I think this is where my main problem lies. You are claiming that, in the grand scheme of things (ignoring fringe cases) any interaction that is not aggression - initiatory use of force, as you put it - is beneficial for everyone involved. The only way I can see this claim working is if you bend aggression to encompass a whole lot more than just the initiatory use of force. — Echarmion

That's right, that's why I mentioned to Virgo other forms of aggression, aggressive sales and aggressive trading on the market. When we are confronted with such "aggressions" we often make mistakes in our decisions. And these mistakes result in trades which are not mutually beneficial.

There is a leap being made here, and I do not make it with you. You seem to be saying, ‘We need to establish a universal convention of property rights first, and only then can we start talking about the NAP.’ — Virgo Avalytikh

This is your claim not mine, the NAP "presupposes" a system of property rights. Therefore there needs to be a universally accepted system of property rights before the NAP can have any merit. Otherwise the NAP is useless because it would be applied differently according to different conventions of property rights. This is obvious. I am just following the logic of your claims. The NAP refers directly to the right to ownership. You have stated this clearly. But if what I believe is my right to ownership is different from what you believe is your right to ownership, we would each apply the NAP differently. So the NAP would be meaningless in this case, useless. And when the land is full of people claiming that you have no right to ownership of what you claim to own, the NAP does nothing for you.

Alright, so let us say that ‘being good’ is a logical precondition of ‘not acting aggressively’. Does this mean that we cannot even have a discussion about the worthiness of non-aggression, until we have got a suitable number of people in the world to be good? I don’t see why. We can develop a system of thought with numerous logical steps, before we seek practically to implement the first, or before we have successfully done so. Of course we may. — Virgo Avalytikh

Sure we can discuss such things, but what force does a discussion impose upon our actions if we fail to agree with one another? When we discuss things and fail to agree, we will each retreat and resort to our own means. Since we haven't agreed on property rights, the NAP could not be relevant.

Again, a complete non sequitur. That the State is the only possible ‘source’ of rights has not yet been justified. Indeed, that the State even can be a ‘source’ of rights has not been justified. It is simply assumed. There is nothing special or mystical about States. They are associations of human individuals, who hold a successful monopoly on the use of force over a historically arbitrary territory. And this leads into another point which ought to be clarified: I do not begin with an opposition to Statism. That is an incidental consequence of libertarianism. It is because the State exists in violation of the NAP that it is objectionable. — Virgo Avalytikh

We've been through this already. I don't claim "the State" as the source of rights. I thought we agreed on "convention". But the State upholds the conventions with the means of force when necessary. Notice I say "when necessary". The majority of conventions are upheld by the State without the use of force, through institutions, because we readily agree to them. But without the State we do not have the institutions, nor the means to uphold the conventions, and the conventions fall apart. "State" and "conventions" co-exist.

That the State violates the NAP is simply an indication that the NAP places the right of ownership higher up in the hierarchy of rights, than the conventions which the State is bound to uphold places that right. The State upholds a multitude of rights, and there is a hierarchy of rights which itself is conventional. That the right to private ownership is limited, restricted, even forfeited in some cases, because other rights are of greater importance, according to the conventions which the State is bound to uphold, is evidence that the NAP is not a good principle. Why ought the right to private ownership be given such priority when the conventions which are presently accepted, and upheld by the state, assign a lesser priority to this right? The State can force one to give up ownership (fines) when that individual has committed offences not covered by the NAP. Clearly there is reason to believe that some rights ought to take priority over property rights. In this case the State is right in forcing one to give up one's property. Valuing private property higher than what is provided for in the conventional hierarchy of rights, validates the use of force against oneself, in contravention of the NAP.

You begin in the opposite direction. You begin with the State, taking for granted both its legitimacy and its necessity, as well as affording it the unique privilege of rights-bestower, and from these assumptions you take it that the libertarian alternative is impossible. But this is not convincing. Rights are principles, abstractions, and to leave the question of which rights are worth recognising, and which are not, to the State is simply un-philosophical. It is nothing short of ‘might makes right’ — Virgo Avalytikh

No. this is not all what I've been arguing.

If you take issue with my thesis that voluntary trade works for mutual benefit, then what I would expect you to do is to provide a counter-instance. — Virgo Avalytikh

I've already given you examples of such, aggressive sales, and aggressive trading. They refer to the means by which one takes advantage of another in business transactions. If one takes advantage of the other, yet it is not fraud, you cannot call this "mutual advantage". Are you not familiar with these terms?

In Aristotle's Physics, the principles of change are matter and form. Form is what is actively changing, and matter is the underlying aspect of a thing which does not change, allowing us to say that it is the same object which has been changed. In Metaphysics, form is actual and matter is potential. This is derived from De Anima where matter which is the substance of the body gives form which is the substance of the soul, its potencies, potential.

I look at "substance" as primarily a logical term for Aristotle. It is defined in his Categories, and doesn't play a big role in his Physics or his De Anima. I look at substance as what substantiates logic, it's almost like what gives a true premise. Primary substance is the particular thing, what we would call the object, and secondary substance is what we would call the logical "subject". In ancient Greece there was an issue (which is actually prevalent today) with sophists assigning identity to the logical subject. This is probably why "ousia" was associated with the subject. But as a subject, is simply how an object is represented within logic, so if there is a problem with this representation, it's like a false premise, and the logic which follows is unsound. This is why Aristotle moved to put identity directly within the thing itself ( a thing is the same as itself), instead of the identity which we give it, what we say about it. So for instance, "Socrates" refers to a particular man, an object, and that object referred to is the primary substance. But if we make "Socrates" a subject of logic, and state the proposition "Socrates is a man"., then the identity of "Socrates" is not the object itself, but what the proposition says about Socrates, "is a man". This is substance in the secondary sense, it substantiates the logic, as the premise. Notice that within the logical system being employed, "Socrates" cannot refer to anything other than a man, this is fixed by the premise, and this is the stipulated identity of "Socrates". But if there is a problem with this initial identification, identifying the object which is referred to as "Socrates" as a man, then the soundness of the logic is off.

That is why Aristotle moved to put the identity of the object right into the object itself (primary substance) rather than what was traditional in the logic of the time, which was to make the identity of a thing, what we say about it, (secondary substance). Notice that what we say about a thing is formal, our descriptions are of the thing's form, what the thing is. But a thing always changes, it's form is changing, while the human description is fixed. So he uses the concept of "matter" to account for that changingness (the potential for change). Then "matter" accounts for that aspect of the object which the human mind cannot grasp, and the difference between the object in its own identity, and the object as identified by human beings. We identify the essence, but the thing itself contains accidents which are associated with the matter.

If you read carefully Aristotle's principal definition of "soul" (Bk2, Ch1) in De Anima, you'll see that the soul is a "form" of a body, the actuality of a body, and that this is a body with life potentially in it. I believe it is important to recognize that the soul for Aristotle is a form. It is not a composition of matter and form, which would be a body, it is just the form. Further, "actuality" is used here in the sense of possession of knowledge, rather than exercising the use of knowledge. So it is a possessive actuality, the body itself manifests as the knowledge possessed by that form. If you read further, you'll see that within the material body itself are the various potencies (potentials) possessed by the soul. These are the powers of the soul, power of self-subsistence, self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, intellection, etc.. The key to understanding that these powers are all potentials, is Aristotle's description that each of these powers is not always active, as the being might be asleep, so the potencies must be actualized, brought into action.

Andrew M insists that the separation between matter and form can only be made in principle, in theory, but it is not a real separation. I argue that Aristotle gives reason to believe in a real separation. First, as I've argued above, he demonstrates that the form of a particular material object is prior in time to the matter/form composite of that object. Now, here in De Anima, the description of the potencies (powers) of the soul, as remaining inactive, in potencia, while the soul is active as the animal lives, requires such a separation between the actuality of the soul, and the various potentials. This separation between the actual and the potential is not just a separation in principle, it is necessarily very real, and is most evident in the case of a seed. The seed may lie dormant, as potential, for a long period of time. The knowledge within the seed is possessed by the soul, but is not actually being used by the soul, so there is a real separation here, between actuality and the potential.

