Well I wouldn't say "absence of matter" is a "thing that exists" so I didn't include it in the system, but that's not to say I don't believe there are no places where there is no matter.

Maybe it's hypocritical of me to believe that a pattern is a "thing that exists" but an absence isn't. Hmm...

"Sir, there is a sum of money you must pay to the government called taxes"

"Aha! But this sum of money changes for different people at different times in their life! Therefore there is no sum of money I must pay to the government called taxes! Taxes aren't real!"

If only it was that easy.

You’re just describing the state of the liquid. — NOS4A2

Ok. And what is a "state"? Is it a physical thing, a mental thing, or some sort of quirk in language?

Because your language certainly makes it seem like a "state" is something a liquid possesses.

What's stuff? — Bylaw

What you'd find discussed in a physics or chemistry book.

What are we ruling out? — Bylaw

"mental stuff" as dualists and idealists have it.

Physical. It's one of the 4 fundamental forces. — Michael

Right, but then are the fundamental forces themselves physical? What physical properties do they have? Do they have a mass or a velocity?

What about "Newton's second law". Is that one physical, mental, or has no referent?

Well, there's the question you asked of me; what does it even mean for an abstract object to exist (as some mind-independent thing)? — Michael

I told you:

an abstract exists if there could exist material things that act according to it. — khaled

They should which is why I said:

I prefer "stuff" to "matter", and I prefer "arrangement" to "pattern"
— unenlightened

Yea that sounds better. — khaled

But before we do anything know that it's 1:30 am here so excuse me if I just suddenly disappear.

The boiling temperature varies with pressure, so it is relative. Therefore it is not true that there is a temperature at which something boils. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a non-sequitor. Just because it varies with another value doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

Gravitational pull varies with distance. That does not mean gravitatoinal pull doesn't exist.

Anything with a mass.

The obvious question would then be why you are so sure those two categories are all there is.

As for a lack of need for it: If things are either mental or physical, then when we refer to "gravity" we must be referring to a mental thing, a physical thing, or having no referent at all. So which is it? I disagree because I don't think any of the options does it justice.

But other than that, your only problem for it is that it seems unnecessary? Not some sort of internal inconsistency or issues that arise from assuming it?

My view is a bit out there when it comes to ontology and probably long overdue for a good tearing down, but I think that what we call "mental" belongs in the realm of abstract objects, along with the traditional inhabitants of said realm. And that they offer the least problematic account of interactions between mental and physical.

You seem confident it doesn't exist, so what exactly do you mean by "exist" in the first place. What would it look like if distance existed vs didn't exist. Mordor and unicorns are easy because we'd be able to see/touch them if they existed. But what about "temperature", "energy", "distance" etc

To me, an abstract exists if there could exist material things that act according to it. So gravity exists because things are pulling each other. Distance exists because if I represent things in xyz, and add up their vector positions, they seem to be where I'd expect them to be, etc.

To say gravity doesn't exist would be to say it is impossible to even have a world where material things pull each other. An example of an abstract that doesn't exist is a "square triangle".

What does existence for abstract stuff mean when you say it?

You're saying that the temperature at which something boils exists. But this is meant in some abstract sense, not in some concrete sense, e.g. the temperature at which water boils exist. — Michael

Yes.

Then your argument above equivocates: — Michael

Not intentionally. I thought when we speak of "boiling point" we speak of it in the abstract. Not a specific instance of it. So the boiling point is the temperature at which something boils (something is unspecified because we are speaking abstractly)

The temperature at which something boils exists, therefore the boiling point exists.

And so I will simply deny that the temperature at which something boils exists. — Michael

That just seems...weird. Would you deny the existence of distance between two points as well? When a mathematician speaks of "distance between two points a and b" but doesn't specify a or b, what is he speaking about?

When a chemist says "boiling point of substance X can be used in *insert formula here* to calculate the entropy of the system" what are they speaking about?

If these properties don't exist even abstractly then how are these two talking about them?

Also I want to understand what you mean by "abstractly" exactly. Does a unicorn exist abstractly? Does a "sphere" (with unspecified radius)? As I understand it the answer is yes for both.

I will accept that the temperature at which water boils exists, but then if so we are only left with my argument above — Michael

Yes, which we seem to agree is valid. The boiling point of water is indeed not a property. Because the boiling point of water is "100C". That is a value in Celsius, not a property.

It seems iffy to me to deny the existence of properties in general, but to think they exist for certain things nonetheless, but I haven't thought about it much yet. I'll get back to this point when I do.

