P is that Superman stopped the train in this manner.

P is true at a physically impossible world.

By virtue of this, we know P is also true at a metaphysically and logically impossible world.

True? — frank

Isn't it logically and metaphysically possible for the laws of physics to be different from what they are?

Concerning modal knowledge, it seems similar to the problem of induction. In order to make alethic modal statements based on a posteriori sources, you need to go from specific examples to general rules. So you are using an inductive process.

If you genuinely can't think of any reason someone might write for a forum such as this other than to 'prove' they're right, then that explains quite a lot a lot about the direction of your posts. — Isaac

Not only is that a misrepresentation of what I said, it's also poisoning the well.

I think it's fair to ask you why you started arguing a point here, given your position on the value of argument as a whole. I find it incoherent to on the one hand state:

that it cannot be resolved and is just a result of confusion over terms — Isaac

, but to at the same time take a position within the argument, namely that it's "better" to consider meaning to be objective.

If I come across as annoyed, it is because I am getting the impression that you are on the one hand taking a position in a specific discussion but on the other hand deflecting any criticism by denying the value of the discussion itself. Perhaps I am just misunderstanding you though.

Have you read Kuhn? I think your account of 'the scientific method' and the history of its development is flawed. — Isaac

I have not. I am vaguely familiar with his concepts of paradigm and the paradigm shift, which I consider fairly useful. What I know of his theories doesn't seem to be opposed to what I said. If you think it's worth considering, perhaps you could sketch the argument for me?

This is very interesting, care to name a few? — Isaac

Sure. In no particular oder: Stoicism, Kant's categorical imperative, the collection of different forms of logic, universal human rights, the concept of a social contract, various arguments against religious dogma, economic theory and of course the philosophy of science.

Not one that can be carried out entirely 'from the armchair' though, that's the point. One must use it an observe the results. One cannot simply deduce that it will work. — Isaac

You have to start somewhere though. If you start by observing, and go on observing, how do you arrive at anything other than observing?

The difference is, I have no intention of doing so. — Isaac

Right, and this is the reason for my annoyance. Because it looks to me like you started making a specific argument, which you now claim you never intended to follow up on.

I don't think there is a 'right' here in an objective sense. You're the one who thinks that there can be a 'right' and answer based on logical deduction, so I expected to read those deductions. — Isaac

Are you asking me to provide a full derivation from first principles, or are you merely unsure of what my exact position is? If it's the former, I don't think that's a reasonable request to make. If it's the latter, I can provide you with some quotes from my past posts.

What did you "already do"? You haven't given any examples of objects whose origin, whether natural or artificial, is open to serious doubt. — Janus

I have - prehistoric tools.

I can respond to that part of what you write that I think is relevantly responding to what I have been saying. — Janus

You can also respond to the rest, if only to say that you don't see it's relevance. That way, I am not left wondering whether or not you read my posts at all.

So, as I see it, what you claim is a relevant response is not so at all. I haven't claimed that texts "fully represent" author's intentions, much less "brain states". What I have said is that texts and other intentionally produced artifacts are the result of cultural conditions and their makers' intentions (which are themselves correlated with neural states) and that they therefore have a different kind of material origin than naturally occurring objects. — Janus

That is so trivially true that it's not worth debating. I don't believe that this was your initial point, and if it was it wasn't very clear.

What purpose does "ontologically" serve here? Symbols carry meaning; if they didn't ancient texts would heave no meaning to decipher. This is a very straightforward argument. — Janus

The purpose of specifying ontology is to go beyond such trivial claims as "symbols carry meaning" or "intentional objects have a different kind of origin from natural objects" and ask what meaning is and how it is carried.

Your "straightforward argument" has been addressed several times by now, repeating it doesn't get us anywhere.

I don't think it is "equally reasonable" to say that ancient artifacts are no different to natural objects in that they do not embody any intentional meaning. — Janus

I have explained multiple times how I think meaning "works". You can keep repeating you disagree, but unless you engage with my actual argument we won't get anywhere.

We are just going to talk past one another it seems, so I am not going to continue this conversation any further; I would rather just acknowledge your disagreement and leave it at that. — Janus

It seems this topic inevitably leads to the claim of "talking past each other" with no way to resolve the alleged misunderstanding. I find it puzzling, but of course it's your decision. See you around!

But I think that your problem is imagining that it's a problem that I'm imagining it, when that isn't a problem at all, it's actually just an old Berkeleyan argument which is deceptive and illogical. — S

Sigh. Thanks for repeating this, I had overlooked it the first 500 times you said it.

And no, if you try to make my position subjective,
with all of this "looks like" and "yellow" and whatnot, then you're doing it wrong. I'm not a subjectivist, so I don't go by a subjectivist interpretation. I'm an objectivist and go by my own objectivist interpretation. You'd have to apply the right interpretation to avoid drawing an irrelevant conclusion.

Why would it supposedly matter whether I could or couldn't explain it to them? I don't accept that anything of relevance hinges on that to begin with. If you manage to justify this hidden premise of yours then I'll accept that it matters, but until then, this does nothing. — S

It wasn't intended as an argument. It was intended as a thought exercise to try to bridge the apparent failure to communicate. To perhaps bring out the hidden premises, as you call it. Oh well.

No, which approach works is connected to which approach works. One might presume a successful approach works because of its corresponding to the way the world actually is, but we do not need to know if it is. — Isaac

Or one might simply say that if an apporach works, it tells us something about how the world actually is (it's structure is such that the approach works, at least in our perception). I think that's less confusing, anyways.

