Still, consider the times. In the treatise, Hume mentions God four times. Count ‘em. Four. In however-many-hundreds of pages. This goes great lengths to show the separation from the philosophical standard of the time he is making, and for which he is, as ↪Manuel says, definitely of historical importance. Can’t really blame the guy for not getting the finer points out in the open, when he was the first to seriously open the box out of which his successors would step. — Mww

It was a time when human beings were stepping away from God as an explanation for what is natural. This was opening up the field of natural philosophy allowing speculation into other causes as to the existence of natural things (previously attributed to God). This was relatively early in the study of natural philosophy, so the fundamental principles were still being established.

From Hume’s point of view, from the Treatise, you mean? I’d agree with his premise, or principle, that our reason is insufficient for grounding the certainty for the existence of bodies. But it isn’t reason by which that certainty arises anyway, so his claim with respect to reason does nothing to prohibit some other means by which the certainty of the existence of things is given. — Mww

The issue is not so much certainty about "the existence of bodies", as such, because we take that for granted, with great certainty. But the uncertainty arises when we question what does this mean. What does it mean to be a body, and to exist. Then we find great uncertainty. And this is why we have the contrariety. There is extremely little certainty concerning the meaning of a phrase which we accept with great certainty.

Here is a brief exegesis of the next section (p205-208):

After determining that the idea of continued existence is a fiction, he proceeds to question why we produce such an idea. So he considers the following contradiction:

The smooth passage of
the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions
makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted
manner of their appearance makes us consider them as
so many resembling, but still distinct beings, which appear
after certain intervals. — p205

This contradiction causes an "uneasiness" within us, and begs to be resolved. One or the other, of these contrary principles must be sacrificed. The notion of identity supports smooth passage of our thoughts, so we are very reluctant to give up that idea in favour of each perception existing as a distinct being. So we turn to that side, the idea that our perceptions are not interrupted. However, the interruption can be so extensive that we are forced to consider that the perceptions may have existence independent from the mind.

Now there are two questions raised (p207) relating back to the stated contradiction. How can a perception be absent from the mind without ceasing to exist, and how can it become present to the mind without creation, or become present again to the mind without some form of recreation. So he proposes that a mind is nothing more than a unity of perceptions, united by relations, allowing that any particular relation may be broken and outside the mind, thus allowing the separation of a perception from a mind, thereby apparently resolving both of these two questions.

The problem I see with this proposal is that he does not ascribe a cause to these relations. The mind exists as a unity of perceptions, such that we have a "connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a. thinking being". But "thinking" is an activity, and he has posited no real cause to account for his proposal of a unity of perceptions in the act of thinking. There is no cause given for a perception to establish a relation and become part of the unity, and no cause given for a perception to break its relation and become independent from the mind.

Because of this problem. the assumption of continued existence is said to be a "feigning" (208). If we could identify the cause of perceptions coming into the unity (which is the mind) and going out of the unity, then we would have the reason for this, and we would not have to resort to invoking a feigning to account for this. So the issue here is that thinking is an activity, and thoughts or perceptions come into and go out of the thinking mind, but we have no identified cause of this activity.

If we had an identified cause, we could accurately, and truthfully say (without feigning) whether the perceptions are recreated each time they come into the mind, and annihilated when they leave it, or whether they are passed off whole into an independent space, and later come back from that independent place.

Because the cause is not identified, Hume is left saying that we "feign" continued existence. He then proceeds to analyze why we have a propensity toward believing this idea which has been feigned.

You know…..it’s awful hard to maintain the conceptual schemes of outdated philosophies. One has to keep in mind what the original author knew about, and from which his terminology derives, even if he himself alters its meaning. For instance, perception. Perception now means something very different than how Hume wanted it to be understood with respect to his “new” philosophical approach. The concept of mind itself was still taken to be one half of the entirety of human nature, while in later times it became merely an apex placeholder, having no exacting import of its own, at all. — Mww

I try to maintain a chronological order to my understanding of philosophy. It is always good to put a philosopher's writing into a temporal context. This is why I believe it is imperative toward understanding philosophy, to have a good training in ancient philosophy. This allows one to conceive of ancient ideas, how things were understood in those times, and grasp how different ideas evolve over the course of time through different influences.

...what you are emphasizing, are the reasons for the belief,... — Manuel

Sure, that's what Hume has explicitly said is the subject of this section of the book. The section is not really concerned with the vulgar beliefs themselves, it focuses on the causes of these beliefs. And, when it is found that a principal cause of one such belief is an error, this presents us with a problem.

If his reason cannot be trusted with respect to determining the existence of bodies, why would it be trusted to reasonably ask for the causes by which his believing that the existence of bodies is to be taken for granted? Furthermore, why would we be “induced to believe”, when the principle which grants the existence of bodies has been given to us, insofar as Nature has “….not left this to his choice….”? — Mww

I believe that this is exactly the unresolvable inconsistency which Hume finds himself up against. Overly simplified, it's reasonable to take the existence of bodies for granted, But it's also reasonable not too. What I think this indicates is that we ought not claim certainty about the existence of bodies.

"We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (p.187) — Manuel

The conclusion that continued existence is an erroneous assumption is not completely inconsistent with the assumption of body. It just means that body does not exist in the way that we commonly think that it does. In mysticism and some religions we find the idea that the whole world, every single body uniquely., must be recreated at each moment of passing time. We are led toward this idea because of the reality of change, and the reality of the free will. This constant recreation, which is done in a way that produces the appearance of continuity to us (consider the analogy of a succession of still frames producing a film), is attributed to the Will of God. It is necessary that God acts at every passing moment to maintain the appearance of continuity, the continuance of order, which is known to us as the laws of nature.

What he is discussing here is not the existence of these objects, it's that the reasons we give for our belief in their continued existence to be far weaker than what we ordinarily suppose. But he does not believe that we are deluded or fooling ourselves when we conclude that there are bodies. — Manuel

Yes, "far weaker" indeed. He explicitly describes the reasons for our belief in continued existence as an error, and deception. You can rationalize this however you please.

That's his own conclusion and although he says "I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable — Manuel

What you quoted clearly supports what I've said. Hume believes perceptions to be distinct from each other, therefore not of a continuously existing body.

"Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu’d existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions, that tho’ all sects agree in the latter
sentiment, the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary consequence, has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it. There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214) — Manuel

Yes, this is the point here. Most philosophers except that there is not continuity to our sense perceptions. The necessary consequence of this is that the idea of continuous existence ought to be rejected altogether. However, philosophers, except some skeptics (such as Hume) are reluctant to reject this idea of continuous existence.

I think it is important to point out, that in Hume's use of the term, "fiction", does not mean what we mean by it today, something not being "real", or belonging to mythical tale or a novel. It simply means "more than is warranted by the empirically available evidence." It is real, in the sense that we do experience the identity of objects, but when we look at the evidence, it turns out to be weaker than we would like. — Manuel

Let me assure you, Hume is using "fiction" in a way which is very customary to us. It means something created solely by the mind, and not representative of reality, non-factual. Of course the fictitious is not warranted by the empirically available evidence, as you say, but it is more than just this, it is also a fabrication. And, if the fiction is believed to be, or presented as, a true representation of reality, it is an error, and a source for deception.

This fiction of the
imagination almost universally takes place ; and ’tis by
means of it, that a single object, plac’d before us, and
survey’d for any time without our discovering in it any
interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity. — 201

That speaks of your concerns that each perception is different, and it is by resemblance that we posit continuity. True. Now he says, on p. 204:

"I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions
by the strongest relation and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. "

Italics mine. Each perception is new, and he does not want to distinguish between objects and perceptions. Yet he still speaks of "my chamber", if he didn't have a notion of identity, he couldn't speak like this, because he would have no way to separate his chamber from anything else.

An important, passage, I think, is this:

"We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion concerning the continu'd existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the manner in which the conclusion is forrn'd, and principies from which it is deriv'd."(p.206) — Manuel

This is an example of what Hume calls the "error" of identity at page 202. The error is caused by believing that the fiction, is true reality. Fiction misleads us into error.

To enter, therefore, upon the question concerning the
source of the error and deception with regard to identity,
when we attribute it to our resembling perceptions, notwithstanding their interruption ; I must here recall an observation, which I have already prov'd and explain'd. — 202

The error he describes, is when the mind associates one idea with another, easily passing form the one to the other, because of some relation between them, such as resemblance, causing us to judge them as the same. This disposition, to judge them as the same causes the error of identity. They are not the same. He explains this on 203. The ideas, or perceptions are not the same, they are distinct, yet they cause a similar "disposition" of mind within us, causing us to judge them as the same.

So we have here exposed by Hume, our error of identity. This error is a form of self-deception which further inclines the mind to create a fiction of the continued existence of an object. We readily associate distinct impressions with each other, and we have a disposition to judge them as the same. This judgement of same is an error, and this error causes us to believe in the continued existence of an object.