Good talk for now though. Gave me a lot to think about.

Yes, the boiling point of water is not a property. In the same way that the height of the empire state building is not a property. But height is a property.

The boiling point is a property. The boiling point of water is not. The boiling point of water is a specific value.

No. "Boils at 100 degrees Celsius" is a property. That water and maybe some other things have.

I would think it is a property of the thing yes.

pattern as " a regular arrangement of lines, shapes, or colours" — RussellA

I have since then also said:

I prefer "stuff" to "matter", and I prefer "arrangement" to "pattern"
— unenlightened

Yea that sounds better. — khaled

The Cambridge Dictionary defines arrangement as "a particular way in which things are put together or placed". No mention of regularity.

If I understand correctly, you are saying that as everything in a mind-independent world is in a particular order or regular arrangement, then there is nothing that is not in a particular order or regular arrangement. — RussellA

Correct. There is nothing in the world that is not in a particular order. Don't know where you got the "regular arrangement" bit since that is not a common concept between the two definitions.

Can you give an example of something that is not in any arrangement? Or an object that has no shape?

However, no single part can be in a particular order or regular arrangement, only the whole, the set of parts. — RussellA

A set can include one object only. So this is not a problem.

If everything in a mind-independent world is in a particular order or regular arrangement, either each part has information that it is a part of of a particular order or regular arrangement, or the whole has information that its parts are in a particular order or regular arrangement. — RussellA

Too vague. What does something inanimate "having" information even mean?

But again, I don't see any responses from you. When I present an argument, you ignore it and come up with a new way to say the same thing I have argued against. There is no point in this exercise, so this will be my last reply.

You say that "All patterns exist independently of anything", inferring that before sentient beings there were some things that existed as a pattern and some things that existed as a non-pattern. — RussellA

What? How did you make that inference?

No, everything that exists has a pattern/arrangement. No judgement is needed. To think a judgement is needed for a pattern to exist is to assume that patterns are mind-dependent, begging the question.

Just like every object we can see has a shape. We do not need to judge what the shape is or have a word for the shape, and yet the object has a shape. This screen will continue to be square even if we had no word for "square" and even if no one had seen this screen before. What would an object without a shape look like? What would an object without an arrangement look like (since you seem to think those don't exist)?

And the arrangement "square" that the screen has determines some of its capabilities. A square can be laid flat, whereas a sphere can't. Thus, we can see that the arrangement of the screen has real world consequences.

If on top of that, the arrangement was entirely mind dependent, then we should be able to change the capablities of the screen by arbitrarily judging it to have different arrangement, but we cannot do that. If I judge the screen to be spherical that will not suddenly allow me to roll the screen on the floor smoothly. Thus, my judgement does not seem to determine what arrangement the screen has, only what arrangement I think it has.

In short: Although the arrangement of an object affects its capabilities, even if we judge that the object posseses an arrangement X, that does not grant it the capabilites that X would grant. Thus, which arrangement the object actually possesses must not be determined by our minds. Thus arrangements are mind independent.

Do you agree that arguments of this form are valid:

A is B
B exists
Therefore A exists

If so, replace A with "boiling point" and B with "the temperature at which something boils" and you get "the boiling point (a property) exists"

The boiling point, for instance, is the temperature at which something boils. — NOS4A2

but there isn’t something called “red” in Anthocyanins and Heme. — NOS4A2

Yes there is, you just described it. It is the property of:

the light bouncing off of these compounds is similar. — NOS4A2

That light being within a certin range

If patterns did ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, then as no pattern can be exactly regular, something within either the parts or the set of parts as a whole would have to have judged whether it was a pattern or not. — RussellA

Or that the pattern is simply irregular. ABABABABAB is a pattern. ABABBABBAABA is also a pattern. The second being irregular. It is our judgement that it is irregular. But both patterns exist. Some collections of things are arranged per the first pattern, others are arranged per the second.

Which also addresses this:

If patterns did exist in a mind-independent world, then the problem would be in finding a mechanism within the mind-independent world that determines whether an inevitably irregular set of parts is a pattern or non-pattern. — RussellA

There is no need for determining. The pattern is whatever form the irregular set takes.