I'm not ignoring it, arguing that it cannot be resolved and is just a result of confusion over terms is not ignoring it, its just not dealing with it in the way you want. — Isaac

Thanks for clarifying then. I wasn't aware that this was what you were trying to do. I tried asking a few times, but maybe I worded my questions wrongly.

They very obviously can't. If the truth of a proposition outside of empirical observation were derived from a timely mechanistic check of each step against rules of logical validity then what the fuck do you think philosophy has been arsing around with for the last 2000 years? Do you think this matter has only just come up? That we're at the coal face here, checking each step against our table of 'logically valid moves'? Are we soon going to have to report back to the world "Done it! And the answer is..." — Isaac

The 2000 years (a low estimate I think) of disagreement come from trying to figure out what the correct premises are. And it took a while for the rules of logic to coalece to the extend they have today. And even then, not all philosophy is analytic philsophy.

I understand your view, but whenever this comes up, I point out that it took us thousands of years to come up with the scientific method itself. Even though it now seems entirely self-evident and "true". It's maybe the most universally accepted piece of philosophy there is. If there is no way to progress in philosophy, how did we come up with it, and why did it only happen a few hundred years ago?

There's one of two possible scenarios I can see. Either it is not possible to judge arguments by their logical validity with sufficient granularity to obtain any useful results, or, it is possible to do so, but the process takes at least 2000 years and seems to require an unfeasible amount of circling back to previous ideas. — Isaac

I'd argue that philosophy has come up with quite a few useful results over the last 2000 years.

I certainly don't deny any knowledge outside of empirical theories. I explain why the scientific method works by the same justification as I'm arguing for philosophical theories. Theories that work stay, theories that don't work go. — Isaac

Ah, but that causes an infinite regress, because "working" also needs to be defined. That's easy to do for empirical science (because we were all brought up with the scientific method already part of the culture), but how do we know whether or not, say, a theory on moral philosophy "works"?

Any theories that are still working are still in the running. You can add useful devices like Occam's razor, but again, no one deduced that these devices work, we tried them, they produced useful results, so we kept them. — Isaac

Deciding that a device works and should therefore be kept is a deduction.

That's fine, but you haven't explained why you're right and I'm wrong, only that you think one thing and I another. — Isaac

No, I haven't. Neither have you. That was my point. Your original argument relied on that definition being "right".

Again I refer you to the 2000+ years of philosophical investigations thus far, do you really think the first two options are going to get us anywhere? — Isaac

If you don't think so, then why the hell are you still here?

But that leads to seemingly absurd logical consequences. A sign saying "Caves up ahead" wouldn't mean that there are caves up ahead? Just because no one is there interpreting it? :brow:

How do people even take this claim seriously? — S

The only thing I can offer you at this point is a bit of armchair psychology, namely that I think your problem is that you are imagining a scenario without humans, but when you are then trying to look at that which remains, you are looking at it from a human view (in this case, literally imagining a yellow sign with text on it).

As an exercise, let's imagine the only humans left are blind, and have been for generations. How would you explain to them what a yellow sign with text on it even is?

By which works best to achieve our goals. — Isaac

That only works if our goals are not connected to the question what meaning is, which is to say the goals are entirely off-topic for this discussion. Again I feel I need to point out that this thread has a topic, which you are now apparently entirely ignoring.

Yes, and I've asked you several times now for an explanation of how we judge which arguments are true, if not by empirical methods. — Isaac

Empirical methods don't judge arguments. We have the scientific method, which is empirical, and it generates theories. Arguments are judged by their logical validity. And the premises can be judged based on whether they agree with current theories generated by the scientific method, or they can be derived from synthetic a priori statements. An example for the latter would be the famous "I think, therefore I am".

If you deny any knowledge outside of empirical theories, you run into the problem of having to explain why the scientific method works to generate those theories.

That's just not the definition though. The definition is emitting particles, it's an action, not a state. You can re-state the definition to suit your world-view, but I'd wonder why you were doing so. — Isaac

But we're not talking about what the definitions say. Your argument goes like this: radioactivity, as defined by the dictionary, is a property, radioactivity is defined in the dictionary as having emitted radioation. Therfore, the definition of radioactivity references past events. Therefore, properties can reference past events.

But I disagree with the premise. I don't think "radioactive" is a property if you stick to the letter of that definition. I think the dictionary definition provides a shorthand reference to the actual property of radioactive substances, which is that their atoms are unstable and therefore prone to emit radiation.

Yes, but others don't, so now what? — Isaac

They either think about it and revise their decision, think about it and point out the flaws in my argument, or ignore me and go on with their lifes.

No, if you want to claim there is no inherent difference between objects intentionally produced and those naturally produced then you would need to provide an actual example of an object whose kind of origin, whether artifical or natural, cannot be determined. — Janus

I already did in a previous response to you. I also already pointed out that we have no way of telling how many artificial objects we have wrongly identified as natural.

So, the discussion cannot continue unless you clarify what you were referring to there; that is clarify what you think I was arguing for, why you think I was no longer arguing for it, and why you think what I was saying instead ( "pointing out its nuances") doesn't address the points you raised. You need to address specific points; if you just make sweeping statements how am I to know what you are referring to ? — Janus

I think what you were saying didn't adress the points I raised becuse it didn't adress the points I raised. You ignored my entire post save for the two sentences you quoted. Here is a relevant quote from my post:

You therefore have to explain how "the intention for the text to mean X", as a mental state, is represented by a brain state and this brain state is then fully represented by the text.

