In my mind the “internal stages” are a part of the perceiver and thus mediated by him. I don’t see why we need to include some other intermediary. If there is no intermediary the perception is direct. — NOS4A2

There is no mitigating factor or intermediary between perceiver and perceived, therefor the perception is not indirect. — NOS4A2

You seem to be stuck on this point, which is incorrect. We hear things which are far away, therefore there is an intermediary. We see things which are far away, therefore an intermediary is called for. Touch and taste appear to have no intermediary, but smell appears to have an intermediary.

Because of these differences between the various modes of perceiving, we cannot make any general statement about whether perception requires an intermediary or not. Therefore we need a more precise description as to how we perceive, one which would be inclusive of all five senses, before we can make any general conclusions about whether there is an intermediary or not.

Yes. Our empirical experience of reality always finds form and substance interwoven. Do you have any empirical experience of form and substance in separation?

I argue that: form without substance is an unreachable abstraction; substance without form is an unintelligible chaos. This leads to the claim that form and substance are essential attributes of existence. — ucarr

Why have you replaced my word, "matter" with "substance"? There is nothing to prevent the conception of substance without matter, such as the conception of independent Forms. So form without matter might be substance without matter. Matter is not essential to substance.

In making your argument here, you’re presupposing God is in time and, moreover, that time WRT God is insuperable. You need firstly to establish the logical necessity of this supposition. If you can do this you will then be in position to establish the logical necessity of “God prior to time” being incoherent. — ucarr

I told you the logic of this. God acts as a cause of the material world. Any act requires time to occur. Therefore the idea that God is prior to time, is inconsistent with the idea of God having actual existence, or God as the actual creator of the world. Therefore to think of God in both ways, as creator, and as prior to time, is incoherent.

No? Then what is? And what of the notion that all thoughts are singular and succession, which implies any thought is itself a particular instance of it? All conceptions are thought, so….. — Mww

I think I explained this. I guess not satisfactorily. Let me try again, in a different way. What is conceptualized is a bunch of relations between concepts, as you described earlier. "The particular" is something posited as having a relation to these conceptions. The particular does not enter into the conceptualization though, so we cannot properly say that it is conceptualized.

This is the point with truth and falsity being a judgement which is outside the validity of the logic. Logic here represents the conceptualization. The relation between the logic and the particular is that judgement of truth, which cannot be said to be part of the conception. That's the point with Wittgenstein's chair example. The person sees the chair one day, and sees it the next day looking exactly the same, and in the same place, yet the person cannot say whether it is the same particular (it may have been switched overnight). This indicates the what we call "the particular" does not enter into the conception of the chair. The person has all this knowledge about "the chair" in that place, but cannot accurately judge whether it is the same particular which is there now as was before. This is a statement of how we understand "the particular", as an object with temporal extension.

It's actually a very difficult ontological principle to grasp, which is tied up in Aristotle's law of identity. The law of identity is set up to support the very intuitive notion that there are real objects in the world, particulars, which exist with temporal extension, despite undergoing minor changes as time passes. Change is incompatible with our conceptualizations of an object, yet it very much appears (is very intuitive) that an object maintains its identity as the same object despite changing. Logically, if a thing requires two different descriptions, at two different times, then it is two different things. So Aristotle posited a principle of continuity, matter, which links the object at one moment, to the changed object at the next moment. This accounts for the reality of "the particular", as a thing having temporal extension.

The problem is that matter is described as potential, in order to account for the reality of change, and potential as what may or may not be, escapes intelligibility by defying the law of excluded middle. The other way of portraying the unintelligibility of matter, is that it defies the law of non-contradiction, as both is and is not. This is the position of dialectical materialism, which comes from Hegel's dialectics of being.

I hope that will help to explain this idea, that the particular does not enter into the conceptualization. There is something about the particular, that it changes (its properties change) while remaining the same (it maintains its identity as the same thing), which makes it fundamentally unacceptable to conceptualization. So logic simply leaves the particular out, and works with the properties. "Socrates is a man", for example, indicates a particular with that name "Socrates". But the proposition replaces the particular with a name, "Socrates", and the name, as the subject receives predications. If we say that the name, which enters into the conceptualization as the subject, is the particular, then we deny the grounds for truth, because it is what we say about it. So truth in the sense of correspondence requires that the name must represent the particular, rather than be the particular.

As for the issue of thoughts being singular, and in succession, as particulars, I don't think this is an accurate representation of thoughts. Thoughts are very much overlapped, in their comings and goings, and this is why they are best described as relations and associations.

It is still logical that a sensation now is of the same thing as the sensation is of that thing at a later time. — Mww

This is the key point. If the supposed "thing" requires a different description at a different time, it is not logical to say that the two are the same thing. A different description indicates a different thing. And when we learn that a thing undergoes minor changes at each moment of passing time, logic dictates that it cannot be the same thing unless we establish something which relates them like temporal continuity. This is what the thing is at one moment, and this is what it is at another moment, the two are not the same, therefore the two are different things. So we simply assume a temporal continuity between the two, and this allows us to say that they really are the same thing.

So, we allow a separation between the thing (particular) and its description (its conceptualization). This allows that the same thing can have certain predications at one time and contradicting predications at another time. The predications are applied to the subject, and the subject is a stand in for the thing, the particular, as a representation of it. We cannot allow that the subject is the thing, or particular, or we lose the grounds for truth (as correspondence).

Compromise: if we say my transferring is your collecting, I might still be inclined to grant intuition is the collecting tool, in that the matter of an object from which sensation proper arises, is represented as an empirical intuition. Dunno if that works for you. — Mww

It doesn't really work for me. The point is to make a complete separation between your mind and my mind, as each is being confined within distinct particulars (different bodies). The ideas produced in my mind are created by my mind, and the ideas produced in your mind are created by your mind. Similarities are the result of past occurrences, genetics, and conformity in teaching practises, etc..

So there is nothing which is really being transferred when you and I communicate. You write something (create something) according to the way your mind works, and I interpret it ( a creation of my mind) according to the way my mind works.

You might, I would not. I would limit the senses to information transferring devices, the information already residing in the things perceived. There isn’t any information collected per se, it is, rather, merely that which the mind employs as the instantiation of its methods. — Mww

This is the difference in our understanding of causation, which has pervaded this discussion. I place the cause of perceptions and ideas as within the person. You place the cause as external to the person. So where I say the person uses the senses as tools, in the mind's creation of ideas, you say that the external thing enters into the mind through the senses, and causes the existence of what the mind perceives.

Of course this is where some compromise could be afforded. I think we would both agree to some of each, as a combination. The question though is to priority, which is the principal form of causation in perceptions and ideas. And this is where determinist/choice becomes relevant. From my perspective, the chain of causation, which we commonly represent as necessary, is broken, so your representation cannot hold. Causation from the internal side is final cause, and there is no necessity in how external things are represented within the mind, so the chain of efficient cause from the external is broken.

Ok, so what something other than the mind creates forms? And if the information contains inherent meaning within it, what does understanding do? How is this not precisely the materialist doctrine writ large? — Mww

The common solution here is "God", simply because we really do not know where the order which appears to inhere within the universe comes from.

Ok, the mind abstracts meaning inherent within forms received as information, according to what it knows. But once again….what if the mind doesn’t know? Why would the mind create its own meaning, if there is already meaning inherent in the forms? Although, I’m beginning to see where your notion that judgement being the source of error, as I hold it to be, is not the case. I’m not sure it is legitimate to permit the mind to misinterpret, that is, mistake the meaning inherent in forms with the meaning it creates for itself. — Mww

Again, I will insist on a complete separation. The way that the independent Forms (the forms which particulars are supposed to have) affect us, is the way of efficient cause. The way that the perceiving mind creates its forms in conception, is the way of final cause. The two are incompatible, because "efficient cause" is a representation of how material bodies affect each other, and "final cause" is a representation of how the immaterial affects the material. In our commonly accepted understanding of efficient causation, those employed in science, there is no room for the immaterial to affect the material.

The only reasonable explanation for why the mind must create its own meaning (through final causation) rather than simply receiving meaning from the existing independent Forms (forms of the particulars), through efficient causation, is that there is a separation between the two. The separation is what we know as "matter", and this is the barrier of unintelligibility.

There is a temporal principle here. The immaterial soul has a causal impact on matter, final cause. But the mind understands causation within material things (particulars) as efficient cause, without the influence of final cause. So until the mind understands causation within the world of material things (particulars) as including an immaterial cause, final cause, there will always be a separation in our understanding of how things affect us, and the way that we affect things. The gap may be closable, but not under our current understanding (misunderstanding).

This works for objects received more than once. In other words, objects known to the mind as experience, re: according to conceptions which it already has. — Mww

You don't seem to be getting the point. This is the way of first time perception, because each instance of perception is a first time, as unique and distinct from every other instance. We class by similarity, not by being the same. There is no need for the same object to have already been sensed, only similarity in prior sensations. You don't seem to be grasping this fundamental point. Your bee sting this year is not "the same" as your bee sting last year, it is only similar. So it is not at all a case of receiving the same object twice, it is a case of similarity. No two distinct experiences are "the same". We class them as the same, but this just means of the same type. And when you come to understand that all such judgements are judgements of type rather than a judgement of the same particular, you'll see that the particular never enters into the conception. "The same" as in the same particular is some sort of ideal intuition, which we cannot grasp in conception because it is contrary to logic.

