Socialism is the doctrine that the means of production should be owned in common, not by a few. So, we could all have shares in GM, but we could not trade them. It is the economic equivalent of direct democracy. We could still hire workers, directors and CEOs all at different wages. We could also buy and sell real and personal property, have savings, etc.

there's no reason to believe that any of the antecedents of any particular ones of those implications are true. — Michael Ossipoff

Then there is no point in proceeding, as I am engaged in the search for truth. I have no interest in hypotheticals that explain posits that might not even be true to begin with.

I will note for the present that Godel has shown that claims of consistency for arithmetic. and systems that can be arithmetically represented, cannot be proven.

Godel showed that, in any logical system complex enough to have arithmetic, there are true propositions that can’t be proven. — Michael Ossipoff

He showed many things. The inability to prove consistency is one of them. It ended Hilbert's program of deriving math from logic. The inability to prove consistency means that there is no justification for assuming your hypothetical life stories are consistent. If they can be inconsistent, why should I give them any credence?

Your life-experience story is self-consistent because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts, or propositions that are both true and false — Michael Ossipoff

Wy point is this is an unjustified faith claim. Perhaps part of my Hypothetical Life Story (HLS) assumes I did something that violates the laws of physics (which you think is impossible). For example, in my HLS, I may have made a decision which I think was free and you think is precluded by the laws of physics. Wouldn't that be an implicit contradiction for you? Or in my HLS I visit a glacier that should not have existed given how global warming works in my HLS. You see, contradictions need not be blatant, they can be subtle. So, it is important to have some justification for thinking that a HLS is self-consistent. As a result of Godel's work there can be none.

I didn’t say that Realism is inconsistent. But your experience is subjective, ... — Michael Ossipoff

My point is not that realism is consistent, but that there is an ontological justification for its consistency, while there is none for your HLSs.

As for subjectivity, all knowledge is both subjective and objective. There is no knowing without both a knowing subject and a known object. I am happy to agree that experience is subjective because that is not an argument against it also being objective.

But I think we agree that your experience can’t be inconsistent. — Michael Ossipoff

Good. But, why do you think this? I think it's consistent because I see it as an experience of being. What do you think is the reason for its consistency?

I live in a world that is actual

Of course, if we use the following useful definition of “actual”:
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“Consisting of, or part of, the physical world in which the speaker resides.” — Michael Ossipoff

Or if we say that something is actual if it can act in any way. In either case, I do not live in a world that does not exist -- as you suggested.

That’s why, in 1840, physicist Michael Faraday pointed out that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world consists of other than a system of mathematical and logical structural-relation. …with the Materialists’ objectively-existent “stuff “ being no more real or necessary than phlogiston. — Michael Ossipoff

Faraday was a great physicist, but that did not qualify him as a philosopher. Mathematics is an abstraction that cannot be applied unless there is something beyond itself to apply it to. It is what the abstract relations describe (that in which they are instantiated) that Faraday forgot.

I know it is actual because it acts to inform me.

Of course…in your experience-story. — Michael Ossipoff

I do not disown my experience, but I'm making two additional points (1) In acting to inform me, objects act and so meet the condition to exist simpliciter, (2) if we did not share common experiences, we could not communicate.

I don’t know what it means to say that God isn’t natural — Michael Ossipoff

It means that God, while operative in nature, transcends nature, and so is not a part of nature.

But of course it’s just that we don’t mean the same thing by “natural”. I don’t know what you mean by it. — Michael Ossipoff

By "nature" I mean all physically observable existents and their dynamics -- and as I said before, by an "existent," I mean anything that can act in any way. By "dynamics" I mean the principles guiding observable change.

While I am not a naturalist, I see no need to avoid an well-defined terminology. It is a type of genetic fallacy because it may have originated with some group with whom we may disagree. Nonetheless, I do not thnk that most of the language I use with respect to physical reality so originates.

Right, your inference is about the nature of what you experience. …an inference that this physical world that you experience has objective existence (whatever that would mean).. — Michael Ossipoff

I have said what it means to exist -- it is the ability to act in any way. So, whatever exists with respect to anything, exists simpliciter. I think we have exhausted the topic of "inferring" reality. You have not responded to the points I have made, so there is no point in my repeating them.

It’s just that the physical world, including us animals, is basically as it was taught to us. — Michael Ossipoff

Exactly, and truth is the adequacy of what we think to what is. Case closed.

But, along with the Materialists, you want to make a metaphysics of that. You want to make this physical universe a metaphysical brute-fact. — Michael Ossipoff

I don't even know why you are saying this. I see the physical universe as contingent at every point of space-time and so in need of a concurrent explanation. Further, I see the line of concurrent explanation terminating in a necessary, self-explaining being, commonly called God. So, I see no brute facts, and consider the very concept of a brute fact antithetical to science. Please do not persist in giving a false account of my position.