I prefer "arrangement" to "pattern"
— unenlightened

Yea that sounds better. — khaled

Electrons are not abstract entities, in that they have a mass and exist in a cloud surrounding an atomic nucleus. It is not that the position of an electron cannot be measured, rather, if you know precisely where a particle is you don't know what direction it is going. — RussellA

It's more than that. Particles act as waves sometimes. See double slit experiment. In the experiment it's not that the electron is in a specific position that if we know, we just wouln't know where it is, the electron is in no specific position at all. In that case, you have a good example of something ontologically existing without having a location.

Using a suffix to turn an adjective such as “red” into the noun “redness” is purely an exercise of the mind, not an observation of something in the world. — NOS4A2

If so, then what is the explanation for all of us largely attributing redness to the same things? It sounds as though there is something in common between all the things we describe with the adjective "red" or to which we attribute "redness". What is that thing in common?

We cannot point to or quantify something called “redness” — NOS4A2

Yes we can, what?

Redness is the property of reflecting light of wavelengths around 625-740nm and absorbing other frequencies. That's something in the world is it not?

Forget universals. Do you believe properties exist? Do things have properties?

They might manifest as words but they will never manifest anywhere else. — NOS4A2

How come that we are able to predict the behavior of things in the world using these abstract concepts then? A concept such as "gravity" is certainly an abstract object right? If we just made it up, how come the universe seems to follow our predictions based on this supposed imagination?

I think the more likely explanation is that we discover abstract objects, not create them. Otherwise, how come they are so applicable to the world?

Wherever they appear they can only prove to exist as products of the mind — NOS4A2

By disagreeing with you there. A realist thinks they are necessary to explain some phenomena for example:

If these universals are merely products of our minds, they'd be no more than imagination. However, when someone says a red apple is green, we tell him he's wrong. You can't be wrong if the redness of the apple is just our imagination. — khaled

It seems highly unlikely for me that all our minds just happen to author all the same universals. That we all just continuously happen to imagine the same things.

The purpose of my question was to see if you can find any sort of internal inconsistency in realism about universals if it is assumed. But your only problem with it seems that you believe it's unnecessary.

Humans group things in their mind in order to see reality from an intellectual perspective and they can get tangled up because we can't see all of reality as it is — Gregory

But there seems to be more to the story than that. If these universals are merely products of our minds, they'd be no more than imagination. However, when someone says a red apple is green, we tell him he's wrong. You can't be wrong if the redness of the apple is just our imagination. Guy just happened to imagine greenness in the apple this time. Nothing wrong with that.

Instead of defending abstract ideas not being real, how would you attack abstract ideas being real? What issues arise if we consider abstract ideas to be real?

One of my problems with the ontological existence of patterns in a mind-independent world, and the relations between their parts, is where exactly do they exist. — RussellA

Again, I don't think something needs to have a location to exist mind independently. Electrons do not have a set location, and they definitely exist in a mind-independent world.

One could say that patterns and relations have an abstract existence, in that they exist but outside of time and space. This leaves the problem of how do we know about something that exists outside of time and space. — RussellA

By being pattern recognizing creatures. We have the ability to notice the abstract patterns that exist (indepencently of us).

Again, you keep using the word "discover" about patterns. For something to be discoverable, it must already exist yes?

When looking at the image, we know that A and B are part of one pattern and D and E are part of a different pattern. — RussellA

That's not true? That's certainly one way to parse the patterns, but one could also look at the pattern of "Giant's causeway and its adjacent shore" and A,B,C,D,E,F are all part of that pattern.

You placed some patterns in a set, forming another pattern, then placed the rest in another set, forming yet another pattern, then were surprised when the universe did not ontologically have the split you just arbitrarily created.

If there is no such information, then within the mind-independent world, patterns, and the relations between their parts, cannot have an ontological existence. — RussellA

Let's dig down on what this actually means. If minds were to disappear tomorrow what happens to pattern D? Does Giant's Causeway stop taking the rough shape of stairs? What shape does it take instead?

In order for something to exist it must have a form, a blueprint. That's all I mean by pattern.

However, even though A may experience a force, there is no information within the force that can determine the source of the force, whether originating from B or D. This means that there is no information within the force experienced by A that can determine one pattern from another. — RussellA

This just seems like a non-sequitor.

Again, all the information you need to determine the interaction between A and B, is in the SYSTEM that includes BOTH A and B. Idk why that information not existing in the system that is just A implies that patterns don't exist...

but for patterns to ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, there must be information within A that relates it to B but not D. — RussellA

False.

