As you noted, I was highlighting the tension. At least one of the following seems likely to be false:
God is omniscient (where omniscient entails knowledge of the future)
Libertarian free will exists
A-theory of time is true
Brute facts don't exist

Omniscience could be revised to mean only that God knows everything that is knowable. This would imply he can only know elements of the future that are the product of strict determinism.

Perhaps brute facts exist (God knows the future by brute fact) but this undermines some important reasons to believe a God exists (i.e. the Leibniz' Cosmological Argument).

Perhaps compatibilism is true, and therefore determinism is true, although this undermines a common theist response to the problem of evil.

Perhaps B-theory is true.

That's doubtful. So let's take this proposition, that a group is a thing, and see if we can validate it's truth. We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. ... — Metaphysician Undercover

We're talking past each other due to using different semantics. I'll be more precise. I'm basically presenting the physicalist ontology developed by D.M. Armstrong (see this).

In Armstrong's ontology, everything that exists is a State of Affairs (which I've been referring to as a "thing"). A SOA has 3 types of constituents: a (thin) particular, properties, relations. None of the constituents exist independently of states of affairs. A SOA is a (thick) particular. ("thin" refers to the abstract consideration of that constituent of a SOA that is neither a relation nor a property; "thick" particular equates to a SOA, and "thick" is usually omitted).

Anything that exists is a state of affairs, and that includes the simplest objects (the "atomic states of affairs") and complex objects (higher order [molecular] states of affairs and conjunctions of states of affairs). If we treat the standard model of particle physics as describing the most fundamental objects of existence, then the atomic SOAs are those particles (the various quarks, leptons, etc). Even these fundamental ontic objects have properties (electric charge, color charge, spin, mass...).

A neutron is thus a second order SOA composed of those ASAs, while an atom is a third order SOA composed of neutrons, protons and electrons. The properties of the higher order SOAs are determined by the properties of their constituents (i.e. Armstrong is a reductionist).

A gaggle of 7 geese is a state of affairs as well - it has properties (such as mass, volume of air they displace,...).

Armstrong accounts for universals: they are multiply instantiated properties and relations. Multiple objects can have a -1 electric charge (e.g. each electron that exists), so "-1 electric charge" is a universal. Similarly, multiple states of affairs can have the property of being a conjunction of 7 lower order states of affairs. "7" is the property they have in common, and this is a universal.

Your statement, "We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. In doing this, we deny the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things, not one entity. " has no apparent meaning in this ontology. A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing - that would imply that only atomic states of affairs exist.

Either we describe the swans as individual objects, or we describe them as parts of a whole (an object, the family), but we cannot do both at the same time without contradiction.

I agree than an individual swan is not identical with the group to which it belongs. Each swan is a constituent of the state of affairs that is the group of swans. We can consider the mathematical relation that exists between one swan constituent and the group. This doesn't entail equating the two states of affairs as you seem to be inferring. Simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist.

You don't have to accept the ontology, but at least understand that it comprises a coherent physicalist ontology - and Armstrong explicitly rejects Platonism. If it SEEMS incoherent to you, it's due to the brevity of my discussion.

"An object cannot have the property of "two-ness", because that requires two objects. "
An oxygen molecule has two-ness. Two-ness is the relation of the parts to the whole. But groups are also things.

A family of 7 black swans is a thing (a state of affairs). 7 is a relation between one swan and the family. A group of 7 swans has a property in common with a group of 7 marbles: the universal "7".

7 exists, not in a platonic realm, but in states of affairs composed of 7 objects.

"Even in an A-theory of time, certainly some propositions exist at that present moment, and God knows the truth of all those propositions at that current moment. So if someone were to say, "Jack is going to drink a beer at t1" God knows the truth of that proposition, and so knows what will happen at t1. It does not seem that A-theory directly eliminates the possibility of God's foreknowledge"
You are asserting God knows, not showing how it can be possible. It is impossible because libertarian free will implies Jack's actions aren't determined. Drinking a beer is only a possibility at t0.

