…..none of the supposed solutions is tenable. — Banno

Yeah, it’s pretty much established, via the historical record in general and this article by Chalmers in particular, that philosophy’s main claim-to-fame is to never leave well-enough alone.

Yeah, my mistake. The quote says not plausible, which isn’t the same as implausible.

So this must be the joke everybody’s talking about….all positions are implausible but any of them might be true. And if one of them turns out to be true, it mustn’t have been implausible after all.

Which just says substance monism is no better or worse than any other -ism. So what’s the point of it? How is it not adding another implausibility on top of all the others?

I’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. And if one of them must be true, does he make any headway in showing his position is?

Far FAR too many -isms and their respective -ists for me.

So if no position on the mind-body problem is plausible, and substance monism is a position that addresses that problem, what advantage does it hold?

Thanks.

As in, “…. the thesis that the universe is fundamentally mental….that all concrete facts are grounded in mental facts….”?

Substance monism arises from that?

Do you take 'transcendental' to mean beyond experience, unknowable? — Janus

It is a method, a type, of reason, of thinking, by which, first and foremost, the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions are proven. Subsequently, and using such cognitions as logical ground, transcendental this or that just indicates the conditions under which this or that is thought about.

So you can cognize beyond experience and knowledge by thinking transcendentally, but transcendental doesn’t mean a reality of things beyond even possible experience and knowledge, which technically, is termed transcendent.
————

All we know is that we think there must be such a reality, a transcendental (because unknowable-as-it-is-in-itself reality), but a reality nonetheless — Janus

Hmmm…..Do we think there must be, or is it more likely we only think it is not impossible that there may be?

that is why I say transcendental realism seems to logically follow. But again that is not an empirically established conclusion (…) It is, rather, an inference to the best explanation. — Janus

Interesting. Logically follow….from what? What do you think is better explained by inferring a transcendental realism?

Even more interesting….how does the consistency of our perceptual representations suggest our senses are representing the noumenal accurately enough for practical purposes?

I’m trying to think like you, so give me more to work with, maybe?
————

You said: This from the Chalmers paper seems to support my interpretation of Kant:

Kant’s transcendental idealism is not really a version of idealism in the metaphysical sense I am concerned with here.

What version of idealism in a metaphysical sense is Chalmers concerned with?

You agree the object in itself is transcendental (to experience) and real….so why not transcendental realism? — Janus

I suppose transcendental to experience just means has nothing to do with it. Transcendental merely indicates a method of reason, and is always a priori, so I’d agree the thing in itself has nothing to do with experience. Took me awhile to sort that out, and I’m still not sure if I read you correctly.

As to why not transcendental realism, is the assignment of a mere conception alone to validate a physical object, and as we all know, conception alone is in no way sufficient for empirical knowledge. On the other hand, the fact of perception makes explicit the reality necessary for its cause, which makes the thing in itself a necessary antecedent condition, even if nothing can be known of it in itself, insofar as it is the representation only, of the thing in itself, that is.

So….here we go.

There are established philosophies in which is found a mix of Kantian transcendental conceptions adjoined to real objects, re: Berkeley and successor dogmatic idealists, the ground of which is the attribution of Kantian transcendental conceptions of space and time as properties adhering in objects.
(The granting of singular space and time to an object, as opposed to the relation of object to space and time generally. This thing is right here, right now, therefore a space and a time belong to any object right here right now)

For those who think thus, a form of realism in which space and time are properties belonging to objects, they wouldn’t thereby consider themselves transcendental realists, insofar as, transcendentally, in Kant, space and time are two conceptions embracing the infinite, yet having no intrinsic substance belonging to them, the seriously contradictory results of that being quite obvious.

1.) If space and time are infinite, it is impossible to even think, must less determine, which space and which time belongs to a particular object immediately appearing to our senses.

2.) If a space and a time belong to an object, it is impossible to explain motion and duration, without claiming the space and time follow the object because it is a property belonging to it. But if that is the reality, it needs be said what fills the void left by change of position and change in successive durations of such object. While empty space is conceivable as having no object in it, it is impossible to conceive of no space at all, which must be admitted if a moving object includes its own space.
(Sidebar: back in my higher education days, in the theory of electron movement….electrons go this way, holes go the opposite way, insofar as a moving electron leaves a hole where it was. But this, just as for space and time, can be a misappropriated conceptual device)

3.) Without the possibility of determining which space and which time, of the infinite manifold of each, belongs to an object, it is impossible to prove that one and only one object can have that one singular spatial property and it is impossible to prove that an object can exhibit the very same existence in a succession of times. Before thinking this is preposterous, reflect on Feynman positing that if it is impossible to determine which path the particle takes through the slit, we must admit it took all of them., a.k.a., “sum over histories” hypothetical premise. And with that initial premise, is given the starting point for demonstrations otherwise.

