I like to think that the transcendent subject is basically just the human species. No humans means no world in any way that we can talk about without confusion. But any particular human is dispensable. Like data moving from server to serve, timebinding flame from candle to candle. But we can't say that the species-subject simply creates the world, for this would not be a subject and (in my view) we wouldn't know what we were talking about. Hence an irreducible entanglement. — plaque flag

Nicely put. I'd say the species itself is similarly entangled with the biosphere, etc. ie. That there is tiered entanglement from most to least animate (correlating with the conditions of being law-governed versus free).

Well, if fits the model of the "new science" which I describe as emerging, ie. it is theoretical modeling. Certainly a complex-cohesive model that can exist and be used to model dynamic systems is, in a sense, a kind of empirical entity. But it needs to be reaching towards points of actual correspondence (empirical verification), otherwise its just poeisis, art. If you've seen my other thread on science as metaphysics you know I think these mutually condition. I would say, per Pigliucci per Popper, string theory is more of the nature of a "metaphysical research project" that may become fully scientific eventually.

edit: I did a little digging into quantum computer simulations of string theory and this popped out to me:

Here we comment on possible implications from this work, combined with quantum
Church-Turing Thesis. The quantum Church-Turing Thesis states that any physical
process that happens in the real world could be simulated in a quantum computer. We
could write it in a more formal way: Any calculation that cannot be done efficiently by
a quantum circuit cannot be done efficiently by any physical system consistent with the
laws of physics.

In other words, if a theoretical model can not be efficiently simulated via quantum computer then it cannot be efficiently realized in the real world. One hypothesis then could be that, the more efficiently a theoretical model can be quantum-computer simulated, the more likely that model is to be reflective of reality. If we are dealing with "large scale theories" whose points of correspondence are nothing less than the parameters of reality, establishing what counts as confirmatory evidence might be...complicated. Perhaps the model is its own best evidence, based on this hypothesis?

Simulating Superstring Theory on a Quantum Computer

Very nice presentation. Metaphysics in the sciences goes on all the time, although most come from actual scientists. — jgill

I second that. Nicely stated. :clap:

Interesting bit of terminology - advocates for string theory and related multi-verse conjectures are often scornful of the insistence that speculative science ought to be subject in principle to validation or falsification by observation or experiment. They devised a slang word for those insisting on such criteria - the popperazi :grin: — Quixodian

I like Pigliucci's description "mathematically informed metaphysics." Suggesting the intimate relationship between science and metaphysics, as I've considered elsewhere. I think the description is a propos.

↪Pantagruel But what exactly are the pseudo science interests and how do they differ from science interest? And does the answer to that not also answer to a demarcation of science?

Am I correct in saying you are:
1) Unsure about the limits of science
2) Sure that there is pseudo-science
3) Pseudo science is not science

It seems that if 2) and 3) are true, then you are sure of at least some of the limits of science.

If I say theory X is pseudo-science because of a and b, then I am saying a and b are indicators that something is not science. — PhilosophyRunner

I think that pseudo-science is perpetrated intentionally by people for material ends. Most of that stuff educated people can ignore, but if I cared to pay attention to some of the absolute twaddle that some people pay attention to I'm sure I could draw a line pretty easily.

This may serve as a good starting point to understand the demarcation of science - what makes one theory science and another pseudo-science? Is it in the method used?
— PhilosophyRunner

I don’t think sweeping, abstract claims can be made. You have to look at specific, real world examples. So, are horoscopes pseudoscience? Yes. Is chiropractic a pseudoscience? It depends - but mostly, yes. Is creation “Science” pseudoscience? Yes. And so on. You can demonstrate each fairly easily. — Mikie

More generally, lets consider quantum physics. Essentially, Einstein's General and Special Relativity remains the best version of an empirically validated theory. While string theory has been highly productive, all of that productivity has been in the domain of the construction of theoretical models. There is no empirical evidence for string theory. This unverified-but-not-unverifiable direction of research begs for abuse by pseudo-scientific interests.

Knowledge brings change. This acknowledgement is at the root of our hybrid culture. This hybrid is not the culture of either of its roots. Technology changes culture. In doing so it some of the old culture is destroyed, but I don't think that means the end of culture. — Fooloso4

But isn't the essence of culture its values? It used to be called crass materialism. It is no less crass because it wears a shiny technological garb. It's all style, no substance. Lots of studies have looked at the correlation between the rise of technology and the decline of human intelligence, and the dangers that entails.

