OK. Thanks.

But I also want to say that recognizing yourself as part of the world is not such a bad thing to do. — Srap Tasmaner

Nope, not bad at all. Actually, conventionally necessary, but oddly enough, at the same time, philosophically impossible.

Humans. The only known species with the innate capacity to confuse itself.
—————

Is your son modeling, or merely characterizing? Even if he is representing both of you in a drawing, he himself is still outside the drawing itself, yet is undeniably the cause of it. But what is he really doing, if not objectively recreating a subjective appearance? Being young, his recreation may contain the extensive manifold of representations possible only with imagination, which could be false, but not the representations given from experiential maturity, which will be true.

I rather think a model, as such, should be a definitive representation of something, composed of a multiplicity of conceptions, as opposed to a mere caricature, which will always have the fewer. Helps alleviate the aforementioned confusion. A caricature is a model, but a model is not a caricature, kinda thing.

The self and its world as a unified modelling relation don't exist at some single scale. They exist - in modern humans - at levels that are meta- to each other. We can't make the questions of selfhood simpler than they in fact are. — apokrisis

Agreed. Metaphysical reductionism taken too far, is always illusory. Hence, psychology aside, the theoretical limits of speculative pure reason.
———-

Oh. Wait. I mis-read. You said a self and its world, modeling, where I took it as a self and the world, being modeled. With this new understanding, I disagree, insofar as the self and its world as a unified modeling relation does exist. Otherwise, what would suffice as causality for any model at all?

wouldn't that refute Kant's argument that we can imagine nothing in space — Amalac

It’s a fine line between your imagine nothing in space, and Kant’s “think space with no objects in it”. If it is true that to think space with nothing at all in it, is self-contradictory, it is safe to assume that is not what Kant meant by thinking space with no objects. One should then allow himself to understand, within the context of the section in which Kant’s statement is found, he meant that we must grant the necessity of space as an intuition even if there are no objects contained in it. This in contradistinction to the absolute impossibility of intuiting an object if it is not contained in a space.

Or did Russell misinterpret what Kant meant by “imagine”? — Amalac

It is reasonable to suppose Russell was familiar with Kant’s productive/reproductive double-sense of the faculty of imagination. I don’t see any need of this confusion, when self-contradiction serves to negate the notion of space completely empty of all objects.

In addition, regardless of imagination. there is also the question of whether Russell took space as a conception, which in itself doesn’t include objects** indicating that space could be conceived as completely empty, or, as an intuition, which only manifests because no object whatsoever can be a phenomenon for us without it, which indicates either space cannot be completely empty, or, we never intuit phenomena. The latter being utterly absurd serves to justify the former.
(**Nod to )

the impossibility of the model containing that which models
— Mww

Why is it impossible? — Srap Tasmaner

Model and modeler is a relation. If the model contains the modeler, the modeler becomes a part of the model rather than being in a relation to it. The categorical error of confusing quantity, the schema here being unity, for relation, the schema properly being causality. The modeler causes the model, therefore cannot be a quantity in it.

To model a real thing such as a world, is to intuit its constituency as phenomena. None of the constituency of my self, predicated as they are on purely speculative principles, can be intuited as phenomena, hence no model of the self is possible, at least by intuition alone. We are certainly entitled to think the logical necessity of a self, simply because without it exceptions to the principle of cause and effect are tacitly allowed, an abhorrent contradiction. But still, a logical necessity is not a model.

to model a "world" in which we are there as the "other" of the world
— apokrisis

Sorry, I can't resist: is this the transcendental unity of apperception?

(@Mww?) — Srap Tasmaner

A serious answer would be no..... — apokrisis

Agreed, because of this:

.....not if the unity is understood in terms of a synthetic bundle of experiences. — apokrisis

According to a certain speculative metaphysics, the unity of apperception is represented by “I think”, the “I” of which in turn, is the representation of the transcendental ego, which in its turn, is the representation for the conception of consciousness, which....(sigh)....in its turn, is the unity of all our representations under a single self. Or, which is pretty near the same thing, the synthetic bundle of all our experiences.

To model a world in which we are there as the other of the world, merely reconciles the impossibility of the model containing that which models.

He almost single-handedly launched us into the modern world. — Joshs

That’s pretty near the definitive characterization of a paradigm shift. Has anyone else done that? Even though Descartes shifted from an object only ontology to a mind/object duality, he maintained a theocratic ground for both. The times simply did not allow him to conceive the possibility of doing otherwise. Hence, a philosophical progression, but still not a complete paradigm shift.
————

Why would you expect to see paradigm shifts in the sciences on a regular basis but not in philosophy? — Joshs

Further paradigm shifts in philosophy certainly cannot be said to be impossible. Paradigm shifts in natural science, on the other hand, are a given. There haven’t been any paradigm shifts in epistemic philosophy since Kant for the simple reason he did something within which no one has yet been able to encompass a greater domain, in the same manner in which Einstein’s theories encompassed a greater domain than Newton’s.