We're just talking past each other. You keep saying the same stuff and I keep quoting and responding to it. Then instead fo quoting my responses and replying, you just restate what you already said. I believe this fits the pattern "endless loop"

How about I ask a question then. Could you at least address this one directly?: You keep saying patterns are discovered. How can something that doesn't ontologically exist be discovered as opposed to imagined?

we discover a pattern in the relationship of the parts. — RussellA

Which would require the parts to have a relationship, or for us to be mistaken about a pattern. That's actually another argument now that I think about it. Mistakes in patterns.

When someone says something like "When I tie my left shoe lace first, it rains the next monday" because they think they spotted a pattern from their experience, we can test that hypothesis and find that it's WRONG.

How do we decide it is wrong? If the pattern doesn't ontologically exist, if it depends only on our minds, then what exactly makes it wrong? If there is no "right" answer in the thing being observed itself, then how can there be wrong answers?

But aside from all of that, I don't see what you present as a criticism of my position so much as offering an alternative, since This:

When we observe the Giant's Causeway, which existed before sentient observers, we discover a pattern in the relationship of the parts. — RussellA

This:

It is in the nature of sentient beings to discover patterns in what they observe, and it may well be that different sentient beings discover different patterns from the same observation. — RussellA

And This:

That you discover a duck and I discover a rabbit in the same picture does not mean that either exists in what is being observed. — RussellA

Are all also possible in my system. Nothing you've presented so far actually shows that relationships ontologically existing creates any problems. All you've done as far as I can see, is presented an alternative view that I am still not convinced makes sense. I'm unconviced because:

1- I do not see how it can account for relations that have been in effect before being found. How can a relationship be in effect if it doesn't exist yet due to no minds existing?
2- I do not see how it can account for us sometimes knowing that a relationship we discovered is wrong/not actually what's happening. How can something be wrong without there being a right answer somewhere?

Two masses on either side of the Universe will have a spatial relation yet there be no force between them. — RussellA

Yes there is, gravitational. And seeing how most physical stuff has a mass, I cited gravitational pulls as a relation that's present between most physical stuff and most other physical stuff. But this is a minor point.

My belief is that patterns and relations don't exist in a mind-independent world, for the reason that there is nowhere for them to exist. — RussellA

In a dualist conception, minds don't occupy a location either, but that's hardly proof they don't exist, especially not to the dualist. Even in materialist philosophies there are things that don't occupy a location. Very small particles do not occupy a single location as shown by the double slit experiment.

And also doesn't this contradict:

The Moon circled the Earth before humans existed, and in our terms, there was a pattern in how the Moon circled the Earth and there was a relation between the Moon and the Earth. — RussellA

There couldn't have been a relation between the moon and the earth before humans existed if minds are required for relations to exist.

No observation internal to the m1, m2 system could discover any relation between m1, m2 and the force between them — RussellA

And YET

there is a relation between m1 and m2 and there is a pattern in the movement of m1 expressed by the equation. — RussellA

EVEN IF no one is able to figure out why. If minds were required for a pattern's existence, then how come m1 and m2 are already acting in accordence to a pattern even before anyone finds (or "creates") it?

Relations cannot be discovered intrinsic to the system m1, m2 because relations don't exist intrinsic to the system m1, m2. — RussellA

Similarly, as the relation F = Gm1m2/r2 may be discovered by an outside observer of the system m1, m2, by implication — RussellA

"Discovered". In order for something to be discovered, it must exist first no? The pattern exists in the system: {m1, m2}, even if it doesn't exist in the system {m1} or the system {m2}

In summary, relations and patterns are extrinsic to a mind-independent world, and exist in the mind of someone observing a mind-independent world. — RussellA

Let's test this hypothesis.

1: Minds are required for relations to exist (If I'm misinterpreting your position please tell me)
2: Therefore without minds relations would not exist
3: Therefore relations did not exist before human minds existed
4: Therefore the movement of the moon was in no way related to the movement of the earth before human minds existed
5: 4 is false, therefore the assumption 1 must be false.

I prefer "stuff" to "matter", and I prefer "arrangement" to "pattern" — unenlightened

Yea that sounds better.

But how do we know that the relation we believe we observe between material things in the world
doesn't actually exist in the world , but is, in a sense, a projection of our mind onto the world. — RussellA

A proof by contradiction.

There have been many times where there existed relations between material objects that we did not detect, but were nevertheless there. For example: The relation "Have a gravitational pull towards each other" has always been in effect, even before we detected it. Every physical law has always existed even before we detected it, and every physical law fits the definition of a pattern (which is why we can represent it mathematically).

