Let's be clear. Everyone else reads the sections around §48 as showing something like that there are no ultimate simples, that the standards we use for defining complexity are in a sense arbitrary. — Banno

Yes I see that, but if you read carefully you'll see the reason for the conclusion, that there are no ultimate simples. The idea is logically incoherent. What 48 shows is that what you call an "ultimate simple" exists as a part of a proposal, a proposition, as a feature of a description. Therefore it could not be a thing named, because it would only exist as a proposed part of a complex. It's existence is relative to the proposal. So there would be a description of the complex, which includes "ultimate simples", but there could be no real name for the proposed simples which compose the complex, because they are only proposed, not observed and named. There is only a description of the role, or function which they are supposed to play in the complex.

Then the problem of differentiating between one proposed ultimate simple and another is exposed at the end of 48. Is each element named by the same letter the same element, or are they different elements of the same type, bearing the same name by being of the same type? Well, as Wittgenstein says, and Banno says, it doesn't matter, so long as we can avoid misunderstandings. So, we'd say "no problem", they are different elements of the same type.

Well, at 49 it is shown that misunderstanding cannot be avoided. Those who propose ultimate simples, propose them as elements which can only be named, and cannot be described. To be describable would imply that they are themselves composed of parts, and therefore could not be ultimate simples. If they are not describable, we cannot judge them as the same type. So the idea of an ultimate simple turns out to be logically incoherent, because they can only be named, not described, but each and every one would all have the very same name, because they are supposed to be of the same type. But they really cannot be of the same type, because they cannot be described as such, nor can they be distinguished one from another. So they cannot be named, nor can they be described, and it's an incoherent proposal.

To perhaps get a clearer picture of my interpretation of this, refer to the PI reading group, p12 in my pagination, (I'd provide a link but I don't know how). There I describe how Wittgenstein demonstrates that the idea of "primary elements" is self-refuting, because it is as I describe there, simply an attempt to circumvent the law of identity, the proposal of a thing which cannot have any sort of identity.

I think the belief in one ultimate first principle followed by Forms followed by sensible particulars is compatible with Plato. — Apollodorus

The belief in one ultimate first principle, is distinct from the belief that the One is the ultimate first principle. I think the former is compatible with Plato, the latter is not. This is because Plato believed in "the good" as the ultimate first principle, and in his writings he treated "the One" as something other than "the good".

As we have seen, Plato taught that particulars have no existence (or essence) of their own. They depend for their existence on “copies” of Forms whose properties they instantiate.

He later developed this idea, introducing the view that sensibles result from the interaction of “form-copies” (homoiotes) and the “receptacle” (hypodoche), which is a form of all-pervading space that serves as a medium for the elements out of which material objects are fashioned. So the objects are made of primary elements shaped by form-copies. — Apollodorus

To say that particulars result from an interaction between forms and a receptacle is not the same as saying that particulars have no existence. "Existence" and "essence" are Latin terms, and there is a clear distinction between them. To say that a particular could have no essence is not to say that it would have no existence, and vise versa.
.

But as Aristotle demonstrated it makes no sense to talk of a being (existent) without a form (essence). so if Plato thought of particulars as beings (existence) without form or essence, Aristotle cleared this up. Matter without form is unintelligible, but form without matter is logically coherent.

You overlooked my quote of PI 241. — Luke

You didn't explain how it was relevant, and I couldn't see the connection.

Does the English language have real existence? — Luke

No, the English language does not have real existence. That is one thing that Wittgenstein demonstrates in the PI, through the game analogy. The English language consists of a multitude of language-games, and we cannot point to one game which could be called "the English language". There is nothing which "the English Language" actually refers to.

Santa Claus or any other proper noun does not really fit types and tokens, because proper nouns only have one type or token. — Luke

That is why your proposed type/token dichotomy is inapplicable here, where Wittgenstein is talking about "naming". "Naming" is a practice commonly consisting of applying proper nouns. You just don't seem to grasp the meaning of "naming", that naming is to relate a word directly to an object, as we do with proper nouns.

However, that is no argument against common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. So your argument isn't what you think. To argue that "what the words represent is imaginary" is to argue that tokens are imaginary, not that types are imaginary. — Luke

I really don't see how you draw this conclusion. Your writing is so confused, saying that a type is a word, and nouns are themselves classified as types and tokens. Such things always depend on how the word is used, so we cannot make universal judgements about "words" in this way.

There is no problem with naming sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed. — Luke

The fact that we do it doesn't imply that there is no problem with it. If that were the case then there'd be no such thing as a mistake. Anyway, the issue is whether Wittgenstein sees a problem with it, which he clearly does.

258 is talking about a private language, not our public language. Think about that, instead of pretending to know what you are talking about. — Luke

That is not true, and again demonstrates that your preconceived ideas influence your reading. At 257 Wittgenstein proposes a sort of private language, where he questions "So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?" But by the end of 257 he concludes with "And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed."

I request that you consider the conclusion of 257 very closely. When we say that the person has given a name to one's pain we are already using "pain" to reference the thing which the person has named. In other words, since we are describing what the person is doing, with words of our common language, it is already impossible that what the person is doing can be called a 'private language' such as proposed earlier in 257. What the person is doing is already in the context of being public, because it is being described. Therefore it has been concluded that we cannot coherently describe a private language. That would be an incoherency, because to describe what the person is doing, makes it necessarily public already.

Then he proceeds to 258. So, the conclusion of 257 ensures that it is impossible that he is describing a private language at 258. He has already excluded that as impossible due to the described incoherency at the end of 257. The diarist at 258 is naming a sensation with "S", and as explained at 261 "sensation" is a word of our common language. Therefore the grammar of the word "sensation" is presupposed, just like "pain" at the end of 257. And Wittgenstein is not talking about a private language at all here. He is talking about the problems involved with naming a sensation. It is impossible that he is describing a private language, because he has already demonstrated that it is impossible to describe a private language.

es, and who claimed that conventional usage implies that Santa exists? You are confused. Still. — Luke

You, explicitly claimed that the existence of something, "a type" is constituted by conventional usage.

What is specific about us is our ability to wield negation, and with it, the practice of symbolic, rather than indexical and iconic, uses of language. — StreetlightX

Negation is the way to certainty. In a world of possibilities, we cannot say what necessarily "is", though we can exclude what is impossible as "is not". This forms the process of elimination.

I should have known better than to engage. — Banno

Yes, you should have. And please, if you can, refrain from blurting out ridiculous things about me, such as that I am "convinced of something along the lines of words having determinate, identifiable or statable meanings". That simply could not be further from the truth, and only demonstrates that you are incapable of engaging with what I actually say. When you do not have the capacity to do something it's best not to try to do it, that's called getting in over your head.

Why are you introducing truth and falsity? — Luke

Why not? Truth and falsity are important features of our communicative reality, and extremely relevant to the subject at hand, the supposed PL:A. Remember the point I made, that your argument was proven wrong by the possibility of lying.

Correctly call what existence? Are you questioning the existence and use of nouns? — Luke

No I'm questioning the existence of types. You keep claiming that types have existence. I think types are something imaginary, simply made up by peoples' minds, having no real existence.

Whose imagination does common usage exist in? If all types are imaginary, then all nouns in the English language are imaginary. But in that case, I could not call you an imbecile. — Luke

Obviously the words are not imaginary, what they represent is. Did you see my example, Santa Clause?

f the problem with naming sensations is found at 258, then why tell me to re-read 244? — Luke

I told you to reread 244 because you presented an obvious misrepresentation of what was said there. At 244 Wittgenstein said there doesn't "seem" to be a problem here. You completely ignored the "seem", and claimed that he said there is no problem in naming a sensation. That's what you claimed, that Wittgenstein said at 244 that there is no problem with naming a sensation. This is very clearly a misreading. What he really says is "There doesn't seem to be any problem here... But how is the connexion between the name and the thing set up?". He then proceeds to investigate what follows the "but.". So, "the problem", which didn't "seem" to be there, as it was hiding behind the "but", is expounded on between 244 1nd 258, and expressly laid out in the example at 258. Did you reread 244 yet, to see what I mean?

Who claimed that it did? — Luke

Luke! How short is your memory?

Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". — Luke

Do you see that? Conventional usage constitutes the existence of a type. Why bother replying to what was written if you are not even trying to follow the conversation? You take a few days to reply, and all your responses are completely off track from what was being discussed.

tTat's just not what is being claimed. — Banno

Well I know it's not what's being claimed, that's obvious. I didn't say it was being claimed, those words are my means of explanation.

You are convinced of something along the lines of words having determinate, identifiable or statable meanings, in this case arguing that identity has something to do with location. But this is the very ting that has been dismissed in the argument you so tortuously mis-comprehend. — Banno

I really don't know where you get this idea from. You do not seem to ever be capable of reading what I write because you have some preconceived notion of what I am "convinced of". That's probably the real reason you do not like to reply, because you cannot understand what I say, as what I say is always inconsistent with what you think I am convinced of..