And for that, we need to identify a property of the text at present that carries that information. — Echarmion

As a response you simply repeated that you think that the text "embodies" something of the intentions of the author. You then went on to explain how that position is compatible with different interpretations. But that's taking several further steps ahead when we are still talking about how the intention is linked to the text in the first place.

The topic oft the thread is "the ontology of linguistic meaning". I think you were arguing in favor of the position that meaning is, ontologically, a property of the symbols or sounds themselves. As opposed of it being merely an interpretation created by minds.

It's not a "given definition of reasonable"; you have to give reasons for what you are saying, that is what it means to be reasonable. Of course any reasons will be based on some presupposition or other, there are no arguments that are not grounded on some presupposition or other. If our starting presuppositions are at odds, then there is no point arguing about anything because we will simply talk past one another and waste a lot of time and energy. — Janus

I am not disagreeing with any of that in principle. But it does mean that two conflicting positions can both be equally reasonable. That is not something everyone will agree with.

Also I am not merely concerned to set out definitions of meaning. I am simply saying that according to ordinary usage of the term an ancient manuscript is meaningful even if we cannot decipher it. We see it as a meaningful object even if we don't know what it means. I have also been arguing that since such an object is, in principle at least, decipherable, it must embody meaning. If it didn't embody any meaning then it would not be decipherable; that is, there would be nothing to decipher. It embodies meaning simply because it was intentionally produced to convey something, to be meaningful. — Janus

I am not disagreeing with a undeciphered manuscript being meaningful to humans. As long as it's identifiable as texts to humans, one could even say it has "linguistic meaning". I just don't think it follows that the object must therefore embody meaning absent of human minds. Humans can decipher symbols created by other humans because they can put themselves in the shoes of the hypothetical writer. That same process can also be used to "decipher" the meaning of natural disasters or illness, by presuming an intentional actor behind those events and imagining their thought process.

This explains both how a text can "have" a relatively stable meaning while at the same time being subject to various interpretations. And it does not have to explain how the meaning travels from the author to the text and then back to the reader, which again I haven't yet seen anyone explain.

Of course not. How on earth could we possibly judge which position was true? The question is whether meaning is best seen as something that persists objectively without minds or not. I can't think of any way we could check which is true. Maybe you mean something by 'true' that is different to my meaning. For me, it is true that P if P. So, it is true that meaning persist without minds if meaning persists without minds - something we can never possibly know empirically. — Isaac

And how can we possibly judge how to "best see" meaning if no true statements can be made about what meaning is? Of course we cannot know empirically what meaning is ontologically, but we're not doing empirical science. We are trying to figure out, with arguments, what can be known about the ontology of meaning.

But that's my point. It isn't at all peculiar. We do it all the time. Do we not say that a property of Carbon-14 is that it is radioactive? And have we not just established that radioactive literally means emitting particles. Therefore we very clearly do talk about a property of an object being something it has done and will do but is not currently doing. — Isaac

We haven't "established" that. That's your interpretation of the phrase "X is radioactive". But what about this interpretation: "the atomic structure of X is such that it's unstable and prone to decay, with an average chance of Y per T"?

I took your line of argument to be that it was not possible to define property this way, so an argument that it is is a viable counter. Again (as you've yet to answer) if we're not comparing the merits of these alternative possible ways of talking, then what is it you think we're doing. If you think we're trying to find which one is 'right' how are you going to know when we've got there? — Isaac

The thread title is "the ontology of linguistic meaning". If we were comparing the merits of alternative possible ways of talking, then all we'd have to decide is whether or not we are communicating effectively. That is very clearly not what anyone in this thread has been doing so far. I have given arguments for why I think meaning is something that occurs in minds and is not part of the text absend any minds, i.e. without minds there will be no meaning. Obviously, I think that these arguments represent "knowing when we've got there". If you think these arguments do not work or cannot possibly answer the question, I'd like to know why.

And yet again, one cannot even wonder what to do about the various factual trends that have been observed and catalogued, because one has been diverted into a fruitless tit for tat argument about predictions. It's a lawyerly tactic of diverting attention away from the evidence that cannot be seriously questioned. And it is illegitimate and inappropriate. Objection, your honour. — unenlightened

A Problem might be that there is very little new to say about the problem, and a philosophy forum isn't necessarily the best place to look for expertise on how to deal with the ecological crisis.

There is little reason to hope that world leaders, be they democratically elected or not, will take any steps with serious side effects until significant and visible damage has occurred. The same is, broadly speaking, true for individual lifestyle changes. The only viable way to improve those chances is individual activism. So, we should all campaign, actively and seriously, for major policy changes. But will we? And where do we go for the right policies to campaign for?

If you mean to say that the natural occurrence of an object indistinguishable from a carved stone tablet or a manuscript is possible, then I think you're dreaming. Of course nothing at all can ever be known with the kind of absolute certainty that you seem to be demanding, and many of the most wildly implausible things are logically possible. — Janus

I know of no law of physics that prohibits such a natural formation. It is, of course, highly unlikely. But the point of thought-experiments is not to provide probable predictions. It's to highlight the points at which arguments break down.

What position did you take me to be arguing for? Set that out and I will tell you whether I was arguing for what you think I was. — Janus

That's an absurd approach to a debate. If you think I have misunderstood you, I am happy to apologize and allow you to clarify.

