I am surprised….. — RussellA

Explained in the rest of what I said, maybe? Note the CPR quote references universality with respect to empirical judgements, where I referenced necessity with respect to analytical cognitions, both under the a priori umbrella.

That there are two names representing a singular whole object makes explicit the conceptions by which the first name represents that object, reside in the second name equally, such that the second name represents exactly the same whole object, hence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is a pure analytic proposition, hence necessarily true. It is no less analytical than the proposition “bodies are extended”.

Now you might say, to point to one is not to point to the other. But one does not point to a name, but the thing represented by the name, so he points to the same thing, the same aggregate of conceptions, even if not the same name.
——————

As I could have chosen any name, the connection between the name "Phosphorus" and "Venus" and between "Hesperus" and "Venus" are contingent. — RussellA

Yes, the names are contingent, fully arbitrary, yet usually related to something antecedent to the name itself, in this case a combination of Roman and Greek gods. Nevertheless, the conditions under which the names are chosen, the connection between the representation and that which is represented, is not contingent, but given a priori in the synthesis of conceptual representations with sensory representations, which makes any name itself a mere representation. The names of the gods are just as analytic and necessarily true, insofar as the Greek god Phosphorus cannot refer to anything other than that for which it was cognized.

To say those names are contingent merely because those names were chosen arbitrarily, is nowhere near the logical contingency indicated in epistemological metaphysics. Or, to put it in simplest terms….see how easy it is to force language to screw with reason.
————-

quote="RussellA;767433"]even though I can only know Hesperus and Phosphorus a posteriori[/quote]

That’s not quite right. You can only know of an object in space a posteriori. The object in space is not its name, it is just a thing. The name you know a posteriori because you learned it through experience, as opposed to being the one that installed the name on the object. But to know the object as such, is not to know the name of the object as such, insofar as they are completely different perceptions. You are merely relating the object to the name, which you cannot do a posteriori, but only in reason a priori, yet under a posteriori conditions.

So according to Kripke, that Hesperus is Phosphorus is known a posteriori, yet not contingent. — Banno

It’s is an empirical fact Phosporus is Venus, and, it is an empirical fact Hesperus is Venus. It is therefore an analytical cognition, hence necessarily true, that Phosporus is Hesperus, in that it is just saying Venus is Venus. Technically, this just means there are no conceptions belonging to the one that do not belong to the others. But it is nevertheless contingent, re: not necessary, that the second planet from the sun is called out by any of the names Venus, Phosporus or Hesperus, such names arbitrarily determined by whoever took it upon himself to assign them. As Kripke said, “it could have turned out the other way”, or, even moreso, the same planet could have been given any name that didn’t already belong to an object known to the one assigning. Nevertheless, identity belongs to the object necessarily, indicating how we are to be affected by it, as a function of our human sensibility, yet naming belongs to the agent’s cognition of the object, merely indicating how it is to be represented, as a function of our human intelligence.
———-

On the principle of induction:

“… Secondly, an empirical judgement never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by induction); therefore, the most we can say is—so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely à priori.…”

Knowledge is experience, experience is always changing with time, so knowledge is always changing with time, therefore knowledge is contingent on time.

“….. Experience no doubt teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise…..”
————

So there is disagreement between you and Kripke? — Banno

Of course, in that he is analytical, I’m continental, with all the implications carried therein. But he’s famous, got letters after his name, might even hold a chair, and I’m none of that, so…..

The suggestion is that Kant took necessary and a priori to be interchangeable….. — Banno

There is a serious caveat here, in that for Kant, when he speaks of the a priori he means pure a priori, meaning having nothing to do with any experience whatsoever. He set this as a definition, probably so he didn’t have to modify the term every time he used it. Conventionally speaking, on the other hand, when the term a priori is used, or even when the uninitiated read CPR and find Kant using the unmodified term constantly, it refers to those conditions of no immediate experience, but grounded nonetheless in antecedent experience.

With respect to Kripke’s metaphysical terms, he actually says independently of ALL experience, which is Kant’s pure a priori, but a priori in its conventional sense, as most are inclined to use it, is not necessarily independent of all experience.

“…. In the first place, if we have a proposition which contains the idea of necessity in its very conception, it is a priori….”

“…..Now, that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgements which are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure à priori, it will be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from the sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics….”