Yes he refers to all of those things. However I'm asking for specific quotes that would demonstrate your claim that they are separable from particulars. Without that, you're assuming dualism without basis in your reading of Aristotle. — Andrew M

I think I've provided you with all that. The formula for the material existence of the particular is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of that particular. What does "dualism" mean to you?

It is relevant because you seemed to deny it in your last two posts. — Andrew M

I surely didn't deny it, it's a principal point of the cosmological argument. What we observe is that the potential for a given thing precedes the actual existence of that thing. This is the case with every particular, material thing. However, the potential for a thing does not necessarily produce the actual existence of that thing, it requires another actuality as a cause of its actual existence. Since we cannot accept an infinite regress (without beginning), there is necessarily an actual existence which is prior to all material existence. This position, that the actuality of formal existence is prior to potentiality of material existence is reinforced by the logic that if there was ever a time when there was only potential without anything actually, there would always be potential without anything actual, because that potential could not actualize itself. However, what we observe is that there is actual existence. Therefore it is necessary that the actual is prior in time to the potential, in an absolute sense. And this is why Aristotle insists that no potential could be eternal, and he refutes Pythagorean idealism on this basis because they posit eternal ideas which Aristotle has demonstrated exist only in potentia.

You regard the form as the agent whereas I regard the particular as the agent. — Andrew M

Under Aristotelian terms, form is actual, matter is potential. A particular thing is a composite of matter and form. However, there must be some sort of form (agent) to act as a cause, in order to account for the actual existence of any particular material object. That form, (agent), as a cause, is prior in time to the material existence of the particular thing. The particular cannot be the agent, as this would mean it is the cause of its own existence.

The form of the geometer (somehow separate from the geometer?) didn't actualize the geometric construction, the geometer did. — Andrew M

The geometer's action is accounted for by final cause, intention, what later became known as free will. So it's true, as you say that the geometer, as a physical object, did act to bring about the geometrical construction on paper, but the cause of that act was a final cause, intention. This is where we see that Aristotle's principles support dualism, in the concept of "final cause", which is distinct from material, formal, and efficient cause. The intent, the form of the construct within the intellect of the geometer (the intellect being a property of the soul such that Aristotle says the form of the construct is in the soul of the artist) is the active cause, "agent".

A true but cryptic response. Do you think fruit would exist without particular fruit such as pears and apples? — Andrew M

The point for Aristotle, is not so much whether the universal form is prior to the particular. That is more of an issue for Plato in the Timaeus, and the Neo-Platonists, who describe this as a progression, or emanation. The One, being most universal is first, and imparts itself to the less and less universal, with the form of the individual being the last. What Aristotle demonstrates is that the form of the particular thing is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of that thing.

The Neo-Platonists took this principle much further to speculate about how the form of the particular, which is necessarily prior in time to the material particular, comes from a more universal form. This is more like the relationship between the part and the whole.

I find your question is badly worded. I do believe there was fruit before there was pears or apples. So the wording of your question is clearly devised so as to be pointed toward a desired answer.

That, I think, best captures Aristotle's thinking about the natural world and makes sense of his rejection of Platonic forms. — Andrew M

As I said, Aristotle clearly denied matter without form, but he did not deny form without matter. In fact, the principles of his Metaphysics necessitate it, as is evident in his cosmological argument. Understanding Aristotle's cosmological argument is very important to understanding his metaphysics, because it unlocks the door to understanding the consistency between Aristotle, Neo-Platonists, and Christian theology.

I wonder if Virgo isn’t actually an older white male billionaire? She’s certainly a cheerleader for their cause. — Noah Te Stroete

Virgo claims to be a cheerleader for the wealthy, but really acts toward removing the rights to ownership with anarchism. That's why I call it deception. No State, means no universal convention on property ownership, means the NAP is inapplicable. It's deception to circulate the NAP as if a billionaire's right to ownership would be respected without the State to support it. I think Virgo is seeking financing for the anarchist cause. Give to anarchism, we guarantee your property rights with the NAP, at a cost much less than taxes.

And being able to leave if I disagree with the laws of that land. — Obscuration

That's a tough one, emigration isn't so easy.

That there is a plurivocity of opinions doesn’t mean that we should throw away the whole enterprise. People who disagree about the precise substance of rights may still agree that there ought to be a system of rights, just as two people may have completely different ontologies while still agreeing that ontology is meaningful and worthy. Moreover, the fact that there may be diverse conventions with regards to rights does not imply that all conventions are created equal. Some systems of rights are good and worthy, and some are not. This is where political philosophy has a role to play. By the same token, the fact that one system of rights might be recognised as ‘conventional’ does not imply that there is not a better system of rights that we might choose to employ. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, we can probably all agree that there ought to be a system of property rights, but this doesn't make such a convention magically appear. But the NAP, as described by you, presupposes the existence of such a system. So it is the NAP which ought to be thrown away, because its principal prerequisite does not exist. Once convention on property rights is established, then we might decide whether something like the NAP is called-for.

Coming at it from a slightly different angle (though it amounts to the same thing), rights determine the acceptable use of force. — Virgo Avalytikh

But you have been proposing a completely different angle, one in which the State has been abolished. At this point, there are no rights, that's the important point which you do not seem to be grasping. At this point we cannot say "rights determine the acceptable use of force" because there are no rights, the revolt is against the State which is the support of the existing rights. At this point, the use of force will be inevitable, it will be required to abolish the State. Furthermore, the use of force will play a role in determining which rights are acceptable, not vise versa.

The alternative to a system of rights is for there to be no principled system of resource-allocation, and no principled system determining the acceptable use of force. — Virgo Avalytikh

That situation follows inevitably from the anarchist induced abolition of the State. It is inevitable because of disagreement. There will be disagreement concerning the need to abolish the State, therefore disagreement as to whether such force is "acceptable use of force". The NAP which might be touted by those who abolish the State will not be respected because the Statists will declare wrongful use of force. And, as I pointed out, if the State is abolished, the NAP would then have no system of property rights to support it, so it becomes completely meaningless anyway.

What you have presented does not pose a particular threat to the worthiness of the NAP. Your argument seems to be that, since the NAP presupposes a system of rights, and since rights are conventions, and since there is no single, definitive convention regarding rights, the NAP should be abandoned. I don’t see how this follows. — Virgo Avalytikh

Try looking at it this way. Suppose we have a principle which states "if we are good, we will not act aggressively". Notice that "we will not act aggressively" requires "we are good", just like the NAP requires a system of property rights. Trying to get people to not act aggressively is impossible and a useless exercise if the people are not good. What is required is to make the people good. Likewise, trying to get people to respect and obey the NAP is impossible, and a useless exercise without an agreed upon system of property rights, because the NAP requires that. So what is required to work on is an acceptable system of property rights. That's how normative principles work, it's pointless to push a principle without the necessary conditions for application of the principle.

If you disagree, can you provide a specific quote where Aristotle would distinguish and refer to "immaterial form" and "material form"? — Andrew M

The point is that Aristotle does not disallow the possibility of form without matter, as he does disallow matter without form. He does not say specifically "immaterial form", but he refers to Ideas, essences, Forms, and intelligible objects throughout his Metaphysics, and clearly determines that essence is substance in Bk.7. Remember, in his Categories there are two distinct substances, primary and secondary substance. In his Metaphysics he looks at being qua being and determines that it is necessary to conclude that essence is substantial, this is Ch.6.

