At the further extremes, even apart from considerations of pleasure, stand the bad man (kakos) and the man of practical wisdom (phronimos). — Leontiskos

Why do you call phronesis an extreme?

I think a wise person will seek wisdom. They will strive to know wisdom and to learn it. — NotAristotle

The way this is stated it seems as though wisdom is something like an object to be found.

That does not count against the point, so far as I see. — Banno

You quote PI 424, but that is not about a theory of pictures. Making mental pictures is something we do.

Here he is taking on a representational theory of meaning - the picture theory. — Banno

Right, as I said:

What the later Wittgenstein rejects is the logical connection between the picture and reality, not that we form pictures of how things are. — Fooloso4

The Indian mathematician shows that a picture can be seen - used - in different ways. — Banno

It is not that the picture can be seen in different ways, but that what is pictured can be seen in different ways. That is, we can form different pictures, and thus see something in different ways. Looking at the theorem in this way, the proof becomes evident. That is, it can be seen that the theorem is true.

But perhaps saying the picture theory is being rejected is too strong. He is still making use of pictures, and it seems to me that hereabouts he is attempting to see how his previous representational approach fits in with meaning as use. — Banno

This is far too narrow a picture. There is in the PI a greater focus on ways of seeing - seeing aspects, seeing as. And this leads to what Wittgenstein says about the imagination:

254. The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination. In other words, the concept ‘Now I see it as . . .’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’.

The imagination is not to be taken as an excursion away from reality, but the way in which we begin to see things in new ways.

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a new true theory but a fertile point of view.

(CV 18)

Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any other soil.

(CV42)

126. The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

There is a connection here with 90:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

The point of the shutdown is, as usual, to create as much chaos as possible so that they can blame the democrats for being so dysfunctional. It’s worked before — but I’m not sure if it’ll work this time. — Mikie

I think it goes much deeper, to the heart of Republican distrust of government and democracy, and the task of dismantling government agencies.

In the Tractatus, the picture stood between the state of affairs and the proposition. — Banno

In the Tractatus the proposition is a picture of a state of affairs, not something between a state of affairs and the proposition.

What the later Wittgenstein rejects is the logical connection between the picture and reality, not that we form pictures of how things are:

115. A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably.

Here he is not rejecting pictures but this picture.

Pictures continue to have an important place in the later Wittgenstein, in both a positive and negative way.

424. The picture is there; and I do not dispute its correctness. But what is its application? Think of the picture of blindness as a darkness in the mind or in the head of a blind person.

What is at issue here is not the picture but the application:

423. Certainly all these things happen in you. - And now just let me understand the expression we use. - The picture is there. And I am not disputing its validity in particular cases. - Only let me now understand its application.

Consider the following:

143 ... I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this sequence of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things. (Indian mathematicians: “Look at this!”)

In Zettel Wittgenstein we find the following:

461. ... (I once read somewhere that a geometrical figure, with the words "Look at this", serves as a proof for certain Indian mathematicians. This looking too effects an alteration in one's way of seeing.)

Despite significant changes the Tractarian theme of seeing and saying are still at work. It is sometimes the case that a proposition stands in the way of seeing things.

PI 66 To repeat: don’t think, but look!

Someone else’s beetle may think they understand what I’m doing, find it “normal” or not, but it’s just their beetle reacting to something. — schopenhauer1

It has nothing to do with beetles. As long as you insist of inserting this analogy where it does not belong you will continue to be confused.

(201) For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the
rule” and “going against it”.

We follow the rules of arithmetic when our calculations yield the correct answer. We follow the rules of chess when we do not make illegal moves. Whatever might be going on in one's mind makes no difference as long as one does not go against the rules.

There is no uncertainty here. If you add 1+1 and get 7 you went against the rules. If you make a prohibited move in chess, we don't check to see if there is a beetle in the box, we consult the rule book. There is a reason why disputes do not arise as to whether a bishop moves diagonally.

That doesn’t confer anything outside of solipsism. — schopenhauer1

You can play solitaire but the game has rules that are not solipsistic. You can make up your own rules but then you are playing a different game. If only you know the rules of the game then how can you be sure you are following them?

