I am crossing a busy road and see a truck moving straight towards me. I perceive the truck and I perceive the truck moving through space and time. — RussellA

I clearly perceive objects, space and time in my mind. — RussellA

Yes, sure seems that way, donnit? Conventionally speaking, its what Everydayman accepts as the facts. If you’re ok with it….so be it.

Me, I reject that my mind perceives, preferring to leave such occupation to my senses, as Nature intended.

The space and time we perceive we must also experience — RussellA

Correct, insofar as experience requires perception, and space/time is not an experience, just means neither is space nor time a perception.

The space and time that exists independently of us we can neither perceive nor experience. — RussellA

That which exists independently of us is that which can be an affect on our senses and is thereby a possible representation in us as phenomenon. Space or time, because they are not perceptions, are not affects on our senses, therefore are not possible as a phenomenon, therefore are not that which is known as an existence independent of us.

It seems that Kant is arguing that the space and time we perceive is not the space and time that exists independently of us. — RussellA

Kant says we don’t perceive space or time, space and time do not exist independently of us insofar as they do not exist at all, so your interpretation is not what he’s arguing. To argue an objective validity is not to promote an existence.

Where the difficulty in understanding occurs generally, is the mediate conclusion derived in the transcendental thesis, that an objective validity without an empirical reality accompanying it, is the same as being an ideal. Further exacerbated by the method by which the former is necessary yet the latter is not even remotely possible, with respect to knowledge a posteriori, which seems contradictory. Which reduces to understanding exactly how, in Kant, the origin of space and time as ideal conceptions is accomplished, irrespective of their employment regarding the possibility of experience itself, and thereby granted as metaphysically legitimate conditions.

Kantian space and time are not experiences.

Understood.

I’m listening.

the importance of an "ontological commitment" validating that a belief is genuinely held. — Pantagruel

Sure. To hold a belief presupposes the something to which it relates. There must be something that serves as the object of the belief, hence the necessary ontological commitment. Nevertheless, to hold a belief says nothing about the means of its origin.

I agree belief is constitutive of consciousness. But then, in humans, everything rational is constitutive of consciousness, so in that respect, there is nothing particularly significant in merely holding some belief or another.

Nahhh…I’m not getting into the belief/knowledge mudhole. I favor what you said about intuition, that’s the important part.

….knowledge (…) contains the framework of its own validation. Intuition doesn’t. — Pantagruel

I’ll disagree with that. Insofar as intuition is a faculty, it must contain its own framework from which it obtains its validity. Knowledge, by the same token, is not a faculty, hence does not contain a framework at all. Knowledge is an end; the means are elsewhere.

We’re saying the same thing for all practical purposes, in language two centuries apart.

Except for the trust part; that I can’t reconcile with disparities in language. My problem, not yours.

So intuition is what bridges the gap between the cognitions made possible within discursive thought, and the reality that is being cognized. — Pantagruel

YEA!!! Best rendition of the nature of intuition yet, I think.

In essence, it is about making estimates that are based on information that is extracted from an idealized model of your perceptions. — Pantagruel

BOO!!! Extracted from a model? To build a model requires information, so, what….information is put in to build it, then extracted from it? Why not extract information from perception and build an idealized model from that?

Actually, this is probably what you meant to say. There is an idealized model of the information received from perception, it even has its own name; intuition constructs the model but does not use it, hence, the notion of being a bridge.

…..allowing yourself to trust that faculty…. — Pantagruel

Might I suggest the trust is misplaced?

Ok. Thanks.

It is a fine ideal, that requires one to be honest with oneself about ones' motivations, but modern reporting is inclined to be motivated most of all by fear of appearing biased — unenlightened

Agreed. Fear of appearing biased is almost worse that actually being so. Peer pressure, job security and the like overriding intrinsic personality.

Or that there is some irreducible level of bias which cannot be eliminated? — hypericin

Under the assumption of any form of report by an individual subject, cognitive prejudice is an irreducible level of bias which cannot be eliminated. But its conflicts can be recognized and subsequently guarded against.

