It appears like you are not quite grasping the law of identity clearly, and you are equivocating between two senses of identity, sometimes known as "numerical identity" and "qualitative identity" (check Stanford for an explanation). — Metaphysician Undercover

Since you’ve pointed me to SEP, you’ll notice that the entry on identity is in no way unequivocal about what identity is. But taken from the introduction:

A distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973). — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/#1

Given this distinction - and the plasticity of the term "thing", which can reference a concept – how is your own concept of “griffin” not numerically identical?

(That it might change over time equally applies to any physical thing. Moreover, it can only change so much as concept while remaining the same concept of “griffin” – this, again, in parallel to the numerical identity of any physical object: e.g. the numerical identity of a flower between the time it is a bud, or earlier, and its full wilting, or later.)

Notice that qualitative identity requires the sameness of qualities that pertain to two or more things. By comparison, the concept of “griffin” is one thing - a given whole that as form is undivided - and not two or more. It is a hybridization of different animals – an eagle and a lion – true; but the hybridized given is nevertheless singular.

----------

As to the ontology of identity, my own views are fringe. In all fairness, I’d rather not get into them right now.

Given that, as you say, we are going around in circles, it might just be that we might need to agree on disagreeing.

All the same I'll give a reply.

If we apply the law of identity to all forms, we see that universal forms cannot have an identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The conceptual form of "griffin" is not the same as the conceptual form of "unicorn". I take it we agree in this. How could this be so if neither has an identity? (an issue further addressed below)

My argument is that since there are numerous number systems, natural numbers, rational numbers, real numbers, imaginary numbers, and so forth, there are numerous different conceptions of "one", and no single mathematical system unifies these into one concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

You would need to establish how the concept of "one" holds a different meaning in each of these systems to make this affirmation. What I find is that - even though they use the foundational concept of "one" in different ways - the concept of "one" remains the same. It's a given whole, a concept requisite for any such system of mathematics to manifest.

This is because we can use language to refer things without any identity. You don't seem to be grasping the intent of the law, which is to prevent the situation where we assume that just because we can talk about it, it is a thing with an identity. You completely misinterpret the law if you claim that a fictitious thing has an identity, because the law of identity puts the identity of a thing into the thing itself, rather than what we say about the thing. The fictitious thing has no existence independent from what we say about it, therefore it cannot have an identity.

Sure, you can say that "the law of identity pertains to all conceivable givens", but unless you abide by that law, and acknowledge that some conceivable givens do not have an identity, then you step outside that law and you enter into hypocrisy. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are conflating identity with primary substances (with empirically known to be physically existent givens).

If I were to ask you for an example of a thing language can refer to that is devoid of any identity, you would likely identify givens that are not "empirically known to be physically existent" ... but you would be identifying them all the same, i.e. disclosing their identity. This in the same breath with which you'd affirm that they lack any identity.

If you believe you can sidestep this contradiction, please provide an example.

This is not a breaking of the law of identity, it is an issue with the law of non-contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is commonly accepted that the law of noncontradiction is a derivative of the law of identity, and that the former is meaningless without the latter.

and primary awareness is necessarily of the external. — Metaphysician Undercover

We again disagree. A different issue, though. But by this I take it that to you the laws of thought can only be external to awareness. A view which stands in utter contradiction to my own.

I don't agree with this at all. I think it is incoherent, so perhaps I misunderstand. First, how could one have knowledge of something which is independent of whether that something occurs? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, my statement was misunderstood: What is real is regardless of whether or not it is known. One does not need to know what is real in order for what is real to be. This applies to what is metaphysically real just as it applies to what is physically real.

Second, the law of identity is extremely difficult even for human beings to understand (as evidenced by this thread), it is set up as a defence against sophism. So I don't see how children or lesser animals could be applying the law of identity as a defence against sophism. I believe you continue to misrepresent "the law of identity". — Metaphysician Undercover

My dog can identify me (e.g., as not being another member of the household or some stranger). Nor does my dog behave as though me is not the same as me. My dog doesn't need to have a cognitive understanding of the law of identity in order to do so. He just does. This is what I meant by saying that the law of identity is intrinsic to awareness, i.e. that it governs all awareness - irrespective of whether there is propositional knowledge of it.

Would you agree with Aristotle, that when the geometer produces geometrical constructs, and discovers geometrical principles, this is an act which is properly described as the mind actualizing the principles. The principles exist in potential, prior to being actualized by the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

For the example just provided, I would not agree - though there might be other examples for which I would agree. The geometric principles, say those pertaining to a triangle, exist as actuality prior to their discovery. Awareness of them is a potentiality that becomes actualized. But the geometric principles can only be so, in actuality, prior to their discovery.

MU, since we disagree on so many issues, I'm OK with leaving things as they are. Of course, feel free to critique my reply, but I might not reply in turn. Benefited from the discussion all the same. Thanks.

That is basically modern realism. [...] — Wayfarer

Agreed.

Don't the three fundamental laws of logic qualify here, as fundamental conclusions concerning "that which is physical"? — Metaphysician Undercover

For me they apply to all forms, including fictional ones, and not only to that which is physical. That Harry Potter is not a unicorn is true - addresses a reality that stands in its own context of fictional concepts - this via the laws of thought, including the law of identity.

