So the effects are exaggerated, but there. — Coben

Yeah, again, if you follow the conversation, NOS4A2 stated that the power of speech is overestimated.
unenlightened said that it's not in the case of advertising. I was agreeing with NOS4A2 and not unenlightened when it comes to advertising. No one claimed that advertising doesn't work at all.

And the point that I was making was that that point misses the point, — S

NOS4A2 stated that the power of speech is overestimated.

unenlightened said that it's not in the case of advertising.

But it is.

My argument, by contrast, is also valid but both of its premises are true. — Bartricks

Not at all. Again, it couldn't be clearer that morality only occurs as mental states that individuals have. All the evidence we have show that that is what it is, and there's zero evidence that it's something aside from this.

That speech, by way of advertisement, generally speaking, is effective, or powerful, or however you want to word it so long as you don't completely get the wrong end of the stick, which is not at all to suggest that it's totally effective or that it's guaranteed to result in substantial success for a business. His point is so obvious it's hard to see how anyone could miss it or disagree, but I think that some people here are too entrenched in their positions. — S

But the point that I was making was that the effectiveness of advertising is overestimated.

And, yes, I realize people can believe false things for long periods of time. But you'd think experts, who they tend to consult with, would have let them know that companies that do not advertise do just as well as those that do, and the incredible benefit of saving that money would have led a number of corporations, generally fascinated with money, to try and that confirm this. — Coben

Yes, a ton of money is wasted on advertising, and there are plenty of studies showing that it's not near as effective as is commonly believed in the business world--or as claimed by the advertising industry, of course.

People need to know about your products or services in order to be interested in them, obviously, but lots of money is regularly wasted on advertising.

But that just misses the point. — S

What's the point it misses?

That doesn't work as an attempted refutation. That some businesses overestimate the effect that advertising will have to the detriment of their business doesn't do anything at all against his point. — S

The overestimation is that advertising is going to be effective, because of a belief that it strongly influences consumer decisions.

No, it's not patently absurd to say that their words altered the world, so long as that's not interpreted in a silly way. Words do have an influence, as you say, and that entails that they're causal, because again, I don't interpret influence in a silly way. — S

If we're going to call actions that preceded actions that were performed because someone decided to perform them "causal" as well as calling actions that preceded actions that were performed because they were forced "causal," how are we going to protect against conflation, for one?

Insatiable and unfulfilled desires are painful by their very nature. — schopenhauer1

Okay, but then you're denying that people can be hungry, for example, without having an "unpleasant" phenomenal assessment of it. Is that right?

The advertising industry illustrates how very widespread this estimation is, — unenlightened

And illustrates the overestimation very well. If that weren't the case, no one would ever go out of business. They'd merely need to advertise and they'd make tons of money.

And that is not only false, but patently absurd, as the counterexamples I've previously raised in response to this ludicrous claim of yours demonstrate. Karl Marx, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill, Socrates, William Shakespeare, Martin Luther, the Four Evangelists... none of the aforementioned were sorcerers. They were just world-renowned wordsmiths. — S

What would be patently absurd is to say that their words are what altered the world. Non-speech actions alter the world, and we need to look at the causes of those non-speech actions. Words can have an influence, but they don't cause the actions in question. (And we're back in the middle of the thread we already beat to death.)

It's looking at the big picture and seeing a uniform principle. — schopenhauer1

Sure. And on the big picture, the uniform principle has it that lacking or desiring things is bad regardless of how anyone feels about it because?

Nothing in that explains why, when an individual has no issues with those things, they're still a moral problem nevertheless.

I keep asking that, and I'm not sure you know how to answer it, because you keep deferring to things that don't really address the question.

Imagine if someone said, "I know you don't mind when you gain or lose a pound, but nevertheless, it's morally bad for you to gain or lose a pound, so I'm going to fix things so that can not happen."

The person would want to know why you think it's morally bad for them to gain or lose a pound and why you're meddling in their affairs "on their behalf" when they don't have a problem with gaining or losing just a pound and they didn't ask you to meddle on their behalf.

When they ask you why you feel it's morally bad regardless of how they feel about it, it wouldn't do any good to keep explaining that you feel it's morally bad, that you characterize it as something negative, etc. They want to know your motivation for the characterization.

