibility I have distinguished all sorts of different shades of colour, so that I perceive, or see, the landscape as completely varied in colour, and beautiful in this way.

What I am saying is that inherent within my sensibility, there is some sort of "judgement", which "decided" to present this display to me in a way which is beautiful, or pleasant. And if we move here to "pleasure" instead of "beauty", the nature of this sort of "judgement" becomes more emphasized. We cannot describe the pleasure we get from sensations in terms of a simple physical reaction to external stimuli because something inherent within the sensibility must judge whether the sensation ought to be experienced as pleasurable or as painful. This is the type of "judgement" which I think we must consider as inherent within sensibility. It is not my conscious mind which upon receiving the sensation decides that the sensation ought to be classed as pleasurable, the sensation is already judged as pleasurable before I have time to think about it. And of course this is even more emphasized with pain.

It is easy to see one cannot be deceived by how he feels, insofar as his feeling IS his condition at the time of it. — Mww

I don't buy this at all. I think what you propose here is sophistic trickery. I think that "judgement" which inheres within sensibility could very often be wrong. What happens if I eat something, and I think that it tastes good, but it ends up making me sick? Clearly that inherent "judgement", which judged it as good was mistaken. You might argue that the inherent judgement was "pleasurable", and this is different from "good", but this doesn't suffice, because being sick is not pleasurable either.

Therefore there is a problem with your qualification, "at the time of it". You'd say that at the time of eating the substance, it was pleasurable, and I was not mistaken in that sensation. But clearly there was a mistake involved here, the mistake which made the harmful substance appear at that moment to be pleasurable. I think that this condition, "at the time of", is really a deceptive phrase. Nothing is ever judged in relation to "the present moment", it is always judged in relation to the past and future.

So perhaps it might be true as you say that a person is never wrong in a judgement of "at the time of", but this is not a real judgement which is ever really made, so it must be disregarded as irrelevant. Our judgements are directed toward what just happened, or what is about to happen. For simplicity sake, I might say "I am doing...right now", but if I have to truthfully describe my actions, I must make a division between what I just did, and what I am about to do. Then "at the time of" becomes an illusion.

Say you are with someone and she says, "See that dog over there; what kind do you think it is?". Say it's a very large dog, maybe a Great Dane. Do you think the other person is likely to say "Oh, it's so small, maybe a Chihuahua"?

Have you had many experiences something like say you are with some people in the city and you see a car speeding towards you and another person says "Oh, look the waves are breaking well, and there's a lovely dog running towards us; let's go for a swim"? — Janus

I do not see the relationship you are trying to propose. Words are meaning based, therefore based in intention. There is no logical relation between a person's experience and a person's use of words. Similar acts of word usage do not imply the same experience. The similar acts may be used to justify a claim of similar experience, but two distinct yet similar experiences does not make one "shared experience".

If you don't think we can generally agree about what objects are where, what kinds of objects they are, how large or small, and so on, then I don't know what planet you are on. — Janus

You seem to be missing the point. What I objected to, is your use of "shared experience". All that is required for agreement is similarity, and two similar things (experiences) does not justify the claim of one "shared experience".

My argument assumes total alteration. — spirit-salamander

I don't see how you come to the conclusion that God must be altered. To take away, or subtract from the infinite leaves it no less infinite. So if the defining feature of God is "infinite", subtracting from Him would leave Him still infinite, therefore unaltered. This is what Socrates argued of "the idea". It doesn't matter how many things partake of the same idea, the idea remains the same regardless.

“…. For truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it is thought. (…) But in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement—neither a true nor a false one….”
(A294/B350) — Mww

Intuition itself maybe be mistaken. Perhaps, faulty intuition ought not be called false judgement, if we should restrict the definition of "judgement''. But this is a different matter. However there must be some form of "judgement", though not rational judgement which is inherent within intuition, and this "judgement" may be mistaken. Since there is already some form of judgement inherent within the intuited sense perception, and this judgement may be mistaken, it is very clear that sense perception may be deception. That is self-deception, which is often considered as a virtue because it is the basis of courage, confidence, and certitude. But taken beyond reasonable levels, following intuition becomes a vice, due to the propensity for mistake.

