He'll have another build the wall fundraiser, except this one will be to build a wall on Texas' nothern border.

The "group" exists only to benefit the individual and its goals. For what reason do you believe that irrational animals - and rational, as in the case of humanity - come together in groups? This "alliance" - commonly referred by us, as community, civilization, etc ... - is simply a consequence of the perception that individuals seek self-realization. Obviously if some people with the same purpose meet, they would probably create some kind of relationship, as this will make it easier for them to reach their individual goals. The fact is, the group only comes to exist - as in the form of the concept - if, and only if, the individual wants it to exist. — Gus Lamarch

This implies that humans start as individuals and then "come together in groups". But that is not what historically happens. Humans always already start out as part of a group, and the rare exceptions where this isn't the case will not have "normal" cognition.

So what you're describing can only be a thought experiment, where we imagine humans somehow enter a world as fully formed individuals yet they're not already in some kind of relation to each other. But even then I don't see the justification for reducing all human goals down to egoism. You're basically claiming you can rephrase all human intentions as some form of egoism, but that is merely a semantical game, not a profound insight.

If the interests of the child aren't important, then whose interests are? The desires of the parents? — Tzeentch

They're not so much unimportant as they are nonexistent. Apart from that, you just apply whatever moral principles you would otherwise. If you think desires have moral weight, then yes the desires of the parents would be relevant.

And doesn't your mention of obligations imply that the interests of the future child should be taken into account preceding the act of putting it into existence? — Tzeentch

No, because the obligation of the parents is one sided. It applies regardless of the interests of the child, so there is no need to try to divine their interests before they can have any, much less ascribe some kind of will to nonexistence.

I'd take it a step back and argue that one should avoid forcing one's will upon others against their will altogether. Voluntary and consensual interaction seems to me the basis of moral conduct. — Tzeentch

But even if I grant that for the sake of discussion, it'd still be the case that I need to decide, for myself, whether or not an interaction is voluntary on the other side. Even if I am being told directly, that only ever constitutes a certain amount of evidence for or against an underlying will.

The way I see it every effect turns into a cause which in turn turns into effect ad infinitum. The domino effect is perhaps the best analogy for describing the nature of causality.. — Jacob-B

"Cause" and "Effect" are not ontological categories. They don't describe any state of affairs. They're merely temporal categories to order events. Like all categories, they can be arbitrarily applied according to purpose. To call something a "cause" or an "effect" is really only to point out this or that property as important for the purpose of communication.

"Individual" is not synonymous with "Individuality". It is easy to confuse the metaphysical perceptions of "One in existence" and "Being one in existence" — Gus Lamarch

It is unless we're operating on a specific definition, in which case this should be set out in the beginning.

It is very likely that your perception of what a perfect world would be is seriously affecting your perception of reality. Human nature was never "group mentality" "but "egoistic". Man exists to fulfill himself individually, not to fulfill the will of the community, in fact, it is the individual's own action to be fulfilled that consequently creates the community... — Gus Lamarch

Do you have anything specific you can point to here? In anthropology, it's not in doubt that our particular line of ancestors had been social, group animals long before anatomically modern humans were around. And what we know of band-level societies - i.e. the lowest level of organisation - shows that mutual support is the norm. Of course using the term "communism" for this kind of mutual support is provocative, and it's different from the 20th century political project of communism. But it's also a far cry from egoism.

And yet we act as if consent is required. — khaled

I think this is mostly down to interpretation.

I don't think any more justification is necessary. You cannot kill people without their consent. Period. — khaled

I mean if you don't care about whether rules like "you cannot kill people" can be derived from more basic principles, that's fine. But it is kinda the point of moral philosophy.

What do you mean what is being conserved? That is not how the word is used clearly. "Conservative" just means less likely to do harm. — khaled

I only really associate "conservative" with a political movement and an approach to social questions. In that sense it's very much associated with the root "to conserve". I don't know where you take your usage of the word from, but if that's the definition you wanna go with, I am not going to argue.

People have more things they don't want done unto them when they exist than when they don't exist. This is trivially true since when people don't exist there is nothing that can be done to them nor is there anything that they don't want done. — khaled

It's trivially true only if you suppose that people that don't exist nevertheless exist, because otherwise the comparison doesn't work. You can also say "grass is greener than freedom", but while it's true that grass is (often) green, I have no idea what it would mean for freedom to be green.

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth. — Tzeentch

My line of reasoning would only say that the interests of the child are not the issue. There may be other reasons why doing so is immoral. For example, it might be immoral on the side of the parents to enter into obligations that they know they cannot fulfill.

This kind of question is actually something I have been wondering about, more in regard to how to deal with the (possible) interests of generations far in the future. Questions like "does it matter if the planet dies after everyone currently living is gone?" I haven't found a satisfactory conclusion yet. But I don't think it can be found by attributing a will and interests to nonexistance.