How is there a public to Witt if there’s no certainty to ontology? — schopenhauer1

There is no certainty to ontology and it is not done according to rules.

Unless his ever increasing rotating army of lawyers are able to exploit loopholes he is going to find that this defense will be worthless.

Overvalues his properties when seeking loans and undervalues the same properties when he is seeking to defraud the IRS.

My point is exactly the same as how Wittgenstein uses it in OC 94. The inherited background is the world we find ourselves in, i.e., a world of mountains, trees, hands, etc. All of us inherit this background in virtue of the fact that we live in the same reality. — Sam26

Once again:

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

The inherited background is not the world but a picture of the world. Consider the "Mountains and Waters Sutra" of Zen Master Dogen:

The green mountains are always walking ...

(3)

This is the inherited background picture he has inherited and gives to his disciples. To state the obvious, it is not our background picture.

... the inherited background is how we get our picture of the world. — Sam26

This is not what Wittgenstein says. "it", what is inherited, refers to the picture not the things pictured.

What I'm saying is that our inherited background (that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, clouds, hands, feet, etc), which is not a system of beliefs, but informs what we believe, both linguistically and non-linguistically. — Sam26

This is an odd and questionable use of the term 'inherit'. While it is true that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, and clouds, they are not ours to be transferred from person to person.

The inherited background is a picture of the world:

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

I'm not saying that the inherited background is a system of beliefs ... — Sam26

But, if I understand him, Wittgenstein is:

298. 'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. — Fooloso4

the foundation of epistemology. — Sam26

I argued above that:

The idea of hinges replace the ideas of foundationalism. — Fooloso4

298. 'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

It is the movement of the work of the community bound together by science and education by which our propositions, beliefs, and knowledge are held fast. The axis is not timeless or immutable, but change is not piecemeal. — Fooloso4

And, as I pointed out earlier in this thread, (repeating 94 cited above):

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

Even the builder has different language games. — RussellA

No. The builder has one language game. The one described by Wittgenstein. It is, as he said, a complete primitive language. (2)

What happened to the baseball team analogies? — NOS4A2

Here you go:

Team A plays baseball. A discussion arises when team A scores a home run. NOS, that tireless defender of all things Trump, joins in and says that the players, who he calls "prosecutors", refuse to score a basket. When it is pointed out that the rules of baseball do not include scoring baskets, NOS then says that he is not talking about these players/prosecutors
but some as yet unidentified players/prosecutors who, when their identity is disclosed, it turns out play a different game by different rules.

Perhaps he is confused because both teams play in New York. Or perhaps in his attempt to make a molehill out of a mountain, he intentionally conflates these different games.

The current district attorney, Alvin L. Bragg, declined to pursue that case, but later indicted the former president in connection with a hush money payment to a porn star.

More obfuscation. You said:

Fraud is a crime but prosecutors refused to pursue the case. I wonder why? “Liable” is becoming the common theme because guilt escapes you. New York is a banana republic. See what SCOTUS says. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ — NOS4A2

There is a difference between not pursuing one case and refusing to prosecute Trump for fraud. Bragg is prosecuting him for fraud. [added: in a criminal trial to establish guilt]

You struck out!

He said the box can be empty no? — schopenhauer1

You are making much more of this analogy then is warranted.

43. For a large class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” - though not for all - this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

The use of a word is not something in a box. Meaning is use is public not private.

I was quoting one of Ankush Khardori's sources from his article in New York Magazine. — NOS4A2

This seems to be another article you did not read. Pomerantz was a prosecutor, he thought he had a strong case against Trump and wanted to bring criminal charges against him. He was a prosecutor and did not refuse to bring charges. Quite the opposite. This is why he resigned.

The author of the article makes it clear that there was still more work to do. This does not mean the district attorney's office refused to bring criminal charges. Again, quite the opposite. Bragg did not think the case was ready at that point. Subsequently, based on the further work that was done he conclude that their case against Trump was now strong enough and he brought criminal charges against him.

my point, or RussellA rather, is that Witts premise about “use” cannot be solely what picks out meaning. — schopenhauer1

That is Wittgenstein's position! It has been quoted several times including by those who argue as if they disagree with him on this.