So there may be a realism in which space and time are properties belonging to objects, but it is impossible for those holding with it to be transcendental realists in a Kantian sense. And if it be granted Kant defines transcendental philosophy, then the notion of transcendental realism itself, is refuted, from which follows necessarily, that those holding with it, have misunderstood the world.

For transcendental realism to be a valid doctrine, the concept of transcendental itself, and all that follows from it, must be conceived quite differently.
————

I'm not an adherent, so not what I had in mind. — Janus

Not an adherent taken to mean regarding the hard problem…..hence my question mark. So did you have something else in mind, as to where we are left when it is the case there is one world but for which we cannot have direct, unmediated knowledge?

If #1…..not so sure a reality is a collective representation.
If #2…..real, and indeterminable.
If #3….that object which appears to us is determinable/knowable. The object in itself is the object as it doesn’t appear, hence is not determinable/knowable.
————-

where does that leave us? — Janus

With the hard problem of consciousness?

It's an interesting question whether Kant's "in itself" denotes a reality — Janus

“…. The schema of reality is existence in a determined time….”
“…. For I can say only of a thing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses and experience….”
“…. we can have no cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as phenomenon…”

Put them together, you get an affirmation that the thing in itself denotes an existence in a determined time.

controversy as to whether Kant's emprical/ transcendental dichotomy should be interpreted as a "dual aspect" or a "dual world" proposition. — Janus

If there is no direct knowledge of the world, but only of its representations, there is no need for a dual world. There is one world affecting the senses, half of a dual aspect, and the system by which it is understood, the other half.

Lots between the lines in all that, if you’re inclined to dig it out.

Everything I said here seven hours ago, doesn’t relate to the content of the post it was in response to. You did some serious editing, I must say.

Anyway…..I’m not up for a do-over, so, thanks for the talk.

That the truth depends on something isn’t that it depends on the existence of something. — Michael

Be that as it may, isn’t the prerogative of intelligence, insofar as it deems truth to be a valid idea, to determine what it does depends on, from whence does truth receive its justification?

I suppose you could argue for mathematical realism and claim that mathematical entities exist as abstract objects, but that seems both unnecessary and fantastical. — Michael

I’d go with fantastical, but I’d be reluctant to deny necessity. Just as for truth, there must be something by which the comprehending the appearance of natural relations, becomes possible.

What else is there?
— Mww

Probably nothing. The mistake is in thinking that a statement's truth depends on the existence of something. — Michael

On the existence of something, agreed. But it does seem as though truth must depend on something, and absent mind and matter there is probably nothing, that leaves truth to be dependent on probably something. Which probably causes the critical thinker to raise one incredulous eyebrow and the average thinker to raise ‘em both.
————

….there is a square root of 2. Its truth just has nothing to do with anything that exists. — Michael

Truth, here, just indicates there is no inherent self-contradiction in the proposition, which, again, requires a mind, does it not? Whether mind or reason, even if not attributed with existence, must be something. Or maybe it’s better to say must be not nothing.
————

And as a related point, (…) idealism doesn't entail solipsism. — Michael

No, it doesn’t and shouldn’t, but typically it happens. Definition-specific apparently.

…….there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the minds that exist. — Michael

……there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the matter that exists. — Michael

What else is there?

I don't read that as Kant conceding dualism….. — Janus

“…..The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, may be an empirical realist, or as he is called, a dualist. (…) A370a

The transcendental idealist is, therefore an empirical realist, and allows matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but immediately perceived.(…) A371

From the start we have declared ourselves in favor of this transcendental idealism, and our doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the reality of matter…” A370b

A is B, B is C, therefore A is C? That’s one way to read Kant as conceding the dualism with which the present general dialectic is concerned.

But that’s not even the most important part. Notice no mention of particular things, no mention of determined objects, but only of matter. If one then concedes Kant to mean the appearance of matter is not, and cannot be, the perception of named things, it becomes clear in relation to your….

