Comments

  • Mind & Physicalism
    You can see it happen here 24/7. The same old tired arguments are being made over and over again on this subject, day after day, month after month, year after year. They think they are arguing but all they do is bang heads. — Olivier5

    Pretty much. But things change. The paradigm is shifting. Consciousness has become a big problem in academia. It's not OK to just sweep it under the rug anymore.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    Well, this conversation has taken an uncomfortable turn for the pathological. Are you saying that you can't tell the difference (even colloquially) between the expressions "there's a song playing in that room over there" and "I've got this song playing in my head"? — Isaac

    No, I'm saying you're wrong: it's not implausible to have a song in your head. It happens all the time.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    It seems highly implausible that you actually have a song playing in your head. — Isaac

    No it doesn't. You've never had a song stuck in your head? Sure you have. People talk about songs playing in their heads all the time. That's one of the problems with the materialist position: it doesn't map on to the way we talk to each other. The materialist has to say, "Yes, we might say "we have a song in our heads", but what we really mean, is neurons xyz are doing abc.". That's a problem for materialism, because when I'm talking about a song being stuck in my head, everyone knows exactly what I mean, and that I'm not talking about my brain.

    Dualism has a distinct advantage in that it maps on to our everyday language the best: we talk about our minds and we talk about our bodies and we don't think they're the same thing. I think if you drill down, you run into problems with it, but dualism certainly seems to be the way things are.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    Having a mind and a body is not necessarily a problem. The duality of form and matter is useful, conceptually and practically. So is the particle-wave duality. — Olivier5

    I know. My position is out there. I think 5% of professional philosophers are idealists (that's from a survey done awhile back). I think idealism is becoming more popular, though. You have people like Max Tegmark saying the universe is made of math, and Christof Koch is a panpsychist. Panpsychism isn't idealism, but it's certainly a step in that direction.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    Indeed.

    Though as ever, I'm intrigued by what you think an answer to "why is it that brains are conscious and kidneys aren't?" would be like. For me the answer is "that's just the way things played out". I don't expect anything to have a reason to have turned out some way and not another. Why is it that you want a reason?     — Isaac

    We're a curious species. We're usually not content with "that's just how things are". We always want to know why. In my case, I think the idea that mental states = physical states is contradicted by the simple fact that I can have a song playing in my head while there's no music in my skull; I can see green, without part of my brain turning green. I think the idea that mental states are caused by physical states is more appealing, but there's no consensus explanation for how that can happen, and for that to still be a mystery makes me think there's a category error going on there.

    I think where the materialist case really bogs down is with computers. Most materialists believe that machines can be conscious. That entails that the pain of stubbing a toe is (or can be reduced to) a bunch of tiny switches turning off and on. That's extremely implausible.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    Yes. — Isaac

    I think we got pretty far defining the physical. Any further posts would be along the lines of "why is it that brains are conscious and kidneys aren't?" and I'm sure you've heard all that and have an explanation you like.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    Yes...ideas. — Isaac

    OK, so we have some attributes for the physical:
    It is sometimes mind-independent (e.g., the sun) and sometimes not (e.g., ideas). Would you agree that the physical is sometimes conscious and sometimes not? For example, your brain is conscious and your kidneys aren't, agreed?
  • Mind & Physicalism
    There are many problems in this world. Thankfully most of us can intuitively feel a difference between dreams, or even hallucinations, and reality. There's a sense of matter being there, being hard and heavy. — Olivier5

    I agree. Idealism is counter-intuitive, but it doesn't suffer from a similar problem as the mind-body problem because it supposes that something we already know exists (hallucinations that people can't tell from reality) exists on a massive scale. There needs to be evidence for that, of course, but the claim itself is not susceptible to a category error. I think the mind-body problem is evidence that there's a category error going on, and you can't get the mental from the physical.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    One question asks if the sun is mind-independent, the other asks if the physical is mind independent. The sun is not all that is physical. — Isaac

    So your claim then is that there is some physical stuff that is mind-independent (e.g., the sun) and some physical stuff that isn't mind-independent. Can you give me an example of physical stuff that isn't mind-independent?
  • Mind & Physicalism
    Right, there wouldn't be labels for anything, but the stuff would still be there. I think we're agreed. So the physical is mind-independent. Agreed?
    — RogueAI

