, as far as I can tell it just means that there's no purely logical argument either way, rather it comes down to evidence.

Sure, the evidence we have thus far, which Big Bang (mostly) is based on, suggests that (at least) the observable universe was significantly denser and "smaller" in the distant past, and has been expanding ever since. Supposing a non-infinite past, there are still some options. Whether or not it had a definite earliest time or not is speculation I guess.

The strongest intuitive argument against an infinite past I know of, is allegedly due to Wittgenstein:

However, completing an infinite process is not a matter of starting at a particular time that just happens to be infinitely far to the past and then stopping in the present. It’s to have always been doing something and then stopping. This point is illustrated by a possibly apocryphal story attributed to the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Imagine meeting a woman in the street who says, “Five, one, four, one, dot, three! Finally finished!” When we ask what is finished, she tells us that she just finished counting down the infinite digits of pi backward. When we ask when she started, she tells us that she never started, she has always been doing it. The point of the story seems to be that impossibility of completing such an infinite process is an illusion created by our insistence that every process has a beginning. — https://books.google.com/books?id=VXEuCgAAQBAJ&lpg=PT197&pg=PT197#v=onepage&q=%22Five,%20one,%20four,%20one,%20dot,%20three!%20Finally%20finished!%22&f=false

There is no logical or conceptual barrier to the notion of infinite past time.
In a lecture Wittgenstein told how he overheard a man saying '...5, 1, 4, 1, 3, finished'. He asked what the man had been doing.
'Reciting the digits of Pi backward' was the reply. 'When did you start?' Puzzled look. 'How could I start. That would mean beginning with the last digit, and there is no such digit. I never started. I've been counting down from all eternity'.
Strange, but not logically impossible. — http://www.philosophypathways.com/questions/answers_47.html#94

There are also counter-intuitive implications of a definite earliest time.

Here are two arguments that an infinite past is logically impossible, and why they’re wrong.

Last Thursdayism:

• assumption (towards reductio ad absurdum): infinite temporal past
• let’s enumerate past days up to and including last Wednesday as: {..., t, ..., -1, 0}
• that is, there exists a bijection among those past days (including Wednesday) and the non-positive integers
• now come Thursday
• observation: {..., t, ..., -1, 0} cannot accommodate Thursday
• let’s re-enumerate the same past days but including Thursday as: {..., t, ..., -1, 0}
• that is, there exists a bijection among those past days (including Thursday) and the non-positive integers
• observation: {..., t, ..., -1, 0} can accommodate Thursday
• the two observations are contradictory, {..., t, ..., -1, 0} both cannot and can accommodate Thursday
• Conclusion: the assumption is wrong, an infinite past is impossible

Note, this argument could equally be applied to infinite causal chains, and nicely lends support to the Omphalos hypothesis (hence why I named it Last Thursdayism). Another thing to notice about the infinite set of integers: Any two numbers are separated by a number. And this number is also a member of the integers. The integers are closed under subtraction and addition. For the analogy with enumerating past days, this means any two events are separated by a number of days. Not infinite, but a particular number of (possibly fractional) days. That’s any two events. To some folk this is counter-intuitive, but, anyway, there you have it.

The first observation is incorrect. Whether or not the set can accommodate Thursday (one more day), is not dependent on one specific bijection (the first selected), rather it is dependent on the existence of some (any such) bijection. A bijection also exists among {..., t, ..., -1, 0} and {..., t, ..., -1, 0, 1}, and the integers, for that matter.

Therefore, the argument is not valid.

The unnumbered now:

• if the universe was temporally infinite, then there was no 1^st moment
• if there was no 1^st moment (but just some moment), then there was no 2^nd moment
• if there was no 2^nd moment (but just some other moment), then there was no 3^rd moment
• ... and so on and so forth ...
• if there was no 2^nd last moment, then there would be no now
• since now exists, we started out wrong, i.e. the universe is not temporally infinite

Seems convincing at a glance?

In short, the argument (merely) shows that, on an infinite temporal past, the now cannot have a definite, specific number, as per 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, ..., now. Yet, we already knew this in case of an infinite temporal past, so, by implicitly assuming otherwise, the argument can be charged with petitio principii. That is, the latter (conclusion) is a non sequitur, and the latter two could be expressed more accurately as:

• if there was no 2^nd last moment with an absolute number, then there would be no now with an absolute number
• since now exists, we started out wrong, i.e. any now does not have an absolute number

Additionally, note that 1,2,3 refer to non-indexical “absolute” moments (1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd), but the following steps are indexical and contextual (2^nd last, now), which is masked by “... and so on and so forth ...”. We already know from elsewhere (originating in linguistics) that such reasoning is problematic.