But "1" does not signify any absolute unity. It is divisible, and infinitely so, by the accounts of many. So how could it signify an absolute unity? — Metaphysician Undercover

"Oneness" can be readily defined as the state of being undivided, of being a whole. As to 1's infinite divisibility, remember that I take the concept of one to be a hylomorphic whole, a form endowed with constituents. But one constituent does not of itself equate to the given whole. A whole given is taken to be undivided as form, hence - for me at least - can be represented by the number 1. As one example, one horse can only be represented by the number "1", and not by any division. Yes, a horse can be divided into parts ad nauseam, all the way down into zero point energy. But its multiple parts are not the horse as a whole, which is in a state of being undivided. As a more abstract example, one grouping of two or more givens is, as a grouping, itself one whole. As one example, "animal" can be conceived of as a grouping of givens, yet the concept of "animal" is itself one whole - distinct, for instance, from the concept of "plant".

As to the adjective "absolute" we neither innately perceive nor contemplate "a horse", for example, to be a relative whole - a whole that is only so due to its relativity to some other given(s). We innately identify it as a complete, unmitigated, whole.

The only difference is that you are not moving along to see the reason why the law of identity has the capacity to govern what we say about physical reality. It gains that capacity to govern, by saying something true about physical reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, the law of identity pertains to all conceivable givens, and not just those of physical reality. One three-headed dragon - say one that a person saw in an REM dream - cannot at the same time and in the same respect be both green and not-green. This, to my mind, is so because it would then break with the law of identity. At any rate, a three-headed dragon holds an identity despite it not being a physical given.

I don't see how you can say this. The "empirical" is fundamentally sense experience. Therefore it is a very base level of knowledge. How could it be "governed by metaphysical properties" which is a principled, and therefore higher level of knowledge? The most basic must always govern the higher, as the most basic has a higher degree of certainty. The lower substantiates the higher, and the empirical is the lowest. — Metaphysician Undercover

Two points:

The empirical is just one aspect of awareness, not the only, nor, imv, the most important. Take the sense of understanding. Without an understanding of that which is perceived via the physiological senses, that which is perceived would be meaningless. We also experientially know of things such as being ourselves happy or sad, and some such states of personal being of which we are aware are in no way obtained via the physiological senses. Hence, I maintain that awareness, and not that which is empirical, is fundamental to knowledge.

Secondly, knowledge of metaphysical realities has nothing to do with whether or not these metaphysical properties occur. Same as with physical reality. Take a preadolescent child or a lesser animal as example. Their awareness operates via the law of identity without them having any knowledge of the law of identity. Or else take adult humans prior to Aristotle's formulation of the principle. They too where governed by the law of identity thought they had no propositional knowledge of it.

That said, to me these metaphysical realities are intrinsic aspects of awareness - again, irrespective of whether the awareness addressed has propositional knowledge of them. We do not, and cannot, create them. We can only discover them. As such, we do not govern metaphysical realities, this just as we don't govern physical realities. We, as aware beings, are predetermined by the former. And, though in different ways, we are likewise determined - bounded/limited - by the latter.

I think "substance" has its meaning relative to logic, and it refers to whatever grounds any particular system of logic, as what underlies it to support it. So it is quite clear to me, that "any whole that can be cognized" is not an acceptable definition of substance, because it allows that fictitious objects may be substance, or have substantial existence. And this is clearly inconsistent with any logically rigorous definition of "substance", as that which provides truth to the logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see your point here. A unicorn as concept is not substantiated by primary substances (which I still maintain can only be empirically known). The claim that “unicorns are objectively real” thereby being unsubstantiated. Yet the claim that “the concept of unicorns occurs within western thought” would be substantiated. Granted. Yet for me the concept of unicorns is itself hylomorphic and as such has an identity as a whole given, as a form, which is itself composed of parts, i.e. has a constituency.

It is only when you disavow the object to which "2" is attributed as a property, that numbers are necessarily arbitrary. That's what you've been talking about isn't it, claiming that there is not need for the physical object which substantiates the number? Didn't you mention bundle theory? Physical groups of two things, is what substantiates the non-arbitrariness of 2, just like physical instances of animals substantiates the genus "animal". The physical group, which consists of two, is the physical object, the particular, the substance in this instance, and "2" is a property of that physical object. — Metaphysician Undercover

In relation to both quotes:

For what it’s worth, I personally don’t take the laws of thought, the law of identity included, to be grounded in anything physical. I instead interpret these to be grounded in metaphysical aspects of reality that then, via awareness, govern how we interpret that which is physical. This in a Kantian-like manner. It’s a can of worms - the details of which I’d rather skip - but, for instance, the absolute unity which can be conveyed by the numeral “1” cannot be found in physical givens: for any one physical given is itself less than perfectly integral—being, instead, in constant flux, change, regarding its constituency, with smaller components always coming in and out, with these leading all the way down into zero point energy. So I take it that the integrity, wholeness, of physical givens is only relative to their context, rather than absolute, and that a perfect wholeness, or unit, is what we experientially project onto the world perceptually. In short, to me, the law of identity isn’t substantiated by physical reality; instead, it of itself governs, and in this sense substantiates, that which we deem to be integral wholes within physical reality.

I mention this because, at the end of the day, our different takes on the law of identity - and maybe on laws of thought in general - seems to play a crucial role in why we disagree about the nature of mathematical objects.

I think I get where you’re coming from, however. More or less, the position that all concepts need to be substantiated in empirically known to be real particulars in order for the concepts to be non-arbitrary, and thereby true to reality. If I’m indeed interpreting you correctly, when applied to most contexts, I would be in agreement with this. The only main, but subtle, disagreement would be that the empirical itself is, to me, governed by metaphysical properties (these including what is formalized as the law of identity, in addition to other Kantian categories such as those of space and causation): thereby making the empirically known reality of the physical itself, in one sense, substantiated by that which is purely metaphysical.

Dude! I'm trying to figure out MU's position a little better. Thanks for the ignoble backing, all the same.

Yea, I get that. For right now I think the argument centers on whether or not there are any mathematical objects to begin with.