"Mathematical fields are mathematics, no different in principle to "2+2=4". If you think that this refers to something real then you believe in platonic realism"
Right, and that's not entailed by scientific realism. Scientific realists can be physicalist. A physicalist rejects platonism, treating mathematics as purely descriptive. The abstraction "2" does not exist, rather there are objects having the property "two-ness". Physics formulae describe complex physical relations between objects.

"the idea that consciousness does not depend on any particular arrangements of matter for its existence"
Aren't you saying the mind is immaterial? If so, how does the mind cause me to scratch my nose? How does my mind know I have an itch?

Considering this particle exists if and only if it is moving, and this movement is determined by the projection from locality to another in one direction, the premise of the particle existing at all is dependent upon its directed movement giving it form. In these respects all particulate are premised in linear movement as extradimensional projection. — eodnhoj7

All movement is relative, you're treating it as absolute. Further, per QFT, particles are not moving; rather a quantum of energy is rippling through a field. Finally, your claim that a particle's existence is dependent on movement is an unsupported assertion.

I was referring to scientific realism, and this does not entail platonism.

Your assertion, "2.) God’s omnipotence gives Him power to look at the future."
Is defeated by my argument. God can't do the logically impossible.

I am treating A-theory of time (presentism) as true.

Obviously, yes.

Feelings are not the product of reasoning. Your point of view might help you cope with a loss, but you will not be treated kindly if you approach an aggrieved parent and inform them they are wrong.

E.g. one could commit to the ontological stance that space is actually curved (per general relativity) - not merely that the equations seem to make reasonably accurate predictions.
— Relativist

I think the issue here is that we must admit to, or assume, that space is real, in order to justify our measurements of length, distance, etc.. How we model space (geometry) may vary. This variance in geometrical models indicates that we don't really understand what space is. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we don't have to commit to the existence of quantum fields, just because the math of quantum field theory makes good predictions.

The feeling of loss is not a consequence of believing death is bad. It's knowing that the loved one is permanently absent from one's life, and in some cases a sense of feeling cheated. We expect our children to outlive us

What does this mean: "The particles as projecting to further particle "

Did you use google translate on your native language?

How do you define "fact" and "thing"? Here's my definitions:
Fact: true proposition
Thing: an existent

So by my definitions, the statement is false. The world consists of things. Facts describe things, their properties, and relations between things.

Doesn't Alibaba just act as a broker for selling goods produced by cheap Chinese labor? That labor can't be exported.

High taxes.

"They chose to deal with life. And in reality, they shouldn´t be sad that they lost their child, they should be happy that they had the oppotunity to have it in the first place."
There's no "should" with feelings.

Define " power". In the the sense that money is power, then some corporations have more power than some nations. However, nations can arbitrarily confiscate property, thus seizing power - consider Venezuela.

I believe there is a tension between knowledge of the future (entailed by omniscience) and the notion of omniscience. I'd describe it thusly:future, freely willed acts are unknowable:

t0: 1AM, Jan 1 1920
t1: 1AM Jan 1, 2020

P1: Jack drinks a glass of beer at t1 (the chosen act is a product of libertarian free will)
P0: God has knowledge of P1 on at t0.
(de re semantics stipulated throughout)

There is no truthmaker of P1 at t0, so how can this constitute knowledge at t0?
(where truthmaker: = an elements of reality to which the proposition corresponds)

(note the difference between a freely willed act and one that is the product of determination)

"The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object."

From an ontological perspective that seems true, but it overlooks the role of epistemology. We do not "know" an object, rather we "know" (perceive) some of its properties in some epistemic context. We identify the object in terms of its properties, but this can be misleading. Paraphrasing Kripke, he notes that Hesperus is that which we perceive as the evening star, and Phosphorous is the name we attach to that which we perceive as the morning star. The ontological identity between Phosphorous and Hesperus is not identical to the epistemic stance because the epistemic context is different.