As I listen to music I "know" implicitly the many contexts that are there — Astrophel

I think I know what it is to know. — Astrophel

Why is it, and what does it mean, that know is given two significations here? What do the scare quotes in the one but missing from the other, indicate?

The cow has been grazing for years, say, and it looks up a sees what memory informs her to be 'good eating over there" but not conceptualized, obviously. She moves over there. To me, this bears the mark of reason's conditional proposition. — Astrophel

For me, it is self-contradictory. Reason’s conditional proposition just is conceptualized. If there is no conceptualization, there is no mark of reason, in humans. To speak of any other cognizance or possible cognizance, is anthropomorphic and thereby “….exhibition of pitiful sophisms quite beneath the dignity of philosophy…”
————

In the world, what authorizes logic, so to speak, is some kind of a posteriori presence…. — Astrophel

In the world, what validates logic is some kind of a posteriori presence.

metaphysics needs to be conceived as an essential part of our existence — Astrophel

Metaphysics needs to be understood as an essential part of our kind of intelligence. Existence is necessarily presupposed, but metaphysics has no part in it.

….this presence itself stands beyond classification. I hold that presence is metaphysics… — Astrophel

Self-contradictory. Presence beyond classification is contradicted by being classified as metaphysics.

It is wrong to think of rationality in terms of the abstract "authoritative" logic it produces — Astrophel

Backwards: logic produces rationality, under the auspices of a particular speculative metaphysical theory, insofar as the human cognitive system is itself a self-sustaining tripartite logical system, manifesting as rational or irrational thought, pursuant to the proper or improper use of its authoritative grounding principles.

If it is the case rationality produces abstract authoritative logic, and it is wrong to think in terms of it, what is there left to think of rationality in terms of?

Logic is actually "of a piece" with affectivity, and the open ended nature of this is not the impossibility and foolishness of reason grasping beyond its means, but a desire that seeks consummation. — Astrophel

I personally have no use for the conception of “affectivity” with respect to a priori methodological predicates, and even less use for the notion that the open-endedness of logic, is a desire. The subject is that which desires. If logic desires, can it also want? Can it need? Can logic possess an interest? Logic is merely a cognitive method in itself, and to associate an aesthetic condition to it merely weakens its place as ground of the system to which it belongs.
————

The idea here was that when reason is set upon something to "understand" it, it tends to produce something of its own abstract utility, a conclusion qua conclusion, which is simply a logical function. — Astrophel

Reason is not set upon something to understand, even if it does produce a conclusion qua conclusion, which is certainly a logical function. Hence the notion that the human cognitive system, in and of itself, is inherently logical.

The conclusion qua conclusion reason sets itself upon, resides in the relation of the abstract utility of understanding in its synthesis of conceptions, to the series of such synthetic conjunctions in judgement, such that the one does not conflict with the other, or, to show that they do. In this way alone, is it therefore possible to learn about a thing only once a posteriori rather than upon each occassion of is perception, or to think by means of the construction of conceptions not influenced by phenomena, re: mathematical objects and fundamental grounding principles.
————-

Do I have that right? — Janus

As far as what you said, yes. Or close enough. But what you said doesn’t properly address the unity of apperception, which was itself misrepresented in what you were responding to. The transcendental unity of apperception is a principle and nothing more, by means of which human understanding as an independent faculty, is even theoretically possible.

“….. The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception…..”

In addition, that the understanding has the capacity to think objects on its own accord yet without being conditioned by the categories, which are noumena, understanding does not think the synthetical unity of apperception as an object so unconditioned, hence there is nothing whatsoever noumenal about it.

As an aside, transcendental the conception, reduces ultimately to the possibility of a priori cognitions. That which is transcendental, then, is that from which anything purely a priori follows, or is derivable. Transcendental this or transcendental that merely indicates a logical function of understanding in conceptions, and reason in subsuming conceptions under principles.