    No, I don't think that follows.     — Isaac
  • Mind & Physicalism
    The sun (or the external states which we interpret as 'the sun') are not caused by minds and would continue to exist if minds didn't. — Isaac

    So, the sun is mind-independent? You didn't agree with this before, and here you are literally saying the sun is not dependent on any mind. So, the sun is mind-independent, yes?
  • Mind & Physicalism
    delete
  • Mind & Physicalism
    That is not true for me. I can feel the difference quite well. — Olivier5

    I'm sure you will grant me the existence of people who cannot tell their hallucinations from reality, and this causes them tremendous trouble in life. You are not one of these people, OK.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    There are clearly lots of physical things produced by minds, all those things would obviously cease to exist of minds ceased to exist. — Isaac

    Did you mean to say the bolded? Aren't you talking labels here? Is your position then that the sun's existence is dependent on whether minds exist??? And what "physical things" do you think minds produce???
  • Mind & Physicalism
    But dreams and reality are different. — Olivier5

    Hallucinations and reality are often indestinguisable rom each other to the person experiencing it. Idealism is the argument that reality is a hallucination. Idealists always say "dream", but hallucination is more accurate, because, as you say, there are obvious differences between the dreaming and waking world.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    So what would my body be made of? Ideas? — Olivier5

    What is it made of when you dream at night? Ideas, yes.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    No but we can play with ideas, analyse them, communicate them — Olivier5

    I agree. I think it's evidence that they're obviously not physical things. Playing with an idea and playing with a physical object are two very different things.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    We'll solve it one day. In the meantime, I'd rather have a mind-body problem than have no mind or no body. — Olivier5

    Idealism doesn't entail you don't have a body. It entails that that body is not made of physical stuff.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    ↪Isaac
    Right, there wouldn't be labels for anything, but the stuff would still be there. I think we're agreed. So the physical is mind-independent. Agreed?
  • Mind & Physicalism
    ↪Isaac
    All right, let's pin the basics down on "physical". What would happen to the universe if all minds dissappeared? Would planets, stars, galaxies, etc. still be around?
  • Mind & Physicalism
    In between these two extremes lies the not-so-new idea that there's no matter without form and no form without matter. — Olivier5

    But then you have the mind-body problem, which seems insolvable, at this point.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    Therefore ideas are empirical, and can be considered as physical. — Olivier5

    Do you think your ideas have physical attributes? Size, weight, texture, etc.?
  • Mind-Matter Paradox!
    If there were no observers there would be no observations of white triangles; that seems obvious and I see no reason to assert any more than that. — Janus

    That's not what I asked. In a universe of no minds, would there be any white triangles? Not "observations of white triangles". Just "white triangles".
  • Mind-Matter Paradox!
    Sure you need an observer to observe something. — Janus

    Would you agree that an observer is a necessary condition for the existence of the white triangle? That is to say, in a universe where there are no minds, there are no "white triangles"?
  • Mind-Matter Paradox!
    I see both the white and black triangles on the screen. Both triangles have portions of their boundaries missing. Beyond that I don't know what you are asking, or what you think you are trying to prove. — Janus

    Neither triangle is an actual triangle. They both require an observer to give them the label "triangle", particularly the white triangle, since it isn't even made of line segments and is defined by its relation to the other objects.

    This is a problem for materialists who believe in the possibility of simulated consciousness. If the existence of the white triangle is dependent on an observer, then simulated consciousness is also going to be dependent on an observer- flipping little electric switches on and off in a certain way isn't sufficient to simulate consciousness. You would need an observer to assign a meaningful label to whatever pattern of switching operations is (supposedly) conscious, just as we need an observer to interpret the relationships between the objects in the image Gnomon posted and determine the empty spaces form a white triangle. And what's true of switching operations is true of neural activity: without an observer to give meaning to what the neurons are doing, it's just meaningless arrangements of matter interacting and moving around. Obviously, there's no little observers in our brain, so the brain alone is not a sufficient condition for consciousness.
  • Mind-Matter Paradox!
    Do you see the white triangle with your mental imagination or with your physical eye? Is the meaning of the word "see" the same in either case? — Gnomon