First of all there isn't such a thing as "A" scientific method. Science have many methods but that is a different topic. — Nickolasgaspar

The scientific method is very explicit, consisting of hypothesis, experimentation, observation, etc.. Why do you think that there is no such thing as the scientific method?

Now if you noticed I identified the method of philosophy I was talking about (Aristotle).
The fundamental steps are the following.
1. Epistemology
2. Physika (Science)
3. Metaphysics
4. Ethics
5. Aesthetics
6. Politics
and back to epistemology for additional knowledge.
So if a scientist or anyone decides to skip those first two basic steps he is placing his inquiry on a really shaky ground. — Nickolasgaspar

I do not see how this describes a method at all, you just name a bunch of subjects.

The ONLY training one needs to do philosophy is to reason correctly, obey the steps of the philosophical method and challenge his preconceptions. — Nickolasgaspar

Well, naming a bunch of subjects does not provide a "philosophical method". Perhaps if there was such a thing as "the steps of the philosophical method", it might be a simple matter for the person to get trained in the philosophical method. However, unlike the explicit scientific method, I really do not think that there is an explicit philosophical method which a person could follow.

Why should God, as One, not be His own divisor or boundary-puller, directed towards Himself? — spirit-salamander

If God is necessarily one, then He cannot divide Himself. If He is capable of dividing Himself, you cannot describe Him as necessarily one.

Even if a principle must always have parts, I refer to the Injury Problem: — spirit-salamander

This is an expression of the same problem. It assumes that God is one, and many at the same time. But until the proper principle is applied, which could allow the same thing to be one and many at the same time, the problem described is just fictional, a derivative of the base contradiction of being one and many at the same time.

Okay, then I say God was totally inactive before creation. — spirit-salamander

This doesn't resolve anything, because now you need a cause to make God become active.

Would you agree thatcreatio ex nihilo in the strict sense can only mean creatio ex deo?

The scholars or experts in the philosophy of religion: Daniel Soars, Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker, Bill Vallacella (Maverick Philosopher) whom I quote in the OP see it that way. They all advocate panentheism instead of theism in order to avoid the logical problem. The same applies to the mystic Jakob Boehme.

If in theism stuff of God is the "material" for creation, and considering the following: — spirit-salamander

You'd have to explain to me these proposals before I could assess them properly.

Doesn't it follow that God must use himself up completely in creation? — spirit-salamander

No, because we haven't properly accounted for how "parts" as distinct individuals could exist as a united "whole". Until we establish the proper relationship between parts and whole, such speculation is useless.

The point is that we describe these relations in spatial terms, then we want to transpose spatial relations to establish a temporal priority. But you have provided no principles of commensurability to relate spatial terms to temporal terms.

So for example, you describe God as one whole. This would imply no space within God, as separating one part from another, because this would indicate that god is a multitude. Then (implying temporal posteriority), God divides into parts. But where does the space within God come from? Now we say, that this space is due to the fact that God is active. But space within God implies that God is a multitude, rather than one. So we go around in a vicious circle which is unresolvable, until we remove the idea that God is one. Then God is necessarily a multitude. But how do we call this multitude by one name, "God"? This can be resolved by looking at the possibility of a relationship which is other than spatial.

Anything we say is going to be framed in terms that derive from our shared experience and understanding of the empirical world as well as our intuitions and speculative imaginations. — Janus

How does "shared experience" even make sense to you? From all that I can glean from my own experience, it appears very obvious that my personal experience is radically different from anyone else whom I have relations with.

If this is difficult for you to grasp, try this little experiment. Sometime when you are with a group of people, randomly ask, 'what just happened?'. You'll see that the answers vary just as much as the people in the group.

How can you speak of a "shared experience" when this is so oxymoronic?