Consider the alternative, wherein the mind classifies in accordance with conceptions it already has…..how is it determinable that none of them represent the forms inherent in the information it received? — Mww

We can determine this in the way described above, from the known fact that the independent Forms (the forms inherent within particular material things) are constantly changing. In the mind's system of classification each change means that the thing has become a different thing. But this is counterintuitive to our idea that a minute change ought not constitute a different thing, so we posit a temporal continuity of existence whereby the thing would undergo minute changes and maintain its status as the same thing. However, this implies that the form of the particular, the independent Form is constantly changing, and this is fundamentally different from our conception of the form of a thing, which is a static description. Therefore we have a determination of the difference. A form inside a person's mind is a static description, the independent Form is a continuous change. In the mind, the form consists of properties which are attributable at a moment in time. At a different moment the form would consist of different properties. This implies that something happens between those two moments, and this "something" is fundamentally unintelligible to this way of conceptualizing. The independent Form, the form inherent within the material thing, is constantly changing. So there is no static thing with X properties at time 1 and Y properties at time 2, in the independent Form of the material thing which exists as continuous change.

OK. This is better, in that conceptualization is really categorization, in which the essentials are determined. Now, the mind can certainly interpret the information contained in forms in accordance with categories it already has, and the categories are themselves conceptions, but of a very specific gender and origin. But no particular instance of an object of sense is ever to be conceptualized from a mere category. Th essentials determined by categorization, are necessary conditions for the possibility of knowing what an object may be in general, not properties for determining what it is in particular. — Mww

This is exactly the point. Because of this, what you say "no particular instance of an object of sense is ever to be conceptualized from a mere category", we never actually get a conception of the particular. It's a sort of illusion, we tell ourselves that we've conceptualized the particular, but really, that there is a particular is just a stipulation which we make to account for our inability to properly conceptualize the way things really are. Aristotle stipulated a particular, with the law of identity, and the particular is necessarily distinct from the conceptualization, and this accounts for the failings of conceptualization.

There is certainly still a problem, in that the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, the categorizing conceptual structure, and any instance at all, doesn’t have anything to do with the determination of what that thing is, only that knowing what it is, is possible from them. — Mww

This is exactly why the symbol may be completely arbitrary and have no similarity to the thing represented, and why we must hand priority to final cause with its inherent choice. In one dialogue, I can't remember which one, Plato went through a whole lot of different words, trying to determine the origin of each, and how it somehow is similar to the thing represented. Some are easy, but in the end there is no need for the symbol to be similar, that's just a sort of memory aid for understanding meaning. So the principal determination, we give the thing a name, need not have any thing to do with what the thing is, no value in the sense of similarity. The problem which arises though, is that we find out later that calling two instances of appearance by the same name doesn't necessitate that it truly is the same thing (W's chair), which we've assigned the name to. Now we demand real principles of similarity to ensure that what is called the same thing really is the same thing. And then we get lost because we see that a thing is constantly changing, and it isn't by similarity that we make such a judgement of "the same particular" but by an assumption of temporal continuity. And we cannot understand temporal continuity.

Pinter's asserted view of "the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer" is a performative contradiction. That's the problem with the so-called view from nowhere in a nutshell. — Andrew M

The real problem here is with the notion of "the present universe". What Einstein reveals with the relativity of simultaneity is that "the present" is frame dependent. So the whole idea that there is such a thing as "the present universe" is an unsound premise because "the present" is something created by the observational perspective.

When we realize that "the present" is purely subjective, and we try to imagine an objective universe, independent from any observer, we have no place to insert "the present", because this would be an artificial insertion, therefore the creation of an observational perspective. Then we cannot possibly imagine such a universe, without a designated temporal perspective, (a point in time of now), because all things would exist everywhere, without some way of determining a specific point in time in their motions.

There is a form belonging to any sensed object which becomes known as a certain thing, but it is not abstracted through sense, but resides a priori in the mind. This also relates to the question as to what do you do in the case of first instances.

Again….lots of what you say I agree with, but I can’t see an answer to the original question in it. — Mww

This where I think you have it backward. The form of the sensed object inheres within the thing itself, as indicated by Aristotle's law of identity. What is a priori in the mind is some structure of universals by which the mind categorizes incoming information. So the form of the thing which the mind knows is fundamentally different from the form which inheres within the thing itself, as a representation produced from placing the information within the conceptual structure. The mind knows what it apprehends of the particular as the essentials of the thing, while the thing itself consists of accidentals. So even the appearance of the thing to the mind, the sense image which the mind works with, has been created in this way, as essentials rather than accidentals.

There is no problem with "first instances" so long as we maintain the reality of the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, and makes the first instance possible. As you can see though, the first instance would be extremely vague, and not what we would call a good representation of the particular at all, because the receiving mind would not have built up a good catalogue of information (memory), and so would not produce a good representation. However, the question remains now, as to how good the representation produced by human perception really is. Science tells us that the world is actually quite different from the sense representation that we get of it, with things like atoms interacting to make molecules, etc.. So we may not have really progressed very far from the first instances of sense appearances.

Does this answer the original question, or does it remain?

Abstracts….from what? The thing itself? This presupposes the form is already contained in the sensation, and that the senses have some sort of self-contained deductive power. I usually resort to the ol’ tickle on the back of your neck scenario to refute such description. A tickle is a sensation, and if the form of the thing which causes the tickle is abstracted from it, it would seem we would know immediately what causes the tickle. But we do not. In fact, it is the case we sometimes sense a tickle not caused by any object at all. — Mww

The mind would abstract from the information received through sensation. Remember, I am portraying the senses as tools of the mind in its creations. You might call the senses information collecting tools. The information is received as formal, but it consists of forms created by something other than the mind which receives it, so the meaning inherent within must be interpreted, like interpreting someone else's language. And the mind receiving creates its own meaning according to what it knows in its interpretation. That there is independent meaning, and Forms, not created by human beings or other known life forms results in the need for something like God.

So the act of abstraction which occurs in the feeling of a sensation as per you example of a tickle, is an act of creation within the receiving mind. The mind classifies the information received, according to conceptions which it already has, and creates what appears to you as a conception of that particular instance. But it is really just a particular instance of categorization, whereby the essentials are determined and a representation of a particular is produced. The conception, or categorization appears to be a true conception or abstraction from the particular, because of the vast multitude of possibilities which the mind allows for, but it isn't really a conception of a particular. That is evident from Wittgenstein's example of the chair. When you come into the room and see a chair, where there was a similar chair yesterday, you tend to think it is the same chair. However, someone could have switched chairs overnight. Therefore we can conclude that the abstraction is not really of the particular, but of some sort of universal, and we designate "the same particular" based on some sort of ideas of similarity, or continuity of temporal existence. We cannot properly conceive a particular.

The categorization of the particular according to an already held conceptual structure, isn’t the same as conceptualizing the particular sensation. — Mww

A quick reply in response to reading the first couple lines. The particular is never conceptualized. That is why there is a distinction between the thing itself (the particular) complete with accidents in Aristotelian terminology, and the phenomenal appearance, concept, as consisting only of what is apprehended as essential. So "a sensation" is not a particular. Wittgenstein visited this is the so-called private language argument, in the question as to how one could determine a reoccurrence of a sensation, at a later time, as "the same" sensation.

Is philosophy even searching for "God"? I've always thought philosophers seek wisdom (i.e. greater understanding). — 180 Proof

But "God" is one of the greatest mysteries of human existence. So if a philosopher seeks wisdom, then knowing about God would be a high priority. It's the mystery outlined by unenlightened above. What makes people stand up for, and defend in faith until the bitter end, something they know through probability to be incorrect, yet they still have hope for. The common portrayal is that these faithful people are being deceived by someone else, some higher-ups. This is a deception which builds the faith so that the people can be herded like a flock. However, "deception" implies that the deceivers, those "higher-ups", know something which the deceived do not. So to uncover those secrets is fodder for the philosopher.

Does form exist without substance (matter)? — ucarr

It may. Form is what is actual, and matter is potential. The argument from Aristotle is that if there ever was a time when there was potential without any actuality (what is called "prime matter") there would always be potential without actuality because potential with no actuality would not have the capacity to actualize itself. Therefore this would never result in anything actual. But what we find is potential with actuality, matter with form, so pure potential (prime matter) is ruled out. as impossible. Therefore anything eternal must be actual, and form may be prior to matter.

That form is prior to matter is understood in the following way. Each and every occurrence of an object, or material thing, is not a random occurrence of matter, a thing is an organized state of matter, it has a form. By the law of identity a thing is necessarily the thing which it is. It is impossible that a thing is not the thing that it is. So when a thing comes into being, the form of the thing is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing, as the cause of, or reason why the thing is the thing which it is, and not something else.

However, if this is the case, then a given form, once destroyed, could never reappear at a later time. By this line of reasoning, destroy but one wheel and forevermore the wheel can never reappear. You don't believe this do you? — ucarr

Of course I believe that. Each object, wheel in your example, is unique, with a proper identity all to itself, as indicated by the law of identity. When one material object is destroyed it will never reappear, time does not repeat itself.

Talk to just about any Christian and she will tell you God exists outside of time. — ucarr

There is a little trick of equivocation in respect to the meaning of "time" which might help to understand this problem. By materialist principles the concept of "time" is tied to the activities of material things. If material things are moving, time is passing. Therefore under this conception of "time" there is no time without material things. God however, being the creator or cause, of material things, must be prior to material things and is therefore "outside of time" according to this conception of "time". That of course appears to be incoherent, to have something (God) which is prior in time, (as the cause of time), to time itself.