    That drives the point home very well.
  • Mind-Matter Paradox!
    I've always seen this idea as a deliberate separation of things that are meant to exist in unison. I believe that the spiritual and material are both true and have value. We are not mindless zombies, nor are we floating ghosts. We are humans. — Kasperanza

    Reality certainly appears to have a spiritual and material aspect.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    ↪RogueAI
    When you observe this website you observe philosophical discussions.
    — RogueAI

    Which are no more than a pattern of of letters. Which are no more than than a pattern of lights on your screen lighting up. Etc.     — khaled

    Well, this gets to the heart of my problem with materialist reductionism: it strips the world of meaning. You are claiming that this website is nothing more than computer code. OK, so the only difference between Plato's Republic and Lady Chatterly's Lover is the way the matter is arranged? Really? The only difference between this place and Breitbart is the amount/pattern of little switches turning off and on? Maybe you believe that, but if someone asked you to describe this website, I bet you wouldn't talk about computer code. You would say it's a website where people discuss philosophy. Because that's what it is!

    The position you take is extremely counterintuitive and certainly does not map on to the way people talk. It also entails that a physicalist account of pain is a necessary AND sufficient definition for pain. I think that's preposterous. Any definition of pain has to include that it hurts. It feels bad. The physicalist account of pain doesn't mention the mental component of pain, and I think it becomes an absurdity by leaving subjective experience out of the definition and claiming it's a complete definition. I mean, if an alien asked you "what's pain?", you wouldn't talk about it hurting and feeling bad? Of course you would. That would be the first thing you would talk about.

    Because she's never seen red before. No new knowledge was gained in the usual sense. Because again, in this case "know" has 2 meanings. There is the know in "know pythagorean's theorem" and the know in "know red". The latter simply means seeing something red. By the latter meaning, mary doesn't know red. Even if she knows everything about seeing red in the former meaning. No new knowledge in the former meaning is gained. The surprise comes from seeing red for the first time — khaled

    You're arguing my case. There are indeed two kinds of knowledge going on in Mary's room: book knowledge and experiential knowledge. Are you sure you want to argue in favor of the existence of experiential knowledge? I certainly think it's a thing, but you're going to have trouble reconciling the existence of experiential knowledge in a purely physical world.

    After reading ahead, I see we're too far apart on basic principles. You're willing to sacrifice meaning. I'm not. Sorry for how late the reply was! And the video I linked is really good.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    PBS's Closer to Truth just released a new video that covers a lot of what's talked about in this thread:
    "What is the Mind-Body Problem? | Episode 205 | Closer To Truth"
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3TnBjLmQawQ
  • Mind & Physicalism
    ↪khaled
    And I saved the best for last. A blatant appeal to authority:

    "A more serious objection to Mind-Brain Type Identity, one that to this day has not been satisfactorily resolved, concerns various non-intensional properties of mental states (on the one hand), and physical states (on the other). After-images, for example, may be green or purple in color, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple."
    https://iep.utm.edu/identity/#H2

    I think they do a good job (far better than I could) explaining it. I'm done for the night! Great discussion, Khaled. I'll reply tomorrow.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    I'm talking about the website itself. Is the website more than the code? No. — khaled

    Of course it is! Is the only thing you discover when you observe this website is that it's just computer code? Absurd. When you observe this website you observe philosophical discussions. You cannot claim that this forum/website/location in cyberspace is identical to computer code. That is a necessary, but not sufficient definition. It totally misses the fact that this is ALSO a place where people meet and discuss philosophy.

    ↪RogueAI
    Is Mary surprised when she sees red?
    — RogueAI

    Yes.     — khaled

    Why is Mary surprised? She already knows everything there is to know about seeing red.

    Maybe a car is a better analogy. We can say "This car can move at X km/h", without knowing anything about the engine or how cars are built. — khaled

    Yes, but you're not claiming the car is identical to "moving at X km/h". I think what you're trying to say is that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, so talk of Phosphorus is talk of Hesperus even if the person has never heard of Hesperus. To which I would reply that that can be resolved by simply pointing out the labelling error going on.