Any concept which cannot be substantiated (grounded in substance) is an arbitrary concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're using substance to denote something different than what I'm denoting by it: for you, it seems, substance is only that which is empirically cognized via the physiological senses. For me it is any whole that can be cognized - perceptually or otherwise, such as via the understanding - which is constituted of parts, any hylomorphic given. In this latter sense, then, every concept is itself a substance. This as per Aristotle's philosophy, wherein concepts are secondary substances. Even so:

Unless we have a principle as to what constitutes a whole, an entity, or an object, all concepts with numbers would be arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't yet understand why you presume that basic numbers are not substantiated via that which is empirically cognized? We perceive quantities. And we express these perceptions of quantity via numbers. Thereby making basic numbers (e.g., 2), as well as their basic relations (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4), non-arbitrary.

We take a group of two and look at it as a single thing, and say that this thing has the property of consisting of two. There's no fundamental problem in saying that the group is not a true object, it's arbitrary, and arguing therefore that the only true object is the property which is assigned. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given what we've been through in terms of prime matter being pure potential and all givens being identified by their forms, why would the abstract form of "2" be deemed arbitrary rather than a "true (abstract) object"? Seems to me that basic numbers are not arbitrary, despite their very abstract nature; else, for example, 2 + 2 could equal 5 in certain cases.

As for context, what is salient is that there are ways of stating beliefs and ways of showing beliefs. Which is the right hand side of a T-sentence? A showing or a saying? I say both. — Banno

Long story short, I agree with this.

Consider how someone might demonstrate to you that they understood what to do at a traffic light.

They might say that they know to stop on red, go on green and dither on yellow.

Or they might take you for a drive, through sets of traffic lights, and show you that they can do as expected. — Banno

In still trying to think this through:

It strikes me that the showing can occur even if not intended. For instance, in this quoted example they might intend to show you their understanding but inadvertently show you the opposite via their actions. Whereas a telling would always be an intended conveyance - an intended showing (?) - and, hence, maybe, always propositional.

In other words, I'm currently assuming that what is show may or may not be propositional. But that what is told (via language or otherwise) is always propositional.

As to one possible significance of this: In terms of at least art, since art is an intentionally produced expression, it would then consist of tellings (which might be construed as intended showings). If so, does that then imply all art to be in some abstract way propositional? Haven't thought that far out yet. But the notion of fake rather then genuine art does have some sway ... as in, for example, art that is a sell-out. Might the emotions of some songs, for example, be false rather than true due to the intentions behind their expression? This such that the beliefs via which the songs are produced are, in some highly abstract way, false beliefs? Thereby somehow making the song a propositional expression?

I'll apologize in advance if I need to. I'm freely thinking out loud here, without any discernible conclusions, in what's likely a very idiosyncratic take regarding what propositions can be constituted of ... And I know these thoughts are in a serious muddle.

But I'm posting this anyway, just in case it might be of interest. Still, may the post be overlooked if its train of thought derails the thread's subject matter.

I haven't thought about the distinction between showing and telling much; but to give a quick answer i would say that they are more or less synonymous in this context. — Janus

Yea, I'm thinking it through myself. To use an example, if the pointing dog is not showing but telling, then its pointing is itself propositional - could be a true or false telling (which doesn't seem to fit for "showing") - and this sans the use of language. And if its pointing is propositional, then it is indicative of (language-less) belief. Something along these lines. (I know from at least anecdotal evidence that dogs can deceive - and are thereby endowed with a rudimentary theory of mind.)

Haven't read through most of the tread, so I don't know if I'm addressing things already addressed.

I'd say that good art always shows something. In the case of music (absent lyrics) and painting, nothing is said in the literal sense of 'said' that applies to sentences. In the case of poetry I agree that what is literally said rarely, if ever, exhausts its meaning. But in the case of poetry meaning is not use at all, but association. — Janus

Maybe I'm naive in asking:

Why always the metaphor of "shows" and never that of "tells"? As one example: a good poem tells of things it does not directly say. Or, in the case of lyric-less music, the melody doesn't show you emotions but instead tells you of emotions. Or, a pointing dog doesn't show you where the given is but tells you of where to look so as to discern the given.

"Showings" imply visualized images, which could be construed to be meaningless in the absence of a tale that they invoke. "Tellings" are always telling, bear significance and, hence, meaning, by their very nature.

This question goes out to @Banno as well.

Therefore, we need to keep in mind that the very notion of meaning is artificial and is seperated from nature. — Eliot

This would make sentient beings seperated from nature. Which invokes a very weird notion of "nature".

This means that purpouse is an artificial concept not just for nature, but also for us: we do not have any goal in life, rather we tend to create objectives upon which we set ourselfes to make sense of the world around us. — Eliot

We are not that which causes ourselves to be in want. Wanting is an intrinsic aspect of all sentient beings - from the want of physical sustenance to strictly sapient wants, such as those of a better life, of greater wisdom, and so forth. This the quenching of want is, of itself, a goal we constantly pursue.

Are you, in contrast to this, saying that the quenching of wants is not "a goal in life"? Or else somehow not real? How so?

I think it's quite soothing, at times, to think it's all absurd. In the words of Monty Python:

"For life is quite absurd
And death's the final word
You must always face the curtain with a bow
Forget about your sin
Give the audience a grin
Enjoy it, it's your last chance anyhow"
— Echarmion

:up:

What do you think? — Ellis

My view is that that being per se is by its very nature beyond the principle of sufficient reason and, therefore, in one literal sense, absurd.

