How many other unspoken speech acts are you aware of? — Banno

"Beliefs" are just assertions dressed in unhelpful mental woo. Better and sufficient to deal with,

It's raining, but I don't assert that it is. — bongo fury

Belief is a relation between an individual and a statement. — Banno

An assertion will be sincere iff the person asserting p believes p vocally also asserts p mentally. — Banno

It seems easy to credit animals with inductive reason and hard to credit them with deductive reason. — apokrisis

Again, the question is whether the ape reasoned [whichever the duction] by giving meaning to symbols, by being able to play the social game of pretending to point them at things. That would be logic in the human (as opposed to pocket calculator or trained neural network) sense. — bongo fury

But if you, MacIntosh, were to say exactly the same thing to McGillicuddy—“It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is”—your friend would rightly think you’d lost your mind. Why, then, is the second sentence absurd? As G.E. Moore put it, “Why is it absurd for me to say something true about myself?” — Wheatley

It's raining, but I don't assert that it is.

It’s not like someone behaves a certain way, then obtains a high IQ, and begins behaving differently. — Pinprick

The room grew silent. I cursed myself for losing control and creating a scene. I tried not to look at the boy as I paid my check and walked out without touching my food. I felt ashamed for both of us.

How strange it is that people of honest feelings and sensibility, who­ would not take advantage of a man born without arms or legs or eyes-how such people think nothing of abusing a man born with low intelligence. It infuriated me to think that not too long ago I, like this boy, had foolishly played the clown.

And I had almost forgotten.

I'd hidden the picture of the old Charlie Gordon from myself because now that I was intelligent it was something that had to be pushed out of my mind. But today in looking at that boy, for the first time I saw what I had been. I was just like him!

Only a short time ago, I learned that people laughed at me. Now I can see that unknowingly I joined with them in laughing at myself. That hurts most of all. — Daniel Keyes: Flowers for Algernon

yet so many begin their discussion with "let's first define our terms". — Banno

The problem with this account is that it underdetermines actual word use. I suppose you could (as has been tried) twist every word use example as drawing the listener's attention to something (object, concept, state of mind), but this is utterly trivial as everything falls into that parenthesised list, and following another's talk cannot be done without paying it some minimal attention.
— Isaac

Bang. — Banno

Woodger's term, p.17, is 'shared name'. Martin, in Truth and Denotation, Ch. IV, speaks of divided reference as multiple denotation. I applaud that use of 'denote', having so used the word myself until deflected to 'true of' by readers' misunderstanding; and Martin's 'multiple' obviates the misunderstanding. — Quine: Word and Object, p 90n.

Crows can plan three steps ahead, — Banno

I think what the crows (and current AI) are able to do is less than we are able, which we might distinguish as "rational" but I would propose clarifying as semantical: the ability to discern meaning in the sense of discerning what symbols are supposed to be pointed at. — bongo fury

the equivalent of a disjunctive syllogism where the ape could tell that if one food reward cup was empty, then the treat was hidden in the other. — apokrisis

But what I had supposed was that his theory of reference had some merit, it would be ill conceived to consider it an account of the whole of language. — Banno

Well, I'm going to continue to side with Quine and StreetlightX here, — Banno

and say that pointing is pointedly indeterminate. — Banno

You agreed with Harry as to "hello", but I find that most unconvincing; — Banno

it is not obvious that pointing up is a form of pointing. — Banno

Harry suggests that words are to be understood by determining to what they point. The reasonable response is to point out, as I and others have done, that there are words that do not seem to point. — Banno

So are you for it, or agin it? — Banno

"Hello" doesn't point to the beginning of a conversation; it doesn't point to anything. — Banno

Kids arrive at five by playing with beans, moving them around, sharing them, sorting the beans from the marbles, cooking them, embedded number in their lives.

Pointing is a gross oversimplification. — Banno

↪Banno Hello.

This is a scribble or sound used to point to the start of communication, — Harry Hindu

The "Na" in...

