For instance, I read some time ago that Covid is, quite literally, nothing compared to what could happen with other unrelated viruses should they: 1. make the leap from the animal to man; 2. be airborne; and 3. be easily transmissible. The worst case scenario being a pandemic that wipes out 70 or 80% of the world's human population in a matter of months. — James Riley

You're confusing different issues. What I am talking about is making people take a vaccine.

So, there's a vaccine freely available. Those who want it can take it. And they will now be protected from the virus - or at least, from getting seriously ill from it.

And there are those who - for whatever reason - do not wish to undergo this medical procedure. That's their right. I personally think it is unwise. We - most of us - have instrumental reason to take the vaccine, for whatever risks it may carry are less than the risks posed by the virus it protects against. And so given that it seems inevitable that we'll all be exposed to the virus at some point, it is wise to get the vaccine. But that's a prudential obligation, not a moral one.

Those who decide not to take the vaccine are not violating the rights of others. Far from it - it is those who want to make them take it for their own good who are violating their rights. It is a constant danger - the danger of imposing your own conception of the good life on other people.

So that's this issue: this issue is about whether you can make adult free agents do things for their own good, or whether you have to let them decide for themselves.

I'd give an option: Stay away from the public and stay out of public spaces. Problem solved. — James Riley

Yes, that is what everyone can freely decide to do. So, those who - despite being vaccinated themselves - are paranoid about getting seriously ill from those who haven't been vaccinated (a concern that is silly if, that is, the vaccine is effective) - can stay at home if they so wish. Similarly, if they do not want to go to work anymore out of an irrational fear of those who have not taken the vaccine, then they can, once more, stay at home. They'll be sacked, of course. But that's their choice to make.

Is there any case where you would change your position? — James Riley

Not sure what you mean. But I'll say yes, as I am extremely reason-responsive. Give me a good argument and I'll change my position on anything - literally anything. I'll respond to the rest shorlty

Not true. Innocent people have died because they could not get a bed. (By bed, I mean all the staff and kit that goes with it). These people didn't have covid. They had accidents or other illnesses that hospitals usually have room for. — James Riley

They did not violate those people's rights. You're blaming the wrong people. It was those who determined who does or does not get a bed, if anyone, who violated those people's rights (not that anyone has a 'right' to a hospital bed).

What objection do you have to what I said, then? I mean, I assume you think it is ok for the government to flex its muscles and bully people into getting the vaccine. Why? Because of the science? What does that even mean?

So, if the vaccine is effective - and I am going to assume that it is, and believe that it is - then those who freely decide not to take it are exposing themselves and others who have made the same choice to a risk.

What's wrong with that? Whose rights are they violating? It's imprudent - but lots of things are imprudent. Punching yourself in the face is imprudent. Not taking enough exercise is imprudent. My friend Sarah's dating decisions are imprudent. But in none of these cases are anyone's rights being violated. Am I entitled to stop Sarah dating Steve because Steve's a bloody gold-digging pillock and will take her for every penny she's got? No. At most I can advise against it, but not actively intervene.

Likewise, deciding not to get the vaccine is stupid, but people are entitled to do stupid things so long as doing them doesn't violate anyone else's rights. Right?

Incidentally, the relevant experts in this scenario are not the scientists, but ethicists. For this is a normative issue, not a scientific one. The science can and should inform the ethical judgement, but it can't be a substitute for it, for scientific claims are simply not normative claims.

So, the experts we should be listening to here are professional ethicists, yes? Guess who's one of those?

Ok, so what is the difference between hard determinism and "ordinary" determinism (compatibilism)? — litewave

Compatibilism is not a form of determinism. Determinism is a thesis about how events are unfolding - it is the thesis that every event that occurs had to occur given the past and the laws of nature. It is not a theory about free will.

Compatibilism is the view that free will is 'compatible' with determinism. So compatibilism isn't the view that determinism is true, or that it is false. It is a view about what can co-exist with what. (Many contemporary compatibilists are agnostic on whether determinism is true or not - they think it simply doesn't matter where free will is concerned, for we have it either way).

The opposite of determinism is indeterminism.

The opposite of compatibilism is incompatibilism.

The incompatibilist believes that free will and determinism are incompatible. They do not, qua incompatibilist, take a stand on whether determinism is true or not.