The why of this, is found in the necessity for accounting for how it is possible to come up with stuff never to be found in Nature originated by Nature. It is an irrefutable observation this is done by humans generally, and always has been, but no account for it had even been given from the perspective of the very same intelligence that is actually doing it. Attributing to the supersensible (pre-Enlightenment theologians) or denying completely (Renaissance/Enlightenment empiricists) the validity of pure a priori cognitions the ground and origin of which resides in the cognitive power of the thinking subject himself, met its demise in 1781. At long last. But not that we’re any the better off for it.

I agree, it is inherently and irreducibly a personal condition. — Judaka

YEA!! That means I interpreted the title correctly. Or at least, sympathetically. Morality is personal.

Objective moralists will indeed disagree with me, as you say. But an objective moralist is an ill-disguised behaviorist, which means he begins by barking up the wrong tree.

Anyway, problem solved, and…..thanks.

Morality can have a social effect, certainly, but I don’t think that makes morality any less an irreducibly personal condition.

Yes I read the OP. Interpreting the title as I did, I questioned whether the initial argument was sufficient support for it.

I am arguing that morality is always both personal & social, and never just personal. What you've said doesn't indicate whether or not you agree with that. — Judaka

I wanted a better understanding of what you mean by personal morality is just morality.

I disagree morality is both personal and social. Morality is personal as a function of will, ethics is social as a function of behavior. A decidedly minority opinion, to be sure, but I’m ok with it.

Is all doing thinking?…… — Astrophel

I’m going with an unqualified yes, except for sheer reflex or accident.

…..Implicitly, yes; I would say a cow standing in a meadow "thinks" when it sees taller more tempting grass. — Astrophel

If implicitly yes, as do I, but…..a cow??? And a cow “thinking”. Is that different than a cow thinking? Maybe “thinking” is a euphemism for instinct. Dunno, but I seriously doubt a majority of lesser animals, if not all of them, have any conception of relative heights as a function of temptation. He goes to taller grass because he doesn’t have to bend his neck so far, not because its tempting.

I agree with you, in that I know what it is to know. One thing I know, is that I don’t know what goes on in a cow’s head, and therefore wouldn’t ever suggest anything about it.
———-

….reason, left ungrounded in worldly confirmation, moves to inventing metaphysical nonsense. — Astrophel

Absolutely. But that isn’t so much a Kantian fallacy as the prime example of the human disposition to think beyond its logical authority. As true these days as it’s ever been.

….when reason conceives of what it is to be a "rational truth" according to its own model, it creates an abstraction out of reason. — Astrophel

Yeah, the intrinsic circularity of reason herself. Nothing to be done about the way Nature made us.
———-

Truth as a philosophical idea requires actual occasions of truth to be revealed for what they are PRIOR to analysis, not after. — Astrophel

I don’t think occasions of truth are antecedent to the philosophical idea of truth. How would we know a thing is true if we didn’t already know what form any truth must have? Are not universals prior to particulars? How could particulars be analyzed without the universal to which it necessarily relates?

If all truths are contained in propositions, and the simplest possible proposition that cannot possibly be false is the gauge by which all other occasions of truth would be judged, it follows that the idea is before the occasion.

I’ll grant that occasions of truth must be revealed for what they are prior to analysis of possible truths.

You begin with the idea personal morality is just morality.

If I begin with the idea morality is personal, would you say we’re beginning with the same general idea?