I would say that our senses are not pre-cognitively affected by objects — Janus

….that in a Kantian sense, our senses are indeed pre-cognitively affected by objects. Senses are affected pre-cognition. Affected antecedent to their phenomenal representation, hence, antecedent to being thought, which is antecedent to be cognized as a particular form of matter, or, which is the same thing, as a particular object.

You’re probably thinking along the lines that as soon as we know what a thing is, our senses are not pre-cognitively affected. Which is fine, as long as you don’t consider what happens within the cognitive system itself, that tells it it has nothing to do when it receives an input to the senses from something already determined.

All sorts of inconsistencies arise if one considers the system stops doing its job, no matter the reason. On the one hand we have a system that works one way for knowing a thing, and on the other hand we have a system that works some other way for remembering the thing it knows. So far, so good. But what tells the system the known thing and the remembered thing relate to each other, sufficiently enough to be identical, and furthermore, what happened in the case where they do not so relate?

What’s the difference between saying we know the thing as a tree and remember it as such, or, we cognize some matter as being, e.g. a tree, every single instance of that matter being an affect on our senses? If there is no difference, it then suffices to say the latter very well could be the case, the immediate advantage being the removal of any operational inconsistencies, insofar as the cognitive system works in its procedural entirety each and every instance of the appearance of matter to it.

And what entails that matter affects the senses in such a way as to be consistently represented? Why…its being given to us as extended and shaped in a certain way in space, of course. As such, as far as concerns the senses, there never is a tree, a branch, a leaf. Or even the dirt all that came out of. There isn’t even any “coming out of”. There is only matter of certain extension and shape that were once not given, then were.

In general, then, as long as the matter’s extension and shape don’t change, the representations of them won’t change, and they all will end up being known as a single consistent thing to all observers with congruent cognitive systems, so everybody experiences the same thing. So when you asked that guy how many branches he sees, by all accounts he should see just as many as you, insofar as his senses are affected in exactly the same way, by exactly the same matter, as yours. All else being given….language, rationality and so on.

TA-DAAAA!!!! I mean….how much simpler can it be!!!!

….could be interpreted to mean that they really are extended and that on account of that they can make their appearance to our senses. — Janus

That is what is meant by the term appearance, yes.

Not to take sides, but the question in this…..

What could it then mean to say that there was a time before human beings existed?
— Janus

I said that it is a matter of empirical fact. — Wayfarer

….is not supported by the answer, unless time is to be considered an empirical matter, a contradiction. A time before humans existed certainly has meaning, but the meaning is logical, in the form of inference to a self-sustaining series of regressive successions, which are not themselves matters of empirical fact, and that only possible insofar as there happen to be humans with the ability to think in terms of mere relations.
———-

given the challenging nature of the issue — Wayfarer

Yeah, about that. Humans: invent stuff to explain other stuff, but can’t explain the stuff they invent to explain that other stuff. They say that stuff is only possible for us if this stuff comes first, but can’t say how this stuff came first.

And that’s only the half of it, fercryin’outloud!!! On top of all that, they demand certain knowledge of that stuff, but predicate that very certainty on stuff the certainty of which is completely different in kind and measure than belongs to that which they want to know about!!!!

It’s what makes philosophy so much fun: finding out who’s got the most reasonable explanation for, and means for preventing, the nonsense we inevitably bring upon ourselves.
———

I'm also intrigued that Kant appears to concede dualism in that passage — Wayfarer

I’m intrigued as to why he said for the record he is a dualist in A, but sorta misplaced it in B. Maybe he figured he didn’t need to say it twice….dunno. But it is conspicuous in its absence.

The question about what the world would be like without any percipients in it seems unanswerable, even incoherent, — Janus

Agreed. Who what ask? Inferences as to what it might have been like without them, abound, now that there are percipients that do ask.

…..to my way of thinking extension just is spatiality. — Janus

That’s fine. Spatiality is merely another form of the conception of space, which we already have. Extension is spatiality and extended in space say the same thing. But do either of them tell us anything about space?
——-

With the "degrees of separation" thing I actually had in mind the simple fact that objects appear extended to us….. — Janus

As long as appears in “objects appear extended” means objects are presented to us as being extended. Or, objects make their appearance to our senses by being extended. And not…objects look to us like they are extended. Only in this distinction does ’s A369 quote make sense, and indeed the conception of spatial extension itself, re: “… outer appearances (if their reality is conceded)…”.

do we merely imagine that we know what we are talking about with such projections? — Janus

Ha!!! Saturn isn’t even thought about absent its rings, but there was a time when it didn’t have any. And I seriously doubt quarks are actually colored. One can possibly experience that which he imagines, but he can never simply imagine that which he has experienced.