So it is that necessity and a priori are always connected, through the LNC, so if one wants to call them interchangeable because of that connection, I guess he could. There’s so much more to all this, that would show they are not, but…..some other time perhaps.

…..and similarly for a posteriori and contingent. — Banno

The a posteriori is always contingent, through the principle of induction, but again……interchangeable?
————-

There's this additional complication, the use of "synthetic" and "analytic" in the place of "necessary" and "contingent".

This seems to be equating a grammatical difference with a modal one. — Banno

Maybe equating the relational with the modal. Still a catastrophic rational error. Necessary/contingent are modal categories, which are logical conditions; synthetic/analytic describe relations of conceptions in propositions, which are relational conditions.

I see what you did here, letting me in without fear of court. I owe you a toddy. Or two.

Metaphysical terms needs an edit.

Would you agree a justification for something, is obtained by a judgement on that something? That justification is a derivative of the act of judging, which itself a derivative of judgement?

I'd rather stick to the Leibniz principle, and hold the belief that if any true statement made about x is also true about y, they are really one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I covered that, and probably best to leave it at the same kind of thing.

the meaning of "synthetic a priori judgements" cannot be irrelevant to the thread, otherwise, why mention it in the first place. — RussellA

Has nothing to do with it’s meaning; only with juxtaposition. If Kant can justify the one, then it is reasonable to suppose Kripke should be able to justify the other. Successors denied the one, successors may well deny the other. Nowhere in the article is one related, compared, or otherwise connected, to the other, and because it isn’t, whatever meaning it has, is irrelevant with respect to the article.
———-

I have two searchable editions, in which transcendental is found 568 times but transcendental knowledge doesn’t come up at all. You probably meant knowledge of the transcendental, which was never intended to be knowledge as such. Transcendental, in its strictest sense, is merely a sub-system of thought, premised on the complete absence of anything empirical. Included in that, are conditions of which there is no conscious awareness, hence cannot be known. In a purely logical system they don’t have to be known; they only need to be non-contradictory. As such, the subject knows of a logical validity, but not the objects that belong thereto.

In the B edition, Kant inserted a refutation of idealism. — RussellA

Yes, that being “material” idealism of Descartes and Berkeley. In A, it is the fourth paralogism.

Kant was an empirical realist. — RussellA

Yes, but more than that. (A370)

Kripke didn't want to unite contingent with identity, he wanted to unite necessity with identity. — RussellA

Then why would he present as a problem of philosophy, “how are contingent identity statements possible?”. Upwards from pg10, does he admit “identity statements are necessary, and not contingent”. If the second, why ask the first?

No more Kant. will take us to TPF court, and I can’t afford the fines.

Ehhhh…..as Kripke says, guy writes a book on something, another guy writes a book on how wrong the first guy was. Been that way since Day One. You and I, operating under the auspices of basic logical laws, reject the accordance of contingency with identity, but if somebody comes along and tweaks this definition, or fiddles with that perspective, he can obfuscate the established laws accordingly, and posit something nobody’s ever thought of before.

If you and I are going to get along with the pure analyticalists, we have to concede that when Kripke says, “ for any two objects x and y, if x is identical to y….”, it is more the case x is congruent to y rather than x being identical to y. Pretty simple, really; x is x and therefore not-y. Two objects having common properties is not the same as two objects being identical.

As for the category mistake, here’s my agreement with it:

“For every property F…..” F can be any property, such that if F belongs to x, and if x is identical to y then it is necessary that F belong to y. If F is the property of being round, and if x is round and y is identical to x, then y is round. That’s fine, in that x is, e.g., a round cue ball and y is, e.g., an identically round baseball. Which is also fine, insofar as the conditional is “for any two objects”, satisfied by one cue ball and one baseball.

It remains that a cue ball is not a baseball. But if x is to stand as identical to y, one of every property F is obviously not sufficient to cause x to be identical to y because of F. So keep adding F’s to x, maybe hundreds of F’s, such that when those properties also belong to y, they become closer and closer to both x and y being either a cue ball or a baseball. Still satisfies “for any two objects”, as well as for any property F which belongs to x also belongs to y.