Yes, he uses "my chamber" to refer to an object with continued existence, in the "vulgar" manner, because this is the only way that we have of speaking, but he is explaining why this is an error. The general population, being unphilosophical, are misled by that error, but philosophers see through it to the reality.

That I may avoid all ambiguity and confusion
on this head, I shall observe, that I here account for the
opinions and belief of the vulgar with regard to the existence
of body; and therefore must entirely conform myself to their
manner of thinking and of expressing themselves. — 202

The persons, who entertain this opinion concerning the.
identity of our resembling perceptions, are in general all the
unthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind, (that is, all
of us, at one time or other) and consequently such as suppose
their perceptions to be their only objects, and never think of
a double existence internal and external, representing and
represented. The very image, which is present to the senses,
is with us the real body; and ’tis to these interrupted images
we ascribe a perfect identity. But as the interruption of the
appearance seems contrary to the identity, and naturally
leads us to regard these resembling perceptions as different
from each other, we here find ourselves at a loss how to
reconcile such opposite ,opinions. The smooth passage of
the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions
makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted
manner of their appearance makes us consider them as
so many resembling, but still distinct beings, which appear
after certain intervals. The perplexity arising from this
contradiction produces a propension to unite these broken
appearances by the fiction of a continu’d existence, which is
the third part of that hypothesis I propos’d to explain. — 205

This makes Hume a direct realist, in contrast to Kant, who puts back a separate external existence as the unfathomable, (and to Hume, absurd) Noumenon. — unenlightened

Notice, what Srap says, it is a world of perceptions only. It is when we attempt to talk about something which is beyond the perceptions, something external, that the error described above, occurs. We erroneously judge distinct perceptions which resemble each other as the same (btw, this is a central part of Wittgenstein's private language argument, the question of how we can judge two distinct sensations as the same), and then we create a fictitious temporal continuity between these perceptions which have been erroneously judged as the same. We create this fictitious continuity because that's what the judgement of "the same" requires in this case of temporally separated instances, uninterruptedness. Then we assign the "uninterruptedness" to a supposed external object. So this error forms the basis of our assumption of a distinct, external object, with continuous existence.

Yeah, this will be interesting to discuss, I'll get back to you sometime tomorrow, there's a lot to say here. — Manuel

Here are what I consider the key points. First, the "broken perceptions". Sensation is often interrupted, (for whatever reason is unimportant), so that we sense the environment at one time, and then again at a later time. Through memory we compare, and observe "resemblance". But resemblance is not the same as "perfect identity", and this inclines us to believe that the object of the past impression was annihilated and replaced by a new object. Therefore, the principal task for justifying the continued existence of an object is to establish consistency between "resemblance" and "identity", what he refers to under "Secondly" at the beginning of page 200.

But Hume explicitly doesn't care.

Same page is where he says all these mental phenomena (perceptions, feelings, ideas, what have you) are 'on the same footing.' And he assumes they are presented to the mind as discrete, already individuated packets.

He is absolutely *not* going to say they are shaped by the mind, because that suggests there is something to be shaped, something that already has a distinct existence outside the mind. But he explicitly wants only to look at perceptions etc. insofar as they are dependent on the mind: for Hume they exist at the moment we are conscious of them, and that's it. — Srap Tasmaner

Actually things are the opposite of what you say here, he explicitly does care about this matter. He is asking about "distinct existence", and this requires that the individual, the person or self, is separated from the rest of the world. It's a sort of inverse way of looking at things, but this is why he mentions the subject of personal identity. Then he explicitly concludes that the senses themselves cannot produce this separation. The senses don't distinguish what is part of yourself, and what is not.

So we cannot say that he assumes that the senses provide discrete individuated packages. He actually seems to say the exact opposite, that the senses cannot perform such a feat of individuation. This is why the senses cannot produce a dual existence.

It may be the case that he believes that perceptions exist only at the moment we are conscious of them, but he has very clearly stated that he is interested in causation, and this implies what is prior to that moment. His enquiry is into the causes of our belief in the existence of body:

The subject, then, of our present enquiry is concerning
the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of
body

If he does not separate that which is derived from the senses from that which is created by the mind, he is left with the appearance of one cause, rather than "causes".

Hume accepts the usual argument as a step toward considering perceptions only, however they appear to the mind — Srap Tasmaner

I think you are hiding behind the ambiguity of "perception". Haven't you already said that "perception" includes all things apparent to the mind. So a belief must be a perception, and he has distinctly stated that he is enquiring into the causes of a particular belief, therefore a particular perception. So he cannot be considering perceptions only, because this would imply an infinite regress or circular reasoning, where only perceptions cause other perceptions. Rather, he is considering the causes of perceptions. In the enquiry concerning the causes of what appears to the mind, we have to have some way to get outside "what appears to the mind", or else what appears to the mind is caused by the mind itself, and all reality becomes hallucinations and dreams.

So we take the existence of "body" for granted, as something outside the mind, and we say that it has causal effect within the mind. But if we did not assign causation to body, then we are just left with the mind doing all the causing, hence creating the illusion of "body", and we would still be in the same place, unable to justify the existence of anything outside the mind. So, we must determine that body has real causal efficacy to escape the skeptic's trap. Though it is true that only perceptions, within the mind, appear to the mind, it is also true that through the concept of "causation", we might be able to conclude the existence of something outside the mind. This would get us past skepticism.

I don't see how this follows. I mean, one can use the example of the Ship of Thesus: we replace on part of the boat with new wood and discard the old parts, it's literally not the same object - as it has new pieces in it, but we still recognize it as the same ship.

Likewise, if we are looking at a flower, miniscule parts of the flower are blown off by the wind, so it's literally not the exact same object one moment to the next, but we still recognize it as the same object. You can think of it as flower at T1 and flower at T2. — Manuel

Well, The Ship of Theseus is usually presented as an example of how complex and difficult the subject of identity really is, not as evidence that identity is something simple as you seem to imply here. However, I would agree with you, that the law of identity allows that a thing might remain 'the same as itself' despite undergoing many changes, thus maintaining its identity as the thing which it is despite changing. But this idea of identity presents us with a stack of logical problems.

First, we would not be able to associate identity with any type of description of the thing, because we are wanting to say that the thing remains the same thing and continues to be the same thing, despite changing and therefore requiring a different description. Furthermore, we would not be able to associate identity with any type of determination as to "what" the thing is, meaning a specified type of thing. This is because by allowing that a thing can change, and still maintain its identity by always being the same as itself, we'd have to allow that the thing could even change type, and still remain its status as the same thing. And even if we tried to establish a boundary between types, and tried to enforce a rule whereby the thing if it crossed that boundary would stop being itself, the thing that it was, to become something different, a new thing, then we'd need some principle to create this boundary. And what sense would it make to say that the thing stopped being itself, to become something different from itself.

To get back to the text, we need to pay close attention to what Hume says about "identtiy" from page 200 onward. Hume does not interpret the law of identity in the same way that you and I do. We accept that a thing changes yet continues to be itself, thus the same thing that it was, thereby maintaining its identity despite changing. Hume thinks that a thing must remain exactly the same, perfectly unchanged, to maintain its identity, by the law of identity. He attributes "identity" to invariableness:

We cannot, in any propriety of speech, say,
that an object is the same with itself, unless we mean, that
the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent
at another. By this means we make a. difference, betwixt
the idea meant by the word, object, and that meant by ifself
without going the length of number, and at the same time
without restraining ourselves to a strict and absolute unity. — p201

So you see he interprets the law of identity in a way completely different from you and I by associating "identity" with invariableness, remaining unchanged. Furthermore, this must have a profound effect on how he understands continued existence. If, to have continued existence, and maintain its identity as the thing which it is, a thing must remain unchanged from one time to another time. This is completely different from how you and I understand continued existence, which presumes that a thing continues to be the thing which it is, despite changing.

There is an issue around the individuation of perceptions.

There's that passage where Hume claims perceptions are exactly what they appear to consciousness as, etc etc, so he's basically claiming they are self-individuating. — Srap Tasmaner

The problem I have with this, is that I do not see the basis for claiming that individuation is something carried out by the senses, therefore inherent within the sense perception, rather than something produced by the mind which is apprehending the sensations. The problem again is in the ambiguity of "perception". If "perception" refers to what is created by the mind, then there is no need for any sense input, like what Manuel describes above. But when we say "sense perception", then a necessity for sense input is implied. However, in the case of sense perception, the part which is created by the mind is not distinguished from the part input by the senses. So even if we say perceptions are self-individuating we don't know for sure how much of this is done by the senses, and how much is done by the mind. So we still do not get at the source of individuation

Reading between the lines, it seems to me an inscrutable fact about how we experience the world. We strongly believe in the continuity of objects, but they change all the time. As do our perceptions. — Manuel

The problem though, is that "continuity of objects", and "they change all the time", is inherently self-contradictory. So the proposition that "we strongly believe" in this, cannot be properly supported. If an object has continuous existence, it must continue to be the object which it is, or it becomes something else. That's what change does, it annihilates the object as being what it was, to be something else. So change negates the continuity of an object, by always making it something other than it was.