The question then is whether in determining the whither and why of mankind the philosophers would pull in the same or different directions. — Fooloso4

But the celebration of pluralism essentially defines universal consensus as an archaic concept. There is no longer any interest in an "overarching truth".

As I've mentioned before, I think that the boundaries of our scientific understanding have expanded beyond the limits of convenient observability in space and time. Hence experimentalism has been replaced by modeling and simulation. Science has become much more of an architectonic pursuit. However this is itself a danger, because pseudo-science can also cloak itself in the garb of architectonic. Hence the confusion of the modern world.

How philosophy is thought of today, as one academic subject of many, taught by those with Ph.D.s, who mainly discuss the history of the great thinkers and great books…yeah, this professionalization is basically irrelevant today. May it die out sooner than later — Mikie

But isn't this what keeps philosophy alive as an independent discipline? Without that, doesn't it become just a theme?

No. We haven't outgrown yet religion, politics or science, all of which require critical analyses and reflective interpretations. — 180 Proof

Yes, they require it. Will there be disciplined minds there to supply it? I do feel philosophical studies form part of the balanced project of the advancement of human knowledge, but that has to be ratified on an ongoing basis by collective will and consensus. What hope is there in a shattered milieu of alternative facts?

Whatever light the philosopher brings to the cave it remains a cave. The transformation brought about by philosophy is self-transformation. — Fooloso4

This was my conclusion too. However the technologization of our culture is in danger of fatally marginalizing philosophical values. If it can even be called a culture anymore.

The end of 'metaphysics' is argued in certain theses. Well, there they are, to be discussed. — Paine

I think metaphysics needs to continue to inspire scientific exploration, while ethics guides technological implementation.

As for answering as a human being, I got very little out of philosophy until I read Sartre and found I was an existentialist. — jgill

Sartre is a great starting point for embracing the power of human choice. I still advocate his notion of 'radical freedom' often.

How much more can one learn by reading and rereading works produced hundreds if not thousands of years ago? — jgill

How much is the quality of the experience of the present enhanced through understanding of the past? How much does understanding enhance experience?

Yes it does. It gives people tools with which to explore their beliefs, views, values, underlying assumptions, etc in a way that science alone can't. While science indeed gives us a tool to explore the world in ways philosophy alone can't. Both are needed. — PhilosophyRunner

:up:

Of course it does tend to overflow itself and produce valuable things — Leontiskos

Well that is the question, are there valuable things of which it is inherently productive. I was suggesting at a social level that it produces 'philosophical minds' that live and act in philosophical ways. And wondering if there is some kind of ongoing evolution of social consciousness measurable by some philosophical yardstick.

Definitely. Ecology values diversity and native species. Economics values wealth creation. Psychology values psychological "norms". — LuckyR

Hmm. Are you suggesting these are sciences where "value" enters in? Because, just to continue the science/philosophy dichotomy, you could call those the quantitative measures of those fields. Stipulating the psychology is of the behaviourist flavour. Valuing psychological evidence isn't evidence of the existence of 'ought' type values.

Yes. It is the old is/ought divide. Philosophy is uniquely useful on the ought side. — PhilosophyRunner

And does it exhibit a clear benefit in developing minds the way that science does in developing technologies? Is such a progressive evolution even happening at all? Presumably we are continuously becoming "more" than we were. As the nature of the world we inhabit expands along with our scientific awareness of it, our adaptation to the world must also proceed.

While not every student can contribute to the body of knowledge of philosophy in a significant way, the body of knowledge of philosophy can contribute to the constitution of each student, as a human being. So philosophical principles and methods can shape an individual's nature and be reflected in an individual's actions, thereby helping to shape society. So, in a practical sense, philosophy can shape the world.

The true value of philosophy is how much we allow ourselves to be shaped by it.

Perhaps Philosophy pertains uniquely to the "value" sphere, as it is so commonly contrasted with science. Is there an ethical correlate to the scientific method, whose application can be seen to have fostered the development of the most enlightened minds?

Would you say that the various disciplines that have grown out of philosophy are ‘applied’ forms of philosophy? If so, what exactly is it they are applying? This I would say is the role of philosophy. Other disciplines are founded on presuppositions that are built into their chosen vocabularies, but those presuppositions remain outside of their purview of examination. — Joshs

Are you saying that there are fundamental philosophical principles that are "built-in" to sciences, for example? Because I am thinking that sciences uniquely identified themselves with the emergence of the scientific method, which maybe is an extension of philosophy in one sense (in the sense that it clearly emerged from that more "comprehensive" type of knowledge that predated it). But merits its own identity owing to the meteoric rise of technology coinciding with its level of adoption and application.