An incompatibilist who believes that we have free will and thus that determinism is false is known as a 'libertarian'. (Not to be confused with 'libertarian' in political philosophy).

An incompatibilist who believes that determinism is true and thus that we lack free will is known as a 'hard determinist'.

An incompatibilist who believes that determinism is false but that we still lack what is needed for free will is known as a 'hard incompatibilist'.

Anyway, hard determinism is, by definition, incompatible with compatibilism.

What counterexamples? Like the one I gave about self-sacrifice? — litewave

Yes, there are tons of them.

Let's say I proposed that everyone is concerned for the welfare of others and does nothing out of self-interest at all. That's known as psychological altruism. Is it plausible? No. Sometimes - often - we appear to do things for the sake of ourselves alone, and sometimes - often - partially out of self-interest. ONe could reinterpret those cases as involving self-deception - but at that point one is following one's theory and not following the evidence. So, psychological egoism is no more or less plausible than psychological altruism - that is, not very plausible at all.

The plausible thesis is banal: we are motived by other-directed and self-directed desires. Sometimes we do things for the sake of ourselves, sometimes for the sake or others or some cause or what-not; and sometimes a mixture.

A thesis that says we are only subject to one class of desires - be they exclusively self-directed or other-directed - is implausible on its face (though it may tell one something about the proponent of the view, namely that they themselves are predominantly self-interested or predominantly altruistic, for it is hard to see why else, apart from confusion, they would find such a view prima facie plausible).

Generally it's exactly what the label says: being anti-vaccines. Won't get their kids vaccinated, believe vaccines cause autism (yes, that's still out there), etc. — Xtrix

That's still ambiguous between being opposed to anyone taking them, and simply being opposed to taking them oneself.

For instance, I think crystals are a waste of time. But I am not opposed to people decking themselves out in them if they really want.

So, I am opposed - very opposed - to anyone being made to get a vaccine. I think it is wise to get one. I think it is irrational not to, given that any risks that attend the vaccine are likely to be even greater from the virus itself. But I am opposed to anyone being made to get one. And I am very much opposed to the state using the powers at its disposal effectively to force people to get one.

I am not in the US, but as I understand it, that's exactly what's happening. And it is disingenuous in the extreme to suggest that merely forcing companies with over 100 employees weekly to test all of those who haven't got one doesn't amount to such an act of forcing.

I am opposed - very opposed - to the government (any government) doing anything other than recommending getting one. Which is all I would do - I recommend people get one if they can. But it would be quite wrong for me forcibly to inject someone or to do things that amount to something similar, such as issuing threats to you until or unless you get one or mounting a campaign of harassment against you if you don't have one.

Now, given what I have just said, do I qualify as an anti-vaxxer? I am not opposed to the existence of vaccines, nor do I disbelieve in their effectiveness, nor do I think that it to mess with a divine plan to try and come up with them; nor am I opposed to others getting them; and I intend to get one myself. But given what I have just said - given my opposition to any government (or indeed, anyone) forcing or menacing anyone into getting one - am I an anti-vaxxer?

Is it? If you mean cases where someone sacrifices his own pleasure for someone else or for some honorable principle, don't you think such a sacrifice has given him a good feeling of satisfaction that was worth the sacrifice and therefore prevailed over the sacrificed pleasure? — litewave

Yes, it is highly controversial - it is known as psychological egoism and has virtually no defenders. It's exposed to so many prima facie counterexamples that it just isn't plausible.

We still have free will in the compatibilist sense. — litewave

That's confused. If compatibilism is true, then hard determinism is false. This thread is about what hard determinism entails. So it must be granted that compatibilism is false, for compatibilism is incompatible with hard determinism (hard determinists are incompatibilists about free will).

The car is programmed to start when you turn the key, like we are programmed to fulfill our obligations. — litewave

Question begging. We don't have any obligations if hard determinism is true. See earlier reasoning for why - reasoning you've not challenged.

What is an anti-vaxxer? It is unclear to me.

Is it someone who is opposed to vaccinations?

Or is it someone who does not want to get a vaccine themselves, but is fine with others getting one?

Or is it someone who is fine with getting one themselves, and fine with others getting one, but doesn't believe others should be 'made' to get one?

I mean, I am an anti-vaxxer in the third sense (although I'd say 'anti-vaxxer' would be a misleading term to refer to me by, as I am not opposed to vaccinations and am very much in favour of me getting one).