Hume's mistake in the outset, is to class "continued" and "distinct" together, and try to analyze them as both the same type of property. There is a fundamental inconsistency between "continuous" and "discrete", which makes classing these two together impossible. So his analysis of sensation is a bit off, because he presumes sense perceptions to exist as individual occurrences, rather than as a continuous experience. Since we continually sense through a duration of time, the perception itself is actually changing. Each and every sense perception occurs over a duration of time, so it contains change within it. Then if we try to break up a continuous perception into distinct perceptions we can never remove the activity from the sense perception. Notice page 192, where Hume attributes motion to sensation.

So what Hume refers to as a "single" or "distinct" perception cannot really be applied logically to sense perception, because the single perception would involve activity, hence an object being in more than one place at the same time. That is because motion, and the continuity of activity inhere within sensation. Therefore, there is a logical inconsistency between Hume's "single", or "distinct" perception, and a true description of sense perception. The true description would say that sense perception consists of a duration of time, and each act of sensation could logically be broken down into a multitude of distinct frames. This implies that the double existence, and resemblance relation referred to, is already inherent within any supposed "single" sense perception itself.

In reality, what we ought to conclude from this, is that there is an incompatibility between "continued existence" (what the senses provide us with the appearance of), and "distinct existence", (what reason tells us that a sense perception must consists of). While sensation provides us with a continuity of activity, without a division, or individualization of distinct parts, or objects, reason wants to break this down into individualized parts, or distinct parts, for comparison, and analysis of different rates of change occurring to the different objects within the continuous sense perception.

So the idea of distinct objects is assumed by Hume to be derived from imagination. And, when we take this idea of distinct objects, and apply it toward our sense perceptions, sensations, we assign to the sensations, objects with a continued existence, to match up with, or to be consistent with, the "continued existence" which sensation gives us.

He describes the role of memory in this imaginary creation of an object at 196. When the sound of the door is so similar to his past experience of the sound of the door, that it could not be anything else other than the sound of the door, he concludes that it would be contradiction to say it is not the sound of the door. Therefore, he has created in his imagination, an object, "the door", and the object thus entitled must have continued existence, to account for numerous appearances.

However, in criticism of Hume, notice that the claim of an object is dependent on something else, it's dependent on the memory, and this dependence makes the assumption of a "distinct" object imaginary, created by the mind to account for the similarity between instances of memory. That the object is "distinct" is fictional, imaginary, because that claim is a product of a need to account for similarity in instances of memory. Therefore, that the object is continuous is supported logically, but that the object is distinct is not. This is the consequence of him trying to make the assumption of "object" (as a distinct individual) consistent with sense perception which is continuous. The object loses its status of being a real distinct individual, because it requires the dual status, of two separate instances, and memory to relate them. And the separate instances are similar rather than the same.

At this point, p199, he proceeds to replace "distinct" with "coherent", such that the defining features of an "object" would be "continuous and coherent", and he says that "distinct" might be assigned later, perhaps as an after thought. The use of "coherent" instead of "distinct" allows for changes to the object between one appearance to the mind, and another, so long as the changes can be reasonably accounted for as coherent. Otherwise, each appearance of the supposed object, to the mind, would be distinct from any other, due to accidental differences. And then we'd have to say that these were distinct objects.

But textually, I see no easy answer. In my own opinion, putting Hume aside, it's not evident what this necessary effect would be. — Manuel

The "necessary effect" is the assumption itself, the assumption of a body, or an object. If we have no choice in this matter, as Hume says, then this assumption must be taken as necessary. Whatever is necessary must be caused, as the effect of that cause. Therefore there must be a cause which necessitates this effect (the assumption of bodies and objects) giving it the status of necessary.

Not what I intended at all. I was, I thought, following Hume's usage in using the word 'perception' to cover both impressions and ideas; so a perception is something present to the mind, of whatever source, a perceiving that is done 'by the mind's eye' we might say. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, my mistake then, but I tend to think that "perceive" and "perception" are most often used to refer to what the mind apprehends through the medium of sensation. When the mind creates something which is not the result of sensation we normally would use "imagination", or even "conception".

As I watch the birds flitting about in my front yard, I have an impression of a bird first here, then there, then there, as it moves from tree to tree. On a naive view, we might say there is a body, some force is applied to that body, and thus the body is caused to move through the air. We can see in the bird's flight inertia, which carries it along a certain path (modified by gravity and drag) until it flaps its wings again, adding a new vector which modifies its course, and so on.

Now consider me watching this: I have an impression of the bird; that impression is replaced by a different one with the bird elsewhere. Did my impression of the bird move? Of course not; I'm sitting on my porch and all my impressions of the bird are in the same place. Did my impression of the bird acquire an inertial force carrying it from one place to another? Perforce, no: my impression did not move; my impression had no such force applied to it. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think this is quite right. What Hume seems to be asking, on behave of the skeptic, is why do you believe that you have an impression of a distinct and continuous object which you call "the bird" in the first place. You seem to have a continuous visual image, but it is full of motion and change, so why do you believe that there is a continuous, distinct object as part of that changing scenario, which is the bird?

All the following ideas, inertia and Newton's laws follow from this idea, that there are objects which have continued and distinct existence. We take it for granted that there are such objects, bodies, like the bird, because it appears like we have no choice in the matter. But if we have no choice in this matter, then there must be a cause of us taking this for granted. And if there is a cause of us taking the continued and distinct existence of objects for granted, we ought to be able to determine that cause.

So he proceeds to show that the cause is not sensation, or the senses. The reason why we believe in the continued and distinct existence of objects is not because that is the way sensation presents the world to us. Now we might be led toward something in the mind, like imagination, as the source of this belief in continued and distinct existence, but we still need to determine what causes us to have this idea.

We grant to each what it desires (nature and reason), but it is something we do,we don't have a choice. — Manuel

This is the key issue, saying "we don't have a choice". If we do not have a choice, then this is determined by fate or something, so there must be a cause of this belief. Where is that cause? It's not from sense nor from reason. Furthermore, the skeptic says that we do have a choice in this matter, and even that our belief in such objects is unfounded and therefore a bad choice. So skepticism affords us the capacity to believe what you say we have no choice but not to believe. And to validate this statement "we don't have a choice", we need to determine the cause which produces this as a necessary effect.

Of course you can disagree with Hume; but can you make a case against his view?

For instance, Hume's view as I'm presenting it (not sure I'm getting him right) could be tweaked to more closely resemble relatively mainstream psychology: to claim some physical law governs the behavior of external objects is to describe our expectations about their behavior, which will for us just be particular sensory experiences and that's what we're actually predicting.

There's (not coincidentally) a similar perspective flip in the subjective account of probability (and thus of statistics).

So what's the critique of such views beyond mere disagreement? — Srap Tasmaner

The critique is that this way of looking at things posits sensory experience as the cause of all mental ideas. Thinking, mind, ideas, and mental activity in general, is represented as being dependent on perception, therefore caused by perception. This perspective is strongly determinist, and does not allow for the reality of free will. Free will requires that ideas may come from a source independent from bodily influence (sense perception).

The offending part is this:

There is no claim that perceptions are the only kind of objects, or that all objects are really perceptions, but only that the only kind of object in our minds is perception.

The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking, we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions and durations. But of this more fully hereafter.

And that's the pointer to our section, Part IV Section II, where he will refer back to this section: — Srap Tasmaner

I haven't found where you've taken this quote, but I do not think you interpret it correctly. You represent the conceptions of external objects as being dependent on, or necessarily caused by, perceptions. This denies the possibility that a representation of external objects could be entirely fictitious, imaginary, created completely by the mind. But I do not think that Hume intends this, he seems to give imagination a very strong role.

To be fair to Hume now, he seems to be more inquisitive of this perspective, that perception plays a necessary role in the conception of external objects, rather than firmly attracted to it. That's why he starts with the premise that the continued existence of external objects, cannot be justified, it's something that we just take for granted. So he moves then, to ask what causes us to believe in continued and distinct existence, what causes us to take it for granted, rather than asking what causes continued and distinct existence itself. And this leads him toward imagination.

We may, therefore, conclude with
certainty, that the opinion of a continu’d and of a distinct
existence never arises from the senses — 192

It's a funny turn around, and a bit deceptive if we don't analyze and understand the position properly. If we truly took continued existence, (what I call temporal persistence) for granted, as a real thing, then we'd move to inquire into the cause of continued existence. But Hume is taking the skeptical position, saying the idea is not justified by our perceptions, and that it's an idea that we take it for granted even though we do not have proper justification for it. This inclines him to ask what causes us to believe in continued existence, rather than to ask what causes continued existence. And it is within this hidden premise, that a belief must have a cause, if we accept it, that Hume could actually lead us to negate free will, for the sake of determinism. That is, if we accept Hume's notion that the belief in continued existence must have a cause, rather than attributing this belief to free will, and accepting continued existence as real, something to be taken for granted, and searching for the cause of it.