Notice, that what I said is that spatial-temporal positioning is a type of description, therefore it does not provide for a true sense of "naming". That's why I said "in the end, such a naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible, because the principal criterion of identity is a thing's spatial-temporal positioning". I had already said that spatial-temporal position is a description, and therefore it cannot be the basis for a true "naming".

So you replied with "I, and pretty much everyone else, read this section, we see that what Wittgenstein has shown is that there can be no 'principal criterion of identity"'. But he really hasn't shown anything about any criterion of identity at this section. He has simply shown exactly what I said, "naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible". And as I explained (in my own words), this is because any attempt to name is reduced to a description. as the result of any application of a criterion of identity, which is a requirement for naming.

It's not the case that there cannot be a criterion of identity, what's the case, is that whatever criterion of identity we choose, it will not give us what Wittgenstein requires for a true naming.

What Wittgenstein shows is that words do not have such fixed meanings. — Banno

This is obvious, it's everywhere in the text..

We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing, — Banno

Yes we do decide this, quite commonly actually. It's an important legal matter of ownership and possession, for instance. If someone steals my possessions, and I see you with some things which appear to be exactly the same as mine, I might accuse you of theft. .We need to determine conclusively whether the things are or are not mine.

And, if that does not convince you, we could look at the methods of scientific experimentation, and the need to determine whether the object observed at a later time is the same object which was observed at an earlier time.

I really do not know how to put this any clearer, but you are being very foolish to claim that "We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing,"

Aristotle himself refers to Plato at 988a25.

Aristotle says that Plato recognizes only two basic causes:

1. The cause of essence which is the One.
2. The material cause which is the “Great and the Small”, a.k.a. the “Indefinite Dyad”. — Apollodorus

You are willfully ignoring what I wrote, how Aristotle describes what Plato said, at 987b. This is where the detailed report of what Plato said on this issue is found. You also ignore the fact that at the lead in to 988a, Aristotle states without logical support, "Yet what happens is the contrary...". Then he proceeds to state what you say he says about Plato at 988a, which is contrary to what he says Plato said at 987b. This is simply Aristotle's unsupported conclusion of "what happens" according to Aristotle, if we follow Plato's principles. But there is no logical support for this claim of "what happens".

Why? — Banno

This is how we decide conclusively whether two temporally separated instances of what appears to be the very same thing, actually are two instances of the very same thing, rather than two different but identical things, by referring to a spatial-temporal continuity. Think of what Wittgenstein says of the chair at 253. How would you determine conclusively that the chair in front of you is the same chair as was there yesterday, rather than another chair which is exactly the same? You'd look to determine the spatial-temporal continuity of the chair between yesterday and today. Hence spatial-temporal positioning is the principal criterion of identity.

As I, and pretty much everyone else, read this section, we see that what Wittgenstein has shown is that there can be no "principal criterion of identity". — Banno

Wittgenstein presents us with the pieces of a puzzle, that is his way of writing the Philosophical Investigations. You, and "pretty much everyone else", are inclined to say that he presents us with a puzzle which cannot be solved. I am inclined to look for the resolution.

The reason for my insertion is the translator's (Hugh Tredennick's) own note:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some 5
....
5 Plato; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.10.

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 14, section 1091b

Tredennick actually says "Plato". — Apollodorus

You'll see that your footnote refers to your previous reference. And here, Aristotle discusses the difference between the Pythagoreans, and Plato. When Aristotle says "some", and Tredennick refers back to this part of the text, we must take this "some" to refer to the Pythagoreans rather than Plato, because it is explained that Plato distinguished Numbers from Forms, whereas the Pythagoreans did not. Also, it is explained that for Plato the One is the first principle of Number. Therefore it is clearly a mistake of Tredennick to say that "some" here refers to Plato, because it was the Pythagoreans, not Plato, who did not separate Numbers from Forms, thereby equating the Number "One" with "the good".

Furthermore, consider that "some" is plural, and Plato is an individual. Plato excluded himself from "the Pythagoreans" by proposing a very unique and distinct perspective, so it is impossible that "some" refers to the unique Plato. Your previous proposal, "the Platonists", allows for the reality of "some", but the "Platonists" at that time, taught by Pseusippus, were closer to the Pythagoreans than Plato.

. According to Plato the One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms the cause of everything else. — Apollodorus

Let's get this straight. At 987b, Aristotle very explicitly says that Plato placed Number as intermediary between Forms and sensible things. Further, Forms are the causes of all things, and from the Form of "One" come the numbers. Then Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things.

The key to understanding Plato's real position is the way that he treats Number, as explained by Aristotle. The infinite is not "one" as a number (Pythagorean), but a multitude, as "great and small". That's how Aristotle explains the important difference. This perspective is a product of Plato's analysis of definition, his dialectics, which the others did not use.


Notice now, that under Plato's dialectical principles, "the infinite" is a Form which transcends "the One", as referring to the multitude of great and small, rather than a unity "one", or "one as a principle of number. Plato then uses the difference between the dyad and the One, to demonstrate that not all things can be produced from Number, "one" for the Greeks was not a number. This places Forms as prior to numbers.

Then Aristotle proceeds at 988a with "Yet what happens is the contrary...", and he proceeds to discuss the problem of creating a multitude of individuals from one Form. But this is a misrepresentation of what he has already stated that Plato said. Plato has placed Forms, represented by "infinite", into the category of the multitude, great and small, not into the category of One. So there is no such problem of creating a multitude out of one Form, because One is not the first principle of Forms, great and small is, which implies a multitude rather than One.

Aristotle then states what you claimed, Forms are the causes of all things, and the One is the cause of Forms. But this is clearly inconsistent with what he has painstakingly described as Plato's position.

Additionally, Plato himself says that the One is without beginning nor end and unlimited:

“Then the One, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d) — Apollodorus

You are making the mistake which Fooloso4 made earlier with The Sophist. Fooloso4 presented the argument of the visitor as if it were Plato's argument, when in reality Plato was demonstrating the deficiencies of the visitor's argument, as sophistry. Here, you present the argument of Parmenides as if it is Plato's argument, when in reality Plato is demonstrating the deficiencies of such a sophistic argument.

Aren't we talking about the sensation of pain? What many different ways are there to define "pain" in this sense? (I'm not asking what many different types of pain there are). — Luke

Consider: pain definition1, unpleasant bodily feeling, and pain definition.2, suffering of the mind. Each of these two have distinct subtypes, which do not cross from 1 to 2 because 1 is distinct from 2. If we were to say that 1 and 2 are both types of a further category "pain" in general, then we'd have to have a third definition, "pain" in general. a definition which included both 1 and 2. We might propose "unpleasantness", and suggest that pain is unpleasantness, of which there are two types. However, there are other types of unpleasantness which do not qualify as "pain", so the class of "unpleasantness" contains things other than pain, so we cannot define "pain" in general this way. Therefore 1 and 2 are different ways to define pain, not different types of pain. Plato made a very thorough demonstration (in the Gorgias, or Protagoras, I can't remember which one now), showing that pain is not the opposite of pleasure, therefore pleasure is not simple a release from pain.. Likewise, we cannot simply say that anything unpleasant is pain.

Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". Like when Pluto was declassified as a planet. "Planet" is the type, the definition of the word. The rocks in our solar system are the concrete particulars that we classify as planets or not planets. — Luke

Now, can you see that "common or conventional usage", though it may dictate what is correct and incorrect, it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what is false. In other words, common usage might have us saying something which is false, because it is conventional, and therefore correct, though it is not true. That's why there's a difference between justified and true.

So, let's look at what you call "the existence of a 'type'". If the "type" is produced by, or it's existence is dependent on, common, conventional, or correct usage, with complete disregard for truth or falsity, how can we correctly call this "existence"? Such a "type" is something purely imaginary, and it is incorrect to say that imaginary things have existence. We might say that imagination, as as a mental activity is real, and existing, but it is incorrect to say that the things imagined (in this case the "type") are real and existing.

Therefore, if anyone such as yourself, claims that a "type" has existence, and this claim of "existence" is supported by, or justified by an appeal to conventional usage, we must conclude that this is an invalid attempt at justification. That is because common, or conventional usage is insufficient to necessitate truth. Simply put, we commonly talk about nonexistent things.

What I've told you multiple times is that the type-token distinction is independent of "things sensed"; the distinction is merely classificatory, distinguishing a class from its instances; a name from the things named. — Luke

This is false. If the type-token distinction is merely classificatory, then all tokens would simply be types, because classification just produces types.. But that's not how you use "token", nor is it the common or conventional use of "token", to talk about a type as a token of another type.