I don’t expect another paradigm shift, given the current epistemological conditions, without some sort of theory which shows the human cognitive system is something other than primarily logical, which in turn answers the question.....what would the next paradigm shift look like.

Going to be mighty difficult to release a human from the necessity of his logical truths, wouldn’t you agree?
———-

Kant believed , along with his predecessors, that there was a world whose existence was independent of the subject (...) Nietzsche rejected the idea of a world independent of the subject’s valuations. Whether you agree with this or not, would you say this constitutes a new paradigm? — Joshs

No, because Nietzsche never promoted a self-consistent logical theory to support his assertions. Besides, rejecting an idea carries very little implication compared to proving the impossibility of knowledge.

These philosophers stand i. the same relation to Kant as Kant did to Descartes, Aquinas Aristotle and Plato. — Joshs

I shall take exception here. Each and every properly recognized philosopher before Kant, from British empiricists to continental rationalists, in addition to the ancients, reduced his epistemic philosophy to theocracy in one form or another. Kant never once mentions any deity in any form, as the irreducible ground of either empirical or a priori human knowledge. As such, Kant stands in relation to his predecessors as a complete and utter paradigm shift, as his successors did not stand to him. The very primitive tenets of the brand new self-determinant transcendental philosophy epitomizes the human cognitive system as a self-contained whole in and of itself.

In addition, this same transcendental philosophy doesn’t care about the ontology of things, but only concerns itself with a logical method by which it is possible for them....whatever they really are.....to be known as something to us, because of us.

Now, even granting that every recognized philosopher after Kant accepted this paradigm shift in general, didn’t prevent a few of them from attempting to expand on it, because there existed a feeling Kant didn’t complete some task or other with respect to it. Truth is, if Kant didn’t expand on a thing, it was because he didn’t think such expansion necessary, the theory being sufficient as he stated it. I mean....if you’re trying to show all grass, as such, is green, to talk about winter is superfluous.

Kant’s only speculative stumbling block gains some authority from advances in natural science, answerable by two separate and distinct rejoinders. One, he can’t be blamed for that which he had no reason to conceptualize, and two, he wasn’t concerned with future experiences of humans, be them as they may, but human experience in general, which is always predicated under the exact same conditions. In other words, it matters not what we know, but rather, how knowledge is possible to begin with.

Anyway.....two, or maybe a couple, thalers, for your consideration.

Sorry....don’t know the best way to respond to those questions.

Tthe extention of possible objects? — Nummereen

Yes. Possible for us. Has nothing to do with the possibility of objects in themselves.

Everything Kantian has to do with us, without exception.

do you buy lock stock and barrel Kant’s metaphysics of moral reasoning? — Joshs

Yep, absolutely. Not because I think he’s right, which can never be proved, but because his theories make sense to me. Hell, we could both be blowin’ smoke, but until something better comes along.....

Lock, stock and barrel because of its logical consistency, its being completely self-contained, and it is entirely possible. What more does one need, in a purely metaphysical dynamic?

Of course, there are those that will inform me something better has come along but I’m blinded to it because of my better than half century’s worth of entrenched cognitive prejudices. To which I say, well, sure, but that’s a judgement call, judgements being thoroughly covered in its own treatise by....you know who.

I have, nonetheless, maintained a familiarity with both his contemporaries and his successors. Just in case....

By empty space, Kant refers to only that space which would bound the extension of a possible object.

“....We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it....”

Regarding Russell, who correctly denies the possibility of imagining space with nothing in it, for to do so is to imagine the non-existence of that which contains the subject thinking space as empty of all things, a contradiction, Kant stipulates that by objects space is thought to be empty of, are those external to he who is thinking, from which is derived the principle that space is no more than the necessary condition by which objects relate to each other as such, or, relate to us as mere phenomena.

“...in order that certain sensations may relate to something without me (that is, to something which occupies a different part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as without, of, and near to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space must already exist as a foundation....”
————-

Kant's space is absolute, like Newton's, and not merely a system of relations.

Kant doesn’t call out space as absolute, and it certainly was nothing but a system of relations, but Russell invokes that representation, perhaps mistakenly, from this:

“....For, in the first place, we can only represent to ourselves one space, and, when we talk of divers spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same space. Moreover, these parts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space, as the component parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be cogitated only as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and multiplicity in it, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this or that space, depends solely upon limitations....”

In fact, in “The Metaphysical Principles in the Foundations of Natural Science”, Kant refutes Newton’s iteration of both absolute time and space, which ironically enough, predates Einstein by a century, and even though Einstein had precious little appreciation of Kant, at least in some respects.

Anyway....hope this helps.

I can say that we form better judgements about some action A the more experience we have, without making it a necessary condition that we have experience of doing action A. — Welkin Rogue

Right, and the only possible way to do that, is by means of pure practical reason. So, yes, I’m admittedly uncharitable, but only with respect to....

reason is not at the root of ethical wisdom. — Welkin Rogue

....which is the entire explanation for my participation herein. I may even be generally uncharitable towards your chosen representation of moral/ethical philosophy, but only because I disagree with its fundamental grounds, while not intentionally disrespecting either it or yourself.

