Human consciousness, when it pays attention, experiences that its present is always transitioning into its past at exactly the same rate as its future is always transitioning into its present. All is movement, nothing lasts!

The distinction between past and future does not appear to be the present. Instead, human consciousness, when it pays attention, appears to be that which constantly distinguishes between the three (past, present, and future) phenomenologically, as described. — charles ferraro

I can't agree with this charles. If when paying attention, human consciousness experiences these things, and it is only human consciousness which produces a difference between past present and future, then my present should not transform into the past when I am not paying attention, yet it does.

If what you mean to ask is "by what measure can we know if some knowledge indeed corresponds with 'reality'?" then why make this about past and future, that just confuses things. — Isaac

If the only way that we can know things is by measuring them, then I might be asking that. But I think that we can know things by means other than by measuring them, like intuition for example. So I am not asking "by what measure" can we know this. But some people might not consider intuition as knowledge. The reason I made this about past and future is because it appears extremely obvious that past is different from future, yet we cannot measure these things.

In a way, I think the whole question is misguided. How can I tell the difference between the posts that come before this one, and the posts that come after it? Well I can read the ones that come before. and the ones that come after are blank. In terms of orientation, one faces the past and walks backwards into the future, anxious that the next post will be unkind or make one look foolish, or worst of all, that there will be none. Spatially, one can look where one is going, but temporally one sees only where one has been, so I think one is oriented one way and travels the opposite way. — unenlightened

The question might be misguided, and I think that's what Isaac is getting at, but I like your answer in this post. However, you haven't mentioned the other option. Perhaps we are actually facing into the future, walking that way, and oriented in that direction, and we only look backwards into the past. That would explain why anxiety is common. This is what I feel, like the vast majority of my "being", all my internal systems, which are mostly operating in the non-conscious level, are all oriented toward the future, and these systems create anxiety which is not produced by my conscious being. It appears like it might be only my consciousness, which comprises a very small part of my overall being, which is oriented toward the past. For some reason my brain has an extensive memory system and my consciousness is supported by this activity of looking at the past.

Now my consciousness is misguided, thinking that I, as a being, am facing the past, and walking backward into the future, when in reality my being is facing the future and only a small part of it, my consciousness, is looking backward at the past. So I have a serious inconsistency between my being and my consciousness with respect to orientation, and this is causing me to be completely disoriented, and probably the reason why I ask misguided questions.

Any question of what 'really' is must have within it your means by which you propose to establish how we'd know such a thing. — Isaac

Actually that's what I'm asking, the means by which we'd establish what really is. So it would be kind of silly to include a proposal of that within the question, unless the question was rhetorical.

But what could you anticipate without memory? — unenlightened

This would be anxiety, a general anticipation without anything particular which is anticipated. In severe cases I think it's called an anxiety attack.

But that's the extreme, and I agree with you in the general sense that the two, memory and anticipation go together. That's why I rejected Janus' description of knowing the difference between future and past as a matter of orientation. Either we're oriented toward the past, or toward the future, but we cannot be oriented in two opposing ways at the same time. Janus suggested that it's not at the same time, but I think memory and anticipation come together at the very same time.

But once we reject this as a mistake, as did Ayer, we realize we are then unable to provide an experiential distinction between past and future, even while we continue to insist on it. — sime

Right, this is one of the key points of the op, we cannot claim to have any empirical knowledge which would justify the conclusion that there is a difference between past and future. However, the other key point is that we tend to consider it as self-evident that there is a difference between them.

There is of course, a big difference between an eaten Hamburger and a Hamburger sitting in front of us; if an object is called 'destroyed', then there does not exist a direct and local reference to the object that we can point at. There is instead a potentially infinite and interlinked fabric of facts called "the evidence of the destroyed object" together with our investigatory sense of anticipation. Hence an empiricist might be able to equate the past with our current sense of inferential expectation together with today's appearances taken holistically as an inseparably entangled whole. But this of course is too vague to constitute an empirical "theory" of any description. — sime

But the difference we are considering is not the difference between past and present, but past and future. So your example of the hamburger would have to be phrased differently. Consider a hamburger which could possibly be destroyed in the future, and a hamburger which actually was destroyed in the past. Now the situation at the present is as you say, an eaten hamburger (destroyed) and a hamburger in front of us (possibly to be destroyed in the future). From the situation of there being no hamburger now, one has to take the hypothetical situation of there being a hamburger now, project that situation into the past, at which point there would exist the possibility of the hamburger being destroyed, and then conclude that the hamburger was destroyed. So understanding the past is much more complex than understanding the future. Understanding the future requires observing what is present and considering the possibility that it might be destroyed. Understanding the past requires taking the idea of possibility for the future, which exists at the present, projecting it into the past to determine possibilities in the past, and then determining which possibilities were actualized. Whereas understanding the future requires only determining which possibilities exist now.

It seems to me that experience (which happens in the present) is more than capable of distinguishing between before and after (e.g., cause and effect), and designating the measurable change: time (per Aristotle). — Galuchat

Before and after is a completely different concept from future and past. The former requires an ordering of events on a temporal scale, the latter requires a present.

Is it logically consistent to be an empiricist who accepts a hard ontological distinction between past and future? — sime

No, I think it is clearly not consistent. But the distinction between past and future is obviously "the present", and most modern empiricists seem to deny the reality of the present, so there is consistency there. Yet some empiricists might agree that it is self-evident that there is a difference between past and future, so this is where there would be inconsistency. Perhaps it's the case that what is self-evident cannot be demonstrated empirically. If this is the case, then what does "self-evident" mean? Is it completely semantic?

I presented a suggestion which you can take as an argument, that the experienced difference between our phenomenological orientations to past and future events, and the ways in which we can imagine logically elaborating that difference, give rise to the very recognition that there is past and future. How else would we arrive at such an idea? — Janus

You have one sort of attitude toward some events, and a completely different sort of attitude toward other events, and you classify two types of events, future and past, according to this difference of attitude. Is that what you are saying? If so, the question is, how does a difference of attitude toward different events constitute a real difference between the events? I mean it's not like we can see the events, or in any way sense them, to make the judgement that they are different sorts of events, so the judgement that there are these two distinct categories of events is not an empirically based judgement. What type of judgement is this? It is based completely in a person's attitude toward the events. Is it a moral judgement? Moral judgements seem to be based in one's attitude toward the event.

You asked what type of knowledge allows us to differentiate between future and past.
Most people would say 'common sense' and experience. — Amity

In the op I explained why we cannot refer to empirical knowledge to justify the claim of a difference between past and future. Perhaps it's "common sense", but what's that?

Let me say it boldly; memory is time. — unenlightened

I can't agree with this, because you don't give proper recognition to the temporal aspect of anticipation. I think that anticipation has a greater effect on my overall psyche than memory does, hence I tend to be an anxious person. I think we have to respect Janus' determination that there are two distinct temporal orientations, toward the past and toward the future. I do not think we can just dismiss the orientation toward the future, and focus on the orientation toward the past, to say that memory is time.

However, having said that, there is a sense in which time only occurs at the present, as time passes. In this way, only past events are "within time", because they are within the passing of time. Anything in the future has not yet occurred, and is therefore outside of time. In this way, only remembered events are within time, and anticipated events are outside of time. Perhaps this is what you mean by memory is time, such a restricted sense of "time".

Incidentally, I think that confabulation is something which we all practise to some degree. When I try to remember a complex event which has occurred, I have to go over it again and again in my mind, putting words to the immediate memory, which is in images. As I do this, the event takes on the character of a description rather than an imaginary scene, like the inversion of making a book into a movie. This activity, of putting words to the images is driven by intention, the purpose for memorizing the event, (which is an attitude toward the future), and this intention greatly shapes the description. That shaping of the description is confabulation.

The only way it makes sense for you to wonder what makes one different from the other is if you can't distinguish them. Otherwise you'd know what makes one different from the other. That would be how you'd distinguish them. — Terrapin Station

That's nonsense. I point to two things, and say that they are different. I ask you what makes them different. You say that if I can see that they are different, then I know what makes them different. You are missing the difference between using your senses and using your mind. Normally, your senses tell you that things are different, and your mind tells you what makes them different. In this case, my mind is telling me that future and past are different, but it is not telling me what makes them different. However, your claim that if I can say that they are different, then I must know what makes them different, is clearly false.

And furthermore, the issue of the op is that if we cannot say what makes them different, then the claim that they are different is not justified. That they are different might be an illusion. So your response is really nonsensical, because you are saying that if you see them as different then you know what makes them different (which is false). And then you assume that the claim that they are different is justified, without any justification, as the appearance that they are different may be an illusion.



So how does semantic information tell us that the past is different from the future?

Can it be argued that the past and future modes of time can only be experienced by the person's imagination in the perpetually vanishing present mode of time; thereby seeming to indicate some sort of ontological priority of the present mode over the others? — charles ferraro

I think that if we say there is a difference between past and future, this necessarily gives ontological priority to the present. Don't you? Wouldn't such a difference be dependent on the existence of the present?