This was because, to their chagrin, "There was nothing to indict" — NOS4A2

Who are you quoting?

What evidence do you have that the district attorney's office is no longer pursuing criminal charges? The so called "Hush Money" case is ongoing and includes criminal charges. Or do you have reliable evidence to the contrary?

When dealing with Fooloso be prepared nonsensical analogies and other sophistries. — NOS4A2

Let me try to explain this to you. Just as there are things that a baseball team can and cannot do, there are things the NY Attorney General can and cannot do. Just as the claim that a baseball team refuses to play basketball demonstrates ignorance of the game of baseball, claiming that the NY Attorney General refused to bring criminal charges demonstrates ignorance of the office.

Now, when called out, you attempt to hide behind the vagueness of your claims. Despite the fact that it is this case that is in the news, and despite the fact that it was in this case that it was found that he committed fraud, you say you were not referring to the prosecutor in this case, but to some unidentified other prosecutors. So who are these other prosecutors who refused to pursue the case?

... which I never read in any case. — NOS4A2

When dealing with NOS this should be kept in mind! He has no interest facts or in discussing issues. He is a shill for Trump.

He claims to know the difference a civil and criminal case but also claims that:

... prosecutors refused to pursue the case. — NOS4A2

This is like saying a baseball team refuses to play basketball.

You haven't been on some the the building sites that I have been on, where a slab of cake has been the highlight of the day. — RussellA

Neither of us have been on the building site where the builder's language occurs, but Wittgenstein gives us enough information to know what the word slab means as it is used there. You keep conflating the builder's language with other language games.

Yes, but we must understand what the slab is before knowing how best to use it. — RussellA

All the assistant needs to know is to bring a slab when the builder calls "Slab!". The builder needs to know how to build with slabs, but there are no words for instructing the builder. His knowledge is not based on a language that consists only of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”.

Unless the assistant is a foreign worker who doesn't know the language yet. — RussellA

He will not be an assistant unless or until he learns the language. He will not learn it by pointing to "blocks" and "slabs". He can only learn it by learning how those words are used.

One can point not only to objects such as slabs, mountains, trees but also to actions such as running, walking, wincing. — RussellA

You are agreeing with Wittgenstein that there are different kinds of words, that not all words are the names of objects.

How do I know that you are pointing to running rather than the runner?

It is still the case that a language is not a collection of names, even if those names name activities.

A "slab" can refer to a slab of concrete used in a builder's yard or a slab of cake used in a cake shop. — RussellA

It can but neither of these is what slab means in the builder's language.

it may be described as ... — RussellA

In the builder's language it cannot be described at all, but what it means can be shown by bringing the builder a slab when he says slab.

But such as slab can have many uses ... — RussellA

All of its uses are uses within the activity of building.

But we know the meaning of "slab" even before we have decided what we want to use it for. — RussellA

In the builder's language it means one thing - bring me a slab. Pointing to a slab does not explain the meaning of "slab".

Therefore, it is not the case that we have to use something in order to discover what its name is. — RussellA

As Wittgenstein says:

And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

(PI 43)

In the larger context of our language, pointing to a slab may explain the meaning of the name, the bearer of the name, the thing we are referring to when we say slab, but, as the builder's language shows, a language is not a collection of names.

Pointing to a cog does not explain what a cog is. If you find a cog and ask me what it is, my pointing to it and saying "this is what it is" or "it is a cog" is not an adequate explanation. An adequate explanation must include what it is used for.

You might decide to use it for a paperweight or door stop, but that does not mean that a cog is a paperweight or door stop. In this case, the meaning of cog is not determined by your use but by its use as a functional part of a machine.

If the assistant had no intrinsic theory in their mind as to the meaning of words, they would be bringing onions as often as they brought slabs. — RussellA

If the assistant brought onions he would either be out of a job or undergo further training. Having an intrinsic theory of slabs cannot determine whether that theory matches what it is supposed to be a theory of.

Does my dog have an intrinsic theory in her mind when she brings the ball when I say "ball". Does it even matter, as long as she brings the ball? If she had such a theory it is the ball which determines whether it is the right theory.