If it is acceptable to use one's power at one's own subjective discretion to force one's will onto others, we enter a slippery slope that inevitably leads to "might makes right." — Tzeentch

Whose discretion do you suppose I apply? I only have access to my own.

This is not true. "Individual" is defined by unity, not by being differentiated from its environment. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to whom though? We haven't really settled on any definition, and I was assuming we go by the common meaning.

I don't think this holds from either a logical or a historical perspective.

But there is nothing within the concept of "individual" which requires that one is the member of a group. In this way, "individual" is logically prior to "group", because "group" is dependent on "individual", while the inverse is not the case. — Metaphysician Undercover

While the term "individual" may not logically depend on a specific group, it does depend on the concept of a multitude. You can only be an individual if you can be differentiated from someone else in some way. Without this, nothing would give rise to the notion of individuality.

From a historical perspective, it seems clear that individuation requires contact with other humans, and there has never been a time in human history where humans did not live in some kind of community. In this sense, "communism" is humanities ancestral form, and individualism is a recent invention.

Protection implies more parties are involved (AKA, parent protects their would-be child from a third party). — Tzeentch

I don't see how this is the case. Parents can also protect their children from objects.

I am arguing from the viewpoint of the parent in relation to their would-be child. 'Protecting' one's future child from one's own desire of having children can be more easily understood as making the choice not to potentially violate one's would-be child's will. — Tzeentch

But this implies that the child that doesn't yet exist already has a will we are protecting.

What justifies the act of forcing an individual to experience life without knowing whether they want to or not? — Tzeentch

What individual is being forced? You're only an individual after you have already experienced life.

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent? — Tzeentch

You should use your power if doing so follows a maxim that you can will to be universalised. Usually, asking if you yourself would want to experience it is a good first approximation. But the details depend on the experience and the relationship we're in.

From whom? — schopenhauer1

The same person we're otherwise imposing life on.

It's always been do not cause unnecessary suffering on behalf of someone else. I will admit I went down a consent rabbit hole with you, but I still think after debate this can also be an principle because I see this is about forcing other people into impositions unnecessarily without consent as well. — schopenhauer1

The word "unnecessary" seems to do all the work here. I already argued above that suffering that's necessary to exist in the first place cannot reasonably be called unnecessary.

Absolute vs. instrumental. Already born, vs. no need to impose at all, period. — schopenhauer1

You were asking about what I do in general, so this answer seems out of context.

If people should not be exposed to suffering or imposed upon unnecessarily, that principle is the judge. If you don't believe in it, see my idea about how meta-ethics works. — schopenhauer1

Principles cannot judge, on account of not having minds.

You do not have to minimize anyone else's suffering unless they're dependents. But what you must not do is act in such a manner that they suffer more due to your actions as opposed to if you just weren't around then. — khaled

Ok, thanks. I'll just take this as given for now.

I know what consent is. And I know I don't have it in this case.
What does "consent from an unconscious person" mean?
And yet you talk of consent. — khaled

I specifically said there is no such thing as consent from someone who isn't conscious, so I think you misremember. Anyways you have already admitted that you can't answer the question, so your claim to know now seems rather flimsy.

At that point it's their fault. They should have changed the declaration if they changed their mind. — khaled

Regardless of fault, the possibility means it's not the same as actually having consent.

Agreed. But I don't think the principle is "maximization of choice". I think the principle is simply: You can't kill people without their consent — khaled

"Maximisation of choice" is the answer to the question: why can you not kill people without their consent.

If you have a child you risk someone getting harmed. If you don't, no one gets harmed. Therefore the latter is obviously more conservative. — khaled

I still do not see what is being conserved, the word "obviously" notwithstanding.

Even IF their life is overall good, they definitely had more harm due to being born than they would have had they not been born (because then they would have had NO harm). — khaled

I don't quite see what "having more harm" means if harm is "doing something to someone they don't want done". Grammatically, you can't have more doing.

You have defined harm from the perspective of the subject, the part that acts. But you're now using it in a passive sentence from the perspective of the object that is acted upon.

There's no protection of another's will. It's the prevention of violating another's will. — Tzeentch

I don't see how there could be a "violation" if there is nothing protected.

Why would it be? You keep asking these questions that seem to imply a "default position" where there is none. — khaled

I am asking to find out what your "default positions" are, because it seems to me that you want to minimize suffering in one situation, and then in another you say that the important question is consent, and suffering is only relevant as a proxy.

I don't require it answered. You're the one asking "What does it mean to have consent from from non-existence", not me. Why would I require that answered? — khaled

If it's not answered, you have no idea what you actually demand.

Same here. More importantly, what do you do if you have no idea that that is what the person wanted or didn't want? You don't pull the plug do you? If you already knew the person would want the plug pulled then you DO have consent. — khaled

Yes, if you have no idea you keep the person alive (so long as the effort is reasonable, you wouldn't do CPR forever), on the off chance that they might wake up again. The principle here is again to preserve the possibility for choice.