What we have been arguing about here is what it is reasonable to believe, and what it is reasonable to say, and also whether the terms we use in saying what we say are in accordance with ordinary usage. So, I have been arguing that it is reasonable to say that an intentionally produced inscribed stone tablet embodies meaning, on account of the fact that it was meaningful in the culture within which it was produced, and also on account of the possibility that what it meant could be, at least to some significant degree, deciphered. — Janus

For a given definition of reasonable, sure. You can define terms any way you like. But what was the point in arguing if all you wanted to do was tell us one of the possible definitions of "meaning"?

Yes, you could say that. I'd more emphasise that I'm making the case for there being no purpose behind arguments to the contrary because there is no problem to solve by them. — Isaac

That sentence doesn't make much sense to me. You could argue the entire question is somewhat pointless, as it doesn't make any practical difference, but how can only one position on the question have "no purpose"? Isn't the question which position is true?

Exactly my point (except the last bit about utility). The object (Carbon-14) does not have to actually currently be emitting beta particles in order to have the property of being radioactive, even though radioactive means "emits particles of radiation". It is sufficient that it did emit such particles and that it could do again in the future.

So, with a word. If it did once cause a particular reaction in language users when spoken, then that is sufficient to say that the ability to cause such a reaction is a property of the word. — Isaac

But this is a very peculiar way to talk about properties. You're not really making an argument here, merely asserting that it's possible to define property in such a way as to refer to past events that were in some way caused by the object. Of course it's possible to define any word any way you like, but there is still a difference between properties that an object has, and which are detectable by only observing the object itself, and the entire history of an object, which you cannot know from just observing the object. This is why the actual configuration of the atom is different from the past uses the atom was put to.

I would say that a text, insofar as its author created it for some reason, embodies something of the intentions of its author. A text also possesses intentionality in the phenomenological sense that it is about something. But all texts can be transliterated or paraphrased in various ways which can yield a number of more or less different interpretations. The so-called "literal" meaning of an ancient text, as is the case with a modern text, will be detremined by the common use of the icons, symbols, words, phrases, and so on, in the culture in which it was created. — Janus

It seems to me, though, that you have essentially stopped actually arguing for your position, and are now imply pointing out it's nuances. Which is fine, it just doesn't adress the points I raised.

I haven't said a text "includes" all past states leading to its creation. What does "include" even mean here? The text is the result of all past states leading to its creation. Each instantiation of a text is thus unique, but all reproductions of an original text are obviously causally connected to the original. . — Janus

Right. But in that case, how exactly do the past states imbue the current text with meaning? What is your argument?

I never said "correct". What possible measure of "correct" could we be using here? Against which table of answers are we comparing ours to check if it's right? I said "unproblematic". — Isaac

As above, I never said "... actually are", and as above, if you're interested in getting at how things "actually are" what are you going to use to see how close you've got — Isaac

Presumably, you are making a case for meaning to be objective and using the "unproblematic" use of language as an argument. If that's not what you're doing, then what were you trying to say?

But we don't talk about the instability of the configuration of protons and neutrons. We talk about the emission of beta radiation. We don't say that a property of Carbon-14 is that its neutrons are arranged in such-and-such a way, we say that it is radioactive, meaning, quite clearly, that it emits (in this case) beta radiation. — Isaac

Yes, but when we say a substance is "radioactive", we do not mean to say that every single atom is at this exact point in time decaying and emitting radiation. We treat "radioactive" as a property of the substance because it's atoms are unstable, not because the substance is used to produce radiation.

This splitting hairs over the exact meaning of common phrases is precisely why arguments from "ordinary language" don't work.

I don't know about Janus, but this is not an accurate paraphrasing of my position. What I'm saying is that the meaning of a word is not what the author intended it to mean, it is what the word is used for. — Isaac

Whether you use a past intent or a past use, the argument stays the same. The history of an object is not necessarily a property of the object, for the reasons stated.

When we say a tool "is used for" some task, we are not expecting it to actually be in such use at the time, it is an historical fact about that tool and yet we speak quite plainly of it as a property of the tool. I don't see any difference with the pattern of ink-marks we call a written word. If it was, at one time, used for a certain task, then such a history is a property of that word. Given that its use is its meaning, then its meaning is a property of that word. The same way its use for driving nails is a property of the hammer, its tendency to emit beta radiation is a property of Carbon-14... Past events and future potential are quite unproblematically spoken of as properties of the objects. — Isaac

This line of argument seems circular to me. You take a possible statement about an object "this object is used for X" and interpret this statement to mean that the (past and present) usage of the object is a property of the object. You then use this interpretation to prove that the interpretation is correct.

You're assuming the thoughts behind the statement and then you're further claiming that because people think this way, this is how things actually are. None of these steps really follow though.

The (historical) use of a tool is also not the same as the instability of certain configurations of protons, neutrons and electrons. That instability is a property of the atom whether or not that atom is currently decayed.

I'd say that is untrue: there is always a causal connection between the original work of Shakespeare and any copy of it. In any case I don't see the relevance to the present argument. — Janus

We know there is a material difference between an intentionally produced object and one that is not intentionally produced; and that difference consists in the neural and perhaps physiological activity that gave rise to the one and not the other. — Janus

It seems to me that, like @Isaac, you now identify the meaning the text objectively has with a meaning that the text was, at some point in the past, assigned by the writer. You treat the causal chain that lead to the text as a property of the text. That is not accurate though.

Assuming a material, causal universe it makes sense to treat the past as a material property, since all past states are embodied in the current state. However, that is a property of the universe in it's entirety. The current state of the universe includes it's past state, including the brain states of writers, but it does so only by virtue of including, by definition, every effect of every event.