Witt's (and Austin)'s method of examining our expressions (or examples of those--even made up ones) — Antony Nickles

What....method for me examining my own expressions, or methods for another to examine my expressions? If the former, such examination carries the implication of redundancy, in that I must have already at least somewhat examined my manifold of expressions in order to have picked one to express, and if the latter, such examination carries the implication of relevancy, in that it presupposes I care what some arbitrary external examination of my expression reveals, and I find myself right back on that proverbial, albeit figurative, couch, in effect, being reviewed by my peers.

not empirically, but to learn what the implications are of what we say — Antony Nickles

How can anything learned of a saying, with respect to its implications, be anything other than empirical knowledge? And given a plethora of possible implications of a saying, what exactly is the benefit of examining them? Can’t un-ring that bell, right?

As worthy a dialectician as you are, we have a history of opposing paradigmatic metaphysics. Which is fine, kinda cool, actually. I have answers for whatever you say, you reciprocate with equal vigor and justice. And the world is a better place.

"rationality [of ethics] lies in following the methods which lead (...) to a knowledge (...) of ourselves." — Welkin Rogue

reason is not at the root of ethical wisdom. — Welkin Rogue

Hmmmm...... Apparently, ethical wisdom begins with knowledge of ourselves, but the method for arriving at such knowledge is not derived from reason, insofar as....

You can't shortcut a deficit in experience with the sheer power of reason — Welkin Rogue

According to this....err, rationality, because I’ve never committed an abominable moral act, which is a particular deficit in experience, I lack wisdom with respect to what my judgement should be, given the occasion for the possible commission of such an act. But if I follow a perfectly rational method for obtaining sufficient knowledge of myself, what my act on the occasion of possibly committing an abomination, should already have been determined, which immediately presupposes reason is the root of ethical wisdom.

Without the sheer power of reason, how do I even know what an abominable moral act is? Do I have to commit one, hence gain wisdom from the experience of it? In other words, I must be immoral, in order to ascertain what the condition of my morality is? But that won’t help at all; if I lack moral wisdom I have no reason to judge my act as immoral in the first place, which then tells me absolutely nothing about my moral constitution.

The alternative can only be, I must be informed from external sources what an abominable moral act is. If such be the case, it cannot be said I’ve followed a method of rationality, which contradicts the methodological necessity of obtaining ethical wisdom, insofar as mere information about a thing is very far from the understanding of it.

This isn’t moral philosophy, it’s empirical anthropology. This isn’t where one employs pure practical reason, it’s where he pays $200 an hour to lay on a couch and lament his own unsatisfying subjective conditions.

Still, it seems to be the current state of intellectualism. As my ol’ buddies James and Lars say.....sad but true.

Anything that can be thought, can be described. Doesn’t mean the description is communicable, but that wasn’t the question.

Are our senses the only things that make the world real to us? — TiredThinker

The thread title question, “Is reality only as real as the details our senses give us?”, is having your cake, but the second question contained in the opening comment, is eating it too.

These are mutually exclusive, having two separate and distinctly opposing answers. Makes me wonder what it is you’re looking for.

Do you take this to mean that free will is required for all knowledge other than moral? — Hanover

By this I’m guessing you’re referring to:

Freedom of the will is a necessary precondition of some human understanding, but not any human understanding consistent with pure intuitions. — Mww

If so, then no, I take that to mean freedom of will is required for understandings other than empirical. Pure intuitions are the necessary prerequisites of knowledge a posteriori, or, experience. Moral understandings, with respect to Kantian moral philosophy at least, and deontology in general, are never derived from experience, but are given as a fundamental human condition, iff the transcendental conception of freedom is subjectively granted, not as the determinant of moral law, which arises from pure practical reason alone in the form of imperatives, but as merely sufficient logical causality for the possibility of such determinations.

where he specifically asserts that the "speculative cognition of freedom" is required for judgment or something along those lines? — Hanover

Actually, Kant says just the opposite, as quoted from Bxxix above, in that morality, the only proper employment of the will in the first place, does NOT require speculative cognition of freedom. This follows from the theoretical procedures incorporated in his epistemological and moral theses, insofar as judgements, which are merely procedural constituents, are far down the line from antecedent conditions from which they arise. It is then the case that freedom is not required for judgements, as such, at all, but only as an unconditioned causality for that which is to be judged. What is to be judged are our actions; our actions are judged as to their correspondence to our will; our will determines the actions autonomously; the will’s autonomy is given by the transcendental idea of freedom, insofar as the will is free to determine what the action ought to be, in order to sustain the moral constitution of the individual subject to whom the will belongs.

It’s like, say....necessity. We cannot cognize necessity, but only that which is necessary. Same for freedom, in that we cannot cognize freedom, but only that which is free.