And, if we were to be very strict in our usage, and enforce that the distinction is just classificatory, then we could not apply "token" to any thing whatsoever, because a token would always be a type, and a "thing" is not a type.

He says there doesn't seem to be any problem of words referring to sensations, and that "we talk about sensations every day, and name them". Where does he "explain how there really is a problem" with words referring to sensations? — Luke

Come on Luke, 258, where "S" is proposed as the name of a sensation, is where he shows that there really is a problem with names referring to sensations..

You start by saying the problem is not with "S" but end by saying the problem is with justifying the use of "S"...? — Luke

Exactly. We use words all the time without justifying our usage. There is no problem with such usage. Likewise there is no problem with the private language, which names sensations privately without justification. Justifying one's usage though is a completely different matter altogether. So the private language is shown to be useless in the public sphere, because justification requires translation from private to public.

As explained above, we talk about "types" all the time, no problem whatsoever, but when we are asked to justify such use, demonstrate what sort of thing we are referring to when we say "type", then there is a problem. You might simply say, a "type" is a thing whose existence is created by common or conventional usage, but conventional usage is insufficient to support "existence". Talking about Santa Clause does not give that named thing existence. This is a very real and epistemologically significant issue, despite your assumption that it's metaphysical nonsense, and your subsequent refusal to consider such nonsense.

So I'll reiterate, the problem is not with the reality of a private language, there is no problem here. The problem is in making the private language compatible with the public language. Here, the private language will necessarily be negated, annihilated, because there is no such thing as altering the public language to make it private, yet the private may be altered to make it public. But upon such alterations, it cannot be called a private language. Ever watch a baby learn how to talk? The entire process is a matter of trial and error, the baby producing and annihilating the private language, because it is incorrect.

Meta's public language argument(!), which demonstrates the logical impossibility of a public language.

...All stated in a public language. — Luke

Obviously you misunderstand. That the assignment of a specific name to a particular object cannot be logically justified, does not make public language impossible. It just means that our common practise of naming things proceeds in an unjustified manner. That I name the vessel which contains my coffee today, a "cup", rather than a "mug", is not justified. It's a habit. As stated above, we use language all the time without justifying our usage, and this does not make communication impossible. It is your implied requirement, that the naming of an object must be justified for language use to be intelligible and communication to be successful, that is what would make public language impossible.

One thing of note in your posts is their mercurial nature. — Banno

I think I just tend to reflect back what gets thrown at me. Maybe it goes back with more force than it comes at me though.

Then help me to work out if naming is part of a language game or not. — Banno

Try this Banno. If something is composite, then we ought to be able to name its parts. But when we go to name the parts, the parts derive their identity from their position (order) within the the thing which they are parts of, as per the demonstration (48). In this case, the name doesn't really name a thing, it names the thing's position as a part of that larger complexity. But this is not really a naming of these things (the parts), it is a description of the complex thing which the parts are a part of.

So, if we distinguish between naming and describing (49), then true "naming" would seem to be prior to all description, names for the things, a requirement for the description of them. We'd need to identify and name the objects, or elements, so that the names would be fixed to them, independently of any context, any description, and this would be true naming, allowing us to proceed in describing them.

However, in the end, such a naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible, because the principal criterion of identity is a thing's spatial-temporal positioning. So we cannot get away from our reliance on description for naming, and description appears to be prior to naming, as naming is nothing more than describing, because we have no true criterion of identity.

In the context of what has been discussed, he does make some important statements, e.g.:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some [i.e., the Platonists] say that the One itself is the Good itself (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13) — Apollodorus

There is no reason for you to insert "the Platonists" here. I see footnotes mentioning Pseusippus in this section, but it's well known that he was not consistent with Plato.

If you read what Aristotle says about this idea, the equivalence of the One and the Good at this part of the text, and also what Aristotle says about how Plato related the One to Number, and to the Forms at other places (like your previous reference), you ought to come to the understanding that this is not a position held by Plato.

For example, the word “one” (hen) can have many meanings. The most important of these is “One in the sense of ultimate principle beyond being”. The second-most important is “One in the sense of Monad as a principle of Number”. The third is “one as a number”, etc. — Apollodorus

It is evident from what Aristotle says, and also from what Plato wrote, that Plato held "One" in the second sense, a principle of number.

Numbers may, indeed, be said to be “between Forms and sensibles” but only in the sense of abstract mathematical ideas, i.e., in the domain of reason, which is certainly not what the One as ultimate principle is. — Apollodorus

Do you see the problem which you are developing here? Plato clearly used "One" in the sense of a principle of number, ("abstract mathematical idea"). And, "ultimate principle" clearly refers to "the good", for Plato. Nowhere do we find Plato using "One" in the sense of "ultimate principle".

Plato is a very complex writer who uses metaphor, allegory, myth, logic, mathematics, astrology, harmony theory, and even humor to convey a message. But his personality and life show that he also is a writer who is dead serious about his overarching philosophical project. And I think those who take him seriously have more to gain than those who don’t. — Apollodorus

This is definitely true.

This is the principal feature of the difference between Luke's interpretation of the so-called private language argument, and mine. Luke believes that a word's meaning is based in rules, therefore Luke is drawn toward the reality of essentialism. So Luke thinks that Wittgenstein demonstrates that a private word cannot have meaning. As Luke says above: "The problem is with the putative private word/sign 'S'".

But I see he so-called PLA as involved with the problem of naming an object, rather than being involved with the meaning of a word. What 258 indicates directly is a problem in naming supposed private objects. You seem to agree with me on this point. But I take a step further, where you refuse to go, to say that the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public. This is the criterion of identity, as referenced by the example of the chair at 253. This means that the demonstration presented by Wittgenstein is not a "private language" argument at all, it is misrepresented as that.

However, I think you are absolutely on the right track to refer us back to 48. What is demonstrated here is the apparently unbridgeable gap between naming an object, and describing an order. This points to a huge discrepancy in metaphysical world-views. which manifests as differences in language use. What I propose is that the so-called private language argument (253-270) is intended to demonstrate a problem inherent in "naming" an object.

You are the one who brought in God in the first place. — baker

Yes, and "God" is a subject of philosophy and religion. But "God" is not the subject of the spiritual experience, so the mistake is yours.

I always do that. — baker

Some people never learn.

If I can make a reasonable distinction between the headache I have now and the headache I had then, then they are different instances of headache. — Janus

A "reasonable distinction" does not constitute a criterion of identity, which is what Wittgenstein is talking about.

All those pages about tokens and types miss the point. — Banno

Agreed, this is what I kept telling Luke, who insisted on this type/token dichotomy, it's irrelevant and misses the point.

I was describing my guess at MU's view, so you agree with him rather than me. — Srap Tasmaner

Not a bad guess, but Banno seems unable to even manage a reasonable guess.

but this is oddly matched against a form of essentialism, where there is a determinate meaning for each and every word; and hence Metaphysician Undercover sees the philosophers task as somehow identifying that essence. — Banno

Why would you think that I'm focused on essentialism? That's been part of Luke's side of the argument. Didn't Luke just claim:

Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain". — Luke

To which I said "this is clearly false".

However, this is not the whole story. There is something missing there and this is that aspect of the soul that is responsible for the five sensory faculties of sight, smell, taste, hearing, and feeling by touch.

There is an additional aspect responsible for motor faculties such as locomotion, etc. But the relevant part here is the sensory or sensual aspect that we may provisionally call “aisthetikon” (from aesthesis, sensation). — Apollodorus

Why do these need to be "aspects" of the soul, and not simply the soul itself which is responsible for these things? Otherwise, we could start naming every activity of a living body, like the heartbeat for example, and ask what is the aspect of the soul which is responsible for this. That's how Aristotle greatly simplified this type of description, in On the Soul, by naming these activities as potencies of the soul. So he lists some of them, self-nutritive, self-movement, sensation, intellection. He argues that the powers of the soul are each one, a potentiality, because each one is not active all the time. Since they are potentialities which need to be actualized, he claims the soul itself as the first principle of actuality, which is responsible for actualizing the various potencies.

Aristotle says:

From this account it is clear that he [Plato] only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14) — Apollodorus

Yes, I saw this, and it is inconsistent with what he said about Plato the very page before, what I quoted. It makes me wonder how accurate this account of Plato's metaphysics, which Aristotle presents, really is. Aristotle presented it to refute it, so it's likely a bit of a straw man.

If we take Aristotle’s statement, “the Forms are the causes of everything else” in an absolute sense, then they will be the cause of the Good, not only of the One. — Apollodorus

Since Aristotle's statement directly contradicts what he said just the page before, I don't think these statements are reliable in any sense.

That seems absurd to me. Say last week I had a headache, and now today I have a headache. They are two different occasions or instances of having a headache. They are not the same headache, as they would be if it had persisted the whole time. — Janus

OK, but by that logic I can say that the headache I had last second was not the same headache as this second. Or we could say that it changes by the nanosecond, or Planck length. Luke and I went through this already.