So by example, we can see that patterns exist, and are in effect (have an instantiation) before we find them all the time. So how could patterns be projections of our mind only?

Not every pattern we think of represents reality, but that does not mean that every pattern we think of is merely a mind-dependent projection.

Besides that, I think there is a misunderstanding of my position. I believe ALL possible patterns exist, even if there is no material instantiation of them, and even if we haven't thought of them. So in a world without spheres, the pattern of "sphere" would still exist, even if no one imagined it yet. That is because I believe that patterns are fundamentally found, not created. Though, I suspect "all possible patterns exist" vs "only patterns that have a material instatiation exist" is an inconsequential difference ultimately. The proof by contradiction proves the latter not the former.

PS: By "possible" pattern I mean not self-contradictory, like a square triangle.

If there was no relation between the parts, then the pattern wouldn't exist. — RussellA

What exactly does "no relation" mean when it comes to material things? Let's take the pattern "on top of". Any 2 material things can be on top of each other as long as we specify a direction. If I stack 2 boxes they are on top of each other. If I set one down next to the other, then they are no longer on top of each other, but now they fit the pattern "next to".

My point being that since material things have a location, they are always related at least when it comes to their locations relative to each other. I don't see how 2 material things can have no relation whatsoever, no pattern that they fit.

Even "located 32 kilometers away from each other" is a pattern for example, one many pairs of things emobdy no less, just one that we haven't deemed useful enough to make a word for.

How do you justify the belief that relations exist, ie, that relations ontologically exist. — RussellA

But I'm curious what made you ask in the first place. Why would justifying the existence of relations be a task for my view specifically? How would a materialist or substance dualist justify it for example? Seems like such a building block concept.

Patterns aren't limited to the ones we find. The pattern of a quadrliatiral would exist even if no one discovered shapes with 4 sides. — khaled

All patterns exist independently of anything.

Also your question would be akin to "Can patterns exist independently of pattern A" since minds are patterns in my view.

patterns of matter — RussellA

Also, since there are no patterns of patterns, and there is only patterns and matter, then this would be a useless distinction in my view. patterns can ONLY be of matter, they can't be of anything else.

Let's take a concrete example.

Material event A is the light from my computer screen with this page open, hitting my retinas, and going through visual processing. The immaterial event B is my mental processing on what I just read. The material event C is me moving my fingers to type a response.

Now let's break down event C more. In order to hit the L button (the first in my comment) my ring finger needs to move a specific way. Let's call the movement of my ring finger to type L, event C1 (material). Now let's take event C2 to be whatever caused my finger to move that specific way. Let C3 be whatever caused C2 and so on, where event Cn is caused by event Cn+1.

Your hypothesis is that B will be in this chain of events, that it will cause Cm for some m, where Cm is a material event.

Now let's take this Cm, we know it causes Cm-1, and that Cm-1 causes Cm-2, etc, until C1 which results in typing the letter L. We also know this entire chain is material events which obey conservation of energy, no problem there.

However the step from B to Cm is the problematic one. A physical event has to envolve some sort of change of energy correct? For example, a few atoms existing in vacuum in complete stillness is clearly not a physical event, a movement (kinetic) or heating up (thermal) would be though.

So to say B caused Cm means that B must have caused some sort of energy change, and THAT is the part that contradicts conservation of energy. For a mental event to cause a change of energy is nothing short of telekinesis.

An analogy would be: Cm is the first in a line of dominos, C1 is the last domino, and B is what topples Cm. If B is non physical, that means that energy was added to Cm without any physical source. That contradicts conservation of energy.

The energy is transferred from A to C 'by' B. — Bartricks

How would this work exactly? The way I understand it is for a system that has 10 joules of energy, A happens, and now it has 7, then B happens and it still has 7, then C happens and it has 10 again. So unless B takes 0s of time, then there are two different times where conservation of energy is violated here, the start of B, and the start of C. And we know mental events take more than 0s of time.

What's the problem with intrinsic value being reduced to instrumental value?

This would be valid if every action we took was dictated by picking a random number between 0~9, and if it's from 0~2 then it's evil (too low) 3~6 is just right, and 7~9 is evil (too high). But it doesn't work like that.

This isn't fruitful. It takes too long to type these and it takes longer to get a straight answer:

Right, this is what I'm asking you to resolve. Which is it? — khaled

It's unresolved. We have already established that. — Tzeentch

I can't tell if your sense of morality is warped, or if you're just insistent on not "losing an argument". I'll just answer your questions and leave.