There is, on the other hand, this, which says freedom is a necessary attribute, but not that it must be cognized as such:

“...Now I affirm that we must attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea. For in such a being we conceive a reason that is practical, that is, has causality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgements, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgement not to its own reason, but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles independent of foreign influences. Consequently, the will of a rational being must regard itself as free, that is to say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom....”
(Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Sec 3, Para. 4)

Lotsa weeds way down here in the swamp of proper philosophy. Most don’t like getting their feet that wet. Might ruin their post-modernist analytic Gucci’s, doncha know.

I see free will as a necessary precondition for any human understanding consistent with a Kantian pure intuition (...) which I'd be grateful if someone could confirm or deny. — Hanover

I shall deny, albeit second-handedly.

“....This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition..... (A20/B35)
“....it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensibility, or, pure intuitions, namely, space and time.... (A22/B36)
.....The sphere of phenomena is the only sphere of their validity, and if we venture out of this, no further use can be made of them....” (A39/B56)

Freedom of the will is a necessary precondition of some human understanding, but not any human understanding consistent with pure intuitions. That which takes the place of pure intuitions operating under speculative empirical conditions, are the so-called hypothetical or categorical imperatives, which legislate in the same manner but under practical moral conditions alone. The former has to do with what is, the latter with what ought to be.

“...Now morality does not require the speculative cognition** of freedom; it is enough that I can think it, that its conception involves no contradiction, that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But even this requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the twofold sense in which things may be taken; and it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits....” (Bxxix)
(** absolutely requiring the pure intuitions of space and time)

For whatever all that’s worth......

I'm not familiar with this distinction of four perspectives. Is it raised later in the CPR? — darthbarracuda

(Sigh) Ya know, I often frown upon subjectively, and sometimes chastise objectively, those who take some passage and reinvent it. So...here I am, unceremoniously busted for doing exactly that. From this little bit in the B introduction at xxviii.....

“.....For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity about it, that it can and should measure its own capacity according to the different ways for choosing the objects of its thinking, and also completely enumerate the manifold ways of putting problems before itself, so as to catalog the entire preliminary sketch of a whole system of metaphysics; because, regarding the first point, in a priori cognition nothing can be ascribed to the objectsd except what the thinking subject takes out of itself, and regarding the second, pure speculative reason is, in respect of principlese of cognition, a unity entirely separate and subsisting for itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake, and no principle can be taken with certainty in one relation unless it has at the same time been investigated in its thoroughgoing relation to the entire use of pure reason....”

.....I unceremoniously took it upon myself to substitute perspective for relation. But there’s enough support for the substitution, elsewhere and throughout the text, I think, to make it at least not inconsistent. Kant is notorious for saying stuff like, understanding views all its conceptions....., or, imagination reaches for its synthesis....., which just makes it seem like these faculties have a sort of capacity to reflect or look at their objects, which is, for all intents and purposes, a perspective these faculties possess, relative to the mode by which objects are presented to them.

So rather than a reification of abstract ideas on my part, which is usually considered an argumentative fallacy, I think the use of perspective as more along the lines of a rhetorical device, which is sort of allowed. Still, CPR can be successfully studied without the notion of perspectives. Whatever suits the student, right?
—————

Space is not an intuition.....
— Mww

Not sure if I agree with this exactly....(...)
......but a representation cannot be both a concept and an intuition for they have a different nature. — darthbarracuda

Point to you. I should have said, “space is not an empirical intuition”, insofar as all intuitions are of appearances and space does not appear in sensations. It is easy to see that space is necessary for the determinations of sensible objects, insofar as objects must be in space in order to be a perception for us. This from the metaphysical exposition of the conception of space. As such, we represent to ourselves a condition which pertains to all objects, as opposed to intuitions respecting the dissimilar matter of them. I suppose Kant means to say that whenever something is represented about an object, the representation of its space must have already been given, from which is deduced that space is then the form of sensibility, or, “....that which effects that the content of phenomena can be arranged under certain relations...”. All this means is, we cognize one end of this undetermined object as “tail” and the other end as “head”, with absolute certainty, because one is intuited as being in a different spatial relation from the other, and all that such that the conception of “dog” doesn't contradict itself. And while this seems like an awful lot of trouble to go through every time, the methodology of the system as a whole, just wouldn’t work without doing exactly that.

On the other hand, from the transcendental exposition of the same conception...Kantian dualism once more....in the case of synthetic a priori cognitions in which there are determinations on objects that are not of sensibility, re: geometric figures, which give to us a representation of the determinable space these figures enclose, it is found that this space is necessarily intuited as well, but not under empirical conditions. Kant says of this, “....What, then, must be our representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be possible? It must be originally intuition...” (added in B41, omitted in A).

Apparently, a representation can be both an intuition and a conception, albeit from different perspectives. Space is represented here as an intuition, there as a conception, but always a priori.