That said, beings, in the plural, are parts, fragments, of being proper. As fragmented aspects of being proper, we crave/want. And, inherent in this, is the need to understand, to hold and find meaning: this so as to quench our cravings/wants as best we can. Hence:

[...] but long story short, to me, everything, especially that in relation to human society, seems absolutely absurd. — Ellis

To me, while "everything" in its largest form can well be construed as absurd, as reason-less, that which relates to human society is anything but ... for it's replete with reasons and, as entailment, with meanings.

The OP reminds me somewhat of this:

A man said to the universe:
“Sir, I exist!”
“However,” replied the universe,
“The fact has not created in me
A sense of obligation.” — Stephen Crane

While I find a lot of truth embedded in this poem, notice that the man's implicitly given wants are, and can only be, inherently meaningful (at the very least to the man himself) - even though the universe which he addresses may very well not be.

I'm glad to hear that there isn't any significant disagreement (if any) in relation to Nirvana as "ultimate identity".

Finally got around to reading Kelly Ross's manuscript which you linked to. I’m envious of the clarity and simplicity with which complex concepts are expressed. I don’t fully agree with some of the concluding inferences. But, for the sake of this thread, I’ll skip all of this. (And for what its worth, despite his many shortcomings as a philosopher (what philosophy can ever be “perfect”?), I continue to greatly admire Hume for many of his insights. :razz: But anyways …)

For anyone interested in furthering the issues of identity already discussed in this thread, taken from about a third of the way in in Ross's manuscript:

Concepts, or predicates, are always universals, which means that no individual can be defined, as an individual, by concepts. "Socrates," as the name of an individual, although bringing to mind many properties, is not a property; and no matter how many properties we specify, "snub-nosed," "ugly," "clever," "condemned," etc., they conceivably could apply to some other individual. From that we have a principle, still echoed by Kant, that "[primary] substance is that which is always subject, never predicate." On the other hand, a theory that eliminates the equivalent of Aristotelian "matter," like that of Leibniz, must require that individuals as such imply a unique, perhaps infinite, number of properties. Leibniz's principle of the "identity of indiscernibles" thus postulates that individuals which cannot be distinguished from each other, i.e. have all the same discernible properties, must be the same individual. — https://www.friesian.com/universl.htm

If my interpretation of it is valid, to me Leibniz's principle of "identity of indiscernibles" can equally apply to substance theory and to bundle theory - the latter standing in contrast to the former, with the former being typified by the first portion of the quoted passage.

If so, curious to hear what would be wrong with the following: an individual object's identity of itself consists of a gestalt form that results from the synergy between all relevant properties as parts. In this manner, hybridizing substance theory with bundle theory in relation to identity. (I'm toying around with this notion at present). Hence, there here would be no inherent, independent substance (primary or secondary): all substances being emergent byproducts of properties. On the other hand, the gestalt is that to which all its properties are predicates of.

An individual apple's identity would then be the gestalt that results from all of the individual apple's properties, including those of its spatiotemporal placement (which is a predicate of the apple).

An individual number's identity (say, the number 2) would then likewise be the gestalt that results from all of its properties: this gets far more tricky due to the degree of abstraction, but maybe including those of duality, its placement within the appropriate context of other numbers (e.g., greater than 1 but lesser then 3), and so forth.

Edit: I'm aware that the Wikipedia article on bundle theory makes a skimpy mention of "bundle theory of substance". More musings on this issue can be found here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#BundTheoTheiProb. All the same, if anyone is interested in debating the notion of identity as a gestalt form emerging from a bundle of properties as parts, I'm curious to see in which ways this would be critiqued.

To do a Galileo like thing: but still the table can burn due to being constituted of wood rather than marble.

You are of course correct in respect to the notion of primary matter. Yet in practice we, for example, have to build houses whose bricks are constituted of solid matter rather than, say, some sponge-like material. I was addressing this more practical view of a hylomorphic given's constituency when addressing bottom-up determinacy.

I don't think we can correctly say that anything occurs in a moment of time without any temporal extension. All occurrences require duration. Therefore I do not think we can exclude "bottom-up" and "top-down" from a temporal analysis. — Metaphysician Undercover

In one sense I agree, but in this sense all four of Aristotle's causes co-occur (an Aristotelian variant of codependent arising). Which is not the case when each cause-type is addressed individually.

To address this via example, if a wooden table’s burnability holds as its material cause the wood out of which the table is constituted, what duration occurs between a) the material cause of wood and b) the table’s intrinsic potential to burn?

So far, to me (a) and (b) seem to be necessarily simultaneous, with no duration in-between, while standing in a bottom-up relation.

Nice concepts on the issue of space, btw.

I have mentioned this essay before, but you might find it worthwhile - Meaning and the Problem of Universals, Kelly Ross. (The author is a retired academic.) — Wayfarer

Thanks. Briefly skimmed some of it for now. Will look further in it in a few days. Looks to be up my alley.

Buddhism says that there is nothing that constitutes an 'ultimate identity' in this sense whatever. — Wayfarer

I have a great deal of respect for Buddhism in many regards, this being one of them.

That said, the Buddhist notion of Nirvana, though different in many ways to that of Aristotle's unmoved mover, to me does share a number of similarities. The utterly, literally, selfless state of awareness (hence, a state of awareness devoid of all duality) which is Nirvana - more correctly in this context, "nirvana without residue" - seems to be interpretable, to me at least, as the ultimate identity of all sapient beings (and at least some schools of Buddhism seem to hold of all sentient beings; this being an inference gathered from those Buddhists that take an oath to enlighten all sentient beings). And - again imo - it is from this vantage of what our ultimate identity is that the no-self principle of Buddhism can be derived.