If imagination as a faculty has the power attributed to it in theory, it occurs that one always imagines that which eventually he comes to know. But with respect to the projection of existence you’re asking about, though, there are serious contradictions if we deny the existence of the world before human experience, which at least allows us to project that it did, but the fact remains, we cannot possibly know the fact of it in the same fashion by which we know apodeitically that stupid-ass tree has three branches.
————

Kant could have said that the empirical world, time and space and all, possibly exist outside of human experience and judgement, whereas they necessarily exist within that context? — Janus

He does say that. Then demonstrates how it is impossible, iff a certain set of conditions are in fact the case. If they aren’t, well…..time for another demonstration of a different kind, and we find ourselves faced with stuff like logical positivism, OLP and quantum mechanics, in which case…..errr, you know…..we imagine we know what we’re talking about.
———-

Experience is of representations of objects in space, but not of space itself, which can never be represented in us.
— Mww

I think we do perceive dimension, or degrees of separation, which just is space, so it seems I disagree here. — Janus

Maybe, but you’re talking perception and I’m talking experience. Yours is on the one end of the cognitive spectrum, as means, mine is on the other, as ends. Nevertheless, I’d say we think dimension and degrees of separation, which are just representations for the appearance of one object’s relation to an observer, or objects in relation to each other, and for which we couldn’t represent at all if those objects weren’t to be found somewhere other than in the very system which is thinking about them.

Yes, we do perceive degrees of separation…this is closer than that, this is adjacent to that. This is of the same time as that. This is this now but was that before. But, what, in the most basic, primal way possible, makes all that, make sense to us? Gotta start somewhere, right?

….I’m not sure about universal truth as such.
— Mww

I'm assuming from this that you don't think there are moral or aesthetic truths? — Tom Storm

Deontological moral philosophy mandates compliance to a moral law, which is the same as there being a universal moral truth, that if one adheres to this mandate without regard for circumstance and therefore without exception, then he is a truly moral agent. It is in this case a universal truth but under entirely subjective conditions.

Needless to say, it follows that there may be as many universal moral truths as there are truly moral agents. And even if one guy recognizes another as adhering to his moral truth, is nonetheless disgusted by it, hence would never adhere to it, which is sufficient to render objective universal moral truths to vanishingly small possibility.

Aesthetic truths are very different in occasion even if similar in form, insofar as they merely reflect some condition of a perceiving subject prescribed by the feeling instilled in him through observation of something with which he had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do. A guy’s aesthetic truth may very well be that the Mona Lisa is the ugliest broad he’s ever seen, and enlightenment of him by established authorities regarding the artist’s technique, the physics of paint and application of it, physics of light and shadow, sway him not the least.

The mitigating factor is causality. In the former, even though the subjective condition is an aesthetic feeling, it is a feeing of satisfaction as an effect for being a moral agent, which he caused himself to be and for which no representation is possible; in the latter the subjective condition is still an aesthetic feeling, but of a relative pain/pleasure affect caused only by the object, but for which representation is necessary.

So…universal truths in Nature the causality for which has nothing to do with us? No, I don’t think there are any, insofar as the logic of pure speculative reason is against us, but if there were we couldn’t ignore them. Universal truths for which we ourselves are causality? Yes there are, insofar as the logic of pure practical reason demands it to be so, but those we can, and often do, ignore.
———-

“…. many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be so very clear….”

Or….sometimes you just want a simple yes or no, but you end up with a miniature dissertation.