It's best that you give proper context to "continu'd existence". This is what is expressed by Newton's first law, the law of inertia. In general terms, this law states that what has been, in the past, will continue to be in the very same way, into the future, unless caused to change. This is the temporal continuity of existence, inertia, or temporal persistence. This law states that staying the same as time passes is to be taken for granted, and it says that change requires a cause. Notice that the reversal of this law would take change for granted (process philosophy, Heraclitus), and state that staying the same (continued existence, or temporal persistence), requires a cause. Though Newton stated his first law in such a way as to take continued existence (temporal persistence, inertia) for granted, he is also known to have said that this law requires the Will of God for its truth. That is to say, that continued existence, or inertia, is caused by God's Will. So his first law, the law of inertia, takes the Will of God for granted, in order for it to be a valid "law", effectively denying God the capacity of free will to alter what we know as continued existence, setting up the grounds for determinist physics.

Specifically what Hume is saying here is that we can have no idea of existence, an idea that we might join to another idea, as a way of having the idea of something existing. It's about our conceptions, not logic, not language. Might Hume have taken another line? Might he, for instance, have said, that to imagine an object differs from imagining it as existing in that the latter is more vivid, or more complete, or something like this? There would still, I think, be no distinct conception of existence. Even if he were to say that conceiving an object as existing is the usual conceiving but accompanied by some particular feeling, that leaves the conception the same, and this is Hume's only point.

...

Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind [ argued earlier ]; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.

That is, when we try to conceive the 'external objects' that occasion our perceptions, we have nothing but perceptions to work with — we have no other material with which to construct a conception of 'object', no material that would make such a conception a distinct sort of thing from a perception.

Or: try as you may to conceive, for once, of an external object, itself, you will only produce another idea, an idea derived from previous perceptions, impressions and ideas. It's all your mind can do; there is only one sort of object available to your mind, a perception, and any attempt to bring some other kind of object, whatever it may be, into your mind will fail utterly or substitute an idea of that other kind of object. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think Hume is correct in these points. We can pull from the imagination, a completely imaginary conception of what it means to exist, or a completely imaginary conception of what it means to be an external body, without reference to sensation. This is what happens with so-called pure mathematics, mathematicians come up with completely imaginary ideas about objects, and orders, without referencing perceptions.

In reality, we generally do reference perceptions in order to validate these conceptions, but it's not necessary to the conceptions. So we really dream up imaginary conceptions independent from our perceptions, and then we relate them to each other, conceptions to perceptions, in an attempt to validate each other. But the validation is not just one way, in the sense that the conceptions must conform to the perceptions, because sometimes conceptions can prove the perceptions to be wrong. Therefore we cannot assume, as Hume seems to, that all conceptions are based in perception.

THE TODDLERS HAVE SPOKEN!!!!!! — Mww

Yeah, let's see if the two-year-olds can validate the reality of an inertial frame of reference. Doesn't this require the reality of a straight line? Hahaha, the joke is on us.

There are authors who have written books or novels about fleeting of life or moments. One of the aspects I am agree with them the most is the fact that ephemeral is beautiful. I mean, if we consider a nettle as “pretty” is not due to their physical appearance but the brief of the moment where the flower grows up and then withers. This “transitoriness” is another perspective of how we see death. Instead of being a taboo topic, it can be understood in an artistic portrayal. It sounds so poetic, doesn’t it? — javi2541997

It does sound poetic, but true. The most beautiful things are the most ephemeral. I think that it fills us with awe to see so much complexity packed into a very short period of time. This is what music gives us, and the overlapping of temporal themes is very important. A large part of beauty seems to be associated with this temporal layering, 'occurring at the same time'. We can say that a single flower is beautiful because of its own arrangement of parts, but it doesn't even compare with a garden, or field of flowers, because the single flower always has to exist within its background, or context. That's why the unique sunset is so beautiful, because it encompasses the entire field of view. The natural and the artificial arrangement, each has its own type of beauty. But no matter how you look at it, beauty consists of a synchronicity of elements.

I think you need to be careful though to distinguish between living and dying. The transitoriness which you refer to is a property of living. It is not a property of death, because having been forced into the past (death) is permanent. Dying is the process whereby the permanent overcomes the transitory.

If living (being at the present) requires effort, then dying is an incapacity in relation to this effort. These two perspectives, looking at life as living, and looking at life as dying, are fundamentally different, like the difference between believing in free will, and fatalism. Fatalism has been demonstrated to be an attitude which incapacitates.

So the proper perspective is, to ask the question of what can I do in my act of living, rather than what can I do in my act of dying. This is because the latter, to die, is to negate one's capacity to act, and such an act would be suicide, which contradicts "what can I do", as it provides only one option, death.

At 85 turning a heavy page can irritate an arthritic finger . . . but worth the effort. — jgill

I think I'll be happy if I can still manage the keyboard at 85.

We have to keep in mind the fact that Thomas Mann saw death as an artistic expression. But in the correspondence maintained with Herman Hesse it looks like he increased the sense: without death we are meaningless. — javi2541997

I look at death as having been pushed into the past. To live, to be, to exist, is to be present in time. And at the present, the future is a massive force exerting substantial pressure over all that is at the present. Feeling the pressure which is the force of the future, is the source of excitement, anxiety, and stress. This is the passing of time, the exerting of pressure over all that is, forcing all that is, into the past, and this is known as the law of entropy.

To be at the present, to live, to exist, requires effort. We disguise the effort required to be at the present, by taking the persistence of mass for granted in the law of inertia. This law reverses our perspective, so that being at the present is taken for granted, instead of requiring effort. From this perspective, "force" is required to alter being at the present. That is a negation of the effort required to be at the present, produced by taking being at the present for granted. This makes dying, (being forced into the past) unnatural, as requiring an external force.

I want to put an example I was thinking about.
The main substance of flowers is to perish, right? Well, that's what it makes them so beautiful. Whenever a rose, nettle or sunflower flourish you enjoy it because it is beautiful and colourful. But trust me on the fact that we will end up getting tired of "perpetual" flowers in our garden for seeing them everyday in our lives.
I think this examples fits the concept of transitoriness so well. The aesthetic concept of a flourished flower is ephemeral. — javi2541997

Creativity, beauty, and all aesthetics, are a matter of the way that one exerts effort in being at the present. We can resist death, resist being pushed into the past, making oneself strong, solid as a rock, but we know that this is a futile effort. Instead, we as living beings, have learned that it is far more productive to exert our efforts towards making an appeal to others. This instinct has evolved so that now, being at the present is not a matter of long term perseverance, attempting to fight the futile battle of being solid as a rock and preventing oneself from being forced into the past, it is a matter of doing something productive for the sake of others, during one's brief time at the present. That's what we see in the beauty of the flower.

So effort is best placed, not in attempting to extend one's time at the present, indefinitely, as this is futile. Effort is best placed in doing something spectacular in a very brief moment of being at the present. So we sense the most beautiful things as occurring in the most brief periods of time, like the flowers, music, and all our moments of joy, which are but a flash in the pan, so to speak.

Yet that assumption might be like someone reading a book and believing that once a page is turned it no longer exists, or someone believing the pages that haven't been read yet do not exist until one turns the page It makes me wonder what is around me in the universe. — javi2541997

Yes, this is exactly the perspective one ought to take. To exist is to be at the present. The pages in the past no longer exist, yet we have learned from them. And the important thing to note is that the pages of the future have no existence until the prior page is turned. The living being, existing at the present, is not the one turning the pages though. The page turning is being forced upon us, and if we do not move to the next page, (which has no existence until the previous is turned), by creating a place for ourselves on that page, or even better, creating a spectacle for others, on that page, then we get forced into the past.

I believe the "agent" is anything you want it to be in game theory, so long as it is acting. This is why game theory has a very wide range of applicability. You could probably even adapt game theory to be applied to quantum physics, where fundamental particles are the agents involved in decision making.

True enough, but couldn’t that be conditioned by natural evolution? — Mww

We could say that natural selection is a process whereby different structures of order are selected for, but it doesn't account for the cause of the ordered structures which are selected for.

Again, true enough, but that kind of intelligence isn’t human, nor could it be, and human intelligence is the only one we have non-contradictory grounds to discuss. — Mww

I agree that this type of intelligence isn't the same as human intelligence, but neither is the intelligence of dogs and other animals, the same as human intelligence. This is why I said to Creative, that the way one defines "intelligence" makes a difference. But why would we define "intelligence" in such a way so as to exclude the possibility of intelligence which is not human intelligence? It makes much more sense to look at what it is which is referred to as "intelligence", and define the term accordingly. This would clearly allow for the possibility that there is intelligence which is not human intelligence. Then the argument I provided necessitates that there is intelligence other than human intelligence, if we use that open definition.