Don't know if its just me, but I take it that anything which can be identified holds an identity, a discernible form. Though we're accustomed to thinking of all identities as being finite forms that are constituted of parts, the state of being which is Nirvana certainly is utterly devoid of parts, is stated to be infinite in the sense of being devoid of limits or boundaries, and is identifiable. Hence, Nirvana is a discernible form of being. So while this will probably be a bit irksome, I can interpret Nirvana to of itself be the ultimate identity. This in parallel to what was previously discussed about the Aristotelian unmoved mover as the ultimate identity ... or of what can be said in relation to the Neo-platonic notion of "the One".

(The perennial philosophy parts of me like to believe that all three are different interpretations of the same metaphysical given.)

Curious to hear your thoughts on the just given musings.

I also question the tendency to 'absolutize' the forms. I think they're real on a specific level, viz, that of the 'formal realm' which 'underlies' the phenomenal realm but they can't be pinned down or ultimately defined. — Wayfarer

Right. I tend to agree in this for all forms save for "the One".

I don't agree, I think "that which constitutes" is closer to what Aristotle meant than "composition". — Metaphysician Undercover

In truth I can't find much of any meaningful different between a constituent and a component of a given, so I'm perfectly fine with rephrasing material causes as a "constitutional determination" rather than a "compositional determination". I was initially hesitant in so doing due to "constitution" being so readily interpretable in the senses of government and law. But I suppose the term's contextual use would suffice to clarify the intended meaning. Thanks for that.

What I'm saying is that I believe that final causation, intention, will, is bottom-up. Formal cause, which we apprehend as acting top-down, is distinct from final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I find reasons to disagree, thanks for the explanation.

To illustrate what I mean, the goal, or objective, one has in mind while engaged in making a decision will be the decision's final cause: it determines what will be chosen in so far as what will be chosen will be so chosen for the reason of best obtaining the objective. Bottom-up addresses synchronic occurrences, yet the goal pulls the momentary act of choice making toward a potential future that has yet to be objectified. So, to me, there is a type of temporality involved with a telos. This to me stands in contrast to both bottom-up and top-down determinants, both or which strictly occur in the specified moment of time without any temporal extensions into the future.

So I am disagreeing with your use of "composition". I think it is misleading, implying that we can remove the particular arrangement of the parts as inessential to the composition. — Metaphysician Undercover

No such implication was intended:

1. The act of putting together; assembly.
2. A mixture or compound; the result of composing. [from 16th c.]
3. The proportion of different parts to make a whole. [from 14th c.]
4. The general makeup of a thing or person. [from 14th c.] — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/composition

One one hand, these definitions are in accord with Aristotle's definition of matter as ""that out of which" X is made". One the other hand, my current more formal definition of composition is "a given's synergy of parts"

My reason for using "composition" rather than "matter" as a determinant (as in: material cause) - this in what I'm currently working on - is that "matter" nowadays commonly denotes that which constitutes the physical, whereas composition does not. The latter being more in-tune with what Aristotle meant. So, the synergy of ideas which constitutes a paradigm (say evolutionism rather than creationism, or vice versa) is the paradigms composition (its matter in Aristotelian terms). This synergy of parts, in this case of ideas, then sets the limits or bounds of what form the paradigm can take and of what changes it may or may not undergo so as to remain the same paradigm. This synergy of parts is then the paradigm's compositional determinant (the paradigm's material cause). This even though, in today's terminology, neither the paradigm nor the ideas from which it is composed are material - rather, both, to most, are deemed immaterial.

What is inevitable with this process of reduction of the matter, is the appearance of infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, and in related passages, we seem to agree in full.

The bottom-up form, which is properly an immaterial form, as responsible for the cause of material objects, is the form of an individual, rather than a universal form. [...] The teleological form, associated with intention and final cause is the bottom-up cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

This part to me is a bit confusing. Are you saying that formal causation is a bottom-up causation? Or that a hylomorphic given's form is the result of material causation, with the latter being bottom-up? Or something other?

As a little bit of background: To me a form, as the term was traditionally intended, can be reexpressed as a whole, as a given's entirety (of being). So, in a maybe oversimplified manner, one can contrast a given whole with the same given whole's synergy of parts. (Yes, each individual part is its own whole ... but this leads into different avenues of investigation, ones you've already touched upon). The given's whole, or form, results in the given's formal cause upon its synergy of parts. Whereas the given's synergy of parts results in the given's material cause upon its form (upon that which makes the given a whole given).

At least when viewed this way, formal causation is to me always top-down, rather than bottom-up, even if it is deemed to be of primary importance relative to any identity: for it is the whole's determination of the synergy of parts from which it as a whole is constituted. (And I acknowledge this is a very complex subject to embark upon; but, notwithstanding, it still strikes me as a synchronic top-down determination). Whereas it is material causation - the synergy of parts' determination of what the whole is - that strikes me as bottom-up causation.

So, here, everything both material and immaterial (modern usage) is hylomorphic, save for the unmoved mover. But the latter is a telos which moves everything teleologically. So its being as form need not have a synergy of parts. Not being itself a hylomorphic being, it holds neither top-down (downward) nor bottom-up (upward) determinations, but instead is solely composed of teleological (what I currently term "pull-ward") determinations ... which affects everything (including all efficient causes) either directly or indirectly.

I likely expressed more than a mouthful. Of course, feel free to critique my interpretations, but I am curious why you express formal causes to be bottom-up rather than top-down IF this is indeed what you here intended.