I don't think you have consent even if you have a written declaration for medical procedures. It's always possible they changed their mind since writing it.

To say that it is unavailable. Therefore the conservative course should be taken. Which is not to have kids. — khaled

What's conservative about it? You're not conserving anything.

I wouldn't conflate what a person wants with what's least harmful to them. For example, the comatose patient may have wanted people to pull the plug if he went comatose but never told anybody. — khaled

Well we take an educated guess. But I don't think a meaningful definition of harm that doesn't refer to individual will somewhere is possible.

But regardless, if this is what we do, why would having kids be ethical when we know for a fact that not being born is less harm than being born? — khaled

But we don't know that. You said so yourself:

And I already told you that life is not "overall" objectively more harmful or good. — khaled

Because the best option is too difficult to be expected regularly. — khaled

Doesn't that just mean you'll sometimes fail to live up to your expectations? That's not really a reason not to have expectations.

Creating situations for suffering so you can get to consent.. — schopenhauer1

It's not about getting consent from some individual after they have been born. That'd be ridiculous. The point is realizing that consent is based on respect for an individuals freedom. It'd be entirely backwards to protect freedom by taking it away.

This is honestly why I rarely form the argument around consent and just keep it at unnecessary suffering because at the end of the day, you are creating the suffering so you can ask consent. That is why I brought up the idea of let's say you know that a baby will get tortured if it is born. But it doesn't exist yet, so does this consideration matter? I mean according to your view nope, there is no thing to give consent, so who cares right? Fine, at that point the original AN argument stands.. causing unnecessary suffering onto another is wrong. — schopenhauer1

So your approach to this discussion is to just use whatever argument is convenient? What's the point is you're putting the conclusion first and select arguments according to happenstance?

Can you name the first principles you base your view on?

You can make an argument combining both too. Unless you get consent, you shouldn't put someone into a negative state without knowing what the person wants. Why would the assumption be that this is okay?
Surely this goes back to something about suffering itself which makes its imposition on someone else wrong. That is not something intuitive or relevant to your judgements? — schopenhauer1

You cannot simply combine utilitarian and deontological approaches to the problem. The assumptions underlying them are fundamentally incompatible. If you're talking about suffering, you are talking about some kind of state of affairs. Something that exists "out there". If you're talking about consent, you're talking about a relationship between subjects, an idea.

If it is "something about suffering itself" then how does it then matter about how it's imposed? Suffering is either bad in and of itself or it isn't.

If not, I'd like to know why you think you can just do that on behalf of someone else other than rhetoric for the sake of argument. Cause I doubt you really do, other than this case of procreation. I can't find out if this guy wants to be put in a state of negative situations.. so I'll go ahead and proceed. Wrong. — schopenhauer1

We put people in jail against their will, do we not? The justification is that putting them in jail is necessary to preserve the freedom of everyone.

And here's why in my first formulation in the post I said unnecessarily and absolute not instrumental. — schopenhauer1

And who judges what is and isn't necessary? Whose goals define instrumentality?

When it is our job to minimize the other party's suffering AND when we know that our choice is actually minimizng suffering (vaccines for example). Which only really happens with dependents. — khaled

Why isn't it always our job to minimize suffering?

What would it mean to have consent from an unconscious person? In both cases: Meaningless question. Point is, you need consent, and you don't have it. Doesn't matter why you don't have it. — khaled

If you admit the question is meaningless, you cannot then go ahead and require it answered.

Not really. We don't pull the plug. Period. — khaled

I don't know where you live, but where I live we absolutely do pull the plug if there is sufficient evidence that this would be what the person wanted.

You don't "guess" you only look at the amount of harm done in both cases and pick the one with least harm. You take the conservative approach. I challenge you to come up with a situation where you pick the option that does more harm when consent is not available. — khaled

So if consent is not available, we then default to least harm? Then why do antinatalists bring up consent? Anyways this is basically what I said: When consent is not avialable, we don't default to "no". We default to figuring out what the person would want, their interest, which is the same as asking what is the least harm to them.

What's wrong with having such a moral system? Why would you demand? — khaled

It just seem absurd. You have figured out what the best thing to do would be, but then you go out and do something else, because why pick the best option?

Yes but when non compliance results in severe harm that's not really a choice. That scenario is what people call "an imposition". For instance: You theoretically could kill someone in public, you'll just be executed for it. In this scenario, while techincally there is a choice, practically there isn't. That is what impositions do, practically remove choices. — khaled

Ok, I guess we ultimately agree on this point. But I would go from this and conclude that therefore, being born is not an imposition, because it doesn't practically remove any choice. In fact it does the opposite: Create any and all choice.

Because without it one risks causing harm or distress against an individual's will, regardless of one's intention. — Tzeentch

And I think this puts an anti-natalist in a bind, because they would now need to argue that we must protect your will by preventing you from having a will, which just seem absurd.