But this just demonstrates that there is a problem with the materialist conception of "time". When "time" is tied to the material existence of things, in that way, the possibility of time which is prior to the occurrence of material things is ruled out. Then the actuality (form) which is necessarily prior to material objects as the cause of their existence, is rendered unintelligible, as "an act" without time is incoherent.

Therefore to understand the theological conception of "God", as creator of material existence, it is necessary to dismiss that faulty conception of "time" which places God as outside of time. Aristotle's arguments showed God to be eternal, as outside time, by that conception of "time". This made it impossible to properly apprehend or understand God, "God" being incoherent, as an activity or cause which is outside of time, i.e. prior to time. However, the logic which places activity, or actuality, (Form) , as prior to the material existence of things, is sound. This indicates that the conception of "time" which ties it to the material existence of things is faulty. Nevertheless, that conception of "time" persists in most technical usage of "time", and "God" remains unintelligible to most educated people.

Quantum mechanics is the most accurate physical theory ever devised. What is at issue in all the interpretations is the meaning of the theory, not what it actually predicts will happen. — Wayfarer

That itself is a matter in need of interpretation. What quantum mechanics predicts is probabilities, not what is actually the case. That's exactly the problem I discussed above. What is actually the case, is what is, right now, the zero point in time. And that's when uncertainty is maximum. So quantum mechanics can accurately predict the probabilities of what could happen if..., the odds of X, the odds of Y, etc.. But it's absolutely uncertain about what is happening right now, and that's why it needs the "if", because those are the temporal conditions which introduce degrees of certainty.

Not sure where you get this idea. PoR is defined in a few places
In physics, the principle of relativity is the requirement that the equations describing the laws of physics have the same form in all admissible frames of reference. — noAxioms

Try this:

Galileo formulated the principle of relativity in order to show that one cannot determine whether the earth revolves about the sun or the sun revolves about the earth. The principle of relativity states that there is no physical way to differentiate between a body moving at a constant speed and an immobile body. It is of course possible to determine that one body is moving relative to the other, but it is impossible to determine which of them is moving and which is immobile. — https://www.tau.ac.il/education/muse/museum/galileo/principle_relativity.html#:~:text=The%20principle%20of%20relativity%20states,moving%20and%20which%20is%20immobile.

Sorry noAxioms, but we're just too far apart in terminology to carry on any meaningful discussion. I spend all my time just having to show you that you don't know what you're talking about. First we spent forever on the meaning of "inertial frame", now we're stuck on the meaning of "the principle of relativity". It's pointless, we can't discuss anything significant.

Some claim matter is neither created nor destroyed. How do you go about refuting this? For example: do you think caused and created are two different things? — ucarr

That might be true, but under the Aristotelian conceptual structure matter has no existence without form. Matter without form is an unintelligible and incoherent idea. So what some claim about matter, that "matter is neither created nor destroyed" is completely irrelevant, because when we talk about material objects we are talking about matter with form, and form is what is created and destroyed.

Do you think the {cause ⇒ effect} relationship always implies a temporal sequence? — ucarr

Yes.

If someone claims God is self-caused, how would you refute this refutation of {cause ⇒ effect} is always temporal? — ucarr

I would say "God is self-caused" is incoherent because it would mean that God is prior to Himself in time, and that seems to be contradictory.

Outstanding critique. Well-thought, and asks pertinent questions, not all of which have answers. — Mww

Thanks Mww. It's difficult to do. It's easy to take what another says and disagree with it because it's somehow counterintuitive, so it doesn't make sense. But it's actually quite difficult to take apart what another has said and determine the reasons why it doesn't make sense. So on this forum, we tend to do the easy thing, and just disagree with each other and never make any progress in finding out why. Anyway, I'll answer your question, but sometimes its even more difficult to take apart one's own intuitions, then to take apart the statements of others.

.what happens in the very first instance of a perception or an idea in a particular human cognitive system? By first instance I mean the very first observation of something in Nature, or the very first flash of a possibility a priori? The implicit ramification being of course, there is no experience on which to draw, therefore there is nothing in memory, re: consciousness, therefore the representation by already present conceptions is quite impossible. — Mww

That the conception is prior to the sense perception is what validates the idea of "a priori". What is implied is that there is some sort of conception which is prior to sense perception. You could look back at an individual person's first sense perception, or the first human being's first sense perception, or even the first sense perception of a living being, and ask the same question, how is it possible that there is a conception prior to sense perception. But even if we look only at the physical aspects of sensation, I think we would find that not only is a sense organ required for sensation, but also some sort of brain.

Notice the way that conceptualization works, consisting of universals, categories, etc.. So it is not necessary that there is a conceptual representation of each thing, prior to it being perceived by sensation, it is only necessary that there is a sort of conceptual structure of universals, which gives the mind the capacity to categorize the information received from the particular. Therefore I wouldn't say that perceiving a particular is an instance of conceiving the particular (that would be contradictory), it's more like an instance of categorizing the particular according to an already held conceptual structure..

The point being that on the other side, the sense side, the image which we are able to get. via the sense, is limited by the capacity of the mind to support the sense. But we tend to think that the senses are giving us a direct representation of the thing sensed, when in realty what the senses give us is greatly restricted by what the mind has the capacity to apprehend.

This is why the Aristotelian description was that the mind abstracts the form of the thing, through the means of the senses. It is the mind which is creating the form or image, through the means of sensing. But we commonly attribute the production of the image or form, to the sense. This is because of the pervasiveness of the physicalist mind-set, in our current society. This mind-set apprehends a chain of causation from the thing itself. The thing causes an effect in the sense, which causes an effect in the mind. From the dualist perspective, the mind creates, using information received by the senses. So what is produced as "a sensation" is restricted by the capacity which the mind has to create. Therefore it is possible that the senses received a whole lot more information than what we receive as a sense image, but if it doesn't fit into the mind's capacity to represent it, it doesn't get represented within the representation which the mind creates.

The base of the problem is found in Zeno's paradoxes, and manifests in the way that calculus resolves the issue with the concept of approaching the limit, or approaching zero. When this concept is applied to the temporal existence of waves, the uncertainty principle rears its ugly head.

To determine the features of waves requires a period of time because waves are activities. As the period of time utilized becomes shorter and shorter, the capacity to determine the wave features is debilitated, and the result is an increase in uncertainty. As the zero point in time is approached, uncertainty approaches infinity. In classical mechanics this was the problem of infinite acceleration required for a change in motion . Any body at rest, if it began to move, would require a time of infinite acceleration at the point when it was caused to move. The problem transposes to relativity theory when a body at rest is replaced with a body with uniform motion, and we consider changes to that motion.

So we have a fundamental incompatibility between "position" which refers to a object's rest spot, and "velocity" (or any wave features) which implies no rest spot. What is demonstrated by the need to employ the concept of "infinite" in the calculus which relates these two, is that our way of plotting an object's position, and our way of plotting an object's movement, are fundamentally incommensurable. This basic incommensurability demonstrates that our mathematics of "space" is fundamentally inadequate. Zeno demonstrated this very well with the tortoise and the hare. And the issue remains as the uncertainty principle.

But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on. — Werner Heisenberg, The Debate Between Plato and Democritus

The problem though, is that mathematics really does not give a "clear-cut account of what is going on". The uncertainty principle is produced by the application of the mathematics, in an attempt to understand elementary particles. The uncertainty is not resolved by the mathematics. So this statement from Heisenberg is not true at all.

And the conclusion drawn from that statement, that the elementary parts of material objects are "Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics" is not a sound conclusion either. The reality of the situation is quite the opposite, that quantum theory demonstrates to us that the elementary parts cannot be understood through the application of conventional mathematics. The uncertainty principle is obviously a failing of our mathematics, in its capacity to understand the reality of space, time, and material existence, not a success of our mathematics.

The concept of God is inherently unprovable and unverifiable. — gevgala

Every material object has a cause. The cause is prior in time to the object. Therefore the cause of the first material object is not material. This immaterial cause is what is known as "God".

In the sense that “house” includes glass, wood, metals, it does, yes. One cannot cognize without these antecedents, but one can have those antecedents without being cognizant. This is partially why cognition regards perception alone, insofar as to say we are cognizant of our thinking, is quite superfluous. — Mww

I don't quite understand this, so let me put an example to you. Suppose I look around me. What I perceive with my eyes is a bunch of different colours around, and I also somehow see a separation between some of them, as a difference in distance. Because they appear separated, I think of them as distinct things, and I have a name for many of them, "house", "car", etc.. The latter part is all conceptual, me seeing them as things, and as specific things. And the former part is supposed to be perceptual, seeing the differences.

The problem I have, is that to talk of them as "colours" and "separations", or "distance", is also conceptual. Now I have to keep reducing the type of differences I am sensing, to a most basic concept, "differences", which is still conceptual, but as close as possible that I can get to making a separation between the perceptual (of the senses) and the conceptual (of the mind). But when I do this, I deny myself the capacity to even distinguish between what is being perceived by one sense, and what is being perceived by another sense, because "colour" and "sound" are conceptual separations. All the senses are just demonstrating "differences" in general, and they are completely uncategorized because categorizing them is conceptual.