This is not true for the text itself. The text does not include all past States leading to it's creation. If it did, it would have to include all information on the universe going back indefinitely. The text is a partial effect of the past state that includes some information, but not all. You therefore have to explain how "the intention for the text to mean X", as a mental state, is represented by a brain state and this brain state is then fully represented by the text.

And for that, we need to identify a property of the text at present that carries that information.

By the way: I am not getting notifications for your replies for some reason.

No, the thought experiment is not significant because such a thing has never happened and never will happen. — Janus

You cannot possibly know that it never will happen.

In practice we can always tell the difference between human-made and naturally occurring objects. If you disagree perhaps you can provide a counterexample. — Janus

I cannot tell the difference between stone age tools and stones chipped by chance, at least not with high certainty.

But if we limit ourselves to texts: it's a truism that everything we identify as a human text must be possible to identify as a human text. There is no telling whether we have correctly identified all human symbols from the past. Perhaps some old scribbles that look like art to us are really text? And there are things like the Voynich manuscript.

Anyways I don't claim that humans cannot identify human texts. I am saying we identify them by running them through our specifically human pattern recognition hardware. We figure out what texts say by imagining ourselves as the author of the text and using the result as the "meaning of the text". But that meaning never traveled from the text into our brains, because how would that even work?

There is a "material difference" between the two texts: and that difference is the way they were created. — Janus

That material difference is lost whenever the text is copied. The pixels on a computer screen displaying a work of Shakespeare have no material connection to the original document.

It doesn't matter whether we can tell the difference or not. — Janus

It does, because if you cannot tell me how the texts differ without begging the question, how can you argue your point?

The other point is that works of art never would be created by the "random work of monkeys" anyway, and nor would objects indistinguishable from ancient tablets or manuscripts occur naturally, so the whole thought experiment is not really of much significance. — Janus

Just because your position cannot deal with the consequences of the thought experiment doesn't mean it's insignificant.

Please list all aspects of this hypothetical that are wrong because it creates a bit of a problem for your side: So that dictionary (or whatever surviving texts) had meaning when humans were alive, then had no meaning for a long time, then suddenly had meaning again when the next "language capable" being shows up? — ZhouBoTong

The text was always the same, I am not supposing it materially changes as soon as a language capable intelligence shows up. The text is a specific configuration of matter. It was originally intended to convey information to other humans. A human that read the text could understand what it means. In that sense, the text "has meaning".

But without an intelligence to read the text, it's simply a configuration of matter. It still embodies information in a way, as does every configuration of matter. But it's indistinguishable from that other matter. To an intelligence that is quite unlike our own, the dictionary might be a sign of a complex lifeform, but it wouldn't contain words any more than the remains of our buildings do.

How are you interpreting the definition of meaning? google says meaning is (had to combine with definition for "mean" because google uses "meant" in definition of "meaning"): intending to convey, indicate, or refer to (a particular thing or notion); signify. — ZhouBoTong

I am trying, as much as possible, to stick with @S notion that meaning is "X means Y" in the sense of a dictionary definition. So meaning is the "particular thing or notion", the symbol conveys.

Where does your side's, "relative to an observer" come from? Don't get me wrong, obviously without an observer there is no one to understand the meaning. But so what? Totally separate point. Maybe someone will come along...right? And when that new person arrives, they do not invent the meaning...right? So it already existed...or not? — ZhouBoTong

It comes from starting what I know about meaning, that it's something that is in my head, and working backwards to see if it's also something outside my head. I know I have thoughts. I don't necessarily know that they correspond to something "out there". For meaning to be "out there", it has to be shown what and where it is, and how it gets from "out there" to "in here".

I haven't seen an answer to the first question, let alone the second. @S has said something nonphysical is going on, which is something I agree with, I just think the nonphysical something is happening in my mind. Certain configurations of matter cause certain thoughts in my head, but that doesn't mean the matter is the thoughts.

It would have no meaning unless someone who spoke the language the sonnet was written in viewed it. Then intentional meaning would probably be (incorrectly) imputed. It would still possess accidental meaning, though — Janus

Are you saying that an intentionally written sonnet always has meaning, but an accidentally written sonnet has meaning created for it upon viewing?

Wouldn't that require there to be some material difference between the two texts? And does the meaning of the intentional text then travel with every copy or representation of the text? How could a viewer tell whether the text they are looking at is a copy of the original, intentional sonnet by Shakespeare or the random work of monkeys?

Is the such a thing as free will? Do we really have full control over our own actions? Or do the current circumstances dictate what we choose to do? — Wolff

As long as some circumstances that dictate are part of our brain activity, and therefore a representation of our selves, cause and effect does not preclude free will.

All of these circumstances are also influencing each other, and it is the summation of all of these influences that determine the action that we will make. You might be a person that usually plays it safe and doesn’t take a lot of risks, but because all of the circumstances are in a certain way right now you decide to finally enter for that study course you’ve been putting off for years now. If the circumstances where different, like if you where not in the same financial situation or you didn’t have certain past experiences that tell you it’s important to try and improve yourself, you might have been putting it off for even longer. Or if you would have to decide on something else, that is less important to you than these studies, you would not take the same risk and play it safe like you normally do. — Wolff

But isn't that an example of a person making a decision based on who they are? If free will is not making decisions based on your internal process of reasoning, then what is it?