    Not so with ancient people meaningfully talking about their experiences. If experiences = brain configurations, then talk of experiences is talk of brain configurations and it's not just a labelling error going on. Ancient peoples had no idea what the brain even did. They were able to communicate meaningfully about their minds without exchanging any other meaningful communication, mislabeled or otherwise. If mental states = configurations of matter, and two people are meaningfully talking about their mental states, there should be meaningful communication about neurons and chemicals and action potentials and what not, but of course there's not. There's communication going on ONLY about mental states, which should not be the case if mental states are identical to anything else.

    Me: A car is actually this specific combination of parts

    You: So why is a car not this other specific combination of parts?

    Does that make sense to you? How would you begin to answer that question? We can agree that a car is a combination of parts and no more yes? Engine, wheels, steering wheel, etc. Now if someone asks you "Ok but why is a car not a combination of biscuits, chocolate, and cream" how do you respond to them?

    Explain to me why a car is a combination of parts (engine, wheels, steering wheel, etc) and not (biscuits, chocolate and cream), then I'll explain to you why stubbing your toe is pattern ABC not XYZ ok?     — khaled

    I think I addressed this with the Hesperus/Phospherus example.

    Rogue AI: Are these pattenrs substrate dependent
    — khaled

    No I don't think so, but some define them as such. That's what I meant.

    But you're not sure. So how would you go about verifying whether anything other than neurons can be conscious? You have a definition that neural state XYZ is the same as tasting vanilla ice cream. I will grant you there's neural correlates to experience and that's a definite plus for materialism and a problem for idealism.

    So, you start with a prima facie advantage that the brain sure seems involved in consciousness (I think this grants you a prima facie casual connection between mental and physical states, and not an identity relationship). But now you have to prove whether brains alone are conscious. And of course you can't. There's no way in principle to verify the consciousness of anything outside yourself. Whatever physicalist theory of consciousness emerges, a scientist is going to eventually point to a machine and say, "that thing is doing the same thing brains do, so it's conscious." But you already admitted you don't know if consciousness is substrate dependent. So how is that scientist going to verify whether the machine that's functionally equivalent to a human brain is conscious or not? She can't. Science cannot give us the answer. I think that has implications. I think the above also answers the part I snipped out.

    Let me ask you on the other hand, supposedly consciousness is an immaterial mind. How can you tell that your duplicate has an immaterial mind? You can't make a detector for it, because it's immaterial. So how could you tell? Or can you not tell? — khaled

    I can't tell if there is more than one conscious mind or not. That is different than the situation the materialist finds herself in. Not only can she not disprove solipsism, she can't prove the material stuff she thinks brains are made of even exists (it's a non-verifiable belief), and she also can't prove whether a machine duplicate of a brain is conscious or not. I am not the in same boat. I only claim that mind and thought and consciousness exist. Unlike matter, we know that mind and thought and consciousness exist. My only problem is whether solipsism is true or not.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    No because the meaning of "know" in both instances is different. When we tell someone "You don't know X emotion" or X color we mean "You haven't had X emotion" or seen X color, not "You don't know the neurological basis for X emotion". If the latter was what we meant we woudn't be able to talk about emotions or colors without knowing the neurology, yet we do so all the time. In the same way that you can use this site without knowing the code, so can we talk about emotions without knowing the neurology, and vice versa, EVEN THOUGH the emotion is no more than a neurological pattern (and the site is no more than the code). So no, Mary doesn't know red, even though she knows everything physical about seeing red. — khaled

    At t1, Mary has never seen red before
    At t2 Mary learns all the physical facts about seeing red
    At t3, Mary sees red for the first time.
    Is Mary surprised when she sees red?

    Same as above. Two people talking thephilosophyforum need not know about the code that comprises the site. Even though the site is no more than the code, or do we disagree there? Is there something more to this site than its code? Something that you need to add to the code to get thephilosopphyforum? I've already mentioned this previously: — khaled

    Are you saying the philosophy forum is identical to a computer code? I don't agree with that. The forum is computer code and a community of people talking about philosophy. Don't you agree that defining the forum as purely computer code is an incomplete definition?