" Na na na na na na na na na na na na na " - My Chemical Romance. — Isaac

Maybe it's me. Maybe I'm too stupid to understand Goodman. — RogueAI

To sort out the wheat from the chaff and then watch the chaff complain about it. — StreetlightX

SO why not drop pointing and go straight to use. — Banno

Pointing is a gross oversimplification. — Banno

No, it's not raining or not independently of the state of affairs representation. But it is raining or not independently of any report or statement. — Andrew M

And on your view? — Andrew M

The pointing of symbols at things by social animals. — bongo fury

is it raining or not independently of any report or statement? — Andrew M

On your view, is it raining or not independently of any report or statement? — Andrew M

The states of affairs represent the weather and the talking. But states of affairs are not themselves talk. — Andrew M

The SA is a representation of the concrete situation so, no, not literally wet. — Andrew M

If so, perhaps one of them would suffice?
— bongo fury

No, because I make a distinction between what the weather is and what a person says the weather is.

It seems that you don't make that distinction. — Andrew M

And thus lack a model for what it means for a statement to be true. — Andrew M

Statements S1 and S2 are the weather-talk by Alice and Bob — Andrew M

(which are derived from states of affairs SA2 and SA3 respectively). — Andrew M

So, SA1 (or asserting it) is talking about the weather, while SA2 and SA3 are talking about the talking?

But SA1 isn't the weather (e.g. it isn't wet), but rather represents or talks about it. — bongo fury

or as some bizarre kind of weather sentence... with a fifty percent chance of predication, perhaps... something like that? :wink:
— bongo fury

Your comment would apply equally to Alice's statement. — Andrew M

But both her statement and the state of affairs refer to rain, not predication. — Andrew M

Platonism says (after a process of cosmic reasoning) that our pointing must also reflect the way the things really are, and introduces more things (properties, similarities etc. [and now states of affairs]) to create a new level of sorting. To correspond with the first. — bongo fury

The benefit of so doing is that it is now possible to apply logical operations or transformations on those formal structures.
— Andrew M

Such as? (You may need to decide if you are talking about the weather, or about the talking, or both.)
— bongo fury

Yes, but note that that information is implied by the structures. — Andrew M

I can represent the original concrete situation in a model with the following obtaining states of affairs:

(SA1) It is raining
(SA2) Alice says that it is raining
(SA3) Bob says that it is not cloudy — Andrew M

Finally, a conditional can be added that relates statements to states of affairs — Andrew M

this feeds the suspicion that metaphysics is not being easily given up by some of its supposed critics, who need to disparage nominalism because they would rather not be shown a way out. — bongo fury

So the concrete situation is that it is raining outside and Alice says, "It is raining outside".

Now suppose I want to model that situation. In my model, I can represent the weather formally as a state of affairs. This, it seems to me, is at least comparable to a physicist representing a physical system formally as a state. — Andrew M

The benefit of so doing is that it is now possible to apply logical operations or transformations on those formal structures. — Andrew M

Is that still metaphysics, on your view? — Andrew M

Can "that it is raining outside" please be the actual raining? Can Alice's statement please be her actual utterance?
— bongo fury

Yes, of course. All of these abstractions are grounded in the actual raining and Alice's actual utterance. — Andrew M

The pattern, then, is that the logical form of a state of affairs is the same as the logical form of a statement (i.e., they both contain a subject and a predicate). — Andrew M

this feeds the suspicion that metaphysics is not being easily given up by some of its supposed critics, who need to disparage nominalism because they would rather not be shown a way out. — bongo fury

That they are abstracted from concrete situations is what prevents them from being Platonic Forms (which would "exist" prior to any concrete situations). — Andrew M

A state of affairs is an abstraction - something that obtains or not. — Andrew M

A statement is also an abstraction - something that can be true or false. — Andrew M

But they are both abstracted from concrete situations. — Andrew M

For example, that it is raining outside (a state of affairs concrete situation), or that Alice says that it is raining outside (a state of affairs concrete situation where Alice makes a statement). — Andrew M

They are sharing a pattern, which just is the abstracted common form. — Andrew M

To transform a state of affairs to a statement, quote it. To transform a statement back to a state of affairs, unquote it. — Andrew M

This feeds a suspicion that metaphysics is not being easily given up by some of its supposed critics, who need to disparage nominalism because they would rather not be shown a way out. — bongo fury