If coming into, and going out of ,the conscious mind, is what constitutes the beginning and ending of an instance of sensation, then why do I say that I have the same toothache when I wake up in the morning, as when I went to sleep? In reality, we do not judge a sensation as "the same", based on a judgement of "an instance", we judge it as "the same" based on a description of type.

The issue is even more pronounced and significant when we consider other types of inner experiences like memories and ideas. We designate it "the same memory", and "the same number two", no matter how many different times it comes in and out of the conscious mind. So why is there a double standard with respect to what constitutes "the same" inner experience? In the case of "a sensation", one might say that it is "the same" sensation for the length of its continuous duration in the conscious mind, whereas in the case of "a memory", or "an idea", we say that it is "the same" memory, or idea, no matter how many different times it come in and out of the conscious mind.

Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain". — Luke

Well, you'd have to demonstrate that, if you really think it's true, because I think the evidence demonstrates that this is clearly false. That "pain" may be defined in different ways indicates very clearly that there is not just one type or class which is called "pain".

I agree the type exists only as in knowing how to use the word "pain" correctly; as the definition of the word "pain"; or as our agreed usage of the word "pain". — Luke

You seem to be overlooking the reality of the situation, that most of the time during language use we do not proceed based on "agreed" definitions, or "agreed" usage. If this is what constitutes the existence of a "type" then I suggest we need something other than types and tokens, to account for all the times when we are talking about type-like things (like sensations for example), which are not "types" according to what you say types are, as agreed upon definitions or use.

he word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. — Luke

No it doesn't, because "sensation" has many different meanings or definitions. What I've been telling you, is that in common usage of "sensation", the thing sensed, the object of a sensation (something seen for example), might be called a token of a type. Now, when you say that pain is a sensation, you conflate the object of the sensation with the act of sensing, to say that the act of sensing, "the sensation" (the pain) is itself the object of sensation. So you have no separation between the object being sensed, (which might be pain or something completely different), and the act of sensing which produces the sensation. Therefore you use "pain" to refer to a complexity which is both the object sensed, and the act of sensing it. This conflation which unites a passive object with an act, is just a confusion, a misunderstanding, which cannot have a token.

I disagree with this reading. The word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. And he clearly indicates at PI 244 that our reference to sensations is unproblematic: — Luke

Uh, I beg to differ. Reread 244 please. He distinctly says, there doesn't "seem" to be any problem here. Then he goes on to explain how there really is a problem. And that's the issue at 258, the problem he alluded to at 244, what does it mean to name a sensation. If sensations like pain exist as tokens, we ought to be able to name them, like applying a proper noun "S" for example, such that we might be able to distinguish one sensation from another, like we would distinguish one chair from another. Of course, the problem becomes evident, that sensations do not exists as things, (or tokens), which we can name with a proper noun.

.

He is referring here to the mistaken idea that "the connection between the name and the thing
named" can be established privately. He is not saying that this is a problem for the words "sensation" or "pain" as these are words of our public language. The problem is with the putative private word/sign "S". — Luke

There is no problem with the words "sensation" and "pain", because they refer to what you call types. The problem is in the attempt to name a particular instance of sensation (what you call a token), with a proper name like "S". Then there is an issue of distinguishing the supposed particular sensation, which is to be named with "S", from all other sensation. Since sensation is something inner, "private", there is no criterion for this naming process, because a criterion, or rule, by Wittgenstein's definition is necessarily public.

So the problem is not with the "private word/sign 'S'", as you state, it is with the assumption of a private object, thing, (what you call a token), which is supposedly named with that sign "S". The issue is not a problem with private symbols, or words. There is no problem there, someone could make up private symbols for things, and not tell anyone else, that's simple. The problem is with the supposed thing named by the symbols, being something private, "inner experience", "sensation". The use of the proper noun, "S" as a name to name a particular sensation, which is a supposed private thing (token for you) cannot be justified.

That is, what reason have we for calling the private sign "S" the sign of a sensation, given that the word "sensation" has a public meaning? — Luke

The problem is with your misreading, and misunderstanding. You refuse to acknowledge that when Wittgenstein talks about "a sensation", and "the sensation", he is proposing a particular thing (a token) to be named with the name "S" as a proper noun. The public use of "sensation" is to refer to a type-like thing, whereas "S" is proposed as referring to a token-like thing. What reason do we have for saying that "S" refers to a token of that type, "sensation"?

If there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type. That obviously contradicts how we use the word. — Luke

Right, Wittgenstein is trying to draw our attention to this type of usage, which he has said is an illness which needs philosophical treatment (254-255). People like you insist on taking the so-called PLA out of its proper context, to propose that its purpose is something else. What Wittgenstein is demonstrating is the reality of the situation, what you describe with: "there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type". That is the reality. But this reality is completely different from, even contradictory to, how we commonly use words. This is an illness which requires philosophical treatment. We cannot change the reality, only our usage of words.

Why should religious/spiritual people hold the philosophical community as authoritative over the religious/spiritual community? — baker

I was talking about something philosophical, understanding the existence of a cause which is unobservable, through observation of its effects, with the application of logic. You came and tried to change the subject, by describing the unobservable cause as something spiritual, implying that it could not be understood through the means that I presented.

Now you are trying to equate "religious" with "spiritual" in an attempt to exclude the philosophical aspects of religion, from religion, and claim that philosophy has no place in religion. Obviously you are wrong though and I have no need to present an argument for that, because it's so obvious to anyone who knows anything about religion. Your writing just appears as absurd, and undeserving of a response.

Do you feel the need to demonstrate to the religious/spiritual people that you are right? — baker

No, you changed the subject on me because you were unhappy with what I was talking about. I suppose you felt threatened by the truth. I would like to get back to the subject I was discussing, but since you refuse to go there, I'm content to simply point out where you are wrong.

A) The One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms are the cause of everything else.
(B) There are only two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause.
(C) There is a material principle called the “Great and Small” and an essence or formal principle called “the One”.
(D) The “Great and Small” or “Dyad” is traditionally identified with what is elsewhere called the “Unlimited and Limit” and with the One.
(E) Therefore the One is the ultimate cause of everything.

The mainstream Platonic position is that: (1) there is a first principle of all and (2) Plato reduces sensibles to Forms and Forms to a first principle called “the Good” or “the One”. — Apollodorus

According to Aristotle, at your quoted passage, Plato differentiated between three categories, sensible things, Forms, and numbers. Numbers come from participation in "the One". But Forms are prior to Number, as Number is the medium between Forms and sensible things.

You have the order reversed, putting One, and therefore Number first, as prior to the Forms. But that's the way Aristotle describes the Pythagoreans, as saying that all things are Number. But he distinctly says that Plato differs from the Pythagoreans in this respect, placing Forms as prior, (being based in definition). The One, and Numbers, follow from the Forms, and finally sensible things.

[quote} Further, beside sensible things and Forms he says there are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position...
..
...by participation in the One come the numbers"

I understand that "the One" in Plato, refers to a type of Form which is responsible for the existence of numbers. But "the One" is not necessarily the first principle, or first Form. For that position we must look to "the Good".

So, to begin with, I think it is reasonable to regard the Creator-God as a form of Intelligence. And since he creates the Cosmos from the Same, Other, and Being, and according to certain eternal patterns such as Goodness, Order, and Beauty, it stands to reason that these patterns or Forms are within this very Intelligence itself. — Apollodorus

I agree that from Plato's metaphysics we'd have to go this way. But I was saying that this does not make sense to me, for the reasons explained, so I would not follow Plato at this point.

(A) The Creator-God is above the Cosmos.
(B) The One/the Good is above the Creator-God.
(C) The One is the first principle and cause of all.
(D) Therefore the Creator-God is a manifestation of the One. — Apollodorus

Placing the One as the first principle is inconsistent with the passage from Aristotle. Aristotle describes Plato as positing the One as the first principle of Number, but Number is in a place intermediate between the Forms and sensible things. So the Forms are prior to the One, and Number.

Of course, it is arguable that the One being ineffable, unfathomable, and above Being, the designation “the Good” is, strictly speaking, inappropriate for it and that the One becomes “the Good” only in relation to Being and Becoming. In this sense, the Good may logically be said to be subordinate to the One. Ultimately, however, the two are one and the same thing. — Apollodorus

The One, is a Form. And it is the cause of Number. But the good is not itself a Form. It transcends the Forms, as described in The Republic. The good is what makes the intelligible objects intelligible, as the light which shines on them. Therefore the good is prior to all Forms.

Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain. — Luke

That's obviously wrong. Clearly there are many different types of pain. That's exactly what being divisible into many different types means, that there are many different types of the type which is divisible.