Are you honestly asking this? Your mind works so that you can't make out any distinction between memories of things that happened and imagining what might or will happen? — Terrapin Station

I did not ask whether one can or cannot distinguish between memories and anticipations, I asked what makes one different from the other. And, I implied that saying one is of past events and the other of future events would be begging the question, because reference to memory and anticipation was used to support the claim that there is a difference between past and future.

There seems to be past - present - future, as memory, sensation, and imagination. I suppose you privilege the present as all-encompassing, in that memory and imagined futures are also 'sensed' as 'present' — unenlightened

Yes, I actually do privilege the present. That's because without the present, as the thing which separates or divides the future from the past, there could be no future or past. Also, I tend to think that it is impossible that the present could be a dimensionless dividing point, or else we couldn't exist in the present (as we are dimensional). So I believe that the present actually contains within it, some of the past, and some of the future, and this is why we have both memories and anticipations at the same time.

I am never afraid of the past. — unenlightened

That's a good answer, but what if your memory started to fail you? If I started having trouble remembering things this would make me afraid. But maybe this would just be a matter of being afraid of my future in demential state.

Have I said that you could be oriented to both the past and the future "at the same time"? It's irrelevant to the argument. — Janus

If it's at different times, then what would separate one time from another time? What would constitute turning from being oriented to the past to being oriented to the future, and back and forth? It seems to me that such a back and forth would be a disorientation.

I don't think you can say that something is irrelevant to the argument until there is actually an argument. Did you present an argument?

I didn't say we are oriented towards the past or the future; in the sense of being oriented to one and not the other. We are oriented towards both but in different ways. — Janus

I would say that's contradictory. One cannot be oriented towards two opposing things, that's like saying you're oriented toward the east and toward the west, at the same time. And, you cannot validate this by saying that it's in different ways, because the orientation is in relation to only one thing, the passing of time. This claim of "different ways" would require showing that there is a difference between past and future, to support the "different ways", but that there is a difference between past and future is what we are trying to justify in the first place. So we have something like, you're coming from the east, and walking toward the west, and you're saying that you're oriented toward both. But that's not really the case, because you're really only oriented toward the west, as that is the way that you're headed.

In the case of future and past, empirical knowledge is based in past experience, while moral knowledge is based in what ought to be done in the future. If we are headed into the future, then we orient ourselves through moral knowledge and not empirical knowledge. Saying that we use both, empirical knowledge and moral knowledge in our orientation doesn't make any sense unless one can establish a meaningful relationship between the past and the future, through which one type of knowledge can be converted into the other. Otherwise it would be like trying to establish where you are going by looking at where you have come from. It doesn't make sense to look back at the east to determine where you are going in the west, unless you have some principles to transpose the past points of being in the east, into future points of being in the west..

Hegel: a Mystic Man ? — Amity

That's what we were discussing in the other thread.

Do you agree with Wayfarer in his comment:
"I think it is possible to identify aspects the Hegelian 'absolute' with both the 'first mover' of Aristotle, and also with the One of neo-platonism (feasibly a kind of 'world soul')." — Amity

Yes, but these terms are very general and vague, they can be interpreted in so many different ways that it's not a very meaningful observation until some particular principles are compared. It's like saying all monotheist believe in "God". it doesn't really say too much.

If I understand you then, you think that we have a particular orientation, and this orientation justifies the claim that there is a difference between past and future. To be oriented means to be pointed in a specific direction. What direction do you think we're pointed toward, the past or the future? If it's neither, then how can you call this an orientation?

Empirical (experiential) knowledge (semantic information). — Galuchat

I don't think empirical knowledge can justify the claim of a difference between past and future, for the reasons outlined in the op. We experience neither past nor future. Could you explain what you mean by "semantic information"?

The past, as the determinate, is embedded in memory, whereas the future, as the indeterminate, is merely imagined. — Janus

This might be a place to start. What makes the memory of an event different from the anticipation of an event. Don' refer to one event having already occurred, and the other not, because that would be circular, as we are referring to memory and anticipation to justify the claim that there is a difference between one event already having occurred and the other not yet

Is there anything wrong with this argument? — TheMadFool

Yes there is something wrong with the argument, you haven't defined "absolute rest". Does absolute rest mean that nothing is in motion, as would be the case if time stopped passing, or does it refer to something, relative to which the motion of all things could be measured? The argument does not show that either of these is impossible, so it really does nothing to show that absolute rest is impossible.

The issue is not a matter of my capacity with the English language. It is a matter of your inability to explain what you mean with terms like "Mind", and phrases like "American mind", "where language is stored", and "thinking that comes in groups". When you explain your use of these, simply by saying that this is common usage therefore I ought to know what you mean, this gives me no indication that you have any idea of what you are talking about. You could be a parrot, or a bot, for all I know. You've heard it, now you repeat it. Get back down to the Common, smoke some more of that weed, maybe try some psilocybe this time, and clarify your ideas, why don't you, tim?

If the forms are transcendent, then logically they are eternal, not temporal, in which case a claim of temporal priority would be incoherent. So, either way, no temporal priority. — Janus

Now, Aristotle demonstrated that the Ideas of Pythagorean idealism (the Forms of Platonic realism), cannot be eternal. But that does not force the conclusion that forms are inseparable from material particulars. There is another option, the one which Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians prefer, and that is to conceive of Forms as particulars. Apprehending Forms as particulars is the source of our notion of perfection, the Ideal.

This puts "matter" in an awkward position conceptually, because matter is now not necessary for the existence of the particular. The particular, as a form, the Ideal, is independent from any material particular. Prior to Aristotle, the defining feature of the particular was that it was a body, material. After Aristotle there was the conceptual structure available to conceive of the particular as a pure Form. The pure Form, as a particular, is validated by the good (Plato), what is intended, a particular object (goal), in perfection. The material existence of the particular, however, what comes about as a result of an attempt to produce this perfection, is always deficient. This is the fact that no act is perfect, there is always some degree of mistake.

For many, this points toward matter as the root of evil and mistake. It is assumed that faults inherent within matter itself are responsible for the privations of material objects, and consequently our own failures. I believe that a principle similar to this is fundamental to Manichaeism. Christian theology, on the other hand, teaches that privation is formal, and therefore not intrinsic to matter. It is not the fault of matter, that we cannot produce the perfection desired, but a problem with the form which the human mind apprehends (the form is less than Ideal). This points right to the concept of Original Sin, which might be an attempt at reconciliation between the principles of Christians and Gnostics. In dualism, the cause of evil is a difficult question. Is the cause of sin inherent within the soul of the human being (form), such evil is a necessary product of the free will, or is it produced by the material aspect of the human being, and necessitated in this way?

It's not an easy question, because the human body is already a composite of matter and form, so we have to look toward the principles which produce this composition, and this is beyond what is evident to the human experience. This is why it is a mistake to limit epistemology to what is empirically known, because this would exclude the possibility of knowledge in moral issues. Appropriate mental training, discipline, is required in order that one may proceed logically and coherently within this body of knowledge which is not grounded in empiricism. This is the top section of Plato's divided line.

Going back to this. Is your claim that this temporally prior form is itself separate from particulars? If so, then why would that not be a Platonic form on your view? — Andrew M

It is a particular, but it's prior to and therefore separate from material particulars. It is better understood as a Neo-Platonic Form, because Plato was rather confused in his efforts to relate the universal to the particular (Timaeus). But the Neo-Platonists manage to do this with the fundamental unity "One". See, "One" is both a universal and a particular. It is a Platonic form and a particular. Plato's Parmenides actually leads in this direction.

I don't see 'the forms' as temporally prior - before in time - but ontologically prior, i.e. the form is something that is 'realised' to a greater or lesser degree of perfection by the particular. — Wayfarer

If the form is "realised" in the perfection of the particular, then the form is necessarily prior in time to the particular. It's like when you try to draw a perfect circle, the form, the perfect circle, exists in you mind, prior in time to the one you draw, acting as a cause (in the sense of final cause) of the less than perfect circle which you will draw.

The "Ideal", (in the sense of "the perfect"), is a particular because it cannot be anything other than perfect as this would make it less than ideal. The Ideal is therefore a unique thing, a particular. In the sense that we strive to produce the ideal, the ideal is a cause, and therefore prior in time to the multitude of less than perfect things which we produce in that effort. The vast multitude of the less than perfect circles which we draw may be classified under the universal category of "circle", but this is only because we allow the universal to be less than the Ideal, which is a particular.

This is where Plato was confused in Timaeus, he wanted to put the universal first, and have the particulars emanate from the universal. But Aristotle turned this around, and showed how the particular must be prior, so the Neo-Platonists proceeded with the One as first. We can understand the One as the Ideal.

Aristotle identifies a different kind of cause - a final cause. The golfer moves his hand because he desires to play golf. Thus he is the unmoved mover that causes the golf ball to move. — Andrew M

This is where the concept of free will is derived, a cause which is not itself caused.

Just common sense and common usage. Yours is an illegitimate reification of a notion of mine. — tim wood

Don't try to turn the table, you are the one making the illegitimate reification, talking about this Mind, as if it is a real thing. If it's not a real thing, then what are you talking about other than a group of human beings, each with one's own mind?