So all of this is wrong about Schopenhauer's view. Schopenhauer's ideal would probably be something like Nirvana- a complete lack of lack. I've said this before about Schop- his world would be one with absolutely nothing or absolutely everything. There would be no deprived states. All being or all nothing. There is no becoming or flux. Thus, a world "worth living" in a Nietzschean "suffering makes things worth it" isn't even in the radar of this kind of holistic metaphysics. That's intra-worldly affairs, and Schop's metaphysics is the "world" itself. — schopenhauer1

Okay, but presumably you agree with him. So WHY do you feel it's wrong? (If why you feel it's wrong is identical to why Schopenhauer feels it's wrong for some reason, you can just report that, but in that case, why does Schopenhauer feel it's wrong?)

I'm presuming that you're not just parroting Schopenhauer's views without critically thinking about them very much.

One thing weird about the "systematic" view schopenhauer is endorsing is that it implies that the preferred state would be to just sit like a lump and not want to do anything--as if that's some ideal for some reason, and as if the ideal is a lack of variety for some reason.

Even if one were to concede that something like hunger is bad, — S

This is all stemming from schopenhauer saying that the view hinges on "systematic suffering," where that doesn't need to take into account any contingent assessments of the states in question.

I agree with you otherwise, but if it turns out that he's simply wanting to argue that hunger is necessarily a negative experience to an individual, in phenomenal/assessment terms, then he's not actually arguing for anything "systematic" where the individual's assessment is irrelevant. And then it would just turn into me trying to figure out why he'd be insisting that everyone feels a way that they clearly do not on my view (and in my personal experience, including my own).

The fact that we are in a deprived state = suffering. It matters not what people evaluate about this or that actual experience. In this model, it is acknowledged that we are always in a sense becoming and never fully being. Becoming has a quality of not fully satisfied. — schopenhauer1

Right, I understand that that's the view. What I'm asking is WHY that's the view. What would be the motivation for having that view?

Again, why does the guy grab something from the fridge? Why isn't he satisfied without doing so? Is it something related to a deficiency in hunger, thirst, comfort, entertainment? — schopenhauer1

Why do we have to keep going over this when I've said maybe six or seven times that the person is hungry. I'm not disagreeing with that. I'm saying that one can be hungry without assigning any sort of "unpleasant" assessment to it at all. And according to what you're saying above, that's fine, because the view doesn't hinge on an individual assigning an "unpleasant" assessment to the experience.

So we don't have to keep going over this.

Let's just get to WHY one would have a view that something is morally problematic even though someone doesn't have a problem with it.

Right, hunger.. Let's start there. In the Schopenhauer view, the "negative" state is that which is not at some sort of satiation- to be deprived. — schopenhauer1

I know you're saying this. So you do not need to repeat it.

What I'm saying is that it makes no sense to me that you'd be saying that something is morally problematic even though an individual has no issues about it. They don't at all mind any of the states in question, etc.

You explained that it's because it's "Something that is so structural, it is not reflected on, but runs our lives." Well, that's true of things like physics, our autonomic nervous systems, etc., too. So why wouldn't those be morally problematic on your view? That's not a commentary about conventional linguistic frameworks. So conventional linguistic frameworks that we'd use have nothing to do with the issue.

The problem is they aren't commensurable per se. One is about the universe, one is about human nature. You never answered, why is someone going to the fridge from the couch? I know funny question. — schopenhauer1

Well, one is about human nature, too, unless you think we're somehow "outside of physics."

But if you want to stick to human nature, we can use our autonomic nervous systems, as S suggested.

Re going to the fridge, I already said because they're hungry, but I pointed out that they might not have any negative phenomenal assessment of that at all, and you pointed out that you weren't talking about that anyway--you're saying something that's independent of any individual's assessment of their states.

Ah a rare look at Terrapin Station in the flesh. — schopenhauer1

I'm more like this (but not bald):

I had moths do that once. Delete threads.

I know you got sidetracked, but I was interested in your response to this:

"Wouldn't, say, physics fit that description--something structural, it's not reflected upon, but it runs our lives. So would you say that physics is morally problematic? "

I was thinking more along the lines of this:

"What has philosophy taught you?"

That people believe a lot of weird shit, but it's entertaining at that.