I don't think there's any reasonable, ethical basis for forcing people to get vaccinated. You have the right to refuse medical treatment. And in this case, refusing to be vaccinated means one exposes oneself and others who have made the same free decision as oneself to greater risks, not innocent others. Unless, that is, the vaccine is not very effective - but then it'd still be unjust to force others to take it, for if it is unjust to force people to take an effective vaccine, then a fortiori it is unjust to force people to take an ineffective one.

Yes, we choose the option that seems to maximize our pleasure and minimize our pain (according to our evaluation). We are programmed that way. An autonomous car is programmed to stop at red lights and go at green lights; it too has options when reaching a crossroad: stop, go, turn left, turn right... — litewave

Well, that's a highly controversial and fairly obviously false pyschological thesis. It's not clear what bearing it has on the current issue - if we're programmed to behave in any way, then we lack free will in that respect and thus will lack any obligations. We'll engage in the behaviour, but none of it will qualify as satisfying or violating obligations. So you're talking past the issue.

An autonomous car is programmed to stop at red lights and usually it can do it. But if it malfunctions it can keep moving. — litewave

Yes, and cars are not agents and do not have obligations. My car is not obliged to start when I turn the key, is it? When Basil Fawlty thrashed his car for breaking down, his behaviour was absurd (and therein lay the humour) precisely because he was treating his car as if it was an agent.

The point is that if hard determinism is true - which it isn't - then we lack free will and thus lack obligations (not just moral ones either, but instrumental and epistemic ones as well).

What I have done is explain why this would be the case: obligations presuppose free will. They presuppose possession of reason, and possessing reason means one acts under the idea of free will. And one is not obliged to do something unless one has the ability to do it or refrain from doing it - and so again, the notion of an obligation is intimately bound up with the notion of free will.

One can have free will and no obligations, but one can't have obligations and no free will. So, if we have no free will, then we have no obligations.

Two reasons First, to have any obligations one needs to be an agent. That is, one needs to be reason responsive - one needs, in other words, to be able to recognize and respond to normative reasons.

To recognize that there are reasons to do things involves recognizing that one has options - that there are alternative possibilities available and thus one needs to consider what one has most reason to do or believe.

Well, that's what taking oneself to be free involves. As Kant said, to act is to act under the idea of freedom. The very notion that we have obligations then, presupposes that we have free will, for one can't take seriously that one has any reason to do anything without presupposing alternative possibilities and the ability to select which one be actualized.

Second, it is manifest to the reason of most that if you ought to do something, then you can do it. And if you ought not to do x, then you can refrain from doing it. As Kant said, 'ought implies can'.
If, then, we have obligations, we have the possibility of not fulfilling them, and thus the possibility of doing and not doing them and the ability to select which one is the case.

All you are doing is describing behaviour. And yes, one does not need free will to go through the motions, mental or otherwise. But one does seem to need it in order for any of one's behaviour to qualify as the fulfilling of, or violation of, an obligation. And it is plausible that unless some of one's behavior can so qualify, one does not have any obligations. That is, once more, because it seems a condition on having obligations that one is able to fulfill or fail to fulfill them.

Again, you miss the point. It is implausible that it makes a difference.

I don't know. Something. It's beside the point.
Let's say you find yourself in a bed, all bandaged up and hooked up to various monitors. There are also others around you in a similar situation. Well, it is reasonable to infer that you are in hospital and that you suffered a major health incident. You don't have to know specifically what.
Likewise: we can reasonably infer that we are in a prison. One does not have to know for what.

So, just to be clear, if people exist prior to birth, then it is wrong to procreate because of the lack of consent. Whereas if they don't, then the lack of consent doesn't matter?

So if people exist before birth you'd agree that procreation was wrong?
And if someone dies, there's no need to honour their will?

That quote doesn't say that "knowing makes guilty" (whatever that means).

Read it carefully. It's an argument.

1: If God exists, God would not allow innocent persons to live in ignorance in a dangerous world.
2: God exists
3. therefore God has not allowed innocent persons to live in a dangerous world.
4. We are living in ignorance in a dangerous world
5. Therefore we are not innocent

What? Where? Quote me
(And answer my question - why are you talking about the bible when I never mentioned it?)

how does that have anything to do with what I said? Why are you talking about the bible? Did I mention it? I haven't read it and don't care what it says.
Reasoned reflection reveals we are in a prison.