I don't think that you can call the parts of a thing as the cause of its composition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, you’ve misconstrued what I was saying. I wasn’t saying that a given’s summation of parts *causes* the given’s composition/matter. What I was suggesting is that its summation of parts, or constituents, *is* its composition/matter. This such that “matter” and “composition” can be used interchangeably. Hence the reason why the bronze statue can dent—for one example—rather than shatter or burn, is its composition/matter of bronze (rather than the same statue-form being composed of stone (which can shatter) or wood (which can burn)). Reworded, the bronze statue is dent-able (rather than shatter-able or burnable) due to its composition as the cause of its dent-ability. Again, such that composition and matter are in the addressed Aristotelean context interchangeable.

Aristotle assumed that there was matter so that he could say that an object has an identity, and to insist that it continues to be the same object despite changes to it. This was an argument against philosophers like Heraclitus who would say that all is flux, becoming, disputing the idea that there even is any real objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

As regards continuity, forms, and matter, I think it’s a complex minefield. However, this is to me an interesting Aristotelian tidbit that might (?) clash with the gist of your affirmations regarding the impermanence of forms vs matter: the teleological unmoved mover is taken to be pure form sans any and all matter. And, as the unmoved mover, it neither comes into being nor goes from being, remaining as permanent as permanence can get, this while being deemed the mover of everything hylomorphic, with the latter taken to be in states of change, i.e. flux.

So, in my quirks of interpreting Aristotle, if we’re looking to affix identity strictly to that which is permanent, unchanging, then this cannot be matter but instead can only be form: specifically, that matter-less/composition-less form which specifies the identity of the unmoved mover as telos.

But again, to me this is a complex field to enquire into. And, for the record, no, I’m not denying that forms (other than that form which specifies Aristotle's teleological prime mover) change over time, including by appearing and disappearing. I simply don’t associate identity to that which is necessarily unchanging.

As regards concepts, it looks like we disagree on a lot of small points that, in short, add up to a large disagreement overall. I won’t nitpick, preferring the let this issue of concepts be for the time being.

Read the context or shush. — Kenosha Kid

Blushingly, point taken.

In Aristotelian physics temporal continuity is provided for by matter. Matter is what persists, unchanged as the form of a thing changes, and substance contains matter. Today, this is represented by conservation laws, energy and mass. Accidentals are formal, as part of a thing's essence. The problem with representing "the concept" in the same way, as having temporal continuity, is that it seems to be immaterial. So it seems like we need a principle other than the physical "matter" to account for any temporal continuity of a concept. We might try 'information' to account for the identity of a concept, but that doesn't remain constant over time, so identity of the concept would be completely different from identity of an object, if we were to develop such a principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm going to push this issue a little.

Aristotle defines X's matter as "that out of which" X is made.[1] For example, letters are the matter of syllables.[2] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism#Matter_and_form

From such quotes I interpret Aristotelian matter to be fairly synonymous with composition. A material cause is a compositional cause, for instance, one whose effects are bottom-up and concurrent with the composition as cause.

So Aristotelian matter need not be physical (as we moderns interpret it to be). For a somewhat easier example by comparison to a concept, a paradigm's Aristotelian matter is, or at least can be, the sum of ideas from which it is composed. This in the same way that a syllable's matter is the sum of letters from which it is composed.

I know this breaks with common and traditional interpretations, but how do you find that Aristotle himself would have disagreed with what I've just outlined in relation to matter?

No, the concept denoted must be different, because the Spaniard and the Anglophone are two distinct people, with two distinct backgrounds, so the meaning will be different to each {...] — Metaphysician Undercover

As someone who speaks two languages fluently, I wholeheartedly disagree with this. Yes, some concepts do not translate in a single word, if at all. But basic concepts (again, generalized ideas), such as that of "tree", are the same across multiple cultures regardless of the language via which they are addressed (given that the populace is exposed to concrete instantiations of trees in its environment).

[...] just like the concept of 'tree' is different for you and me. — Metaphysician Undercover

As to the concept of "tree" being different for you and me: these visual scribbles we term letters, syllables, and words are meaningless in the absence of the concepts they convey. The complexities of language aside, if no such scribble could convey the same (essential) concept between two different people, how would communication of anything be possible?

The concept of tree is not the same as the concept of tree, because there are accidental differences in each instance that it occurs, therefore it violates the law of identity and cannot be an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

By this argument, no continuity of (the Aristotelian notion of) any substance can occur, for any physical object will have accidental differences between itself at any time t and t'. Yet (the Aristotelian notion of) substance - as I best understand it - is precisely that with is identical relative to itself over time; more precisely, that which survives accidental changes (implicitly, over time). In much the same way, the concept of tree remains identical relative to itself over time; i.e., it survives accidental changes, or differences, over time.

The issue becomes even more problematic when considering personal identity over time.

Because the law of identity applies to objects only, and a concept is not an object, I don't think there is a valid way to say that a concept might be identified. Instead, we define concepts. If we proceed to state that a definition identifies the concept, then we are in violation of the law of identity. A definition exists as words, symbols, so now we'd be saying that the identity of the concept is in the words, but by the law, the identity must be in the thing itself. That's why a concept does not have an identity. However, if we assume an ideal, as the perfect, true definition of tree, an absolute which cannot change, then this ideal concept could exist as an object. Every time "tree" is used, it would be used in the exact same way, to refer to the very same conceptual object. But I don't think that this is realistic. — Metaphysician Undercover

When we say “tree” and a Spaniard says “arbol” are not the concepts denoted by each different term identical - this despite possible accidental differences in the two term’s connotations? As in: the concept of tree, T, is the same as the concept of arbol, A. Hence T = A.

Given that the definitions of each will utilize different words, the English definition of “tree” and the Spanish definition of “arbol” might very well not be identical; but both definitions will define an identical concept. Again, one that survives accidental changes, including those of possible differences in connotations.