Now, in Ch.7 of Bk.7 he explains "agency", this is what is necessary for the coming to be (becoming) of any thing. It is necessary that the form of the thing, what the thing will be when it comes into being, is prior in time to the material existence of the thing, in order that the thing will be the thing that it is, and not something else. This is explained earlier, and supported by his law of identity. A material thing is a particular composition of matter, with a particular form, not other than it is, and not something random. So the form of the thing (what it will be) is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing. In the case of a thing produced by art, the form comes from the soul of the artist. So in Ch.8 it is stated that form is put into matter. I had a long discussion about this section of A's Metaphysics with dfpolis in another thread. Df argued that the form (as the source of actuality, what a thing actually is) of a thing came from within the matter, but this is inconsistent with Aristotle because matter is potential, and Aristotle clearly describes here that the form is put into the matter. This necessitates that the form of a particular thing exists independently of, and prior in time to, the material existence of that thing.

I'm well aware of the senses in which actuality is prior to potentiality but that is not what I was referring to. The temporal sense in which actuality is not prior to potentiality is discussed by Aristotle where he says, "... for the individual actuality is posterior in generation to its potentiality." (Aristot. Met. 9.1051a) [italics mine] — Andrew M

I cannot see how this is relevant. The potential for a particular material actuality precedes that material actuality in time, this is clear. However, to actualize that particular potential, rather than some other potential (because potentials consist of multitudes) requires an act of agency. It is this actuality, the act of agency, which is necessarily prior in time to the existence of any particular thing, which is being discussed here. The need to assume this form of "actuality" is what necessitates dualism. There is an act of agency which is necessary for the existence of any material thing, this is what accounts for the actual existence of a contingent thing. Since there cannot be an infinite regression of material things backward in time, one prior to the other infinitely, there is the need to assume an actuality (Form) which is prior in time to the existence of all material things. That is the cosmological argument.

Primary substance is particular such as Socrates or an apple. Secondary substance is formal, such as man or fruit. To suppose that man or fruit are separable from particulars comes from Plato, not Aristotle. This is what Aristotle's rejection of Platonic forms was about and it is why Platonism and hylomorphism are not consistent with each other. Though, of course, Aristotle is fine with "taking that which does not exist in separation and considering it separately" (Aristot. Met. 13.1078a) [italics mine]. — Andrew M

"Substance" is substance, whether it is primary or secondary substance. It appears like you haven't read Metaphysics Bk.7.



What evolves in later Platonism (Timaeus, Aristotle, Neo-Platonism), which is inconsistent with modern day representation of "Platonism", is a distinction between the Ideas produced by the human mind, and the true separate Forms. This separation is necessary to account for the imperfections of human Ideas. Human Ideas are created through abstraction, and appear to be posterior in time to sensible, material existence, while the separate Forms are necessarily prior in time to material existence. Aquinas provides a very coherent description of this difference. The forms of the human intellect, abstraction, conceptions etc., do not have separate existence, they are dependent on the material existence of the human being, and this material existence accounts for the deficiencies of these forms. However, there are separate Forms, property of the divine intellect, which are not dependent on material existence, material existence is dependent on these Forms.

The idea of right-wing anarchism strikes me as rather ridiculous. Since the poor outnumber the rich by a vast majority, how could these people reach a consensus which would allow the rich property owners to maintain their wealth? Who puts forth such crazy ideas ... Virgo?

Dualism doesn't follow from Aristotle's examples. The soul is not separable from the body - it is always the particular that acts (and thus is the locus of causality, including final cause). That is standard hylomorphism. — Andrew M

Aristotle denies that matter can exist independent of form, but not that form can exist independent of matter. And, when you understand the earlier part of his Metaphysics, which I referred to earlier, you'll see that the form of a thing is necessarily prior (in time) to the material existence of that thing. This necessitates a dualism between the immaterial form and the material form.

Logically, but not temporally. Which is what Aristotle says in the last sentence of the Chapter 9 quote. — Andrew M

He clearly argues that actuality is prior to potentiality temporally at the end of Ch 9, Bk 9, "so that the potency proceeds from an actuality". That's why potential cannot be eternal. I think you ought to read the entirety of Bk. 9, especially Ch. 8 where he explains in what sense actuality is prior to potentiality in time. 1050b, (5) "...one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover.".

We agree that something actual is needed to actualize a potential. However the Aristotelian position is that that thing must be substantial, not merely formal. That is what we observe. — Andrew M

For Aristotle there are two senses of "substance" primary substance and secondary substance. One can be said to be material, the other formal. He provides the principles to deny that there can be material substance without form, but there are no principles to deny a substance which is form. without matter. This is why the Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians who posit independent Forms as substance, maintain consistency with Aristotle.

The perceived threat is the military in the grand scheme of things, NOT Joe Schmoe who became excessively upset his boyfriend/girllfriend, or even extremist group personnel. Is Joe a threat? Of course, but not as large as a threat as the government entity trying to care for me.

30 people can do massive damage to an area when the citizens do not have the same weapons and tactical knowledge when they themselves are highly trained and capable. — Obscuration

Actually, contrary to what you say, if the citizenry are unarmed, and the military is armed, the citizenry will be subdued with very little "damage". But if the citizenry is armed and decides to take on the military, that's when you'd have "massive damage".

Remember that time is simply changes/motion. — Terrapin Station

That's nonsense. How do you account for the difference between past and future with a definition of time like that?



That's exactly right. There must something which remains the same, through the temporal duration, in order that our calling it "the same river" is a valid identity. Aristotle resolved this discrepancy between being/not being (Parmenides), and becoming (Heraclitus) with his duality of matter/form. Identity, under the law of identity, as "the same thing", does not require that the identified thing does not change, it requires that the thing is the same as itself, therefore not other than itself, and this does not exclude the possibility that the thing is changing.

I would think this would be a huge problem for anarchists. With anarchy there would be no single convention on property ownership, so to propose a form of anarchism which pretends to be based in a system of property rights requires that those property rights be explicitly expressed. If these principles of property rights were adhered to, then I think we would just end up with a State, and not a form of anarchy.

There's more to life than private property. I have a lot of possessions, and they mean a lot to me. Some I bought, some given to me, some I found, and there's probably a few that I borrowed and forgot to return. Each one is in my possession and is mine. But if I said I have the right to claim any of these things as my private property I'd be referring to the legal status given by the State.

It doesn't follow in the least that therefore libertarians 'don't have' a system of property rights — Virgo Avalytikh

A multitude of different, incompatible philosophies of property rights does not constitute a system of rights. We've agreed already that rights follow from conventions. So when people do not agree there is no convention, therefore no rights. What you describe is incompatible philosophies, not conventions.

I would say that a major task of political philosophy is to determine in a reasoned way what kinds of conventions in relations to property are worth recognising and which are not. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, if we can pick and choose which philosophies of property rights we would like to recognize, and call these "conventions", doesn't that mean we can choose our rights? What good is the NAP if it presupposes a system of property rights, and is built on property rights as its foundation, but each individual is allowed to choose one's own system of property rights, depending on their preferred philosophy?

The fact that there are differences of opinion on this question is not to say that there are not or could not be such conventions; it simply requires us to do the hard work that political philosophers do. — Virgo Avalytikh

The problem though, is with the NAP. As you aptly demonstrated, it presupposes property rights, it requires them, and is meaningless, useless without them. Now you admit that such conventions (which establish property rights) don't even exist, and require philosophers to do the hard work of producing them. Therefore the NAP is meaningless, useless. So, let's dump the NAP as not worth the paper it is written on. Agree? Or, would you keep pushing the NAP creating the illusion that people who presently own property protected under rights given by the State, would maintain such property rights if the State were dissolved? I think that's deception.