I recognize that intuition rebels against a suggestion that all that’s describable is just hypothetical. But there’s no physics-experiment that can establish otherwise — Michael Ossipoff

I didn't think you were a logical positivist or a physicalist. We both know that physics is not the only approach to truth. I have explained why there is no dynamic separation between subjects and their objects and how experience links them by a partial identity. You have chosen not to dispute my analysis.

It’s my impression, largely from metaphysics, that Reality, what-is, is good. …and that there’s good intent behind what-is. …and that Reality is benevolence itself. — Michael Ossipoff

I am happy to agree with you here.

”If there hadn’t been apples, it would have been something else edible, because we animals couldn’t live without edible things” — Michael Ossipoff
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This argument is inconsistent with your worldview. How can you know that we are animals in need of food except by experience?

You aren’t an anti-evolutionist, are you? — Michael Ossipoff

I accept the science of evolution while rejecting the naturalist spin on evolution as an example of order emerging from mindless randomness. That is not the point. Evolution is known by reflecting on our experience of reality. As you think experience does not give us reality, you have no reason to believe that we are animals, let alone evolved animals.

How would such an animal grow and reproduce without taking-in material? — Michael Ossipoff

How do you know any of this, except by experience? Besides, if your life is one hypothetical story, and mine quite another, there is no reason for us to have any common experience or share any common knowledge or beliefs. What makes it possible for us to communicate is that we share the same objective reality. Absent that, why should we have any common ground?

You’re making inferences, assumptions, about the nature of your surroundings — Michael Ossipoff

Of course I am, but their existence and their capacity to inform me are not among my inferences.

I don’t know the meaning of that terminology. I haven’t read the author that you’ve referred to. — Michael Ossipoff

That is why I explained the difference to you. Ideas do not need to be know before they can signify. Other kinds of signs do. Since we do not first know we have an idea of x, we can't infer the existence of x from "I have an idea of x." Instead it works the other way. We know x (by experience) and then infer that to know x I must have an idea of x. If you want a reference, look at Henry Veatch, Intentional Logic.

In what context, other than its own, do you want or believe this physical universe to be “existent” or “real”? — Michael Ossipoff
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I know it is objective in all contexts.

.…such as…? — Michael Ossipoff

In the context of the lived world, science, philosophy, theology, human relations, morality, etc, etc."

There is no reason to think the quarterback's choice does not modify the laws of nature [physics?] and many reasons to think it does.
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Name one. — Michael Ossipoff

1. Physical acts are consequent on intentional commitments. If physics applied invariantly, what we thought could not result in physical effects.
2. The causal invariant in intentional actions is the goal (which is intentional) not a physical trajectory. When I decide to go to the store, I may envision a path, but if the preplanned path is blocked, I will find another to attain my goal. Mechanism is backward looking, teleology forward looking. So, my goal rather than my physical trajectory determines by motion.
3. It has been experimentally confirmed, beyond a statistical doubt, that human intentional can modify "random" physical processes.
4. On the other side, as I have argued in many posts on this forum, the fundamental abstraction of physics limits is realm of application to purely physical objects -- excluding any operations of the intending subject. So, we have no reason to expect that human acts of will are adequately described by physics.

Each of us influences this physical world. …but not by changing its physical laws. — Michael Ossipoff

This is self-contradictory. If the laws are unmodified by human action, the state of the world before we are conceived, together with the laws of nature, determine all future states. If future states are fully determined before we exist, we can have no influence on them

I don’t know what there is to “back up” about physics, other than that it’s been useful in describing the relations among the things and events of the physical world. — Michael Ossipoff

What needs justification is the application of physics outside of its verified realm of application, viz. its application to human intentionality. Physics has nothing to say about meaning or intent because they are not part of its ontology. (By the ontology of physics I mean the things it deals with such as space, time, mass, fields and dynamical laws.)

I still do not know what you mean by "describable" in "describable metaphysics."

On further reflection, everyone is entitled to use language consistent with their positions. I certainly do.

What is objectionable is damping down other perspectives on the basis of being "mentalistic." I would think the vast literature on experience offers the possibility of substantially enriching the concept of subjectivities. Cutting off or restricting this avenue of elaboration as "mentalistic," with no further justification, is what seems prejudicial.

I'm loathe to talk about subjectivities in terms of 'experiences', which reeks of a mentalistic vocabulary that I'd prefer to be expunged if at all possible. — StreetlightX

I have no problem with adding new perspectives, such as that of subjectivities, to my repertoire. The exclusion of "mentalistic" language moves in the opposite direction. Like the deprecating usage of "supernatural," it seems designed to prejudice discussions without the need to address the relevant issues rationally.

When I say that our experience-stories consist of complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, with one of the many consistent configurations of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions... — Michael Ossipoff

This is not a complete sentence. You may wish to edit it.

I will note for the present that Godel has shown that claims of consistency for arithmetic. and systems that can be arithmetically represented, cannot be proven. So, you philosophy has a very shaky foundation if it is based on the assumption of self-consistency. By way of contrast, the consistency of realism is based on the fact that one cannot instantiate a contradiction. So, as long as we abstract our principles from reality, they are guaranteed to be self-consistent.

Why should I waste my time on worlds that do not exist?