I am enlightened, meaning I see the truth, and on this forum and this thread, I speak the truth, and you're coming back with pseudo philosophical BS. How can I be egoic if I am enlightened? If you want to question the veracity of this claim, call me out on a post and let's talk. — PhilCF

At least you're not engaging in the "ego-fest."

haha, yeah, that too.

Well that's a weak argument — Bartricks

It's a modus ponens (If P then Q. P. Therefore Q.) That's what you always use.

its first premise is garbled. — Bartricks

If we're allowed to examine the semantics of the premises, then let's get back to that with respect to your argument.

Note, you need to say that if morality is YOUR mental dispositions, otherwise the second bit simply isn't true and the premise is false. — Bartricks

No, morality is not just MY mental dispositions. I'm not the only one who has the mental dispositions in question.

It's not a matter of opinion as to what's reasonable otherwise there could be no basis for reasonable discussion. — Janus

The basis is how individuals reason. Not everyone reasons the same way.

Re definitions of morality, I've relayed mine many times here:

Morality is how one feels about interpersonal behavior that one considers to be more significant than mere etiquette. And specifically, it's feelings about whether behavior is "good" or "bad" or in a more fine-tuned analysis, whether it's permissible, obligatory, recommended, etc.

Something that is so structural, it is not reflected on, but runs our lives. — schopenhauer1

Wouldn't, say, physics fit that description--something structural, it's not reflected upon, but it runs our lives. So would you say that physics is morally problematic?

One can construct a modus ponens argument in about two seconds to support any arbitrary thing, by the way.

One could also construct a valid argument in about two seconds that's simply in the form of (1) P (2) ~P therefore Q. Of course that wouldn't be sound (outside of paraconsistent logical interpretations, perhaps) but you don't really care about soundness, or at least your approach is simply to assert that the premises are self-evident, which anyone could do with any arbitrary modus ponens argument. That's not going to convince folks who disagree with one of the premises, but you don't seem to care about that. You're using the tactic of simply calling them unreasonable, insane, etc.

There are reasonable and unreasonable definitions. — Janus

Reasonable and unreasonable according to whom?

Yes, do you understand that you're not a god and your opinions don't determine what's true. — Bartricks

Right, what the world is like determines that. What the world is like is that morality is only mental dispositions.

So, what you need to do is construct an argument that has "If I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable" as its conclusion. I — Bartricks

If morality is only mental dispositions, then if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable to me.
Morality is only mental dispositions.
Therefore, if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable to me.

Once more, my premise 2 says this: "If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable" — Bartricks

Do you understand that I don't agree with that premise?

Why do you keep talking like you're an authority on these things? You thought my argument was invalid, didn't you? Be honest. And then you decided it was valid. — Bartricks

I just explained this re formal logic versus plugging in natural language. What's difficult to understand about that?

That's just wrong. there is a common definition of morality, that it is to be concerned with personal interrelations. To be unconcerned about social harmony, general well-being and happiness is to be unconcerned about personal interrelations. Using people for one's own gratification, for example, is a one way street, not an interrelation. — Janus

I just said that there were common and uncommon definitions. (Not that I'm agreeing that your definition is common, but that's irrelevant for the moment.) What I said was that it's not correct to be common or incorrect to be uncommon. You're apparently saying that that is wrong. Per what?

Tell you what, I'll just think you understand it, and then you will. That's how the world works according to Terrapin, isn't it? — Bartricks

How many times have I made it clear that just because one person feels that x is morally permissible, it doesn't imply that anyone else will feel that x is morally permissible?

It is deductively valid and apparently sound. It has exactly the same form as my argument - the one you're trying to take issue with. — Bartricks

Why don't you understand that I don't accept the second premise in your argument when it comes to morality?

No, a person who didn't not value those things would not be a morally motivated person, by definition. — Janus

By your definition, maybe. Not by theirs. There aren't factually correct definitions. Just more or less common ones. It's not correct to be common, or incorrect to be uncommon.

So, to recap, you now accept that my argument is valid. — Bartricks

Modus ponens is valid under traditional logic. If we ignore semantic problems with certain natural language formulations, and we retain the modus ponens relations, then sure, insofar as that goes, it's valid.

Of course, we shouldn't really ignore semantic problems once we start plugging in natural language, but that's an issue we've already discussed.