Suppose a hundred years from now, science still hasn't explained how brains produce consciousness. Would you still be convinced that brain states cause mental states? What about a thousand years and still no explanation?

I know it doesn't. At this point in time, it should. The lack of explanation should give one pause about being certain about the primacy of brain states.

If you're going to argue that brain states are primary, you should have a coherent causal explanation for how brain states produce mental states.

Before we can determine whether thinking takes place in the brain, we have to first establish the brain exists outside the mind.

Argument From Incredulity — TheMadFool

No, the problem comes from asserting minds are brains. If minds are brains, then when I imagine a red sunset (or see a green afterimage), there's nothing red or green in my brain.
https://iep.utm.edu/identity/#H2

"A more serious objection to Mind-Brain Type Identity, one that to this day has not been satisfactorily resolved, concerns various non-intensional properties of mental states (on the one hand), and physical states (on the other). After-images, for example, may be green or purple in color, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple. And conversely, while brain states may be spatially located with a fair degree of accuracy, it has traditionally been assumed that mental states are non-spatial. The problem generated by examples such as these is that they appear to constitute violations of Leibniz’s Law, which states that if A is identical with B, then A and B must be indiscernible in the sense of having in common all of their (non-intensional) properties."

I agree with your claim about metaphysical status, but I think mind and consciousness are in a different epistemological category than anything else. I think we know for certain that at least one conscious mind exists. We don't have that kind of certainty about the existence of anything else.

The thing is, physics doesn't make any metaphysical claims about what matter ultimately is. "Particle" could refer to some mind-independent stuff or some dream stuff. Physics is equally compatible with materialism and idealism.

That's a good point. When I mediate and still my mind, I don't become unconscious so thinking and consciousness are not the same thing.

If you think like that then you mean to say that the information accessible to us is insufficient to conclude the presence of consciousness. So, here I am, talking to my friend and his conduct is identical in important respects to mine - he talks, acts just like me - and I, from that, make the following analogical inference:

1. I talk, act, initiate, respond in certain ways and I'm conscious.
2. My friend also does talk, act, initiate, respond in the same way as I do.
Ergo,
3. My friend is conscious. — TheMadFool

I don't think we're justified in making that inference. Two things are going on. One, we assume that we're all biological beings that are pretty much built the same way, so that if I have a body and I'm conscious, and you have a similar body, then you should also be conscious. But I'm not justified in assuming that matter even exists, let alone that you or I are made of it. The belief in the existence of some external non-conscious stuff is just that: a belief. It's equally likely, for all I can tell, that this is all a dream and your (and my) body is just part of a dream. If that's the case, then I should no more assume other people are conscious than I should assume people in my dreams are conscious.

The assumption that materialism is the case is also contradicted by the Hard Problem of Consciousness. At this point in time, we should have some scientific theory, if only a very primitive one, about how consciousness arises from non-conscious stuff, but of course, the theories are all over the place, from panpsychism to mysterianism to computationalism to outright denial of consciousness itself. This, I think, is evidence that materialism (and substance dualism) is not the case. That means that everyone I meet are probably dream figures who may or may not be conscious.

The other reason we assume other people are conscious is we don't want solipsism to be true.

Now, if I'm to doubt my argument from analogy above, there must be a relevant dissimilarity between my friend and me. If none can be found, the argument is cogent and I, perforce, must accept that my friend, like me, is too conscious.

Coming to AI, we seem reluctant to follow the same logic i.e. the following intriguing scenario is the case for AI:

4. I talk, act, initiate, respond in certain ways and I'm conscious.
5. An AI does act, initiate, respond in the same way as I do.
BUT...
6. I hesitate to conclude the AI is conscious.

We're trying to eat the cake and have it too. If you have doubts about the AI being conscious, this uncertainty automatically extends to your friend too and, conversely, if you believe your friend's conscious, the AI must also be conscious!

That doesn't necessarily follow. If I believe consciousness is only produced by organic brains, I could be sure my friend (who I believe has an organic brain) is conscious, yet doubt whether any machines are conscious.

Something about the evidence for consciousness is problematic. Either we believe it can be mimicked perfectly in which case there's no difference between your friend and a p-zombie and nonphysicalism is true or it can't be and AI that pass the Turing test are truly conscious.

The thing that's problematic about it is everything is filtered through our own minds, so it's impossible to verify whether any other minds exist. Solipsism will always be a viable option.