We can learn to navigate the empirical world more or less effectively, but if our perception and understanding of the empirical world were at odds with the underlying real nature of things it seems reasonable to think we would not do well. — Janus

Notice how you use 'perception and understanding". This is because we use the rational mind to resolve all the problems which sense perception presents us with. You speak as if the senses provide us with an accurate representation. In reality, the senses provide us with huge problems, problems which the rational mind has some success at resolving. So it's really not the senses which provide us the capacity to navigate, its the rational mind.

The reason I mention this, is because it provides a kind of conceptual background for making sense of the claim that appearances are deceptive. — Wayfarer

That's a very enlightening passage from the CPR. It demonstrates how "matter" is just a concept, and it is simply an assumption made by us, which is used to explain why our sense perceptions of the world or so radically inconsistent with what our rational minds tell us the world must really be like. We posit "matter" as the medium between rational understanding, and sense perception, as the reason for this inconsistency.

This is the true understanding of "matter", that it is simply a concept, and as Berkeley demonstrates, not a necessary concept, but one which has been chosen. Notice how Kant describes that when we apply this concept "matter" in its true form, all proposed spatial relations are internal rather than external. As objects having spatial relations with one another is simply how we represent the proposed external reality, and there is no necessity to this representation. It is just what is customary to us, as consistent with that assumption of "matter".

As a Scientist he is limited by Methodological Naturalism's principles to keep his work within a specific demonstrable realm, not because of a ideological bias but due to Pragmatic Necessity.(Its where our methodologies and evaluations function).
So by definition his interpretations and conclusions are pseudo scientific. — Nickolasgaspar

This, in no way is an accurate representation of how a scientist philosophizes. The method of philosophy is not the same as the method of science, so when a scientist philosophizes, that scientist may or may not have some training in philosophy. And if the scientist has some training in philosophy, the degree of training will vary from one scientist to another. This degree of training will be evident in the philosophy which the scientist produces.

"Pseudo science" on the other hand is the inversion of this, when someone without proper scientific training makes an attempt at science, without applying the appropriate scientific method. That you confuse these two is evident from the fact that you switch from pseudo science to pseudo philosophy in the course of your post. You don't seem to know what you're talking about.

C 1. God is absolutely simple. Otherwise, He would not be the first and most original principle.

C 2. Accordingly, He has no parts to offer for transformation. Rather, He would have to give Himself completely for this purpose. In fact, in His simplicity, He is so much of one piece that He would be entirely the power that would serve to transform.

D Therefore, God has completely transformed Himself into the universe. — spirit-salamander

I don't see how you derive what you call "D" here. If God is One, and was active prior to His creation, what prevents Him from being active currently?

What I see first is contradiction within B 2:

B 2. However, the transformation of a transcendent substance into mundane things is possible.

If all that exists at a given time, is one substance, then all is one. Accordingly, it is impossible that one becomes two. or any other multiplicity, unless there is something which is other than the one, which serves as a boundary, or divisor, within the one, to make two, or the proposed multiplicity. Therefore it is contradictory to say that One can transform itself into Many. This proposition implies that the One is not really one, or the Many is not really many.

Because of this, we need to look more closely at your principle that God is simple. You say that God must be simple, as the "most original principle". But this as well is contradictory. The nature of "a principle" is such that it always consists of parts. There cannot be a principle which does not have constituent parts which comprise the principle.

So, allow me to return to my original objection. To "be active" is a principle which implies the necessity of parts. There is a number of things implied within this concept "active". There is a substance which is active, there is space to be active in, and there is time. If God was active, then those three required parts of the principle "active" are necessary.

I conclude that your argument is misdirected in a number of ways.

If the non-mental does interact with the mental however, that raises questions as to how that is even possible. — Ø implies everything

You might start with the simplified question of how any sort of interaction is possible.

since our perceptions allow us to navigate the world fairly smoothly, it is reasonable to assume that they are giving us more or less accurate information. — Janus

I guess that depends on how how you define "accurate information". Are you saying that since we nourish ourselves, reproduce, and manage a little entertainment as well, this means our senses must be providing us with accurate information? Even single cell organisms manage to nourish themselves and reproduce, therefore "navigate the world rather smoothly". So does the capacity to entertain ourselves imply that we are getting accurate information? Not really, because in general fiction provides better entertainment than fact.