Still no proof, as some of the religious apologists propose. :-|

I'm admittedly biased against the death penalty (possibly culturally), but tried to round up some pros and cons a while back.

Some pros:

• retribution
• an eye for an eye, punishment fits the crime
• deterrence (except for places where shown ineffective)
• cost (except for places where execution is actually more expensive than alternatives, depends on legal system)
• permanent incapacitation (e.g. prison escape and subsequent recurrence avoided)
• practical
• modern science grants higher certainties (DNA, genetics)
• everyone dies eventually in any case
• closure to victim's family and friends

Some cons:

• wrongful execution, seemingly faced with faceless/anonymous executioners (also see argument con below)
• finality (also see argument con below)
• consistency (also see argument con below)
• slippery slope; plus potentially setting dangerous precedence
• sending wrong messages (why kill people who kill people to show killing people is wrong?); two wrongs don't make a right
• human rights, value of human life, "inhumane" societal action, international trust/acceptance
• execution may be painful and accompanied by emotional anguish
• somewhat "barbaric", "brutal", a "primitive feel", or otherwise uncivilized (two wrongs don't make a right again)
• capital punishment makes it easier to ignore in-depth understanding, e.g. social causes
• edge cases (like mental illness)
• victims cannot be brought back to life in any case
• impact on convict's family and friends

Sample implementations of the death penalty:

• Saudi Arabia is a theocratic monarchy that has a special police force trained to weed out witchcraft and magic, for example. They have put people to death for protesting against the system, criticizing superstition, apostasy and whatever else, and here criticizing means speaking or writing. There's a (summary) process in place, by which "undesirable" elements can be "dealt with".
• Some states in the US has a much better implementation in place. Yet, here determining guilt falls back on a jury and a couple hired lawyers (of whichever experience/skills). An execution is irrevocable, with no uncertain finality. The determination of guilt is clearly less certain. And this discrepancy can put retentionists into the same category as those they may execute.

If we're talking morality and justice, where does that leave us? There are examples of abolitionist countries with relatively low crime rates. Might be worthwhile taking a look at their example?

Here's an argument con:

Determining guilt is less accurate, than execution is irreversible, and thus (morally) disproportionate. Hence, given the irrevocability, voters-gone-executioners-gone-killers ought be held accountable and responsible, and face their own music. By appeal to logical consistency:

• wrongful capital punishments are known to have occurred (including youngsters), so who's responsible?
• in such cases, those that endorsed death penalty have (knowingly by their decision) caused wrongful deaths, with the exact same effect as murder
• should those that endorse death penalty hide behind legalities as a means to justify death penalty, comfortably from their chairs?
• in case of wrongful capital punishment, the endorsers should be subject to their own sentiment ("an eye for an eye")
• are you (the retentionist) promptly willing to stake your own life thus?

If we're talking "an eye for an eye", then the retentionists put themselves in danger of execution, unless their method of determining guilt is error-free. That, at least, is the logical consequence.

Aren't we better than this?

Aren't Levine's explanatory gap / Chalmers' mind-body thing usually brought up to complain about this stuff?
It's worth noting, though, that the partitions of such a gap do not contradict, which would be a stronger argument.

I wasn't summing up SP. I was explaining the circumstances in which the denial of absolute space impacts truth aptness. — Mongrel

Right. Speaking of constant motion typically requires two objects, moving relative to one another. Acceleration does not, since one can determine a force, like gravity, while accelerating. The same holds for rotation.

There is nothing natural in quantum. — Rich

Natural is science's escape word when it can't explain something. — Rich

What are you trying to convey? Quantumatics isn't science? :o

SP says that for an object in a void there is no true statement about its motion. Period. — Mongrel

Isn't that Galilean invariance? (SP = special relativity?)
There are a few things, like the equivalence principle and constant light speed, playing roles in relativity.

There is nothing natural in quantum. — Rich

Huh? The microworld is unnatural or something? :o

Seven wonders of the quantum world (Michael Brooks, New Scientist) — jorndoe

I don't get it. Why postulate that such idealism is popular/prevalent/undeniable among academics, when that's just not the case?