This is circular. If "slab" gets its meaning from use, then how do you know how to use it before knowing what it means. — RussellA

Use refers to the activity of building. The meaning is determined by the role of "slab" in this activity. He has been trained to bring a slab when the builder says "slab". If he brings an onion he will have to undergo further training or be out of a job.

I have worked with Bedouin nomads, and we were using the word slab all the time. — RussellA

What does it mean when they use the word slab?

When the builder calls "slab" the assistant does not bring a mackerel or an onion. Whatever theory you have about what you think must be going on in his mind, the fact is, he brings a slab.

What you ignore is that in this language there is no word for 'bring'. "Slab" does not function simply as the name of an object. "Slab" means bring the builder a slab. "Slab" gets its meaning from its use. Its use is determined by the form or way of life. Nomads do not have the word "Slab". Not because there are no slabs but because they do not build, slabs are not used in this way.

Unless I am reading him wrong — schopenhauer1

If you mean Wittgenstein and not @RussellA then you are reading him wrong.

What does "slab" mean? How does the meaning of slab differ from the builder's alleged inner concept "slabY"? And how does this differ from the assistant's inner concept "slabZ"? How is it these three things - slab, y, and Z get sorted out so that the assistant brings the builder a slab? Or is it four things - slab, y, z, and whatever your inner concept is? But I think I know what "slab" means, and it is not what you or Russell means. Is it then six - slab, y, z, whatever your inner concept, his inner concept is, and my inner concept? Should we add Wittgenstein's inner concept? Is there any end to this multiplicity of confusion?

We can dispense with inner concepts and zombies and subsequent confusion. The assistant brings the builder a slab because he has been trained to do so. His training consists of being able to identify a slab and bring it to the builder. Being able to identify a slab does not mean forming an inner concept. All that is required is being able to distinguish this thing from the other things he has been trained to identify and bring. All with this one word "slab".

Mathematics is only useful insofar as it applies to reality. — chiknsld

When non-Euclidean geometries were invented (discovered?) they were considered parlor games. It was only later, when it became known that astronomical spacetime is not Euclidean that their use became evident. The description of this reality depended on what seemed to be a useless game.

True, that's why the foreman doesn't just say "X" but rather "bring me X". The word "bring" determines the activity, not the object "X". — RussellA

The foreman does not say "bring me X". He lacks the words to say so.

For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”,
“beam”.

(PI 2)

This language consists only of what we might think of as names of objects, but that would be wrong. That is not the way these words, the only words in this complete primitive language, function. That is the point. A language consisting of only the names of objects cannot be a complete language.

5) The foreman must say "bring me X" — RussellA

The foreman does not say "bring me X". He says "X".

If "X" didn't mean X, then nothing would happen and there would be no activity. — RussellA

If "X" simply meant the object, there would be no activity. The meaning of "X" is determined by the activity and not simply by the name of the object.

I don’t see that at odds. — schopenhauer1

What is 'that' and what is it not at odds with?

Perhaps I misunderstood what your point was in saying the quote was a good one for me.

This may or may not apply, but if not in this case then in others. I think there may be some here who think that interpretation is just gathering and giving information, which is assumed to occur without thought or insight.

Baking a cake is more than getting the ingredients together.

That last quote is a good one for Fooloso4. — schopenhauer1

Thank you for that information. It reinforces my suspicion that:

Your practice and experience with interpretation seems to be quite removed from mine. — Fooloso4

I have often quoted the following:

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.)

(CV, 24)

In this compact statement he touches on three things that are central to my work in philosophy:

Working on oneself
Interpretation
One's way of seeing things

The term 'hinge' occurs three times. The first:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

Much of the discussion of hinges focuses on doubt and neglects the questions that we raise. He draws our attention to hinges not simply to address the problem of skepticism:

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

The idea of hinges replace the ideas of foundationalism.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

The "door" is our investigations. Rather than resting on foundations they turn on hinges.

Wittgenstein only gives us one example of a hinge:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

The mathematical hinge is not pre-linguistic. Neither are others:

298. 'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

It is the movement of the work of the community bound together by science and education by which our propositions, beliefs, and knowledge are held fast. The axis is not timeless or immutable, but change is not piecemeal.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

Either its non-interpretive and up for various interpretations, or the author truly wanted you to see something — schopenhauer1

I think he follows the ancient tradition of esoteric writing:

From a draft for the preface to Philosophical Remarks:

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.