However, is the brain sufficient for thinking? Can AI think? Can silicon-based life-forms think? — TheMadFool

There's the rub. Will we ever be able to verify whether A.I. is actually thinking/is conscious? No. Even if someone's entire brain was replaced with a functionally identical mechanical brain, and they reported they were conscious, we would still wonder: are you really conscious? We would always wonder that. Science can never answer that question. That suggests science is not the tool for this particular job.

Badgering other people to answer leading questions is juvenile. — Valentinus

"Do you think it's possible you're not conscious when you're replying to people?" is a "leading question"? Lol.

My thesis couldn't be simpler: it's silly, nonsensical, and counterproductive to doubt one's own consciousness. Do you think you might not be conscious, Valentinus? Are you a P-zombie???
(no)

I can see you're having trouble with a very simple question. You are a conscious being. Doubting that you're conscious is silly and nonsensical and just serves to illustrate the absurdity of physicalism/materialism. It's like that one materialist I was talking to here who couldn't grok "what is it like to be me?" Seriously? Maybe focus less on mockery and more on shoring up your core beliefs.

Why are you having trouble answering a very simple question? Either you're sure you're conscious when you're typing replies to people or you're not. I'll answer it: I'm sure I'm conscious.

Do you think it's possible you're not conscious when you're replying to people? Yes/no

As for whether it's "possible" I'm not conscious, clearly I am not conscious most of the time, or continuously, just like everyone else. — 180 Proof

Do you think it's possible you're not conscious when you're typing your reply to me?

I'm not questioning your mockery, I'm wondering if you doubt whether you're conscious or not. Do you?

Because you said this

I bet you're "pretty sure" your eyes 'see things directly as they are' too. :roll:

In response to this:

What does it mean to say consciohsness is an illusion? Im pretty sure that Im conscious.

It sounded like you were mocking Prishon's surety about being conscious.

I bet you're "pretty sure" your eyes 'see things directly as they are' too. — 180 Proof

Do you have doubts about whether you're conscious or not? Do you think it's possible you might not be conscious?

Maybe our guns do stave off tyranny, or would if they had to. — Srap Tasmaner

There's no maybe about it- they don't.

It depends on the gun. Civilians should be allowed to own and carry shotguns, bolt action rifles and revolvers. Anything else, only the military and police should own and carry.

I wouldn't have a problem with anti-vaxxers if they were anti-hospitalers as well.

Do you really believe that a tremendous amount of death, suffering, and economic loss would not be prevented if everyone was vaccinated? — hypericin

I was wondering this too. Also the converse: how much worse would it be right now if we had no vaccines at all? All the evidence points to: a lot worse.

So? Computer simulations are real things, you can buy them in the shops. Why would they present some problem for what to call them? — Isaac

Are simulations observer dependent? That is to say, is it possible for a simulation to exist in a universe with no minds?

I'm not being mean. I'm just floored that someone can think the question "what is it like to be me?" doesn't make sense. I suspect there's no argument in the world that can get you to change your mind, so I'll stop at this point.

It's not that I know or don't know. — Isaac

Are you seriously claiming you don't know what it's like to be you? You can't see the absurdity of that?

You don't know what it's like to be you? You can't grok that?

Asking what it's like to sky dive is asking for my affect at the time, the answer is "It was great", or "it was really scary". Asking what it's like to be a bat is not intending such an answer. Nagel would not be satisfied with "it'd be fun", or "it'd be boring". — Isaac

There is something that it is like to be you (you), and there is something that it is like to be me (me). You would agree? It sounds like you're only objecting about considering what it's like to be things like bats. You concede that "what is it like to be you?" is a question you can answer?

But if someone can be "highly conscious", "barely conscious", and "unconscious", then this suggests different degrees of consciousness. At any rate, there must be increasing degrees of consciousness between unconsciousness and full consciousness, e.g. when we wake up from deep sleep.

Conversely, when we are extremely tired we may be increasingly less conscious than when fully awake and alert. The same is true when the normal function of our brain or general nervous system is impaired due to illness or other causes. — Apollodorus

I get this, but I think even if you're emerging from a deep sleep and extremely drowsy, that drowsiness is just as much a conscious state (quantatatively) as when you're fully alert. Like I said, the conscious experience in those cases (drowsiness vs wide-awake) is just different, and not a measure of quantity of consciousness.

I think "awareness" is better. You're either aware or you're not. If you're emerging from anesthesia and barely conscious, you're just as aware as if you're amped up on meth, say. I get that that seems counterintuitive. I'm not doing a good job describing what I mean here.