Or, we could go the other route, which I proposed above. We can maintain that definition of "intelligence" which limits it to human intelligence, as a product of the human brain, and look for another name to account for that other source, or cause of order. This name has been proposed as "soul", which is intelligence-like, but not quite the same.

Pick an explanation, I guess, run with it ‘til you trip over it. Metaphysical reductionism can only go so far before it defeats itself, right? — Mww

I don't think it's a matter of picking an idea and running with it, it's more like back and forth, back and forth, like the trial and error process I referred to above. Take a set of premises, and produce a conclusion. The conclusion is never completely satisfactory so we go back and make some changes to the premises. The conclusion is still not completely satisfactory so we revisit the premises again, and so on.

In traditional Christian theology, I believe the will is considered to be independent from the rational part of the intellect. It does not necessarily follow reason, nor does it necessarily follow concupiscent feelings. This is what makes it free, and not necessarily following reason accounts for the fact that a person can knowingly do what one knows to be wrong. This renders the cause of willed activity fundamentally unknowable, and the will itself, as that cause, is fundamentally unknowable.

[

You guys are exhibiting inconsistencies between comments. — Mww

Creative and I seem to be on completely different planes of understanding. So I really don't understand why Creative engaged me after the thread had gone dormant for a number of days. We could have both foreseen that any attempt at discourse would not get far, based on past experience. Maybe it was a matter of boredom.

I didn’t get from your comments, that you hold the senses are existentially dependent upon an intellect, or that the intellect orders the individual parts, that is to say, the biological structures, of the senses. — Mww

I think this is the position I was arguing. The biological structures, which include the senses, must be ordered in such a way so as to fulfill each one's purpose. In this case the structures which constitute the various forms of sensation must be ordered in the way required for the senses to sense. The argument is that it can only be an intellect which creates this biological order, the order which is necessary for these parts to serve their various purposes.

That there is no intellect without the physiological structures sufficient for it, is given, but that structure is the brain and ancilliary connectivity, not mechanistic sensory devices. — Mww

So "the brain" presents an interesting problem. If we equate intellect with brain, or say that intellect is dependent on brain, (as produced by it or something like that), then when I present my argument that the physiological structures which are responsible for sensation require an intellect, we could just reduce this to say that they require a brain. But the problem is that the brain itself is an organized biological structure. And the argument is that any such order in material bodies requires a cause of that type of order. And, the cause must be an intellect of some sort. So this places an intellect as prior to the brain, and impossible that the intellect is a product of, or dependent on, the brain.

You mentioned how we have exceeded our innate capabilities, or words to that effect. — creativesoul

Yes, every person exceeds one's innate capabilities, that's what learning is. We learn how to do more, and to know more than what we are born with.

The intellect is existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception(biological 'machinery'). — creativesoul

This is what you insist, but you have not justified it. And it really depends on how one defines "intellect". A materialist will define it such that the thing described in the description depends on sensory perception. A dualist sees as I do, the need to allow for some sort of intelligence as the cause of order in the living body, therefore existing prior to the "biological machinery", and "intellect" gets defined in a way to allow that it is not dependent on physiological sensory perception.

There is really no correct or incorrect definition of "intellect" here, one's preferred definition is a reflection of one's world view. However, how one proceeds from the definition makes a difference to the way that one would understand the reality of the living person.

So, I can accept your proposal, that "The intellect is existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception(biological 'machinery')", and we could define "intellect" in this way, as a function of the brain or something like that, but we still need to account for the cause of organization, and order in the living being which constitutes the material body, the cause of existence of what you call "biological machinery".

This is what I believe Aristotle proposed, a separation between "mind" (intellect), and "soul". Prior to him, "mind" and "soul" were used interchangeably, so there was much ambiguity and confusion between those who insisted as you do, that the mind is a product of the biological machinery, and those who insisted like I do, that the immaterial soul must precede the biological machinery as cause of its existence. So Aristotle separated the concept of "soul" as the immaterial cause of the material body, from the concept of "intellect", as an attribute of the soul, which is dependent on the material body.

So, the intellect orders the parts that it later doubts? — creativesoul

Yes, that would be the case. And there is really no problem with that idea, because we always proceed in our activities without absolute certainty. So we order things, move them around, with healthy doubt and skepticism, then look back at the consequences with the same skepticism, to see where we have had successes and failures. In its basic form this is trial and error, and in a more complex and structured form it is the scientific method of experimentation.

But now I've proposed a distinction between the mind (intellect) and the soul, to help you to understand this matter. Let's say that the immaterial soul is prior to the material body, as the cause of that order, and the intellect is posterior to the material body, as dependent on it, like you say. In this way, we have also a direction, or guidance toward sorting out the difference between innate knowledge, and leaned knowledge. We can attribute some sort of "knowledge" to the soul, which inheres within the living body, in its capacity to act, and which must have preexisted the living body, as the cause of it coming into existence as the very body which it is, and we can also attribute a different sort of "knowledge" to the intellect, as knowledge which is learned by the living being.

When A is existentially dependent upon B then B is necessary for the emergence of A. When something(A) is existentially dependent upon something else(B), the former(B) cannot precede the latter(A). — creativesoul

This is what I say is begging the question. Your claim was that A cannot precede B. You attempt to justify this by defining A as "existentially dependent" on B. But that's just using different words to state your conclusion as your premise, begging the question. What you needed to do was to show, give a demonstration to prove, that A is existentially dependent on B.

That would require that the intellect exist in its entirety prior to the parts that it arranges into order. — creativesoul

How do you get this conclusion of "in its entirety"? There is nothing to necessitate your conclusion that the named thing "intellect" cannot be changed as a consequence of its own actions. In fact, that's exactly what learning is, changes being made to that thing "intellect", changes being made by the actions of itself and of others. It makes no sense to insist that the intellect must exist "in its entirety", prior to learning. And, the process of trial and error, and the scientific method mentioned above, are changes which the intellect makes to itself. Why insist that the intellect must exist "in its entirety" both prior to and after such changes? How could these even be changes to the intellect, if the intellect must exist in its entirety both before and after the change?

I've no reason whatsoever to believe that the intellect is even capable of remaining intact(in it's entirety) in the complete absence of those structures. — creativesoul

I really have no idea what you could possibly mean by "in its entirety" when you refer to the intellect. The intellect is something constantly changing, learning, bettering itself. It could never be complete except possibly in omniscience, but then it wouldn't even be an "intellect" which always has the objective of learning.

Therefore your argument along these lines really is not useful. You observe an intellect using specific biological structures, and you call this an intellect "in its entirety", so as to exclude other forms of "intellect" which are using other biological structures, or even no biological structure at all, from being an intellect "in its entirety".

To use your word "tool", the biological structure is a tool of the intellect. It shapes that tool in its learning process (neurological patterns), so the intellect is actually conforming the tool to suit its purpose. Why would you not consider the possibility that it created the tool altogether?

Or, do you think that when living creatures were evolving on earth, there was a specific point in their evolutionary advancements which constituted "having an intellect" in its entirety? All creature without this definable attribute had no intellect, and those with it have an intellect. How would you propose to draw this boundary?

Whereas there is no evidence to the contrary. — creativesoul

I don't see where you derive this idea from. All the evidence points exactly in the opposite direction of what you claim. First, there is no such thing as the intellect in its entirety. Next, it is exceedingly clear, that the intellect uses the biological structures as a tool. Neurological patterns are shaped in the learning process, for various purposes. And, it is only the particular purpose, the specific end, which is dependent on the tool. The existence of the thing using the tool is not dependent on the tool. Only the particular end desired by that thing is dependent on the tool.

So you seem to see a biological structure, which has been shaped and formed toward some particular ends, and you conclude that the thing using this tool, (the biological structure), depends on it for existence. But you are not respecting the proper relationship between the user of the tool, and the tool. The user of the tool is only dependent on that particular set of tools, for obtaining that particular set of ends. You are not respecting the reality that if the thing which is using that set of tools (the intellect in this case), was inclined toward completely different ends, it would be using a completely different set of tools.

In other words, you observe in the world, human intelligence inclined in a specific way, depending on its tools (biological structure), to achieve its desired ends. And you conclude that the evidence indicates that the intellect is "existentially dependent" on that biological structure. This is fallacious logic. The intellect is not existentially dependent on that biological structure. Only the fulfillment of those specific ends is dependent on that biological structure. So now, you will move to define "intellect in its entirety", as the capacity to fulfill some specific set of ends, and insist that "intellect in its entirety" is dependent on that biological structure.

All things begin simply and grow in their complexity. — creativesoul

This is obviously a false premise which seems to be misleading you. The second law of thermodynamics indicates that the natural process is for the complexity of things to break down over time. So the starting premise needs to be the reverse of what you propose here. All complex structures naturally break down, and lose their complexity as time passes.