— Culture and Value

It is not that he did not want to be understood but that he had not and would not be understood by more than a few people:

From the preface to PI:

I make them public with misgivings. It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another a but, of course, it is not likely.

Did I say that one was to not understand the author? — schopenhauer1

Again, given the divergence of interpretations the problem of interpretation remains. My concern it that when the reader (note that this is a general comment about readers of difficult texts) uses the text

...as a jumping off point, — schopenhauer1

or when you

offer your own alternative. — schopenhauer1

it is as if the interpretative work has been completed.

While I agree to a certain extent that you can learn from various philosophers and their writings, that to me is a dead-end if you just read a philosopher and you don't do anything with it for yourself. — schopenhauer1

Your practice and experience with interpretation seems to be quite removed from mine. Interpretation is not a matter of just reading. Rather than being a dead-end it is an opening up and shedding light. An interpretive reading is not passive. It is doing something with it for yourself, but not by yourself. It is an engagement with the thinking of the author and with other readers and to the extent that philosophy is a dialogue across the ages, with other philosophers.

It's narcissistic dogmatic self-limiting to think you can't "think" past the "published works" of the "great philosophers". — schopenhauer1

Perhaps you are the exception, but very few will stand the test of time. This does not mean that the philosophers are prophets or gods, but that their work is superior to ours. Exempt yourself if you like.

The interpretive challenge is made evident by the fact that interpretations vary widely. He can not possibly mean all these different things attributed to him. One's jumping off point may be at odds with what the author says and means. If that is not a concern then I question the extent to which you are discussing Wittgenstein.

I see "philosophy" as an iterative, participatory thing ... — schopenhauer1

If one has little concern for what the author means then to what extent is this a participatory thing? If I say "ABC" and you respond as if I said "XYZ" in what way is talking passed each other iterative or participatory?

The author themselves shouldn't be a substitution for one's own thoughts. — schopenhauer1

In my opinion, one of the greatest values of reading certain philosophers is that through our attempt to understand them they teach us to think.

Even if you agree 100% with the author, it's the evaluation and integration part that is yours. — schopenhauer1

I agree with the second part, but see it as part of interpretive practice. As to the first part, all too often what one agrees or disagrees with their own misunderstanding of the author.

So, that doesn't mean there isn't some sort of interesting truths or gleanings that one can gather from the idea or use as a jumping off point, etc. — schopenhauer1

When discussing a particular philosopher or particular work of that philosopher, to use it as a jumping off point, however valuable that might be, is a jumping away from what that philosopher says and means and intends for us to examine.

These are two different practices that are too often treated as if they are the same.

(I want to be clear that there are other names associated with these beliefs. The obvious one is hinge-proposition (OC 341) — Sam26

Are you saying that a bedrock belief (a term that Wittgenstein never used) and a hinge proposition are the same? This is what I take to be the difference. We reach bedrock when there is no further justification. The Earth revolves around the Sun, on the other hand, is a hinge proposition. The claim can be justified and, like a hinge, a great deal hangs from and revolves around it.

It's not just the belief about hands, but a whole system of beliefs that falls into the same category. — Sam26

"I believe I have hands" is as problematic as "I know I have hands".

I do not think that my dog believes it has paws. The question of their existence does not arise. Consider again OC 476:

Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.
Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise

Think of these beliefs as ways of acting, i.e., the actions associated with my hands show my belief that I have hands. — Sam26

Using my hands does not show that I believe I have hands. If, however, I were to move my hands in odds ways, that might show that I believe my hands have magical powers.

The one thing that makes bedrock beliefs stand out is that doubting them makes no sense or is senseless. Why? Because the framework for doubting and knowing is built upon the inherited background of our surroundings. The inherited background is prior to doubting and knowing, i.e., you wouldn't be able to doubt or know without this framework. — Sam26

Wittgenstein does not limit what he says about bedrock, hinges, inherited background, to what is pre-linguistic:

Consider the following:

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

Compare this to your claim that:

The one thing that makes bedrock beliefs stand out is that doubting them makes no sense or is senseless. — Sam26

and both Copernicus' and Kant's revolutions. "Fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid".