If we can agree that forcing individuals to do things without their consent is inherently problematic, then this raises a lot of questions regarding the act of having children. — Tzeentch

The question that needs answering first here is why consent is important. If it's because we care about some notion of "choosing your destiny", the conclusion doesn't seem to be to not have children, but the opposite.

In an abusive relationship you could cause harm by breaking up because doing so will alleviate more form yourself. — khaled

But how does this work if you're at the same time saying I am not allowed to assess harm for others?

I don't know what you mean by "harm is different", I don't know what I said to make you think that in any way. — khaled

The question was essentially when we are allowed to cause harm on the basis of our assessment that doing so is better than the alternative.

But regardless, even applying this "general rule" when do we have consent to give birth to people? — khaled

What would it mean to have consent from nonexistence?

So why are you now still trying to get me to make a claim that I never made for a reason? — khaled

I was asking you whether the question is relevant I'm your view.

It is not uncommon for consent to be impossible to obtain. For instance, we don't pull the plug on comatose patients. The whole POINT of consent is that the default value for any request is "no" until that request is actually made and answered positively. — khaled

We're not asking comatose patients for their consent. That'd be a pointless exercise. We ask what their interest is, according to our best guesses.

And saying "the default answer is no" doesn't help, because you can arbitrarily change the wording of the question to fit any result.

I already said "virtuous" is doing more good than the system demands.

"right" is the best possible outcome (donating to charity/saving the drowning person/ etc) — khaled

How can you have a moral system that doesn't demand the best possible outcome? If you know a better outcome is possible, why would you not demand that outcome?

Well if I were to take this to the extreme, then you have an abusive relationship. And I am pretty sure we can agree that the abusers in an abusive relationship are being immoral. — khaled

As I said, it seems that there is some kind of scale between everything being completely voluntary and everything being forced.

What do you mean? — khaled

You usually have the theoretical choice to not comply. Oppression doesn't take away your ability to make choices, it takes away your ability to make those choices operative by imposing consequences.

So if you cannot get consent, you should be able to impose suffering and impositions on someone unnecessarily? — schopenhauer1

But if consent is something that matters, then the imposition is necessary, because its the conditio sine qua non for consent. If the core of morality is people deciding their own destiny, then it seems to follow that it's a moral good to create that ability.

However, if I was to indulge this as if it was a symmetry rather than an asymmetry, then I don't want to be around you at all because your default position is you are allowed to cause impositions if you cannot get consent. — schopenhauer1

I mean obviously I do think it's permissible to cause impositions if you cannot get consent. Else we'd not be allowed to operate on unconscious patients etc.

So there is a contradiction in the very act of deliberating here admitting that this is the very thing, not quite "denied" the person that will be affected, but simply incapable of even doing so from the very nature of the non-existence. — schopenhauer1

Yes, precisely. That is the contradiction. So what is your answer?

Because if this is so:

The very fact that you think deliberating upon a moral framework right now, implies that people should be able to make decisions on what affects them. — schopenhauer1

Then how can you support denying people any decision whatsoever by denying them existence itself?

It seem to me one could imagine a society where one person makes the rules, but the rules aren't enforced. i.e. centralized power (as in A) but no coercive power (as in C).

1) Imposing suffering.. used in conjunction
2) Imposition in general.. as in for example, if I said you have this game where you make many choices, but you cannot escape except through death. That can be an imposition. It is de facto imposition as there is no escape without death or making the choices the game's conditions imposes. These more generally, are the challenges of life.

Certainly one should not unnecessarily impose suffering on others no matter what. But it also stands to reason, which I will just call Argument Against Paternalism, is to try to benefit someone else by imposing on them challenges to overcome which they could not consent. — schopenhauer1

But this really just sounds like the suffering isn't actually what matters. The argument really only refers to suffering as something that exists. But what changes some behaviour from permissible to impermissible or vice versa isn't some quantification of suffering, but really only whether or not there is consent.

So, where does the consent get it's moral weight from? What is it that makes consent "good"?

Yeah, well it is a special scenario. What do you want me to say. That is the point. It is a special scenario that is hard to analogize without making a false analogy. — schopenhauer1

But you also realize the problem with that is that this almost legitimizes special pleading?

I'll answer in two ways:
1) Fine, ditch it. Self-imposed suffering is also not analogous. Doesn't hurt my argument, just shows how using analogies like these aren't great anyways in this very unique scenario, and hence my highlighting how unique it is.

2) It can be kept because, self-imposed suffering, or suffering on others who consent are examples of being able to consent. The only example where one would unnecessarily cause suffering (because it's not in order to prevent a greater harm as they don't exist obviously), and where there is no consent that can be obtained is the case of E v. N. — schopenhauer1

But to me, the logical thing to do in a situation where the very concept of consent is unintelligible (because whatever could it possiblý mean for a nothing to consent?), is to drop consent from my test or system. It seems a bit like asking whether green is heavier than red, or whether nights are colder than forests.

You can always set up categories that include all possible options. For example, using the classical meaning of republic - a system of government where the head of state is not a hereditary monarch - all political systems are either a republic or they aren't.