So, if things are observed to grow in complexity, we need to assume a cause of this. So I proposed "intellect" as the cause of this order and organization. You prefer that we define "intellect" in another way, which makes the intellect dependent on, as emergent from this organized complexity. I will consent to this, but will you consent to my proposal now, that "the soul" is the cause of this growth in complexity? Then we can have a proper separation between the soul and the intellect.

I've not given any argument. Answer the questions. — creativesoul

I didn't bother because I thought Mww gave a satisfactory answer. But I really didn't understand your use of "tool". Why do you think that the intellect has to use tools? Wouldn't the intellect be best represented as a tool itself? And as a tool, it is distinct from the senses, which might also be represented as tools. So the intellect would be a tool which we use without the requirement of trusting the senses.

In fact, in the Platonic tradition, we use the intellect to question, doubt what appears to us through sensation. That's how people figured out that the earth orbits the sun. So we have established a relation of non-trust between the intellect and the senses, and that's why the scientific method is so strict in relation to observation, such that multiple observations are always compared. This is because sensation is not trusted. So science, through the use of intellect and distrust of the senses, has led us to understand the reality of all sorts of things which we cannot directly sense, like molecules, atoms, subatomic particles, photons, and waves.

So all valid conclusions are necessary in your view? Seems our notions of "necessary" differ. — creativesoul

Yes, that's what constitutes a valid conclusion. The conclusion is necessitated by the premises. Some people call it entailment or "logical consequence".

Logical consequence is necessary and formal, by way of examples that explain with formal proof and models of interpretation. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_consequence

My claim is supported by the evidence. — creativesoul

Since "evidence" is empirical, this statement is a fallacious argument called "begging the question", which does not qualify as valid justification. You need to demonstrate logically, why the evidence shows that it is impossible to give priority to the intellect, over the senses. Simply insisting, that this is the way it is, and that the evidence supports this, does not justify your claim. Justification requires a logical demonstration.

Plato's is supported by logical possibility alone. — creativesoul

I provided you with the logical demonstration. This is not "logical possibility", it is a logical necessity. A conclusion produced by valid logic, is a necessary conclusion, not a logical possibility. Since the logic is valid, and the conclusion is necessary, you need to address the premises, if you do not believe that the conclusion is sound.

Which premise do you believe to be unsound, that a living body is an organized body, consisting of ordered parts, or, that an organized body consisting of ordered parts requires an intellect as the cause of the ordering? And, how does "the evidence" support your belief of unsoundness?

I don't quite see how it's a science or religion situation? — Agent Smith

That's right, we ought not limit our investigation of such problems just to "science or religion". The majority of "conceptual confusions" which we tend to take for granted, but are massive logical cesspools, leaky as a sieve, and spewing waste over the entire planet, are to be found in mathematics.

You claimed that we ought not trust our senses but rather our intellect. I claimed it was impossible. — creativesoul

Actually, I claimed that was Plato's message, and I explained why. You still haven't justified your claim.

To negate a number is to subtract it from zer — Andrew M

Again, we were not talking about mapping. Your analogy was stated explicitly as "To be across from something means to be reflected in a line, point, or plane."

"To be across from something" as in opposite to it, does not imply mapping. If you would have been up front in the first place, and said that you were describing opposite as mapping, instead of as a reflection, I would have rejected that right off the bat. Instead, you tried to use the ambiguity of "opposite" to lead you to "across from", then on to "reflection", and finally "mapping". That's nonsense to describe "opposite" as "mapping".

How's that going for you? — Real Gone Cat

It's going very well, thank you for asking. I find it quite amusing, a lot of fun, and a good source of entertainment. I sincerely hope it is as much fun for you as it is for me. Then we're both winners here.

You're equivocating. The subject is numbers, not statements. — Andrew M

The subject is "inverse", and "opposite", and whether mathematics uses a perverse meaning for the words, which allows that a term such as "zero" might be opposite to itself.

In our inquiry as to whether this is the case or not, we can either adhere to the logical definition of "negation", or move to some perverted definition of "negation" which you propose, ("To negate a number is to subtract it from zero"), devised by you to be consistent with a perverted meaning of "opposite", and "inverse".

Of course, we ought to adhere to the logical definition of "negation" and not succumb to the perverted definition, because then we would not grasp the perversion which is present, and not see that mathematics has perverted the meaning of "opposite" and "inverse", to allow zero to be opposite to itself.

So, you separate the intellect from the senses by virtue of positing a mind(presumably of God) and then tell me that my claim that senses precede intellect needs justification? — creativesoul

I have not presumed God, I just gave you the logic. A sensing body is an organized body. This means that it requires ordered parts. The only thing which is capable of ordering parts, is an intellect. Therefore intellect must precede sense. Thus my claim is justified. Yours, that senses precede intellect, has not been justified.

From the Platonic perspective, which is what I am giving you, the immaterial mind as "soul", precedes the material body and causes the parts which constitute the organized body to be ordered in the necessary way. There is no need to assume God at this point, only the need to assume an immaterial soul, as prior to the material body. This is because a material body can only exist as an organized body, and that requires something to order the parts.

It is only when we consider the belief that material bodies preexisted life forms, that we see a need to assume God. This is because these material existents also exist only as ordered parts, and some sort of intellect is required as that which orders the parts.

Which tool do we use without requiring us to trust and use our senses? Which thought can we have without using our senses? — creativesoul

I don't see how these questions are relevant. Questions do not justify your claim, nor do they address the logic I've presented you with.

I just took a moment doing what I do to read this post, and now I feel so guilty. :cry:

You have no mercy, MU. — jgill

That's right. Show up at confession and feel the guilt for your sins. But you know you will be forgiven.

They're comparable because in each case the number remains the same. On that basis you reject that a negation has occurred but, apparently, still accept that an addition and a division has occurred. Which seems to be an arbitrary conclusion. — Andrew M

There is nothing about the definitions of "addition", or "subtraction" which requires that the result be other than the starting number. "Negation" is defined as producing a statement other than the one which is negated.

I've linked to the definition several times now. Here it is again with the relevant parts bolded. — Andrew M

You provided a definition of "additive inverse", not of "opposite", nor of "negation". And, as I've told you already, your quote only demonstrates that mathematics uses these terms in a way which is inconsistent with other fields of study, like philosophy and logic.

In fact, I see now that there is inconsistency within the quoted paragraph itself. It says: "For a real number, it reverses its sign". And it also says: "Zero is the additive inverse of itself." Since zero is a real number then it is an exception to the stated rule for real numbers, therefore the inconsistency inheres within your definition. It is self-contradicting, stating a rule then a contradicting rule.

For example, to negate 2 is to subtract 2 from 0 which is -2. Conversely, to negate -2 is to subtract -2 from 0 which is 2.

Similarly, to negate 0 is to subtract 0 from 0 which is 0. — Andrew M

This clearly demonstrates the contradiction. Negating a real number is to reverse its sign, by your definition. Zero is a real number. Yet you propose that zero is negated without reversing its sign.

You seem to be forgetting what negation is:

In logic, negation, also called the logical complement, is an operation that takes a proposition {\displaystyle P}P to another proposition "not {\displaystyle P}P", written {\displaystyle \neg P}\neg P, {\displaystyle {\mathord {\sim }}P}{\displaystyle {\mathord {\sim }}P} or {\displaystyle {\overline {P}}}\overline{P}. — Wikipedia

Notice, negation takes the proposition to "another proposition". There is no exception, which would allow that a negated proposition could remain the same, as you propose with zero. You simply refuse to adhere to the rule, and insist on defending all those sinners who have gone before you. Please, approach the confessional box, now! You will be forgiven.

Welcome to the world according to Banno.

Do you also hold that adding zero to a number cannot be called "addition" because the number is the same before and after?

Or that dividing a number by one cannot be called "division" because the number is the same before and after? — Andrew M

Why bring up things which are not comparable?

Yet "negation", defined as zero minus a number, can be just that. — Andrew M

Well, I've never seen "negation" defined as " zero minus a number". Care to share where you got that one from? Zero minus a number clearly does not negate the number, as negating a number gives zero. So I think you are really stretching for straws now Andrew.

Where do you get this from? This is not how mappings work. — Real Gone Cat

We are not talking about maps, we are talking about reflections, mirrors. It's your analogy, keep on track and don't change the subject please.

Here, we're considering a single plane of reflection, and a single reflection (a single mapping). You've invented a situation that doesn't exist. — Real Gone Cat

No, you are changing the analogy. There is no "mapping" in the analogy.

I imagine you're a wonderful person, so it pains me to have to say this : usually, discussing math with you is like discussing the phases of the moon with a flat-earther. You really have no idea what mapping, or inverse, or almost any other math term means. And you have no interest in learning. — Real Gone Cat

Again, you are trying to change the subject. We were not talking about "mapping".