You're right, neither of us can. We can't have the class/category. We can only have tokens or instances of that class/category. — Luke

If I don't have the type, and you don't have the type, then where is the type? I think you're wrong here. A type must be somewhere, if it has any existence at all. I think that types are within my mind, and they are within your mind as well. They do not exist in some realm of Platonic Forms.

Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to. — Luke

No that's not true, because you are again using sensation to refer to a type of inner experience. A type is not a token. "Mustang", as a type of car is not a token of the type, "car", it's a subtype. A particular Mustang, or any particular car is a token of the type "car". But, as Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258, "a sensation" cannot be identified as a particular thing, due to the lack of a criterion of identity. So it cannot have an identity as a particular, because there can be no correctness in identifying it.. Therefore "a sensation" cannot correctly be used to refer to a token. If you insist on that type/token dichotomy, then it must always refers to a type.

If you took some time to analyze your own inner experience, and sensations, through introspection, as Wittgenstein did, you'd probably come to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein does at 261 " he has
something—and that is all that can be said". Inner experience is "something", sensation is "something", but we surely cannot say that it consists of tokens.

Is there not a different instance of pain each time you hit your hand with the hammer? — Janus

No, because no pain exists as "an Instance", so it's equally wrong to say that different pains are different instances of pain. We do say things like this though, but Wittgenstein is demonstrating that this is a way of speaking which is like an illness that needs philosophical treatment.

That doesn't answer my question of what you think a token is, or how you think I am using the word "token". — Luke

Sorry Luke, I can't demonstrate to you, the way that you are using a word. If you can't remember, reread the posts.

There is only one type, which is "pain" - i.e. the category or class called "pain". — Luke

No, there are many different types of pain.

Likewise, if you had a Ford Mustang and I had a Ford Mustang, then there would not be two different types of car (yours and mine); instead there would be two different tokens of the (one) same type of car: "Ford Mustang". — Luke

There are many different types of Ford Mustangs.

We cannot possibly have different types of "pain" in the way you suggest. In order to have different types we might call your type "pain A" and my type "pain B". But all that distinguishes pain A from pain B is that one is yours and one is mine. Either they both still refer to what we were previously calling "pain" or else we are no longer talking about "pain". — Luke

That's obviously not true. The type of pain which I have could easily be different from the type of pain that you have, especially if I have a different type of injury from you. And, the fact that we'd be talking about different types of pain, does not imply that we are not talking about "pain" any more. If you and I are talking about different types of Ford Mustangs, that does not mean we are no longer talking about Ford Mustangs. This fact is a big reason for the existence of misunderstanding.

In order to be different types, if you had something of the type "pain", then I would need to have something of a different type that is not "pain". — Luke

Again this is obviously false, as a type, or class, is often divided into subtypes, or subclasses. "Pain" is described in many different ways, sharp, ache, throb, etc., each referring to a different type of pain. That we have different types of pain does not imply that one type is not "pain", this is like suggesting that if we had different different "types", one could not be called a type. But that denies the whole point of having different types, which is to allow that a class can be divided into subclasses.

Moreover, you cannot have a type. — Luke

This is what is nonsense. If I can't have a type, then neither can you. And if no one can have a type, then where are all the types? Are they existing in a Platonic realm of eternal Forms?

Wittgenstein does not mention the word "pain" at all at PI 258. He mentions only the word/symbol "S", which has a supposedly private use in a supposedly private language. — Luke

Right, now maybe you're catching on. When I apply "pain" to refer to an inner experience, what we've been calling a "sensation", I might follow some sort of criterion. Use of the criterion ensures the appropriate classification as to the appropriate "type.". However, nothing indicates that whatever it is which I "have", is a token. I might simply have a type, which I class as a subtype, by placing it into the proper category, through reference to the criterion.

Look, "inner experience" refers to a type. Then we have specified a type of inner experience as "sensation", so we have just named a new type. We further divide to another type, the one specified by the diarist as "S". Each division produces a new type, and at no point is a token produced. Now, the diarist wants to say that the thing referred to with "S" is a token rather than a type, but there is no criterion (other than the law of identity which Wittgenstein has rejected as nonsense) as to what constitutes a token. Whenever criteria is applied we simply divide the established type into a further type, coming up with a new type, but never defining "a token".

There is no need to explicitly mention the One everywhere. The point is to follow the logical process suggested in the dialogues. Once a principle of inquiry has been established that reduces everything to a first principle, then we must logically arrive at an irreducible One. Of course, we are under no obligation to do so. It is a matter of personal choice. — Apollodorus

OK, so you define "the One" with "first principle", so that passages which are translated with the use of "first principle", you interpret as "the One".

A beautiful girl, a beautiful horse, and a beautiful lyre are beautiful by reason of their co-having, having a share, or participating in the Beautiful (or Beauty) itself (Hipp. Maj. 287e-289d).

The girl, horse, and lyre are things that participate; beauty is the property or attribute they participate in; Beauty itself is the unparticipated, transcendent Form to which the property or attribute properly belongs. — Apollodorus

Why do you first say here, that they are participating in Beauty itself, then you say Beauty itself is the unparticipated?

Plato distinguishes between a property, e.g. Beauty, “itself” (auto to kalon), and beauty in beautiful things or in us (en hemin kalon) (Phaedo 102d). Beauty itself is perfect, eternal, transcendent and “unparticipated”. It cannot be co-had. What is co-had is an imperfect, transient, immanent and “participated” or “shared in” version or likeness (homoiotes) of Beauty, also referred to as “enmattered form” (enulon eidos). — Apollodorus

I disagree with this. I think it's very clear in The Symposium that the Idea of Beauty, which is Beauty itself, is participated in. And I can't find your reference in Phaedo. In any case, this discrepancy points to the problems of the theory of participation which I described earlier.

Personally, I see the One as not comparable to a particular sensible object. To begin with, it is not an instance of a universal. So it is not a particular. :smile: — Apollodorus

A particular is not necessarily an instance of a universal. That is the conclusion of a judgement

Don't worry, you'll know where it is as soon as I start smashing your hand with that hammer. — Olivier5

All right, I'm not worried, I've hit myself with a hammer enough times to know what it feels like, and also to know that there is never any tokens for me there.

I don't care if you're lying or not. It's not about me trying to work out if you genuinely have pains. I directly asked you whether you have pains. I already know that you do, and you have already said on multiple occasions that you do. I do not understand why you are refusing to refer to separate instances of having pain (or any other sensations) as "tokens". — Luke

That's right, I think it's nonsensical, incoherent, and inconsistent with the definition of "token", to call pain a token.

That there are two of them - you have one and I have one - and that they are both "pain" means that we each have a token of that type. It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain". There is only one type called "pain" and we each have a token of it. — Luke

We each have a type of sensation which we call "pain". Why do you say that this makes no sense? When I have a sensation of the type I call pain, I call it "pain". When you have a sensation of the type you call pain you call it "pain". There is consistency between my usage and your usage due to our outward expressions, as Wittgenstein explains, how we all justify our use of "pain". There is absolutely no need to assume the existence of tokens of pain.

The consistency in our usage is not produced from tokens, examples of the pain itself, it is produced from our outward expressions which are not themselves tokens of the type, but they represent the type in a way other than the way that a token represents the type. So the type is recognized and understood through means other than tokens (examples). And, as Wittgenstein explains at 258, it would not even make any sense to think of the sensations which I call "pain", as tokens, because there is no criterion of correctness by which to judge whether the sensations I call "pain" are really of the type pain. To be a token of pain would require that the sensation conform to some criterion of correctness. Therefore they are just sensations which I say are of the type pain, but do not qualify as tokens of pain because there is no correctness as to whether they really are pain or are not pain..

You want me to produce my sensations? Do you not have them yourself? — Luke

I have sensations, but as I explained to you, they do not consist of tokens, if I maintain consistency with the way you use the word "token".

Do you want to contradict Wittgenstein and say that you doubt whether you are in pain? Also, what do you make of the remarks at 250 which relate to your comments on lying: — Luke

I am not discussing Wittgenstein's expressed point of view on this matter, we are discussing whether sensations can be considered to be tokens. And I often doubt whether some of my sensations ought to be called "pain" or not. That's a common experience for me.

Also, I don't see how the comments at 250 are relevant to the argument I made . You said that if I express "I am in pain", then it is necessary that I have a token of pain. But you accept that the expression is not itself the token. So you seem to completely overlook the possibility that I might be intentionally lying. I don't see how the question of whether a dog could perform such a pretense is relevant.

Is a dog so honest that it cannot help but express only real pain? — Luke

Why would I think that? How is a dog's supposed experience of pain even relevant to what we're discussing? Are you simply writing this as an intentional distraction? You can use the dog as a token of a dog, but how do you use a dog as a token of pain?