You mean other than because you live in one? — Michael Ossipoff

I live in a world that is actual, not hypothetical. I know it is actual because it acts to inform me. By way of contrast, I am the one informing hypothetical worlds.

I look forward to your fuller response.

There’s no reason to believe that your life and experience are other than that hypothetical logical system that I call your hypothetical life-experience-story. — Michael Ossipoff

I think this requires argument. You need to say why some propositions only are hypothetical, and what it is to be true. If you refuse to specify what you mean by truth, then how can anyone know if they agree or disagree with you?

Also, why do you refrain from saying what experience exists? What do you man by "existing"?

Any “fact” in this physical world implies and corresponds to an implication — Michael Ossipoff

More fundamentally, it corresponds to a possible human experience. I only "encounter" the roundabout because I experience it. This makes experience fundamental.

A true mathematical theorem is an implication whose antecedent includes at least a set of mathematical axioms. — Michael Ossipoff

What if the axioms are false? How would we know they are true or false?

Instead of one world of “Is”…
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…infinitely-many worlds of “If”. — Michael Ossipoff

Why should I waste my time on worlds that do not exist?

We’re used to declarative, indicative, grammar because it’s convenient. But conditional grammar adequately describes our physical world. We tend to unduly believe our grammar. — Michael Ossipoff

We use such grammar because it expresses what we actually think. Your conjecture that life is hypothetical is not what most people actually think. So, the burden is on you to convince us that what we think is wrong.

I suggest that Consciousness is primary in the describable realm, or at least in its own part(s) of it. — Michael Ossipoff

How would you describe consciousness? (I do not mean the contents of consciousness, but that which makes us aware of those contents.)

Of course consistency in your story requires that there be evidence of a physical mechanism for the origin of the physical animal that you are. — Michael Ossipoff

I think it would be consistent, but false, to say I had no parents. It is only because we know what is true from experience that we know (not hypothesize) that we have parents.

I am happy to answer your questions.

what do you mean by “”objectively existent”, “objectively real”, “actual”, “substantial”, or “substantive”? — Michael Ossipoff

By existent, I mean able to act in any way. Objects (potentially or actually) are one pole of the subject- object relation we call knowing. To be an object is to be able to inform a subject -- in other words, to be intelligible. To be a subject is to be able to be aware of intelligibility.

A substance is an ostensible unity. As such, it has various notes of intelligibility that we can predicate of it.

Actual means operative -- able to act at the present time. It is opposed to potential, which means immanent, but not yet operative. It is also opposed to fictional, which means that the corresponding idea has a sense or meaning, but no operative referent.

2. In what context, other than its own, or the context of our lives, do you want or believe this physical universe to be real &/or existent? — Michael Ossipoff

It is not a matter of my wanting or believing that the physical universe is operative. I am directly aware that it operates on me to inform me that it is and what it is -- whether I want it to or not, and whether I choose to believe it or not. So, its reality is not context dependent.

Continuous waves have infinite degrees of freedom, at least in the abstract.

I have not heard of treating a photon as an observer.

No, I think the MWI is based on an error (thinking the bulk matter of the brain is subject to linear dynamics, just like quanta in isolation).

Yes, I think the wave function collapses because detectors are made of bulk matter and buk matter has nonlinear dynamics that cannot support super positions.

I don’t have an argument with your statement that spiritual reality is unnatural, because I don’t know what you mean by spiritual reality. — Michael Ossipoff

It is not relevant to our present discussion, but by "spiritual" here I mean a reality with no intrinsic dependence on matter.

, which, while real, is not measurable.
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So then, is it that anything that isn’t measureable (physical)? is unnatural? So you’d say that God (hypothetically, if you don’t believe there’s God) isn’t natural? …and that abstract-implications, even they’re the structural basis of the describable world, are unnatural? — Michael Ossipoff

All I am saying is that many things can be real (and natural) without being measurable. Qualia, intentions and the laws of nature are a few examples God is a special case. God is inseparable from nature, but not part of nature because nature is ontologically finite, and God is not. So, God is operative in nature, and natural in that sense, but not natural in the sense of being part of nature. Abstractions are human thoughts and so quite natural, though immaterial.

Please note that I am not a materialist. I think that there are intrinsically immaterial realities, such as God, with no dependence on material reality.

Yes there’s outward sign to justify Theism, but there are also discussions that more directly justify faith, aside from outward sign. I define faith as “trust without or aside from outward sign”. There are discussions that justify faith. — Michael Ossipoff

Just to be clear, I distinguish faith and reason, and see philosophy as dealing with what can be known by reason independently of faith.

At the same time, I think faith is real, have reflected a great deal about, it, grace, inspiration and related topics. While I would be glad to share my thoughts on these matters, I consider these reflections part of Sacred (as opposed to Natural) Theology and not part of philosophy. So, yes, I think that we can be aware of the presence of God within, but I don't think that is grist for the philosophical mill.