It terms of different views, one might note that for most of human history, people had no concept of "the economy" as a separate entity. There were also many societies where the political institutions had little to no coercive power, so while there were technically leaders with autocratic powers, they didn't actually control "the economy", because there was no such concept, and they could only really use their powers if there were enough people backing them up.

Not commenting on the historical accuracy of your system, but one thing that does seem possible is "rule by algorithm", where there isn't actually any person in power anymore, and instead there are automated system managing some given status quo.

Of course one might argue that such a system is really just a dictatorship of whoever can influence the algorithm.

It's both. If you want to self-impose your own suffering, go ahead. Once you impose it for someone else, it's not good. Please don't make the move comparing E v. N vs. E only scenarios as I addressed that. Otherwise, we will keep talking in circles. — schopenhauer1

So, can I impose things that aren't suffering on others?

Also your request to "not compare E v N vs. E scenarios" just seems impossible. Since there is only a single "E v N scenario" no comparisons are possible at all, and hence the entire argument begins and ends with a claim. You're not even following this request yourself, since "self-imposed suffering" clearly is only possible once you already exist, so it ought to be entirely irrelevant.

As I said: Children are a special case because it’s your job as a parent to make sure they don’t do something stupid. You don’t do that for adults or strangers’ children do you? — khaled

You don't usually apply your own judgement in place of others, no. But the reasons why matter. Note that we got here from this:

If you're in an abusive relationship, surely you should cause heartbreak. It'd be just as easy to come up with situations where you should cause pain. — Echarmion

via this:

When I talk of “harm” I mean causing more than you alleviate. So vaccinating a child isn’t harm, even though it hurts and is against their wishes. — khaled

So is harm different for children and adults? Or is harm really only relevant when dealing with children or other dependents, and the general rule is actually about choice or consent or freedom?

Which part precisely? When did I ever say life had “more harm than good”? Please quote me this supposed BS. — khaled

As per above, does it matter whether life is, overall, harmful or not?

First off, I don’t understand how they’re not working in this scenario. — khaled

You're asking for something that's impossible ("you'd need a time machine"), but instead of concluding that, therefore, the standard cannot be applied, you apply it anyways and then claim it's actually violated.

My objection was against forcing people to do things. If I am choosing to live with someone else I’m not actually being forced to do anything am I? — khaled

It's theoretically possible that you literally choose all the consequences, but chances are you don't. There are probably going to be things you end up doing just because you don't want to damage the relationship (and I don't necessarily refer to a romantic relationship here). This gets more obvious the farther out from your inner circle you get. It's at least plausible you can hash things our precisely with your flatmate, your spouse or your nuclear family. It's essentially impossible to have this kind of control over a political entity of any size.

Now you could say you also choose those outcomes, either by virtue of the original decision or by some kind of democratic process. But how far does that justification hold? After all, even in extremely oppressive circumstances, there is usually some kind of choice you could make. It seems to me to avoid any of the extreme outcomes (immoral impositions are either everywhere or nowhere) we need a more nuanced standard for when an imposition is moral and when it is not.

Why are you conflating the 3 terms. I define each of them differently. — khaled

Well, perhaps it was just a misunderstanding then. What are virtuous or right actions?

A state of E (existing itself) vs. N (not existing), rather than default already existing E (where x, y, z intra-worldly affairs happen within it). — schopenhauer1

This implies something that doesn't exist can still have properties, which seems weird. Is everyone who doesn't exist nevertheless hanging around as some kind of disembodied soul?

Oh can we make no one suffer? Please tell me how? But since we obviously can't, simply not procreating is sufficient to prevent all harm to a future person, and it is sufficient to not impose unnecessarily challenges to be overcome on someone else's behalf. — schopenhauer1

This doesn't really relate to the question. I was wondering whether it's the suffering that matters or the lack of choice.

No rather, the fact that the happy natalists/optimists cruel next move is to just say something like "Oh well you always have the choice to kill yourself or find a piece of wilderness to slowly die" or something like that. But what a shitty choice.. Either be imposed by the things that you need to live or kill yourself. But where did this choice come from? Being born in the first place. — schopenhauer1

So can I take from this that bad choices are worse than not having a choice at all?

You know for a fact that a vaccine doesn't harm. That's non-negotiable. — khaled

That's simply not true. Most vaccines can potentially cause serious side effects, and you always gamble the long term benefits outweigh the short-term risk and the pain. It may be a very one-sided assessment, but you're certainly putting your own assessment in place of the child's.

You don't. Both are subjective. Some are having a blast with life, some hate it. — khaled

So what you wrote earlier was just made up BS you don't actually apply in practice? I am confused as to what your actual position is.

The child's assessment which is obviously not available. That would require a time machine. — khaled

So, again, you realise your standards cannot possibly work but you still insist they're correct?