If I claim that the Universe existed prior to humans that is a claim about existence outside of the context of human experience and judgement. — Janus

That’s technically a logical inference, hence certainly not independent of human experience and judgement. Nevertheless, with this, you’re attributing a justified universal claim to existence, when we’ve been relating justified universal claims to human experience and judgement. Which reduces to….the specified existence is outside human experience and judgement, but the claim is not.
————

Our notion of existence is derived from our experience and the concept is fine in that context. But are we justified in projecting that concept beyond that context, by saying things like 'the world existed prior to humans' or the 'the world didn't exist prior to humans'? — Janus

Good point. It is a different kind of logical inference, however, that our existence….not the notion of it, but the fact of it….derives from experience on the one hand, which is deductive, and existences outside our experience, which is inductive. So, yes, I think we can project the concept, but not in that context; we invoke the category of necessity in the former, but possibility in the latter.
————

Not all experiences are spacial, but the body and all other objects are experienced as existing in spacetime. Does it follow that we and all other objects can only exist or be in spacetime? — Janus

Another good point. Yes, and no. Yes according to certain theories, no if other theories falsify the one that says yes. But there haven’t been any falsifying theories, at least no paradigm shifting, everybody’s on the new bandwagon kinda theory, so it seems we’re pretty much stuck with the paradigm-shifting theory we’ve already been given.

If I were to go all nit-picky, on ya, quibble-y even, I’d bring to your attention that no experience is spatial. They are temporal, as you said. Experience is of representations of objects in space, but not of space itself, which can never be represented in us.
————-

such claims are justified only if you believe that the very fact that we can imagine certain things reflects some higher, human-independent truth. — Janus

Ehhhh…maybe. I’m in the nature-of-the-human-beast camp myself; maybe we can imagine just about anything we want, just because we can. Even if there is a higher, human independent truth, it would only be comprehensible if our intelligence permits it, and if it did, it wouldn’t be either higher or human independent. And if it didn’t, then we’d never know about it anyway. You know…the ol’ transcendental illusion trick: reason thinks this stuff up, which is quite obviously within its purview, because we actually do it, but then can’t do anything with it.

Anyway….good talk.

….there can be no justifiable universal claims that purport to obtain independently of the context of human experience and judgement. — Janus

Ok, close enough. There certainly are justified universal claims, but there are no justified universal claims independent of human intelligence. I mean…where else but from human intelligence can any claim come from, justified or not?

There could be justifiable universal claims about human experience, but I understand such claims to be phenomenological, not metaphysical. — Janus

Sure, I guess. There is no such thing as universal human experience is itself a justified universal claim about human experience. Still, being tautological, the claim tells us nothing we didn’t already know, given the infinite conditions of space and time, which are the necessary conditions for experience in the first place, both of which are implied by universality, and is certainly contained in a metaphysical doctrine.

If phenomenology justifies universal claims about human experience other than the one I just stated…..so be it. I wouldn’t dare say there aren’t any, but I would dare you to offer one that isn’t every bit as metaphysical as it is phenomenological.
———-

Heidegger equates phenomenology with metaphysics, but then that would not be the kind of traditional metaphysics that does make claims that purport to obtain independently of the human context. — Janus

Hmmm. That presupposes there is such a traditional metaphysics, which may be true whether or not I’m even the least familiar with it. Which puts me in a tough spot, insofar as if you offer such a justified universal claim that purports to obtain independently of human context, in a non-traditional metaphysical way, in accordance with the phenomenological doctrine, I’m pretty sure I won’t understand it. But others seems to well enough, so…there ya go.

….would that not be to posit that such reasoning yields universal truth, at least as regards the human? — Janus

That’s not what kills the definition. Independent of human understanding, in the original post’s wording, does. But I see you’ve added the qualifier later.

There may be things that are true universally, re: pure mathematical and logical propositions, in accordance with our intelligence, but I’m not sure about universal truth as such. What could be true under any possible condition, including whatever kind of possible intelligence, when the totality of possible conditions is itself inconceivable?

I see a priori reasoning to principles as phenomenological and pragmatic, not metaphysical. — Janus

That’s fine, but with respect to Kant, from whence this exchange originated, metaphysics is a priori reasoning from principles, and the latter would always and necessarily consider the former as merely the tail wagging the dog. Unfairly perhaps, but from the meager top-down predisposition, there it is.

My definition of what qualifies as a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus

That definition would certainly turn any metaphysical doctrine endorsing it into irredeemable junk. Thankfully there are definitions without those conceptual relations, which do not.

As Kant has shown us, no metaphysical views are supported, because they are the erroneous attempt to extrapolate to an "ultimate" "god's eye" view of reality — Janus

Dogmatic metaphysical views, and metaphysical views as an empirical science, are not supported. And the metaphysical view regarding pure speculative reason’s attempts to obtain the unconditioned in any form, is not supported.