There is more to this, but I wonder if a mutually profitable dialectic has been encouraged thus far. — Astrophel

On second look, perhaps it has.

philosophy conceived as "feast of thought" (….) and while it certainly is this, it begs the question, what is thought? — Astrophel

What if it could be said what thought is by what it does? If only this can be done by thinking, then the doing of this is thinking. If I think of, or cognize, a dog as fur, teeth, a tail, a nose, in a certain arrangement, and if fur, teeth, tails and noses represent conceptions I’ve thought, than I should be authorized to say….thought is cognition by means of synthesis of conceptions to each other. And its negation works just as well, insofar as if I cannot connect a set of conceptions to each other, then I have no authority to say I’ve thought anything at all.
————

but thought is never simply thought; it is inherently aesthetic (see Dewey on this — Astrophel

What does he mean by aesthetic? Something like a feeling? If so, I call that a subjective condition, but deny thought as a subjective condition while maintaining that feeling is. Thought, then, would revert to a condition of the faculty from which it arises, which is understanding.
————

Truth isn't, nor has it ever been, just a propositional affair — Astrophel

Why not? What would prevent it from being just a propositional affair? What is truth such that it cannot be merely propositional? Propositional implies a relation, so what if everything the human intellect does, is relational? It follows necessarily then, that truth must be a propositional affair.

Having suggested that philosophy, as you say, is an affective, makes explicit a relation between it and that which is affected. So….there ya go: truth, insofar as it is a philosophically determinable judgement in accordance with the laws of logical thought, is indeed a propositional affair. With the obvious caveat that we’re not talking about what is true, but only what being true, is.

you don't really mean it's inconceivable that you are not thinking…… — Srap Tasmaner

Right.

….you mean it's impossible for you to think, "I am not thinking" — Srap Tasmaner

Wrong.

Good luck. Just remember it’s only a theory. If this, then that kinda thing. Whether or not there ever is a this….ehhhhh, you’ll have to decide.

Transcendental Idealism generally, particularly, with respect to the OP, the first Book in CPR, entitled Transcendental Aesthetic.

Don’t hate the messenger.

We only know of thinking as something organisms do. — Srap Tasmaner

That’s a logical inference, the negation of which is possible, but nonetheless vanishingly improbable.

I only know of thinking as something of which I do, the negation of which is impossible.

Are you saying that cognitive neuroscience is misguided? — Joshs

No. I’m saying cognitive neuroscience is irrelevant to my self, insofar as even if it proves its point, the fact remains the self does not operate in terms of the physical laws by which science necessarily operates. It may in fact be the case that 47 phosphorous ions traversing a set of 7nm clefts at 12pv activation potential manifests as my perception of a civil injustice, but it remains that the civil injustice in and of itself, is what presents to my self.

Nietzsche’s view is correct, in that thought, and talking about thought, are very different, while thought and thinking about thought, are exactly the same.

I do find it a little puzzling that comments I made were in no way suggestive of "a mutually profitable dialectic." — Astrophel

Yeah, well, they weren’t. When I returned comment, it became so. The mutually beneficial part kinda fell by the wayside because of those damnable concepts inspiring little to no agreement. But forget them, I say.

There is more to this, but I wonder if a mutually profitable dialectic has been encouraged thus far. — Astrophel

I find myself agreeing with most of your writings, so the point of a dialectic is established already.

What changes would be required in your thinking about what the self is in order for the possibility of self to make sense? — Joshs

That’s just it: that I think presupposes the means for it, which makes explicit its possibility is already established. That self is its representation is merely a conceptual device given from the type of intelligence which contains it a priori.

The changes required, then, reduce to the fact that I do not actually think in the way that seems to me to be the case. Hence…..psychology on the one hand and cognitive neuroscience on the other.

Would any notion of self be possible without the ability to experience self as object? — Joshs

To experience self as object requires a whole different set of preconditions then those that affirm that experiencing the self as object, is absurd. Subjective, or non-empirical, experience has a different name.

The notion of the possibility of self makes no sense, insofar as the even the inception of it presupposes what is asked about.

At best, the human intellect can think the self as object in propositional logic, in which case the subject that thinks the proposition treats itself as a content of them. Nevertheless, that which thinks must antecede the representations which manifest as thoughts, from which follows the thought of self as object, is contemporaneous, re: in relation to, rather than coexistent with, that from which the proposition, the synthesis of conceptions to each other, arises.

Under the assumption the question pertains to my self and the treatment of it by me, recognition of other selves is irrelevant.