So, it's up to you to tell me, what are you talking about, a real thing called Mind, or real individual human minds. You talk about "Mind" as if it is something other than individual human minds, and when I point out that's nonsense, you say you weren't talking 'mind' as is it's a real thing. What were you talking about then, a bunch of individual minds? I think so. So stop calling this group of minds "Mind" if there's no such thing as Mind.

Consider, for example, American freedom, such as it is these days. Where and in what does in inhere? Steve's mind? Bob's mind? Stephanie's mind? Perhaps some aspect of it, some sense of it, in all their minds. What do you call that collectivity when it includes 300+ million Americans? I'd call it the American mind - not necessarily restricted to Americans. Is the American mind a thing? Have you ever the hear the expression "American mind"? — tim wood

I've never heard of such a thing as the "American mind". You're still talking nonsense. Freedom is not something that inheres in a mind, unless you are talking about free will. But free will is proper to each mind individually. We are each free to choose, individually, in one's own way, we do not choose collectively.

Or where is language stored? For example, English? In the minds of English speakers. What might you call that collectivity? — tim wood

What are you talking about, "where is language stored"? Have you never heard of "memory"? Each one of us has one's own memory. There's nothing collective about that, it's personal. Where do you get this idea that language is stored in some sort of collective memory? Do you mean books? But books just contain written symbols, which must be read and understood by individual minds, through reference to one's memory.

Or any kind of thinking that comes in groups. So-and-so has a mathematical mind, or a legal mind, or an artist's mind, and so forth. This is all just common usage. — tim wood

"Thinking that comes in groups"? That is not common usage at all. We might classify a person as having this type of mind or that type of mind, just like psychiatry identifies "states of mind" which are common to different people, but in no way does this indicate that there is thinking which comes in groups. It is just classifying similar ways of thinking.

Saying "all human beings have a mind" doesn't justify talking about "a Mind which all human beings have", just like saying "all grass is green" doesn't justify saying "there is a Green which all grass has". You're either being totally abusive of the English language, or you really misunderstand simple logic.

This I neither thought nor said. What I mean is that there are individual minds, "and given minds, you get something like Mind." Offhand I'd agree that ideas - the content of them - originate in one mind, or a few working together - I suppose one must always be first. But as the knowledge becomes generally known, it becomes a community possession. No special mystery here. — tim wood

There's no mystery here, only an invalid conclusion. The point, is that many human minds does not make a "Mind". That's like saying many horses makes a "Horse". There's no justification for such a conclusion. No matter how many human beings with minds you put into the same room, they do make a Mind which is human, but which is not a human mind. You've inverted subject for predicate by pluralizing, such that a number of human beings with minds becomes a Mind which is human. How could you possibly justify such an illogical maneuver?

You apparently missed that the article wasn't there. Human mind, not a human mind. — tim wood

That's nonsense. You're saying that this proposed "Mind" is not a human mind, though you said it is human, it's simply human mind. So there's this thing called Mind, and it's not a human mind, it's human mind. What are you guys smoking down there at the Boston Common?

Actually, Toronto is a great example of classic Trumpian business practise. Bring in an investor with a big "debt" (for God knows what) to be paid off. Fill your personal account by charging exorbitant management fees. Defer payment to the locals who are doing the work. Declare bankruptcy and get the hell out of Dodge, pockets lined with gold. Debt paid off! -- At the expense of the locals.

He probably thought that being up north, property would be cheap, just partner up with a Russian investor, and the locals could be bulldozed. You think he would have learned something from his experience in Toronto!

(he's way ahead on the global warming curve). — Baden

No, he just goes by the name, Greenland, perfect for golf courses

"I'm a Mystic Man, I'm just a Mystic Man ... I man don't ... I man don't ... I man don't..." -Peter Tosh

A mind? How about minds?

Or maybe you're just arguing that in the whole entire history of the universe every single instant that ever was or ever will be is unique. Not only can you not step into the same river twice, you cannot even once. Is that where you're going? And every thing, which requires continuity, is just a dream, because nothing is the same from moment to moment. - wait! not even in dreams! Is that where you're aiming? — tim wood

I'm not arguing anything here, I'm just trying to get some clarification of what you mean. You say things which do not make sense to me. For instance, why do you say "minds" instead of "mind"? I can have an idea in my mind, which does not seem to be dependent on any other minds, so why would you jump to this conclusion that ideas are dependent on minds, not on a mind?

Isn't it true that every instant of time in the history of the universe is unique? That seems very obvious, once something has happened we cannot go back to how things were before. Why would I need to argue this? Where do you get the idea of "continuity" from? We observe that some aspects of reality stay the same even as time passes. Aristotle posited matter as the principle of continuity, to account for the reality of what is observed. Newton took matter for granted, as the substance of "a body" and gave matter the property of inertia (continuity); Newton's first law. You seem to think that this idea is wrong, and ought to be replaced by a modern conception of "matter", how so?

In the Augustine citation almost the first qualification that meets the eye is "...must be independent of particular minds...".

I buy the notion that no mind(s) at all, then no ideas. Plenty to think about, but no one to do the thinking, or even to think about the possibility. But given minds, you get something like Mind, the collective and dynamic wisdom of..., that as history plays out, ebbs and flows, and has its spring and neap tides, its seasons of flood and drought.

A difficulty I have with any notions of being-less minds being the author and communicator to us of reality-as-we-perceive-it, is that the people who themselves create such theories do it to give an account, and the only account they can think of, of what we perceive and how we perceive it. In every case they simply do not have access to any understanding of the history of the development of mind - brain - itself over, what, most of five-hundred-million years? Maybe four hundred million?

Arguably the human brain given its methods of perception has itself evolved into a cognizing organ of very great sensitivity to the world it finds itself in - or more accurately, to the world as it perceives it. Were we whales or porpoises or squid, or had we thousands of eyes like a fly, or if like May flies we lived a day, or some other things that live very long times, or if we were just plain a lot different that we are, then likely we would have very different ideas of our world.

So what I find in most ancient philosophies and religions - and imo all religions are ancient, even the modern ones, is the attempt to make sense, but with the only recourse to make the sense being non-sense - and a credulous audience. Unfortunately credulity too is both an ancient and a modern trait, with some excuse for them, and not-so-much or hardly any at all for us.

Of course this Mind in question is human mind, its wisdom, as opposed to knowledge, mainly in good and astute psychology. But this won't do at all for either of the myth-ifiers or the mystifiers. Just leaves the question if we will survive them. — tim wood

There's a deep inconsistency here. Let's take the assumption that an idea is dependent on minds, and cannot be produced, nor maintained simply by the single mind of an individual human being. Because of this assumption you are forced to jump to "Mind", which is supposed to represent some sort of collective mind, as this is what is required to support the existence of ideas. But then you belittle this Mind by saying "this Mind in question is human Mind". Do you see the inconsistency? A human mind is a particular mind of an individual human being. If you assume some sort of collective Mind, it is impossible that this is a human mind. The assumption of a collective Mind is not so easily supported as you make it sound.

I go with the first option, my dogs have always been much smarter than me. The fact that they do not talk is evidence of this. The barking is intended to irritate me, but probably for good reason.

As to the question of whether Hegel was a mystic, we must first ask what a mystic is. Is it someone who has experiences or someone who has been initiated formally or informally into secret teachings or someone who yearns for immediacy or someone who attempts to attain altered states of consciousness via particular practices or ...? — Fooloso4

Mysticism is philosophy centred around the mystical experience. I believe that in it's most simple form, the mystical experience is the experience which makes one aware of one's own spirituality. Recognizing your spirituality, and acknowledging this as experience, makes you a mystic.

In brief, it means that, for example, studying what people have done and thought is usually helpful to current effort.

So long ago I do not remember the particulars, an economist addressed the challenge of new manufacturing in countries that did not have good manufacturing and wanted it. This question (c. 1962?) was, why don't countries without good manufacturing just buy "stuff" and copy it, maybe improving it in the process?

By way of answer, the author noted that BMW made excellent motorcycles. The Soviets (as I recall) had bought several and taken them apart on the assumption they had merely to copy and make. They made, they ended up with, the Ural. A look-a-like motorcycle, but in quality as a horse chestnut is to a chestnut horse (thank you Mr. L.). The idea was that in order to have good manufacturing, you have to travel at least most of the path to get there. To learn to make good tools, have good steels, make good plants - a problem of its own - have skilled labor and technicians and management, and on and on. That is, copy and make just is not that simple.

In the same way, the history of philosophy - the history of ideas - is at least as valuable. I've read it - if I could cite I would - that philosophy just is the history of philosophy. Call it the propaedeutic part.

As to the rest of the latter part of your remark, that's too much deconstruction for (my) present purpose. — tim wood

Sorry Tim, but I just can't understand what you're trying to say here.

"... just be an expression of..."? Isn't that both minimalist and reductionist beyond sense? It implies that idea is based in a mind and has no independent existence. Granted that people can express ideas in different ways, but the idea itself, to stand as an idea, must have something constant in it independent of either yours or my twist of it. You may have feelings about two plus two equaling four, but they don't touch it, yes? — tim wood

What do you mean by "the idea itself"? And how does an idea "stand as an idea"? Isn't an idea dependent on a mind? Do you think that an idea can stand alone out in a field, like a horse? We have books, and written material which maybe could be considered to stand alone, as representations of ideas, But to refer to the idea itself, wouldn't this be referring to what the mind produces from the reading and understanding of the book? And this is in a mind. What do you think is this "constant" thing? I believe that my understanding of two plus two equaling four is similar to your understanding of this, but similarity is not the same as "constant thing".