And, as they all recognise, it presupposes a system of property rights. — Virgo Avalytikh

We've come back to the same issue we started with. You disavow the State, which gives a system of property rights, but at the same time you presuppose a system of property rights. Unless you produce an acceptable statement of property rights, you have no system of property rights, and therefore your presupposition is void, false. You've shown me two, very distinct and incompatibles systems of property rights, claimed by libertarians, the left and the right. Clearly the incompatibility between these two indicates that there is no such thing as the libertarian system of property rights, and your presupposition is void, false.

Your initial assertion was that the NAP is incompatible with private property. — Virgo Avalytikh

To be more precise, I said that the NAP is incompatible with the right to private property. You have shown me the fundamental disagreement between right and left on this issue of property rights, such that you have demonstrated that there is no such thing as convention on property rights. Therefore there is no "system of property rights". The NAP presupposes the existence of something which does not exist, a system of property rights. The convention required for there to be a system of property rights does not exist, yet the NAP presupposes such. That is why the right to private property (something recognized as non-existent, by lack of convention) is incompatible with the NAP which presupposes the existence of that right.

So to take the first example ("Why is the sum of the interior angles of a triangle equal to two right angles?"), the parallel line is drawn by the geometer. The "act of thinking" does not mean that the construction is in the geometer's mind, it means that drawing the line is an intelligent act (by the geometer). Once drawn, the question about the angles can then easily be answered. Similarly for the second example. — Andrew M

Right, now we have here what you call "an intelligent act". This is an act with a purpose, its purpose is to demonstrate the angles. The cause of such an act, in Aristotelian terms is a final cause. In Aristotle's biology, the existence of such acts is accounted for by the soul. And this is why he is dualist.

What Aristotle is showing here is that mathematical (and thus universal or eternal) truths can be discovered by acting intelligently on sensible objects, in this case the geometrical drawing of a particular triangle and a particular line. — Andrew M

But his demonstration goes deeper than this. Notice that he is arguing in this section, that actuality is prior to potentiality, in all senses of the word "prior". So he turns this against Pythagorean idealists, and those Platonists who adhere to Pythagorean idealism, to show that it is impossible that such mathematical "Ideas" are eternal. This is his famous refutation of such Idealism, known as the cosmological argument. It is impossible that potential is eternal. That is, looking back in time, it is impossible that potential is prior to actual. Converted to look ahead in time, this becomes the principle of plenitude, given enough time any potential will be actualize, so potential cannot be eternal in that way either.

The geometrical figures (as geometrical) are neither located in a separate Platonic realm nor in the mind, they inhere in sensible objects either as potentials (before construction) or actuals (after construction) and thus are a legitimate source of knowledge. — Andrew M

Let's assume that the geometrical figures inhere in the sensible world, prior to being actualized by the human mind, as potentials. According to Aristotle's cosmological argument, there must be something actual which is prior to these potentials. This is because if the potential was prior in time to the actual, it would not have the capacity to actualize itself, so there would always be only potential without any actuality. Something actual is needed to actualize a potential. And what we glean from observation is that there is something actual, therefore actuality is prior to potential. The Neo-Platonists, and Christian theologians take up this argument for Forms (actualities) which are prior to material existence (material existence having the nature of potential).

It’s not a ‘problem’ at all. In a system of thought, some beliefs are relatively basic and some are derived. I have made no secret of the fact that the NAP presupposes a system of property rights; this is a point I have made numerous times. — Virgo Avalytikh

You're going around in circles, we've covered this already. The NAP does not presuppose property rights, that is your twisted interpretation. You have explicitly stated what is protected by right according to the NAP as "that which belongs to oneself". I grant you one's own body as "that which belongs to oneself". You have disavowed the State, so you cannot turn to any legal principles of ownership provided by the State. How do you get from here to a system of property rights?

As I observed above, fundamentally all rights are really just rights of use or ownership over scarce resources which have alternative uses. The right to do anything in particular is really a right to do what one wants with a resource which might have instead gone to serve someone else’s ends. So the whole question of ‘rights’ in general is really just a question of resource allocation to someone or other, to serve someone or other’s separate ends. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, I'll go with this, it sounds reasonable.

In regard to the concrete question of how a specific property right is generated in the first instance, there are two main competing views in the literature. Right-libertarians in the tradition of Locke argue that all external resources are originally unowned, and come to be owned as individuals engage in productive acts of transformation (‘homesteading’). Thereafter, just property titles are transferred through peaceful exchange, or gift. Left-libertarians, by contrast, and more in the tradition of Rousseau, consider all the resources in the world to be owned by everyone in an egalitarian manner. The arguments both ways are voluminous and technical, but if you can get your hands on ‘Left-Libertarianism and its Critics’ (Hillel Steiner and Peter Vallentyne, eds.), there is nothing better out there for exploring these issues. — Virgo Avalytikh

You propose here two distinct perspectives on property rights, Right-libertarian versus Left-libertarian. The two are not reconcilable. But from what I said above, we have an NAP which, contrary to your belief, does not require a system of rights. So why dwell on this issue of property rights? There is no need for property rights, it's a distraction from good governance.

Put a pin in the word ‘aggression’ for moment. There is a philosophically and practically meaningful distinction between the initiatory use of force which invades that which belongs to another, and the defensive use of force used to protect that which belongs to oneself (or some other victim of initiatory force which one wishes to aid). What the libertarian is seeking to do via the NAP is to distinguish these two things, prohibiting the former and permitting the latter. So the word ‘aggression’ is used to designate the initiatory use of force. Another word might easily have been chosen, but this one is perfectly suitable. There is nothing ‘improper’ about it. — Virgo Avalytikh

The problem, Virgo, is that you are taking for granted ownership of property, "that which belongs to oneself" in your definition of aggression. If you properly define "that which belongs to oneself", you will see that this is one's body, and nothing else. The properties of "oneself" is one's own body and nothing else. To extend "belongs to oneself" beyond the limitations of one's own body, requires principles of justification. How do you justify your assumption that property beyond the limits of one's own body belongs to oneself?

So, when someone makes an initiatory use of force, to invade a property which is not a part of your body, but you claim as belonging to yourself, you have no principle by which to call this an act of aggression, because you have no principle justifying your claim that this property belongs to your self. All you have is a claimed "right" to ownership, without any State to support this right. Your NAP allows you to view an act as aggression if it is force against properties of "oneself", but what principles relate oneself to other things, allowing one to own others?

That's why I say you've hijacked the NAP to use it in an unethical way.

They are quite muddled. Most people form their beliefs about libertarianism based on what non-libertarians say about it, and it certainly seems that you have arrived at your position in this way. — Virgo Avalytikh

I've gotten my knowledge of libertarianism from you, in this thread. Are you non-libertarian? Perhaps your ideas are quite muddled.

It's a very crucial issue as it simply shows that not everything is taken care by the markets and there is this very real collective effort on the shoulders of the society, not the individual. — ssu

If everybody's priority for ownership of property, reasons for claiming ownership of things, was the same, then things might be taken care of by the markets. But there is a big discrepancy between owning capital and owning things for personal subsistence. Any reasonable convention designed to give a right of ownership needs to respect this difference.

Minor differences due to air pressure and the supposed variation in accuracy of thermometers can be taken into account and are irrelevant to the point. — Janus

Your point was the testability of the proposition "water boils at 100 degrees at sea level". You said, we could just take a thermometer and test this. My point is that such a test is impossible. Some days you will see that water boils at 100, some days it will not. You cannot test such a proposition in this way, because "sea level" is not the proper variable, "air pressure" is. Now that you see the need to properly account for the variables, you will see that other variables, such as the physical constitution of the water, also make a difference. Dissolved elements make a difference (ever boil sugar water?). And have you ever heard of heavy water?

Clearly, your claim about how easy it is to test such propositions is way off base. .

So, for example, how exactly evolution happened is not directly observable being in the past, whereas the proposition that water boils at 100 degrees at sea level can be tested by direct observation in the present using a thermometer. — Janus

It's not that simple though. Some days water will boil at 100, and other days not, in the same location, depending on air pressure. And even if you allow for differences in air pressure, all you'd be testing is the accuracy of the measuring instruments.