If the world in itself were nothing at all like the world we perceive, then fitness (or anything else) would seem to be impossible to explain. — Janus

Our perceptions of the world need not resemble the world in any way, in order for us to develop some sort of understanding. All that is required is consistency in usage. For example, the words we use, and mathematical symbols we use, do not resemble in any way the things they refer to, yet the usage of words and symbols develops into an understanding. This is the nature of "meaning", it is based in consistency of usage, not in resemblance.

Hoffman seems to be making the point that we ought to look at the relationship between the human mind and the supposed "world", which is developed through sensation, as a relationship of meaning rather than a relationship of facsimile. The way that the world appears to us is a product of how meaning is apprehended.

Or, to put this in a better light, if we want to understand the reality behind how things appear to us in sensation, we ought to look at how meaning appears to us because the sense apparatus has been developed to aid us in dealing with things which are meaningful, significant, and important to us. So, to understand the way that meaning appears to us, our best and most direct examples are in the use of language and symbols.

What we can see, as a starting point here, in an analysis of the use of symbols, is that the principal usage of symbols is as an indicator, or sign, of some form of classification, type, or universal. The use of the symbol acts as a memory aid, so that a sophisticated concept is signified with a simple symbol, facilitating the memory. There is no need for the symbol to resemble the category. If we now look at the act of naming a particular object or individual, use of a proper noun, we can see the same thing, there is no need for the name to resemble the named particular, only a need for the mind to have the capacity to make the required association.

So if we look at sensation now, we can see that the lower level senses, the tactile senses of taste, touch, and smell, deal exclusively with types, general or universal feelings. We associate similar smells, tastes, or feelings, as "the same" sort of feeling, and we have little if any capacity to distinguish unique peculiarities. Hearing gives us a better tool for distinguishing peculiarities of the particular circumstances, and seeing is even better. Notice that the two basic categories, the principals of the fundamental tactile feelings, are pleasure and pain, and these are subdivided with a whole range of sub-categories. None of these in any way can be construed as resembling the thing sensed.

If we look at the higher senses now, hearing and seeing, there has been developed a stronger capacity toward distinguishing uniqueness and peculiarities. Still, there is no basis for the assumption that the way that the peculiarities of the individual circumstances of sensation are being signified is a mode of resemblance. And, as the evidence of the lower senses indicates to us, it is highly unlikely that it is a mode of resemblance. So if we take the electromagnetic activity which sight is sensitive to for example, we see that a very narrow range of wavelength is interpreted through the eyes. it appears like distinguishing tiny differences within this very limited range has proven to be more meaningful than interpreting a very wide range of wavelengths. But of course, we can understand that colour in no way resembles electromagnetic waves.

Idealism, one way or another, has it that there is nothing that is not related in some way to mind. Hence things only exist if they stand in some relation to mind. — Banno

You ought not describe everything in monist terms. From a dualist perspective, (and many idealists are dualist) there is an unintelligible aspect of reality. So not everything has a relation to the mind, as there is that which does not have a relation to the mind, and this is consistent with idealist dualism.

From the dualist perspective, the issue is which fundamental aspect of reality has priority, is it the intelligible or the unintelligible. Depending on how one understands this priority, the person is either an idealist dualist, or materialist dualist.

Oh thanks, that makes more sense. I couldn't figure out what you were asking, now I can answer the question.

So, how could physcal interactions produce free will? — Dfpolis

Physical interactions do not produce free will, it comes from something else. If Lamarckian evolutionary theory is closer to reality on this point, then so be it. Darwin's theory was accepted for its scientific merits, not for the philosophical aspects. Lamack's treatise on habits is more consistent with Aristotle, (as implying final cause), than Darwin's vague allusion to chance.