Pure metaphysics: both the bane and the blessing of the human condition.

how do you see the 'self' as coexisting as subject and object? — Jack Cummins

I see that such coexistence is not the case, under a certain set of preconditions. Consciousness of self as subject is very far from a cognition of self as object.

the I guess radical conclusion for me is that phenomenal properties cannot be illusory — goremand

There is an entire Enlightenment philosophy predicated on a similar conclusion. So either your conclusion isn’t as radical as you supposed, or, your conclusion is as outdated as the original.

If it were me I’d have said judgement instead of interpretation, but other than that I’m in general agreement.

One has to ask what a foundational existence could even mean — Astrophel

I asked, because you brought them up. I’m guessing you know what a can of worms they are, which makes me wonder….why bring them up, then do nothing with them.

And also keeping in mind that a word like 'absolute' has already corrupted the inquiry. — Astrophel

Yep. Goes without saying, so why did you bring that up along with foundational existence? Point being, you’ve said some interesting stuff, but contaminated the interest with that which doesn’t belong with, and cannot contribute to, a mutually profitable dialectic. I keep looking for a connection that doesn’t seem to be there.
————-

”I am" is not a singularity. there are no such things in language. — Astrophel

Of course there is. It’s right there. From both of us. And people in general. Perhaps the only place it is. And it has to be a singularity, meaning there is only one “I” that is. Or maybe you meant there is a plurality of “I”’s, which is fine but each is still singular in itself, insofar as no “I” can replicate any other such that a common identity is given from it.

to engage a singularity is impossible. — Astrophel

Engage with, true enough. But that does not deny that a singularity engages. How else to partake in the world?

… analysis places the intuition apart from the understanding, the former being affective, the latter cognitive, and the understanding is distinctively cognitive. Non propositional knowledge is not recognized. — Astrophel

Agreed, in principle. What does any of that have to do with existential absolutes or foundational existences? I mean, you brought them up….I guess….in an attempt to lay the groundwork for something apparently about the world, but from what you’ve called our contemplative midst. I can’t seem to find a connection you’ve made between them, as yet anyway.

One is simply directed to purify one's gaze, deliver observation from the presumptive thinking that generally steps in and makes claims and argues…. — Astrophel

To purify one’s gaze makes none but metaphorical sense, but nevertheless observation is already delivered…..separated…..from presumptive thinking, which you’ve already granted, insofar as affective intuition is placed apart from cognitive understanding.

But I argue that even though we face the world in a determinate historical way (educated and enculturated), the event of acknowledging something retains its original status as an intuition. — Astrophel

Again, agreed in principle, overlooking the repetitive semantic disassociation (we in general face the world, but each subject alone, retains some original status). Still, no exposition of a relation between an existential absolutes and foundational intuitions. And yet the problem seems to be the loss of foundational intuitions and the subsequent recovery of them, or at least their status as such. But how can that be the case, in a systemic whole? Can’t lose a part then get it back and still have the system maintain itself.

They say that once an intuition is observed it is already embedded in context, and the "purity" (or innocence) of the observation is entirely undone. — Astrophel

I’m guessing that because intuitions are representations of observations, the rationale is that the innocence of being observed is lost to manifestation as phenomenon. While that does no harm, it also has no benefit. Seems like naught but a minor rendition of “non-overlapping magisteria”, in that observation is this, intuition is that and while one necessarily presupposes the other, neither is contained in the other. In other words, intuitions are never that which is observed, which in turn leaves observation to be just what it is, no part of it in the least undone.
————-

I think you’re trying to elaborate on the distinction between private philosophy (thought) and public philosophizing (thought-in-the-world), re:

It is called 'I am' in the context of language; it is complex in that when you look for the 'I am" you find a multiplicity, not a singularity. One finds thinking, feeling and the rest; but a single "I" does not show up. — Astrophel

So it was called “I am” in the context of “I think”, as it should be. I am that which thinks, is a singularity. Even though “I” never shows up in thought, it is nonetheless the case that all thought is the manifestation of a singular thinker, for which “I” is merely the representation. All of THAT, in the context of language.