With all these factors from the past and the present influencing us, and many more we are not even aware of, where does free will come into play? — Wolff

It comes into play when you weigh the circumstances and make a decision.

The meaningfulness and the meaning of intentionally produced marks (heiroglyphics) is embodied in the marks themselves. It is the semiotically meaningful character of intentionally produced marks that distinguishes them from naturally occurring marks. If you can't understand that I dont know what else to say. — Janus

I understand what you are saying. But you're begging the question. How is it embodied? How does it travel from the marks to the reader? Absent humans or any similar intelligence, what constitutes the difference between meaningful marks and any other configuration of reality?

How many times do I have to repeat the point? Intentionally produced patterns are not the same as naturally occurring patterns; the former are semantically meaningful, and the latter are not. — Janus

Not the same to a human mind. You haven't established how they are not the same in any other way, e.g. physically.

By your lights an ancient text was meaningful when produced, became meaningless when it was lost, and became meaningful again when it was found. This is nonsense thinking. — Janus

No, by my lights an ancient text is meaningful to a human mind, but not meaningful outside of it. If meaning were to be found in the text itself, how would that meaning reach the mind of the reader? Does it travel on photons? Because that sounds like nonsense to me.

Actually the unintentional meaningfulness of natural patterns only supports the point that meaning is not merely in human or animal minds. — Janus

How so? You just said that intentionally produced patterns are not like other patterns.

Excuse me? The pattern of waves on the ocean do not have linguistic meaning, which I've said countless times is the only kind of meaning I'm talking about. — S

Unless there was a being capable of deciphering the meaning.

In what sense? You're not being very clear. Physically? No. In terms of meaning? Yes, obviously. Having meaning is obviously different from having no meaning. — S

Begging the question. That the scratches have themselves meaning is what you seek to establish.

It's only impossible to understand in practice, not in principle. In principle, if there was a being able to decipher the meaning there, then it could be understood. — S

That's true by definition, but it's also true of the pattern of waves on the ocean.

The difference is obviously that random scratches on a rock have not been given a meaning, so there isn't one. There is not, and was never at any point, a this means that. — S

And if someone did give meaning to the scratches? Would the scratches then be any different, objectively, than they were before?

Exactly! When scholars attempt to decipher ancient texts, they examine patterns of repeating symbols or heiroglyphics to discover clues to their meaning, and painstakingly construct the meaning of the text. Interpretations can be wrong, of course, at least in part.

But that they could be wrong about the meaning of an ancient text indicates that there must be a right interpretation; so it follows that the text has meaning, even if we cannot discover what it is. In something which consisted in merely random marks it would not be possible to construct any interpretation.

The fact that there are meaningful patterns in such texts is on account of their intentional nature. This is the salient difference between texts and naturally occurring patterns. texts are intentionally produced and forever embody that act of intentional production; and that just is what we call 'meaning'. — Janus

But that intentionality is only visible to an intelligence with something akin to human "rationality". Without an intelligence, the patterns would still be there, but patterns are literally everywhere.

If you were to ask, "What does it mean?", then that removes the subject from the equation. I can give an answer to that in objective terms. — S

But no matter how you phrase the question, you are still talking about what people want to communicate. They can be long dead people, but we are talking about words (symbols) that are supposed to be understood by someone. Even if you differentiate between meaning and understanding, for something to have meaning it must be possible to understand that meaning.

If it's impossible to understand the meaning, because e.g. nothing that speaks any language exists, how are words in a dictionary different from random scratches in a rock, or the pattern of waves on the ocean?

If we accept that there can be unknown, but decipherable meaning, in other words that there can be meaning there to be deciphered, then that would seem to commit us to accepting that meaning is not merely in the human mind. — Janus

Well meaning created by humans can be unknown but decipherable by humans. For any language to work at all, we need to be able to mirror other humans to some extend. We cannot read minds, yet we can approximate what other people think by listening/reading etc. This ability allows us to decipher meaning even in dead languages, but we do that by simulating what other humans think. The meaning doesn't travel from our eyes to our brains.

Methodological naturalism.

The main issue in this thread isn't with climate change predictions, it's with societal collapse predictions, which are not scientific, even if the reasons for predicting a collapse are scientific.

Consider the analogy with predictions about future automation displacing a large percentage of jobs. The studies about current technology might be sound, but prediction about how the technology will be applied and how workers and employers will adapt are not well understood. — Marchesk

What does methodological naturalism have to do with repeatability?

And I don't see how you go from "social processes are not well understood" to "therefore predictions about social processes are unscientific".

Thanks for that in-depth summary!

Science is all about repeatability, — Marchesk

That is a highly controversial statement. Which epistemological principle requires repeatability specifically?

Shows 3 year global trend of dropping temperatures. — King in the Desert

Are you sure you know what a trend is?

Look at the primary source, the IPCC assessment report:
https://archive.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_chapter_05.pdf — King in the Desert

How old is that report?

1. it predicts that we should have experienced an 15-18 degree C increase in global temperatures by now.

look at the global temperatures now, last winter, we were only 0.1 degree above the global mean.

that is not just a wrong prediction, you are not even in the same ballpark. — King in the Desert

From the executive summary of that report:
"near the Earth's surface, the global average warming lies between +1.5°C and +4.5°C, with a "best guess" of 2.5°C"

Where did you get your number from?

2. It predicts that rainforest would have lost 20% of its precipitation and would shrink due to climate change

completely false, precipitation is increasing. Again they are off not by a little, but by an order of magnitude. — King in the Desert

Again, from the executive summary:
"Precipitation: (...) the global average increases (...) by 3 to 15%..."