There’s a very good examination of the background history of Kantian critical philosophy in the introduction by Guyer/Wood, found here: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf . Damn thing is 80 pages long, just as a measly intro, but there’s a lot of interesting commentary in it. You might find it useful.

0. There really isn’t a definition qua certain criterion, for cognition as such. There are fly-by’s, like, “thought is cognition by means of conceptions”, or, “(truth is) the accordance of a cognition with its object”. Cognition, in and of itself, is hidden in this passage: “...the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations under one common representation....” (A68/B93), in which it may be surmised cognition is the culmination (the unity) of the act (the logical “function”) of the understanding in synthesizing a series of conceptions under a general representation.

1. Spontaneity. Which makes more sense....that there exists in some faculty of the human mind a repository of all possible conceptions, even for that of which there is as yet no thought, or, a certain faculty of human reason brings up new conceptions pursuant to a circumstance in which no extant conception is sufficient? If the former, there would be no need to conceive anything at all, for the conception of it, no matter what it is, is already present in the mind. But then we would need a mechanism by which the mind, which is itself not part of the cognitive system, picks and chooses the proper conception out of every possible standing iteration resident in the repository, and then gives the conception to understanding, which most certainly is part of the cognitive system. Now, such could be the case, but parsimony suggests the simplicity of just letting understanding be that faculty by which conceptions arise, and that only and always in conjunction with something else already given by the system, re: phenomenon, because in that way, the system remains a unified procedure, operating by and within itself, without the influence of that which is not contained in it.

Again....transcendental philosophy. We aren’t talking about what we know. We talking about how it is possible to know, which presupposes not knowing. It follows that T.P. concerns itself with that instance between the absence of and the acquisition of, knowledge. In other words, the first ever instance of it. People are fond of missing the implication, instead complicating it by insinuating the effect of extant knowledge, when the cognitive system is most effective in, and absolutely necessary for, the absence of it. From the conception of “wheel” to the conceptions of “quark”, it’s all done the same way, the only difference being the time of it.

3. “Our nature is such that intuitions are never not sensuous; they must always appertain to the way in which objects affect us”

How can Kant claim to know this, — darthbarracuda

He doesn’t claim to know it; he claims that according to transcendental philosophy, such is a necessary hypothesis such that the philosophy is internally consistent and logically coherent. There is never an empirical proof for speculative metaphysics. What may be said that he does know, is that if intuitions are in some case not of sensuous origin, the entire treatise is worthless.

4. “Pure general logic contains only a priori principles which can be applied to either empirical or transcendental content.”

By transcendental content, I take Kant to mean space and time? — darthbarracuda

No. Logic has to do with understanding, as phenomena has to do with sensibility. Kantian dualism. The transcendental content of the logic of understanding, are the categories, which provide “.....unity to the different representation in a judgement...”. Space and time, as pure intuitions, are that which makes representations of objects possible, but has nothing to do with either the empirical content of phenomena, nor with judgements respecting the unity of those representations. Space and time, on the other hand, as conceptions, are deduced transcendentally, which merely indicates their objective reality and logical validity are thought absent any empirical influence in the formulation of their respective representations, and, their employment is completely a priori. This does not, however, make them transcendental conceptions, but only indicates the manner of their production.

An a priori principle takes the form of conceptions such as “cause”. While we have no logical need of cognizing a cause for the possibility of objects of sense, we certainly must append the conception of space to them necessarily, as a pure a priori intuition, as a means to justify the invocation of the system in the first place. “....for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought...” (A91/B123)

6. The answer to that is in the notes.

I don't understand what you mean by systemic successions, could you clarify this? — darthbarracuda

Systemic successions is just me, keeping the theoretically mandated order of the particular influences of the particular elements involved, between the perception of an object and the experience of it.
————-

"Give to ourselves" - I take this to not mean things like memory or imagination (which we present to ourselves without an external stimuli), but rather that which does not have its original origin in us? — darthbarracuda

Backwards. Given to us means has its origin external to us; given to ourselves means has its origin internally within us. Thus, “give to ourselves” does mean things like memory, imagination. Technically, every facet of the representational cognitive system we give to ourselves. The world only gives to us the things on which the system is used.
—————

the intuition of space is not identical to the conception of space. — darthbarracuda

Space is not an intuition, because all intuitions have sensuous origins, and we never sense space. Space for us is never a phenomenon. Space is called a pure intuition just to provide a condition under which objects of perception can be said to be located relative to us or to each other. As a conception, it allows the concept of motion to have meaning. Just as time as a concept allows change to have meaning.
————-

How do I imagine space without something in it? — darthbarracuda

By imagining where some object would have to be, if there was one. Don’t forget, in Kantian-ese, you’re imagining a transcendental ideal, not a thing. Just hold out your hand, palm up, and imagine a Mars bar sitting there. Now think away the Mars bar, and imagine the space it was in, which you should be able to do. Now....just for fun....try thinking away the space the bar was in. You can’t, because there wasn’t, and never could be, anything relative to that empty space. There no such thing as an empty thought, you cannot think of that which may take the place of the space you thought away, therefore it is impossible to think it away in the first place. That’s why, along with time, Kant calls them ideals, because they are not themselves conditioned by anything. Instead, they are the conditions. Speculative epistemological metaphysics.

