Also, it's not exactly the case that "digitization only encodes what it is specifically designed to encode". There is a trivial sense in which that is true, in that digital hardware is designed to encode bit states and can only encode bit states. However, it is very much the case that digitally instantiated artificial neural networks, after training on whatever inputs were provided to the ANN, will have a great many bit states which were not determined by the designer — wonderer1

I am not talking about bit states, I am talking about the objective data (information) which is digitally encoded. Since data is being specifically symbolically encoded, digital neural networks have only that known data to work with. Versus an analog system which works with a "signal" whose total data properties are not necessarily so restricted. You can talk about bit states being "information", it is a level of abstraction below that at which artificial neural nets actually operate, part of the underlying mechanism and addressed via back-propagation, which is a function of error-correction, which is determined at the top informational level.

Looks like Nicolai Hartmann is another punitively priced author. I bought a couple on ontology for $110, but volume 1 and 2 of his Ethics are nearly $80 apiece. So they'll have to wait. Great perspective on the mind-body psuedo-problem it seems.

Barnaby Rudge
by Charles Dickens

:up: Thanks for your reply. I take it that ‘analog = intuition’ and ‘digital = analytical’? — 0 thru 9

I think intuition exploits analogicity, yes, which analytic thinking cannot do since it involves working with an unknown.

I think it is the consequentialism that leads you to believe, cynically, that personal moralities tend to (and intend to) control others socially.

I cannot agree and find your analysis specious because there are people who do not approach morality from the perspective of consequentialism. They wish to act right no matter the fee-fees of some person, with no care for the consequences or social costs, and with no desire or goal of controlling others. — NOS4A2

:up:

And of that immense amount we are able to ‘collect’, there must be more that is somehow beyond us. Stuff that perhaps animals can detect, or highly sensitive equipment. — 0 thru 9

Yes. Analog vs digital collection and processing of information becomes interesting in this respect. Analog collection of information captures an actual "imprint" of the real world. In which sense, there may actually be information captured which is unexpected or unknown. Neural networks are able to exploit such "hidden" information and extrapolate hidden connections. In fact, that is more or less exactly how they work. By contrast, digitization only encodes what it is specifically designed to encode.

I don't want to distract from the OP, which I think stands on its own as an important topic. The mechanics of belief and knowledge covers a lot of ground.

But then, in humans, everything rational is constitutive of consciousness, so in that respect, there is nothing particularly significant in merely holding some belief or another. — Mww

Again, here we must agree to disagree. Which I hold to be a significant difference. :wink:

Our senses take in a huge spectrum of information all the time. We only successfully process a small portion of that spectrum. Increasing our knowledge is one way to increase the portion of the spectrum we process.

At a purely neural level, an experiment showed that a cat's brain did not even register the input from a tone within its auditory range until that tone was subsequently paired with a significant event (feeding). So there could be sensory cues of which we are unaware but which could contribute to this kind of performative intuition.....

Nahhh…I’m not getting into the belief/knowledge mudhole — Mww

Roger that. For my part, I favour a radical view of belief. I believe that belief is constitutive of consciousness in a real and fundamental sense, hence my contention of the importance of an "ontological commitment" validating that a belief is genuinely held.

As you said, a matter for another time.

:up:

Well, falling back on the traditional, "true belief based on sufficient evidence," the sufficiency of the evidence constitutes part of the knowledge.

We’re saying the same thing for all practical purposes, in language two centuries apart.

Except for the trust part; that I can’t reconcile with disparities in language. My problem, not yours. — Mww

Well, knowledge is essentially self-justifying, right? It contains the framework of its own validation. Intuition doesn't. So what other option is there?

Actually, this is probably what you meant to say. There is an idealized model of the information received from perception, it even has its own name; intuition constructs the model but does not use it, hence, the notion of being a bridge. — Mww

Without delving too deeply into the informational aspect, what I wanted to emphasize was the way that intuition bridges the gap between the ideal-theoretical and the actual, especially as that relates to the need to operate and enact in the real world. I'm not saying information is unimportant, but information is inextricable from symbolization or encoding, and what I'm suggesting is that intuition is integral to the cognition of the differential between the concrete totality and its only-ever-partial or approximate conceptual cognition.

As for the trust being misplaced, good intuition is effective, so being committed to the accuracy of one's intuitions is an ontic-epistemological commitment. If I really believe in the truth of something, that is a practical commitment. Hypothetical truths are empty. Consciousness does not just believe truths, it instantiates them.