Once more: the act of rape cannot be consented to. As you don't seem capable of understanding this, imagine someone cannot give consent to sex - does that make sex with them ok? Er, no. Yes? Lesson: the fact consent for x was unachievable does not make x ok. It - typically - makes it very far from ok.
So, contrary to what you think, the fact the one who is brought into being here by an act of procreation could not consent to it makes such acts far from ok.

What? What was that?

If the purpose was to give you fun, the world would contain more of it. It'd be nothing but fun. He's omnipotent. Look it up.

Er, what? What are you on about?

Yes. This is a prison. You are living in ignorance in a dangerous world. God exists. God wouldn't subject innocent people to a life of ignorance in a dangerous world. Thus you are not innocent. There is no other reasonable conclusion

You aren't getting it. You can't consent to be raped. So, the fact it is impossible to consent to an act doesn't mean the act is morally permissible. It typically means the exact opposite.

Your mind is still stuck in the "rape" thing. I already answered you that no its not right at all. And I also mentioned you that is totally irrational to compare a living woman's choice(which she is entitled to have and to express it), with an unborn, non existing creature "potential choice". — dimosthenis9

That's because you don't seem to understand its import. You said previously that as it is impossible to consent to be born, this somehow means the choice to impose a life on someone here doesn't matter, ethically. That's absurd. There are lots of acts it is impossible for the affected party to consent to, such as acts of rape and other acts of coercion. You can't consent to be raped. You can consent to sex. You can't consent to rape. So, by your logic, that means rape is fine, or at least that the fact it was non-consensual doesn't matter. Which is absurd.

So, the fact one cannot consent to be created is a fact about procreative acts that it is reasonable to suppose makes them immoral.

imagine all the world's women decide they don't want to have kids. You think it is ok to rape them?
The human species is not a person. It doesn't have interests. It doesn't have desires. It's just a term for a collection of persons whose bodies have some things in common, namely a certain genetic history. No one owes it any obligations.

So if no woman wants to procreate, you think rape is now right? My reason says that'd be wrong.
The human species isn't a human. It doesn't die and you can't kill it and it has no interests. It does not experience pleasure or pain and it has no will.
Obligations are more clearly owed to persons than species. But anyway, if people freely decide not to procreate, no wrong has been done. And it'd be wrong to make them breed - very wrong.

The correct normative theory is pluralism. There are a host of features that typically make actions wrong, not just one (sometimes an act is wrong because it causes suffering; sometimes an act is wrong because it hasn't been consented to; sometimes an act is wrong because it expresses a bad character trait; and so on). Hence the partial credibility of consequentialist, deontological and virtue-based theories. The bottom line is that for the most part our rational intuitions about an auction's moral status are our most reliable guide. You don't need a theory to know a wrong act when one is described to you. And it would be perverse to judge an act wrong because one's favourite normative theory predicts that it will be, if one's rational intuitions- and the rational intuitions of informed others - says otherwise.
The exception is when we have good independent reason to distrust our rational intuitions about certain sorts of activity. If, for instance, one lives in a culture in which, say, homophobic attitudes are constantly promoted, then one's intuitions about the morality of same sex relations should be viewed with suspicion, especially if the denizens of other cultures do not share the same rational intuitions. That's when theorizing has a role.

But anyway, to bring this back to the topic at hand: hard determinism entails that we lack all obligations, as free will is surely something obligations require? Yet as we clearly do have obligations, hard determinism should be rejected. For any case for hard determinism will have a premise less plausible than that we are obliged not to do x, where x is some clearly wrong act.

For my argument - the ought from is one - to go through, an act needs to be wrong or possibly wrong. So the argument goes through. You can get enough from an is. Easily. We don't need to discuss which normative theory is correct.

It's about as self evident to reason that rape is wrong as that 2 + 2 = 4. Thus some acts are wrong.

So, if you try and argue for nihilism your argument needs to have premises all of which are more plausible than 'rape is wrong'. Good luck!

Furthermore, any argument for moral nihilism will, with small adjustment, entail normative nihilism. And that's absurd - indeed, self refuting.