In Europe it's a bigger deal and holocaust deniers get much more coverage because they're doing something illegal and it gets blown up into this big thing. — BitconnectCarlos

And what's wrong with it being illegal in human made democratic laws if fascism is indeed something bad ... that inevitably leads into lands of the atrocious?

Tolerance for those who are intolerant can only lead to intolerance, period.

I get the need to talk to others. But this can only have any meaningful effect/affect when the other is of an open mind and is listening. Otherwise, it becomes an issue of fending off offensive violence with defensive violence.

What is the logical conclusion of anti-fascism? — Kenosha Kid

What is, democracy?

Its a jeopardy-like answer to a jeopardy-like question.

Shit may happen when you attack a federal building, I suppose. — Olivier5

Try to imagine the same attack being perpetuated by people of non-white skin ... or by those utterly evil "anti-fascists" (an attitude which blatantly specifies whom the good guys are: those who are not antagonistic to fascism but, instead, either endorse it or are indifferent to it).

The shit you've specified would have been a lot worse. More along the lines of a slaughter. "Why" we wonder (sarcasm here).

But then, those who are not anti-democracy wouldn't attack a democratic institution to begin with.

I’m curious to know how you would address the following scenario via the law of identity:

--The concept of tree is the same as (is equal to; i.e., is identical to) the concept of tree … and is different from (is not equal to; i.e., is not identical to) the concept of rock.

Here, I’m addressing conceptual forms (which are naturally devoid of perceivable shapes: for, as a concept, i.e. as a generalized idea, it can take on multiple concrete, perceivable shapes …. None of which individually specifies what the concept, a generality, itself consists of in full). This, to me, is very much in tune to how a triangle, a geometric concept, can take on innumerable perceivable shapes without any such concrete shape being in and of itself the universal, abstract form of triangle per se. Likewise to how any number, itself an abstract concept, is identical to itself as number but not to any other number.

But my main interest here is in how you'd address the concept of tree as having, or as not having, an identity (albeit an inter-subjective one) as a concept - this as per the example mentioned. To be explicit, an identity via which it as concept can be identified.

Do you disagree with the qualitative difference, or the out-dated notion of a god-given Soul? — Gnomon

Neither. I sharply disagree with the part about there being a metaphysical division between humans and all non-human life.

So how does this work? — apokrisis

I'll leave that for another day.

primacy of awareness — javra

How would you define this? — Olivier5

My own definition of awareness’s primacy: The tenet that everything which can and does exist (i.e., everything that can and does stand-out in any way) is either directly or indirectly contingent on the presence of awareness - with some existents (like the objectivity of space, time, and matter) being contingent on all cooccurring instantiations of awareness, some (like the intersubjectivity of cultures and languages) being contingent on certain limited cohorts of cooccurring instantiations of awareness, and some (like one’s personal REM dreams) being contingent on unique instantiations of awareness. This tenet of awareness’s primacy thereby results in a stance of idealism.

My post regarded a conditional partly constructed from “if primacy of awareness is true” and not an argument for awareness’s primacy. I currently don’t want to engage in any such argument.

I noticed once an item of dogma from one of the Hindu religious sects: 'life comes from life'. To my knowledge, this supposition has not yet been overturned by an empirical observation. — Wayfarer

I think I can very much understand and respect where you’re coming from. Abiogenesis is a big thorn in the side. As for myself, though, I do strongly believe in the universe having once existed in the absence of lifeforms - despite my idealist leanings.

That is where panpsychism becomes even more intellectually dishonest. People do argue that neural complexity somehow amplifies the dilute awareness that is already a property of the material realm. — apokrisis

People are sometimes also fond of arguing that ameba do not hold a first-person awareness of light and dark, not to again mention of what is relative to them predators and prey. They hold no "neural complexity" to speak of. But then, this can get boosted all the way up the to the supposed metaphysically unique status of humans - as divided from everything else in the cosmos.

Then we sharply disagree.

Most of the higher animals have some form of culture, including ants & bees. But I wouldn't put them in the same category with human culture. — Gnomon

Bees and ants do not have socially transmitted behaviors as far as I'm aware - hence, no culture. If you know otherwise, please provide a reference.

No, human culture is not chimpanzee culture, nor vice versa. The question isn't whether human culture should be placed into the same camp as the culture of some lesser animal species or another. The issue is one of whether humans are metaphysically divided from the rest of life, or, else, are a progressive aspect of life in general - this despite the massive punctuated-equilibrium leap which our species has undergone.

But it doesn't support panpsychism for the reason I gave. There is still a clear line to be drawn between the inorganic realm and the organic realm. Science also talks about that. — apokrisis

Other than via mischaracterization or willful strawmaning, panpsychism does not deny the (somewhat) clear line between the inorganic realm and the organic realm (unless we forget viruses, viroids, and prions - which are organic and replicate but are nonliving, or, at the very least, non-metabolizing).

Recall that, of itself, panpsychism "is a difference that makes no difference".

The "effete mind" quote is easy to misinterpret as one sentence picked out from a large corpus.

Peirce was clearly trying to move beyond Cartesian dualism in toto, not merely declare against materialism and for divine soul. His focus was on the semiotic relation between impersonal information and informed material being.

Either you critique that machinery - the thirdness of a modelling relation - or you are avoiding the point of his metaphysics. — apokrisis

I'd don't believe that I misinterpreted the notion of effete mind. Peirce, after all, was an objective idealist, not a materialist. And yes, the concept is vastly more complex than what can be conveyed by two words.

As to Peirce's point, agapeism was a part of it. Something your system appears to conveniently overlook.

Primacy itself is the problem here.