Very interesting. Doesn't this reflect the distinction between mathematical idealisation and reality? The former allows for complete precision as a matter of definition, of which the reality is always an approximation. (I have in mind the argument from equality in the Phaedo.) — Wayfarer

I think mathematics could be construed as the extreme limit of ideal-theoretical symbolization? The golden ratio appears in organic forms, but these instantiations are close approximations to the mathematical ideal.

As you've probably noticed, I like to try to view things as concisely as possible.

Doesn't this really fall under the general rubric of a standard of rationality, and rational discourse? Because there are dimensions and appeals of discourse and rhetoric that can temper the importance of truth (or logic or accuracy). For example, if there is a significant discrepancy of objective knowledge, a truth may have to be cast in metaphorical or approximate terms. Like explaining reproduction or gravity to a five year old.

:100: Old school. — Wayfarer

Discursive or conceptual cognition operates by casting concrete particulars in symbolic terms, which relies on general concepts or universals. But there is always a gap between the ideal rational cognition made possible by symbolic thought and the concrete totality. I remember being very struck by this when I moved from the high-school physics of vectors and formulas to university physics, where the plethora of approximations involved in real-world calculations were suddenly being considered.

So intuition is what bridges the gap between the cognitions made possible within discursive thought, and the reality that is being cognized. In essence, it is about making estimates that are based on information that is extracted from an idealized model of your perceptions. And allowing yourself to trust that faculty is also part of intuition.

So right & wrong, fair & unfair, and concepts of justice aren't part of morality? — Judaka

Right and wrong are evaluations made of actions that are judged to take place in the context of morality. So you can heed a legitimate cry for help and do right, or ignore the plight of your fellow man and do wrong.

Justice is the interpretation of morality at the social level. One human being doesn't get to be just (unless he is a judge). Also, I think some of what you are discussing might be more ethical - a formal presentation and codification - than moral. For me, morality speaks loudest in actions.

To what extent should consumers be free to make choices about what products and services they consume in the context of neoliberal capitalism? — Judaka

The standard for overriding personal choice is usually public safety (as in the limits of the right to privacy) or the public good. This begs the question of who decides what is the public good. No matter what regulatory policy is put in place, it is guaranteed that some group will reject it. Some people feel that it is inherently safer to open-carry firearms than to restrict them. So asking "should people be free to open-carry firearms" is a loaded question, so to speak, since it is really about having a fundamentally different standard of reason.

Cassirer characterizes intuition as a consonance of being and knowing which bypasses and transcends discursive understanding. It overcomes the limitations of discursive thought and is the basis of metaphysical cognition. I like this view.

I have no idea what "true" morality means, so I just clarified my views on the subject. If we're going to talk past each other, may as well be honest about it. — Judaka

I don't think that there is such a thing as "moral thoughts." You can think about morality. But ultimately only one's actions can be classed as moral. As such, morality is always a specific response to a specific request for support being made either by a specific person or persons or (as society enlarges) made by groups who are suffering under some known systemic burden, an implicit request.

I am not looking for an argument, I am just saying, we can recognize objects as such, that's kind of strange is it not? — NotAristotle

If we were not able to identify objects it is unlikely we would have evolved to our current form.

For example, two trees are green, but I recognize that, despite the similarity in their color tone, they are not the same tree. — NotAristotle

Beyond the cognitive and psychological construal of identity, are you looking for some kind of argument for a logically fundamental category? Our minds are wired to identify things in certain ways.

We perceive objects in contexts, gestalts.
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/waymaker-psychology/chapter/gestalt-principles-of-perception/

↪Manuel Recently observed 'time-dilation in the early universe' might account for JWST's anomalous "six galaxies" ... — 180 Proof

But would this effect have the opposite result? The anomalous galaxies appear much older than they should be?

You might want to look at some gestalt principles. Objects are always embedded in a context. Analogously, what is more fundamental, the word or the sentence? Dictionaries contain words, but the fundamental unit of thought is the sentence. Our object-oriented consciousness may be a modern conceit.

Moral discussions are often couched in terms of "fairness" or "goodness" or other general terms. However moral actions are demanded in very specific circumstances, which may never have been exactly anticipated or discussed. So when you are discussing morality in general terms, you may not be really facilitating moral actions. Which is why people can rationalize not doing the right thing so easily.

I certainly think it's an important aspect of moral discourse. It seems inconceivable to me that one could take the position that X is immoral but not be concerned if anyone actually does X. — ChrisH

But is moral discourse an essential feature of morality? Or only incidental? Do you think morals are more explicit or implicit in nature?

As I see it, the point of a moral position is not simply to defend one's views but, more importantly, to persuade others. — ChrisH

Are you saying that proselytizing is a feature or purpose of morality? Morality is fundamentally performative in nature. The best defense of a moral position is the things that one has in fact chosen to do, consonant with that position.