I don't think it needs to be less. It may simply be different. Otherwise, what it is that makes them "disabled"? — Apollodorus

I agree that conscious experiences are different, but I don't think you can quantify consciousness. You're either conscious or you're not. I don't think, say, a cat is at level x and I'm at level x+whatever because of my higher order thinking skills. I think the conscious experience is just...different for me and the cat.

If consciousness were correlated with intelligence, then the times when I'm wasted, my consciousness should be "less" than when I'm not on drugs. That is not the case. Often, the opposite is true. I don't think disabled people have any less consciousness than brilliant people.

What exactly do you attempt to eliminate in your "eliminative materialism"?
— Olivier5

We've been through this - things like qualia, consciousness (in the sense of 'what it's like') — Isaac

Isaac, are you claiming "what is it like to go sky-diving?" is something that needs to be eliminated? Or is nonsensical? Surely you've been asked "what is it like" questions by people before. How do you respond to them? Do you just ignore the question?

Get out of the sun of introspection. — jgill

The unexamined life is worth living?

Define 'song'. — Kenosha Kid

Lame.

I can go one better: I have even written an entire song, lyrics, chords, bassline and all, in the space of a cigarette break without making a peep. But there was still no music playing in my head, no sounds, just mental representations of sounds. — Kenosha Kid

But you didn't answer my question: have you ever had a song stuck in your head?

Yes, if by “song playing in your head” you mean that there are air vibrations that produce a certain sound literally emanating or passing through your head. But this is what you must mean in order to make your point. — khaled

I'm talking about a song playing in my head. It has nothing to do with air vibrations, and of course you know that because in your life I'm sure people have told you they have songs stuck in their heads and you never said to them "but how can that be??? There are no air vibrations in your skull!", so I give up. If you are incapable of acknowledging the trivial fact that people have songs in their heads, what more can I say? The absurdity of your position has been laid bare.

Question not to me but, yes, mistaken. Very mistaken. In the same way there's no red in your head when you think of the colour red. You have representations of a song, but no actual music is playing. — Kenosha Kid

Have you ever had a song stuck in your head?

What are minds themselves in an idealist system? Are they also projections of a mind? Or are they somehow independent and fundamental? If they are the former, whose mind? God’s? Then in whose mind is God a projection? If he’s not a projection in another’s mind, what is he? If the latter, how do they seem to increase whenever a kid is born?

Sorry for all the questions I just don’t get y’all. And I’ve been trying to. — khaled

These are questions that need answers, but they're not indicative of a category error, which is what you were claiming before. In idealism, there's only one ontological category: mental stuff. In dualism, there are two categories: mental stuff and physical stuff, and the dualist claims that one comes from the other. That would be fine if there was an explanation for it all, but in the absence of any explanation (and the problem has been around a long time), I think there's a prima facie case for a category error.

Having a song in your head and actually hearing a song from the other room are different yet similar experiences corresponding to different yet similar brain states. What’s the issue with this? — khaled

There is no issue with what you're talking about. This is what I was responding to:

It seems highly implausible that you actually have a song playing in your head. — Isaac

No, it's not implausible to actually have a song playing in your head. I have a song playing in my head right now. Do you think it's implausible? Do you think I'm lying or mistaken?

The "mind-body problem" is a misnomer. Call it an enigma instead, or a mystery, or simply a question. There are many unresolved questions, like the origin of the universe, what existed before the big bang, how did life happen, and who came first: the chicken or the egg? These are accurately called questions, not problems. Nobody calls abiogenesis a "problem", for good reasons. — Olivier5

Because, with abiogenesis, we already have a framework for an explanation: life started when chemicals xyz, did abc in environment efg. We're just trying to figure out exactly the environment, steps and chemicals. What's the framework for the explanation "how does consciousness arise from matter?" What does the answer to that even look like? Consciousness is an illusion? Consciousness IS brain activity? Consciousness is information integration? Unlike with abiogenesis, the explanation for consciousness at this point is pure guess work. I think it's a unique problem. You think "give it time". Maybe. But we should at least have the broad outlines of an explanation by now. The fact we don't is good evidence there's something deeper to the mystery.

Thing is, this science of idealism we've just described --Xism -- is physicalism. — Kenosha Kid

No, because the idealist says that the cause of your experiences is a mind(s). Everything you experience is a projection of either a coordinated set of minds or a god-head mind, like in Berkeley's idealism. Modern idealists like Bernardo Kastrup talk about a "cosmic mind". In any case, no physicalist would agree that reality is the product of a cosmic mind's thinking.

But you do bring up a point: science works equally well under idealism as it does under physicalism. Positing the existence of some mind-independent non-conscious stuff doesn't solve any problems.