Whether you are an idealist or realist, theist or materialist, the problem with your scheme is the drive to declare one metaphysics right and its opposing metaphysics wrong. That is the faulty mindset that defines the Cartesian bind. — apokrisis

Misplaced words. The dichotomies offered are faulty. Plato, for instance, was a realist. Moreover, isn't it about truth and that which is real? As one example, if one rejects the notion that a first-person awareness can be reincarnated, is this not about one's belief in what is true? In what can and cannot be real? Or is this conclusion the "faulty mindset that defines the Cartesian bind"?

So that makes a hierarchy with a sharp division. The foundation is a brute material world of entropy flows and the structures and patterns that must produce. Then the further thing is the evolution of semiotic mechanisms - truly informational substrates like membranes, genes, neurons, words, numbers - to support a world of self-interestedly entropifying organisms. — apokrisis

How does that follow from the premise that the universe has been partly negentropic from the Big Bang get go? This being something you’ve previously stipulated in other threads.

Upholding a partly negentropic universe that is, and has always been, governed by teleological and formal principles is nothing short of a proposal for an Anima Mundi, i.e. for an animated cosmos with teleological strivings, this being a form of panpsychism. Only that, to the staunch materialist, this flavoring of “anima/psyche” can only be an object of ridicule. And this due to a deeply engrained materialistic dogma that needs to be safeguarded.

On the other hand, if there indeed is upheld a sharp division between the entropic and the negentropic, as you’ve here asserted, then how can a fully entropic system logically give rise to negentropy? The empirical fact that life (which is negentropic) emerged from nonlife (which you here specify as being sharply entropic) does not, in and of itself, provide a shred of explanation of how this could have come about.

Again, panpsychism is a theory that is "not even wrong" as whether it is the case or not, makes no difference. Panpsychists still explain atoms vs amoeba vs chimps vs humans in terms of genetic information, neural information and cultural information. — apokrisis

And so panpsychism is not something that, of itself, makes a difference. Granted. Notwithstanding, the primacy of awareness, from which the stance of panpsychim can be derived, does. A reading of C. S. Peirce's philosophy can illustrate how. With one example being that of the objective world being effete mind; another being the difference in where the cosmos is headed: a difference that is exceedingly substantial.

But I gather the primacy of awareness is a bit too theistic reeking for the materialistically minded. So, to avoid that slippery slope into monotheism or some such, it must be denied tout court.

A psychism limited to certain life forms. — Olivier5

Maybe this needs clarification: if primacy of awareness is true, and a universe that was once devoid of life-forms is also true ... then what other viable conclusion to reconcile these two truths?

But the categorical difference between our own and chimp/dolphin consciousness, is that human self-awareness has created a whole new form of Evolution : Culture. — Gnomon

Haven't read up on dolphins but, as a fun tidbit, chimpanzee cohorts have their own unique cultures (with a small "C").

For example: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2195890-unique-chimpanzee-cultures-are-disappearing-thanks-to-humans/

If one accepts both a) the primacy of awareness in one form of another, together will all that this entails (e.g., goal, and thereby telos, driven behaviors), this as an idealist would; and b) the logical necessity that life - and, thereby, the first-person awareness it can be deemed to necessitate - evolved from nonlife; what other conceivable, logically consistent inference could one arrive at other than that of panpsychism?

As you’ve alluded to, the “biggism” brand of panpsychism which bert1 refers to is a modern rebranding of the Stoic Anima Mundi. In such form of panpsychism, prior to the emergence of life in the cosmos, the cosmos would yet have been an animated given governed by Logos and its universal telos (the “universal end” the first quote in your post makes reference to). What awareness, or consciousness, or mind, or psyche/anima means in the context of a cosmos devoid of life is to me still a riddle. But, so far, the conclusion of panpsychism (in some variety or other) seems to me well enough justified - here claiming this as someone who upholds both (a) and (b) aforementioned.

I’m asking because I’ve gained the impression that you don’t find the panpsychism hypothesis appealing—while yet upholding both (a) and (b) as tenets.

I might be wrong in my presumptions regarding your outlook, however.

If my imaginations serve me right, when younger I once remembered a world of benevolent and wise Yahoos while reading Gulliver’s Travels.

Oh, wait, a faulty imagination: I got it backwards. It was a remembrance of the Houyhnhnms that gave me pause.

Yea, doesn't quite work.

Yea, false memories can occur. Whoop-de-do. So can illusions and hallucinations. What’s the big novelty here? How does one “know” that one isn’t suffering the same conundrum as that guy in the movie Beautiful Mind when seeing a stranger on the street? Confirmation? All those one confirms this with could be part of one’s hallucination as well. Too many doubts in search for infallible knowns, me thinks. One trusts till evidence indicates reason not to trust. And yes, this is coming from a die-hard fallibilist.

In essence, as a purely mental effort, we can't distinguish between imagination and memory. Does this mean that our imaginations could actually be memories or, what for me is the more implausible alternative, that memories are imaginations? — TheMadFool

Since I haven’t read anybody mention it yet, imaginations are willed at the time experienced, memories (be they false memories or not) are not willed at the time experienced. At most one wills to recall a memory, rather than having the memory enter one’s awareness on its own. But one never will’s the memory’s contents into psychological existence, else one knows oneself to be willfully imagining things.

[Un-willed imaginings that occur during awakened states, on the other hand, are often enough ascribed to various mental disorders - be these mild, transitive, and generally normal (like a brief hallucination of seeing an animal in a dark corner when it was just wind-blown leaves, which is still a hallucination) or, else, psychological conditions that can be more debilitating.]

In case one asks “how does one know what one wills and what one does not”: One knows this via immediate awareness of oneself as a first-person awareness that engages in volitions.