So why is inaction wrong in some circumstances, but not in others? And why is it wrong in the case of Sarah and Jeff? — Tzeentch

Inaction is not wrong when action is risky, for one. For Sarah and Jeff, pinching Jeff despite his protests is not nearly as risky as walking away and killing two people for sure.

Moral obligation.
— khaled

I don't believe such a thing exists. — Tzeentch

Lead with that. Save everyone some time.

Maybe small changes in neural structure and brain chemistry. — RogueAI

Right. There is some physical difference that’s the cause. That’s all that’s needed to allow us to know what others are seeing.

The clone would occupy a different point in space, would physically diverge from me right after the cloning process. These are very small changes, but who's to say whether they result in different mental states. — RogueAI

It’s very simple to confirm that neither of those have an effect. If being in different points of space changes perception of color, your perception of color should change as you move. That doesn’t happen. If minor physical divergences of the kind you’re describing change perception of color, then your perception of color would be changing all the time. That doesn’t happen.

And similarly we can continue eliminating variables. If we hypothesize that changes in neural structure and chemistry change our perception of color, it is theoretically possible to try changing those and checking what changes the subjects report if any.

With enough testing (let’s not consider practicality of ethics right now) we will be able to map out all the relevant variables and their effects.

Since the contents of my mind are a black box to you and vice-versa — RogueAI

False, they aren’t. As stated above, if you concede that differences in perception are due to physical differences, then theoretically, it is possible to discover each relevant physical difference and it’s corresponding effect.

If, say, we find that toe size affects perception of color by increasing the red value proportionally to toe size, and that’s the only physical difference between me and you, then I can easily see exactly the contents of your mind. All I need is a color spectrum and I transform it accordingly, and the result will be what you see.

We just need to repeat this for every relevant physical difference and each of us can figure out exactly what’s in the other’s mind.

I have a general question. How do you determine what a benevolent intent is?

When one saves another person's life, the rest of their life will be a consequence of this act. In that case, I would agree certainty is impossible thus it is not a moral act. — Tzeentch

If one does anything to another person the rest of their life will be a consequence of that act. You can't be certain of how much of a butterfly effect any act had. This means there are no moral acts in general. That's unavoidable I think.

Or the intentions. And whether consequences can be known is up for debate. In a lot of cases I would argue they cannot, but perhaps in some cases they can. — Tzeentch

I understand. I thought I corrected my comment and added "acts with benevolent intent" everywhere but I seem to have missed one. Or two.

But what is to be done when the consequences cannot be known? What's the takeaway? Say someone drops a bomb from an airplane, with the benevolent intent of reducing the crime rate by eliminating criminals, and there is no news coverage of the event. Now they don't know the consequence of their action. What's their takeaway?

If inaction is wrong, then every moment spent in inaction towards the problems one perceives is wrong. I think there's no way around that. — Tzeentch

I didn't disagree. I explained why I don't act to solve every problem I see. I said it's the same reason you don't track all your consequences. Which is:

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. But also, I am not here claiming I am a perfectly moral being. Far from it. — Tzeentch

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify your inaction towards all the thousands of beggars and poor people you know exist?

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify ever sitting on the couch watching tv when you know there are people out there that need your help? — Tzeentch

Ideally I would, yes. But I am not here claiming I am a perfectly moral being. Far from it.

I see a contradiction here:

Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so?
— khaled

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. — Tzeentch

But you also say:

As for the idea that one is obliged to track the consequences; I don't see how that follows. — Tzeentch

So is one obligated to track or not?

So inaction is only wrong every once in a while? — Tzeentch

Correct. Why is this strange? You have it so that action is wrong only every once in a while. I'm saying both are sometimes right and sometimes wrong.

Of course. Don't be ridiculous. — Tzeentch

I'll be as ridiculous as I need to be. I outlined exactly how it could here:

Maybe someone has broken into your house with the intent to kill you but are hesitating. If you startle them by waking up, they will kill you and start their serial killer career. If you don't, they'll come to their senses and become an upright member of society. — khaled

If certainty that the act you're about to do is harmless is what you require, then you will never be justified in acting. Where have I made a mistake here?

By some miracle, the killer has caused no harm. Are his actions neutral? Maybe. Or maybe his gross ignorance and risk-taking are of themselves immoral. — Tzeentch

Right, this is what I'm asking you to resolve. Which is it?