I agree with Metaphysician Undercover and LD Saunders about science, but add that there is also a metaphysical stance called "scientific realism" - which treats theoretical objects as ontological. E.g. one could commit to the ontological stance that space is actually curved (per general relativity) - not merely that the equations seem to make reasonably accurate predictions. That particular stance is fairly well justified. On the other hand, if one commits to some particular interpretation of quantum mechanics (e.g. many worlds) they are still being "realist" but the justification is much weaker.

Some people equate science (which is empirical/epistemological) with scientific realism (what is ontic). That said, a lot of scientists actually are scientific realists.

I see nothing "intelligent" in the behavior of particles. Their "behavior" is a consequence of their properties, not due to decision making or anything else that is typically described as intelligent behavior.

Are you equating "complex" with "intelligent"? Complexity is due to the fact that particles interact and entropy is increasing, but unevenly.

Perhaps the growing originalist majority on SCOTUS will overturn Marbury v Madison. It's a prime example of judicial overreach.

According to Quantum Field Theory, waves -not particles- are fundamental. There's a field for every particle: a quark is a quantum of the quark field. All fields exist at every point of spacetime. So-called "virtual particles are actually non-quantized effects of the fields.

"So time has to have a start and there has to be something causing time to have a start"
Monday cause Tuesday, Tuesday causes Wednesday...So what's wrong with an initial Monday? Just like any other, it will still cause a Tuesday.

Our universe seems to have a absolute beginning of space-time, so that means causality must extend beyond time. — Devans99

All known instances of causation entail a cause that is temporally prior to the effect. How can something that is causally efficacious exist "beyond time"? This is a key premise and is in need of support.

photons are timeless yet they change.

Photons (which are quanta of the electromagnetic field) don't change. Rather, the energy of the field ripples across space.

There must be a timeless realm in which our universe was created:

1. Something can’t come from nothing
2. So base reality must have always existed

No problem with #1, but #2 is more precisely written as: base reality exists at all times.

3. If base reality is permanent it must be timeless (to avoid an actual infinity of time)

Non sequitur. An initial state, with a potentially infinite future is not timeless.

4. Also something without a start cannot exist so time must have a start

The initial state constitutes a "start".

5. Time was created and exists within this permanent, timeless, base reality

non-sequitur.

Why think anything that is causally efficacious can exist timelessly? Abstractions (if we regard them as existing at all) exist timelessly, but they aren't causally efficacious. The universe is not "timeless" - it experiences time.

"The only world the hangs together logically/does not need magic is the one with nothing in it. All the others present a logical conundrum. "
Show that this worlds depends on magic:
A world with an absolute beginning of space-time, and therefore cannot have been caused - because causes temporally precede effects and there is no time before the beginning of time.

"
I used Occam's razor in a hypothetical sort of way; the question of what we should expect; 'what should be?'; by way of reality, I answered with the simplest model possible: nothing. "

We should have no specific expectations, including the expectation that there would be "nothing".

Imagine all the metaphysically possible worlds, only one of which obtains by chance. There are very simple worlds, and extremely complex ones. There is a minimum complexity (e.g. one object, but ni maximum. Each level of complexity is low probability, but one of those obtains. The actual world is at the low end of the possibilities.
"

"The universe has a start in time and space"

If the universe=spacetime, then the universe didn't start IN time and space. Rather, there is a start of time and space.

I would have preferred that the options stated "lean towards" but I voted that way anyway: I lean towards materialist/atheist. However, materialist theories of mind are not quite complete - there remains the hard problem of consciousness (although I have a vague idea about how this might be solved).

"causally inert objects are not indispensable, and therefore useless."