Source: https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl
^{(Here skepticism should perhaps be read as parsimonious skepticism, albeit not radical.)}

In an ontological sense, such idealism will have it that the Moon is not actually the Moon, but rather is Moon-experiences. There may be all kinds of chatter about the Moon as if it's real, but, on idealism, I'm led to understand that experiencing the Moon cannot be separated from the experiencer (even in principle), such chatting is like a kind of pretense (maybe even hypostatization), or just linguistic practice perhaps. So there's no mind-independent Moon as such, it's dissipated according to this inquiry, rather it's relata among the experience (e.g. qualia, phenomenological) and the experiencer (the self). All I (the self) can ever know is the experience, and so that's where the road ends, more or less literally. The Moon = those Moon-experiences.

It's been discussed plenty, and remains sort of strangely artificial. OK, maybe "artificial" isn't the right word, but you catch my drift. Sure is self-elevating. I'm not omniscient, since otherwise I'd know that I were. I don't have to experience someone else's self-awareness to take it's independent existence for granted; I don't have to become the Moon to take it's independent existence for granted; I learn of both much the same way, by interaction, observation, whatever.

I'm aware of Hameroff's Orch-OR. Wave-function collapse does not take consciousness. But of course mind is also part of the world per se, whatever exactly it all may be. As mentioned, hijacking quantumatics for idealism is not philosophy, neither scientific.


Is “information is physical” contentful? (Scott Aaronson, Jul 2017)
Seven wonders of the quantum world (Michael Brooks, New Scientist)

@Rich, are you conflating the theory itself and what it describes (it seems you were conflating epistemology and ontology earlier)?
The statement you quoted is referring to the latter.

Have you discovered a derivation of qualia from quantum mechanics? — jorndoe

@Rich, hijacking quantumatics for idealism isn't philosophy, it's common in New Age woo though.
Have you discovered a derivation of qualia from quantum mechanics? (I suppose that would be something.)
The observer effect illustrates a difference between causation and interaction.
I haven't come across anything in quantum mechanics that necessitates what we think of a minds, nor derive minds, nor is incompatible with minds; maybe you've come across something otherwise?

You Aren't Living in a Hologram, Even if You Wish You Were (Ryan F Mandelbaum, Gizmodo, Jan 2017)

I incidentally came across this illustration the other day:



Outsider test (Iron Chariots Wiki article)
Ignosticism (Wikipedia article)

@Joseph, @fishfry, technically these are well-formed propositions with mixed quantifications:

• ∀x∈S ∃y∈S φ(x,y)
• ∃x∈S ∀y∈S φ(x,y)

I'm not sure anyone wrote up a concise grammar for their syntax in general, but that'd be interesting to take a look at (feel free to point me in their direction if you know any).

In computing there are analogies to be found in comprehensions.

[...] if it's problematic, it's logic that has a problem, not existence. If existence declares that particles are waves or whatever quantum weirdness you care to mention, logic will just have get it's act together about it. — unenlightened

Yep.

Apologies @unenlightened, skim-reading is poor reading, my bad. The two propositions, "existence is not a predicate" and ∃x∈S [ φx ], are sufficiently different that I couldn't formulate the former as an example of the latter.

• ∃ ∉ Φ, where Φ is all φs (no unrestricted comprehension please)

Is "to be a predicate" a predicate? I suppose so, but haven't figured out whether that's problematic.

why should we care about answering this question? — Agustino

Philosophy and forums? In my own case, also looking for (in)consistencies among different things, e.g. ∃ and quiddity (old post).

Well, what does it mean to exist? — Michael

In this case, any such meanings (including hypothetical) already exemplifies existence. Seems in some ways, existence is auto-presupposed.


Anyway, using existence as a predicate can sometimes lead to nonsense, and other times make sense. So, ∃ is not just another φ, except sometimes it is?

@TheMadFool, how to demarcate fictional and real entities?
If you suppose that a fictional entity exists, then what would it take for it to be real?
It seems like fictional (not real) entities exist as their hypotheses (or definitions) alone.

@unenlightened, according to those pesky objectivists "existence exists", though I think Russell argued otherwise.
Does existence then not exist...? Maybe we should have a poll on that one as well.
How about this one? "There exists an apple in the bowl of apples, so that apple does not exist." :)

There are cases where "existence is a predicate" comes through as nonsense, which makes me think that (generally) "existence is not a predicate".
As far as I can tell, there isn't anything further that "to exist" can reduce to; existence is ground if you will.

Another angle:
We commonly characterize things by predication, quiddity — what those things are.
These are different propositions from merely existing though — that something exists.