Some metaphysical views must be supported, otherwise transcendental philosophy as a doctrine grounded in synthetic a priori principles, is invalid. And even if the validity is subjected to dispute, it can only be from different initial conditions, which are themselves metaphysical views.
———-

There's an expression that captures what I was getting at: Cartesian anxiety….. — Wayfarer

I hadn’t considered Cartesian anxiety; just lending credence to….“the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken”.

I'm not saying that our designation as 'beings' means that we are beings in the causative sense…. — Wayfarer

Cool. Just me, personalized conceptual analysis.

idealists" of a certain variety (…) have to bite the bullet and say that non-living things have some sort of experientialness…. — schopenhauer1

I hate the taste of bullets.

….the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken…. — Wayfarer

It must be mistaken; it is self-contradictory. Twice.

If it was completely separate from us, we wouldn’t see anything at all;
Insofar as we do see, it is necessary that we be part of that something which is seen.
———-

…..through rational sentient creatures such as ourselves, the universe comes into being…. — Wayfarer

This seems dangerously close to sentience as sufficient existential causality. Might be more the philosophical case, that the universe assumes a form in accordance with the rationality of sentient creatures.

…..which is why we're designated 'beings'. — Wayfarer

I fail to grasp how that explanatory qualifier justifies the original assertion. Maybe just needs an elucidation of “being”…..

Me: idealism not in its strictest sense….external material reality granted;
You: strict idealism….external reality is material, denied.

What’s the difference? Not strict idealism grants; strict idealism denies. We’re saying the same fargin’ thing!!
———

Why Kant proposes an idealism, and that of a particular kind…..is in dispute to the empiricists of the day.

In the idealism Kant proposes…..noumena are proposed, superficially, in that they represent what not to do; or technically, in that they represent what understanding is capable of if left unchecked by itself. They are, after the paint has dried, metaphysically insignificant.

What I'm pointing out is that the claims of the idealists, such as Magee and Kant, are themselves delivered as "what actually is" about humans. — L'éléphant

“…. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general….”

“… This completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions à priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis…”

“… Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building.…”

Nothing in Kantian tripartite critical philosophy asserts “what actually is” about humans, but is merely a domain-specific series of if-then logical syllogisms writ large, which at most, says what actually is about a speculative theory.
———

On the other hand, there are “….claims (….) delivered as “what actually is”.…”, serving as premises for the logical method following from them….

“…. That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience….”

….and this, with respect to his theory of knowledge alone, is not idealism in its strictest sense, insofar as external material reality is tacitly granted as a necessary condition.

my prejudices are not as uncommon as it might seem — Banno

Nope, hardly uncommon. Everybody’s got ‘em, maybe not so overtly….you know…contrarian.

Your prejudices are showing.

Two cents. Or in this case….. kronenthalers.

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition….

Because the topic is an objector’s misunderstanding of a “Kantian demonstration”, and without an intrinsic dualism the demonstration wouldn’t be Kantian at all, there are exactly two “impossibly deep levels of presupposition” with respect to empirical conditions, the first being the treatment of space and time concerned with intuitions, and the second being the categories concerned with conceptions.

…..and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.

Them being the concepts as we normally use them, as we usually use them is in regard to the whole of the empirical world, the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect being the difficulty with which transcendental idealism always contends.

All that reduces to….the original disposition of the intellect is mere observation, from which arises the assumptions of the inborn, re: non-critical, realism, that the empirical world is in space and time.

Transcendental realism says it is, but, of course, it is not, and by which the untaintedness of transcendental idealism is justified. And THAT, is what Kantian transcendental philosophy, in the form of speculative pure reason, proves, given the validity of those aforementioned presuppositions.

As stated, Magee didn’t say, so I took the liberty. Hope you don’t mind.

I didn’t forget or ignore; just couldn’t come up with anything more to say.

Been real, all the same.

‘Til next time…..

….the thing that's 'out there'. It seems something of an odd pastime of philosophers to start fiddling with that. — Isaac

Logical thing to do, from their point of view, when fiddling with the ‘in here’ couldn’t be improved.

Mostly, we're grateful. — Isaac

I can….errr….‘see’ how that is likely true.

You know…the currently fashionable talk at the table. Linked herein some time ago by somebody. And, fortuitously enough, upon reconciliation of the ambiguity over the word “see” and other assorted and sundry “perceptual verbs”, the Bad Argument disappears. Still, as we all know only too well, only to be replaced with another one.