The kicker: “For every property F….”, in order for the cue ball x and the baseball y to be identical, every property F must belong to both equally. It follows that in order for x to be identical to y, a space F belonging to x is the same space F belonging to y, and x and y simultaneously be commonly imbued with every other possible F equally. But two objects sharing the same space F is a contradiction, which negates the case. It must be, then, that they occupy different space F’s but still be commonly imbued with every other F equally. How does that happen, you ask….surely with bated breath. Well…..the space of x in one world, and the space of y in another world. What else?????

Hence contingent identity, contingent on the possibility of other worlds. Under the assumption of another merely possible world, however, such world can only have possible space, from which follows only a possible y can have the property of possible space, or, more correctly, only a possible y can occupy a possible space possibly, which reduces to a real x being identical to a possible y, which is not the original argument. In effect, then, in order to assume x = y identity necessarily, mandates a veritable maze of contingent possibilities.

And that’s a category mistake. Dunno if it’s yours or not, but it works, doesn’t it? The article goes on to circumvent these mistakes, re: “let us use necessity weakly”, or actually, to deny them altogether, re: “I will not go into this particular form of subtlety** here because it isn’t relevant”, in order to justify the notions contained further on in it.

But still, if a theory starts out illogically, and if the circumventions are not all that valid, wouldn’t it jeopardize the whole? Kripke is just saying, if it was this way, we could say this about it. But if it couldn’t be this way, why still talk as if it could? He goes on to talk about it in a different way, that’s all.
(** existence as a predicate, reflecting on existence in possible worlds)

The term "synthetic a priori" should be understood as an idiomatic expression rather than as a literal guide to Kant's doctrine of "transcendental idealism". — RussellA

Kantian transcendental idealism, not needing any inverted commas, is predicate on the possibility of synthetic a priori relations, and cannot stand without them, so must be understood as a literal guide to it, whether or not one regards the philosophy itself as legitimate.

In Kant, identity is the ground for truth in analytic judgements, which are never contingent. Synthetic judgements do not rely on identity, and the truth of them relies on the relation between its conceptions, hence is contingent. Kripke wants to unite the contingent with identity, which Kant deemed, if not impossible, then at least logically insufficient in regard to a brand new philosophy.

So maybe Kant’s term isn’t a mere idiom after all. Which is neither here nor there with respect to the thread.

“…. Now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever.…”
(CPR, A61/B86)

Possible world semantics: amusing to play with, but don’t think for a minute there’s any knowledge to be gained by it. And if there’s no knowledge to be gained, whatever amusement there is, is time poorly lost.

To see if two is a number, one looks at the list of numbers to see if it included two. — Banno

You GOT to be kidding me. If a guy doesn’t know whether or not 2 is a number, how would he know what the list of numbers looks like? So, what….he knows…like…3 is a number, but doesn’t know 2 is a number? The list of numbers is infinite. How does one look at an infinite list?

But maybe you meant, to see if this object perceived is a number 2 or not. To understand the object as being a 2, representing a specific quantity. Of course he would not, if he had no experience of the series of numbers having that particular member in the series. But he would still have an understanding of successive quantitative magnitudes, regardless of the form of its representations.
————-

To see if "the cup has a handle" is true, just check to see if the cup is on the list of things with handles. — Banno

(GASP) How long is the list of things with handles? The handle on a hammer looks nothing like the handle on a cup, but the hammer must be on the list of things with handles. To see if it is true the cup has a handle, why not just look at the farging cup???? It never was a question whether the cup has horns, or wings, or is in the shape of a basketball; it is only asked if it is true the cup has a handle, which immediately presupposes it’s supposed to, insofar as handles are a necessary conceptual schema for that which are cognized as cups. Things which perform similar functions as cups but do not have handles, are cognized as goblets, or whatever.
—————

2 is a number. That's not generally something one experiences as a phenomena — Banno

Oh dear.

2 is nothing but phenomenon. 2 is an object to be perceived by sight. That which 2 the empirical object thus phenomenon represents, on the other hand, is something not generally experienced. Actually, it isn’t at all; it is merely thought, and thought a priori in descension as quantity, and as schemata of a series of successive quantities, finally as specific schema representing a particular quantity.

