When dealing with Fooloso be prepared nonsensical analogies and other sophistries. — NOS4A2

Let me try to explain this to you. Just as there are things that a baseball team can and cannot do, there are things the NY Attorney General can and cannot do. Just as the claim that a baseball team refuses to play basketball demonstrates ignorance of the game of baseball, claiming that the NY Attorney General refused to bring criminal charges demonstrates ignorance of the office.

Now, when called out, you attempt to hide behind the vagueness of your claims. Despite the fact that it is this case that is in the news, and despite the fact that it was in this case that it was found that he committed fraud, you say you were not referring to the prosecutor in this case, but to some unidentified other prosecutors. So who are these other prosecutors who refused to pursue the case?

... which I never read in any case. — NOS4A2

When dealing with NOS this should be kept in mind! He has no interest facts or in discussing issues. He is a shill for Trump.

He claims to know the difference a civil and criminal case but also claims that:

... prosecutors refused to pursue the case. — NOS4A2

This is like saying a baseball team refuses to play basketball.

You haven't been on some the the building sites that I have been on, where a slab of cake has been the highlight of the day. — RussellA

Neither of us have been on the building site where the builder's language occurs, but Wittgenstein gives us enough information to know what the word slab means as it is used there. You keep conflating the builder's language with other language games.

Yes, but we must understand what the slab is before knowing how best to use it. — RussellA

All the assistant needs to know is to bring a slab when the builder calls "Slab!". The builder needs to know how to build with slabs, but there are no words for instructing the builder. His knowledge is not based on a language that consists only of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”.

Unless the assistant is a foreign worker who doesn't know the language yet. — RussellA

He will not be an assistant unless or until he learns the language. He will not learn it by pointing to "blocks" and "slabs". He can only learn it by learning how those words are used.

One can point not only to objects such as slabs, mountains, trees but also to actions such as running, walking, wincing. — RussellA

You are agreeing with Wittgenstein that there are different kinds of words, that not all words are the names of objects.

How do I know that you are pointing to running rather than the runner?

It is still the case that a language is not a collection of names, even if those names name activities.

A "slab" can refer to a slab of concrete used in a builder's yard or a slab of cake used in a cake shop. — RussellA

It can but neither of these is what slab means in the builder's language.

it may be described as ... — RussellA

In the builder's language it cannot be described at all, but what it means can be shown by bringing the builder a slab when he says slab.

But such as slab can have many uses ... — RussellA

All of its uses are uses within the activity of building.

But we know the meaning of "slab" even before we have decided what we want to use it for. — RussellA

In the builder's language it means one thing - bring me a slab. Pointing to a slab does not explain the meaning of "slab".

Therefore, it is not the case that we have to use something in order to discover what its name is. — RussellA

As Wittgenstein says:

And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

(PI 43)

In the larger context of our language, pointing to a slab may explain the meaning of the name, the bearer of the name, the thing we are referring to when we say slab, but, as the builder's language shows, a language is not a collection of names.

Pointing to a cog does not explain what a cog is. If you find a cog and ask me what it is, my pointing to it and saying "this is what it is" or "it is a cog" is not an adequate explanation. An adequate explanation must include what it is used for.

You might decide to use it for a paperweight or door stop, but that does not mean that a cog is a paperweight or door stop. In this case, the meaning of cog is not determined by your use but by its use as a functional part of a machine.

If the assistant had no intrinsic theory in their mind as to the meaning of words, they would be bringing onions as often as they brought slabs. — RussellA

If the assistant brought onions he would either be out of a job or undergo further training. Having an intrinsic theory of slabs cannot determine whether that theory matches what it is supposed to be a theory of.

Does my dog have an intrinsic theory in her mind when she brings the ball when I say "ball". Does it even matter, as long as she brings the ball? If she had such a theory it is the ball which determines whether it is the right theory.

This is circular. If "slab" gets its meaning from use, then how do you know how to use it before knowing what it means. — RussellA

Use refers to the activity of building. The meaning is determined by the role of "slab" in this activity. He has been trained to bring a slab when the builder says "slab". If he brings an onion he will have to undergo further training or be out of a job.

I have worked with Bedouin nomads, and we were using the word slab all the time. — RussellA

What does it mean when they use the word slab?

When the builder calls "slab" the assistant does not bring a mackerel or an onion. Whatever theory you have about what you think must be going on in his mind, the fact is, he brings a slab.