What is it about trees, for these people, that is so impenetrable, I wonder? — Isaac

Dunno about “these people”, but lil’ ol’ me…..go back to that picture on pg 4. See that word “tree beside the object? At the same time, notice the first condition of visual experience in Searle’s list? See where the picture says tree, but #1 says object?

In Searle’s list, object becomes tree at #3, and in the picture it can be a tree only after Searle’s #3, but without that condition, which is not even implied by the picture, it is the case that it should have been object on the left, at instance of perception, and never a tree. Nevertheless, the picture correctly represents the initial conditions for visual experience, demonstrating the presentation of an object directly to the system, according to physical law.
———-

Other oddities from indirect realists here….. — Isaac

Ehhhh….that’s just conflicts in domain of discourse. Over-extended physicalist reductionism adds nothing to the human physiological act of perceiving, such that without it knowledge of objects is impossible. Our intellect, in its empirical manifestations, concerns itself initially with the output of sensory devices rather than their input, and it shouldn’t be contentious that our intellect works indirectly with, and is necessarily conditioned by, the real in accordance with its own methodology, whatever that may in fact be.

Ya know, something I wondered about, given our conversations, fly on the wall kinda thing….are you and your colleagues appalled at the extent to which humans can’t find agreement among themselves on the most fundamental human considerations? To be honest, I might guess you guys just figure we all like to bark at the moon, confident in the pretension that it is listening.

Anything that is the “mechanics of human vision” is itself the perceiving…… — NOS4A2

The mechanics of any human sensory device makes the perceiving possible, being necessary but not sufficient for it, in accordance with their design alone.

…..and not the perceived. — NOS4A2

Obviously, hence trivially correct.

If indirect realism accepts this it is redundant. — NOS4A2

Redundancy is moot, insofar as the proper indirect realist accepts as given, that the mechanics is neither the perceiving nor the perceived. The former belongs strictly to agency, the latter belongs strictly to that which affects agency.

If sensation is removed, as output of sensory devices, and all else being undisturbed, is it rational to say perceiving remains intact?

Which tree do we perceive? And who is perceiving that tree? — NOS4A2

All that picture does is demonstrate the mechanics of human vision, from which the answer to that question is impossible, insofar as both forms of realism must accept that physiology.

Remove the word “tree”, then ask where and when the warrant for putting anything in its place, comes from.

Now let the games begin.

The particular is never conceptualized. — Metaphysician Undercover

No? Then what is? And what of the notion that all thoughts are singular and succession, which implies any thought is itself a particular instance of it? All conceptions are thought, so…..

The same sensation is not the consideration. Obviously, time conditions all of them, in that sensation now is not the sensation before or later. It is still logical that a sensation now is of the same thing as the sensation is of that thing at a later time. The mind doesn’t worry about the relative time of the thing itself, only the time at which we are affected by it.

Ehhhhh….Wittgenstein. I don’t care what he says. The bee sting I experienced last year is for all intents and purposes precisely the same experience I will have next time. How else to know it as caused by a bee?
————

You might call the senses information collecting tools. — Metaphysician Undercover

You might, I would not. I would limit the senses to information transferring devices, the information already residing in the things perceived. There isn’t any information collected per se, it is, rather, merely that which the mind employs as the instantiation of its methods.

Compromise: if we say my transferring is your collecting, I might still be inclined to grant intuition is the collecting tool, in that the matter of an object from which sensation proper arises, is represented as an empirical intuition. Dunno if that works for you.
———-

The information is received as formal, but it consists of forms created by something other than the mind which receives it, so the meaning inherent within must be interpreted — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, so what something other than the mind creates forms? And if the information contains inherent meaning within it, what does understanding do? How is this not precisely the materialist doctrine writ large?
———-

And the mind receiving creates its own meaning according to what it knows in its interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, the mind abstracts meaning inherent within forms received as information, according to what it knows. But once again….what if the mind doesn’t know? Why would the mind create its own meaning, if there is already meaning inherent in the forms? Although, I’m beginning to see where your notion that judgement being the source of error, as I hold it to be, is not the case. I’m not sure it is legitimate to permit the mind to misinterpret, that is, mistake the meaning inherent in forms with the meaning it creates for itself.
————-

So the act of abstraction which occurs in the feeling of a sensation as per you example of a tickle, is an act of creation within the receiving mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. In Plato, this is “knowledge that” there is something affecting the sensory apparatus. But it is not “knowledge of” the particular object. As such, it is merely one of a general class of possibilities. The mind knows immediately what some causes of the sensation is not, but not yet as to what it is.