Since this distinction, between sound, coulour, taste, etc., appears to me to be done at a level prior to any form of conceptualization as I would understand "conceptualization", it doesn't look right to me. It appears to me like there is some form of relating sensations inherent within the act of perception, which already categorizes them prior to even relating them to any conceptions. So I think that your proposed division between 'of the thing' (cognition) and 'of the conception' (reason) doesn't make any sense to me because the two seem to contaminate each other right from the most basic levels and one cannot be said to be prior to the other. So sense perception has inherent within it a fundamental relating of percepts and classification, because I naturally distinguish between colour and sound. Likewise, the objects of reasoning always seem to have a sense aspect, as they seem to always be representations of something sensed, like words, symbols or images. I am incapable of reasoning without employing some sense images.

Yes, given the fact cognitions are of things, from which follows we are not conscious of the relating of conceptions, nor are we conscious of the judgement itself. We are conscious only of the relation of one cognition to another, which is reason. On the other hand, in aesthetic judgements having to do with conceptions alone, we are conscious of these as to how they make us feel, but we cognize nothing by them. It is easy to see that how we feel has no predication on logic, in that it is true we do in fact sometimes feel very differently than the judgement warrants. Like….the guy who fell off a ladder should have caused consternation, but you laugh because it looked so funny when he landed. — Mww

Here is where the problem I had above, manifests into a bigger problem. You say there are cognitions of "things" which is at a sub-conscious level. I assume these "things" would be the differences I referred to above, as I explained "differences" to be the fundamental object of the senses. So when you say "cognitions are of things", you mean cognitions are of differences according to the description I provided above. "Things" is reducible to "differences". Also, within the act of "cognition", there is some sort of relating of differences to each other, and a basic classification going on, and this is the "judgement" you speak of, which we are not consciously aware of.

Now, there are what you would call "cognitions". And reason relates cognitions one to another. However, and here's where the problem lies, you now have another separation, within the conscious level of reasoning, and this appears to be between aesthetic judgements, involving the relations of cognitions, and logical judgements, involving purely abstract conceptions. So the problem is, where do these purely abstract conceptions employed in logic come from? You provide a big description (which I find to have problems) of how a cognition can come to a reasoning mind, being 'of things', but no description of how purely abstract conceptions come to a reasoning mind. And, I explained how each of these, cognitions, and purely abstract concepts, are both fundamentally contaminated by each other, so this renders that whole division as ineffectual. In reality, it appears like both cognitions and abstract concepts are produced in the same way within the sub-conscious, so that when they come to the reasoning mind, they simply come as different categories similar to how colours and sounds come as different categories, but they are actually created in much the same way.

I’m ok with that. Except that my example is concerned with form, but yours is concerned with content. I’m saying the kid stacks numbers, gets a result, you’re saying the kid stacks 5 over 9 and gets 14. I’m saying the kid will necessarily get a result from any stack whatsoever, you’re saying the kid will only get a certain number contingent on the numbers he stacks. I’m constructing the math, which is not itself an experience, you’re using the constructs, which is. — Mww

I was emphasizing the process, which must be learned. So yes, the kid stacks 5 over 9, and gets 14, but more than this, the kid puts 4 below the 5 and 9, and carries the 1 to the next column. So what I am saying is that what you call "the math" is just a learned process without any necessity to it. The kid does not have to write down the 4 and carry the 1, if it's a simple case, it might be all kept in the mind. Then there would be some other way to remember the digits, rather than writing them down. So your determination of necessity is completely meaningless. It's like saying, put some numbers in front of the kid, and the kid will necessarily do something, but you can't make any statement of necessity as to what the kid will actually do. What point is such an assertion of necessity? It's like saying something will necessarily happen, but it could be absolutely anything.

Yes, as long as the stipulation of being taught applies, because there are two distinct methods involved. In such case as being taught, the things being learned about are given to him, the method is presupposed, re: addition, also taught to him, which eliminates him having to exercise his pure a priori conceptions for the construction of them, an entirely different method. In other words, he needs not think what a two is, or how it came to be a two, nor does he need to understand the cause/effect of succession, but only that he should conform to an expectation.

A question of….why is it, that which is known by rote practice makes far less impression than that known from self-determination. Stands to reason it is because the mental effort of the former is far less stringent than the latter. If far less, which effort is not used, as opposed to when it is. — Mww

This conclusion you make here, ought to serve to demonstrate to you the problem with your division between cognition and reason which I explained above. What you describe is the two different ways of learning a rule, explained by Wittgenstein. You can be taught the rule, or you can observe activity and learn the rule simply from observation. As you describe, the two produce a fundamentally different understanding of what is here called "the rule". Both means of acquiring "the rule" are sense based. In one case you acquire the instructions through language, as a prescriptive rule, and in the other instance you observe, and make a descriptive rule.

The problem is that the two are fundamentally different. The rule that you learn from being taught will not be the same as the rule that you learn from observation, as you say, the latter involves a deeper understanding. But does it really? In reality, the other way, being taught the rule, involves a whole lot of purpose, meaning, which the observational way does not reveal. So prior to even being able to understand the rule in language, a whole lot of other education is required, and this is implied already when one is taught the rule, so there is a whole package of understanding purpose, and meaning, inherent within learning the rule through language. So really we cannot say that one is a better understanding than the other because they are both completely different, and understand completely different aspects. To have a complete understanding requires both.

How this bears on the division you proposed, between cognition and reason, is that both these ways of understanding "the rule", prescriptive and descriptive, are based in cognition, recognition of things. However, they involve completely different ways of looking at things. In the descriptive way you look at the activity of "things", people in this case, and notice that their activity is patterned and intelligible, and you thereby make some conclusions about those patterns, allowing you personally to replicate them. In the prescriptive way, you look at "things" as carriers of inherent meaning, like words and symbols, and you learn some understanding about what these things are supposed to represent.

So I would say that the division here is not between cognition (of things), and reason (of concepts), but a difference in the way that we look at things. So each "way" is cognitive in the sense that it deals with things, but in one way the thing is seen as something which you must personal assign meaning to, in your attempt to understand it, and in the other way you see the thing as having meaning already inherent within it, and this is taken for granted.

The phenomena in your mind are representations of physical words, just as in any perception. In the sense that you already know a language, you don’t need to conceptualize the words, you’ve already done it when you learned the words that constitute the language. All you need now is to judge the relation of the word you’ve learned, to the word you perceive. If you cognize a sufficient correlation, you understand what’s been said. In some cases, though, if you cognize a necessary correlation, you know what’s been said is true.
(Guy says…I just went to Home Depot. Ok, fine, you understand how that could be the case. Guy shows you a garden rake, says…I just went to Home Depot and bought this rake. Now you understand he more than likely actually did go to Home Depot. Guy says….I just went to Home Depot and bought this gallon of ice cream. Now, you understand he might have gone to Home Depot, but he more than likely didn’t buy the ice cream there, because yo have no experience of any Home Depot ever selling ice cream. Guy says…I just went to the bank and got a cashier’s check. Now you understand he had to have gone to a bank, because you know for certain there is no where else to get a cashier’s check.)
———— — Mww

This further demonstrates the two different ways of cognizing things. Once we understand that there is meaning inherent within the thing, get a fundamental grasp on this meaning and take it for granted, we can move on toward understanding further meaning which is within the context of the thing. What context is, really, is the assumption of a larger thing ( eg. instead of a word, a sentence) with meaning inherent within that larger thing. But if we cognize a thing without inherent meaning assuming that we must assign meaning to the thing through some act of reasoning, then we allow for the existence of unintelligible "things". That ends up being like the ice cream at Home Depot. If the things cognized, "ice cream" and "Home Depot" in this example have no inherent meaning, then we allow any form of relation. But such a judgement would render everything unintelligible because there would be no inherent rules for relating things.

So we must allow that within cognition, which is the first interaction between mind and thing, there is already assumed by the apprehending mind, that there is meaning already inherent within the percept. So perception presents all things to the reasoning mind as if they are symbols or representations of a concept already. And that's why I do not like the division between cognition and reason, because there would reasoning already inherent within the cognition, because the meaning of the thing cognized has already been understood, just like after we learn to speak, we recognize words as things because we understand the meaning which inheres within.

Yeah but I still thought it was pretty good. — Wayfarer

That's the way poetry rolls. There's no need to follow any particular rules. And if certain styles become conventional, often it's stretching the bounds of the convention which makes the poetry good. Or, like in your example it's good for other reasons, and going outside the conventions really doesn't matter, because that 's the way poetry rolls.

This is the problem with telling people it is "a game". Then the psychology of game play, competition and all sorts of things, enters the picture. And we'll try all kinds of tricks, strategies, to get as much advantage as possible, on the other, without crossing the line of cheating, upon which one would be expelled from the game.

This is the problem with the op, as expressed. It doesn't make clear whether the "players" are told whether they are playing a game or not. If they are simply told the rules, and proceed, that means one thing. If they are told that they are playing a game, that sets completely different stakes. And even just giving the players a set of rules implies that they are playing a game, so that it's a game, and there's different stakes, is unavoidable. And because "the game" is an entity itself, distinct from the person's real life existence and association with money, the person's way of dealing with money will differ. This is probably how gamblers come to feel comfortable with high stakes games, they disassociate the money in the game from their real life relation to money.

So if you pull out the Monopoly board and say we're going to play this game of Monopoly, and the starting amount is 70/30 in your favour, I'd say fuck you, put your game away, I'm not playing. That the game of the op uses real money is just a ruse thrown in by the creators of the game, intended to create ambiguity as to the objective of the game. The stakes are unrevealed. So you urge me on, and say come on play Monopoly with me, it's real money we're playing with, so you really can't lose. I'd be even more inclined to say fuck you, you deceptive bastard, quit messing with my head, I'm losing just by agreeing to play.