Of course not. If one can discern their actions will have a positive effect, surely one can choose to act. The question is whether one can discern it. — Tzeentch

Let me change it then:

1- One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action since everyone can discern that inaction is safer since it has a 0% chance of failure in your system. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite despite thinking that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative. (may change depending on your resolution of the above)

I don't know of what obligation you are speaking here. — Tzeentch

Moral obligation.

The likely result will be they live an immoral life, and if we agree that living a moral life (or at least approaching it as we can) is something we are interested in, that prospect of failure should serve as a deterrent in itself. — Tzeentch

We're discussing what's right or wrong by your system not what practical actions a person abiding by your principles would be motivated towards or deterred from.

If individuals want to go out and take incredible risk because of contrived reasons presented for the sake of winning an argument, who will stop them? — Tzeentch

We're discussing what's right and wrong not how enforceable right behavior is.

Darkness is the absence of light, whether we call it darkness or "not-light". — Tzeentch

One could also define light as "not darkness" could they not? There is no third alternative, it's either light or dark. So what meaning is lost by defining light as "not darkness"? Which of these two "exists" and which is the "non existence of the other" and why can't these criteria be flipped?

Your action is detected. — Tzeentch

I ask you what makes an action. You say something is detected for action that's not detected for inaction. I ask you what that something is. You say action. See the problem?

Let me try something else since this is going nowhere:

Say A operates a gate by pressing a button. When he presses it the gate opens for a few seconds then closes. B is walking and wants to pass through the gate. B cannot operate the gate (can't get to the booth as it's on the other side of the gate). A refuses to let B through. A is denying B space. Is A imposing on B?

I think "yes" is the unavoidable conclusion, since this is the exact same scenario with the walker and stander, except I just changed the mechanism by which the stander is impeding the walker. If so you have an example where sserping a button is an action (since inactions can't be impositions since they can't be wrong). Now we can clearly see that sserping is sometimes an action. So, what makes it an inaction in Sarah and Jeff's case?

You couldn't reverse engineer a mental state by observing brain states. — RogueAI

Yes you could.

Is the person with brain states "seeing red" really seeing red, or does red to them look blue to everyone else? — RogueAI

Why would it look different? If I clone you do you think there is a chance that “red” to the clone will look different from “red” to you?

If not, then there must be some physical difference that inverts the spectrum for you, or do you disagree with that? If there is such a thing, then we can scan for it and find out exactly whether or not someone is seeing an inverted spectrum or not.

If you can see them, yes I think.

Taking a risk implies one lacks the wisdom and/or power to produce the intended effect and must rely on luck. It cannot be a moral act, thus there's no point in talking about justification. — Tzeentch

I'm asking if it's immoral to take the higher risk option. You answered that it is not moral. That doesn't answer the question as it could still be neutral.

Perhaps certain certainties are possible, but definitely not to the extent that we can divine the future life of a person. — Tzeentch

That is contradictory for our purposes. If you claim that sometimes we can be certain that our actions will lead to our intentions, then we need to be able to divine the future life of the person who we're acting upon. If we cannot do that this reduces to:

One can conclude that certainty is impossible, and thus moral acts are impossible, — Tzeentch

The certainty you require for moral action is precisely the certainty to divine the future life of a person.

As I said, criteria 3 is a confirmation or criteria 2. If criteria 2 cannot be met, then criteria 3 (ergo the result) is irrelevant. — Tzeentch

It is very relevant. If I lack the wisdom to do something, and attempt it anyways, that's not moral. However, if it doesn't result in a negative consequence that's not immoral leaving us at neutral. Again, there is a world of difference between neutral and immoral acts.

That one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, I suppose. — Tzeentch

That's the problem with your system. Since one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, any action is as justified as another when the only criteria to judge immorality is consequence.

I'm arguing inaction isn't wrong, and pointing out the inconsistencies that arise when one tries to argue it is wrong. — Tzeentch

I know, and I'm saying these "inconsistencies" are just as present in your system of consequentialism. To be moral, one needs to not do immoral things. In your system, what is "immoral" (as opposed to not moral, which is determined by intention) is determined only by consequences. Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so? Do you have some flowchart keeping track of all the consequences of every action you've ever taken? No. You don't spend all your energy tracking the morality of every act you take.