But I think it is possible to identify aspects the Hegelian 'absolute' with both the 'first mover' of Aristotle, and also with the One of neo-platonism (feasibly a kind of 'world soul'). — Wayfarer

In my experience Hegelians generally dismiss this enterprise of relating Hegel's thought to that of the ancients, insisting on Hegel's originality. I find that this enforces the representation of Hegel as mystic, because mysticism focuses in on the originality of the individual. We approach the meaning of One (in the sense of the unity of all), through understanding "one" in the sense of one individual, oneself.

This classes all phenomenology as mysticism. This mystical method takes the approach that the only true access we have to the unity of being, which is the source of the particular, the object, is internally. Presupposing the existence of things, as objects, is rejected, because there is no principle of unity to justify that assumption. The subject, oneself, can be the only true object, because only by looking at oneself can one come into contact with the source of unity, which is necessary for the existence of an object.

Perhaps you could specifically quote where you think Aristotle argues this. If you simply mean that there is potential for things in prior (actual) states of the universe, then that is not at issue. But neither does that imply dualism. — Andrew M

We've been through this already, and I referred you to some of the sections. If you still don't get it, pick up the book and read it from beginning to end. As I said, it's consistent throughout the book.

After some consideration, I choose not to play water-polo with you in your pool. Aristotle is your subject. As to matter, my only point has been that whatever the jr. high school science teacher means by "matter," it is not in any way or sense what Aristotle meant. As to presuppositions of Aristotle, I feel no need to list them. They're there in Stanford.edu, such as they are. In any case he was not a modern scientist. He observed and tried to make sense. A modern scientist asks questions and does experiments to find answers. — tim wood

Yes I would agree with all that. That Aristotle was not a modern scientist is a rather obvious and trivial point, unless perhaps someone here thought he was, then there might be a need to point that out.

Mainly it is significant thinking in the history of thinking. — tim wood

What exactly does this mean to you, "significant thinking in the history of thinking"? Suppose that someone thinks, and comes up with some influential ideas. Would this constitute significant thinking in the history of thinking? Does this put Aristotle in the same category as someone like Einstein?

Earlier you said "The history of ideas shouldn't be confused with ideas in themselves." What does this mean? How would you propose to create a separation between an idea and the history of that idea? An idea has a temporal presence, an extension in time. Doesn't it appear to you, that to describe an idea is to describe its extension in time, its influence on people through time, how different people understand the same idea, etc.. What do you think would be 'the idea itself'? Consider the example of Einstein's general theory of relativity. The history of that idea would be how different people interpreted it, applied it, and the effects that it had on the people in general. What would be the idea itself? Suppose you tried to tell me what the idea of general relativity is. Wouldn't that just be an expression of how the idea affected you, and therefore just a small part of the history of that idea?

My own view is that the unmoved mover should be understood in terms of Aristotle's hylomorphism and naturalism and not in Platonic terms. — Andrew M

Aristotle was a student of Plato, he was not educated in modern naturalism. And, he clearly refers to the difference between artificial things and natural things which was the convention of his day. In the attempt to establish principles for resolving this difference (which was a chasm of misunderstanding), he employed the concept of "final cause", "that for the sake of which", "the good", which is clearly Platonic.

Nope. One is material, the other intellectual. Otherwise, why is it ‘dualism’? And why doesn’t the soul simply die with the body? — Wayfarer

Have you not read Aristotle's On the Soul? He's explicit, sensation is a power (potency) of the soul.

I guess I just don’t see why conceiving of prime matter as pure potentiality is problematic. The concept seems fairly straightforward to me; I mean whatever exists materially must have the potential to do so, right? So that potential is prime matter. — AJJ

Prior to the existence of a thing, is the potential for that thing. But the potential for that thing exists as something actual, so this potential is not "pure", it is restricted by what actually exists. Pure potential would be infinite, and this is what is impossible to conceive of as being real. It can't be real, because as I said this would mean that at this time, when there was infinite potential there would be nothing actual. And if there was nothing actual, there would be nothing to actualize anything out of that potential, so there would always be nothing actual. But this is inconsistent with our observations that there is something actual. That's why it's impossible to conceive of, because it requires that nothing is actual.

Plotinus has it that the One, being beyond the constraint of ignorance, creates freely and not of some necessity beyond its control; an important distinction I guess, although it seems to me it amounts to the same thing - since to not create would presumably then be an error made in ignorance, and so not free, and so impossible. — AJJ

That's right, there is no principle which we can say "necessitates" material existence. One Form necessitates another Form, through a logical process (logical necessity), but no Form can necessitate material existence. This is an indication that material existence is caused by an act of free will, the love of God, or because God thought it was good.

And btw, the "what" referred to what Aristotle says about matter. It's right there above: "What is it he says...? So the question stands: what does he say about it? — tim wood

Actually tim, you said: "What is it he says explicitly matter is". This is asking what Aristotle said matter "is". AJJ answered that very well, with "potential". Potential neither is (being) nor is not (not being), that's why it is proposed as a means of accounting for the reality of becoming And since "potential" is other than "actual", and this is what "is" refers to, what is actual, it really doesn't make any sense to ask what matter is. Now you've changed the question to what Aristotle says "about" matter, and this is a whole lot of different things, in a whole lot of different places, and that's why your quotes from Stanford show such a variance. When we say "what" a thing is, we generally state some sort of definition. But when we talk "about" something we tend to say many different things about it, and it is not necessary that "what it is" is one of the things that we say about it. So we might entertain the possibility that there could be something (like matter), which has no "what it is".

Now I make a claim about Aristotle. He was operating with wrong presuppositions... — tim wood

OK, if this is the case, then you ought to be able to state these presuppositions which you believe Aristotle was operating with, and we can discuss whether he actual was or not, and if he was, we can determine whether your judgement that it is wrong is justified.

As a matter of the history of ideas, his conclusions are interesting. But they're not modern science. As noted above, his "matter" is that which not only isn't, but isn't even an isn't, and cannot even be asked about. it's a plug-placeholder for a problem that Aristotle encountered in giving an account that he did not solve and that he knew perfectly well that he did not solve. — tim wood

Of course he knew perfectly well that he didn't solve that problem (the problem of becoming), he proposed some principles, and a direction to move in. I don't see the point in your comparison to modern science. Physicists know perfectly well that they have not solved this problem either. Modern physics points us in a direction slightly different from that proposed by Aristotle. The fundamental particle "isn't", but this isn't isn't even an isn't, because the fundamental particle is something, it's a wave. OK, I see the point to your comparison. But since neither solves the problem, on what basis would you claim that one is wrong?

Besides, whether formless matter ever was doesn’t change the fact that pure potentiality is the what prime matter is conceptualised as; and being so means it must be whatever is actualising it that prevents the world from being drastically different from one moment to the next, which is what I was quibbling about. — AJJ

The point though, is that it is impossible to conceptualize something which is logically impossible. You can say it "prime matter", but you cannot conceptualize it.

That’s fine. From reading a bit about Plotinus I take participation to mean being fashioned by Soul in imitation of whatever Forms. — AJJ

The Neo-Platonists, like Plotinus use a different conception of participation than the one Plato described derived from the Pythagoreans. This follows the difficulties with the original theory of participation revealed by Plato and Aristotle. I believe Plotinus uses a system of "emanation", and some other Neo-Platonists refer to a "procession". But this is a participation of Forms, strictly, and I don't think material existence is even necessitated in Plotinus' system.

Those quotes I referred to make a very clear point: the material senses (eyes, ears) perceive the particular being, the intellect perceives the form. The material thing must always, of necessity, be apart from us - in modern terms, an object to us, something outside of us. But 'the form' is known directly by nous, as the form is basically an idea, not a thing. That is the 'rational intellect' in operation. — Wayfarer

The senses, and the intellect are both powers of the soul. They both perceive a form. "Form" refers to what a thing is. The senses perceive the form of the particular (though this perception is deficient), while the intellect may apprehend the essence, which is the universal form. So for instance, through my senses I perceive the form of the particular object in front of me, my laptop, but this perception of the object is deficient, because I am only actually perceiving certain aspects of the form, its shape, colour, etc.. At the same time, my intellect apprehends the form of the thing in the sense of "laptop", recognizing the essence of the thing as a laptop.

The form is 'the type of thing it is'. — Wayfarer

Aristotle is very clear on this point, form refers to whatness, (I think it's called quiddity) what a thing a thing is. He starts with "form" as the type of thing, but proceeds to examine "form" in the sense of the individuality of a thing. This is made necessary by his law of identity which he proposed as a law against sophism. The sophist could claim that two things which are the same type, are actually the same thing. So the law of identity designates that two distinct things which appear to be the same (are the same type) cannot actually be the same thing. Since they are in fact distinct, there must be some formal aspects which distinguish one from the other. Remember, the intellect only apprehends form, so the distinction between two things must be formal if the intellect is to be able to grasp it.