By "wrong" or "wrongly chosen" sentences, do you mean false sentences? — Andrew M

If so, then I take it you hold either a deflationary or correspondence-style theory of truth, not a coherence theory of truth (which is what I was assuming). Would that be right? — Andrew M

Do you mean you think that the T-schema actually exhibits or requires an isomorphism between the sentence p (or its quotation or both) and the situation affirmed? Or was this only, like "reflect", a figure of speech?
— bongo fury

The isomorphism (i.e., equal form) is between the state of affairs and the statement, as abstracted from their concrete instances. — Andrew M

For example, it is raining outside (the state of affairs) and Alice says that it is raining outside (the statement). — Andrew M

I'm asking how you use the term "true". — Andrew M

For example, I assume you believe there were dinosaurs roaming the Earth millions of years ago based on evidence such as the fossil record. Is your belief true because you have formed it based on that evidence? ... — Andrew M

In ordinary use, there is an isomorphism between statements and the world, as captured by formulations such as "p" is true iff p. On that schema, we are mistaken when our statements don't reflect the way the world is. — Andrew M

So I'm curious what it means, on your view, for a statement to be true. — Andrew M

We use experiment and such like to decide the best choices of pointing. — bongo fury

Does it simply mean that you classify the statement as true (according to some specifiable criteria), — Andrew M

and thus it is something that you can't be mistaken about — Andrew M

• thoughts (brain shivers)
• symbols (words and pictures)
• other objects (things and scenery)

And while a re-presentation always depends on a prior presentation (i.e., the world precedes language),
— Andrew M

Do you mean, when we point symbols at things, it depends on the things being there (not necessarily there and then) to be pointed at? Or something more elaborate, like the choice of symbols depending on the choice of things?
— bongo fury

The first. There needs to be something that we are talking about beyond the talk itself. At least, there does if we want our talk to be useful or meaningful.

As I read you, it seems that it is the talk itself that constitutes the world. — Andrew M

foundations of math, psychology of consciousness, theory of reference, theory of learning, logic of induction, semiotics etc? [...] plenty of philosophy [...] cheerfully non-metaphysical — bongo fury

I'm not making claims about meta- and object-languages, — Andrew M

nor of being "outside" the world — Andrew M

And while a re-presentation always depends on a prior presentation (i.e., the world precedes language), — Andrew M

There's no contrast. — Andrew M

I'm just making a further natural language claim which, in this case, makes explicit what is implicit in the earlier claim. — Andrew M

Again this is just a natural language convention. — Andrew M

Perhaps you could unpack what the phrases "from outside" and "as meta" are contributing in your above explanation. — Andrew M

• You keep saying it's nonsense (and metaphysics) to say that "how the world is" is dependent on how we describe it. I keep saying it's nonsense (and metaphysics) to deny it. You ask me to use language to represent a state of the whole world without language. I have to remind you that is impossible, and the best we can do in that direction is represent a state of a part of the world and assume that it is represented from outside of it.

• On that basis, we might say plenty of things in an object language; but saying things is just hot air, and we will inevitably desire to say things about how the hot air relates to things in the specified part of the world. "F = ma" won't be enough, and we will want to say how the symbols map onto things. I mentioned that I was excluding "similar" from the likely vocabulary of an object language.

Let's also consider one more example. — Andrew M

The planets Mars and Venus both orbit the Sun. — Andrew M

They are similar in that respect. — Andrew M

They were also similar in that respect billions of years ago — Andrew M

Now it seems that you think that is false. — Andrew M

Therefore I'm somewhat surprised, and incredulous, — Harry Hindu

What use is a contradiction? To what use could dialetheism be applied? — Harry Hindu

The causal relationship between the first principle (i.e., God, or a strong wind) and any teleological concept of being (Being) is, according to Pascal, "so ludicrous that it's not even funny (Funny)." — ibid.

Finally, there can be no doubt that the one characteristic of "reality" is that it lacks essence. That is not to say it has no essence, but merely lacks it. (The reality I speak of here is the same one Hobbes described, but a little smaller.) — Woody Allen: My Philosophy