The issue here is an uninteresting semantic one. 'Aggression' has a specific meaning in the context of libertarianism: it is the initiatory (in distinction from 'defensive') use of force; hence 'non-aggression principle'. — Virgo Avalytikh

That's the problem libertarians define "aggression" in a way which suits their purpose, not in a way which represents the thing which we refer to as aggression. Then they hijack the non-aggression principle, applying this definition of "aggression", to create the illusion that the non-aggression principle is compatible with the right to own property. With a proper definition of "aggression", the illusion is shattered.

The libertarian has the right to use force to defend the ownership of one's property which has been obtained through aggressive means that do not qualify as "aggression" under the libertarian's definition. Simply put, the libertarian may use unethical, aggressive means (aggressive sales, aggressive trading, lying, cheating, fraud, etc.) to obtain property, as these do not qualify as "aggression" for the libertarian, then use force to defend the right to own this property.

To say of any particular action that it is ‘aggressive’ presupposes a background schema of rights. Therefore, rights are a precondition of aggression. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is clearly false. There is no need for "aggression" to be defined in relation to "rights". You are just making this up in order to subjugate "non-aggression", thereby creating the illusion of compatibility between non-aggression and the right to property.

An act of aggression is an act of offence. There are offensive (aggressive) acts which do not violate another's rights. But sometimes if such behaviour becomes extremely hurtful, human beings will enact rights to protect people from it, as is the case with hate speech for example. Hate speech is an aggressive act.

Perhaps we have both signed up for a boxing match. — Virgo Avalytikh

Clearly, a punch in a boxing match is an act of aggression. Most sports are aggressive, and much competitiveness in general, is aggressive.

I see that you trying to qualify "aggression" for the purpose of your argument. I think that to define "aggression" in relation to "rights" is really a mistaken enterprise, because aggression existed long before rights. Life forms other than human are aggressive, but they do no have human rights, so "aggression" is the wider category. Therefore there is aggression which is not relative to rights. This is extremely evident in acts of aggression which do not amount to an infringement on an individual's rights. To limit "aggression" to "right infringement" does not give a clear description of what aggression really is. And, as I told you, "right" is a concept which has emerged as a form of aggression itself.

The leap you make from this to a justification of Statism is completely unwarranted, logically. — Virgo Avalytikh

I didn't attempt to justify Statism. What I am arguing is that non-aggression is incompatible with the right to property. I even said that saying a State has the "right" to govern is incoherent. where does it look like I am trying to justify Statism?

You simply insist that, if we do away with a State, we would have to do away with rights too. But I see no reason to think that this is so. The fact that rights are commonly ‘associated’ with a State is not particularly decisive. — Virgo Avalytikh

I am not saying that it is necessary to do away with rights if we do away with State, but why not do away with rights? If "rights" are the means by which some aggressively oppress others, "right" is a harmful concept.

There may be a ‘common sense’ that the State is the source of rights, but I think there is an equally strong ‘common sense’ that it is possible for States to commit rights-violations of their own, implying that there is a higher standard of rights to which States are subject. — Virgo Avalytikh

Again, I see no reason to call this "higher standard" by the word "rights". If it is a higher standard, then it does not categorize as rights.

Moreover, it is simply incoherent to say that declaring an act of ownership is aggression. Certainly, it can be aggression (like in the case of theft), but it is not aggression per se. It is incoherent for the same reason as Proudhon’s dictum, ‘Property is theft’, is incoherent; as Marx himself observed, you have to first have a system of property in place before you can even recognise theft (or any other kind of aggression) for what it is. — Virgo Avalytikh

It is not the declaration of ownership, 'this is mine' which is an act of aggression, it is the declaration of a right to ownership, 'people have the right to own things', which is an act of aggression. So it's not comparable to 'property is theft' it is inherent within the concept of "right", the declaration of a right is an act of aggression against all those who do not believe that the declared right ought to be a right. This is the problem with Locke's concept of social contract, it is not a contract which we willingly agree to, and therefore rights are imposed and enforced. Locke's idea that there are natural rights is what is incoherent.

And it is a false premise to assume that a system of property is required to recognize an act of aggression, because many acts of aggression have nothing to do with ones property, they are attacks against the person.

If rights do not exist prior to the State, then my first question would be: Where does the State get its ‘right’ to govern? Either this right comes from the State’s own declarative statement about itself, or else it is a precondition of the State. The former is simply circular: it is no more persuasive to argue for the State’s legitimacy by appealing to what the State declares about itself than when I declare myself to be the supreme ruler of the universe. If the legitimacy of the State is the very thing in dispute, then appealing to the State’s authority to justify its authority is begging the question. And if the State’s right to govern is a precondition of the State, then your assertion is simply false: at least one right can and does exist, prior to and independently of the State.

The third possibility, of course, is that the State really doesn’t have the right to govern — Virgo Avalytikh

Your options here are not exhaustive, some might say God gives the right to the State. Regardless, people have rights, a State is not the type of thing which could have a right. So we agree on your third option, I think it's incoherent to say that the State has the right to govern. The problem though, which I mentioned in the last post, the rights which individual people are said to have, are given by the State, or some other social convention. If we abolish the State, we give up what is given by the State, and this includes rights. There is no such thing as "natural rights", this is incoherent. You yourself have dismissed talk of "the natural" as providing no useful distinction. So, would you agree that rights come into existence (naturally) as a product of human conventions, such as the State, and do not pre-exist such conventions, which bestow upon the individual human beings, various "rights"? And, since "rights" are commonly associated with "the State", and you advocate for removal of the State, why not dismiss rights altogether as an archaic concept produced for the purpose of gathering support for the State, and opt for a completely different sort of convention, without 'rights'?

Again, no: ‘aggression’ is used very specifically in the context of libertarianism. It is defined as the initiatory use of force against persons of property. — Virgo Avalytikh

The phrase "person of property" appears to be incoherent.

As I explained above, a system of property rights is a precondition of recognising acts of aggression for what they are. — Virgo Avalytikh

Again, this is incoherent, because you are defining "aggression" in relation to property, rather than in relation to people. It is very obvious that many acts of aggression occur against people regardless of the person's property. You cannot define "aggression" merely by reference to a person's property, or else you would have a decrepit principle of non-aggression which would only apply to property-related acts of aggression. You are merely subjugating you definition of "aggression" to the concept of property rights, to create the illusion that there is no incompatibility between "non-aggression" and "property rights". 'Aggression is an act against a person's property'. That's nonsense, and if we define "aggression" properly we see that the convention of "property rights" is itself an act of aggression.

Is it aggressive to lock your doors so that you can keep all of your possessions and your home? Do we own our bodies? According to you the State has the power to decide what we can or can't do with our bodies — Harry Hindu

I don't see how this is relevant, or how it is, as you say, according to me.

Political philosophy is not my thing, but I just thought I'd bring that up, because anyone who's seriously researched these two principles, ought to have come across this notion. To declare ownership is an act of aggression. Libertarians cloud this issue, creating the illusion that we naturally own things. In reality we are born without private property. We are born with nothing.

If the State violates the non-aggression principle by its very nature (and I believe that it does, contra Nozick), then it is illegitimate no matter what size it is, or what services it provides. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is exactly the problem. A "right", such as the right to property, is something bestowed on a person from the State. It is a "service" provided by the state. If the State, by its very existence violates the non-aggression principle, and therefore ought to be dissolved because of this, then everything given by the State, including the right to own property will be lost with the dissolution of the State.