What you ignore is that in this language there is no word for 'bring'. "Slab" does not function simply as the name of an object. "Slab" means bring the builder a slab. "Slab" gets its meaning from its use. Its use is determined by the form or way of life. Nomads do not have the word "Slab". Not because there are no slabs but because they do not build, slabs are not used in this way.

Unless I am reading him wrong — schopenhauer1

If you mean Wittgenstein and not @RussellA then you are reading him wrong.

What does "slab" mean? How does the meaning of slab differ from the builder's alleged inner concept "slabY"? And how does this differ from the assistant's inner concept "slabZ"? How is it these three things - slab, y, and Z get sorted out so that the assistant brings the builder a slab? Or is it four things - slab, y, z, and whatever your inner concept is? But I think I know what "slab" means, and it is not what you or Russell means. Is it then six - slab, y, z, whatever your inner concept, his inner concept is, and my inner concept? Should we add Wittgenstein's inner concept? Is there any end to this multiplicity of confusion?

We can dispense with inner concepts and zombies and subsequent confusion. The assistant brings the builder a slab because he has been trained to do so. His training consists of being able to identify a slab and bring it to the builder. Being able to identify a slab does not mean forming an inner concept. All that is required is being able to distinguish this thing from the other things he has been trained to identify and bring. All with this one word "slab".

Mathematics is only useful insofar as it applies to reality. — chiknsld

When non-Euclidean geometries were invented (discovered?) they were considered parlor games. It was only later, when it became known that astronomical spacetime is not Euclidean that their use became evident. The description of this reality depended on what seemed to be a useless game.

True, that's why the foreman doesn't just say "X" but rather "bring me X". The word "bring" determines the activity, not the object "X". — RussellA

The foreman does not say "bring me X". He lacks the words to say so.

For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”,
“beam”.

(PI 2)

This language consists only of what we might think of as names of objects, but that would be wrong. That is not the way these words, the only words in this complete primitive language, function. That is the point. A language consisting of only the names of objects cannot be a complete language.

5) The foreman must say "bring me X" — RussellA

The foreman does not say "bring me X". He says "X".

If "X" didn't mean X, then nothing would happen and there would be no activity. — RussellA

If "X" simply meant the object, there would be no activity. The meaning of "X" is determined by the activity and not simply by the name of the object.

I don’t see that at odds. — schopenhauer1

What is 'that' and what is it not at odds with?

Perhaps I misunderstood what your point was in saying the quote was a good one for me.

This may or may not apply, but if not in this case then in others. I think there may be some here who think that interpretation is just gathering and giving information, which is assumed to occur without thought or insight.

Baking a cake is more than getting the ingredients together.

That last quote is a good one for Fooloso4. — schopenhauer1

Thank you for that information. It reinforces my suspicion that:

Your practice and experience with interpretation seems to be quite removed from mine. — Fooloso4

I have often quoted the following:

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.)

(CV, 24)

In this compact statement he touches on three things that are central to my work in philosophy:

Working on oneself
Interpretation
One's way of seeing things

The term 'hinge' occurs three times. The first:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

Much of the discussion of hinges focuses on doubt and neglects the questions that we raise. He draws our attention to hinges not simply to address the problem of skepticism:

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

The idea of hinges replace the ideas of foundationalism.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

The "door" is our investigations. Rather than resting on foundations they turn on hinges.

Wittgenstein only gives us one example of a hinge:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

The mathematical hinge is not pre-linguistic. Neither are others:

298. 'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

142. It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

It is the movement of the work of the community bound together by science and education by which our propositions, beliefs, and knowledge are held fast. The axis is not timeless or immutable, but change is not piecemeal.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

Either its non-interpretive and up for various interpretations, or the author truly wanted you to see something — schopenhauer1

I think he follows the ancient tradition of esoteric writing:

From a draft for the preface to Philosophical Remarks:

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.

— Culture and Value

It is not that he did not want to be understood but that he had not and would not be understood by more than a few people:

From the preface to PI:

I make them public with misgivings. It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another a but, of course, it is not likely.

Did I say that one was to not understand the author? — schopenhauer1

Again, given the divergence of interpretations the problem of interpretation remains. My concern it that when the reader (note that this is a general comment about readers of difficult texts) uses the text

...as a jumping off point, — schopenhauer1

or when you

offer your own alternative. — schopenhauer1

it is as if the interpretative work has been completed.