Besides, I don’t see a problem with imagining the empty space between two objects a foot apart. Elementary particle physics aside, of course, which we don’t care about anyway, but people like to try proving Kant wrong by bringing up such nonsense.
————

The book is a critique of reason. Reason is what the show is all about. Transcendental is a perspective, one of four, that reason takes with respect to what it is doing at any given time, the others being empirical, rational and judicial, or, moral. Reason examines....we can examine using reason in these various perspectives....everything from one or more of those perspectives, and some require all of them, re: freedom of the will. The most noteworthy being, of course, the so-called Copernican Revolution....something Kant never said by the way....in which reason is said to look at things from a different point of view. The ultimate transcendental perspective.

Amazing, isn’t it, how human intellect can’t get out of its own way?

How would it even be possible to discern, with apodeictic certainty, whether there are intrinsic patterns in Nature, or, there are occurrences in Nature that appear as intrinsically orderly to an intelligent observer?

Given that order is a relation between two things, what sense does it make to say order is intrinsic to two things, one of which is not an observer sufficiently intelligent enough to estimate it? It follows that it makes no difference whatsoever, and is therefore utterly meaningless, for there to be patterns as an intrinsic condition of the empirical domain, if there is no intelligence to which the pattern is comprehensible.

Ironic, though, that it takes an intelligence to determine that which constitutes a pattern, or an orderly occurrence of some kind, then declare there is no such thing as a pattern or orderly occurrence without him as a witness to it. In effect, he is both the author and the arbiter, over that of which he has absolutely no control.

(Sigh)

0. The whole is not the same as its parts.
1. Immediate merely indicates systemic successions. Everything starts somewhere.
2. Because object herein relates to intuition, they are real, physical existences with the capacity to affect the senses. They are distinguished thereby, from objects of reason, objects of experience, ideas, notions, transcendental objects in general which do not affect the senses.
3. It is enough to say the time of the affect on the senses by objects, is sufficient for how intuitions happen. Intuitions do happen in time, but that doesn’t say how they happen. For that, we really don’t have an explanation, nor do we need one.
4. Intrinsic Kantian dualism. Given to us here means that which we do not give to ourselves. That which is a perception vs that which is merely thought.
5. Keep in mind the perspective. This has all to do with the empirical side of reason, thus objects here are the real physical things in the world. Signs are the matter of objects in accordance with the mode of their affect. One kind of sign of an object is its odor, another sign is its shape.....and so on. Like any sign, it is a preliminary indication of that which is to understood by means of it, but in this case, a preliminary indication of the phenomenon it should become. Thought must relate just says the conceptions synthesized to intuitions must be imagined as necessarily belonging together. In other words, it is inconsistent to synthesize a conception belonging to smell, to a sign given from the sense of sight.
6. Representations are not all present to awareness, but that which is present to awareness, is a representation. Intuition and conceptions are representations, as are ideas, sensations, even perceptions themselves. As unsatisfying as it may be, representations are the means by which reason explains itself.
7. In this system, an object of intuition just indicates any object of perception in general, that is as yet merely an appearance. An undetermined object of intuition, per se is that which follows from the operation of that faculty, which is therefore a phenomenon, a particular determinable representation. Intuition can be said, if anything, to contain the forms of objects, insofar as such forms reside a priori in this faculty. The CofJ gives a more inclusive exposition of this part of the system....changes in subjective conditions, and all that. Aesthetic vs empirical judgements. Productive vs reproduction imagination. Seriously complex methodology, needless to say.
8. It is safe to say manifold content is the matter of the object, because all sensation is with respect to it. Technically, that which in phenomena is arranged according to forms, is the manifold content of them, and they correspond to the sensation from which they are given. The inference being, if the matter of objects were that which is arranged, they would be determined by that arrangement. It follows that if object were to be determined merely from the arrangement of its matter, there would be no need of any synthesis with conceptions in order to experience an object as a certain thing, and the entire transcendental system immediately becomes untenable.
9. Space is an intuition....a pure intuition only....because it is considered to be the necessary condition for the experience of objects. Space is a conception insofar as it must first be thought as both justified for, and logically consistent with, the role it plays in a theoretical system. If space could not be thought, it could never be a conception. If never a conception, never a possibility. If never a possibility, never a necessity. If never a necessity, never a necessary condition. If never a necessary condition, never a logically justified domain in which objects are to be found, because we already know with absolute certainty where they are not. If no logically justified domain in which they are to be found, no logically justified possibility of being known. A contradiction.
10. That space is necessary for objects, and objects are necessary for color, it follows that empty space will be absent any color, which is merely our conception of black, which is contingent on objects in space, not the space they are in. Extension is shape, neither extension nor shape is a property of black. Space doesn’t have shape, insofar as all parts of space are each themselves just space, and the shape of objects is merely the limits of the space it is in. To imply space as black or that black is extended, are a transcendental illusions of mischaracterized reason.