I don't think they're trying to overconsume, it's just that their world is configured to keep them in that state. — frank

Tomato tomato.

I think that arguing about the nature of the problem when the solution is the same describes exactly the fragmentation of political will by diversity of interests. Everyone has a pet peeve, so there are themes of protest identifying different groups. Each is aiming for a "better world," and their overall set of priorities are probably the same, except they disagree as to "what is to be fixed first." When if they pooled their collective agreements, they could realize the political will to address all the problems collectively, which is probably a whole lot more realistic as they are all interrelated.

Never mind that the entire continent of Africa emits only 4% of global emissions a one ton per capita. — Mikie

What does this have to do with anything? Obviously, the problem has to be addressed where it is created. If I read you right, you would advocate for a campaign of public awareness to drive political will to regulate industries, which are the material if not the final cause of climate change. Well that's exactly what I suggested people could be persuaded to do, essentially curtailing their own worst tendencies, indirectly.

Every year I'm amazed at the demand for air conditioning. People make their dwellings colder in the summer than they would be in the winter. — frank

It's almost like they enjoy the exaggerated sensation of being in control.

To come here and announce “Give me any solution and I will tell you why it won’t work,” use an example of cows, declare “good luck with that,” and expect to be taken seriously, is exactly the issue. Whether it’s truly trolling or just childishness, I don’t know. — Mikie

Granted, that last part was really poor. However, up until then I thought the points were legitimate. The best argument becomes meaningless when it declares itself unassailable.

Who are you and why are you trolling this thread? — Mikie

People have to reduce their demand to have any hope of "solving" climate change. And even that might not be enough. — Agree to Disagree

Seems like a perfectly reasonable position to me. Just because someone disagrees with you doesn't make them a troll. Sounds more like an ad hominem to me.

My wife and I did a little excursion for lunch on Sunday (my Mini got 60 mpg on the trip so I don't feel so bad about that). On the way home we stopped at a rural antique store. I parked next to a giant black Ford truck that was idling, nobody in it. The people were walking around browsing the store. They just left it idling for 20 minutes or more to keep the AC going. It wasn't even that hot out.

People and their inherent stupidity, their willingness to project problems on others while completely ignoring their own culpability, are definitely at the heart of this problem. However if a majority of people won't wake up to the fact that they are causing the problem, they might still get behind initiatives to curtail production through increasingly stringent regulations, thereby indirectly regulating their own behaviours.

Then how do you account for the hard problem of interaction? — Bob Ross

To really appreciate it, a good grasp of systems theory is essential. However, I can offer part of Laszlo's explanation of why systems philosophy (the philosophical expansion of systems theory) constitutes a new "paradigm":

The disciplinary matrix, defining what may be termed the 'paradigm' of systems philosophy, may be stated as follows.
Holism as a world view. Reductionism exists in many forms: methodological, epistemological, ontological, radical and 'soft'. Holism likewise exists in these many forms. In systems philosophy a 'soft' variety of holism is usually espoused, as consistent with the openness of its scientific base and its
non-dogmatic spirit. It is assumed that many phenomena can be understood only by taking into account the full set of relations constituting them, without reducing them to casual interactions between analytically isolated parts. It is also assumed that it is often counterproductive to reduce concepts and
principles applicable to complex systems to the concepts and principles applicable to their parts.

Essentially, you never effect a split because everything we experience is always a "system" which is a composite of those elements. The best description I have ever encountered is in Laszlo's Introduction to Systems Philosophy (as I've mentioned before) however it's $120 on Amazon and I can't find a PDF so I can't quote it.

As for process philosophy, Whitehead and Bergson are probably the best examples. Considering "events" as metaphysically primary is essentially a precursor to the paradigm-shift to a systems-theoretic metaphysics.

What about the fact that consciousness is dependent upon the physical brain? — chiknsld

Conscious presents itself in our experience of it through the physical brain, as well as through the mechanisms of other living beings. Consciousness is embodied but it is also embedded in environmental information and processes in a non-trivial way. Mind needs a mechanism of interaction and influence with matter, that is true. But who is to say what form that could take? Amoeba's do not have a brain, but they can learn and have memory. Perhaps consciousness of some kind subsists through and as a kind of supervenient field of quantum coherence.