Individual particular objects have a form proper to themselves. You'll see that this is one of the main topics Aristotle investigates in his Metaphysics, where he investigates being qua being. He dismisses the commonly quoted "why is there something rather than nothing", and poses instead, the question of "why is there what there is instead of something else". So this question becomes why is a particular object what it is, and not something else. This is because it is given a particular form. He's very specific on this point, a particular thing has a form unique to itself.

My thought is that there is no 'form of the particular' because 'forms' by definition are *not* particular but universal. Read this passage again: 'The proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized; the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.' And 'a particular being' is precisely a combination of accidents and universals, of (individualised) matter and (universal) form. Hence, hylomorphic, matter-form, dualism. — Wayfarer

I think if you read more you'll find it very clear that Aristotle proposed a form of the particular. "Accidents" are formal, part of a thing's form, they are just not part of a things essence.

The quotes in this post are all exactly about that, and, I must confess, make perfect sense to me. — Wayfarer

I mostly agree with what's in those quotes, except this:

The individuality of the object cannot be due to any of those abstractions, which are universals, and so must be due to something else. To Aristotle that was the "matter" of the object. "Matter" confers individuality, "form" universality. — Kelly Ross

Aristotle actually distinguishes two primary senses of "form", the form which we grasp, the universal, or the essence of the thing, and the form of the particular. The form of the particular includes all the accidentals, which are left out from the essence. We do not grasp the entirety of the thing's form. So it is not matter which confers individuality, it is form, but it is the property of a material thing, to be an individual. We have in Aristotle a distinction between form as essence, abstraction, or universal, and the form of the particular, material thing.

It is in understanding that each individual object has a distinct, and unique form, that you may come to realize that the form of a particular object is necessarily prior to the material existence of that particular object. This is one way that we come to see that form is prior to material existence. Material objects come into being. When a thing comes into being, it must be the thing which it is, and not something else. It is impossible that a thing is other than itself, by the law of identity. Further, a thing is an ordered unity, it is not random. By these two premises, it is necessary to conclude that what the thing is (its form) precedes its material existence.

I guess I don’t see why it does account for that; if matter is pure potentiality then it can be anything from one moment to the next. — AJJ

Sure, but for Aristotle prime matter, or pure potentiality, is incoherent, unintelligible, a logical impossibility by the cosmological argument. Simply put, a potentiality requires an actuality to be actualized. If there ever was a time when there was pure potential, there would be no actuality at that time, and therefore the potential could not ever be actualized, so there would always be pure potential with no actuality. However, we observe that there is actuality, so it is impossible that there ever was pure potentiality.

So this is where I like Platonism: the notion that there is an organising principle (Soul), which fashions the world after the Forms. That way it seems an object remains the same object throughout changes so long as it’s participating in the same Forms. — AJJ

The problem with the theory of participation, which Plato uncovered, and becomes evident from The Republic on, into his later work, is that the thing which is participated in is passive, as the thing participating is active. What Plato discovered, and this constitutes his proposal of "the good", is that in order for the Forms to have any real participation in the real world, they must be active, actual. He found this principle of action in "the good". We act for what we perceive as the good, and the Ideas, or Forms are directed towards the good, such that they receive actuality in this way, from the good.

This is why the philosopher in the cave turns things around, realizing that what the people in the cave see as reality, the material objects, are really reflections, representations of the Forms, which are actively causing the existence of material objects, which the cave people take as the totality of reality. So a material object does not participate in the Forms, the Forms actively cause the existence of the thing by informing the matter. This makes matter the passive aspect of reality, while Forms may participate in passivity by remaining the same, and having the potential to change.

What is it he says explicitly matter is? — tim wood

Is this a trick question? The whatness of a thing is the thing's form. Matter is distinct from form. So it makes not sense to ask "what is matter", because asking "what", is asking for a form. If someone tried to tell you what matter is, they'd be handing you a form, saying "this is matter".

My bolds. I had read previously that 'mother' and 'matter' were etymologically related but never knew how. — Wayfarer

Plato described matter in Timaeus in sexist terms, coming from ancient myths. It is a passive principle which receives the form, like being impregnated. Notice also the duality in "conception". Plato plays with that duality in Theatetus, when Socrates refers to himself as a midwife.

The issue of the intellect receiving the form of the object, in conception, becomes a difficult question for Aquinas. In order to receive the form of an object, the intellect must have a passive aspect. The passive aspect is a potential, like matter, but Aquinas wants to maintain the immaterial essence of the intellect, and I think he refuses to refer to this passive aspect as material in nature. The way I understand this issue is that the intellect is essentially immaterial, but it has material accidentals. The accidentals are what individuate us as distinct, separate, and unique human beings.

Another point: that Aristotelian dualism comprised 'matter and form', not the Cartesian 'matter and mind'. — Wayfarer

What Aristotle does, which is not as evident in Plato (except perhaps Timaeus), is extend the duality of reality into all things, all objects, not just human beings. Notice that Descartes brings us back to the primitive form of dualism, similar to the dualism expressed by the myths described by Plato. Plato demonstrated how difficult it is to make sense of this dualism. From this position, where dualism is extremely difficult to make sense of, we have the choice of two distinct directions. We can dismiss dualism as simply incoherent (as is the modern trend), or we can follow a system like Aristotle's, which extends dualism into all aspects of reality. I find that the cosmological argument is very important because it demonstrates very forcefully, and decisively, that the only rational way to proceed is to extend dualism.

To those others discussing "prime matter", the cosmological argument denies the possibility that the concept of prime matter could refer to anything real.

I don’t understand the above though. Since matter isn’t composite, doesn’t that mean the same matter underlies every object? In which case the only way to distinguish between objects is by their forms; but why then do individual objects remain the same objects as their forms change? — AJJ

This is a good question, and I think that the best way to proceed is to understand "matter" as an assumption. Aristotle assumed "matter" as the principle of continuity of existence. Ultimately, it accounts for the fact that the world cannot be randomly different from one moment to the next. Newton characterized this as inertia. I understand matter as the continuity of time itself. Modern physics now uses "energy" (conservation of energy), to refer to that which remains, or persists, through change, this allows the principle of continuity to cross between one object and another, such that the continuity of an object is no longer assumed in physics, as it is in Aristotelian physics.

So matter is simply the potential for there to be a form instantiated in the world, as opposed to being a mere abstraction. — AJJ

It's better to look at matter as the potential for change. The concept of "matter" is introduced by Aristotle as a means for understanding the nature of change. If a thing has one form at one moment, and a slightly different form at the next moment, we say that the thing has changed. If "the thing" is identified strictly by its form, then at one moment it is not the same thing as it is at the next, due to it's changing. So in his Physics, Aristotle wanted to be able to explain what we all observe, and say, that a thing remains being the same thing despite the fact that there are changes to it. Matter is the underlying thing which persists, and does not change when a change occurs, and assuming the reality of matter allows us to say that the same thing persists from one moment to the next, but it changes.

I say it is "the potential for change", because it is what has been determined by Aristotle as what is required (logically) to make change into something real, something comprehendible. If we can state the form of a thing (describe what it is) at one moment, and do the same at a following moment, and see that the form is slightly different, then we ought to be able to account for the change to the thing which happens between these moments. If we account for the change by stating an intermediate form, which is different from the other two, this does not solve the problem because now we have changes between this form and the others. We cannot posit an infinite number of forms between one form and the next, to account for change, so Aristotle posits matter. Matter is not a form, but it provides the potential for one form to change into another, with the thing remaining as the same thing. Matter is what makes becoming intelligible.

The context here is Aristotle's hylomorphic particulars. Aristotle rejected the existence of anything separate from hylomorphic particulars - and specifically Platonic Forms. — Andrew M

Sure, Aristotle rejected Plato's form of dualism, to introduce one which he thought more reasonable. Rejecting Platonic Forms does not make one monist. I reject Platonic Realism but I am still dualist.

The thinking is not a Platonic Form, it is the thoughts of the unmoved mover. If the unmoved mover is the universe itself then the universe is also the final cause of the changes that occur within it (in any observer's reference frame). — Andrew M

But the unmoved mover is not the universe itself. It cannot be, for the reasons I've given. And a final cause is an intentional act, which is completely inconsistent with our conception of "the universe". Some people say that the universe was created by a final cause, but it is impossible that "the universe" as we understand it, is a final case.

What is said in BK.12, Ch.7, is that the unmoved mover is a final cause, and the type of motion caused by this final cause is circular. Notice the distinction between cause and effect at 1072b: "The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things are move by being moved." (4) "For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover produces."(9).

What Aristotle has argued, consistently throughout Metaphysics, is that the form of the particular is necessarily temporally prior to material existence of that particular, as a cause of it. His cosmological argument shows that the form of the universe (as a particular material thing) is temporally prior to the material existence of the universe. This means that it is necessary to interpret Aristotle as dualist, because the form of a particular exists independently from the material existence of that particular, prior to that material existence. To insist that Aristotle does not allow the form of the material particular to exist independently of the material particular (as you and dfpolis do), in order to make it appear as if Aristotle's Metaphysics is consistent with modern science, is a seriously mistaken interpretation.