Substitute x for something that is wrong by a utilitarian's crazy lights. It'll still go through.
Incidentally, this argument refutes utilitarianism:

1. If utilitarianism is the correct normative ethical theory, then gang rape is right (if the gang is sufficiently big)
2. Gang rape is wrong (irrespective of the size of the gang)
3. Therefore utilitarianism is not the correct normative ethical theory.

I mean, do you seriously think any premise in an argument that has the conclusion 'therefore utilitarianism is correct' is going to be more plausible than 'gang rape is wrong'?!?

Are you making empirical claims? — Zugzwang

No.

What case do you make ? — Zugzwang

I have said that a fact is what's asserted by a true proposition. Now, if you disagree then kindly tell me what you'd call what's asserted by a true proposition.

That's another zinger. There's an anti-metaphysician within you, clawing its way out. — Zugzwang

I have no idea what that means.

But you'll have to fix the sentence above. As I asked elsewhere, what is the form of the answer that could tell you what a fact is? What more can you ask for than a definition...a context-relevant description of usage? What's a shovel? Well, we use it to dig, see. No, I mean what is a shovel, really? It's as if there's an ultra-vague Beyond that haunts metaphysics. — Zugzwang

That too.

There's an ambiguity to the word 'is' that makes questions such as "what is a fact?" ambiguous. But clearly the questioner is not asking to be provided with a list of facts, or told when we have facts on our hands, but with insight into what a fact is made of, so to speak.

And that's what I'm addressing. A fact is the asserted content of a true proposition. To get more by way of an answer would require answering the question "what is truth?" For until one answers that question one can't gain further insight into what, precisely, being the asserted content of a true proposition amounts to.

You lot are so confused it is painful.

So, statements can be true. But statements aren't facts. That's nonsense. The propositional content of a true statement expresses a fact. But it - the statement - is not itself a fact, but a statement - a true one. That's why if it is true that p, then it is a fact that p. The fact that p is what the proposition "it is true that p" asserts to be the case.

Stephen Jay Gould said:

In science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent. — T Clark

That's not an answer to the question. That's a false statement about when a proposition expresses a fact. Even if it were true, it would not tell us what a fact itself 'is'. It's akin to answering the philosophical question "what is yellow" with "bananas".

What's your favourite thing about the Sistine chapel ceiling? That it keeps the rain out?

I think facts are what true propositions assert. So if the proposition "It is raining" is true, then that it is raining is what's being asserted. That is, it is a fact that it's raining. Not married to that analysis, but it sounds about right to me.

You're talking what your image is designed to receive.

I can somewhat understand how all these features of this proposed mind-stuff were cooked up. IMV, a casual and basically useful way of talking is transformed by philosophers into something rigid. Is a toothache immaterial? I guess one might say so, but is this science of some kind? 'Immaterial' is a negation. And yeah, intentions aren't like apples. Dreams aren't like shovels. — Zugzwang

Sounds to me like you've already decided you know what's what.

Are toothache's immaterial? That's a confused question. An 'ache' is a sensation - it is something felt - and feelings are states of mind, not things. Minds are immaterial and feelings are states of minds. But you weren't actually asking, were you?

Do we all imagine 'pure' space in the same way? Who knows? If we are locked in private minds, I don't see how we could ever check. Why should imaginary pure space correspond to practical material reality? Maybe some things can't be sliced. Or maybe there is a way to slice dreams that we haven't discovered. Or maybe this is more about usage than reality. — Zugzwang

What the blue blazes are you blithering on about??

Point being that this seems more about grammar/usage that obscure immaterial entities. — Zugzwang

No. It's squarely about entities, namely what kind of entity a mind is.

Philosophy is about using reasoned reflection to figure out what's true (as opposed to just making stuff up or just believing whatever there's a tradition of believing).

Reasoned reflection will tell you that your mind is immaterial in all manner of ways. You just have to listen to it and not decide in advance that you already know what your mind is.

One way it tells us this is it tells us our minds are indivisible. All material objects are divisible - which you can recognize just by thinking (material objects are extended in space - well, any region of space is capable of infinite division, and thus any and all material objects are capable of infinite division).

Thus our minds are not material, or at least not if what our reason is telling us is accurate.

We would have some grounds for doubting the accuracy of our reason on this if our reason told us other things that appear to contradict it. But it doesn't.

Yes, because that's how philosophy works. Forget whether the view withstands rational scrutiny. As long as you're satisfied, reality will play ball.