“…. Philosophical cognition, accordingly, regards the particular only in the general; mathematical the general in the particular, nay, in the individual. This is done, however, entirely à priori and by means of pure reason, so that, as this individual figure is determined under certain universal conditions of construction, the object of the conception, to which this individual figure corresponds as its schema, must be cogitated as universally determined.…”

Number the conception as opposed to number the word, is not a phenomenon; a number, constructed to represent a quantity, is. Mathematics is impossible without phenomenal representation of quantity. Just as one can think a triangle but can never think the properties belonging to any triangle without the construction of one, so too can one think number but never count a total series of them, or determine possible relations between them without construction of objects representing them.
————

It's also clear that whether the cup counts as red or not is a function of the activity in which we are involved, which includes other folk. — Banno

So if I’m all by myself, I won’t count the cup as red? If I’m all by myself, the activity in which I am involved is all my own, so I can only count the cup as red if I think it does. As for the community, we all can count the cup as red iff each of us thinks it does.

But you’re probably coming at this from the fact that when you were a little tyke, you were told the cup was red, hence the “other folk”, and ever since, you’ve never had to think about the properties of that particular thing. Which is tantamount to saying…..you stopped thinking.

Somebody says to you, hand me the red cup……why did you NOT hand him the green one? If other folk are involved in the activity of what is the case, how do other folk get involved with that which is not the case? Can you imagine….all those folk saying, not that one, not that one, not…there ya go, that one. Shheeeesh, how would anyone have invented the Slinky, under those conditions?
————

…..it is a bit silly to berate logicians for not starting with experiences. — Banno

Agreed. Logicians shouldn’t start from experience, but from principles.

Ok, thanks. I’m good with Banno might have put on a green shirt this morning. I’m aware of the logical entailment that in some possible world he did, but my knowledge of either of those is exactly zero, so….

Best way to think of the process is that the facts in a possible world are stipulated. — Banno

”Banno might have put on the green shirt this morning" would be rendered as "In some possible world, Banno put on his green shirt this morning". — Banno

Why would we do that?
————-



Got it. Thanks.

Some of the stuff found in modal logic runs contrary to Kant, so will be anathema to Mww, — Banno

I don’t think what’s now called modal reasoning is all that contrary to Kant, but more a unnecessary extrapolation of it. Or, to be gentle about it, a modernization. Kantian speculative metaphysics, after all, employs the very same modalities, just without the fancy symbols, and at a MUCH more fundamental reasoning level.

↪Mww ...the property of being made from H₂O is true of water in every possible world, but is known a posteriori. — Banno

Known a posteriori in this world. Empirical knowledge obtained in a given world cannot translate to empirical knowledge in some possible world without contradicting the conditions for empirical knowledge. Ever been to a possible world, observed what is already cognized as water, analyzed it to find H2O in it, or not? Unless that happens, knowledge by experience is utterly irrelevant.

So it must be that is hardly an a posteriori necessity. Only if a myriad of presuppositions hold, the very epitome of contingent identity, would water on any possible world perfectly replicate water as it is known a posteriori on this one, the presuppositions we have logical….you know, one of those cursed a priori “scripts”…… but no empirical, justifications whatsoever, to hold.

So, yeah, true enough, water is made from H2O in any possible world, iff every single antecedent condition by which that criteria is met here, is met as well there. THAT……is what we have no warrant to authorize, insofar as the plethora of antecedent conditions makes explicit there are some of which we have no knowledge, which means we could never claim the criteria there is met because we don’t even know the totality of the criteria here. Therefore, a posteriori necessity is, while not absolutely false, is not necessarily true.

Philosophy was warned about this misuse of reason, but apparently, chose to disregard it.

An individual cannot exist in numerous possible worlds. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed. If he exists at all, in whichever of the possible worlds he exists in, that world must be necessary.

He shows that there are a posteriori necessities. — Banno

For instance? Quick and easy and to the point, please.

Naming and Necessity, by Kripke — frank

Oh. Language philosophy. Hard pass.

I speak, you listen. You speak, I listen. Figure out whatever differences there might be.

End language philosophy 101.

Read the essay. — frank

You’ve linked to trope theory and Cartesian theater. Which of these is the essay?

You still have properties. Judge yourself as you see fit. Those properties are just not essential. — Banno

Then I am left to judge myself by that which changes, which makes explicit I cannot know myself as a singular self, insofar as my self must change as do the properties of me. And insofar as it is always and only myself that judges, and that which judges, and that which is judged by, always changes, then it is impossible for there to be a singular identifiable self which is judging.

What a mess am I.