You probably tripped over this sentence:
" Total deforestation of the Amazon basin could reducee rainfall locally by 20%".

But that is talking about a specific hypothetical.

It's only relevant in a particular context, and it isn't relevant in the context I have set up. The subjective interpretation is useful in a subjective context, such as "What do you mean?", but it is obviously inappropriate in the context I'm talking about. I'm obviously talking about the objective angle, which you might well reject, but your rejection doesn't effect me. The objective context is as I set out, for example "What does it mean?". Again, it would be very silly to apply the subjective angle in a necessarily objective context, such as the post-subject scenario, but that doesn't stop idealists from frequently doing so. Metaphysician Undercover is a perfect example of that: "But who would be there to understand it?", "But how would it sound?", etc. These are frankly stupid questions to ask an objectivist, or anyone really, given that there's explicitly no subjects there. — S

Isn't accepting an objective context for meaning already the conclusion you want to draw? Your conclusion that meaning is objective is inherent in your premise that there is an objective context in which to discuss meaning.

Oh my god, what a joke. It's just a way of wording it which is relative or conditional, and yet maintains objectivity. Meaning is relative to the language rule. It's also a very common way of speaking: "What does 'chein' mean in English?", "It means 'dog' in English", "Sorry, I'm unfamiliar with that word in English, what does it mean?", "The word 'dog' in English means a furry creature with four legs and a tail which barks". — S

So what about the other very common way of speaking that I pointed out? Is that not relevant? And if it isn't, why not?

I think the global social collapse and extinction bit was unenlightened, not the guy from the two-bit college. — frank

No, I think it's the paper making these predictions. Though when it says "extinction event", it doesn't mean extinction of humans.

Massive disruption, yes, sooner or later. But that would be true even if there was no anthropogenic global warming. — frank

That's neatly sidestepping the issue. We are talking about a specific prediction about near-term societal collapse due to anthropogenic climate change. As @unenlightened said, you are free to ignore it, but not to call it "silly" without argument.

It means: in this language, x means y. That's also ordinary language use, and it doesn't have the problems of idealism. — S

And down the rabbit hole you go again. Sorry, as long as I have the impression that you're not honestly engaging with my posts, I won't continue putting effort into a discussion with you.

The author states: "We do not know for certain how disruptive the effects of climate change will be."

That is correct. — frank

But if there is a significant chance for massive disruptions, avoiding or alleviating such disruptions ought to be a major concern.

There's no way to make an accurate prediction like that. It's one thing to predict the climate 10 years from now. Seems like we have fairly good models. Society is a whole different animal. — Marchesk

We still ought to consider reasoned predictions. Just that the knowledge is not certain does not mean it isn't a relevant prediction.

Fine, no one is forcing you to do anything you don't want to. But the problems remain. And this is not meant as an insult, but I genuinely don't believe you when you say that you don't know this meaning. I think that you think that you have to say that in order to maintain your position. I think that it's like the photocopier guy from the video when he asks what a photocopier is. Did you watch the video I'm referring to? — S

I did watch parts of it. I am not sure how exactly it's relevant. I know what you mean, or what you want to establish. I just don't think it works that way.

If we go by ordinary language, the term "meaning" can be used as "I mean X" as well as "X means Y". So what is the proper, ordinary language use of meaning? I can make sense of "X means Y" as a short form of saying "When I (people) say X, I (they) mean (usually mean) Y". That seems like ordinary language use to me.

That might seem okay. That might seem like it works. But then we all die, and those rocks on Mars immediately cease to exist. And you find this plausible? — S

You already know what my position is, I am not going to discuss this with you again.

I still don't know how I am supposed to know what words mean without referencing things I have experienced.

So you've seen, heard, and felt rocks on Mars? — S

No, but I have seen, felt and heard rocks. And I've seen pictures of Mars (and also of rocks on Mars, but we can ignore that). So I have things to reference when you talk about rocks on Mars.

This presupposes that all rules governing language use are existentially dependent upon being shared. I don't think that's right. Some. Not all. — creativesoul

I was thinking in terms of how language rules could be established, and for that communication seems necessary. One can of course make up new rules in their heads. I thought up the tern "Quixpel" just now. It has a definition, so it's a kind of rule concerning language. But is it a rule governing language use?

What I am getting at here is that I can certainly make up new rules without communicating them. I can make up an entire language. But in order for these thoughts to become rules governing language use, they kinda need to be used, no? You can repeat the term "Quixpel" to me, but that's not talking about a Quixpel unless we somehow communicate the definition between us. And what language is "Quixpel" even part of before it's shared? It's in my head, but I speak two languages, and know some vocabulary from a couple more. Do I have a personal language including all the languages and vocabulary I know?

Rough and incomplete... but sure. Some. Not all. — creativesoul

Certainly rough and incomplete. I have no idea if what I wrote can account for grammar, for example. But since @S has specifically criticized that part, I think there is no way around language referencing observations. I just cannot think of any other way I know what things are other than to reference things I have seen, heard, felt etc.

Seeks to be, but perhaps fails to achieve this aim? I think that's the issue, isn't it? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

The scientific method is just that: a method. It doesn't seek to do anything, it's either correct or it's not. While some particulars of the scientific method can be debated, I can't see anyone arguing that it's entirely wrong.