Not really. If I count myself as part of the calculation then I don't have to live as a hermit somewhere. Could you give an example as to why it would lead to me living as a hermit? What harm am I inflicting by being in society that is so bad I must instead suffer myself so as not to cause it? — khaled

For one, I don't see how you could possibly live together with anyone else if you find having to do additional chores as a result fundamentally immoral. That is unless you genuinely like menial work so much you actually want to do it for it's own sake.

To say nothing about things like taxes.

It is a fact of the matter that if you don't consider something a duty you will be less likely to do it (which is why I call doing it anyways virtue) — khaled

I can see how this works if we're looking at someone else's decision from the outside. If they do something I consider a moral duty, but they don't, I could say they're being virtuous.

I don't see the internal monologue if you're considering your own actions though. What would it mean to conclude that something is virtuous, but you "don't have to do it"? The entire point of figuring out what is and isn't right/virtuous/moral is to tell yourself what you have to do.

No it wouldn't though. My personal assessment of whether life is worth living should be applied for myself, not for others. — khaled

Aren't you directly contradicting your earlier example about vaccinating children here? And apart from that, how are you going to assess whether there is "more harm then good" in general if you're not allowed to generalise your own judgement?

Just because I find life worth living doesn't mean my child will, and so my assessments are unimportant. — khaled

What other assessment could possibly apply?

Still wrong to force people to do it. Much less so than slave labor, but still bad. — khaled

Which once again brings us back to the issue that your standards could only possibly be upheld by living as a hermit somewhere.

There is a practical difference. I don't have to donate to charity if I don't want to for instance, whereas by your standards you have to. You would also have to volunteer, etc as long as you're capable. — khaled

I'll second @Isaac here. You don't somehow loose your ability to act differently if you recognise a moral obligation.

Yes, then you would be correct. Different states. — schopenhauer1

Like which ones?

But these are also different cases. These are self-imposed. I have nothing against that. It is creating unnecessary harm and impositions, in an absolute sense for someone else. This is the height of paternalism (and again, not in a literal sense.. which it is too, but meaning that someone knows better for someone.. and worse knows better to the point that suffering and impositions have to be overcome by the person born due to someone else's decision.. even if intentions are good that it is for the child's "benefit"). — schopenhauer1

So, to leave the boundaries of accustomed debate a bit: Why does it matter whether it's self-imposed? If it's about avoiding suffering, it's not necessarily obvious why we care about concepts of choice or consent. Why aren't we paternalistic and just make sure no one suffers, regardless of choice?

There are some choices, but certainly not the choice to not have these choices in the first place. That can never be when born. — schopenhauer1

So is having choices good or bad now?

One is about inter-wordly affairs (should we impose existence, and the harms and challenges to overcome that come with a usual life) — schopenhauer1

I wasn't aware we were traveling between worlds in a literal sense.

In the intra-worldly scenario, it is an instrumental case. Survival, comfort, entertainment is necessary, and when the child becomes an adult has no other choice (unless they are okay with death or somehow finding a remote wilderness to hack it alone) to follow the impositions of a given society. — schopenhauer1

See, here is the negative framing again. That the only reason anyone would accept having obligations imposed on them, or having to endure suffering, is if they were forced to in order to survive. This seems to me a very reductive view of human sociality. As I have alluded above, if that were true, noone would be having children in the first place, since having children comes with both obligations and suffering attached, and it certainly is not necessary for survival nowadays.

But it really applies beyond that, to all forms of human community. Engaging with others always comes with impositions and the possibility of suffering. Beyond anti-natalism, your view seems to imply that the best way to live is as an individual detached from all obligations, and therefore all relationships.

But none where you cause more pain than you alleviate. When I talk of “harm” I mean causing more than you alleviate. So vaccinating a child isn’t harm, even though it hurts and is against their wishes. — khaled

In other words, there are qualifications. So it would really come down to your personal assessment of whether life is worth living.

It’s not bad in itself. But forcing it on others is wrong. Take forced labor for example. — khaled

What about being forced to do the dishes every other day?

Why not? — khaled

There doesn't seem to be any practical difference.

So are pain and heartbreak. Yet we agree you shouldn’t cause those. — khaled

Without any qualification? If you're in an abusive relationship, surely you should cause heartbreak. It'd be just as easy to come up with situations where you should cause pain.

But this wasn't really where I way going with the argument. I was wondering what's so bad about having obligations, impositions, being in relationships with others, in the abstract.

I don’t know where you get that. I’m just saying you can’t derive a should from a would. — khaled

I wasn't deriving any shoulds. That would look very different. I was talking about your differentiation between "things that I think are virtous and that I would do" and "thinks I should do, in the sense that I am morally obliged to", which I cannot make much sense of.

Instead of rehashing the same arguments made on this forum a dozen times before, I'd like to look more at the underpinnings of your view. Why is it a principle "not to cause an imposition"? Aren't impositions a right and proper part about being human?

I think it's interesting that an Anti-Natlist has a very strong individualist, classical-liberal bend. I wonder if you share it. After all, you do also make your argument around the idea of imposition without consent.