Enough.

Damn!! No wonder you been absent so long.

Beautiful sentiments from the light.

And essentially ignored, in favor of puerile egos represented by the Mutual Admiration Society cheerleader section. The loudest voices with nothing worth saying.

You're a drink of water in the desert, you know. — Wayfarer

Yeah, well, you know how it goes. In keeping with the complementary nature of human reason, I’m as likely to be found just as full of centuries-old cow patties as are you.

the human conscious system, the primary determinant for understanding, does not operate in the same terms as cognitive neural biology measures.
— Mww

But physicalism, by definition, believes that everything in the Universe is resolvable to physical laws. — Wayfarer

To which I say.....big fat whoop!! To be human is to be a two-aspect biological entity, so even if physicalism proves we don’t really think, that brain mechanics is entirely determinable by natural law, it will still seem to us that we think. Any empirical science that denies that, is just stupid. I mean, c’mon, man. Has any experiment been done that wasn’t first thought? That wasn’t predicated on a necessarily antecedent judgement?

I have a long-standing interest in idealist and other non-materialist forms of philosophy — Wayfarer

As do I, for the excruciatingly simple reason that the rational workings between the ears is never susceptible to its own contradiction, which, of course, physicalism attempts to prove.

“....Let us once again assail your ears, That are so fortified against our story...”
(“Hamlet”, 1.1)

“....The true nature of things is evident only at the bottom, that is, on the molecular level, and so life can only be understood in those terms, that is, from the bottom up....”

And yet.....for those thinking, e.g., the moon landing a hoax, not one of them ever substituted the variables in the Hodgkin/Huxley equations, when explaining why he thought so, given his understanding of that which he considers as pertinent evidence.

So, no, not even close; the human conscious system, the primary determinant for understanding, does not operate in the same terms as cognitive neural biology measures.

Doesn’t matter how the brain works, when the ways and means for the transition from the given physical law governing matter, to the abstract logical law governing rational agency, is what we actually want to know.

vague and elastic nature of the concept. — Jack Cummins

That’s certainly half of it, and true enough in itself.

But the concept of mind can be unambiguous if the theory of which it is a constituent is logically consistent and internally complete. Then, of course, with respect to the other half, we have a plethora of theories, so we don’t gain much from a rational perspective, and gain not a damn thing from an empirical perspective.

Same as it ever was......

So, my own framing of the mind and body problem is in to put it back to the area of metaphysics. — Jack Cummins

Right where it belongs.

Whether or not there is an actual problem, the concept of mind, taken in its irreducible sense, is at least part of the question. That alone is sufficient to justify the claim the extent of the mind/body problem is entirely metaphysical.

For the time being.

There are numbers in Nature in the form of recursions — Fine Doubter

Hmmm. How does infinite reflections in paired mirrors prove numbers are contained in Nature?

If counting is a recursive procedure, the procedure itself cannot show numbers are already contained in Nature, for numbers must be presupposed in order for the procedure to even occur.

But....maybe neither of those are what you meant by recursive. In which case, I don’t understand what you do mean.

surely it was always obvious that maths is an ideal / a fiction / an approximation? — Fine Doubter

Yeah....a take-off on the old “is math invented or discovered” dichotomy. There are those that say math is ideal because there are no numbers in Nature, that math is a fiction because there are no mathematical laws in Nature, and that math is an approximation because the possibility exists that other rational agencies have different maths. Not to mention, any mathematical formulation predicated on pi must necessarily be an approximation.

What is sets of sets of sets?

What supports Kant against his usual opponents? Max Black’s comments? Is it Black that says what you wrote...

Some simple ones are 100 or 99 per cent synthetic and the more complex they get the greater the analytical proportion of it. — Fine Doubter

If so, that opposes Kant rather than supports him, insofar as Kant makes no mention of the varying degrees of analytic/synthetic with respect to mathematical judgements. Maybe nowadays, folks have added their own interpretations to Kantian metaphysics, but that shouldn’t detract from what the man himself says.

And Kant was brief about the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, because all he was trying to prove was the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions. In order to do that, he first had to distinguish the conditions synthetic cognitions must have, from the other kinds of cognitions there are, then determine whether such cognitions were indeed possible a priori.

It turns out he was so brief, because it was so simple and easy to prove. In fact, he chastised Hume....gently of course..... for not having thought of it already.

Anyway.....drop in when you feel like it, bearing in mind there are no proper Kantian scholars here. Or, if there are, they’re being awful damn quiet.

Ok. Good to know.

“....Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed, really analytical, and depend on the principle of contradiction.....

Yet, the analytic is conditioned by the....

“....Analytical judgements are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity....