The mind classifies the information received, according to conceptions which it already has, and creates what appears to you as a conception of that particular instance. — Metaphysician Undercover

This works for objects received more than once. In other words, objects known to the mind as experience, re: according to conceptions which it already has. Once more, the question remains as to conceptions the mind does not have, in which case it would seem the mind couldn’t create a conception of that particular instance. Consider the alternative, wherein the mind classifies in accordance with conceptions it already has…..how is it determinable that none of them represent the forms inherent in the information it received? I don’t think ol’ Mother would imbue the human intellect with so inefficient a methodology, which requires it so eliminate all that doesn’t apply, only to find out nothing it already has, does.

But it is really just a particular instance of categorization, whereby the essentials are determined and a representation of a particular is produced. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. This is better, in that conceptualization is really categorization, in which the essentials are determined. Now, the mind can certainly interpret the information contained in forms in accordance with categories it already has, and the categories are themselves conceptions, but of a very specific gender and origin. But no particular instance of an object of sense is ever to be conceptualized from a mere category. Th essentials determined by categorization, are necessary conditions for the possibility of knowing what an object may be in general, not properties for determining what it is in particular.

When you come into the room and see a chair, where there was a similar chair yesterday, you tend to think it is the same chair. — Metaphysician Undercover

Long before Wittgenstein, critical metaphysics established that tendency is unwarranted. Conventionally, perhaps, through lackadaisical thinking endorsed by herd mentality. Simply put, it’s just easier to say it’s the same chair because it’s too complicated to explain why it might not be, or indeed, isn’t.
————

The form of the sensed object inheres within the thing itself — Metaphysician Undercover

The primary, and probably irreconcilable, difference in our respective theories. The form resides in the mind. Sensation contributes nothing but the physical matter of the object affecting the senses.

What is a priori in the mind is some structure of universals by which the mind categorizes incoming information. — Metaphysician Undercover

YEA!!! Agreement!! Categorizes. What do you think this means? What is happening when categorizing occurs?

So the form of the thing which the mind knows is fundamentally different from the form which inheres within the thing itself, as a representation produced from placing the information within the conceptual structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. The thing the mind knows as representation of sensation, is phenomenon, which is the matter of the object, arranged according to the form provided by the mind a priori, kinda like placing information within a conceptual structure.

There is no problem with "first instances" so long as we maintain the reality of the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, and makes the first instance possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is certainly still a problem, in that the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, the categorizing conceptual structure, and any instance at all, doesn’t have anything to do with the determination of what that thing is, only that knowing what it is, is possible from them.

Fair, but doesn’t answer the question.

The categorization of the particular according to an already held conceptual structure, isn’t the same as conceptualizing the particular sensation. So that structure isn’t how conceptualization works, but is merely the necessary criteria by which it is possible.

I would say the limitations on sensibility are physiological, and not the mind’s inherent capacity to apprehend that which is presented to it. This relates directly to the question above, insofar as there doesn’t seem to be a limit on our conceptualizing practices. The most rampant, uncontrolled faculty in human cognition, is imagination, after all, right? In fact, it is the case understanding does synthesize conceptual representations into the objects of sense that do not belong to it, re: optical illusion.

There may indeed be more information in sensation than is transferred to the mind, but such information would be irrelevant to the process of determining what an object is, insofar as understanding uses only whatever information is given to it, as phenomenon.

This is why the Aristotelian description was that the mind abstracts the form of the thing, through the means of the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

Abstracts….from what? The thing itself? This presupposes the form is already contained in the sensation, and that the senses have some sort of self-contained deductive power. I usually resort to the ol’ tickle on the back of your neck scenario to refute such description. A tickle is a sensation, and if the form of the thing which causes the tickle is abstracted from it, it would seem we would know immediately what causes the tickle. But we do not. In fact, it is the case we sometimes sense a tickle not caused by any object at all.

There is a form belonging to any sensed object which becomes known as a certain thing, but it is not abstracted through sense, but resides a priori in the mind. This also relates to the question as to what do you do in the case of first instances.

Again….lots of what you say I agree with, but I can’t see an answer to the original question in it.