You do not seem to understand what a "right" is:

Rights are legal, social, or ethical principles of freedom or entitlement; that is, rights are the fundamental normative rules about what is allowed of people or owed to people, according to some legal system, social convention, or ethical theory. — Wikipedia

Notice that a right only exists in relation to some sort of convention. It is not a property of a person, but of that convention. Further to this, the right to own property is a right which by its very nature requires enforcement, acts of aggression, because we are born with nothing. Perhaps you might avoid the necessity of force, by rewording the "right", as the right to give property, or sell property, but this implies that someone already owns the property which would be given or sold. Since we are born with nothing, we cannot get into the circle of ownership without acts of aggression.

I think the "non-aggression principle" has been shown to be deeply incompatible with the right to private property.

I really do wish to know why we should listen to philosophers. — Denovo Meme

If you read what a philosopher says, and it makes sense to you, this itself is an attestation to the philosopher's credibility. If it doesn't make sense, the opposite is the case. So, you should listen only to those philosophers who make sense to you.

How do you know it is widespread? — Moliere

It's widespread at TPF, although it has a bad reputation so many who practise it here, claim not to.

I would say that there are two distinct forms of scientism, those who believe "only science can give us truth", and those who believe "if it's claimed by scientists, it must be science". The op seems to focus on the former, but there may be some conflation between the two. The latter is much more prevalent, and extremely difficult to reckon with. The difficulty arises from the problems with defining what qualifies as science. Philosophers of science cannot even decide this, so how could the average person? The average person believes that if it is claimed by a scientist, or if the news media reposts it as "science", it is science. This is the scientism which is most widespread.

Alcontali has described a division between science and mathematics. Further, the axioms of mathematics are said to be arbitrary. If this is the case, then there is an incompatibility between using mathematics and practising the scientific method, because science requires premises which are empirically proven.

Scientism is so incredibly widespread, and its fake morality so prevalent with the unwashed masses, especially in the West, that it cannot merely be a character trait. There is an entire, organized media-clergy preaching its heresies. The political class loves it too. The political manipulators happily subscribe to it, because it increases their power. Scientism is a fake religion that comes with its own fake morality. It is simply obnoxious. — alcontali

Yes, rant some more, I love it!

Axiomatic derivation reduces theorems to underlying, unexplained axioms. So, if we equate the term "metaphysical" with presuppositionalism (apriori knowledge), then yes, mathematics is by design indeed presuppositionalist. — alcontali

How would you define "axiom"? Do you see a difference between an axiom in mathematics and an axiom in metaphysics? In mathematics an axiom is produced and stated to serve some purpose, and accepted because of its usefulness. In metaphysics an axiom is stated as something self-evident, and therefore is supposed as a truth.

Now consider the problem which is the societal illness called scientism. When modern science first began developing centuries ago, it was based in solid metaphysics, truths, and it was designed to bring forth further truths, by employing valid logic to truthful premises which were demonstrated to be sound through empirical process. Notice the base, sound empirically proven premises, not mathematical axioms. But mathematics proved to be an extremely useful form of logical. However, mathematicians are prone to produce premises which are simply useful axioms, rather than sound truths. They are useful for the purpose of solving a mathematical stumbling point. Many axioms simply veil, or make vague such mathematical stumbling points. So, into science creeps unsound premises, from mathematicians, which are accepted because they are extremely useful. Now pragmatism has invaded science. Science is no longer guided by the desire for truth, it has turned into the art (because mathematics is an art, and it has subdued science) of statistics and probabilities, because the goal is not to know the truth, but to predict the future.

There is no point is having a forum if all we do is dwel on the past. Should we call it a pastrum? — Razorback kitten

How are we ever going to know what to do in the future, if we do not pay respect to what was done in the past? We learn through experience. And if we can learn from the experience of others, that's even better because we can avoid making the same mistakes that someone else made.

No, if it turns out that there was (in the end) nothing there, I and probably the speaker will look for an alternative interpretation. I did say "albeit provisionally". — bongo fury

It's not a question of how it turns out, it's a question of whether or not there is something there being pointed to, and the answer to that question is no. The argument, that something may come about, and this particular thing would be the thing which is pointed at, doesn't make sense because that thing might not come about. And when it doesn't, this is clear evidence that the speaking was not a case of pointing to something, in the first place. That's the point, we have clear evidence here that speaking is not reducible to pointing at something.

I notice you keep saying "pointing at something" and ignoring my reminders that it is generally a matter (or rather a mutually agreed pretence) of "pointing a word at something". This (stated properly as a semantic relation between word and object and not usually finger-pointer and object) strikes me as perfectly intuitive, something a child will recognise as being essentially what we are playing at, with language. I sense that you sense this, and are forced into mis-stating the principle in order to deflate the intuition, or to divert us into a certain famous ready-made critique of finger-pointing, which I think is an unnecessary diversion. — bongo fury

No, this is not intuitive to me at all. As I've said, I find that the majority of language use cannot be described as establishing a semantic relation between a word and an object. That's why I've taken the time to explain to you that very often there is no object which is referred to. "Get me a cup please", when there is a thousand cups in the room does not establish a semantic relation between a word and an object, nor is it spoken with the intent of establishing such a relation.

Furthermore, I really cannot understand what you could possibly mean by "pointing a word at something". As I said before, this is incoherent to me, and I asked you for an explanation. So you called it "labelling", but I don't see how labelling is pointing words. And speaking about things is not simply labelling things, it consists of describing things, saying where they are, etc.. These are not instances of labelling. This is what I've been trying to explain to you. It is one thing to name something, label it, and maybe you might like to call this pointing a word at it, but it is something completely different to say something about that thing. Let's assume we've labelled an object, "my phone", so that you would assume that when I mention "my phone" this is a matter of pointing to it. When I say something about my phone, like "I do not know where my phone is", how can you construe this as a pointing at my phone?

And thank you very much for your highly interesting interrogations about it! — bongo fury

You're very welcome, that's what I like to do, interrogate so that I might better understand your thesis, so it's really my pleasure.

Your token of "cup" could be pointing at (referring to) any or all of past, present and future cups. — bongo fury

Then it appears like you agree that it's not really a pointing. You might interpret "get me a cup please" as pointing to a cup, but you readily admit that this is a misinterpretation, because I'm really not fussy and I don't care which cup you bring me. Really, I'm not pointing at any cup whatsoever, or anything in particular, I'm just trying to get you to do something.

But you both want to allow the pointing at any or all cups as well, as this is how (according to the theory I recommend) we create what other philosophers were (and on occasion still are) inclined to call a "concept" or "idea" or "form" of a cup, but which we can better see as a classification, through language, of objects. — bongo fury

Of course I would say that this theory is evidently wrong. We do not create the concept, idea, or form of "cup" by pointing at cups. We create such concepts through descriptions, just like geometrical concepts. This is not to say that a child cannot learn how to identify a cup by having people point to cups, but knowing how to pick out a cup from a bunch of objects does not require that the child has a concept, idea, or form of "cup". This is the difference between knowing how to identify a cup, and knowing what a cup is.

You don't go to a restaurant to get what you like, rather you go to a restaurant to (because you) like what you get. — tim wood

This statement is clearly false, and does not make sense. There is an illusion of sense, which you have created with ambiguity of verb tense. When you properly distinguish between what you've gotten from the restaurant in the past, from what you expect to receive in the future, then you will see that the reason you are going to the restaurant is your expectation to get what you want, not because of what you've gotten in the past.

The fact that you like what you've received there, in the past, does not motivate you to go there, in the future. What motivates you to go is the expectation of getting what you like, in the future. And this is the very opposite of what you say. This is the very difficult aspect of consciousness to understand, the conversion of past experiences into an expectation for the future. And understanding this conversion is very necessary because it is the expectation for the future which motivates one to act, not the experiences of the past. You cannot avoid this difficult aspect of consciousness, hiding it behind smoke and mirrors, by creating the illusion that it is past experiences which motivates one to act.