Any idea what that would be, what form it would take? Is that the scope of your elucidation?
— Mww

Foundational intuitions? — Astrophel

No. An existential absolute. Or, apparently, just recently, your foundation of existence. Is one the same as the other?

I claim there is an existential absolute (…). This is the bare givenness of the world. — Astrophel

There is a confidence that science is "about" something, even if that something is implicit and elusive. It is here I wish to elucidate. — Astrophel

So the main thesis does not concern foundational intuitions, but rather, an existential absolute with respect to the implicit and elusive something science is “about”?

Any idea what that would be, what form it would take? Is that the scope of your elucidation?

Or am I wrong about this? — Astrophel

There is no wrong in speculative metaphysics; just coherence, and logical consistency to support it.

The notion of foundational intuitions initially became coherent, within its own logically consistent framework, in 1781.

Attempts to dismiss them as such, or maybe realign them as something else, began in 1818, been going on ever since.

He is clearly explicating that there is a phenomenal appearance of a self and a transcendental self….. — Bob Ross

“…. because it is self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think,” must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no representation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of à priori cognition arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I am not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many important results….”

The self that thinks transcendentally is not meant to indicate a transcendental self;
The notion of a phenomenal appearance of a self is an unwarranted intermingling of domains, leading to methodological incompatibilities, and from those arise contradictions;
I see no reason to agree he is clearly explicating as you say.
—————-

“…. This relation**, then, does not exist because I accompany every representation with consciousness, but because I join one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations; in other words, the analytical unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity. The thought, “These representations given in intuition belong all of them to me,” is accordingly just the same as, “I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them”; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of representations, it presupposes the possibility of it; that is to say, for the reason alone that I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious….”
** “this relation” is between me and my representations.

This is a very subtle exposition that the doing, the methodological operation, and the talking about the doing, the speculative articulation of such method, are very different. When thinking, as such, in and of itself, “I think” is not included in that act, but just is the act;
That I am conscious that, is not the same as the consciousness of;
That I do this, presupposes the conditions of the ability for this.
————-

”My conviction regarding the fact of the categories is irrelevant….”
-Mww

It’s not irrelevant to me, and what is the ‘affirmative argument’? To me, Kant just asserts it flat out and super speculatively in CPR. — Bob Ross

The Part in CPR on understanding is a Division consisting of 2 Books, 5 Chapters, 8 Sections, 24 subsections, covering roughly a 185 A/B pagination range in 214 pages of text, AND…a freakin’ appendix to boot!!!!….so to say he asserts anything flat out is a gross mischaracterization on the one hand, and at the same time stands as a super speculatively affirmative argument on the other.
———-

I must agree with when he says you’re not listening. I keep saying I’m persuaded yet you keep asking why I’m convinced, which is merely an insignificant microcosm but representative of a significant part of the present dialectic nonetheless. Same with requests for proofs. There is no damn proof, fercrissakes. It’s a fargin’ THEORY, grounded in abstractions for which there never can be a proof. And that a mind must be a thing-in-itself, when in accordance with the consistency of the presently concerned dialectic, it cannot.

(Sigh)

I didn’t see a proof in that quote…. — Bob Ross

Because, as you say, it’s a summary, or an abstract, sort of, hence there isn’t a proof per se. There is only, in the text that follows, an affirmative argument for something, at the time, that had never even been considered by any of his peers.

quote="Bob Ross;817972"]……you should be able to articulate the proof that convinced you.[/quote]

My conviction regarding the fact of the categories is irrelevant. I’m sufficiently persuaded by the affirmative argument to think he’s come up with a perfectly fascinating metaphysical theory. That’s it.

“…. If a judgement is valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the particular character of the subject, it is termed a persuasion.….”

I could articulate the argument, but all I’d doing is reading the book to you. To be as fair as possible, re: not imbue my interpretive subjectivity into a text, you should study it for yourself. Cut out the middleman, so to speak.