But, if you’re not a Materialist (“Naturalist”), then I’d suggest ditching Materialist language like “nature” and “the natural world”. — Michael Ossipoff

I see no reason to forget about nature and the natural world. While they are not the whole of reality, they are certainly an important part of it. If one is interested in knowing God, much can be learned from studying his handiwork.

You experience them, and then you infer objective existence for them. — Michael Ossipoff

No. That is not it as all. Think about how inference works. It does not create new information. It makes new connections between old information. So, If the object's existence was not already immanent in my experience, no amount of inference could inform me it exists. The very fact that the object is acting to inform me shows that it exists. How it informs me is a partial revelation of what it is -- a thing that can inform me in this way.

Experiencing is entering into a subject-object relation. Without an object, such a relation is impossible. I, as subject, bring awareness to the table. The object brings an intelligibility that will become the contents of my consciousness when I am aware of it. My being informed by the object is identically the object informing me. This Identity prevents any separation of subject and object. So there is no need to bridge a gap by some inference.

There may be incidental inference. I may decide that this object is like others I've experienced and infer properties I'm not experiencing, but filling-in gaps is not the subject-object relation of experience. It is a separate, second movement of thought.

But don’t you see that that claim about an objectively-existent physical world is what you’re arguing for? You can’t use it as an argument for itself. — Michael Ossipoff

Every line of argument needs unproven premises; however, "unproven" does not have to mean "unknown." As I have just explained, there is no separation between me being informed by the object, and the object informing me. Experience provides us with our known, but unproven premises. The analysis of experience does not prove it, but it does remove rational grounds for doubt. The lack of dynamical separation between object informing and the subject being informed removes any need for mediation or inference.

Apples are among the things and events that are in your self-consistent hypothetical life-experience-story. — Michael Ossipoff

There is no hypothesis. Hypotheses bridge ignorance. I have no need for such a bridge when apples act to inform me whenever I encounter them.

If there hadn’t been apples, it would have been something else edible, because we animals couldn’t live without edible things — Michael Ossipoff

This argument is inconsistent with your worldview. How can you know that we are animals in need of food except by experience? It is perfectly self-consistent to be a being without need of food.

No doubt infinitely-many terminologies are possible. I don’t disagree with them, but I don’t use all of them. — Michael Ossipoff

My point is not terminological, but epistemological. Saying that we only know our ideas is simply wrong -- and wrong precisely because it confuses signs that must be known in themselves before they can signify with ideas that have no reality beyond signifying.

quantum-physics in particular, is their specialty, their field. …not yours — Michael Ossipoff

Actually, I have a doctorate in theoretical physics and continue to work on its foundations -- specifically the foundations of quantum theory.

In what context, other than its own, do you want or believe this physical universe to be “existent” or “real”? — Michael Ossipoff

I know it is objective in all contexts.

It doesn’t contravene physical law. The quarterback is a physical, biologically-orignated, purposefully-responsive device. — Michael Ossipoff

There is no reason to think the quaterback's choice does not modify the laws of nature and many reasons to think it does.

In this physical world, there’s no contravention of physical law. — Michael Ossipoff

Thank you for sharing your faith in physics. Do you have an argument to back it up?

No one’s denying that Idealism and Theism don’t mean the same thing, or that they’re positions distinct from eachother. But they aren’t incompatible with eachother. — Michael Ossipoff

Agreed.

I am a philosophical theist. I am no sort of idealist.

Then, you must be a Materialist or a Dualist. I don’t think you can be a Theist and a Materialist, so doesn’t that make you a Dualist? — Michael Ossipoff

I could not possibly be a theist and a materialist. As It happens, I am not a substance dualist either. I am a moderate realist who thinks that there are physical and and intentional acts by substances that are ostensible unities.

Describable metaphysics only discusses the describable. I don’t claim that all of Reality is describable. — Michael Ossipoff

Certainly God is not.

I agree that we are natural beings…

I translate that as “physical beings”. — Michael Ossipoff

We are physical and intentional beings.

Thank you. I will reflect on this perspective -- try it on as it were.

Thank you for introducing subjectivities.

I have a few questions. First, would it be a reasonable summary to say that a subjectivity is a role (say being a pedestrian) that a person can engage in? I mean, would it be a mistake to speak of subjectivities if we are not dealing with persons?

Second, you say:

Now, of the various reasons why studying different subjectivities is important, chief among them are the political and ethical implications of these differing subjectivities: — StreetlightX

Since you seem to be familiar with the literature, could you give a few examples of the implications being discussed so that we could see how this projection of human activity illuminates political philosophy and ethics?

Thank you again.

Thank you.

The physical world is more "natural" than...what? Human-constructed architecture and pavement? — Michael Ossipoff

The natural world excludes spiritual reality, which, while real, is not measurable.

I also object to naturalists' use of "supernatural" as a term of derision. God is, as Aristotle saw, the logical completion of our investigation of nature.