A reference frame provides this (see the experiment I linked earlier). The universe is an inseparable and unchangeable unity (in the universal frame of reference). Whereas in our frame of reference, the universe is separable and changeable. — Andrew M

But a reference frame is artificial, and must be supported with valid principles to be other than arbitrarily chosen. To say that "X" reference frame will give us a unified universe requires that "X" reference frame be supported. There is no theory of everything, so such a reference frame does not exist.

That may have been fine with Aristotle who had a natural theology and located his unmoved mover within the universe. As he wrote, "the things nearest the mover are those whose motion is quickest, and in this case it is the motion of the circumference that is the quickest: therefore the mover occupies the circumference." (Physics 8.10.267b.7-8) — Andrew M

This is a good example of such a misinterpretation. What he describes here is a problem with locating the unmoved mover as within the universe. He says that things closest to a mover move the quickest, but with circular motion the quickest is the circumference. This leads us toward the conclusion that the unmoved mover is not within the universe.

However, he also says it is 'clear that it is indivisible and is without parts and without magnitude' (which is the basic argument of the whole section); so rather difficult to imagine the sense in which the unmoved mover is 'located within the universe'; for without parts or magnitude, how can something be located? — Wayfarer

That's right, Aristotle at this point is arguing that the unmoved mover is not within the universe. This is the point where dfpolis and I had extensive disagreement. Df argued that Aristotle taught that the principle of actuality of a thing (its form) came from within the matter of the thing. But this is clearly inconsistent with Aristotle, who argues specifically at Metaphysics Bk.7 Ch.7, that the form of a thing is given to that thing from something else, whether it's a thing produced by art, or by nature

Suppose, on the other hand, that we are talking about somebody being in a position where they ‘have to’ trade away their house for a loaf of bread. Again, for what is this an argument, exactly? If you are on the brink of starvation, and the only way to save your life is to make such a trade, then you are better off for having made it, and this is consistent with my thesis. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is doublespeak. Sure, you are "better of" not to be starving at that moment in time, than to be starving at that moment, but If there is someone else around the corner, willing to trade two, or five, or ten loaves of bread for that house, you are not necessarily "better of" for making that trade. You could have walked around the corner and gotten a much better deal, in which case you would be even "better off"..

Libertarianism is modest in the sense that it requests only that persons not be aggressed against; a modest request indeed. It’s really not much to ask. — Virgo Avalytikh

Try saying this to an aggressive person. Please, don't be so aggressive. I'm just making a modest request. Good luck with that!

Your argument hinges on the claim that the State gives rise to a greater degree of standardisation than does a Stateless situation; that, under Statism, peaceful order is the norm and aggression is the exception, and that, under anarchy, we are wild animals engaged in perpetual aggression. — Virgo Avalytikh

No, you don't seem to get my point. I am not arguing for Statism, I've told you this already, I am arguing that your principles are wrong. I did not say that without the State we are wild animals engaged in aggression. In fact, I said the very opposite. I said that in order for a State to come into existence, we must have an attitude of loving, caring and sharing, and having things in common. A State can only come into existence from these prerequisite conditions, because it requires agreement amongst people, and this can only occur if people are agreeable, and this requires the attitude I just described, not an attitude of wild animals engaged in aggression. Therefore, prior to the existence of the State, the conditions which were conducive to bringing the State into existence, and these conditions were therefore in existence without a State, were conditions of loving, caring, and sharing. These are the only conditions which could bring a State into existence, because a State requires agreement amongst its members.

It would be helpful for us to remind ourselves that the ‘standardisation’ we are concerned with is of a specific kind, namely a system of rights. This is the only reason why ‘convention’ entered the discussion, because rights are a convention, and convention requires at least some measure of standardisation for it to be meaningful. So the question before us is whether a State really does do the job that your argument needs it to do, in terms of creating a standardised system of rights, relative to anarchy. — Virgo Avalytikh

Right, "standardization" is part of the second level of agreement which I referred to. This includes State, as well as rights. These things, State, and rights, can only come into existence following the first level of agreement which I described as loving, caring and sharing, generally having the disposition of being agreeable.

I have attacked your argument at both ends. First, I have argued that the State is a miserable candidate for being a rights-standardiser, rights-protector, rights-bestower, or however you would wish to phrase it. I argued that States are engaged in perpetual aggression towards their citizens (a point to which you have not responded at all), and that the historical record excites serious distrust of the claim that battle is some sort of occasional exception to a State’s normally ordered activity. The hundreds of millions of deaths which I enumerated in my previous post are to be accounted for by wars between States, and States murdering their own citizens. Does this give you a moment’s pause? It seems not. all you have to say is: — Virgo Avalytikh

I am not defending Statism, I am showing that your principles are wrong, so this ranting against States is irrelevant. As I already explained, your principles are wrong because loving, caring, sharing, and generally having things in common, are fundamental necessities for the existence of conventions (which are agreements), including conventions on rights. Therefore, sharing and having things in common must be the top priority of any system of rights because caring and having things in common is necessary in order for any system of rights to exist. Your NAP which gives top priority to personal ownership is inconsistent with this, it doesn't pay respect to having things in common. In fact it opposes this. It is therefore the proposal of a right designed to support the things which are incompatible with the existence of rights. It is an unacceptable proposal.

To be sure, the State does not have its own inherent agency. Only individual persons have this. There is nothing objectionable in speaking about ‘collective agency’ so long as we recognise that it is an abstraction, and that we be careful not to smuggle in any untoward ontological commitments (like the idea that groups have their own independent capacity for purposeful action). As Murray Rothbard says, ultimately, there are no ‘governments’; there are only certain individuals who act in a manner that is recognised as ‘governmental’. Recognising this is much more of a threat to Statism than an apologetic for it. It dispels the notion that there is anything peculiar about a State (or the individuals comprising it) which grants it license to engage in activities which non-States do not. You yourself have spoken of the State as though it has agency, on numerous occasions. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, if you respect this, then you ought to quit talking about the State being an aggressor. Or is it that difficult for you to quit the doublespeak? I've tried not to speak of the State as if it has agency, though it is difficult because it is common parlance. I think that the closest I've come is to refer to things like state-run institutions. The common parlance tends to make us blame the faults of human beings on the State. The State has bad laws. If we separate these, we can ask whether a State is really a bad thing, or whether a State (which could be a good thing) is overrun by bad people.

So it looks like we agree on this much: peaceful cooperation, and standardisation regarding rights, are possible independently of the State. You extoll the virtues of education in further cultivating this standardisation, but there is no reason why this education could not occur under anarchy (indeed, hardly any education really occurs under Statism, see Caplan’s book I mentioned). — Virgo Avalytikh

I really don't see the principles here. How is it possible to have standardized education throughout a vast land without an organization like the State? The anarchists could set up an organization like a State, and call it something other than a State, but how would this be different?

Where does this leave us in the trajectory of the discussion? We began with the principles of right-libertariansm, private property rights and the NAP. You claimed that the NAP was useless (deceptive!) in the absence of a system of rights. ‘Rights’ are a service bestowed on an individual by the State, a service provided by the State (there is the State as agent!). I have agreed that the NAP does depend on a system of rights, and that rights are conventions, which of course require a certain measure of standardisation. The disagreement from this point has seemed to involve the question of whether I can sensibly hold to a system of rights, given my disavowal of the State. My response has been to point out that, not only is the State a truly miserable candidate for rights-bestower (or whatever job it is supposed to do here), it is also perfectly possible for spontaneous order and cooperation to arise in the absence of a State. This latter point is one which you now seem prepared to concede. So, as things stand, I feel like my position is vindicated. — Virgo Avalytikh

The point is that making the basis of the hierarchy (the principal right), the right to private ownership, undermines the very thing which makes a system of rights possible, and this is having things in common. So the NAP is backward. It belittles the very thing which makes a system of rights possible, yet it requires a system of rights itself. A true system of rights must start in (be based in) commonality (that which strengthens any system of rights because rights are agreements), what we all have in common, and proceed from there toward the properties of individuals. it cannot start from the properties of individuals.

I do not at all concede to your concept of "spontaneous order". I think it is illogical. As I said, in the absence of State, can come people with a loving, caring, and sharing disposition, and this must be cultured, it is not spontaneous. Further, a claim to the right of private property is inconsistent with this loving, caring and sharing, and so is not conducive to any cooperation.. That's why the NAP is fool's play, it induces disagreement.

Dualism assumes there are entities that have a reality independent of particulars. In this context it's the Platonic Forms (which Aristotle rejected). — Andrew M

I look at this as contradictory. An entity is by definition a particular. I find this to be a common problem with modern day philosophers, they define "dualism" in such a way as to make dualism impossible, then they frown on dualism as if no rational individual would ever accept it.