What's truly odd is that you're lack of understanding is at the most basic level. You stumble on understanding simple facts about the integers and zero. The Chinese and the Hindus understood the nature of zero thousands of years ago, and even late-to-the-game Europe has known about zero at least since Fibonacci's Liber Abaci. No one debates this stuff anymore. — Real Gone Cat

Please don't be an asshole Real Gone Cat. I really don't understand why some people get so upset when the axioms of mathematics are debated. There's no reason for it, it's just a field of study. Keep your shit together

In the discussion we've been having, the integers (positive, negative, and zero) are clearly a group under addition, with the identity element being 0. So by the theorem above, 0 is its own inverse. — Real Gone Cat

What I am arguing is that mathematicians ought not accept such theorems, I am not trying to say that they don't accept them. So, you providing me evidence that they do accept them, just provides me with inspiration to produce a stronger argument that they ought not do what they do.

It is neither. The negation of zero (a number without a sign) is zero (a number without a sign). The number does not change. — Andrew M

The point is that this cannot be called a "negation". If the thing, zero, is the very same prior to, and after, the proposed "negation" then there has been no negation. "Negation", by definition, creates a statement which is distinct from that which is negated. There cannot be a "negation" with the negation being the very same statement as that which was negated. This cannot be called a "negation".

You need to be more specific. What flaws and differences? — Andrew M

Uh... we're discussing one right here, for example, the role of zero.

Plato's principal message amounts to setting an unattainable criterion. The intellect follows from the senses. The senses are primary. The intellect is secondary. — creativesoul

For Plato it is not an unattainable criterion, it is a description of reality, what is the case. The soul necessarily precedes the body as the cause of order in the material parts which is what constitutes a living body, organized parts. So in Plato the mind is prior to the body, and must rule over it to maintain the order of the parts. That's a fundamental tenet of Plato's dualism, repeated many times. And he posits a third thing, passion or spirit, as intermediate between body and mind, and the means by which the mind rules the body. This third thing accounts for the supposed "problem of interaction" commonly charged against dualism. If the fundamental order gets reversed, and passion or spirit is allowed to ally itself with the body instead of the mind, and the intellect is allowed to follow the senses the result is irrational acts.

Your claim, that the senses are primary, and intellect follows from the senses needs to be supported, justified. The problem is that sensation requires ordered material parts. And nothing but a mind or intellect is known to be capable of ordering parts.

This is entirely your own invention. Give one citation to support this. Just one. — Real Gone Cat

There's a lot written there. Let me know what you think needs to be supported, and I'll address it. Do you not believe that a reflection is light rebounding from a surface? Or what exactly is it that needs to be supported? Do you not believe that if a spot on the reflecting surface reflected back on itself, that this would create an endless back and forth of the light reflecting between the spot and itself, analogous to two mirrors facing each other?

This is an example of you digging in your heels. You're so math-phobic you have to invent concepts out of the blue to justify your stance. But "you know what you know". — Real Gone Cat

Yes, digging in my heels to stand up for what is real, rather than to fall for some smoke and mirrors deceptive proposal from someone like you. Whether you call your proposal math, physics, or some other type of science, I will stand up against it when it is obviously untrue.

Point out where I said zero is both positive and negative. Here, let me help you : — Real Gone Cat

It's implied by the very position you are arguing. The negative numbers are said to be inverse of the positive. And by your analogy, the negative "reflect" onto the positive. So if zero "reflects" onto itself, it must be both negative and positive. There is no other possibility when we are talking about the negatives reflecting, or being "across from" the positive, if zero "reflects" onto itself, then it must be both. If zero is across from itself, like the negatives are across from the positives, then you are describing it as being both negative and positive.

It's understandable that you might not be inclined to say that a person who has no apples has a certain number of apples, namely 0. What you'd prefer is to say that they do not have any apples. There is no quantity that they have at all, and calling 0 a quantity is an abuse of the idea of quantity. That's understandable. The same with measurement: to say that a person who takes one step to the right has moved that amount is fine, but it is an abuse of the idea of distance to say that a person who has not taken a step at all has moved 0 steps to the right, to the left, whatever direction you like. — Srap Tasmaner

You are not quite representing the complete extent of the issue here. The problem is not in calling zero a quantity. That is an acceptable move. The problem is in accepting the consequences of this move, what it implies about the nature of "quantity" when you allow zero to be a quantity.

When zero is a quantity then it falls into the same category as the negative numbers and the positive numbers. Each number signifies a quantity and so does zero. Then we cannot express the numbers as having a mirror opposite, or inverse, the negative numbers being inverse to the positive, because there is a number, a quantity, which has no inverse, zero.

So if the desire is to represent the negative numbers as an inversion of the positive, then we must represent 0 as distinct from the numbers, just like the reflecting surface, or mirror, is something different from the arrangement of light. This points to the difference between cardinal numbers and ordinal numbers. If, what is expressed by a number is a position in an order, rather than a quantity, then zero can be apprehended as a complete lack of order, and this distinguishes it from the numbers which represent order, but then it cannot have a position with the other numbers, on the number line.

It's the bag, the difference between not having a bag at all and having a bag with nothing in it. 0 ends up playing a prominent role in positional number systems because the positions in such a number system are like bags laid out on a table into which you can put at most a certain number of items. But the bags are fixed; you do not remove them when they are empty.

Similarly, when we do algebra, we use containers for values, variables, and it may be possible for a variable to hold no value at all, that is, 0. But the mathematical functions we apply to a variable are defined so that they go through even if turns out the variable held a value of 0, or no quantity at all. You just have to follow some rules, so that you don't mistakenly divide by 0, which makes neither mathematical nor intuitive sense, as in this famous 'proof' that 1 = 2: — Srap Tasmaner

Your use of "value" here seems ambiguous. A value could be a quantity, or it could be a position in an order (hierarchy, or priority). You have not clarified which of these "the bag" in your example, represents. At first you talk about "position", such that the empty bag has a position. But then you say that a value of zero has no "quantity". To me, the latter makes sense, but not the former. It makes sense to say that the empty bag is a container with the quantity of zero apples. The empty container represents that quantitative value.

But the case of position is not so straight forward. If a position is represented by what's within the bag, then the bag itself is not representative of anything, and all bags are the same, as irrelevant. So the empty bag represents a position, through its emptiness, and that must be no position whatsoever (no order). This implies that the empty bag, zero, or no position relative to the order, has no place on the number line, or, is equally well positioned relative to any place. And that it has no place is well represented in practise by the fact that we can count forward or backward starting from any number, we do not need to start at zero. The counterintuitive thing though, is that we should not ever hit zero in counting like this. So if we count down from 2, it should be 1 next, and -1 after that, skipping the habitual "0" here, because zero has no place in the order.

This all relates to how we apprehend point zero, or t-minus zero, in the temporal sense. If we relinquish the idea that there is an exact, zero point, we can remove zero from the number line all together. Then 1 and -1 are directly opposed to each other, and the presence of the two mark the division between positive and negative, as the first position on each side.

Okay, I'll give it a go. But you usually dig your heels in and refuse to hear otherwise when it comes to math. Try to have an open mind.

I could offer an intro to group theory to prove zero is an inverse of itself, but I don't think that's going to sway someone so math-phobic. Let's stick with the idea in my previous post : Can we agree that "opposite" sometimes means "across from"?

To be across from something means to be reflected in a line, point, or plane. Even when facing a friend at a table we can be said to be reflected in an invisible plane between us (actually reflected in a line to preserve left- and right-handedness).

What's of interest is what happens to points lying on the line (or point or plane) of reflection. Under the reflection, such points do not move! Thus a point on the surface of a mirror will reflect onto itself!

When a reflection in zero is performed on a number line, every point maps to it's negated version, but zero maps to itself. In other words, zero is across from (opposite to) itself. — Real Gone Cat

The analogy really does not work Real Gone Cat. A reflection is light rebounding back off a reflective surface, which you represent as a plane. If there was a spot on the reflective surface, a point on the plane, which reflected back on itself, "itself" being a point on the reflective surface, would reflect it again. back on itself, and again and again. This would create an endless back and forth between the spot and itself. This is like having two mirrors in front of each other, accept that your proposal builds this right into the single plane, or reflective surface..

If such spots existed on the surface, each spot would effectively annihilate the capacity of the mirror to properly reflect at that point because the reflection would get absorbed into the infinite back and forth with itself. So if the rules of mathematics allow that zero "maps to itself" in this way, this would effectively annihilate the integrity of the concept "zero", as such a reflective surface (separation) between positive and negative, just like a spot on the mirror reflecting back and forth on itself would absorb the light and not reflect outward, ruining the integrity of the mirror as a reflective surface.