You mentioned the objective side, but it's there only by inference from our subjective experience. — Michael Ossipoff

I disagree. We experience the objects of the lived world. We do not infer them. Locke was wrong is saying we only know our own ideas. Rather ideas are acts by which we may know objects. (My idea <apple> is just me thinking of apples.) When I an aware of an apple, I do not first know I have the concept <apple>, and then infer that there is an apple causing that idea. Rather I know the physical apple and then, in a second movement of thought, infer that my means of knowing the apple is the idea <apple>.

This is typical of the confusion between formal and instrument signs that permeates modern philosophy. Ideas are formal signs -- their only reality, the only thing they do, is signify. Text, smoke and road signs are instrumental signs. They have a primary reality of their own (ink on paper, particulate suspensions, paint on metal) and secondarily signify. We do not need to recognize that <apple> is an idea for it to signify, but we must first recognize relevant properties of instrumental signs before they can signify. If I cannot make out the letters, if I confuse smoke with dust or a cloud, or if I fail to discern the figure on the road sign, they will fail to signify.

there are physicists who are taking physicalism down by saying that the notion of an objective physical world has gone the way of phlogiston. — Michael Ossipoff

And, as I have pointed out, they are confusing objective measurability with having a determinate value. These were never the same, and to lack a determinate value is not to lack objectivity.

Of course that statement quoted from Kim is true. It's true, and it doesn't contradict Subjective Idealism or Theism. — Michael Ossipoff

No, it is false. I did not say that previously, but it is false. If I ask why the end caught the pass and follow the sequence of events back in time, I come to the quarterback's decision to throw the pass to that end rather than another receiver. That decision is an intentional, not a physical act.

Subjective Idealism and Theism are logical distinct positions. I am a philosophical theist. I am no sort of idealist.

In fact, I take it a bit farther, and point say it about metaphysics as well as physical events and causes. Substiture "describable metaphysics" for "physical states", "physical events" and "physical causes". — Michael Ossipoff

I'm unsure what you are saying here. To me, metaphysics is the science of being as being, and so deals with all reality. Obviously, any causal relations are contained within reality.

We're physical. We're physical animals in a physical world. In other words, our hypothetical life-experience-story is the story of the experience of a physical animal in a physical world. — Michael Ossipoff

I agree that we are natural beings, but I think it is important to distinguish physical and intentional operations (aka "spiritual" operations). As Brentano pointed out, intentional operations have an intrinsic "aboutness" that is not required to specify physical operations (even though physical operations are ordered to ends).

Thank you for the clarification.

Yes, one can deny that things occur for an adequate reason, but it is irrational to do so. How can anything come to pass if the conditions of its genesis are inadequate to produce it? Claiming that it can is making the absurd claim that what is inadequate is adequate

Randomness is completely irrelevant. The only relevant consideration is adequacy.

What a whomping non sequitur. The inability to know something does not entail there is no sufficient reason for something being the case. — MindForged

I think you have it backward. My claim is that that if there is no sufficient reason in reality, we cannot know that there is a sufficient reason. This was in response to your suggestion:

You might well reject the PSR as a metaphysical principle ... while still ... retain[ing] it as an Epistemic principle. — MindForged

It seems like you want to hold onto the PSR when that is the very contention that I am attempting to dismantle. — Purple Pond

All the PSR states is that every operation is the operation of something able to so operate. How can you dispute that? Do you claim that beings can perform operations they are intrinsically incapable of? Or do you claim that some operations are not acts of an operator? If you do, you are reifying non-being, because anything capable of acting in any way exists.

You might well reject the PSR as a metaphysical principle (as most scientists do) while still doing as Hume suggested and retain it as an Epistemic principle. — MindForged

Putting aside your unsupported sociological claim, yes, some people are quite irrational. How can we know there is a sufficient reason if there is no sufficient reason to know?

You are welcome.

Let me expand. Metaphysics Delta is Aristotle's philosophical lexicon. In it he discusses the meaning of quantity as an attribute of reality. He notes that there are no actual numbers in reality (no variables with actual values). Rather "quantity" in reality refers to countability and measurability, with actual numbers deriving only from counting and measuring operations. Thus, the objective side of quantitative physical observations lies not in an actual number to be discovered but in the determinate measurability of the natural world. So, the fact that no determinate value exists in physical reality independent of any measuring operation has been known for more than 2500 years. Further, it is not a threat to objectivity.

Certainly the dependence of measured values on the details of the measuring process became more explicit with the advent first of Special Relativity and then of quantum theory. Still the underlying principle was pointed out long ago by Aristotle -- who incidentally, was the founder of mathematical physics.

It is fine not to be bothered by problems that exercise proponents of dubious -isms (such as physicalism). I am not overly bothered by them either. But it's even better to provide a rationale as to why one is entitled not to be bothered by their specific objections to our non-physicalist views. — Pierre-Normand

Of course. As I said, I have many reasons to reject Jaegwon Kim's Principle of Causal Closure, which states that "all physical states have pure physical causes." Kim argues that "If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain. That is, no causal chain will ever cross the boundary between the physical and the nonphysical." (Mind in a Physical World, p. 40)

The first and simplest reason is that we are able to discuss our intentional acts. If these acts were not involved in a causal chain leading to physical acts of speech and writing, we would be unable to discuss them. One could claim that intentional acts are physical, but doing so not only begs the question, it equivocates on the meaning of "physical" which refers to what is objective, rather than what is subjective. (See my several discussions of the Fundamental Abstraction on this forum, including the precis in my last post in this thread.) Further, if the causes within Kim's enclosure include any being we can discuss, the principle makes no meaningful claim, for it excludes nothing.