I cannot show you my sensations because sensations are private. Wittgenstein's is not a private sensations argument (unless you count PI 246-251, where he acknowledges that sensations are private). Did you think he was a behaviourist? — Luke

I can't understand this contradictory mess. You seem to be saying that Wittgenstein argues that sensations are not private, yet at 246-251 he acknowledges that sensation are private.

Wittgenstein clearly indicates at 253, in what sense you and I can be said to have the "same" pain. Read it again, before you continue to insist on what Wittgenstein is saying. If your pain and my pain are distinct, as two distinct chairs are, but are of the same type (to use your word "type", not Wittgenstein's who says "exactly the same as"), then in this sense of "same", you and I might have the "same" pain.

But if this is the case, we are talking about a type, called "pain", not tokens of pain. And if we want to talk about distinct pains as if they are distinct tokens, then we need to produce these tokens, lay them out on the table, or some such thing, so that we can compare them, to see if they truly are "exactly the same". If we have no means for comparison how can we even talk about whether they are one token or two? You are simply talking about imaginary tokens, as if they are real.

Just saying, if you want a token of pain, just give me your hand and a hammer. I can easily combine those two things in a manner that will produce a token of pain for you. — Olivier5

i don't see how you could produce a token of pain with a token of hammer and a token of hand. You could create a token of 'damaged hand', or 'injured hand', but where's the token of pain?

And you have not read the Catechism of the RCC, I presume?

And look, even in the passage you quote, it is said first: "Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us."

Aquinas assumes the existence of God can be self-evident to us. Making inferences based on His effects is only a secondary epistemic method. — baker

Aquinas might have thought that the existence of God "can be "self-evident", but he explicitly said, "in so far as it is not".

I think you misunderstood me baker. I did not deny that a person could have a personal relation with God, I denied that this could be called "knowledge" of God, because knowledge requires justification. That you claim "the existence of God is self-evident" does not make it self-evident.

You keep insisting on approaching the topic of knowing God on your own terms that are extraneous to monotheism (and you interpret standard monotheistic references to suit this agenda of yours). — baker

It's not strictly "my terms". It's what's accepted in the philosophical community, as specified by epistemology. Knowledge requires justification. You can't just say "I know God because I talk to Him every night". Such a use of "know" is unacceptable by epistemological standards. So in reality, it's you who is relying on idiosyncratic use of words. Your use of "know" is not consistent with philosophical standards.

I'm just trying to get you to see the disjoint between the way you think and the way others think. And simply insisting that your way is right doesn't get you anywhere because you need to demonstrate that you are right. Of course, if what you are insisting on is that you do not need to demonstrate what you are insisting on, then you have a problem.

Correct. “Intellect” means the Divine Intellect. The Divine Intellect contains the Forms, the human intellect thinks or philosophizes about the Forms (until it has elevated itself to a level from where it can directly grasp or “see” them). The Forms are independent of human intellects but dependent on the Divine Intellect of which they are a part. The Creator-God who creates the Cosmos is the Divine Intellect. — Apollodorus

Here's the problem I have with these principles. The "intellect" which we know about is the human intellect. And this intellect is a property, or attribute of the soul. The human intellect is deficient in its capacities because of the soul's union with the material body, as explained by Aquinas. But there is also a need to account for the reality of the independent Forms, as we've discussed.

The question is, why would we assume an "intellect" to account for the independent Forms? The "intellect" as we know it is something which follows from the soul's union with the material body, it's posterior to that union, and dependent on it, but here we are talking about "Forms" which are prior to the soul's union with a material body. So why would we think that this is a type of "intellect"? When we look back in time this way, we see the soul as prior to the intellect, and we see that the soul somehow takes part in the independent Forms. To move further, and look to see what supports the independent Forms, why would we turn back around, to look toward an "intellect", when "intellect" refers to something posterior to the soul, not prior to it?

Individual human souls are each endowed with an intellect (nous) of its own that contains something of the Divine Intellect within it. — Apollodorus

So this doesn't really make sense to me. The human soul has an intellect as an attribute. And the human soul has a connection to something Divine, the independent Forms. We might even say that the soul uses the intellect as a means toward understanding the Forms. But the connection is between the soul and the Forms, not the intellect and the Forms, and this is why the Forms are so hard for the intellect to understand. Furthermore, the intellect creates its own forms, which are categorically different from the independent Forms, and since they both have the same name "forms", this confuses the matter. So as much as the human soul has a direct connection to, or relation with, something Divine, which we call "Forms", I don't think it's correct to call this Divine reality an "intellect".

If we look at some of Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’s teachings, it can immediately be seen that they make no sense. — Apollodorus

I wouldn't say this. I would say that it takes a lot of work to understand Aristotle's criticisms of Plato, but once the effort has been made they make a lot of sense. For me, it required a lot of reading of Thomas Aquinas, someone who made that effort. Then I had to return to Aristotle to reread and confirm that Aquinas' interpretations actually were consistent with Aristotle's words in context, and in some instances right back to Plato.

The problem is that the idea of independent Forms was a new idea at Plato's time, so it was very confused and not well worked out. Prior to Plato there was an idea of an independent soul, which was supposed to be immortal. But the immortal soul needed logical support (substance), and this was proposed with eternal "Forms". But the issue was very confused by the fact that human ideas, "forms" are not eternal. So now there was two distinct types of ideas, human ideas, dependent on human minds, and independent ideas which are supposed to be eternal. This is what Aristotle describes in the passage from 1033 which you refer to. Independent forms are the forms of particulars, and if independent "Forms" are supposed to be something other than particulars, these "Forms" cannot account for the reality of particular things.

And Plato is not particularly interested in particulars. What counts in the Platonic project is the Absolute or the One. — Apollodorus

Don't you see this as a contradiction? The "One" by the fact that it is one, is a particular. So to say that Plato was interested in the One, but had no interest in particulars cannot be true.

This is entirely possible. There is some evidence to suggest that under Arcesilaus and others the Academy took a turn in the direction of skepticism. This does not necessarily mean that Plato himself was a skeptic, though. Only that his school went through a period of skepticism. — Apollodorus

The character in Plato's dialogues named Socrates, was definitely a skeptic.

For obvious reasons, Plato cannot be expected to give a detailed account of the One, and he tends to refer to it indirectly, using the language of analogy and myth. His intention is not to provide his readers with an exact description of the One, but to point them in its direction. Still, I believe that he provides sufficient information for us to form a fairly clear idea of what he is talking about. — Apollodorus

There are two very distinct meanings of "one", as the first in an order or hierarchy, and as a unit, particular, a whole, or individual.

1. The One is the First Principle which is “beyond being” and “beyond essence”.
The One cannot be many (Parm. 137c).
The One is without parts, without beginning or end, unlimited, formless, etc. (Parm. 137d-e). — Apollodorus

Here, the two are conflated, and called the One.

2. The Good is One over many Forms (Analogy of the Sun) and beyond being. Therefore it must be fully real and creative (Rep. 509b).
The Forms are good in virtue of the Form of the Good.
Plato predicates “good” and “one” of all the Forms.
Therefore the Good is the One. — Apollodorus

Plato does not equate "the good" with "the One" at this point in The Republic. There is no mention of "the One". That's a blatant misrepresentation.

This is entirely consistent with the inner logic of Plato’s metaphysical system. Plato says that whenever inquiring into intelligible things (e.g., Forms), the philosopher must always rise to the first principle (arche) and apprehend everything in conjunction with that. He reduces the Forms to the transcendent first principle of the One and then deduces all things from that (Rep. 511b-d). — Apollodorus

Nor is there any mention of "the One" here.

You can tell me about your claimed token all you want, that's a far cry from producing it.


Yeah, I'm masochist and Luke readily submits to my desires. But Luke only submits because he thinks I'm feeling pain, when I'm really feeling pleasure.

I claim to be in pain. Yet the question remains, either I have pain or I don't. Where do you think the token is? My claim is not the token.

I guess this is all you have left to say. — Luke

I am waiting for you to produce this token of pain which you seem to believe is so real.

You said that "A token is an example of a type, by definition." So that means your pains are not examples (or instances) of the type "pain"? — Luke

Yes, my pains are not instances nor examples.

Furthermore, you are being dishonest because I acknowledged on more than one occasion that a token could be defined as lasting longer than a day. — Luke

Perhaps I am lying. How would you know?

And, as I indicated in my response at the time, the possibility of lying implies the possibility of telling the truth. If it is possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are a lie, then it is also possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are not a lie. Which proves that your assertion "There is no such thing as a token of sensation" is false. — Luke

This is an invalid conclusion. That there is a token, an example, or instance of pain which is referred to when I say "I'm in pain", requires that I am not lying. The possibility that I am telling the truth when I say "I'm in pain", does not necessitate that there is a token, instance, or example, being referred to, because it's only a possibility. It is required that the token actually serves as an example, to be a token..