Hard to reconcile this apparent mischaracterization. But assuming Kan knew what he wanted to say, the reconciliation must be possible. If that weren’t tough enough.....

“....Mathematical judgements are always synthetical.....

Given that geometricians are mathematicians, and all mathematical propositions are synthetic judgements, the “preposited” principles by geometricians must not be mathematical propositions covered by synthetical judgements. That being the case is supported by....

“....and depend on the principle of contradiction. They serve, however, like identical propositions, as links in the chain of method, not as principles—for example, a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or (a+b) —> a.....

Why not change a little teeny-weeny thing, and call it identity propositions? So if the “preposited” principles of geometricians that depend on the principle of contradiction, are really just the first links in a chain of a method, and if that method Is just formal logic, not mathematics, then it follows that it is only logical that the geometrician work with one figure in order to gain something from it, and he would not work with any other kind of figure, for working with trapezoids would necessarily contradict what he wanted to discover about a triangle. Hence, the preposited principle of contradiction relates to what figure he works on, but the real mathematical propositions remain synthetical, which relates to how he works with the figure.

Formal logic consists in conceptions by their similar identities, Kantian analytics consists in conceptions by their similar relations, within a given proposition. If conceptions can be conceived as relating without any additional conceptions supplementing that which is given in the proposition, or, which is the same thing, no additional conceptions are necessary to derive a truth from that proposition, it is analytical. This is a two-aspect system, the conceptions avail themselves to mere analysis for their similarity.

If the conceptions in a proposition cannot be related to each other without the addition of another conception, it is synthetical, and is a three-aspect system. The conceptions in this system avail themselves, not to analysis, but to synthesis, by means of which the additional conceptions are derived.

“....merely the equivocal nature of the expression.”

.....the expression being any considered analytical judgement, and the equivocation residing in the dual nature of, on the one hand, identity, and on the other, contradiction. Therefore, even geometrician’s judgements with respect to their profession alone, is nonetheless synthetic. And “...mathematical judgements are always synthetical...”, survives unscathed.

Dunno if that helps or not......

propose the concept of the 'thing outside of itself'; as an extension to the thing in itself. — Cheshire

implying an error probably exist in the original notion of the thing in itself. — Cheshire

....an extension of a probable error, which would necessarily implicate itself as a probable error.

1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 is the error compounded, iff 1 + 1 = 3 is the error.

Seconded. And agreed.

Does Kant define what is transcendental metaphysics in the CPR? — Corvus

Not that I know of. Defines metaphysics as such, defines transcendental this or that pursuant to context, but doesn’t explicitly combine them. But he does so combine transcendental and philosophy, so one could make the leap if he wanted to badly enough.

And how would he answer? — tim wood

“....I confine myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure thought; and I do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind....”

“...the mere natural disposition of the human mind to metaphysics...”

“...For we have not here to do with the nature of outward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its cognition a priori....”

“....the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind....”

As unsatisfactory as that may be, that the mind is the catch-all for that which can’t be explained....but there it is. Besides, if Nature teaches, why would the notion of Copernicus’ transitional thesis even be mentioned as a preliminary inspiration for the entire transcendental philosophy? I submit that we teach ourselves, Nature being nothing but the availability of occasions.

“....Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building. It is the system of all the principles of pure reason. If this Critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental philosophy, it is only because, to be a complete system, it ought to contain a full analysis of all human knowledge a priori. Our critique must, indeed, lay before us a complete enumeration of all the radical conceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But from the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as also from a complete investigation of those derived from them, it abstains, partly because it would be deviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this analysis, since this process is not attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the synthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this essay with the vindication of the completeness of such an analysis and deduction, with which, after all, we have at present nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions a priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis, and that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting....”

Cop-out? Or maybe merely the lazy way of saying....hell, damned if I know where these come from, but trust me, my system needs them so they must be there? Kantian metaphysics suffers these explanatory-gap slings and arrows yet, perhaps even for good reasons.

But still, “all the parts that enter into the building” seems to say the mind isn’t part of the building, but is just where, or is merely a euphemism for where, the building happens to be done.
————

I'm compelled to believe that the challenge for education is to figure out how to make the most esoteric and difficult of scientific pursuits that which children can address. — tim wood

“We don’t need no education.
We don’t need no thought control.
No dark sarcasms in the classroom.
Teacher!! Leave us kids alone!!”

“....it would be more consistent to favour a criticism of this kind, by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel....”

All that to say this: you know of Ron White, right? Guy that made “you can’t fix stupid” into a whole Las Vegas comedy show. Tours, HBO special, an album, the whole shootin’ match. Anyway....the public being those under the influence of the schools, and the schools being that which is challenged in a particular domain, Kant metaphorically says, “you can’t teach critical thinking”, for thinking of the pure a priori kind, that “...which rises to the level of speculation...”, is a fundamental human attribute, and one must teach himself to do it properly, with the least error.

It seems to me......