By the way, is the King of France bald or not?
Russell and Whitehead:

It is hard to filter through all of that, and to ascertain any religious influence that would enable people to become susceptible in believing either for or against such as whether it is apocalyptic in nature or whether it is simply impossible unless deterministically willed otherwise is really hard to tell. I would assume that the large masses of religiously devout who also tend to have conservative leanings fall into a trap of climate change denial because of the political rather than the religious. — TimeLine

Yep.

Though, one of the reasons for posting the poll was that a climate-change-denier elsewhere wrote (paraphrased) "God is in control", "There's nothing we can do", and some others seemingly agreed.
Made me think if such sentiments can have unfortunate consequences, hence the bottom part of the opening post (education, informing).

, yeah, effective regulation is a problem.
That said, you'd hope the ethics is informed by the science, and the politics informed by both.
Worst case could resort to sanctions I suppose, it's been done before anyway albeit with mixed success.


Free-rider problem (Wikipedia article)
Tragedy of the commons (Wikipedia article)

, dang, got me. :)

(Let me just add, Danish cities don't have anything on Amsterdam when it comes to bicycle-rule.)

Oh, sorry, I didn't mean "parallel universes" necessarily like modal realism (possible worlds), many worlds (quantum mechanics), multiverse (e.g. ensemble, M-theory, brane collisions), or whatever.
Just "other realities" that are temporal, as per the previous posts.


_{Principle of charity (Wikipedia article)}

, the plot thickens. :)
Souls are then defined as parts of us living in parallel universes?
But why, what's all this stuff for, what's it supposed to account for...?
And how would we differentiate it all from fiction?

A field is a concept based in spacetime. The fact that the position of the particle cannot be determined through the use of the field indicates that there is activity outside of the field (not covered by the field), and quite likely outside of spacetime. — Metaphysician Undercover

An activity outside of spacetime? Activities take time.
Not exactly parsimonious to come up with a parallel universe of sorts. :)

I cannot discuss you without utilizing my perceptions of you. — Rich

Right. What other than perception would you suggest?

It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked. — Thanatos Sand

Let me try to misquote you for the occasion:

It's impossible to discuss jorndoe without discussing both Thanatos Sand's perception and the linguistic dynamics of Thanatos Sand's perceptions and representation of jorndoe. There may be a jorndoe preceding those things, but it's impossible for Thanatos Sand to access that except through Thanatos Sand's perception and language, which are greatly linked.

If anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams (which do exist) and perception, then it must be the perceived (the Moon, jorndoe).
Hopefully you wouldn't (rudely) suggest that I'm not self-aware because you cannot experience my self-awareness? :)

Seems like we could discuss ...

• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion

They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such?

Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself. — Thanatos Sand

Are you claiming that language is only ever about language? Or about concepts? :o
That doesn't seem right.

All you have done is describe the moon after observation.

Now, describe it before observation. — Rich

Huh?
Maybe I should ask you to describe my colleague.
If you're conflating ontology and epistemology, then you'll conclude there's no such colleague.
And maybe there isn't for all you know.

Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself. — Thanatos Sand

Well I'm not trying to be exhaustively accurate with error-free certainty, just chatting about the Moon.
If you'd written "the Moon is a regular tetrahedron", then you might need new glasses or a new encyclopedia or something. :)
As mentioned, I'm not chatting about English, but about the Moon.
Not about the word "Moon" either, but about the Moon.

As an aside, I just noticed the Wikipedia page has a list of characteristics, mean/equatorial/polar radius, flattening, circumference, surface area, volume, ...
I guess you could register and fix the page?

All we know is that the moon is quanta which is essentially nothing. Anything you observe in your life is necessarily the result of the interaction between you, the observer, and the observed quanta. This is absolutely fundamental without any wiggle room. — Rich

Allow me to misquote you:

All jorndoe knows is that Rich is quanta which is essentially nothing. Anything jorndoe observes in jorndoe's life is necessarily the result of the interaction between jorndoe, and the observed quanta. This is absolutely fundamental without any wiggle room.

Solipsism.

"There is no Moon"? :)

, you introduced "smooth-edged orb"; "a spheroid within some margin of variation" is a bit better.
Not that it matters much, though.
Would you prefer using other words when we chat about the Moon?

And since the moon isn't a smooth-edged orb, it's not actually "round." — Thanatos Sand

The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round. — jorndoe

Emphasis added.
In this context, the term round is how we already characterize the Moon, along with whatever other things.
It's not a definition of the Moon's shape (we don't define things into existence), it's observation.
In case I'd written "the Earth is flat", I'd be wrong. Not so with "the Moon is round".