While I agree to a certain extent that you can learn from various philosophers and their writings, that to me is a dead-end if you just read a philosopher and you don't do anything with it for yourself. — schopenhauer1

Your practice and experience with interpretation seems to be quite removed from mine. Interpretation is not a matter of just reading. Rather than being a dead-end it is an opening up and shedding light. An interpretive reading is not passive. It is doing something with it for yourself, but not by yourself. It is an engagement with the thinking of the author and with other readers and to the extent that philosophy is a dialogue across the ages, with other philosophers.

It's narcissistic dogmatic self-limiting to think you can't "think" past the "published works" of the "great philosophers". — schopenhauer1

Perhaps you are the exception, but very few will stand the test of time. This does not mean that the philosophers are prophets or gods, but that their work is superior to ours. Exempt yourself if you like.

The interpretive challenge is made evident by the fact that interpretations vary widely. He can not possibly mean all these different things attributed to him. One's jumping off point may be at odds with what the author says and means. If that is not a concern then I question the extent to which you are discussing Wittgenstein.

I see "philosophy" as an iterative, participatory thing ... — schopenhauer1

If one has little concern for what the author means then to what extent is this a participatory thing? If I say "ABC" and you respond as if I said "XYZ" in what way is talking passed each other iterative or participatory?

The author themselves shouldn't be a substitution for one's own thoughts. — schopenhauer1

In my opinion, one of the greatest values of reading certain philosophers is that through our attempt to understand them they teach us to think.

Even if you agree 100% with the author, it's the evaluation and integration part that is yours. — schopenhauer1

I agree with the second part, but see it as part of interpretive practice. As to the first part, all too often what one agrees or disagrees with their own misunderstanding of the author.

So, that doesn't mean there isn't some sort of interesting truths or gleanings that one can gather from the idea or use as a jumping off point, etc. — schopenhauer1

When discussing a particular philosopher or particular work of that philosopher, to use it as a jumping off point, however valuable that might be, is a jumping away from what that philosopher says and means and intends for us to examine.

These are two different practices that are too often treated as if they are the same.

(I want to be clear that there are other names associated with these beliefs. The obvious one is hinge-proposition (OC 341) — Sam26

Are you saying that a bedrock belief (a term that Wittgenstein never used) and a hinge proposition are the same? This is what I take to be the difference. We reach bedrock when there is no further justification. The Earth revolves around the Sun, on the other hand, is a hinge proposition. The claim can be justified and, like a hinge, a great deal hangs from and revolves around it.

It's not just the belief about hands, but a whole system of beliefs that falls into the same category. — Sam26

"I believe I have hands" is as problematic as "I know I have hands".

I do not think that my dog believes it has paws. The question of their existence does not arise. Consider again OC 476:

Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.
Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise

Think of these beliefs as ways of acting, i.e., the actions associated with my hands show my belief that I have hands. — Sam26

Using my hands does not show that I believe I have hands. If, however, I were to move my hands in odds ways, that might show that I believe my hands have magical powers.

The one thing that makes bedrock beliefs stand out is that doubting them makes no sense or is senseless. Why? Because the framework for doubting and knowing is built upon the inherited background of our surroundings. The inherited background is prior to doubting and knowing, i.e., you wouldn't be able to doubt or know without this framework. — Sam26

Wittgenstein does not limit what he says about bedrock, hinges, inherited background, to what is pre-linguistic:

Consider the following:

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

Compare this to your claim that:

The one thing that makes bedrock beliefs stand out is that doubting them makes no sense or is senseless. — Sam26

and both Copernicus' and Kant's revolutions. "Fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid".

So, "What rests on it?" Language rests on it. — Sam26

When Wittgenstein says:

360. I know that this is my foot. I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary. - That may be an exclamation; but what follows from it? At least that I shall act with a certainty that knows no doubt, in accordance with my belief.

this might seem to support your claim, but here he is not talking about language but the absence of doubt that if it were present would cause a kind of paralysis.

Language does not rest on things like the proposition that I have hands or feet:

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination [Raisonnement].

This seems clearly incorrect, viz., that Moore's statement that he knows he has hands is not a bedrock proposition. — Sam26

What are we to do with that proposition? What rests on it?

I agree that there are bedrock beliefs that are the backdrop of our epistemology, but I do not see why you would think that this is one of them.

Moorean propositions ...(hinge-propositions) — Sam26

I think I have asked you this before. What revolves around these propositions?

...show just where justification ends, and where doubt falls apart or makes no sense. — Sam26

As I understand it a hinge proposition functions analogously to a mechanical hinge.