I don't know if you come to bury "meaning" here or to praise it, but I would point out that I offer a considerable simplification: in equating use, meaning, reference, denotation, labelling, and pointing; and from largely (initially at least) setting aside such related notions as intention, desire, connotation, depiction, metaphor, expression and sensitivity. — bongo fury

What I believe, is that the attempt to simplify a complex thing is a mistake, because it leads to misunderstanding, in the sense of a person who believes oneself to understand the thing because it has been simplified, but really does not understand the thing because it is complex.

The point I'm trying to make, is that I think we can understand some aspects of meaning in terms of pointing, but many other aspects of meaning we cannot understand in terms of pointing. So for instance, part of one's use of language might consist of pointing at a thing, and this is an important part of language and meaning, but what someone says about that thing, what it is doing, or describing its properties, cannot be understood within the context of pointing. This again is an important part of language use and meaning, but it is a part that cannot be understood as pointing.

This is in the spirit of enlightened reductionism outlined above, with an expectation of dividends from the theoretical effort, not least by way of insights into the related notions. — bongo fury

As I explained, this form of reductionism doesn't work. It creates the illusion of a complete understanding through explicitly equating one thing with another, "meaning is pointing", or "momentum is mass time velocity", when in reality there is much more to each of these concepts than that which it is equated with. Understanding "meaning" also requires understanding types of activities (and these cannot be pointed to), and understanding "momentum" also requires understanding inertia (which is not covered by "mass times velocity"), because "velocity" requires a frame of reference.. By saying one is equal to the other, an illusion of completion is created, which is really a deception.

As a non-metaphysician I don't quite see the problem with tracing (albeit provisionally) reference to future objects and events. But perhaps you will provide me with a rude awakening in that regard? — bongo fury

You see no problem with taking it for granted that one can point to something which is not there? I don't understand how you can believe that you can point to something which is not there, and then just assume that you are actually pointing at something. And to simply point, without pointing at anything specific, is not really pointing at all. That's the point I'm making, you ought not characterize this as pointing. If someone uses language to refer to something, then we can say that the person is pointing at that thing. But when a person uses language to refer to something non-existent, how can we assume that this is a matter of pointing at something?

If the difference between us is that you see an impossibility where I see a normal human skill of constructive ambiguity, could that be because you haven't grasped the relevance of the inscrutability involved: there being no fact of the matter? — bongo fury

I really do not see this inscrutability which you claim to be pointing at. What I see is that you are describing something as "pointing" when the thing being described really cannot be described in that way. So you might say "I am pointing to an inscrutability", but in reality there is no inscrutability there, only a vague inaccuracy in your description. What you are really doing is pointing at language use, and insisting that all language use is a matter of pointing, but when it is shown that this is impossible because sometimes there is nothing there being pointed at, instead of seeing that this is not a matter of pointing, you try to dismiss the argument by saying that this is an inscrutable type of pointing. If "pointing" doesn't suit as an appropriate descriptive term, and there is something inscrutable going on, then why not just say that it is something inscrutable rather than a pointing.

Again, why is this a problem, that we should be ever unsure whether a token is pointed at some one or several or all of the things that every token "of the word" ever points at? This would be how we generalise and particularize. — bongo fury

I will ask you then, how is this a pointing? Suppose there are a thousand equally probable possibilities indicated by a single use of a single word, for example, "get me a cup please", when there are a thousand cups in the room. How can you describe this use of that word as a pointing?

Let's assume to point is to direct one's attention. What exactly is the person who says "get me a cup please" directing the other's attention toward? Would this be an imaginary future state, in which the person speaking has a cup? Not really, because the person making the request is requesting that the other perform a particular action, and the reason for this is unknown. So, the person says it because the person wants the other to act. Where is the "directing one's attention"? We often act without directing our attention, as reflex indicates. I think that the principal use of language is to get a response, a reflex action, out of another, without actually directing the other's attention. Any attempt to direct the other's attention would be far too imposing on the other's sense of freedom, and the individual's own will to direct one's own attention toward one's own interests. Therefore attempting to direct another's attention would not be effective, because the person whom you were trying to direct (show the way by pointing), would dismiss this as interference against one's own free will to choose one's own way. So when someone says something, I think that person is simply trying to get a reaction out of the other, without trying to interfere with, or direct, the other's attention. Such actions as trying to direct another's attention (like pointing) would be received as rude and interfering, negative, and therefore not conducive to cooperation. Remember the distinction I made between using another, and cooperating with another? Directing another's attention, pointing, is an instance of using the other.

Can you provide a reference in Aristotle's writings where he asserts this position (that these forms are actualized by the human mind)? — Andrew M

I suppose the best reference here would be Metaphysics Bk.9 Ch.9.

Also, perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, but you seem to be denying that particulars (say, ordinary objects like trees) have form prior to the existence of human beings. If so, I'm curious whether you also deny that particulars exist prior to the existence of human beings. — Andrew M

No, clearly I am not denying that, I am citing that as the reason why Aristotle must be understood as dualist. There is a duality of form, the form of the particular material things, which may be prior to human beings, and, the form which you call the abstraction. These are two distinct types of "form". Since forms are actual, having active existence, a dualism is described by Aristotle. But what Aristotle has done, is switched the positioning of the "Forms " in relation to Pythagorean Idealism. Human abstractions, which are forms in the sense of essence, universals without the accidentals, cannot be eternal, their actual existence is only produced by the human mind. However, the form of the particular may be prior to the temporal existence of material substance which expresses that form to us.

Here's a point he makes earlier in the Metaphysics, and this is tied in to the logic of his law of identity, which applies to particulars. A thing cannot be other than the thing which it is, otherwise it would not be the thing which it is. Also, a thing's existence is not random, it is what it is, and not something else, for some reason, or reasons. This he describes as the first question of metaphysics, not 'why is there something rather than nothing?' (which doesn't make sense to ask because we have no approach to answering it), but 'why is a thing what it is rather than something else?'. Now, we can apprehend that the form of the thing is necessarily prior to the material existence of the thing, otherwise the thing, when it comes into existence, could be other than it is. To ensure that the thing is the thing which it is, and not something else (which would defy the law of identity), the form of the thing, what the thing will be when it comes into existence, must be prior to the material existence of the thing. Otherwise the thing could be other than it is (defying the law of identity), or else it's existence would be completely random.

This is the principle which is expressed by Plato in the Timaeus (in not so clear terms), and is taken up by Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians (cosmological argument), which establishes Form as necessarily prior to material existence. Notice, that in his later work, Plato turns from independent Ideas (associated with the theory of participation, and Pythagorean Idealism), to "Forms", which are more closely related to Aristotle's "form". When we deny the possibility that material existence extends backward in time (toward the beginning) indefinitely (infinitely, as if there is no beginning to material existence), then we must accept that there is immaterial Form which is necessarily prior to material existence, in the beginning of material existence. Otherwise, the material things which exist would not be the things which they are (defying the law of identity), or material existence would be purely random (which is inconsistent with empirical observation). To maintain the law of identity, as well as the validity of empirical observation, we must allow that form is prior to material existence.

Unless, as apparently occurs to you right away, it is a matter of pointing at an activity, probably from a range of alternatives. But, — bongo fury

Telling someone what to do is not a matter of pointing to an activity, because the particular activity which is referred to does not even exist at the time of speaking. So even if we say that speaking is pointing, there is really nothing which is actually being pointed at. This problem is very evident with "meaning". Meaning is related to intention, and intention is related to what is wanted, and the "thing", or state, which is wanted is nonexistent. So your thesis is lacking, because it requires that we can point at non-existent things.