It's interesting because one of the things that's most significant about having children is that you take up some of the strongest obligations possible.

I’m just saying that not everyone thinks they have this moral obligation to help with problems they didn’t cause. — khaled

Yes, obviously. Of course people tend to underestimate the problems they do cause.

I don’t think it’s weird. Everybody eats. Doesn’t make it moral or immoral. — khaled

I get it, you're no longer interested in this conversation.

Right. But "what rules would we want everyone to follow" is not answered by "What does everyone usually do" (in this case save drowning person). — khaled

No, but it's still weird to insist it cannot be an obligation even though you'd not expect anyone to object to doing it.

Yes but I find it easier to believe that people do not agree on a single moral philosophy than that we do agree, but are just morally bankrupt. — khaled

But do you not also consider having children "morally bankrupt", to use your words?

I don't think morality should be deduced from what we all would do. — khaled

How else could it be deduced, other than by asking, in some form, what rules we would want everyone to follow?

It's not what I should do if "should" implies that I would be wrong not to do it. — khaled

What use would morality be if it didn't tell you right from wrong?

By that standard our society is totally morally bankrupt. — khaled

Perhaps it is. There are certainly problems with exploitation, both of other humans and of nature in general.

If helping homeless people was a duty, there would be no homeless people. — khaled

This doesn't follow, since even if everyone agrees to a single moral philosophy, not everyone would always act in accordance with it.

Lets assume we have found the "perfect charity" where you know exactly what your money is getting used for and it directly improves the lives of others. If such a thing existed would people be obligated to donate now? — khaled

Yes, provided you have the means. Though this is essentially a circular argument, because by saying it's the "perfect charity" in this context we're basically already starting that it would be moral to give to it.

And also not my idea. Where did I say "Whose only duty is not to interfere". You can help if you want, you just don't have to. I don't understand why whenever I share this view people worry that it will somehow suddenly make people cold and uncaring towards each other. The idea that I don't have a moral obligation to save a drowning person doesn't mean I won't.

Also, counterfactual? Since when are we talking about facts? — khaled

My goal was more to point out exactly the difference you set out here, which to me looks like a performative contradiction. You're presumably not "cold and uncaring", nor do you act as if you have no duties to help strangers - e.g. help a drowning man. Yet you insist that it isn't your duty. But why shouldn't something we'd all agree to do be a duty? If it's what we should do, then it is our moral duty.

I'd like to ask about your view then. Do you think that people are obligated to donate to charity? And if not why do you think people are obligated to save others from drowning when they can but are not obligated to donate to charity? — khaled

Donating to charity is an impersonal process. There are
also manyy different kinds of charity. So "donating to charity" is too broad to make any singular moral judgement about. Helping a specific drowning person is a concrete situation you can judge.

We could use a more direct example instead of donating to charity, like giving money to a beggar on the street. There are obvious moral complications, like whether you are supporting a drug addiction or somesuch, but I think one can establish a moral duty to give to people in need. The more pressing moral concern though would be to support systematic changes to ensure less people are in need.

I don’t have many of those. Outside of having to try and make up to someone after harming them you don’t really have to do anything morally speaking outside of just not harm people in my view. — khaled

As I have noted before, society can be conceptualised as a net of obligations to one another, from being obliged to protect the life of your children to being at least expected to give strangers directions if they ask. The idea that you're an island whose only duty is to not interfere with other islands unless in a transaction is not only counterfactual, it's downright distopian.

In an arithmetical sense, 3+5 results 8, for example, same as 1+7. I know it seems overly simplistic in this example but that is my intention, because it extrapolates to any possible extent. — Marax

That probably depends on what interpretation of quantum mechanics you ascribe to. The Copenhagen interpretation would, I think, lead to the conclusion that a given cause can have one of a number of different effects, selected probabilistically. I am not sure it works the other way around.

Under any kind of hard determinism, on the other hand, all states are unique and follow from one another, so there couldn't be more than one path either to or from an event.

In this sense, is reality a cause or an effect? — Marax

I don't think the question makes sense, because the idea that there are causes and effects is one way to organise reality. Reality itself isn't in a causal relationship with anything else.

and, if two causes can result in the same effect, is "reality" objectively undetermined and determined only by our imagination, as how I imagined a subjective yet feasible cause? — Marax

Well, if reality is determined by our "imagination", it doesn't appear that we have control over said imagination. On the one hand, it seems logical that reality could only be some sort of imagination, since it must be some model in our minds, created by those minds. But reality is also really stubborn, reasserting the same principles again and again, at least on the macro scale.

I'd go further to say that there is no such thing as a "positive moral duty". If it's a duty then doing it is what is expected, it is not positive. — khaled

"Positive" here is used in a similar vein as "positivism" or "to posit". It's a positive duty because it obliges you to act in a specific way. A negative duty on the other proscribes certain behaviour. It establishes ways you should not act, the command includes a negation, hence it's called "negative".