Tell that Chat bot poetry composer that "how" and "know" do not rhyme. Neither do "stars" and "ours" for that matter. Where does that thing get its sense of rhythm? Send it back to school. and tell it to work with sound waves rather than letters, if it wants to write poetry.

Incidentally, that is the reason why the physical universe doesn't reduce to mathematics properly, the difference between numbers and waves. Mathematics cannot accurately represent waves because human geometry uses ideal representations of space which are unreal (evidenced by irrational ratios), and the result is the Fourier uncertainty principle. In reality the physical universe would only be accurately reducible via temporal concepts like frequency and rhythm. But this reduction doesn't get very far because division of the octave has always been fraught with problems.

Succinctly, we have not yet solved the problems exposed by the Pythagoreans. Nor have we solved Zeno's problems. Modern mathematicians have created elaborate structures which merely hide 'unsound' foundations. We see immense elegant mathematical structures and simply assume that they must have sound foundations, or else they couldn't be sustained. But sustenance of these just requires endless maintenance.

Cognition is only of things, thus things, re: real spacetime objects, are always involved, albeit indirectly, as representations in the form of phenomena. Thing is…imagination, which is the matter of relating conceptions, and judgement, which is the relation of conceptions**, do not require things that are immediately sensed; as parts of understanding, these work on mediate things, re: prior experience, or, without any thing of sense whatsoever, re: fantoms, magic, or just possible experience. — Mww

OK, so this is how you lost me. "Cognition" for you, does not include imagination, judgement, or relating concepts. But isn't "cognition" generally used to refer to all forms of mental activity, thinking, and understanding? And I was earlier talking about logical processes being an activity of relating conceptions. Do you exclude logic from cognition then?

**the adding of numbers, in the way kids are taught in school, put one number above another, draw a line under both, the implicit operation in the arithmetic above the line is analogous to the mental operation in understanding, called imagination, whereby numbers are exchanged for conceptions, regarding mere thought of things without the immediate presence of them, or even without any real sensed thing at all. This method is all a priori, and no experience is forthcoming from it. — Mww

And this I do not understand either. How can you say that learning to do mathematics does not provide one with "experience"? I think that's exactly what practising things like that does, gives one experience.

That which is below the line, regardless of which combination is above it, after the analogous arithmetic operation as sum, is the mental operation of judgement. And this for just a single perception, or a single thought. There are gazillions of them both but only one at a time, some of which we are conscious some of which we are not; reason is how they all relate to each other, how they are kept organized…..how we are not in a constant state of utter confusion yet still sometimes in a minor state. How we know things or not; how we remember things or don’t. — Mww

This gives me something to talk about. The kid puts two numbers, and draws a line underneath. Let's say each number has multiple digits, so the student has to employ a method, understanding how to carry over from one column to the next for example. If the student is to be successful, the method must have already been learned. The student was taught by a teacher, or read how to in a book, but at that time, when the student learned, this is the time when understanding occurred. Now the student relies on this understanding, which has already occurred, to practise what is already understood.

Through the practise of what is already understood, the student makes judgements about what digits to write below the line. The digits written are a representation of those judgements. And the judgements come from employing the method which has been learned earlier through experience. There may be some underlying a priori principles involved in the learning process, but the method itself, which is what is employed in the judgements is learned through experience. Do you agree?

Just as all the number operations of different forms grouped together is mathematics, so too the entirety of the mental operation, is understanding, and thereby is it deemed the faculty of rules. It should be easy to see, that just as adding two numbers is exactly the same as adding a whole series of numbers, each stacked on top of the other in arithmetic form, two conceptions synthesized to each other is a simple, problematical, judgement, many conceptions synthesized all together, is a hypothetical judgement.
(Pointy ears may give the cognition of a dog, but pointy ears in conjunction with a bushy tail gives a more certain kind of dog. Pointy ears, bushy tail and brown spots yet a more certain kind. And so on. Sooner or later, the synthesis of sufficiently many conceptions whether from appearance or mannerisms, may very well end being the cognition of one single dog, YOUR dog, an apodeitic judgement.) — Mww

But where is cognition in relation to all of this synthesis? You separated cognition off, at the beginning, to be only about things, and not about relating conceptions, and judgements. But aren't these mental operations you describe really about things? The numerals which the student works with have a real physical presence on the paper. Likewise, "pointy ears", "bushy tail", and "dog" are real physical symbols in front of me. And if I think by mulling them over in my mind, I am using a representation of the physical symbol. This is phenomena isn't it? I cannot form those conceptions of those dogs without using those words. And the words in my mind are representations of physical words. So why isn't such conceptualizing, cognition, as working with things?

….to which I meant to offer…..“reasons, i.e., thinks about things”….. just doesn’t say enough. I went on to distinguish what a thing is, such that thinking as a whole does not necessary include them. In other words, reason concerns itself with everything we think, whether of real tangible things of perception, necessarily conditioned by space and time, or abstract intangible conceptual objects which understanding thinks for itself, conditioned only by time. — Mww

You have set up two parallel forms of thinking. one concerning real tangible things, the other concerning abstract intangible concepts. But I do not see that this separation is warranted, or even sustainable in application. The real tangible thing itself does not enter into the thinking itself, only the representations of it. But by the time the representation gets into the conscious mind, it's already tied up with so may abstract conceptions, judgements already made (prejudice), that I do not see the advantage of trying to separate the thing (as phenomenon) from the concepts. I think this just gives an unreal representation which may mislead.

If the slave can claim his right to freedom, or in the case of natural rights, already has it, why is he in chains? — NOS4A2

Some people don't respect the claims that others make. That does not mean that the person is wrong. So if the slaver does not respect the claim of the slave to have a right to freedom, this does not make the slave wrong about this claim.

In any case, when it comes to asserting rights, the slaver’s right to own the slave has won out over the slave’s right to freedom. — NOS4A2

Again this does not hold up logically. That something is done in a particular way, does not produce the conclusion that it is the right way. One's actions do not necessarily display one's rights. If a person lives one's life as a thief, and gets away with it, this does not mean that the person has the right to live that way.

Your so-called balance and equality is might makes right. The slaver has the right to own the slave so long as he can claim and take the right. The slave has the right to freedom so long as he can claim the right and make an exit. — NOS4A2

Oh, so now you change your tune! You said rights had to be given. I said what is given had to be balanced with what is taken. Now you say rights are taken. Which do you really believe? Or do you really believe like me, that rights are a balance between the two?

As i said, I am not very familiar with Schopenhauer.

Only man can confer rights. Man is not a rights holder. Rather, he is a rights giver. — NOS4A2

This is an incorrect representation of "rights". A right is an equality, therefore a balance. You portray it as something which is completely dependent on the act of giving, thereby denying the balancing part which is the act of taking. So that aspect, whereby human beings assert their rights, claim their rights, and thereby take their rights, you deny by saying "man is not a rights holder". In reality there is a balance between people claiming "these are my rights" and standing up for that, which is a matter of taking, and people saying "those are your rights", allowing you specific unimpeded actions, which is a matter giving.

Unless you portray "rights" as a form of equality, or balance, whether it is "natural rights" or whatever, which you are portraying, it is not a correct portrayal. But since you are portraying rights as something given by human beings, you are not portraying "natural rights" anyway, and the op is improperly named.

The point though, is that the PSR (sorry, I said PoR in the last post, but I meant PSR) is only circumvented by assuming the reality of randomness. And that would render "will" as unintelligible, or nonsensical, as is "blind striving".

There are ways in which the artist may attempt to minimize the role of the PSR in one's creations, by employing elements of randomness, but this exclusion of the PSR cannot be complete. The artist must choose a medium of presentation, and this choice is always made with a purpose. So even if the goal is to minimize the role of the PSR, this cannot be complete, because that is in itself a goal and therefore subject to the PSR.

Will is blind striving. But is it? Let me examine… — schopenhauer1

There is no such thing as blind striving. Striving must be directed or else whatever it is that is occurring cannot be called "striving". That's what "striving" implies, directed actions.

Schop posits Forms as immediate objects of the will. So what this could mean is that forms are created in order to have desires to achieve so the goals can be directed towards something. — schopenhauer1

So this is backward. "Will" implies goals. The goals don't need to be directed toward something, because they are what actions are directed toward. The actions are the means, the goals are the ends. So subjugated goals are means, and the goal which the means are directed toward is logically prior to the means. Therefore the object which the goals are directed toward, if it is supposed to be a Form, is prior to the goals which are directed toward it, as these are the means.

So in a way, Will does have a telos, that is, to create never ending goals for itself in the goal of completion. — schopenhauer1

Since you reversed the logical order, it is not really a never ending process. The means are determined, and carried out, the goal is achieved. That's why the goal is called "the end", when it is achieved it puts an end to the process.

If you posit a further purpose (goal) for the will itself, a purpose to the process of creating goals for itself, that purpose would itself be an end which would be achievable, by that nature of being an end. Therefore the process could not be characterized as never ending. So if this were the goal of completion, that would be an achievable goal and the process would not be never ending. But if the process whereby the will creates goals for itself is completely purposeless (contrary to the PoR), this would turn out to be a never ending process. But that perspective, of course, is to deny the PoR.