It is trying to find some coherence within the Forms of Life. — schopenhauer1

I think for Wittgenstein it all about making connections. I think I have said a few things about that. I will have to look.

that doesn't mean we can't attempt to create various theories or ideas. — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein might be more hard lined on than I am, but as I look at it, the problem is not theorizing but when the theory stands in the way of seeing something. The theory is accepted and what does not fit the theory is missed or ignored or downplayed This is similar to the problem of a picture holding us captive.

Linguistic analysis is an aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but there are other aspects, such as the seeing of aspects and more generally seeing as opposed saying that are of central importance.

As to theorizing, I take his main point to be that our theories can stand in the way of seeing.

When he says at PI 66:

... don’t think, but look!

He is not telling us not to think, but rather, in this case, if we think that all games must have something in common we will fail to see that they do not.

However, what Moore is appealing to, is a mental state of knowing — Sam26

I would include this idea of knowledge as a mental state as metaphysical.

This isn't so much about metaphysical claims, unless you are referring to mental states ... — Sam26

I consider the claim that there are mental states of knowing as a metaphysical claim. Do we have a particular mental state because we know or do we know because we have a particular mental state. Does knowing cause the mental state or does the mental state cause us to know? Is there a different mental state for knowing I have hands that differ from the mental state of knowing I have feet or fingers?

It is not clear to me whether you are accepting or rejecting an appeal to mental states.

42: To think that different states must correspond to the words "believe" and "know"
would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond to the word "I" and the name
"Ludwig", because the concepts are different.

230. We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement "I know..."? For it is not a question of
mental processes or mental states.

356. My "mental state", the "knowing", gives me no guarantee of what will happen.

"[f]rom it seeming to me-or to everyone-to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. — Sam26

For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed." — Sam26

From it seeming to be that there is this queer and extremely important mental state it does not follow that it is so that there is this state. It arises from the misuse of the expression "I know".

Moorean propositions (so-called bedrock propositions) and there role in epistemology. They ground our epistemology in important ways, — Sam26

I don't think Moore's claims that he had hands is a bedrock proposition and do not see how it grounds or plays a role in epistemology. It may have its place in his attempt to refute skepticism but it most contexts it is odd and out of place. It is an example of philosophers being puzzled by the puzzles they create.

The puzzles occur as a result of an analysis of knowledge it terms of an analysis of propositions:

359. But that means I want to conceive it [certainty] as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination [Raisonnement].

476. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books,
sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.
Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise

"The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them (OC 100 - my emphasis)," which he doesn't. — Sam26

I interpret this differently. Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the fact that philosophers treat claims of knowledge and certainty as if they are metaphysical claims, and this leads them to confusion. Both the skeptic and those like Moore who argue against skepticism suffer from this. They put demands and requirements on these terms that do not exist outside the puzzles they create.

On the difficulty of reading Wittgenstein:

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.

— Culture and Value

I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so that, helped in this way he can put it right.

— Culture and Value

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

— Culture and Value

Conspiracy theorists connect the dots:

What major event occurred during the 2020 election that increased the number of mail in votes?

What was the response on the right and left to that event?

You did not address the questions I asked.

If you do so I will address your criticism of the Greeks. I will say this much. I do not mean Greek culture but the Greek philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle.

Heidegger absorbs the anti-semitic tropes from his culture, — Joshs

What does this mean? Is absorbs another word for accepts? Does his reinterpreting them liberate him from these prejudices? Or does his thinking not rise above the pedestrian?

For instance, he rejects the biological, racialized concept of jewry. — Joshs

Yes, if only they would act less like Jews.

The essence of a thing, including ethical values, is to be found in the contextual particularity↪Fooloso4 of our involvement with it. this precludes universalizing ethics. — Joshs

And how does an understanding of Being relate to the contextual particularity of our involvement?

Greek ethical notions such as phronesis and areti are in opposition to universalizing ethics, and manage quite well without embracing Heidegger's destining of Being.

The essence of a thing is not the meaning of Being. Our involvement with it can take many forms, including building extermination camps.

One cannot properly think responsibility and justice without an understanding of Being. The question of Being is in its essence an ethical question. — Joshs

This requires an explanation. What is the connection between Being and ethics? Rather than address this you invoke the names of Focault, Deleuze, Guattari, and Derrida, but still no defense or explanation of your claim.

you’re looking for a prescriptive ethics — Joshs

No, not at all.

Not every philosophy purports to an ethical dimension. — Pantagruel

The problem is evident in the Introduction to Being and Time. Heidegger claims that the question of the meaning of Being is the fundamental question, the human question. H. says that we must make the inquirer, Dasein, transparent in his own Being. To ignore the ethical dimension of human being is to make what he intends to make transparent opaque. We are not only social animals, we are ethical animals, even if we do not always speak or act that way.