I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense, at least if questioned during the discourse itself, but later on... — bongo fury

It's more than just a matter of using "thing" in a loose sense, because there is an issue of the relationship between the general and the particular. We ask for something in general, and the response is to give us something particular. So for example, "can you get me a cup please", refers to "a cup" in the general sense, but the hearer might get a particular cup. Now, the speaker was not referring to that particular thing which the hearer brought, nor is "a cup" a thing unless you're Platonic realist. And, if you're such a realist, then there is a huge gap between the "thing" referred to, the Idea of "a cup", and the thing which the person brings to you, a particular cup.

There is clearly a problem with this thesis, that speaking is pointing at things. It's obviously not "things" in any reasonable sense of the word, which are being pointed at in the act of speaking. And even if we use "things" in a very loose way, so as to include activities, the activity referred to is always (without exception) something general, while any "thing" referred to is something particular. Say a person describes an activity which has already occurred, such that we might think that it is an existent activity, the words used to refer to any activity always allow that one might be speaking about something else carrying out that (very similar, or "same") activity, rather than the particular thing which is being referred to as carrying out that activity. So referring to an activity is always a reference to something general, but if one points to a particular thing which has carried out this activity, is carrying out, or will carry out this activity, we attempt to particularize this reference. But such a thing, to particularize the general, is impossible because there is an incompatibility between the two.

When you say "speaking is pointing at things", and "I mean 'thing' in the loosest sense", you simply veil this incompatibility behind smoke and mirrors, as if you actually believed that you could use "thing" in a way which would make sense here. The problem of course, is that the general allows for the possibility of many different things, while "thing" indicates that a particular has been specified. So if we are pointing when we speak, we are pointing in many different directions according to the many possibilities allowed for by the use of the general, and the hearer might choose one direction, and act as if that is the "thing" referred to. But as you can see, the thesis that speaking is pointing is really inadequate, because pointing at all these different possibilities would require that one is pointing in many different directions at the same time.

I've noticed a trend in modern metaphysics which is to attempt to create consistency between the principles of modern science, and the principles of Aristotle. This is done principally through a misrepresentation of Aristotle's principles, as you are doing. The reality is that science broke from the principles of Aristotle many years ago. So, we ought to be looking at the differences between modern science and Aristotle, created by this break, rather than misrepresenting Aristotle to create the appearance that modern science is consistent with him. The most obvious difference is that Aristotle's principles support dualism, and modern science has rejected those principles. So to present Aristotle, and simply leave out those principles which support dualism, because one wants to show Aristotle as supporting monism, is very distasteful.

That's not my reading of Aristotle. It is always and only the particular that exists and acts. A form(alism) without matter is merely an abstraction and thus not able to act. — Andrew M

There is nothing within Aristotle to deny forms without matter, nor that such "Forms", if they exist, are actual. That is why Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians maintain consistency with Aristotle's principles, despite Aristotle's difference from Plato. Plato is confused and full of changing views on this matter, as he learnt through his experiences. Aristotle denies matter without form, but not form without matter, and anything eternal must be actual. "Form" in Aristotle is actual, and this includes, essence, and formulae, which you call abstractions. These are the forms by which human beings actively change the world through intention, final cause.

What Aristotle denies is the eternality of these "forms". They are actualized by the human mind, and so if they existed prior to human beings, they could only exist as potential. Then he shows, with the cosmological argument that anything potential cannot be eternal. This creates a distinction between the forms of particular things, which may be eternal as the eternal circular motion is, and the forms which are activated by the human mind, which are not eternal because they are dependent on the human mind for their actuality.

This position is derived from the later Plato, Timaeus for example, and it is the means by which dualism escapes the problem of how the eternal may interact with the non-eternal. Matter, in the realm of "becoming", serves as the medium between the two types of actualities. Plato is famous for exposing the need for such a medium between the eternal and the temporal. Aristotle does not deny dualism, he simply clarifies the principles which make dualism reasonable.

Aristotle famously rejected Plato’s theory of forms and proposed his own theory in its place. — Andrew M

What Aristotle proposed is a duality of forms. And, "form" is very clearly defined as what is "actual". Therefore we have within Aristotle a duality of actuality, hence "dualism". To deny this, and deny that the soul is a form, within Aristotle's writing, is to deny a major part of his work. The assumption that essences, abstractions, are not actual within Aristotle creates a huge inconsistency making it impossible to understand how human beings act to change the world, through intention and final cause. Once you realize that these forms (intellectual objects) are properties of the soul, which is an active form itself, then you can make sense of the activities of living beings.

You seem to be forgetting that Aristotle inverted Plato's ontology. For Aristotle, what is fundamental, and thus primarily known, is the particular. Hylomorphism is not a dualism, it is an abstraction over particulars. What is known about particulars (by way of experience) is isomorphic to how they (really) are. — Andrew M

For Aristotle we can't know the form of the particular because we know through universals. This leaves a gap of separation between the form of the particular, with all its accidents, and the form which a human being knows, the essence of the thing. Since "form" is the actuality of things, there is two distinct actualities and therefore dualism. One actuality is substantiated by the form of particular material things, and the other actuality is substantiated by the form of "the soul"..

Completion eludes us ... except maybe in death.

So what's so disgusting, and so alarming, about this episode, is that Mueller's findings and testimony are obviously damning; it shows beyond reasonable doubt that there was co-operation between the Trump campaign and Russian operatives to interfere in the US Presidential Election. And yet the main beneficiary of this effort will stand in front of the world's media and deny it - and sufficient numbers will believe it to prevent any action being taken. — Wayfarer

There's a saying, "it falls on deaf ears". I think it means that if they do not want to ear it, they will not hear it.

Under what elaborations, or other scenarios, would you like to explore / test it? — bongo fury

I think that telling someone what to do, is not a matter of pointing at anything. How is an activity, which doesn't even exist yet, a thing?

"Can't function" is nice... A relatively entrenched, 'literal' usage sorting the domain of machines into, roughly, those in working order and those not. Then, a more novel, 'metaphorical' usage to sort the different domain of people, according to criteria some of which agree and some contrast with those for literal application. An important contrast, creating humour, would be the more stringent standard, denying the status of working order to perfectly healthy and normal humans recently roused from a sleep state. The story amuses because the child has learnt the secondary, metaphorical use before the original, probably not sensing the humorous implications of the change in domain and criteria. The metaphor itself (the change in domain and criteria) amuses by creating referential links, under the surface as it were, by which other machine-words and machine-pictures are readied to help sort the domain of persons. — bongo fury

So, how does "I can't function...", point to anything? You might say that the subject is "I" so it points to I, but the matter is "function", so the subject matter is "my functioning" and this is not a thing which is being pointed at. Subject matter in general, is not a thing.

Then there is what you call "metaphorical use". How do you think that metaphorical use is a matter of pointing at something?

I really think that most language use cannot be characterized as pointing at something.

And of course we sense the more general struggle of the novice to project, from limited examples, to suitable occasions for pointing a word. — bongo fury

What do you even mean by "pointing a word"? Is this metaphor? If not, I find it rather incoherent. What tool would you use to sharpen the tip of a word?

For the same reason someone might want to restrict the meaning of "momentum" to "mass times velocity". The promise of theoretical simplicity and generality. What I thought you might be craving when you lamented: — bongo fury

There's a problem with this type of restriction though. If you restrict your understanding of "using a word", to "using a word for the purpose of pointing at something", then all those instances in which people use words for something other than pointing at something will not be apprehended by your understanding. And if you say that "meaning is use", and restrict your understanding of "use" to the use of words, you will not apprehend all the meaning which is in those instances of using things other than words. Furthermore, if you restrict your understanding of "meaning" to "meaning is use", you will not apprehend all that meaning which is in things other than use.

Likewise, if you restrict your understanding of "inertia" to "momentum", thereby understanding inertia as mass times velocity, you will not apprehend the inertia of a body at rest. So "momentum" is useful for understanding the inertia of a body, just like "using a word to point at things" is useful for understanding the use of words, but it is an incomplete understanding. And to insist that it is complete would be a misunderstanding.