Your properties change, yet you remain Mww. (…) Individuals need not have an essence. — Banno

I am this, my properties change, therefore the this I remain is not my properties.
I am an individual, but I don’t need an essence.
I am not my properties, and my essence is not necessary.

Then I have absolutely nothing by which to judge myself, thus I cannot know anything about myself.

Yet, I do.

….(to) teach a girl that females are bad at math….. — frank

….is just to be a bad teacher.

You'll be a very different person in each of these cases, — frank

I’ve had a dozen occupations, both professional and incidental, yet I’m still just lil’ ol’ me.

Can the interest which makes one good at something, and conversely the lack of it that makes him not so good, be predicated on cultural or environmental influences?

….the unity of apperception in the mind is mysterious. — RussellA

Ain’t that the truth. Especially since mind is itself merely a conceptual placeholder for whatever’s going on upstairs. Gotta call it something, right? Calling it something isn’t enough, in that it still needs be explained what the hell it’s for, what it’s doing, and how do we know all that.

I prefer reason over mind, myself.
————

….each thought (…) is a distinct unified whole and as a unified whole is not only irreducible but has meaning. — RussellA

Agreed, but the ultra-moderns will insist each thought is reducible to its meaning, which is directly related to its communal, collective use. Without, of course, a strict methodology by which that actually happens.

Because they don’t like metaphysics, they kill it.

I'd call consciousness the act (activity) of having sensations, thoughts, and so on — Banno

Can’t be the act of; it is only that to which the unity of all our representations belong, such that it is then possible for them all to be my representations, which, in turn, makes explicit a singular self, which gives “I think”. Consciousness does not act; it is merely indicates a relative quality of being acted upon.

The activity of the having of sensations is a function of physiology, the exchange of the affect of the sensation to the representation of it, is intuition, the object of which is phenomenon.

The act of having thoughts is understanding, the representations of which are conceptions, the objects of which are judgements.

“…. this principle of the anticipation of perception must somewhat startle an inquirer whom initiation into transcendental philosophy has rendered cautious….”

I) works just fine:

“… But the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining à priori and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the highest in all human cognition.…”

All that presupposes “I think” has some irreducible meaning. Whether we actually do think or not, is irrelevant, insofar as the very seeming of it requires an account.

Ok, but I take exception to compound conceptions. I know what is meant by it, but I think it a misunderstanding. Some thing, with a set of properties in the form of conceptions subsumed under it, is still represented only by its own conception.

Yeah, well, you know: horse, water. Smart horse drinks, stubborn horse won’t unless it’s chilled Perrier.

Outstanding.

This doesnt mean that science isn’t extremely useful, just that truth as pragmatic usefulness is not about knowledge of the “true nature of things”, or even knowledge at all so much as practical ways of interacting with a world. — Joshs

To have a practical way of interacting with the world, I should think it might help to know something about it, which we trust science to provide.

As for the true nature of things….we have no warrant to make any such claims.

Yeah, even stating what a fiction might be, is fraught with ambiguity. I just figure a non-fiction is that for which denying the object of it hurts me, and this extreme sets the conditions for its lesser occasions. For that I need no intesubjective community. Still, our strict empirical proof may be a fiction, iff some other intelligence so informs of it. We can only work with what we got, so until then…..

I consider scientism as standing for the notion that science can answer for every conceivable thing asked of it, which is false, from the point of view that science can only answer for that which is asked of it empirically conceived. From that, it follows, first, that science may very well be the only true method for obtaining knowledge about the nature of things, and second, the nature of things is not the only knowledge possible for humans to obtain.

Philosophy in the form of speculative metaphysics is fiction, if by fiction is meant the impossibility of strict empirical proofs for its conditions.

“…. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account.…”
(CPR, A4/B8)

“Avoided” means not contradicted by experience, “sufficiently cautious” means logically justified, from which follows that speculative metaphysics, even when treated as a logically grounded science, as in pure mathematics, has no empirical proofs. And without strict empirical proofs, itself a euphemism for indubitable fact, it cannot be said such speculations are indeed the case, hence are fictions, albeit logically justified.

….measured value…. — Metaphysician Undercover

That there are things to be known, is given; how the things are to be known, is determined.

You wish.