Fundamentally, humans are driven to survival, not toward selfish promotion. If it works toward our survival that we abuse one another, we will, and the same holds true for cooperation. But we don't intuit our best survival techniques a priori. We learn through trial and error (natural selection). — Hanover

It appears like you are mixing things up here. The natural tendencies which I am born with, form the basis of my intuitions, the innate features which influence my thinking. It is not I who has learned these through trial and error, these are qualities passed to me from others who lived before me. And since the qualities I get in this way, have been selected for by natural selection, rather than by the agent doing the testing, we cannot call it "trial and error". That's a different concept from natural selection. In order to call this trial and error we would need to assume an overarching "life" as a form of being, which is learning from natural selection.

So we actual do intuit our best survival techniques a priori, because they are produced prior to one's own experience, and are innate to the person. But this was not a case of learning something through trial and error, it was a case of something being produced by natural selection. On top of this, the complicating factor is that natural selection has produced the capacity for an individual to learn from one's own experiences in one's own environment, and make decisions based on these learned factors, rather than the innate features. Now the learned knowledge appears to have the capacity to overrule the innate in judgement. And, we must consider this capacity to learn anew, and overrule the selected for qualities, to be a selected for quality itself. Therefore it appears like one of the innate tendencies, which has been selected for, as well-suited for survival, is the innate tendency to allow for the innate tendencies to be overruled by something freshly learned. On the other hand, it seems like this would have to be self-destructive. Allowing all those qualities which have been selected for as best suited for survival, to be overruled by a free will whim, would have to be itself a self-destructive quality. So the basic innate tendency is a tendency toward self-destruction, nut this constitutes "survival" for that overarching being of "life".

Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite. — Mww

I thought you said cognition doesn't involve things, it's only a matter of relating conceptions. I'm going to go back and reread that post.

That’s not all we’re doing. Relating conceptions IS the judging. And we don’t make a judgement about a thing; we cognize a thing, from the relation of conceptions thought as belonging to it. And, need I remind you, we’re talking about things here, real spacetime objects….you know, the things not in our heads (sigh)…..represented as phenomena, which in the thinking process, requires something else from understanding not yet considered. — Mww

OK, I see now, you said judging is relating concepts, and we do not make a judgement about a thing. However, you say we cognize a thing. So I'm confused now, what does "cognize a thing" mean? I see here, an act of relating conceptions, which you insist, is the act of judgement. But then there is also an act of cognizing a thing, described here, which is the act of thinking that the conceptions belong to a thing. Isn't this itself a judgement? And isn't it a judgement about a thing? It seems to be an instance of relating the conceptions to an assumed thing, rather than to other conceptions, and this is a judgement about a thing.

Now, I really do not understand the nature of this "thing" you were talking about back then, five days ago. Maybe if I took the time to question you properly back then, we wouldn't have spent five days getting nowhere. How is it that there are things which a person cognizes, but a person doesn't make a judgement about a thing, only thinks that certain conceptions are related to that thing?

Then you go on to make a short statement about what a thing is, but it doesn't really make sense to me. So it probably went right past me.

That which enters the mind as phenomena is that physical thing which represents how that feeling is to be understood. — Mww

Are you saying that the physical thing actually enters the mind as phenomena? Is this, in your belief, how we cognize a thing? The thing enters the mind as phenomena, and when the mind relates conceptions to it, this is cognizing a thing? If this is the case, then why do you not say that this is a form of judgement?

To me, I think that this is what I've been describing as the highest level of cognition, judging possibilities. But you seem to place it at the lowest level, not even obtaining the status of judgement. Deciding which conceptions are related to the thing, which appears as phenomena, is a matter of judging possibilities. Under Aristotelian conceptions, matter is potential, so the material thing is the substance of possibility. Judging possibilities, which is fundamentally judging things, is what I would say is the highest form of judgement. Furthermore, this type of judging often consists of moral judgements, because the things which enter our minds as phenomena, appearing to us in the form of possibilities, are often other human beings.

Yeah, well….my true understanding of reality demands they be separated. Guess I just haven’t reached the end yet.

But this exchange is getting pretty close, what with the conversational inconsistencies, and the Platonic and the transcendental being fundamentally incompatible. — Mww

I really don't believe that the Platonic and the transcendental are fundamentally incompatible. I think there is a medium between the two, which is the Aristotelian. And I think that the transcendental is in many ways, a rejection of Aristotelian terminology. The Aristotelian terminology is based in a Platonic relating of concepts, and this is what creates the appearance of incompatibility. So what I see is a rejection of the Aristotelian interpretation of Plato, but this does not prove to be fundamentally incompatible with Plato, as Plato can be interpreted in numerous different ways. It's difficult for a philosopher to be fundamentally incompatible with Plato, even if one tried, because Plato offered so many different ways of looking at everything.

That sounds like an absolutist statement, which sort of violates PoR. PoR might be used to say that any body is in motion relative to certain frames. Without the frame reference, motion is undefined. — noAxioms

It is not an absolutist statement, it is a deductive conclusion derived from two premises, the PoR, along with an inductive conclusion derived from empirical observation. It is observed that as time passes, there are always things moving. Along with the PoR we can conclude deductively that any existing body is always in motion.

You are reversing logical priority here. The concept "frame of reference" is derived from the principle of relativity, not vise versa. So motion was defined first, as relative (PoR), and then the concept "frame of reference" was developed as the means for measurement. The PoR discusses the motions of bodies relative to each other, and there is no need for a concept of frame of reference in this discussion.

Only when the intent is to put numbers to the motion, measure it, is the reference frame needed, due to what the PoR assumes. So the PoR gives one of the basic rules for constructing the frame. Also, we need a rule concerning the conceptions of space and time to be employed in the measurement. Newton employed a fixed, static backdrop of space, from which a coordinate system could be applied, along with an "absolute" time. Time is absolute in the sense of constant and continuous. Einstein proposed an alternative conception of space and time.

As per above, the conceptions of space and time are essential aspects of the conception of frame of reference. Also, Einstein used substantially different conceptions of space and time, from Newton. Therefore we can conclude that the substantially different conceptions of space and time employed by Einstein result in a substantially different form of "frame of reference".

I’d have said ‘every moment of time’. I don’t see what the word ‘passing’ adds to that. — noAxioms

There's a big difference in conception of "time" here, which we can apprehend through analysis. Some would posit "the present moment" as a moment which clearly and concisely separates the past time from the future time. No time passes at "the moment" in this conception because it is a precise, non-dimensional, division, similar to the way that a non-dimensional point divides two line segments. The past, along with the future, provide a complete representation of time, and the moment is an arbitrary (yet substantialized, and justified by "the present)") point in time. The abstracted point, removed from the assumed real point at the present, may be projected anywhere in time, to produce specific durations, like specific line segments.

So when I said "every moment of passing time", I implied that within any "moment" there is inherently some duration of time. This denies the reality of the abstracted "point", implying that instead of being a non-dimensional point, like a point which divides one line into two line segments, it is an infinitesimal point, such that there is some time within that point. Now there is not a clear and precise division between the two time segments past and future, as some time passes within the present moment. And since "the moment" is the dividing point by which time is measured, the time which inheres within the moment under this conception, evades measurement. It escapes from being measured. The measured durations are the line segments, yet some time inheres within the points which provide the boundaries to a segment, so that the boundary is somewhat vague, and this time within the point ends up as an unknown relative to the segments produced when a line is divided.

The first conception of "the moment" discussed above, is consistent with the Newtonian conception. The passage of time is constant and continuous and such consistency provides the basis for the assumption that we can posit points of division anywhere, just like what was done with traditional spatial conceptions. The second conception of "the moment" is consistent with the one employed by Einstein. This is understood as "the relativity of simultaneity". The moment in time which marks "now", as the divisor between past and present is not a clear and precise, non-dimensional point. Each frame of reference is allowed to have an independent and separate point which divides the two line segments, past from future. Within the frame of reference, the point is still supposed to provide a clear and precise non-dimensional divisor, but the vague boundary occurs when different frames, the basis from which measurements are made, are related to each other.

Under the Newtonian proposal, there is supposed to be an absolute divisor, "the present", which is substantiated or justified by human experience. This grounds all measurements of time as being consistent with each other, based in the experienced "present". Einstein removes this, saying that "the present" is relative to the frame of reference, rather than the human experience of a division between past and future. As a result, we have no basic principle to resolve any discrepancies in measurement which manifest as the result of the positioning of the divisor, the point which measured time segments are relative to, as measurements are made as time passes at the present. Resolutions would be arbitrary.

Simply put, Einstein recognized that human experience cannot provide a clear and precise non-dimensional division between one time period and the next, and he exploited this fact to employ the principle that there is no precise division between future and past. Consequently the Einsteinian observation perspective is based in this assumption, and all observations recorded from this perspective will demonstrate this feature, as conclusions reflect premises.

Our intuition is doing something more than just a straight forward self-interest. — Banno

Of course, isn't that obvious to you? We didn't need the experiment to demonstrate that. We have certain deep seated tendencies which some people call innate ideas. In the Plato/Forms thread we discussed the innate idea of equality. In your referenced experiment it shows up as a sense of equity. In philosophy this sense of equality serves as the basis for conceptions like "natural rights". The same intuition which makes me want to punish you for not being fair (even at my expense), also inclines me to believe in human rights and equality.

We might, as philosophers, delve into an investigation as to how such innate ideas exist,. And we'll see, as Plato did in his investigation into the meaning of "just", the reason for a wide range of human behaviours in the responses demonstrated in the experiment. There is inconsistency between individuals within one's own particular understanding of the supposed innate ideas. The supposed innate ideas manifest differently in different people. We might take this as an indication that there is no such thing as an innate idea, but if you go to the other extreme you end up in unenlighten's category of sociopath.