Second, with regard to the supporting argument, if we confine our attention to the temporal sequences of physical events ("trac[ing out its causal ancestry or posterity"), of course all we are going to find are physical events. This is neither surprising, nor a reason to support the principle. What it ignores is concurrent causality.

As noted long ago by Aristotle, and canonized in the physical principle of locality, an effect here and now requires the operation of a cause here and now -- not elsewhere or at another time. This kind of causality is not the time sequence by rule discussed by Hume and Kant (accidental causality), which has become the sole focus of modern philosophers. Accidental causality connects two disjoint events and so, as Hume pointed out, has no intrinsic necessity (the separation allows an outside agent to insert itself between the events and disrupt the dynamics).

On the other hand, concurrent or essential causality involves only a single event and has an intrinsic necessity. Aristotle's paradigm case is the builder building the house. The builder building (cause) is inseparable from the house being built (effect). In fact, the builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder. The necessity of essential causality rests on this identity.

The relevance of this distinction here is that Kim's tracing out of temporal lines of causation completely ignores it. One might respond that Kim's principle applies to only to time-sequenced or accidental causality, but that is to ignore the fact that accidental causality is the integral effect of essential causality. To see this consider the temporal evolution of a physical state. From the perspective of accidental causality, the initial state is the cause of the final state. Physics looks deeper. What it sees is that at each space-time point the laws of nature act (concurrently) to modify the state -- and the integral effect of these concurrent modifications connects the initial state to the final state. Thus, Humean-Kantian accidental causality is the integral effect of Aristotle's concurrent or essential causality.

So, if intentionality acts concurrently, if willing progress toward our goal is identically progress toward our goal being willed, then the concurrent act of willing will modify the connection between the events Kim is examining and his argument fails.

The faulty premise in Kim's argument, on my view, rather is the principle of the nomological character of causation (also famously endorsed by Donald Davidson). — Pierre-Normand

I think my analysis above addresses the nomological character of (accidental) causation, but not fully. I have previously argued on this forum that the laws of nature are intentional in character -- (1) being alone with human committed intentions in the genus of logical propagators and (2) meeting Brentano's "aboutness" criterion. Thus, the laws of nature and human committed intentions share a common theater of operation -- as confirmed experimentally by a staggering amount of data showing that human intentions modify "random" physical processes.

I think the issue here is the determination by reason of a causal event. In another topic, I talked about whether QM affirms or denies the concept of causality. — Posty McPostface

Standard quantum mechanics says that while observations may be random, systems that are unobserved develop in an entirely deterministic way. Physics, as physics, has nothing to say about any intentional act, including free will. So, what I am about to argue is constrained by the self-imposed limits of physics.

Consider two nested systems S1, which comprises a quantum system, S0, to be observed and everything required to observe it, O1, and S2 which includes S1 and a potential observer, O2. Over time, O1 makes its observation of S0. At the same time O2 makes no observation of S1. So, relying on standard quantum theory, O2 knows that S1 has behaved in a completely deterministic fashion. That means that the observation by O1, however unpredictable it may be, is deterministic. Thus, for quantum theory to be consistent, not only unobserved systems, but observations, must be fully deterministic.

Now, why does physics have nothing to say about intentional acts? Because of the Fundamental Abstraction of natural science, which I have explained earlier on this form. Every act of knowledge involves both a knowing subject and a known object. At the beginning of natural science, a decision is made to focus on the physical objects observed to the exclusion of the intentional operations of the knowing subjects. Having made this choice, natural science is bereft of data and concepts on subjects' intentional operations. So it lacks the information required to connect its findings on the physical world to subjective, intentional acts. That is why physicalism is an instance of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness (confusing abstractions with reality).

If nature cannot be comprehended or even more logically, simulated in a complex enough computer, then it must be the case that the PoSR has failed us somewhere. — Posty McPostface

The PSR is not a claim that nature behaves algorithmically. If is only a claim that every operation is preformed by an agent able to perform it.

Hence, if we talk about people having a free will, then it's fruitless to assert the PoSR due to the fact that some mental activity could not be determined. — Posty McPostface

Not at all. Determinism vs. free will means that the act of the agent is fully immanent in the state of the cosmos before the agent acts. The PSR here only requires that the agent be adequate to the task of making a free choice. These are entirely different claims.

Because it can be shown by mathematical induction that an infinite regress of concurrent causes can not be a complete explanation.

But university PhD physicist specialists in QM have said that QM lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world. — Michael Ossipoff

Too bad they haven't studied philosophy or the would know that the problem was laid to rest by Aristotle in Metaphysics Delta.