Interesting, so, for you, there’s two types of fundamental things: object and subject; and so you are not a monist then, correct? — Bob Ross

I don't think that either monism or dualism do justice to what's going on in the universe. Cassirer talks about reality as both meta-physical and meta-psychical (i.e. transcending both matter and mind) and I think this has merit. Freedom and determinism, matter and mind, form and substance, being and non-being. Reality seems fraught with antinomies, but these seem more like poles or extremes of a dialectic which mutually condition and require each other. I just posted a link to a book in my old thread on science and metaphysics that purports to be a systems theoretic metaphysics. If you view the universe from a systems theoretic perspective, traditional problems are not solved so much as they do not appear as problems. For me, it is the logical and scientific presentation of a process ontology.

To your second sentence, I don’t think that everything that I am is in relation to something else but, rather, my knowledge of myself requires an other; — Bob Ross

All intellection takes place in and through language, and language is emphatically a social construct/phenomenon. I just cant fathom the idea of a 'disconnected mind.'

But I thought your original proposal more interesting because it makes meaning dependent on even more than context, but also one's knowledge of a particular language. So this multiplies meanings even more while sensibly saying how it is they are multiplied -- since meanings are changed by what they are couched in, not just the meanings that are around the sentence but even the knowledge of a speaker is relevant. — Moliere

Yes, there really are no "generic usages," (unless perhaps media is contributing to the creation of a "generic mind"). But maybe not all nuance is important.

:up:
Why wretched? I thought it a good read.

Minimally, to be a subject is to be a subject "of" something. I am a subject of perceptions, of ideas, of feelings. So while the "ordering principle" of objectivity is subjective (Kant) knowledge of objectivity arises with experience. Hence, the "synthetic a priori" which yokes the two.

For me, any attempt to conceptualize a pure subjectivity falls into the black hole of idealistic-solipsism. Everything that I "am" is in "relation to...." and anything that I stand in relation to must be other than what I am. This seems fairly self-evident (to me). Similarly, for objectivity, something is an object "for a subject".

Ontologically, I am speculating that perhaps the most fundamental characterization of reality is that of subjective and objective. We literally cannot think what a universe minus subjectivity would be because that would be a universe minus thought, which cannot be thought. Even if we tried to imagine it, that would still be an imagined universe. It is a variety of panpsychism for sure.

Your opening sentence is a bit cryptic. Is it the meaning which accrues new experience, or is it the speaker? — Moliere

Yes, that was the idea. We are the avenues by which meaning accrues, but, in some real sense, it must also be external to us since it is objectively encapsulated and shared. It is a bit of an enigma. Possibly the notion of a collective entity solves this?

Meaning evolves as it accrues new experience. Barring simple ostensives, the meaning of words derives from their function in sentence-level constructs (or larger). Average vocabulary ranges typically from about 10 to 30,000 words. What any given (non-trivial) word - duty for example - means for a person with a vocabulary of 10,000 words must be different from what it means for a person with a vocabulary of 30,000 words. Except if the former is in the military, and the latter is a cloistered academic. So meaning must be complex function of both social activity and linguistic competence.

I think mind-dependence is misleading. Neither pure subjectivity nor pure objectivity can be conceived in isolation; each requires the other. Aligning with Kant, Cassirer says "the unity of the I does not come before that of the object, but rather is constituted only through it." The universe is dynamic, dynamism requires energy, and energy is the result of a tension between opposites. For a gradient to exist, there must be a high and a low, which are mutually determined. The most absolute opposition conceivable is that of subjectivity and objectivity. The quality of quantity; quantities of qualities.

An exact and scientific metaphysics
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-99403-7?fbclid=IwAR25Wl-rdb1Pt0E2Z6Xngg5__x0xcG0xYq0XwDkUuYNIhMqRq7kP2QYcsFU

Ok. And they have the same acceleration because they have different inertias. How does this not answer that?

...in fact, this is all we need in my opinion to calculate the g acceleration.
However, since the same is said for the second mass, the two accelerations will need to be added, and if the second mass is great or small will make a difference in the overall g, it seems. — Gampa Dee

But you are conflating a generalized equation for force (which includes two masses) and acceleration (which includes two masses but in which the inertia of the much smaller of the two masses always balances whatever additional force it contributes to the overall system, and so can be factored out). Yes, for any given large body there is an acceleration equation which disregards the mass of the "falling" smaller object. But also yes, the overall force realized does vary if the mass of the smaller object varies.

Indeed it is, but the same condition applies with respect to the relationship between force and inertia. The force is a composite product of the two masses, as is the acceleration.

So while m (small mass) can indeed affect the force, what good is it in calculating the acceleration if all different masses fall at the same rate? — Gampa Dee

Different masses accelerate at the same rate towards a reference mass because they also have different inertias, which balances the different forces generated.....