Yes, but as an actual particular, not as an independent form. Adapted to a modern scientific context, the universe is that grounding existent and, in its reference frame, is the unmoved mover (with nothing external to it). Note the parallels with a modern scientific analysis: — Andrew M

The universe, as it is understood in modern cosmology, does not qualify as an unmoved mover according to Aristotle's principles. In Bk. 12, Ch.7 of Metaphysics he describes the unmoved mover as a thinking which has as its object, the same thing as the object of its desire, such that the apparent good is the same as the real good. This is a final cause, as motion is caused by "being loved". Many commentators refer to this as a divine thinking, thinking on thinking, This produces eternal circular motion such as the motion of the planets. Circular motion is eternal because the perfect circle can have no beginning point nor end point. I admit that the no-boundaries theory of the universe is similar to Aristotle's eternal circular motion, but it does not contain the final cause, which is an essential part of "unmoved mover", as the cause of the motion. This is why Aristotle is very clearly dualist, the cause of motion of material objects is a 'thinking'.

The universe is as universal as it gets and it is the precondition for the (particular) subsystems for which change and time are applicable. — Andrew M

The "universe" is not necessarily the precondition for particulars. We observe particulars, and we can conclude the reality of particulars, from empirical evidence, but we need a principle of unity to conclude that all the particulars are part of a whole, "the universe". Empirical knowledge brings us to assume the reality of particulars, but it gives us nothing to validate "the whole", because we do not see that which causes unity. Without the principle of unity, 'the universe" is an untenable concept, and this is exactly what has happened in modern physics resulting in "the multiverse". Prior to special relativity, "time" was regarded as an absolute, and this was, for practical purposes, the principle of unity, every particular shares the same "now" in time, thus a unity of "what is". This is represented in The Old Testament as God, 'I am that I am', and Plato's Parmenides, 'the Idea is like the day, no matter how many different places partake of the day, it does not affect or change the day itself. Unity is ideal.

I can't see the point of the analogy. Consider a deck of 52 playing cards. You might argue that the 52 parts of the deck are all divided and distinct, and not parts of one deck. But then you are not talking about a deck anymore, you are talking about a bunch of distinct things. You can emphasize the separation between the parts which constitute the whole, or you can emphasize the union of the parts which make up the whole, but if you deny the union, you have no right to talk about the whole. So if you deny the union between Protestants and Catholics you have no right to talk about Christians.

This is why I asked if the standardisation to which you make appeal must be absolute. If the argument is something like ‘standardisation beats disunity, the State breeds standardisation, anarchy breeds disunity, therefore the State beats anarchy’, then the argument is defeated fairly definitively simply by pointing out that Statism gives rise to its own kind of disunity. — Virgo Avalytikh

So this is false. The "disunity" which you refer to here is artificial, manufactured by your way of speaking. You are talking about Protestants and Catholics as if they are not unified in Christianity, and you imply that the distinct forms of Protestantism are not unified as Protestant. That's like talking about the 52 distinct playing cards as if they are not one deck. Sure, you can talk about things in this way, but your conclusion that the parts of a whole are a "kind of disunity" is completely unacceptable because you have simply chosen an inappropriate description. The unity exists whether you recognize it, or choose to talk about the parts as distinct, calling them a disunity.

But there is more to it. What if the aggression to which Statism gives rise is of a scale that no anarchistic situation could ever dream of? Just look at the 20th century, the bloodiest century in history. 40 million dead in WW1, 85 million dead in WW2, and (estimates vary) probably more than 90 million deaths across various communist regimes. These are Statist phenomena. If anarchy obtained, and this was the death toll that resulted, I am sure you would see this as proof-positive that anarchy tends towards animalistic aggression. No doubt, this is passed off as a ‘blip’, as Statism ‘going wrong’. After all, not all States are created equal, and ours are the good guys. We can trust them to use their monopoly on force in the right way, rather than in a corrupt or murderous way. Well, the numbers are what they are, and this century is still young. We may see worse still before we’re through. By the time we do, it will be too late to recant. Send the ring back to Mordor and destroy it. No one can be trusted with it. That is just wisdom. — Virgo Avalytikh

All these killings and yet many would argue that the world has already passed into overpopulation.

One of the reasons why the State’s monopoly on force has perdured for so long is because it has successfully persuaded the vast majority of people that a State is absolutely necessary, and that there could not be a functioning society without one. — Virgo Avalytikh

You talk about the State as if it is a person with the power of persuasion. It is not, and this is another good example of your doublespeak. People persuade other people, groups of people persuade people, the State doesn't persuade anyone. If people are persuaded that a State is absolutely necessary, they have persuade each other. But this is to be expected, as I explained the learning institutions ensure that we see things in a similar way. And that's what learning is, learning is standardization. So I wouldn't really call this persuasion, it's just a matter of learning the accepted conventions.

For that very State to be the principal agent of ‘educating’ entire generations of people is as bone-chillingly Orwellian as the State dictating the language by which we may formulate such criticism. — Virgo Avalytikh

More of the same doublespeak. The State is not an agent, nor does the State educate people. People educate each other, and they generally follow the conventions. But even the conventions themselves allow people to go outside of the conventions. These are conventions of freedom. So when we educate ourselves for example, we are free to consider things which are unconventional. This is why anarchism may be discussed and explored, it is unconventional, but the conventions do not force us to remain within the conventions. The conventions actually allow for freedom of thought and expression.

In effect, you have simply been making Hobbes’s argument: human interaction, in its natural state, is a war of all and against all, in which everyone aggresses against everyone else to benefit at another’s expense, and the only escape from this situation is for there to be a State which maintains order. There is already ample reason for doubting that States do in fact maintain any adequate degree of order, given that they are agencies of aggression, and are responsible for more violence and death than any private agent could dream of. — Virgo Avalytikh

That is not what I have said at all. I said this:

I will add, that I think this culturing consists of two important parts. One is a demonstration of unity, people working together in cooperation which shows that agreement is good, in Christianity this is referred to as love. The other is the standardized principles which are taught in schools, these help us to see things in the same way, facilitating agreement. So we have two levels of conditions which facilitate agreement. First there is the deep level, this is a disposition to be friendly, helpful, caring and loving. This provides the person with an attitude that agreement is good, and inspires the person to be agreeable. The first level provides the foundation, the conditions by which the second level may come into existence. When people have the underlying disposition to be agreeable, they will agree to having things in common, like schools and other institutions which are mostly State-run, or follow principles provided by the State. — Metaphysician Undercover

The State only emerges in the second level. Prior to this, at the first level, there is cooperation, people being helpful, caring, loving and agreeable. But this attitude only exists if it's cultured. From this general attitude of caring for each other, comes communion, sharing, having things in common. A State can only come from this, having things in common.

This is why I posted the essay by Friedman. ‘A Positive Account of Property Rights’ is concerned precisely with the question of how individuals bargain themselves up out of the Hobbesian state of nature. — Virgo Avalytikh

Clearly I do not agree with the Hobbesian description.

If nothing else, please read Friedman’s essay and watch the video on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (10 minutes only). — Virgo Avalytikh

Well, I looked over the essay, I can't say I read it thoroughly. It doesn't seem to say anything about loving, caring, sharing, developing an agreeable attitude, and having things in common, which as I described is necessary for the existence of rights. The author seems to be obsessed by some Hobbesian fantasy.

I think we've made substantial progress towards understanding each other, though it's a slow process. Let me see if I can summarize where we stand. I dismiss the NAP as a principle which could be applied in practise upon abolition of the State, because the NAP requires a system of rights, which is provided for by the institutions of the State. You have proposed that the conventions required for such a system could come into existence through spontaneous order. I think that conventions consist of freely made agreements, and that people must be cultured in a particular way to be agreeable with one another in order for such conventions to exist. And, I think that this way of culturing people is provided for by the institutions of the State.

I will add, that I think this culturing consists of two important parts. One is a demonstration of unity, people working together in cooperation which shows that agreement is good, in Christianity this is referred to as love. The other is the standardized principles which are taught in schools, these help us to see things in the same way, facilitating agreement. So we have two levels of conditions which facilitate agreement. First there is the deep level, this is a disposition to be friendly, helpful, caring and loving. This provides the person with an attitude that agreement is good, and inspires the person to be agreeable. The first level provides the foundation, the conditions by which the second level may come into existence. When people have the underlying disposition to be agreeable, they will agree to having things in common, like schools and other institutions which are mostly State-run, or follow principles provided by the State.

The system of rights, which the NAP presupposes, requires both levels of agreement. Notice that the second level of agreement, from which conventions like "rights" emerge, already requires agreement on having things in common, which emerges from the first level of agreement. Therefore any proposed system of rights, with any real applicability, must be based in a principle of having things in common. To base a system of rights in private ownership would undermine the foundation, (what is provided for by the first level, having things in common), leaving all conventions such as 'rights" which are derived from the second level, as untenable. Agreement on having things in common is necessary to any system of rights.

Are Forms and forms thought to be incompatible? — AJJ

I think Aquinas demonstrated that the two conceptions are compatible.

There are few problems with this. — Virgo Avalytikh

That's good, few problems is good, many problems is bad.

First, I would ask how much standardisation you believe to be necessary. Must it be absolute? — Virgo Avalytikh

Clearly, "absolute" in standardization is impossible.