But in my example, you would have sympathy (feel sorry) for these "animals", not because they are a dumb flock, but because they are unaware of their fate. So it's that particular aspect of their "dumbness", that something is going to happen to them, which they are unaware of, but you know about, which makes you feel sorry for them.

Sure. But I’m not saying that Forms are “at rest”. On the contrary, Forms seem to be nothing more than a particular function of intelligence (in which case they are not separable from the Intellect within which they have their existence). And, personally, I find the idea of “motionless intelligence” hard to imagine, a bit like “dead soul”, really.

At the same time, as I pointed out earlier, something that is outside the spacio-temporal realm cannot be susceptible to either rest or motion in a conventional sense. Presumably, there is some form of "activity", but it wouldn’t be what we normally understand by that term.

In any case, Forms and Intellect seem to stand in a relation of cognitive identity to one another. At the end of the day, Forms are not ultimate realities and they depend on an ultimate principle. They have no separate existence. — Apollodorus

For the sake of argument, I'll assume that forms are dependent on an intellect for their existence, and cannot be separate. You know that's problematic, because each individual person has one's own intellect, therefore one's own forms, which are proper to one's own understanding of things, and so we have no "Forms", the capitalization signifying something independent from individuals, and proper to humanity as a whole.

From this principle you propose, we have no unified human "body of knowledge", only the knowledge which each individual has. Furthermore, the communication of ideas becomes a very difficult problem, because we cannot say that one idea is shared between us through the means of communication. So to be consistent with what you propose, we need to deny the reality of what is represented by our common way of speaking, that we share ideas, we all have the same idea of "two", the same idea of "square", etc..

This proposal of yours, may or may not be consistent with Plato, depending on how you account for the reality of independent Forms. Plato was concerned with independent Forms, and the difficulty he approached was the effort required to bring your perspective, that forms are properly dependent on an intellect, to be compatible with the idea of independent Forms. As much as Plato elucidated this problem, and pointed the direction toward resolution, I tend to believe as Fooloso4 has said, that Plato exposed the problem, but did not resolve it.

This is why, following Plato, we have a division, the direction taken by Aristotle, and the direction taken by Platonists and finally that of Neo-Platonists. Aristotle assumed to have a solution, which involved two distinct definitions of "form". We have "form" in the sense of formula, and this is dependent on the human intellect as you say, but he also proposes that every particular thing has a "form" which is proper to the thing itself. The latter sense signifies a form which is independent from the human mind, so we could capitalize "Form" and we can conclude that if these independent Forms are dependent on an intellect.it is a divine intellect.

This is the direction Christian theology took, following Thomas Aquinas. There are two types of forms. The forms of the human intellect are deficient, because the human mind is dependent on the soul's union with the material body. This dependency on the material existence of the body inhibits our capacity to know the true form of the particular, the individual, the whole, the one. On the other hand, the separate or independent Form, which is the form of the particular, one or individual, is dependent on a divine mind of an angel, or God Himself, for its existence.

And I can see no evidence that Plato’s views on the Forms have been conclusively refuted by anyone. — Apollodorus

I don't think it is possible to conclusively refute Plato's views on Forms. This is for the reasons that Fooloso4 points to, Plato does not propose a coherent theory of Forms. He exposes problems with the theories which were current at his time, pointing to incoherencies and incompatibility with the scientific knowledge of his time, but does not propose a solution. This is why Aristotle claims to refute Pythagorean idealism, and what he calls "some Platonists". What is taken to be "Platonism", at that time, has already become divided, dependent on interpretation, and this is prior to the problem we have today with translation, which only increases the divide. One might argue that the true followers of Plato (Platonists) adopted a position of skepticism, and because of this we cannot claim that they have a "view on the Forms" to refute.

But what Plato is really saying is that the ultimate cause (aition) of the Cosmos or Universe is the One in its aspect as Creative Intelligence, but that for a more precise human understanding several causes (aitiai) are introduced. — Apollodorus

As far as I can tell, you have still not demonstrated to me, where you derive this idea from Plato, that "the One", is the creative force of the Cosmos. He refers to a divine mind, and a creator, but I don't see that it is consistently called "the One".

That is correct. I am only saying that the Forms cannot properly be said to create - in any case not on their own - as it is the Creative Intelligence which creates by means of Forms. — Apollodorus

OK, but the point that I was making was that the theory of participation proved to be inadequate because it represented the Forms as passively participated in, when in reality they are active in causation. This is relevant to what Fooloso4 was saying about Forms being eternally at rest. When Forms are understood as being passively participated in, they appear as something eternally at rest. But when they are understood as active in causation, it is impossible that they are at rest.

One way of looking at it is that Forms exist within the Intellect in which case they are inseparable from it and if they act at all, they do so in conjunction with Intellect. — Apollodorus

It is doubtful that Forms are inseparable from the intellect, in an absolute way. In the act of creation, the form which exists in the intellect comes to exist in the material object. So for example, the form which a building has, is in some way "the form", which was in the architect's vision. But here we have to be careful about the use of "same", as I explained to fooloso4. Even so, a material object has a "form" proper to itself, as stipulated by the law of identity, and it appears like that form, being the effect of the Creator's act of creation, rather than a cause in the act of creation, is independent from the Creator's intellect.

Plato mentions various types of causes, among which the primary are always associate with Intelligence: — Apollodorus

That's a very relevant passage. Notice how he says the causes which most men consider as primary (the efficient causes dealt with in science), are really secondary causes. They are secondary because they do not act with reason, like Soul does, so Soul employs these as auxiliary causes. The first causes belong to the Intelligent Nature, causing what is good, whereas accidents are attributed to the secondary type of causes

That's my interpretation, applied to the person who claims to have some knowledge of the true reality, but refuses to justify it (teach others). What Plato says is too extensive to be quoted here, but the most significant part is 519-520.

Those who have obtained the highest levels of education (ascent to the good), but do not partake in educating others (refuse to come back down to the cave), are portrayed as lazy, growing freely like a weed within a society. In such a situation these people are not inclined by any sense of duty or responsibility to teach others. If we allow those who have obtained the highest level of education into the state which we are creating, we have the right to compel them to care for, and educate the others.

Personally my sympathy has always been with those who stay in the cave. They seem content despite their chains. — Tom Storm

"Sympathy" is an odd choice of words here. "Sympathy" implies feely sorry for, as one might have sympathy for the cattle in the barnyard, who are content despite being slated for slaughter.



I conclude that you are not familiar with Christian theology then, and especially have not read Thomas Aquinas. He explicitly states (Summa Theologica, Q.2, Art.2) "Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us."

God is supposed to be known directly. — baker

Monotheists frequently demonstrate their knowledge of God with other monotheists; they form an epistemic community. — baker

These two statements directly contradict each other. Suppose I approach you, and insist "God can only be known directly". Then I say, "let me demonstrate my knowledge of God to you." Or, in the inverse order?

Plato's cave allegory. It's the part from 518-522.

No, I'm talking about divine revelation, not that "which one obtains from within", "intuition", or "mystical union". Divine revelation as in, holy scriptures. The "inner" part of all this is just the personal affirmation one feels inside that the holy scriptures are in fact the word of God. — baker

Then I think we were talking about different things, and what you said was not relevant to the point that I was making, which you replied to.

I was talking about knowing a cause (God for example), through its effects (the physical world He created). We have no capacity to directly observe the cause, but we can observe the effects, and infer the necessity of the cause. If you cannot relate to this way of knowing God, I could switch it for an example from quantum physics. Physicists assume that there is something real represented by the wave function, and they know about it from it's effects, which are observed and expressed as the existence of particles.

How can you possibly know it's pretense? — baker

Because "knowledge" in the epistemological sense is justified, and "justified" implies demonstrated, which means shared with others. So if an individual claims to know something, but what is known cannot be demonstrated, or shared with others, it is not "knowledge" in epistemology, which is where the accepted definition of "knowledge": is derived from, and it is therefore just a person claiming to have knowledge, which is not real knowledge, but a pretense.

Remember, in Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher, having seen beyond the reflections, toward understand the true reality, is compelled to return to the cave to teach the others. Without doing this educating, the person would just be someone assuming I am right about reality, and they are all wrong about reality, and such a person would not be a philosopher at all, but a poser.

I have asked you several times whether you have had any instances of pain before. — Luke

I answered this. No. My pain does not exist as an instance, or as a token.

You cannot have a token that is independent of its type. That is, I don't think it makes any sense to talk about tokens unless you are talking about them in terms of their type, or in terms of the type/token distinction. And I don't think that everything is a type. To repeat, I introduced the distinction to raise your awareness of two different possible meanings of the word "same": the same type or the same token. — Luke

Yes, and it was you who insisted that the same token, or instance, of pain could not go away and come back at a later time. My pain usually goes away and comes back at a different time, when I sleep for example. Therefore I have concluded that my pain cannot exist as a token or an instance, as you are defining these words..