I'm not referring to our concepts or words, but the shape of the Moon.
Feel free to chat about the former; meanwhile I'll chat about the Moon. :)

Here "round" doesn't mean

$(x - x_0)^2 + (y - y_0)^2 + (z - z_0)^2 = r^2$

The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round.
It had that shape long before homo sapiens walked the Earth.

Depends?

If I observe "I'm in a great mood", then that fact is observer-dependent.
If I observe "The Moon is round", then that fact is independent of me observing it.

An observation may be observer-dependent, the observed may not be.

? — Thorongil

Just uhh surprised I guess. Don't throw yourself off a tall building ya' hear.

:o

Doesn't logic tend to start with self-identity (the 1st law)?

Something like ...
x = x (ontological, anything that exists is itself and nothing else)
p ⇔ p (propositional, statements (not baby-talk) are themselves)

Anyway, attempting to abandon identity (and individuation for that matter) seems to void all our talk, thinking, making sense of things, etc, sort of like a kind of intellectual mental suicide (figuratively).
Maybe identity is auto-presupposed.

Without the hope of salvation, which religion provides, life is demonstrably not worth living. Your typical atheist, like Dawkins, seems to realize this on some level, but the fact is clearly too much for him to bear, as shown above. — Thorongil

... strikes me as a textbook example of wishful thinking, appeal to consequence.
Do you think an emotional existential crisis somehow makes this yearning true...?

I'm not sure what "religious salvation" is exactly (though "salvation" often is preached by Christians), and how it supposedly satisfies your yearnings, but feel free to explicate.
Some sort of predetermined purpose (or predestination perhaps) bestowed upon you by something else?

It seems odd to claim that these atheists you refer to do not enjoy living.
Feel free to demonstrate that "life is demonstrably not worth living" unless your yearnings are the case.
Perhaps Dawkins agrees that it'd be nifty to get together with his grand/parents and other loved ones again, in some sort of afterlife, but admits that doesn't make it so?
(I haven't read much of his stuff, so I don't know.)

In The Illusion of God's Presence: The Biological Origins of Spiritual Longing (Jan 2016), John C Wathey discusses what he dubs an "innate model of the mother", which seems to shed some light at least on some psychological phenomena related to emotional existential crises.
Whether there's something to it or not, who knows, but it's not wishful thinking nor appeal to consequence fallacies.

Existence is all over the place? By what particular definition? — Michael Ossipoff

Not by definition.
You exist, I exist, my coffee cup exists ☕, heck even my dreams exist, you're walking on it, your walking exists (when occurring), ...
Darn unavoidable!

Definitions can be helpful for expressing what we mean when we say something. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes.

By the way, I’d like to add that, so far as I’m aware of, the words “Real”, and “Exist” aren’t metaphysically-defined. Better to not use them. Of, if I use them, it’s with the understanding that they don’t say anything definite or meaningful. You can define them as you like, and people do. — Michael Ossipoff

If they want to define existence in terms of something else, then that something else cannot exist.
But it's rather trivial to exemplify, can't miss it, it's all over the place. ;)
It's one of those things, like truth perhaps, where you strand on rock bottom as it were.
I've become a bit wary of (always) demanding definitions; doing so may also be susceptible to a regress anyway.
Conversely, if we were to exemplify something that does not exist, it could only be by non-referring definitions or nonsense, something like that.
Incidentally, in some older thread, I tried to sort of assert "real on top of existence" as per:
• x is real ⇔ x exists irrespective of anyone's definitions
Not sure it's any good though (maybe some day).

A related inquiry:

Suppose in a few centuries no living person has ever encountered the Harry Potter stories. It's a thought experiment. All that remains of them is a dusty box with the (by then) old books, hidden away somewhere, all else long since having been recycled.
Can it then be said that Harry Potter still exists (as a fictional narrative), perhaps as a kind of extended memory found in that dusty box?
Or, can Harry Potter only "come back to life", as it were, once someone has read the old books?
Can one speak of any ontological status worth mentioning?

It is said that Zeno devised 40 thought experiments, paradoxes, though only 9 are known, and only second-hand. We might suppose they could still be uncovered in ancient texts of course, perhaps even Zeno's own words, however unlikely it seems by now.
What might be the ontological status of these alleged 31 thought experiments supposedly devised by Zeno?
After all, I just referred to them, hypothetically at least.