    You have no explanation for why certain patterns of matter are identical to the pain of stubbing a toe
    — RogueAI

    Do you have an explanation for why vanilla ice cream is vanilla ice cream?     — khaled

    I'm not a materialist. I'm not claiming the taste of vanilla ice cream is anything other than the taste of vanilla ice cream. YOU are saying the taste of vanilla ice cream is actually pattern of matter A,B,C. YOU must then provide an explanation for why pattern of matter A,B,C is the taste of vanilla ice cream and not pattern of matter X,Y,Z or E,F,G.

    Are these pattenrs substrate dependent
    — RogueAI

    Definitional.     — khaled

    Oh, that's easy. OK, consciousness is an immaterial mind.

    Definitional.

    Again with the dualist view, suggesting there is a real object or property called "consciousness" that is added to physical stuff, that we can detect. There is no such thing. — khaled

    There is no real property called consciousness??? Are you conscious, Khaled? Yes. Now imagine you have a mechanical duplicate of your own working brain. Is it conscious? If no, why not? If yes, how would you prove it? "Definitional" does not cut it. YOU are asserting that the machine has a property you admit you have: consciousness. YOU need to be able to prove that somehow.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    ↪khaled
    Do you claim that the pain of stubbing your toe is identical to some configuration/pattern of matter?
    — RogueAI

    Yes.     — khaled

    Ok, I have problems with that:
    1. Mary's room: You're committed to saying that Mary can know what it's like to see red without having the mental experience "seeing red". I think that's a huge problem for you. It's certainly counter-intuitive.
    2. The opposite of Mary's room: You're committed to saying that two people meaningfully talking about their mental states are also meaningfully talking about configurations of brain matter, since mental state = certain configuration of brain matter. So, two Ancient Greeks meaningfully talking about what bad days they had and how depressed they are are also meaningfully talking about configurations of brain matter? Again, very counter-intuitive.
    3. You have no explanation for why certain patterns of matter are identical to the pain of stubbing a toe, while other patterns of matter are identical to the joy of a good book, while other patterns are identical to no experience at all.
    4. Are these pattenrs substrate dependent, and how would you verify whether a non-organic pattern of matter that you conclude is conscious is actually conscious?
  • Mind & Physicalism
    ↪khaled
    Actually, we can ditch the whole mental state/brain state thing. Do you claim that the pain of stubbing your toe is identical to some configuration/pattern of matter?
  • Mind & Physicalism
    No one said that minds are identical to brains, not even physicalists. — khaled

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/

    "The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain."

    Either brain states are identical to mental states or they're not. You seem to be claiming a mental state is identical to a brain state "pattern".
  • Mind & Physicalism
    Minds are patterns of brains. They are not a separate sort of thing. — khaled

    Let's take the mental state: stubbing your state. Is the brain state that corresponds to "stubbing your toe" identical to the mental state "stubbing your toe"?
  • Mind & Physicalism
    No I'm claiming that people can have knowledge of their minds but not their brains. — khaled

    Then minds are not identical to brains. How are they different?
  • Mind & Physicalism
    So, that being said, did ancient people who had knowledge of their minds also have knowledge of their brains? — RogueAI
    Firstly no, — khaled

    You're claiming ancient people did NOT have knowledge of their own minds?
  • Evolution and awareness
    ↪Bartricks
    Could a conscious mind not be introspective...I wouldn't be able to articulate this well, but I have a feeling consciousness entails a certain amount of introspection.

    My wife thinks she has a similar argument:
    1. Materialism means there is no free will
    2. If there's no free will, we have no choice in what we believe nor can we decide whether evidence is good or not
    3. If we have no choice in what we believe and/or no way to decide whether evidence is good or bad, knowledge is impossible.
    4. Knowledge is possible, therefore materialism is false.
  • Mind & Physicalism
    First off, I think consciousness is a neurological state. — khaled

    If X(consciousness) = Y(neurological state), then knowledge of X should entail knowledge of Y. For example, knowledge of the behaviors of bachelors would necessarily lead to knowledge of the behaviors of unmarried men, since they're the same thing.

    So, that being said, did ancient people who had knowledge of their minds also have knowledge of their brains?
Home » RogueAI