As I see no reason to give Kim his principle of causal closure, and many reasons to reject it, I am not bothered by the paradoxes that trouble physicalists.

If you allow brute facts you reject the PSR and with it the logical foundations of science.

I meant to say, the set of facts that explain, and only explain, the set of facts that aren't self-explanatory. — Purple Pond

The problem is that to avoid an infinite regress, you need at least one self-explaining fact that explains all below it.

Quantum mechanics has nothing do with free will. A random choice is not a freely chosen one. The fundamental error is that the Principle of Sufficient Reason does not preclude free will. Reasons can be adduce for every option worth considering, or the option would not be worth considering. It is not the motivations for the options that determine the choice, but the agent deciding.

So, to save the PSR all we need to do is say that the agent is the sufficient cause of his or her choice. One can deny this, but not on the ground of the PSR. One simply has to decide if agents can determine their own choices or not. If they can, they are sufficient to the task of making the choice. If they cannot, there is no free will. Either way, the PSR is unviolated.

I fail to see why the set of facts that explain the set of facts that aren't self-explanatory can't include a self-explanatory fact.

As for the Barber Paradox as you have stated it, there is nothing to prevent someone from shaving all who do not shave themselves and shaving himself. If you want the premise to be the Barber shaves all the beards of those who do not save themselves and only those beards, that premise is provably false.

What the fuck are you talking about? You can't run on a platform for the midterms, after the midterms are over. — Maw

The midterms are not over. My point was that the Kavanaugh debacle is only one issue among many on which the Republicans have a losing hand.

Who praises Putin at every turn? Who takes his word over that of our intelligence agencies? Who hid the fact that he was working on a Moscow Trump tower during the election? Whose son welcomed the offer of Russian help? Who hired a pro-Putin consultant as his campaign manager? Who attacks NATO and our allies?

That may be true but one needs information to conclude, I don't believe we have enough to dis/prove a god. — Grey Vs Gray

The fact that rocks persist is more than adequate. See my video #15 God & Scientific Explanation - Existence Proof https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJUIxaSDfU0.

Deduction may be the wrong word. Does belief, perception or answer work? — Grey Vs Gray

Unexamined belief? The point is simple. Not seeing something doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. We apply reason to the data of experience to discover causes that we cannot see.

there is no emperical evidence of a god — Grey Vs Gray

I ask you to think for a moment. Evidence requires the skill to use it before a conclusion can be reached. Fifty years ago, no one knew how to use DNA as forensic evidence. That did not mean that crime scenes had no evidence, it only meant that we did not know how to use it. The only way to know that there is no evidence for p is to know that p is false. So, your claim is either based on some non-existence proof, or it is baseless.

One can "see" the conversation of mass-energy. Otherwise it wouldn't be a scientifically proven phenomenon. — Grey Vs Gray

At last! We deduce the existence of things we cannot see from things we can see. The first sound deduction of God's existence I know of was by the father of mathematical physics -- Aristotle. He deduced the existence of an unmoved mover from the fact that things change. Since then many other sound proofs have been added.

For science to work, everything must have an adequate explanation, even if we do not know it. — Dfpolis

Yes and no, science is the process of discovering reality not the collection of ultimate conclusions. — Grey Vs Gray

I did not say it was. I am saying that the notion of "brute facts" (things that "just are" for no reason) is incompatible with science. Cosmologists even look for explanations of the big bang. So, no exception is made for the universe, nor should it be.

The distinguishing things about God is that, as the end of the line of explanation, God cannot be explained by something else (or he would not be the end of the line). So, God must be self-explaining. — Dfpolis

Or non-existant. — Grey Vs Gray

The choices are everything has an explanation and so God exists, or some phenomena have no explanation and so science is an irrational enterprise.

A bit nitpicks but I believe "interact" would be a more accurate expression. "Act" implies intent or intelegence. Rocks exist but don't act. — Grey Vs Gray

By "act" I only mean doing something. Doing something may or may not involve conscious intent. Rocks act by scattering light, resisting pressure, exerting gravitational attraction, etc. -- all with no minds of their own.

The universe cannot do any logically possible act. — Dfpolis

I disagree, they occur in and thus by the universe, all of your actions and thoughts are included within that. If one goes by the multiverse theory even more so. — Grey Vs Gray

You are contradicting yourself. Since a multiverse is possible, there are possible acts that are not possible in this universe. So this universe cannot do all possible acts and cannot be self-explaining. Since the laws of physics are contingent, and not metaphysically necessary, it is logically possible to act according to laws that are not instantiated in even a multiverse. So physical systems cannot be self-explaining.

One had to first conclude there is a god, without evidence, to go by your concept. — Grey Vs Gray

This is a plain statement of closed mindedness. As I noted earlier, the only way to know that there is no evidence is to know that there is no God. As you claim not to know this, you are letting your beliefs stand in the way of an open consideration of the data and their implications.

On the other hand, having examined a number of sound proofs, I know how to use the evidence we have to prove that God exists.