It helps to consider what abstract objects refer to: they refer to properties of (causally efficacious) things that actually do exist. We develop a broader understanding of the world by thinking abstractly about the properties apart from the objects that have them. "-1 charge" is a property of electrons, "+1 charge" is a property of protons. Electrons and protons attract because they have these respective properties: there is a relation between any pair of objects that have these respective properties.

"The fact that there IS something rather than nothing is truly remarkable. How can this have occurred? We need some sort of magic to have occurred just for us to exist. Is this evidence for a creator?"
Why should we expect nothing rather than something?

Occam's razor is a epistemological rule requiring that we have evidence for our beliefs. Occam’s injunction is not an ontological truth avowing that the world has a simple constitution (paraphrasing Grunbaum). But if we treat it as such, then we must answer: why is there a god rather than not? The shows the theistic position is self contradictory.

As I first pointed out, there's no paradox if one examines the metaphysical and epistemological issues carefully. An individual engaging in sloppy (i.e. typical) epistemology may fall into a paradox (i.e. engage in hypocrisy) if he's not careful, but that doesn't mean a paradox is intrinsic to the issue. It's intrinsic to poor critical reasoning skills.

What's the paradox for someone who believes the anthropogenic contribution to global warming is too negligible to warrant action?

"
"The answer often comes first, and we fit the justification in. And our values are malleable"

That is an unfortunate fact of human nature, and it is well manifested in political discourse. Nevertheless, the paradox is in the eye of the beholder. To a "global warming denier" (I hate that term) there is no paradox because they've convinced themselves global warming is false (e.g. it's a Chines hoax, as our beloved leader has said). Pro-lifers convince themselves a fetus is not an individual human life valued equally with that of a mother - so again, no paradox.

Your judgment that there's a paradox depends on treating fetuses as individual human lives and treating global warming as factual.

I see no paradox either. Abortion hinges upon a metaphysical principle: what constitutes an individual human life; no amount of empirical analysis can provide a definitive answer. On the other hand, climate change is entirely an epistemic issues associated with propositions such as:

There is global warming (i.e. global temperatures are, and have been, trending hotter)
Global warming will negatively effect humans
Human activity is contributing materially to global warming
Modifying human activity can mitigate global warming sufficiently to avoid or significantly reduce the negative impact
Benefits (mitigating the negative impacts) outweigh the cost of modifying human activity.

Each of these can (in principle) be analyzed empirically.

"You may not be you" is equivalent to saying "the law of non-contradiction may be false". i.e you=you is necessarily true.

At any rate, the concept of identity needs to be well defined before any analysis can be done.

That would increase the money supply beyond what is needed for growth, and therefore be inflationary.

It is complicated, and the main thing I want to convey is that intuition will lead you astray. National debt is not like household debt. We don't necessarily need to pay it off. We depend on perpetual growth of the economy to make it work. And fiat currency is not really a problem - we're still bartering things of value (ie the stuff that money can buy).

I assume you realize that "printing" money is not the issue, it is the money supply - which mostly consists of figures in computers.

If the money supply grows at the same rate as GDP, then dollars retain their value. Adding to the money supply can stimulate the economy because more is then available for investment. Conversely, shrinking the money supply would constrain investment, lower growth and risk recession.

If the debt is paid down, the risk is that it could reduce the supply of money available for investment, but the risk can be managed (e.g. commensurately increasing the money supply). The real problem with the debt is servicing it: paying the interest. If the debt grows faster than the economy, these interest payments will be on an unsustainable growth path - debt service will eventually overwhelm the budget, causing hyperinflation and economic collapse.

"A popular question. Why am I me? Why am I not the person next to me? When I die, will I be another person in the past or future? Was I another person before I was born? If so, why am I not everyone?"
The answer depends on one's positions on identity and essentialism.

Does a car maintain the same identity over time? Is it the same car if the oil gets changed? New tires? New engine and transmission? What, if anything, is essential to the car's identity?

Similarly, what is essential to a human's identity? DNA doesn't even stay constant over time?