I was after all only ever your fleeting sensation anyway. — Banno

“Banno” the singular linguistic object, was a sensation; the manifold of linguistic objects related to “Banno” the singular object, were sensations. One and all merely phenomenal representations, just as are comets and cats, one and all absolutely useless without a judgement or a series of judgements made on them, by the subject affected by those objects.

Nothing whatsoever related to “Banno” the subject from which the linguistic objects arise, was ever a sensation of mine, nor anyone else’s. “You” were never a sensation, hence to say “I was your sensation” is exactly the paralogism, the transcendental argument of your reason formed into a proclamation of your language, you profess to dislike.

There is no difference in kind or relation between thinking objects sensed as red possess redness, and thinking linguistic objects sensed as words possess I-ness. Or, simplified, red does not belong to objects just as “I” does not belong to sensation.

“…. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.…”

Here, lemme fix it for ya: my words were after all only ever your fleeting sensations.

Perfect. No need to thank me; I’m here to help.

Yep. But be careful; I hear Gene and the guys are particularly defensive regarding their brand.

you use "experience" in an unusual way — Metaphysician Undercover

Anachronistic might be the word you’re looking for. I get that a lot. I don’t mind.

What a incredibly foolish (…) way to do things, wouldn’t you say?
— Mww

I think that to deny the reality of deception is what is incredibly foolish. — Metaphysician Undercover

So here we are, two mutually indestructible foolish dialecticians. I don’t mind that either.

Occam’s Razor: the principle that says the fewer ways there are to make a mistake, the easier it is to correct it.

I’d accept that principle.

What makes that transcendental
— Mww

It's the name for arguments with that sort of logical structure... — Banno

That right there is a Gem if ever there was one. Like…what makes this a block of wood? Why, because it’s a block and it’s made of wood. DUH!!!

The “nothing but” merely indicates sensation is always related to objects in the world...
— Mww
Presumably except when they are dreams or hallucinations... — Banno

Opps. There’s an even worse Gem. Or would that be, a better Gem. My sentence has sensation as its subject, and the only possible way your sentence makes any sense at all, is if yours has objects as its subject. There’s a name for that, and it ain’t pretty.

Hell, now that I think about it….how can either a sensation or an object be a dream, re: “when they are dreams”? Sensation or object in a dream, dreams of sensations or objects, yeah, sure, but being a dream? Nahhhh, not so much.
————

You are not just sitting in your head with a bunch of Kant's a priori scripts, looking out at a world to which you have no direct access. — Banno

You had a lengthy discussion with a Kantian professor, and still think this has any legitimacy? If you really think we have no direct access to the world…try walking through a doorway without opening the door that blocks it. Artemis 1 is on its way back from the moon, in case you haven’t heard. Hope you don’t think I mean “moon in itself”. PleasepleasePLEASE don’t say that.
————

Euphemistic and metaphorical implications aside for the moment, as soon as you think it true you’re not just sitting in your head with a bunch of Kant’s a priori scripts, you’ve contradicted yourself, insofar there is at least that one Kantian a priori script in your head, immediately upon thinking a truth. And if it isn’t really that you’re thinking a truth, you shouldn’t have said it as if you were. And if you said it the way you did because there isn’t any other way to do what you meant to do…subsume a set of particular representations under a general….there’s another a priori “script”.

Can you say….flood gates?

Oh. Afterthought: don’t bring rope to a game of chains.

Transcendental arguments are those with roughly the following form: — Banno

As I mentioned, depends on one’s definition which depends on one’s doctrine in play. Mine in play doesn’t consider “attempts to get folks to agree”.

1) A is true
2) The only way in which A could be so is if B
3) Hence, B is so. — Banno

What makes that transcendental? What do you think transcendental means?
—————

The problem here is the truncated "nothing but" pretends that our sensations are prior to our "being in the world". It assumes the perspective of an homunculus. — Banno

Who’s the nutjob that came up with that? If our sensations are necessarily of that which is in the world, how is it possible our sensations can be prior to that which the sensation is of?

The “nothing but” merely indicates sensation is always related to objects in the world, insofar as there is nothing else to which a sensation could relate. The raisin d’etre for our sensory apparatus is to deliver sensations.

Homunculus: how to argue a conception by using it. (Sigh)
————

that "we call all these things red, therefore there is a thing, redness, that all these have in common" - another transcendental argument, for ↪Mww. — Banno

Footnote at B79 shows the attribution of red, among other examples, as a thing, to objects, is illusory.