If there is a god and I ever meet him, I will ask why he exists. If he does not know, I will throw my hands up in disgust at the meaningless nature of existence. — Devans99

God knows He is self-explaining because His essence is His existence.

"Creator", "ruler of the universe", and "unlimited" are terms that imply complexity, not simplicity. — Harry Hindu

Thank you for sharing your faith. Now, do you have an argument a rational person could consider?

If they successfully delay the confirmation pass November 6th, then there is no further platform to run on because the race is over. — Maw

Really? How about health care? Conspiracy with the Russians? The destruction of our alliances? An anti-farm trade policy? Support of racism? Attacks on women? Separation of children from their families? Balancing the budget? Environmental protection? Basic competence at FEMA? Voting rights? A rational response to climate change? The repeal of the state income tax deduction? Failure to respond to mass shootings? Open your eyes. The Republicans are on the wrong side of so many issues that they are in for a historical shellacking.

well one reason is it is less than a day old, has not produced anything, and already it is being criticized for not being long enough or wide enough in depth. — Rank Amateur

I agree with you. It is rather strange to exclude Kavanaugh's drinking, when that is at the heart of the accusation and of his credibility. Still, more truth is better than less.

Anyone who believes that the democratic objective is anything other than to delay confirmation until after the midterms is naive. — Rank Amateur

And what good will that do? They have the majority for the rest of 2018 regardless of how the election turns out.

There is way to much at stake with this particular seat. — Rank Amateur

We agree. There is no point in filling it with a prevaricator lacking judicial temperament.

From the start the request for the FBI investigation was about delay not truth — Rank Amateur

And your evidence for this is? As I have pointed out, a few days delay is not a high price to pay for the chance to resolve doubts.

1. She traveled by air a lot for entertainment purposes visiting many remote countries as she writes in her cv.
2. When invited to the Senate hearings she refused claiming her fear of planes. Only under pressure or for money, I don't know, she agreed to fly to Washington. — Proto

A little thought always helps. How does the fact that she does fly show that she is not afraid of flying? How does the fact that she would rather fly to a place of enjoyment than to a place of trial show that she is not afraid of flying?

Then why is it so difficult and contradictory to define? — Harry Hindu

It depends on what kind of definition you want. The dictionary does an adequate job with "creator and ruler of the universe." If you want a definition based on genus and specific difference, the problem is that God is not in a genus because genera are defined by a limiting specification, and, as I explained above, God is unlimited.

Occam's point is to pick the simplest solution when given a choice — Grey Vs Gray

A non-explanation is not a solution. It is a cop out.

We see the universe but we don't see god. The simplest deduction is the universe is and god is not. — Grey Vs Gray

You seem not to understand how deduction works. It is far different from jumping to conclusions. We can see rainbows, but we cannot see the law of conservation of mass-energy. Does that mean that there are colored structures in the sky, but no laws of nature? Not to a rational mind.

If god can just be, so can the universe. — Grey Vs Gray

No, not if you want to think rationally. For science to work, everything must have an adequate explanation, even if we do not know it. If you admit exceptions, then any new phenomena could "just be." It is only because we know this is not so, that science seeks adequate explanations. Thus, everything, including God must have an adequate explanation. The distinguishing things about God is that, as the end of the line of explanation, God cannot be explained by something else (or he would not be the end of the line). So, God must be self-explaining.

Not just anything can be self explaining. If A explains B, the nature of A is sufficient to account for B. That means that if God is self-explaining, what God is must entail that God is.

Let's reflect on that. As intimated by Plato in the Sophist, anything that can act in any way in any way exists. Conversely, some "thing" that can do absolutely nothing, cannot evoke the concept of existence in us and so does not exist. So, existence is convertible with the capacity to act. Existence is not the ability to act in this way or that way, but the unspecified ability to act.

Extending this line of thought, if we knew everything that an object could do, we would have an exhaustive knowledge of what it is. If something can do everything a duck can do, and noting a duck cant do, it is a duck. Thus, essences, what things are, are specifications of an object's possible acts.

Putting these pieces together, if a being is to be self-explaining, its essence (the specification of its possible acts) must entail its existence (the unspecified ability to act). That means that the range of its possible acts cannot be limited, for then it would not entail the unspecified ability to act. So, a being can only be self-explaining if it can do any possible act. The universe cannot do any logically possible act.

It's only fair that everyone get's the chance to discover God, and not those who are lucky to posses certain qualities. Is God unfair? — Purple Pond

No one that I have ever met claims there is only one way to know God. Most theists grasp God intuitively, not as the result of deduction. How people teach others about God is a matter of personal aptitude and preference. For good or ill, their methods have no bearing on whether or not God is fair.

What we do know is that under pressure, Kavanaugh turned more than a bit vicious. Not a good thing for a potential SCOTUS justice to display. Not a good thing for an appellate judge to display, for that matter. — Bitter Crank

Amen

As this is a philosophical forum can anyone tell about possible ramifications of Kavanaugh case for the USA and the the world on the whole? — Proto

Yes, but it would be nice to have evidence and a rational argument instead of a series of irrelevant and unresarched points.