I think this is what is alluding to. If we allow that "zero" implies both positive and negative (in a self reflecting way) in common applications, instead of neither (as we actually do), this would destroy the integrity of "zero"

They are different kinds of inversion. What would a "true inversion" be? — Andrew M

This is exactly the point, there is no such thing as a true inversion. Inversions are not real things, just like symmetries, they are ideals. So in the realm of the ideal, like mathematics, we can stipulate, or propose something like "an inversion", or "a symmetry" and we can convince ourselves that such proposals or stipulations provide a real, or true representation. But when we get down to the nitty gritty, of analyzing the representation for accuracy, we see the flaws, the differences between the supposed representation and the thing represented.

When we see the existence of such flaws in the representation, we ought to acknowledge that the ideal, the proposal or stipulation, is not meant to be a representation at all. The ideal, in this case "the inversion", or "the symmetry", is not meant to represent reality in any way, it is a tool which we apply toward reality, in a sort of comparison. We can then see where reality varies from the ideal

We can learn from this process of comparing the proposed ideal to reality, but it is necessary to determine where there are flaws in the proposed or stipulated ideal, i.e. where the proposed ideal is less than ideal. This is necessary because we need to know whether it is the case that the differences between the proposed ideal, and the reality, are due to the reality being less than the ideal, or the proposed ideal being less than ideal. When reality appears to be different from the ideal, we tend to think that this is because reality is less than ideal. But if there are deficiencies in the proposed ideal, it could be the case that reality is more ideal than the ideal, because the ideal is really less than ideal.

So in this case, we can see that the proposed ideal, is really less than ideal, because the proposed inversion is contaminated by the presence of zero on the number line. As would say, the zero is a piece of poop in your mathematical sandbox in this proposed "inversion". Allowing zero on to your number line makes your inversion between positive and negative numbers less than ideal.

Major Edit : "Opposite" is perfectly fine when discussing positives and negatives. One of the meanings of opposite is "across from". Consider the number line with zero as the value between the positives and negatives. +5 is across from -5. Opposite works. — Real Gone Cat

That doesn't resolve the problem, which relates to zero being a number, as having a place on the line. Is zero across from zero?

I suggest that these false inversions, which are inversion-ish, rather than true inversions, are what create the appearance of symmetries in the application of the mathematical principles which describe something which is not a true inversion as an "inversion". Then symmetries are taken by some philosophers, to be something real, existing in the universe, instead of just a product of the mathematics, and misleading descriptive terms. This has opened a whole new field of speculation into an assumed phenomenon known as "symmetry breaking". But the symmetries are just fictional, imaginary, produced from the misuse of descriptive terms, and so that speculative field of symmetry breaking speculates about the activity of things "symmetries" which don't even exist.

But I knew it was true when I wrote that post a few hours ago, so it's not only now that I know it to be true. — Banno

Isn't the now of a few hours ago the same now as the present time? Or do you have the capacity to divide time into a multitude of distinct, particular, and separate nows, such that a past now would be distinct from the present now?

In math we also have inverses, additive and multiplicative. They're opposite-ish, the way equivalence is equal-ish. — Srap Tasmaner

This was the point I was making in the first place. Additive inverse is different from multiplicative inverse, because neither represents a true inversion, they're inverse-ish, each in its own specific way.

t's a pretty standard thought, at least in eastern philosophies, that the self is an illusion. — T Clark

Then how would you even begin to talk about sensations like hearing, seeing, etc., if there is not something doing the sensing? If you have an aversion to the term "self", that's one thing, but isn't it still necessary to assume something which is sensing, in order to make sense of sensation?

I don't think the sensations are "what are real", i.e. all that is real. I think they are the measure, or at least one measure, of what is real.

If we start from human sensations, shouldn't that which is sensing be just as real as the thing sensed?
— Metaphysician Undercover

Are you asking if we, our selves, are real? It's a good question. I didn't address that in my OP, but I didn't intend to exclude it from the discussion. — T Clark

Right, that's the point. We consider whether or not the thing being measured (through sensation) is real, and we naturally conclude that if we are measuring it, it must be real. But prior to coming to this conclusion, isn't it necessary to do our due diligence toward understanding the thing which is doing the measuring? If the thing doing the measuring isn't real, then what validity does "if we are measuring it, it must be real" have?

No, I am saying that particular collections are made up of particular collections, not constructed from universals. I take particular collections as granted because I see them all around me and because for any particulars there necesarily seems to be a collection of them, and universals don't seem necessary to explain the existence of particulars. — litewave

That's an irrational, infinite regress, which we already discussed when you said that an object is a collection of objects. The problem is that you've created a vicious circle by saying that a collection is made of collections, and you have no indication of what a particular is. A "collection" is a universal, a group of many. Now you want to deny that a collection is a universal, and claim that is a particular.

You claim to see collections existing as particulars all around you. Please explain to me how you think that you are seeing a collection as a particular when you haven't even said what a particular is. Perhaps an example or two?

For most people, for most concepts, acquaintance with instances of the concept precede, in time, the possession of the concept, and exposure to those particulars is instrumental in acquiring the universal they fall under. That's the argument from ontogeny: you are acquainted with moving, barking, licking particulars before you know that they are dogs. And there is a related argument from phylogeny: modern humans have a great many concepts that they were taught, often through the use of exemplars, but it stands to reason that not every human being was taught: there must have been at least one person who passed from not having to having a concept unaided. In essence, we imagine that person somehow teaching themselves a concept through the use of exemplars, and we imagine that process proceeding as we do when analyzing a population of objects, looking for commonalities. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, this is the effect of teaching, learning. From the perspective of learning, we see the particular as essential to learning the universal, because this is the process which taught us. However, the particular is a tool of the teacher, who already understands the universal to be taught. So from the learner's perspective, the particular appears to be essential to the learning process, as necessary for it, but it is really a weak sense of "necessary", as what has been determined by the teacher as needed, required for the process. It is not a true logical necessity because it might be possible that the student could learn the universal in another way.

This is what Plato looked at in The Meno, with what is referred to as the theory of recollection. The student is induced to produce the universal without the use of a demonstration with particulars, and the observers conclude that the student must have already somehow had the universal in his mind. So they propose, as a solution, that the student must have somehow had the universal in his mind, from a past life, and recollected it. You can see that the proposed solution is inadequate, but it gives us a good representation of the problem. Aristotle gave a better solution, by saying that the student has within the mind, the potential for the universal, prior to actually formulating it.

But use of the particular, as a teaching tool necessitates in a stronger way, that the existence of the universal to be taught preexists the use of the particular through the concept of causation. And if the potential for the universal, which precedes the actual existence of it in the mind, does not necessarily require particulars for its actualization, then what does constitute the actual existence of the universal?

hat's of interest here is that resemblance is not only relative, but comparative: resemblance is a three-way relation, a given object resembles another more, or less, than it resembles a third. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree, there always must be a third in this form of comparison, because two will always be other than each other. But this only demonstrates that "resemblance" is not the true principle by which we categorize. In reality, we produce the category, like "dog" in your example, and judge the thing directly as to whether it fits the category, without comparing it to others within our minds So you see an animal and call it a dog, without performing mental comparisons. And learning the category is a matter of developing the capacity to do this, not a matter of learning how to compare. That's why learning the category is the important aspect, and it consists of seeing examples, not of comparing three things.

The material of the Sesame Street skit is only used to demonstrate that the category has been learned. That's why it gets sort of controversial, because to demonstrate that one knows the group, a person is asked to say what is not part of the group, as a simple form of confirmation. In reality an act of exclusion is not necessary if one has learned the category. We simply need to judge and include members as a part of the group without indicating what is not a member. This is like determining what pleases you without any reference to what displeases. And the commonly touted principle, that one must know "what X is not", in order to know "what X is" is a false principle. It seems to be based in the faulty idea that one must demonstrate one's knowledge, to have it.

I have, twice. But here it is again with the relevant parts bolded:

In mathematics, the additive inverse of a number a is the number that, when added to a, yields zero. This number is also known as the opposite (number),[1] sign change,[2] and negation.[3] For a real number, it reverses its sign: the additive inverse (opposite number) of a positive number is negative, and the additive inverse of a negative number is positive. Zero is the additive inverse of itself.
— Additive inverse - Wikipedia — Andrew M

That's not a definition of opposite, just a use of "opposite" which clearly demonstrates what I said. Your definition of "inverse", as "additive inverse" renders the meaning of "opposite" as inconsistent with common usage. You've demonstrated that by using this definition of inverse, zero is opposite to itself. But a thing being opposite to itself is contrary to common usage of "opposite".

You should try that. What happens if you have a -0 unequal to 0? — Srap Tasmaner

A better thing to try is to consider what happens if a thing is allowed to be opposite to itself. Opposites are commonly the two defining extremes of a measurement scale, hot and cold, big and small, etc.. If we stipulate that the two extremes are the very same thing (like zero relative to the scale), then we have no way to distinguish whether some thing which we're trying to measure, but is off the end of our scale, is off the top of the scale, or off the bottom of the scale, because we have set the conditions whereby the two are the very same (zero relative to the scale).