So we might reject the descriptive terms, "innate ideas", as wrong because they give an inaccurate impression of what is there, but we cannot deny the reality of the behaviour, and its cause, which the words are meant to refer to. The discrepancy between the description and the thing described indicates that we have a poor understanding of what is there. Therefore further philosophy is required.

And here we’ve switched from cognition of things, to that which can only be moral constructions. — Mww

I never made a switch. You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things. I've been talking about considering possibilities, and making judgements. Moral principles very often enter into these considerations, that's unavoidable.

Maybe we've been misunderstanding each other all along, and that's why we can't work out our differences.

Remind me….didn’t we agree feelings are not cognitions? And didn’t we agree the judgement of cognitions is discursive in the relation of empirical conceptions, but the judgement of feelings is aesthetic in the condition of the subject himself? — Mww

You've unduly restricted "judgement" here, to either feelings or empirical conceptions. And I never agreed to this restriction. I agreed to leave feelings aside, as not entering cognition (though I still believe that feelings influence cognition).

Since abandoning feelings, I've been talking about judging possibilities. I think that all forms of judgement are reducible to a matter of judging possibilities. In other words, judgement requires possibility. To judge is to make a decision, and "decision" implies "choice", which implies "possibility".

Why are they being intermingled, when each is of its own domain, and have no business interfering with each other? Allowing the one to cross over to the other weakens the human condition of intrinsic duality, the prelude to a blatant contradiction. — Mww

It is not a matter of allowing one to cross over, and intermingle with the other, it is a matter of what is natural to the human condition. Such intermingling is a natural part of the human condition, which we cannot rid ourselves of. This is why feelings influence cognition. When I am upset, for example, I can't think straight. I cannot prevent the feeling from influencing the thinking, so I have to wait unit the feeling subsides. This situation is not describable as preventing the feeling from intermingling, which I cannot do, it is describable as suppressing the thinking until the feeling which has a bad influence on the thinking, subsides. Getting rid of the feeling requires a diversion, meditation, or some other calming practise. If they both occur at the same time, the feeling and the thinking, they automatically intermingle.

Still, best to keep them separate in philosophical dialectic practices. — Mww

I don't thinks so Mwww. The separation you propose is not real, therefore in dialectical practises which are directed toward the understanding of reality, it's best not to accept that proposed separation. This is why Plato placed "the good" at the top of all knowledge. In the end, right/wrong is inseparable from good/ bad, and they are both meant to be based in a true understanding of reality.

HOWEVER, where I see conundrums in Schop's metaphysics is when he starts discussing the Forms as the "immediate" object of Will. This smuggling in of Plato, gets problematic as we now have to ask "Why?" and there seems to be little answer, other than the post-facto that we know objects exist. Also, how do these Forms turn into the sensible world of "phenomenon" that is of the PSR variety? All of this just gets confusing.

ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1

I would say that the independent Forms are of God's Will, and the phenomenal representations of them are of the human will, as basic idealism, though I am very unfamiliar with Schopenhauer in particular.

If we remove God, then any proposed independent Forms are unsupported and meaningless conjecture. The only "world" or "worlds" are those created by human wills, and there is nothing to justify anything external.

ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1

In my opinion, the op does not make clear the relationship between the PSR and the will for Schopenhauer. It is stated as "no object without a subject" which is no consistent with my understanding of the PSR, and also the inverse "no subject without an object" is derived without any demonstration of the logic behind this inversion. So it is no wonder that you are confused. Maybe can help to explain this.

My takeaway from my hour of research here is that as actual dollars increase, rejections decrease, but to the extent we can afford to fuck those who try to fuck us, we will, but there is a limit to how much we will spend on the joy of vindictiveness. — Hanover

Ahh, I see. The real self-interest, or greed factor does display itself, but in the actions of the receiver rather than in the actions of the one who makes the offer. That makes sense, because the one making the offer is in the unknown and must make decision based on possibility or assumed probability, and might be punished by the other for making an ill-judgement. The one receiving has only two possibilities, take, or punish the other. And the amount taken has a value in an outside system. So punishing the other, which is only a part of the experimental system, becomes less and less relevant as the reward in the outside system, which is fundamentally more important, increases.

In other words, I don't mind punishing another for bad behaviour, if it only costs me a little. And if the amount of bribery is sufficient, and the bad behaviour is rather insignificant, anyone would gladly refrain from punishing.

Interesting, basic and to the point. It may be, that reality is far different from the way that it is conceived by scientists.

I believe the key to understanding this principle is to recognize the reality of time. If the future consists of possibilities, and the past consists of events which have been actualized, then the present must be conceived as the time when possibilities are actualized. This "present" would need to be be a "time period" which consists of some duration, during which possibilities from the future become actualities in the past. For reasons demonstrated by some philosophers, this transition can not be instantaneous, the present is not a "moment", not a non-dimensional division between past and future. "Actualization" itself implies an act which requires some amount of time for possibilities to be actualized at the present time.

Time is measured as it passes, so all measured time is in the past, necessarily, requiring action (actual motion) to make a measurement of time. As we move toward measuring faster and faster motions (pure energy) in our experimentation and practise, we deal with shorter and shorter periods of time. When the present is conceived as having temporal duration, then part is future-like, and part is past-like. In dealing with extremely short periods of time we deal with the part which is future-like, consisting of possibilities, just starting to become actualized. Moving further into the future-like part of the present in our practises provides us with more "power" over how possibilities are actualized at the present.

As the article states, this "new" perspective is not actually "new". It is as old as philosophy itself, and has manifested as the theological perspective. It is from this perspective that moral principles, and our understanding of free-will is derived. The human mind partakes in the future-like part of the present, that part which is immaterial, being prior to the measurable physical activity which occurs as time passes. From this position it has the capacity to direct the actualization of possibilities as time passes. This is the Aristotelian biology, which places the soul as the first actuality of a living body. All the capacities (potencies or powers) that the living being has, are understood as possibilities for actualization (potentials), under direction of that first actuality.

In the mini-treatise preceding this conclusion, and following from your argument just above it, there is not much with which to take exception. Pretty much conforms to what I’ve been saying. I might counter-argue that conclusions can follow immediately from the considering. The only way for there not to be a judgement at all, neither in affirmation nor negation of the considering, is if that which was under consideration wasn’t even imaginable in the first place. Hence the principle…that of which the imagination is impossible the object cannot be conceived. Or, if you prefer, the conception of the unimaginable is empty. — Mww

Yes, it's turning out that we're not really very far apart in our opinions. Nor were we really, at the beginning of this exchange, it was just a matter of fact that we use slightly different terminology, and there was a need to hammer out some details.

But there are still some significant points of disagreement. Why do you think that the only way in which there is no judgement, is if what was being considered was unimaginable? What about my example of relating possibilities, and leaving judgement until later? Suppose I am considering my course of action for tomorrow, and I would like to go to place A, place B, place C, and place D. I have a number of possibilities for ordering these events A,B,C,D, or A,C,B,D, etc.. I decide to keep an open mind on this decision, between now and tomorrow morning, in case new, relevant information comes up. Clearly, what I am considering is imaginable, and also I haven't yet made the required judgement.

Do you understand this situation differently than I do? Or is there a matter of terminology which I am missing?

To which I adamantly object: the highest level of cognition is not judgement. The source of all human cognitive error, insofar as such error is in fact error in the relation of conceptions to each other, judgement, cannot be the highest level to which cognition can attain, from which follows the possibility of error far outweighs the possibility of correct thinking. — Mww

Wait a minute, this conclusion is not valid at all. You proceed from the fact that error is possible, to the conclusion that it is more likely than not, without the required premises. Just because there is an aspect of cognition (judgement) which provides for the possibility of error, doesn't mean that error is more likely than not when this faculty is being used.

It is my belief, that this aspect of cognition, judgement, is the highest level of cognition, for that very reason, that it provides for the possibility of error. It allows for the possibility of choice, and this same freedom of choice is what allows for the possibility of error, as an unavoidable byproduct. It is the highest level of cognition because it provides us with the greatest capacity for the largest variety of activities. So it also provides for the greatest possibility of a good life, due to the nature of ongoing risks and dangers which need to be avoided in order to have a good life.

Reason the faculty subjects judgement, and thereby the cognitions given from them, to principles, by which the immediate judgement is regarded as conflicting or sustaining their antecedents. It is here phrases like, “I knew that” and “Now I know that”, hold as, or become, truths. — Mww

This is where take the determinist perspective which I adamantly object to. Reason does not subject judgement, and this is the crux of our disagreement. That reason does not subject judgement is evident from Socrates' argument, and what in the dialogue is called "being overcome by pleasure".

The issue is not a matter of "I know that", or "I knew that", It is a matter of "I know that I ought not do this, but I am doing it anyway". Reason tells the person "I ought not do that", but judgement has the person do it anyway. In this case we cannot say that reason subjects judgement.

