No, Unnecessary J, it is not. I can't.

Oh, you want some now do you?!

He is asking questions to which the answers are blindly obvious.

For example, here is the first premise that he is having such a hard time understanding:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable.

He's asking - in an extremely painful and convoluted way (probably intentionally so, for a laugh - I hope so anyway, otherwise he's going to have terrible difficulty navigating the world and other people) - whether I mean by "if moral values are my values" "if moral values are 'among' my values" or 'if moral values are my values". Now I wonder if you can figure out which it might be? You know, do I mean what I said, or do I mean something quite different.

Now do you have a criticism of my argument, or are you just one of those who wants to express their disapproval of my inability to suffer fools gladly?

And you realize you - you - just insulted me, yes?

No, no, no. You understand perfectly well, or you don't but then, like I say, I have no interest in engaging with you as it will be nothing but frustrating from my end and entirely fruitless from yours. I mean I can't explain myself more clearly and any subsequent attempts will be no more clear than before. So this delightful relationship between us is, I am sorry to say, null.

Anyway, you are either a tedious troll and are exploiting the human default of taking people at face value, or your comprehension skills are beyond my reach.

What on earth is a null set and how can it be that you will only understand me if I express myself in terms of null sets?

Imagine you order a pizza and after eating it your waiter asks you what, if anything, you valued about your dining experience. Are you going to reply "I am not really understanding what you are asking me. Do you mean that the intersection between this dining experience and the things I value is the null set?"

I mean literally what are you finding hard to understand? If moral values are my values - that is, if my valuing something makes it morally valuable - then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable.

That really can't be hard to understand. No need to bring null sets into this. IF you DO need to bring null sets into this - whatever they are - then I think you're beyond my help, to be perfectly honest.

I don't know what that means.

Reasonable and unreasonable according to whom? — Terrapin Station

Reason. According to Reason.

So, if it is your opinion that 2 + 3 = 9876543, but this appears self-evidently false to virtually everyone else, then you are not reasonable - not remotely - if you persist in believing that 2 + 3 = 9876543.

perhaps everyone else is wrong and you're right. Possible. But not remotely reasonable to believe.

Similarly, if it is your opinion - because your desire to refute me has committed you to it - that if Himmler approves of gassing people then it is necessarily morally good for him to do so, yet this same claim is self-evidently false to the reason of virtually everyone else, then you're not reasonable if you continue to think you're right and everyone else is wrong.

Not unless you've got good independent reason to think that everyone else's reason is malfunctioning on these issues. But to show that, you'd once more have to appeal to self-evident truths of reason that are widely corroborated or you will just be guilty of supporting your unreasonableness unreasonably.

If morality is only mental dispositions, then if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable to me.
Morality is only mental dispositions.
Therefore, if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable to me. — Terrapin Station

Well that's a weak argument and its first premise is garbled.

Note, you need to say that if morality is YOUR mental dispositions, otherwise the second bit simply isn't true and the premise is false. Furthermore, you need to identify moral values with your valuings, or again the second bit won't be true and the premise is false.

So, basically, for the first premise to be true, it needs to be the same as my first premise. YOu know, the one you kept telling me I hadn't written properly!

That'll make premise 1 undeniably true.

The problem, however, is that your argument has a conclusion that conflicts with the self-evident rational representations of most of us.

Now that doesn't mean it is false, but it is prima facie evidence that it is and so your premises need to be powerfully self-evident to justify drawing it.

Your first premise is true (well, it is if you adjust it so that it is). But your first premise is the same as mine.

Your second premise, however, is demonstrably not true.

Why? Well, first it has no support from reason. That is, it is not a self-evident truth of reason that moral values are your mental states. I mean, how many reflective people get the impression that moral values are 'your' mental states? Er, none at all - not even you, I'd wager.

So, it has no evidential support whatsoever. And in combination with a true premise - premise 1 - it leads to a self-evidently false conclusion.

That means all you've done is demonstrate the falsity of your second premise. Good one!!

And yes, you can construct these arguments for anything, but when you do so it becomes apparent what you need to assume to get to your desired conclusion - and if you find that what you need to assume is self-evidently false, or has no support from reason and entails something that is self-evidently false, then you've discovered that your assumption is false and that you need to revise your conclusion.

It's called 'reasoning' and most people find it incredibly irksome and so they don't bother doing it and when another does it and proves them wrong about things they care about they execute the one who did it.