It has recently been shown, rather convincingly [for me, at least,] that we cannot distinguish between living in a simulation and living in a 'real' universe.

That brings into question whether we can truly know anything at all.

Comments? — Torus34

I guess the empirical cases would be:

1. Someone somewhere knows something or
2. Nobody anywhere knows anything.

It seems pretty self-evident to me that 2 is false. By whatever criterion or standard of knowledge you might pick, it must be the case that somebody knows something. In fact, I would go so far as to argue that everybody knows something.

Personal moral beliefs, though seemingly individualistic, ultimately align with the core features of morality, including social control, emotional responses, and the application of moral principles to oneself and others. I would argue there are very few, if any, notable differences between either approach. — Judaka

This is the thrust of your thesis, correct? So, whatever your personal morality is, it is inherently just? So you are claiming that, regardless of any putative "objective" or "intersubjective" moral code, the implementation of that code is always a matter of personal discretion, ergo the only true morality is a personal morality?

You find it pessimistic because you define morality as goodwill. The coercion in morality comes from the intolerance of evil, and a desire for justice. It not inherently bad. But, this thread is not about that anyway. — Judaka

The "disposition" to see morality as imposed versus chosen can be explained through the external versus internal perceived locus of causation (as cited), which is a psychological feature.

This appears to be a recapitulation and recasting of your "Morality is Coercive" discussion.

As I said then, the essence of morality as a kind of duty (Kant) which makes us better is a much more satisfying concept and appeals to a great many people, versus this pessimistic and sad outlook.

Perhaps the question of who sees morality in what kind of way is understandable as an aspect of the psychological question of an internal versus an external locus of perceived causality. This aligns with the tendency to feel like one is responsible for what one does. I can see where some people would prefer to feel like they are not responsible for what they do.

In the Meditations, he argues that the experience of isolated awareness and the choices available to it are not inherited from parents but are created moment to moment by God. That perspective does not favor any attempt to understand how the 'thinking activity' came into being as a process of nature. — Paine

I don't know about you, but when I read something historical, I always make allowances for the limits of scientific understanding at the time. Yes, religion still overshadowed much reasoning at the time of the Enlightenment. In fact, a rebalancing of religion and humanism is a significant feature of the Enlightenment. So anytime a philosopher attributes a function to God, I usually restrict my intake to the functional aspects. Avatar aside, I did not have Descartes in mind when I made my comments.

The more I tried to think from the standpoint of idealized rational subjectivity the more I encounter the fact of social-embedment. It's all well and good to view the brain as some kind of idealized embodiment of consciousness, susceptible of scientific analysis. But the species as an organism is a much more compelling kind of entity to me. If there can be such as thing as a collective mind (which I think is self-evident, trivially and non-trivially) then it serves as a nice transition from personal to transcendental consciousness. The project becomes one of mutual self-objectification.

I and me in the work of George Herbert Mead

Objective self-awareness is a fundamental stage of personality development and is integral to the functioning of a socially integrated psyche. The nuances of what it means might be a matter of some speculation, but its factuality isn't.

The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 3: Phenomenology of Cognition
by Ernst Cassirer

Would any notion of self be possible without the ability to experience self as object? That is to say, to recognize that there are other selves, of which the ‘I’ is just one more? — Joshs

Yes, the way in which you understand objectivity reflects upon and determines the way in which you experience and exercise subjectivity. The self is a subject-object.

No need to take the distinction too seriously. It’s not how we see ourselves most of the time anyway. — Mikie

How so?

The Social Construction of Reality is a truly excellent book.

Here's Cassirer's take on the subject and object:

The opposition between "subject" and "object," the differentiation of the I from all tangible givenness and determinacy, is not the only form in which progress is made from a general, still-undifferentiated life-feeling to the concept and consciousness of the "self"....The I is not immediately oriented here toward the outside world; rather, it refers originally to a personal existence and life similar to it. Subjectivity has as its correlate not some outward thing but rather a "you" or a "he"....[which] forms the true opposite pole that the I requires in order to find and determine itself."
(PSF2, II.1 The community of the Living, p 214)

I think subject-object is one of the fundamental dyadic antinomies; which, as Cassirer says, begins as the self-other dyad. Social reality is in a sense more fundamental than empirical reality to a social entity.

I haven't yet read Jaworsky but, as I've mentioned elsewhere, he is on my short list.

Systems theory has a satisfying perspective on emergence. In particular, I'd recommend Laszlo's Introduction to Systems Philosophy which has a nice section on the mind-matter problem.

When I have finished something by Jaworsky in the next few months I'm sure I'll be posting something. Which of his books did you read?