If you have a duty not to harm others for instance, and so you do not harm others, you are not being virtuous, you're doing the bare minimum. To be virtuous you have to go out of your way and actually help someone with something, which I repeat you don't have to do. — khaled

I'm not sure I follow this distinction. If virtue is to act in accordance with a system of morality, then it doesn't seem to matter what grammatical form any obligation takes.

There are almost unlimited ways to formulate rules/obligations/imperatives. You could say that you should help those in need according to your ability as well as saying you should not withhold help you're capable of giving without danger to yourself. What matters is less how you formulate your rules and more how the system as a whole functions.

For example, the rule "first, do no harm" has very different effects in a system where "harm" is understood to be a specific violation of an enumerated "freedom" as opposed to a system where "harm" is understood to be any consequence by which a moral subject ends up with less ability for self-actualisation than before.

What do you mean "transactional"? — khaled

Generally, this refers to a view of society that is comprised of individuals meeting each other on a level playing field with no previous obligations, and where the goal of social interaction is ultimately to restore that state of no obligations.

It's called "transactional" because it treats all human interactions as market transactions between strangers. For historical reasons, this view of society underpins the idea of rights and freedoms which traces back to classical liberalism. It also lends itself to a moral philosophy which is fundamentally based around what you should not do, where positive moral duties are exceptions that arise if you have in some sense an outstanding debt. Hence again this is a transactional view where moral subjects have no standing connections to each other, and any interaction is concluded with reinstating that status quo.

And I would argue that even if you somehow knew that your next child would do something great (which is impossible) it is the right decision not to have them. That it would be right to have them would imply that the suffering of the child doesn’t matter, as long as he alleviates the suffering of others which I find is a disgusting idea. If I knew my next child would cure cancer but also that he’d suffer severely during his life I wouldn’t have them. In my view: You do not have a duty to help people, but you do have a duty not to harm them. — khaled

The sense I get from this is that you somehow imagine the perfect life to be some form of solitary existence in a state of bliss, which I find kinda odd. Isn't the point of living in a community to help others? To imagine duties as only negative is to imagine yourself to be untied from everyone around you, which of course you are not.

Tangential to the topic, I know.

But it does. Only in situations where someone is capable of suffering, does the position become valid. — schopenhauer1

The term "valid" usually refers to the structure of an argument. You're obviously not using it that way, the problem is I don't know what you mean by it.

Morality is a practical consideration that arises when moral subjects interact. Outside such an interaction, there are no moral judgements. They're not somehow inherent in the state of the universe. To assume moral states of affairs is to treat morality as some object, like a physical law, which can be empirically described.

2) No suffering in the world means no people who suffer, nor people deprived of happiness. The instant a person is put into the world, the antinatalist position becomes valid. You do not need people to exist in order to recognize that the "good" of not existing is taking place. All you need is the fact that if someone does exist, the position becomes valid at that point. We can have millions of years of nothingness, and then this position would be sort of "activated". Once something exists where suffering would take place, then it becomes valid. — schopenhauer1

This only makes sense if you presume there exists some divine logos which is the source of morality and also capable of recognising possible states of "good" and "evil".

Otherwise, the phrase "You do not need people to exist in order to recognize that the "good" of not existing is taking place" just doesn't make any sense.

Good write-up. I would add that the core notion that any risk of suffering ought to be either mitigated or completely prevented is, on closer examination, a very dubious proposition. You allude to this in the reductio ad absurdum at the end of your post.

The anti-natalist position necessarily treats suffering as an absolute evil. The idea is borrowed from standard utilitarianism. But utilitarian positions are usually concerned with relative suffering for a given number of moral subjects. This has it's own problems, but it can at least plausibly refer to the preferences of those subjects to choose the path that entails less suffering as the source of the moral imperative.

Anti-natalism, on the other hand, doesn't have any such basis. There is nothing here to give the supposed imperative any weight. There are no subjects to benefit, and the actual addressee doesn't even feature in the consideration. It could only possibly be grounded in some divine principle, and that is in effect how the argument treats it. Which is also the reason why the anti-natalist position can imagine a world without moral subjects to nevertheless be a moral good.

But for natalists it is not unknown. They know for a fact that having a child will risk harming them. And they also know for a fact that that decision need not be made. — khaled

But the decision does need to be made. Because not having children is also a decision. If you're going to treat a potential existence as a moral subject, you have to do so consistently for both options. So it's not:

1- Take an unjustified risk with someone else's life
2- Don't. — khaled

It's rather:
1. Bring a life into existence and risk it suffering
2. Deny that life it's existence.

I don't think the GOP has applied pressure on it's members to contest the election.

Concerning the Justices, I don't think this is a matter of the GOP directly putting pressure on them. They're not beholden to them. It would be more likely a situation where the GOP can present a case that "the people" want a certain result and the candidate in question just happens to also support the kinds of things the religious conservatives find important.