So, "What rests on it?" Language rests on it. — Sam26

When Wittgenstein says:

360. I know that this is my foot. I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary. - That may be an exclamation; but what follows from it? At least that I shall act with a certainty that knows no doubt, in accordance with my belief.

this might seem to support your claim, but here he is not talking about language but the absence of doubt that if it were present would cause a kind of paralysis.

Language does not rest on things like the proposition that I have hands or feet:

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination [Raisonnement].

This seems clearly incorrect, viz., that Moore's statement that he knows he has hands is not a bedrock proposition. — Sam26

What are we to do with that proposition? What rests on it?

I agree that there are bedrock beliefs that are the backdrop of our epistemology, but I do not see why you would think that this is one of them.

Moorean propositions ...(hinge-propositions) — Sam26

I think I have asked you this before. What revolves around these propositions?

...show just where justification ends, and where doubt falls apart or makes no sense. — Sam26

As I understand it a hinge proposition functions analogously to a mechanical hinge.

It is trying to find some coherence within the Forms of Life. — schopenhauer1

I think for Wittgenstein it all about making connections. I think I have said a few things about that. I will have to look.

that doesn't mean we can't attempt to create various theories or ideas. — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein might be more hard lined on than I am, but as I look at it, the problem is not theorizing but when the theory stands in the way of seeing something. The theory is accepted and what does not fit the theory is missed or ignored or downplayed This is similar to the problem of a picture holding us captive.

Linguistic analysis is an aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but there are other aspects, such as the seeing of aspects and more generally seeing as opposed saying that are of central importance.

As to theorizing, I take his main point to be that our theories can stand in the way of seeing.

When he says at PI 66:

... don’t think, but look!

He is not telling us not to think, but rather, in this case, if we think that all games must have something in common we will fail to see that they do not.

However, what Moore is appealing to, is a mental state of knowing — Sam26

I would include this idea of knowledge as a mental state as metaphysical.

This isn't so much about metaphysical claims, unless you are referring to mental states ... — Sam26

I consider the claim that there are mental states of knowing as a metaphysical claim. Do we have a particular mental state because we know or do we know because we have a particular mental state. Does knowing cause the mental state or does the mental state cause us to know? Is there a different mental state for knowing I have hands that differ from the mental state of knowing I have feet or fingers?

It is not clear to me whether you are accepting or rejecting an appeal to mental states.

42: To think that different states must correspond to the words "believe" and "know"
would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond to the word "I" and the name
"Ludwig", because the concepts are different.

230. We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement "I know..."? For it is not a question of
mental processes or mental states.

356. My "mental state", the "knowing", gives me no guarantee of what will happen.

"[f]rom it seeming to me-or to everyone-to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. — Sam26

For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed." — Sam26

From it seeming to be that there is this queer and extremely important mental state it does not follow that it is so that there is this state. It arises from the misuse of the expression "I know".

Moorean propositions (so-called bedrock propositions) and there role in epistemology. They ground our epistemology in important ways, — Sam26

I don't think Moore's claims that he had hands is a bedrock proposition and do not see how it grounds or plays a role in epistemology. It may have its place in his attempt to refute skepticism but it most contexts it is odd and out of place. It is an example of philosophers being puzzled by the puzzles they create.

The puzzles occur as a result of an analysis of knowledge it terms of an analysis of propositions:

359. But that means I want to conceive it [certainty] as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination [Raisonnement].

476. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books,
sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.
Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise

"The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them (OC 100 - my emphasis)," which he doesn't. — Sam26

I interpret this differently. Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the fact that philosophers treat claims of knowledge and certainty as if they are metaphysical claims, and this leads them to confusion. Both the skeptic and those like Moore who argue against skepticism suffer from this. They put demands and requirements on these terms that do not exist outside the puzzles they create.

On the difficulty of reading Wittgenstein:

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.

— Culture and Value

I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so that, helped in this way he can put it right.

— Culture and Value

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

— Culture and Value

Conspiracy theorists connect the dots:

What major event occurred during the 2020 election that increased the number of mail in votes?

What was the response on the right and left to that event?