I am not avoiding the question. I have answered it. No, I have never had an "instance" of pain as you are using "instance".

If you have something, and you call it a "pain" when it is not a pain, then you are either lying or misusing the word. — Luke

Yes, I told you lying is a real possibility which proves that what you are asserting is false.

You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. . — Metaphysician Undercover

The way I see it, it is not the Forms that create the material things. According to Plato, the Cosmos was created by the Creator-God by means of Forms. If the Forms were to create anything then there would be a multitude of creators and this is not what Plato is saying. — Apollodorus

To say that the Creator-God creates by means of Forms, is not to deny that the Forms are themselves active causes. In fact, the tools, in this case the Forms, must be themselves causes, or else they would have no role in the creative process. The human being creates through the means of machinery and all sorts of tools, but that does not mean that the tools are not active causes. And, if there is a multitude of tools being used, as distinct causes, this does not imply that there is more than one person using those tools.

Plato's concept of participation (metoche) is particularly enlightening. Sensible objects exist by participation in a Form's property. On this subject, Proclus distinguishes between (1) that which participates, (2) that which is participated in, and (3) that which is unparticipated.

The Form's being a Form is its being a paradeigma whose property or properties are participated in by sensible objects. In other words, a Form is the eternal paradigmatic cause of the things that are eternally constituted according to nature: — Apollodorus

This is where Neo-Platonism can become inconsistent with Aristotle. Aristotle's description necessitates that forms, and therefore Forms. are actual. And actual as active is distinct from potential, which is passive. In the theory of participation, material objects (actively) participate in the Forms, which (passively) are participated in. This problem is evident in Plotinus' description of the One. He describes the One as pure, or absolute potential, but he also says that everything else follows from the One as the cause of everything. But in Aristotle's metaphysics, pure absolute potential cannot have any actuality, and therefore cannot be the first cause (cosmological argument), a cause necessarily being active..

This is the problem with the theory of participation, as addressed in the Timaeus. Forms, as prior to the material things which follow from them in creation, must be actively involved in the act of creation, as causes. Therefore we cannot accurately describe the Forms as passively being participated in, they must be described as actively creating the material things.

As the Timaeus shows, the Form is perfect, the sensible objects fashioned after it are not so. The Form itself is the perfect paradigmatic original which is "unparticipated" and therefore transcendent. Its image, on the other hand, is an imperfect version of the perfect paradeigma or model, is "participated" and therefore immanent. — Apollodorus

This is why Christian theology has adopted a distinction, based on Aristotelian principles, between perfect independent Forms, and the forms, or ideas, created by the human mind. The latter are imperfect, being derived from, and therefore dependent on, the material existence of the human being.

I do not understand the Stranger to be saying that "proceeding by the method of division, we would take the kind, "beautiful things", and divide it into further types, bodies, souls, institutions, etc."
I realize just now that I failed to type in the full quote from the Stranger. My apologies. Let me try again: — Valentinus

As I said already, I find that passage in The Sophist to be very ambiguous and confusing, subject to many different translations. I don't think it's a good indication of what Plato says about ideas, that's why i gave what I thought was a better one, from The Symposium. I think that passage in The Sophist represents what the stranger (who is a sophistic philosopher) is saying about forms, intentionally creating ambiguity to make it look like Forms are the same thing as kinds.

So there is a limit to proper division and designating what combines into wholes. That relates to the Hippias passage of how a whole relates to the parts it unifies. Socrates distinguishes a difference between the whole and its parts. Hippias says Socrates is needlessly dividing things to say that. — Valentinus

But Socrates' point here is valid and very important. There is a fundamental difference between a part and a whole, involving dependence and independence, such that parts cannot be treated as wholes, and wholes cannot be treated as parts. This important difference is almost completely ignored in modern scientific enquiry, as atoms, electrons, protons, etc., which are fundamentally parts, get treated as wholes. But a part, by the definition of "part" is necessarily dependent on the whole which it is a part of, while a whole, by the definition of "whole", is in itself complete and independent, and cannot be a part of something else.

So in Socrates' example, if each person is "one", then they are described as independent individuals which are not part of any further whole, but are themselves, in themselves, whole.. But if two people are described as "two", then each of the two are necessarily parts of a whole. Then each , therefore, is not an independent whole, but a part. And, we cannot call each of them "one", because we'd have to call each of them "half" or something like that.

The Forms are said to be eternal and at rest. The category things that are eternal and at rest consists of Forms. — Fooloso4

This is the problem I address above, in this post. Forms are described by Plato in the Timaeus as causally active in creation. Therefore to say that Forms as conceived of By Plato, are eternal and at rest is a mistaken proposition. We must account for the reason why a thing comes into being as the very thing which it is, and not something else. The Form must be prior to the material thing and play an active, causal, role in making the thing be what it is. Therefore Forms cannot be in the category of "at rest". Forms are active causes.

Further, eternal things must be actual and therefore cannot be passive . This is what is exposed by Aristotle's cosmological argument, anything eternal must be actual (Bk9,Ch8, 1050b). So Aristotle straightens out all this confusion caused by the deficiencies of the theory of participation, by placing forms in the category of active, or actual. This inclines the Christian Theologians to posit active independent Forms, like God and the angels.

First, according to your argument no two things are the same. No two dogs are the same dog, but all dogs are the same in so far as they are dogs. It is this sameness that is fundamental to Forms. To be the same does not mean to be identical. — Fooloso4

By the law of identity, "same" refers to the very same, particular thing. A thing is the same as itself. That's what "same" means by the law of identity, one and the same, no two distinct things are the same.

No two dogs are the same dog, but all dogs are the same in so far as they are dogs. It is this sameness that is fundamental to Forms. — Fooloso4

Again, I really think that this is a mistaken proposition. Any particular thing has a form unique to itself. This is what Aristotle describes with the law of identity, This form which a particular material thing has, is complete with accidentals (what the human description, using kinds, or "forms" in that sense does not include". This means there are two distinct meanings of "form", the form which a particular has, and the form which a human being attributes to the thing in description. The latter being a description of kinds. What the latter does not include is what we call accidentals. So the latter sense of "form" does not involve "sameness", it involves similarity. And "similar" indicates a type of difference, not sameness, which by the law of identity is a things relation to itself.. So "sameness" in the philosophically disciplined sense, is reserved for the former sense of "form", what an individual has unique to oneself.

You are confusing the Forms 'Rest' and 'Change' with things that are at rest or change. — Fooloso4

This is a typical example of Parmenidean sophistry. Next you will say that 'Change" is at rest, because change is some eternal unchanging form, and argue some absurdity from this contradiction.

One more try, because I'm tired of your inability to grasp the type/token distinction. — Luke

You don't seem to understand the fact that the type/token distinction cannot be applied in the context of the private language.

However, there is no such Form, there is only the word/concept/type "pain" that we use to refer to actual instances/tokens of pain. — Luke

As I said, I do not believe there is any such a thing as an actual instance of pain. You'll have to show me one before I believe you. That's how you're using "instance", to signify an example of something, a "token". A token is an example of a type. So you'll have to show me your example. To talk about the existence of a token is insufficient, because you are telling me about a type, "pain" and insisting that there is such a thing as examples of this type, "tokens" without showing me these tokens.

I can have a toothache and you can have a toothache and so can everyone else, and we can all refer to it as "a toothache". — Luke

You are insisting that you have something in your box, a token of the type "beetle" (in this case, a token of pain), But to be tokens of a particular type, they must serve to exemplify that type. Since you cannot use what's in your box, as an example of the type you are talking about, "pain", to demonstrate that type to me, we cannot truthfully say that what is in your box is a token of pain.

Do you understand the reality of the type/token distinction? A token is an example of a type, by definition. If there is something which cannot serve to exemplify a type, such as an inner, private sensation, it cannot be called a token. Otherwise, you could make up all sorts of fictitious types, and claim that there are real existing tokens of those types, like unicorns and flying spaghetti monsters, but all the tokens are in your mind.

Lying about what? That you've had pain before? You could be lying, but you could also be telling the truth. What then? — Luke

You really do not understand what a token is. Suppose you name a type, "beetle", and I say, yes, I have one of those at home. The thing I have at home does not serve as an example of a type, and therefore cannot be called a "token", until it is displayed as such.. Since a token, by definition, is an example, used to demonstrate a type, anything which does not serve that purpose cannot be called a token.

This means that we can have real existing things which are not tokens. You seem to be bogged down by some type of dichotomous thinking within which everything must be either a type or a token of a type. So you do not recognize the fact that I can claim to have something, and even call it by the name of a type, "a pain", yet it is not a token of that type because I cannot use it to exemplify that type, as required by the name "token". Therefore it is not a token of that type, as required by the definition of "token".