So my question (thanks if you have made it so far) is if this is just an academic red herring or an example of how academic knowledge has fallen? Or am I just a believer in Eurocentrist science that doesn't get the point of decolonization of science? — ssu

As with many current discussion relating to gender, race and identity I think it's interesting to consider the specific cultural norms and prejudices that might be enshrined in the way we perform, view and teach science. No doubt it is interesting to contrast the approaches of different cultures to concepts like reality, knowledge and truth.

Where these kinds of approaches go astray is if they start to argue for an uncritical, or total, cultural, moral or epistemological relativism. I skimmed the article you linked, and the authors point out that relativism is not the point. It does, however , sound like this particular line of argument necessarily leads to it. Sentences like:

Indigenous ways of knowing nature combine the ontology of monism and spirituality with the epistemology of place-based, holistic, relational, and empirical practices in order to celebrate an ideology of harmony with nature for the purpose of community survival.

Certainly don't help.

What are rules themselves existentially dependent upon?

What do the rules themselves consist in/of?

Are these two answers the same? — creativesoul

These are interesting questions quite apart from any specific definition of the term "rule".

The rules would have to depend on some kind of communication. Otherwise they cannot be shared. That communication is not yet language, but it allows connections to be made on the part of observers.

The rules then consist of a bunch of connections of symbols (in any form) to observations, and connections of symbols to other connections and other symbols.

The bits of it I saw were a bit insane. What the hell has happened to the american democracy? Are these kinds of elected representatives the result of extreme gerrymandering? Or is there some sort of collective insanity going on?

It's on you to demonstrate the supposed logical link. It's unreasonable to expect me to do anything other than point out that, in my assessment, there isn't one. Put together a valid argument and we might just get somewhere. — S

What's unreasonable is to even try to have a discussion with you, so goodbye.

Just rocks. — S

Why not just answer my question? I am serious. If you believe yourself to be intellectually honest, you have to be able to answer.

If you weren't suggesting that they magically change, then what was your point? They are what they are. I've told you what they are. — S

I have told you what the point is further down in my post.

No it doesn't. It refers to a rock. Are you ever going to realise that what you're saying is just what you're reading into it, or is it futile for me to even try? — S

You can start by pointing out any single attribute of a rock that doesn't reference an observation.

There's only one world, which is this world, and in this world, it is a well supported fact that rocks preexisted us. — S

So, metaphysics doesn't exist, or is entirely nonsense?

No, because I provided an argument. You're sending us backwards when we should be going forwards. — S

We aren't going anywhere anyways, that much is abundantly clear.

How it's gathered is logically irrelevant. — S

Uh huh. Is that supposed to be another argument?

Rocks. — S

Rocks as they are in and of themselves?

There isn't any valid logical connection between your first sentence and your question. Your first sentence is logically irrelevant. — S

Uh, ok. Just replace the words "this theory" in the second sentence with the first sentence, then you have your question.

And you wouldn't need to ask your question if you understand the meaning of what I'm saying. Nothing I'm saying logically implies that rocks would somehow have magically changed. That might be your bizarre view, but it's not mine. Rocks are rocks. — S

Where did I say that rocks magically change? I know rocks are rocks, I never claimed they turn into cats or toasters.

But saying that doesn't resolve your problem. Let me explain. If rocks don't exist independently of observation, yet it is true that rocks preexisted all beings capable of observation, which it is, then you must explain how there was observation without any beings capable of observation. — S

Again "rock" refers to bunch of observations, sensory input. As long as we fundamentally disagree about what rocks are, all further discussion is pointless.

You are going to keep insisting that rocks predate humans, which is of course true if we talk about the physical world. I am going to respond that the physical world is the world of human observation, and as such cannot predate humans. You are talking about temporal relations within observed reality, I am talking about the logical relationship between observation and observer.

Hitchen's razor. — S

You claimed "absurd as a deviation from ordinary language is a valid criterion, so Hitchens razor applies to you just the same.

You can look up the wealth of scientific evidence supporting the claim that the world preexisted us, and you can try to argue the hugely implausible alternative, namely that the world immediately sprang into existence the very moment that we did. As for the latter, good luck with that. You're going to need it. — S

So is the argument that scientific evidence, which is gathered by observation, proves what the world is like beyond observation?

If you can't recognise an extraordinary claim as an extraordinary claim, then you're extraordinary yourself. — S

If you're going to insult me, at least put some effort into it.

Since you like to reference fallacies: poisoning the well.

Yes, I disagree with that because it's obviously wrong. It's ludicrous for human observations to have preexisted humans, yet rocks did. They did so for millions of years. So, again, you're doing something wrong. — S

Which begs the question: If a rock is not defined by reference to human observations, then what does the definition reference?

That rocks existed for millions of years is a theory based on observations. How does this theory say anything about what rocks are outside of observations?

Who was observing rocks when no one existed for there to be any observation of anything at all? Ludicrous. — S

Well no-one, obviously.

No, it's okay for people to summarise my position when they're competent enough to do so correctly.

I'm not claiming that it's incomprehensible as a language. I'm making points that it's unsound or a bad way of speaking or a combination of the two. — S

And incoherent is not an acceptable term for "unsound or a bad way of speaking"? Anyways this side argument seems rather pointless.

There was an "either" there. That clearly means that I don't think that it's necessarily impossible. And it doesn't matter whether or not you accept it, because you're wrong either way. — S

Perhaps I am, but so far I haven't seen a convincing argument to that effect.

The world preexisted us, so it preexisted our minds, so your premise that the world is a picture in our minds is false. — S

Did it? Are time and space objective parts of reality? How do you know?