Thus for the same reason, if inaction is wrong, that doesn't mean I have to spend all of my energy tracking the morality of every time I choose not to act.

one is unavoidably in inaction towards many perceived problems at any given time — Tzeentch

False. I don't perceive a problem I can help with that I'm not helping with at the moment. If there was such a problem, say, a beggar approached me and I had a million dollars to spare, it would be wrong not to help them

Besides, I could very easily argue that spending every ounce of energy tracking whether there is a problem I could help with I'm not helping with doesn't help anyone, and so the best strategy is to just check every once in a while as most do.

If you suspect that the act of buying candy is actively causing people's deaths, it would certainly be a good idea to stop doing it.

In this instance you are already hinting towards the fact that your buying of the candy is not causing people's deaths, just like not pressing the button to save Sarah does not cause her death — Tzeentch

I'm very interested in knowing why I am causing people's deaths in the first example, but am not causing it in the second. What is your definition of "cause"? In both cases mind you, I'm not the one doing the damage, it's the murderer or the kidnapper that's responsible respectively isn't it? So why am I causing deaths in one case but not causing it in another?

Not if the intent was to murder, obviously. Then the act is wrong from the outset. We have already been over this. — Tzeentch

Right, but the intent could always be benevolent. The murderer could bet on the 0.001% chance that the victim is actually suicidal and wants to be killed. You can't say the act is wrong until after it is done, and inevitably the 99.999% is what happens. THEN it becomes wrong.

Let's say there is an extremely lucky serial killer. The killer always has the benevolent intent of helping out suicidal people, or sending as many people to heaven as possible. The killer picks targets randomly, but by some statistical miracle they all turn out to have been suicidal and wanting to die. Assume the killer wants to live morally. Should the killer continue to pick randomly?

That depends, if one wishes to live morally (or avoid immoral behavior) one should probably ensure one isn't enabling serial killers, should they not? And if they cannot guarantee one's behavior isn't enabling serial killers, then maybe one should cease that behavior. — Tzeentch

Can you guarantee that you waking up in the morning isn't enabling serial killers? Maybe someone has broken into your house with the intent to kill you but are hesitating. If you startle them by waking up, they will kill you and start their serial killer career. If you don't, they'll come to their senses and become an upright member of society.

See the problem?

Assuming one wants to live morally it's either:

1- One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite the fact that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative.

Because it refers to something one isn't doing? — Tzeentch

Let's say there is an alternate world history, where "sserping" was defined first. And "pressing" was defined as "Not sserping". Does sserping now become an action?

Pressing refers to not sserping. So are pressing and sserping both inactions?

No, she cannot. One cannot detect the non-existence of something — Tzeentch

Let's say I'm pressing a button. What's the "something" whose existence is detected?

I'm trying to understand what is the "something" that is missing and so can't be detected in sserping, but is present and can be detected in pressing. Or simply, the difference between action and inaction.

I intend to help another person, but instead I end up killing them.

A just intention, but a harmful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral. — Tzeentch

Disagreed. That's precisely the point of disagreement. But I'm far more interested in the internal workings of your ethical system right now, than a highlight of its differences from mine.

I intend to kill another person, but instead I end up helping them.

An unjust intention, but a helpful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral either. — Tzeentch

Agreed. Because the intent was to do an act that has a very low chance of helping.

Both intention and outcome have to be regarded to determine the morality of an act. — Tzeentch

You do understand this isn't a majority view or anything right? There is a whole separate form of ethics called deontology which doesn't take into account consequence at all. The idea that both matter is far from a settled conclusion. And I don't intend to debate it right now, I'm interested in your consequentialism specifically.

Wouldn't you see a set of particular switching operations? — RogueAI

Try it. Open up the motherboard and tell me what the first 10 switching operations for the Windows Kernel is.

Of course, there are devices that can detect binary code. You can't do so with your eyes however. Similar to how you can't see feelings when looking at a brain without the use of special tools.

define "computer program" — Harry Hindu

explain what a "computer program" is independent of someone observing it — Harry Hindu

what it looks like when someone looks at it — Harry Hindu

What is it that you're looking for that you say you can't see? — Harry Hindu

A set of instructions to do something. Answer to all of the above.

how they would know that is what they are looking at. — Harry Hindu

By knowing the language the instructions are written in.

what is a "feeling" when looking at it through software or a brain scan as opposed to experiencing it? Why is there a difference at all? — Harry Hindu

There is a difference between seeing something and being something. I can see someone who's sad. That's not the same experience as being sad. I don't get what you mean by the quesiton "Why". You're asking why is feeling X (seeing something, in this case a brain scan) different from feeling Y (in this case being sad). That makes as much sense to me as "Why is this car different from this plane?"