From an earlier post in this thread, quoting from Heidegger's The Beginning of Western Thinking: Heraclitus. Quoted by Wolin:

The danger is not [National Socialism] itself, but instead that it will be innocuous via sermons about the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. — Fooloso4

The absence of the Just should be noted. Heidegger replaces it with the True. Was the substitution intentional? An indication of Heidegger's disregard for man as anything more than a mouthpiece for Being?

Basic to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is the desire for and pursuit of the good. This must be understood at the most ordinary level, not as a theory but simply as what we want both for ourselves and those we care about. It is not only basic to their philosophy but basic to their understanding of who we are as human beings.

For Heidegger consideration of the good is replaced with the call of conscience. The call of conscience is not about what is good or bad, it is the call for authenticity. Its primary concern is not oneself or others but Being. He sees Plato's elevation of the Good above being, that is, as the source of both being and being known, as a move away from, a forgetting of Being. — Fooloso4

That doesn't entail philosophical nihilism. — Pantagruel

Because of the centrality of Dasein, in this case it does.

But I complain about how some consider some media more reliable than another, when all of them are part of the same problem. — javi2541997

Some sources are more reliable than others. Which is not to say that any source always gets everything right.

For the word "slab" to correspond with the object slab, then the word is "pointing" at the object. — RussellA

The word has a specific meaning in the builder's language game. That does not translate to how it might be used elsewhere.

Imagine the builder pointing to a slab and saying slab. His helper now points to the slab and says slab. We might call this the "pointing language game or maybe the "name game". It cannot be called the 'builder's language game". What is the point of all this pointing?

the media manipulate us — javi2541997

There is no single entity "the media". Fox News is a member of the media. All those sources that are competing to be to the right of Fox are members of the media.

Does that mean you agree with the statement or that you approve of philosophical nihilism?

As the meaning of "unicorn" in language doesn't depend on the existence of a unicorn in the world, — RussellA

Whatever one might mean when uttering the word 'slab', it has a specific meaning in the builder's language game. In that game 'slab' gets its meaning from its role in the activity of building. They are not building with unicorns or other imaginary objects. "Unicorn" has no place or role or function in this game. It is a complete but limited language.

what kind of object is being referred to in the Philosophical Investigations. — RussellA

Several objects are referred to in the PI.

Yes, your use of the term "support" is sufficiently vague to endorse what I've been saying. — Pantagruel

Reading his Rectoral Address should give you some idea of what support means.

...any indication that his philosophy is polluted, which is the real issue. — Pantagruel

His philosophy is amoral. No distinction is made in order to distinguish between what Being gives, which is to be accepted and supported, and what is to be rejected. He does, however, make use of the distinction for example in his criticism of technology.

It is as if he were to criticize the death camps because of their efficiency.

1) "the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs"
2) "slabs do exist in the world" — RussellA

The meaning of the word 'slab' in the builder's language depends on two things:

1. The existence of these objects.

2. What the assistant is to do with them.

The meaning is not the name of the object.

And Martin Heidegger wasn't personally culpable for that. — Pantagruel

He supported it though. The Fuhrer and the extermination of Jews and others was, in line with his Protestant provincialism, fated. It is the sending or giving of Being, to which the authentic Dasein must hearken. The German people are Heidegger's chosen people, doing God's work on Earth.

a fine-grained sense of absolute moral right and wrong. — Pantagruel

Does one's sense of right and wrong have to be fine grained and absolute to know that the extermination of human beings was wrong in the twentieth century?

I do feel like the man has some valuable insights. — Pantagruel

I agree.

Lots of saints — Pantagruel

Saint Martin Heidegger?

seems to indicate his inability — Joshs

What do you mean by inability?

As long as I am name dropping I read Heidegger with William Richardson. This was before the current attention focusing on Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazi, but even back then there were those who made the connection.

I asked Richardson about it. He was visibly troubled and admitted that he was not able to reconcile it. But we continued to read Heidegger and I continued to read him after that and read him with some of my students after that.

Joseph Margolis told R.W. Sleeper Dewey made the remark after Margolis asked him to read some of Heidegger's work. — Ciceronianus

Did you know Joe Margolis? He was my thesis advisor. Margolis, a self-professed relativist who stressed the importance of cultural and historical situatedness, would not accept the kind of Heidegger apologetic we see here.