Now you may say you’ve already done that, but your interpretation is so different from mine that you’re just looking for clarity. But what if I’ve got it all wrong? Then you’re right where you started, anyway, left with your own understanding. As it should be.
————-

Addendum: Fancy-talk for dammit!! I saw this but forgot to mention it:

On your “Of The Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception” quote, the very next line after what you posted, shoots your argument in the foot. The “I think” is a representation, therefore not a thing-in-itself, which is, of course, never that which can be represented.

“….. But this representation, “I think,” is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or primitive apperception, because it is self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think,” must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations…..”

Just sayin’…..

I have no problem with that BUT I can do the same exact thing about things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

I don’t think so. Not exactly. You can do as you wish, re: appeal to intuition, but you must first treat the thing-in-itself differently, such that it is all and only that which appears to be represented in intuition as a phenomenon. The established condition is that it is not, therefore you must show that it is. In order to do that, you must treat it differently. Which is fine, you are certainly authorized by your reason a priori. Just, not in accordance with Kantian transcendental philosophy.

Why can possible knowledge not be from experience? — Bob Ross

Experience is present or past; possible knowledge is future. Possible knowledge requires possible experience. Seems pretty cut and dried to me.

We use parsimony, coherence, intuitions, reliability, consistency, empirical adequacy, etc. and this doesn’t require us to limit ourselves to transcendental investigations. — Bob Ross

Yeah, but I want to know if all those reduce to something that grounds them all, or if there is not. For that investigation, a transcendental method, insofar as a priori cognitions are the only way for my determinations with respect to those wishes to manifest and a transcendental method proves the validity of them, I am well served by it.

If I am understanding you correctly, then you are using the “understanding” vs. “reason” semantics from Kant (which is fine). If so, then I would say that (1) your ability to acquire the knowledge of the ‘understanding’ is just metaphysics (and is no different than what I am doing) and (2) I reject Kant’s formulation of it as merely an exposition of ‘reason’ as opposed to the ‘understanding’ — Bob Ross

(1)….correct. I don’t acquire the knowledge of understanding; it is methodologically given as a faculty contained in and used by a speculative system, and is thereby just metaphysics;
(2)….reject to your own satisfaction. That doesn’t detract from the ground of the formulation which shows what the opposition is.
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Maybe expound whatever proof you found convincing for Kant’s twelve categories: that might help me understand better. — Bob Ross

“…. Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our à priori knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding. In order to effect our purpose, it is necessary: (1) That the conceptions be pure and not empirical; (2) That they belong not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding; (3) That they be elementary conceptions, and as such, quite different from deduced or compound conceptions; (4) That our table of these elementary conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole sphere of the pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted with confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate of its existence in an aggregate formed only by means of repeated experiments and attempts. The completeness which we require is possible only by means of an idea of the totality of the à priori cognition of the understanding, and through the thereby determined division of the conceptions which form the said whole; consequently, only by means of their connection in a system. Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from everything empirical, but also completely from all sensibility. It is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged by any additions from without. Hence the sum of its cognition constitutes a system to be determined by and comprised under an idea; and the completeness and articulation of this system can at the same time serve as a test of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of cognition that belong to it…..”

Convinced of a proof grounded in an idea? Nahhhh….no more than persuaded, and that in conjunction with his claim that he’s thought of everything relevant, and needs nothing from me to complete the thesis. For me to think he could have done better, or that he trips all over himself, implies I’m smarter than he, which I readily admit as hardly being the case.

Funny, though, innit? To help you understand? You realize, don’t you, that is beyond my abilities? No matter what anybody says in attempting to help you, you’re still on your own after they’ve said whatever it is they going to say. And because you’ve rejected some parts, it isn’t likely you’re going to understand the remainder as a systemic whole, which necessarily relates to the parts rejected.

My interest here is waning , sorry to say.

A most valiant effort.