If two nation-States both believe themselves (or their citizens) to have some sort of rightful claim over a territory, by what higher standard do they resolve their dispute? There is none, and so, just as two individuals with competing conventions would break out into violence and the winner would be determined by arbitrary force, so too would the two nations break out into war and, once again, justice would be the advantage of the stronger. Even a multinational political union could only ever be a partial solution. In order for a State to do the work you need it do philosophically, there really can be only one of them, and its scale must be global. Anything short of that, and the standardisation problem which you seem to be levelling at the an-cap position is equally applicable to a Statist situation. — Virgo Avalytikh

I don't see that this is a good argument. Essentially you are arguing that if two nation-States come to war over an issue of territory rights, (like the Falklands Islands for example), this is no better than having all human beings acting like wild animals or very young children, running around fighting with each other over every single object which they seek to use. Notice that in the former case, the majority of people are living in peace for the majority of the time, with a few issues arising which might cause battles, while in the latter case, the majority of people are battling each other for the majority of the time. That is why I consider the former situation to be better than the latter.

If, on the other hand, the standardisation does not strictly have to be absolute, then there is no reason why a State is necessary at all to preserve and enforce it. Once we establish the precedent that a convention can exist and be enforced at something less than a global scale, there is no longer any in-principle reason why its enforcement can only be done by the kind of thing that a State is. This is especially the case since, as I have pointed out on a number of occasions, the services of rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution can be (and, to a significant extent, are) provided by private agencies. — Virgo Avalytikh

Again, this is a very bad argument. You've mentioned the possibility of "as many rights-conventions as there are individuals", but that's not really possible because a "convention" requires agreement amongst individuals. So the issue is not enforcing the convention, it is a matter of creating and maintaining agreement. This is done through the educational institutions, not enforcement. Enforcement is only for the few who step out of line of the laws. If we stop funding educational institutions because they are an expensive State-run enterprise, and educate in other fragmented ways, standardized conventions will be lost to a multiplicity of fragmented conventions.

You really cannot portray conventions as being enforced, because conventions are a matter of freely agreeing. This is why the existence of conventions relies on standardized education, not the use of force. When I say that the State upholds the conventions through the means of its institutions, there are many more institutions than the ones I mentioned.

Moreover, we ought not to underestimate the tendency of individuals to arrive at a spontaneous order in the absence of coercive institutions. — Virgo Avalytikh

You might refer to educational institutions as "coercive institutions", but if you call this aggression, I think it is outside the NAP definition, so I think that would be equivocation. Anyway, the idea of "spontaneous order" was disproven by science in its original form of "spontaneous generation", though some people have rejuvenated the idea as abiogenesis. Regardless of how you present it, "spontaneous order" is illogical and inconsistent with fundamental metaphysical principles. I think that what you call "the tendency of individuals to arrive at spontaneous order" is really mostly the result of standardized education.

Spontaneous order occurs because it is in individuals’ interests to enter into peaceful constant dealings with others, and it is private property and non-aggression which allows this to take place. And, while the integrity of such a system requires the means of enforcing one’s rights against aggressors, the very system of private property and non-aggression is capable of producing such services without violating anyone’s rights, by the standards of the system. — Virgo Avalytikh

Here you go, wandering around in your circle, lost. You have explained the conventions as coming into existence through "spontaneous order", and now you say that the system of private property along with non-aggression is capable of producing the spontaneous order. See the circle? The system of property rights is a convention, which you have said could come into existence through spontaneous order. However, you here say that having a system of property rights is a condition which is conducive to such a spontaneous order. The "circle" is always a problem with this illogical concept of "spontaneous order". The so-called "spontaneous" order only comes into existence under the right conditions, but "the right conditions" itself requires an ordering. This ordering, to create the necessary conditions, is actually created by the thing which is supposed to come into existence from the spontaneous order. So the claim of "spontaneous order" really just reflects a completely different, unobserved ordering at a deeper level which is not immediately evident. In any case, I'm really surprised that a person of your intelligence would suggest the ridiculous idea that a system of property rights could come into existence through spontaneous order. And I'm even more surprised that you would also say that a system of property rights would be the favourable condition for such spontaneous order to occur.

I thought we had come to the agreement together that the NAP presupposes property. After I drew attention to the fact that this is universally acknowledged among libertarian theorists (the NAP being a libertarian principle, after all), I thought this was an agreement we had reached. Is this not so? My claim, in any case, is that the dependence relationship between the NAP and a system of property rights is one that is logical and not temporal, so I am not committed to holding off on ‘NAP-talk’ until after I have successfully realised a particular system of property rights in the world. — Virgo Avalytikh

Right, the relationship between property rights, and the NAP as libertarians propose, is logical. I've shown that the premise is false therefore the logic is unsound. The NAP is based in unsound logic, so it ought not be considered as a principle which could be applied in practise. Of course you can talk about it all you want, but I don't see the point in talking about it as if it is a principle which could be practised, unless your intent is to deceive.

The only sense in which a State may be said to ‘solve’ such a disagreement, as far as I can see, is simply by picking a winner, and enforcing a single system of rights upon everyone. — Virgo Avalytikh

I agree with you here, remember, I am not supporting Statism, so I am not going to say that the system of rights enforced by the State is necessarily reasonable or just. But the state has the institutions, courts, judges, police, by which "a single system of rights" might be enforced. The NAP presupposes such a system of rights, requires it, without the means to produce or maintain it. Furthermore, the system of the State is one agreed upon by the convention of those in the position of forming such conventions, and this is intended to create a representation of what is agreeable to the general population at that time. With all of the institutions in place, intended to ensure that the use of force by the State is restricted to those conventions which are agreeable to the general population, it is completely irrational for you, an individual person, to refer to this as "arbitrary use of force".

It is just not altogether clear what you mean by ‘State’, nor what kind of philosophical work the State is doing in your argument. The arguments you are attempting to level against libertarianism can only be successful if the State solves the problems you raise. But I am still in the dark as to how it is supposed to do so. Can you explain? As things stand, the work the State seems to be doing is to enforce one particular system of property rights upon everyone (within its territory, that is). But whether that system is the right one remains to be seen. — Virgo Avalytikh

Having a particular system of rights, which is intended to represent what is agreeable to the population in general, enforced by the institutions of the State, I believe is far better than having a multitude of systems of rights, enforced by the NAP, which would be absolutely impotent because the NAP requires a particular system of rights to have any practical application.

But if the State is not the source of conventions, and conventions can and do exist independently of the State, and if conventions can be enforced by non-States, I fail to see how you arrive at a State. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is where your faulty definition of "aggression" is at play in your little game. You assume, conventions can be enforced by non-States, which is fine. But your NAP, with your definition of "aggression" places the right to ownership as the highest right. This is a convention which I, as well as others, cannot agree to. Therefore it is very clear that as much as you might create a non-State entity which respects the NAP, others will create a non-State entity with no respect for the NAP. You assume to have the "right" to defend your property with force according to your principles, and the others assume a right to seize your property with force, according to their principles, and there is no peace. What good is the NAP if the vast majority of people refer to some other principle of rights?

But whether that system is the right one remains to be seen. — Virgo Avalytikh

It's irrelevant whether the system is "the right" one. This is because organization and cooperation amongst people is better than disorganization and lack of cooperation, as it is conducive to a happy, peaceful life for the human population. Furthermore, if the persons charged with creating the conventions have a true respect for the general population, the State will have a good system, and be on track toward finding "the right" system.

If it is your claim, that the system of the State has as its end, something bad, and the organization and cooperation within the state is all going toward a bad goal, then you ought to be able to make a demonstration of this. Placing ownership of property as the highest goal of human existence, as your NAP does, and implying that the State's goal is to misappropriate the properties of individuals, therefore the goal of the State is something bad is just foolish, irrational talk.

If you want to demonstrate that the State is bad, get to some real principles, rather than playing with material objects like a child.

It is not possible to prioritise a non-property-right over a property right, because all rights are fundamentally property rights. I made this point here:

As I observed above, fundamentally all rights are really just rights of use or ownership over scarce resources which have alternative uses. The right to do anything in particular is really a right to do what one wants with a resource which might have instead gone to serve someone else’s ends. So the whole question of ‘rights’ in general is really just a question of resource allocation to someone or other, to serve someone or other’s separate ends.

And it certainly appeared as though you concede this point: — Virgo Avalytikh

Sure, I conceded that point concerning "rights", but didn't you also notice that I appealed to something higher than rights? It is through the appeal to a higher principle that we have the means to prioritize rights. Notice above, I am talking about goals, and good and bad. This is the basis of morality, and rights are grounded in morality, not property ownership. Don't you think that the latter (rights are grounded in property ownership) is a rather foolish opinion? Rights concern property ownership, but you cannot ground a principle in itself, that would be circular, and not a grounding at all. So we ground rights in morality, and produce a hierarchy of rights accordingly.

Maybe you need to refine what you intend by ‘take advantage of’. In a voluntary trade, we both ‘take advantage of’ each other, in the sense that we both benefit from one another’s existence. — Virgo Avalytikh

If you do not recognize that there are transactions where one person takes advantage of another, or a group takes advantage of another group, and it is not by means of fraud or lying, and that these instances ought to be discouraged rather than encouraged, then I do not see any point in discussing this.