HA!!!! Yeah….everybody that speaks involves himself in language games. I let my abject abhorrence of analytic philosophy impinge on my transcendental nature; I only meant to try making it clear when we say stuff like we do this or that, the manifested doing has no personal pronouns connected to it. If, as you say, we think in images….kudos on that, by the way…..it is absurd to then demand that images themselves invoke personal pronouns. Recognition of this removes the Cartesian theater from being a mere oversimplication, as you claim, but eliminates it altogether. — Mww

Doesn't it make sense to you if I say "I walk to work each day", or "I go to bed each night", as these are activities which I do? Would you recommend removing the "I" from these statements? Thinking is an activity as well. So why doesn't it make sense to you to say "I think", "I relate concepts to each other", and "I decide"? Why does this conjure up an idea for you of an homunculus, which you for some reason think is a wrong idea? It makes no sense to me, to remove the subject, the "I", and propose that thinking is something which just happens, judgement just happens, decisions just happen, intentional actions just happen. What does "effort" mean to you? Is effort something that just happens as well?

Yeah, Schopenhauer is not arguing that objects have subjectivity, only that they have an inner aspect, the inaccessible object-in-itself. He calls it will or will-like on the basis that the thing-in-itself is undivided, so what is inmost in us, being part of the wider thing-in-itself, is what is inmost in everything. — Jamal

This is very consistent with the Christian (theological) view of the temporal continuity of objects, commonly represented as inertia. Newton stated that his first law of motion is dependent on the Will of God. If God pulls out His Will (which is His choice to do at any moment as time passes), then the temporal continuity of objects, which constitutes the material existence of an object, represented as mass, disintegrates, and we have no more material objects.

Sorry @T Clark that reply was meant for

My sense of fairness is worth more that $1 or even $10. If it were $10,000, that would be a different thing. On the other hand, telling someone to go fry ice when he tries to stiff me for thousands might be worth it. — T Clark

That's right, monetary value systems are based in equity, fairness. If someone else gets nine to my one, it is in my "self-interest" to reject the entire system, putting us each at zero.

The issue of the "reality" of mathematical objects. Over two millennia have passed with no consensus. When we speak of Platonism isn't that something from ancient times? — jgill

As I see it is, there is really no question about the reality of thoughts, ideas, concepts and abstractions. Very few people would deny the reality of such things. The problem arises from how we talk about these things. The words we use which facilitate such communication often do not properly represent the way that we understand (or fail to understand) these things. Notice for example, I've referred to thoughts as "things". I really do not believe that thoughts are even similar to material objects which I also call "things". With talk like this, we create an environment where ambiguity and equivocation are highly probable.

So, we talk about mathematical "objects" and we also talk about physical "objects". What is implied by this talk is that there are two types of objects, one type having the properties which mathematical objects have, and the other type having the properties which physical objects have. Then we need principles to distinguish one type of object from the other type, and this is where the difficulties arise. When we try to separate two distinct types of objects we employ a reductive analysis, and they end up "converting" into each other.

What is implied by this, is that we cannot maintain a separation between two distinct types of objects. There is not any real principles to separate the two. The separation of two types of objects is not supported by reality and our attempts to create such a separation are fraught with problems because it is a fictional categorization.

Now we are left with a choice, which of the two types of "objects" provides us with a real representation of what an object is. What Plato argued, with the cave allegory, is that the intelligible objects, thoughts, ideas and abstractions, are the real objects. The supposed physical objects are really just the reflections of the true objects which are the intelligible. However, the majority of human beings, the masses, live in a world directed toward fulfilling their bodily desires. Therefore they prioritize their bodily senses, and they refuse to follow what the intellect demonstrates to them. Accordingly, they reject the guidance of "the philosopher", who has come back from his journey into the intelligible in an effort to disillusion them, returning to the cave where the others are imprisoned by their sense inclinations. They refuse to be led toward the truth.

What this shows is that ubiquitously, folk do not make decisions on the basis of rationally maximising their self-interest. Some other factor intervenes. — Banno

You need to recognize a person's attention to probability, odds. If the person offers $0 they know the odds of acceptance are zero or close to it. As the amount offered increases, so do the odds of acceptance. The person offering 50% of the money is making a pretty safe bet, and will still reward one's own self-interest. Therefore you cannot conclude that the person offering 50% is not "rationally" trying to maximize their own self-interest, while the person offering 10% is. Otherwise you'd have to say that buying lottery tickets is "rational". In other words, being rational is respecting the odds.

That kind of thinking is where the notion of Cartesian theater, or the dreaded homunculus, comes from. The relation of conceptions just IS judgement. WE don’t relate; there just is a systemic process in which that happens. Beware of….and refrain from, at all costs….those abysmally stupid language games. — Mww

I don't agree with this at all. I see a clear difference between relating concepts to each other, and making judgements. As I explained, when I am planning for action, I consider numerous possibilities (relate these concepts), then I make a judgement as to my best course of action. If relating the concepts, and making the judgement was the same thing, I couldn't relate possibilities without coming to a conclusion, which i often do. If judgement was not separate from reasoning, we could not have free will. If the act of relating possibilities to each other (thinking) necessitated a conclusion, then it would be the possibilities themselves which cause the conclusion, rather than the will of the thinking person. That is how we can say that the will is free, because decision is not causally determined in this way. Are you determinist?

There is nothing inherently wrong with the notion of the Cartesian theatre, and the homunculus, other than that it is an oversimplification. It doesn't properly represent reality because it is an oversimplification, but it is a very useful concept for understanding dualism. In that sense it is no different from fundamental concepts of math, physics, and other sciences. They are over simplifications so they don't accurately represent reality, but they are still very useful. A straight line, being one dimensional doesn't represent anything real, but it is very useful. Inertia doesn't represent anything real, but it is simple and useful.

And the infinite regress commonly cited as a problem with the homunculus is unjustified because the will which causes the act is immaterial, while the person acting is material. Therefore the act of the will is a completely different type of act from the observable act of the human body, and cannot be compared in the way necessary for infinite regress.

Note the rela-TION of conceptions is not the relat-ING of them. Relating, which is the subsuming of a manifold of minor conceptions as schema of a greater, technically, a synthesis, is done by imagination; judgement merely signifies the relative belonging of them in the collection, one to another. — Mww

It is you who is playing a silly language game here. The act of relating two conception together, will cause a relation between them, in the mind. But it does not necessarily cause a judgement. I can relate possibility A to possibility B, thereby causing a relation between them, and still not decide which one to proceed with in my actions. We might say that in establishing this relation, I did make a judgement, the judgement not to act. But if this is the case, then every thought is itself a judgement. Just to think of possibility A is to make a judgement. And even to have any thought enter the mind at all would be to make a judgement. Even to remember something would be to judge. Then there would be no difference between thinking and judging.

The problem now is that we'd have no difference between deliberating and deciding. Clearly there is a difference between deliberating, the thinking activity which leads up to making a choice, and deciding, which is the finality of actually choosing. We must allow for this difference to allow for the fact that some deliberations are quick, while others are slow. Therefore it cannot be just considering the possibilities only which causes the conclusion, or else all conclusions would be immediate after the possibilities were considered. So, I believe that the cause of the conclusion, judgement, comes from something other than the act of considering the possibilities.

So it is that, under the auspices of this particular theory, because no cognition of a thing is at all possible from a singular, stand-alone conception, a synthesis of a collection of conceptions is itself necessary for cognition and all which follows from it, and because the synthesis is necessary, the judgement follows from it necessarily. So, no, there is no relating of conceptions without judgement signifying the relation. — Mww

Your use of "necessary" and "necessarily" here indicate that you are determinist, and this is either the result of, or the cause of your refusal to separate reasoning from judgement.

Let me take a look at your proposition here. A collection of conceptions is necessary for cognition, and it is what results from cognition. You ought to recognize that this is a vicious circle of causation. If a collection of cognitions is the effect of cognition, then how could the initial collection of conceptions come into existence, which would be required for the first act of cognition, which would be required to cause the first collection of cognitions?

Here's another proposal, let's look at what "synthesis" means here. Suppose we have existing separate conceptions, not yet related so as to form a collection. These are the things which will be the parts to a collections the parts of a whole. And let's say that there is an act required to "synthesize" these conceptions to make them a collection, a whole. You'd be inclined to say that this is cognition, the act which relates the parts, synthesizes, and produces the whole. However, cognition is required already, to support the existence of the parts, the concepts which will be united in synthesis, allowing them to exist in a way where synthesis is possible. By that fact, that they exist in a way which will allow for synthesis, it is implied that they have some sort of relations to each other. So we need another name for the act which causes the synthesis.

I think we can see this in all natural situations where there is a whole with parts. We need an act which supports, or causes the existence of the parts, and another distinct type of act, which supports or causes the unification of the parts as a whole. So each level we pass through, where a whole becomes a part of a larger whole, in synthesis, a different type of act is required from the act which made the part a whole in the first place.

Sidebar: there is a caveat here regarding the cognition of things, but for the sake of simplicity, it shall be overlooked, re: intuition. For the mere thinking of things, the synthesis of conceptions holds by itself, and judgement works the same way for both. — Mww

I think we are actually not far from agreement. You notice that at the base level of cognition there is needed a different type of act, intuition. I am arguing that at the highest level of cognition, judgement, there is also the need for a different type of act.

Think about it. Has it ever occurred to you that, say, this thing (a perceived object) can’t be “__” (a cognized known object) because it’s missing some property (a conception) already understood (judged) as belonging to (synthesized with other conceptions) that certain “__”? — Mww

I don't think I understand you here. Are you talking about changing my mind because I recognize that I made a mistaken judgement? If so, that's fairly common. If not, what are you asking?

Rhetorical question, because that is precisely what you did right there, which would be readily apparent to you, when you examine what and how your disagreement came about. — Mww

Again, I don't understand. Did I misunderstand your question?