I am having lunch now, I will get back toyou

Yes, do you understand that you're not a god and your opinions don't determine what's true.

Show me that the premise is false by constructing an argument that has its negation as a conclusion. Then we'll look at your premises together. One of them, I guarantee, will be bonkers.

What did you do that for - you need to address my argument. Stop trying to take me to school. I don't need edumacating.

How many times have I made it clear that you need to address my premises, not just say things.

Once more, my premise 2 says this: "If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable"

So, what you need to do is construct an argument that has "If I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable" as its conclusion. I don't know what premises you'd need to put together to get that conclusion, but I am extremely confident - like 99% - that there will be one that is laughably false.

That's my bet. But by all means prove me wrong.

Modus ponens is valid under traditional logic. If we ignore semantic problems with certain natural language formulations, and we retain the modus ponens relations, then sure, insofar as that goes, it's valid.

Of course, we shouldn't really ignore semantic problems once we start plugging in natural language, but that's an issue we've already discussed. — Terrapin Station

Why do you keep talking like you're an authority on these things? You thought my argument was invalid, didn't you? Be honest. And then you decided it was valid.

My argument is deductively valid it just leads to a conclusion that you don't like.

The argument's premises are true beyond a reasonable doubt. You can't challenge one by simply saying random things. You have to address the actual premise and show how another valid argument, with premises that are more powerfully self-evidently true than mine, has a conclusion that negates it.

Tell you what, I'll just think you understand it, and then you will. That's how the world works according to Terrapin, isn't it?

You don't understand the point of the cheese example either.

Here it is again:

1. If my cheese is made of my thoughts, then if I think there is some cheese in the fridge, then necessarily there is some cheese in the fridge
2. IF I think there is some cheese in the fridge there is not necessarily any cheese in the fridge
3. Therefore cheese is not made of my thoughts

It is deductively valid and apparently sound. It has exactly the same form as my argument - the one you're trying to take issue with.

Now, you have to deny a premise. A premise of THAT argument, not some other premise you've just made up.

So, you say "well, 2 is false becusae if I think there is some cheese in the fridge then in my opinion there is some cheese in the fridge".

Er, yes, perhaps - but that doesn't contradict 2 so it doesn't begin to challenge it.

That's EXACTLY how you are responding to my argument.

Premise 2 of my argument says "If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable"

You are trying to challenge it by saying "ah, yes, but 2 is false because if I value something then in my opinion it is valuable"

Er, well maybe - but that is consistent with 2 and doesn't contradict it.

Why can't you see this???

So, to recap, you now accept that my argument is valid. Something I've been repeating ad nauseum.

You have tried to take issue with premise 2. But you haven't raised any reasonable doubt about it.

Premise 2 is self-evidently true. And when I point this out, you reply that a quite different claim is true. What's that got to do with anything?

The view you keep expressing is the view the argument refutes.

Again, we're not talking about opinions.

Here's an argument that is obviously sound:

1. If my cheese is made of my thoughts, then if I think there is some cheese in the fridge, then necessarily there is some cheese in the fridge
2. IF I think there is some cheese in the fridge there is not necessarily any cheese in the fridge
3. Therefore cheese is not made of my thoughts

Your response? You ask what evidence there is that 2 is true. I point out that it is a self-evident truth of reason.
You seek to deny 2 by pointing out that if someone thinks there is some cheese in the fridge, then 'in his opinion' there is some cheese in the fridge.

Er, yes. But there won't necessarily be any cheese in the fridge, yes?

Likewise, if Himmler values gassing people, that does not mean it is necessarily good for Himmler to gas people.

It may result in Himmler forming the opinion that it is good. But it still won't be good, will it?

No it isn't. It is self-evident that you cannot make an act right or good by either issuing a prescription to yourself to do it, or by just valuing yourself doing it. As. Virtually. Everyone. Recognises.

Sure, it's only morally okay in his opinion. Other people disagreed with him. So they're not going to allow him to do that. — Terrapin Station

You don't seem to understand. If Himmler's values are moral values, then if he values gassing Jews and Homosexuals it will actually be morally good for him to do so (and good for everyone else to do so too). It won't just be that he has the opinion it is good. It will actually be good.

And it won't be, obviously, Which just underscores why the argument is sound. It underscores that moral values are not made of Himmler's values, or yours, or mine.

So that it's your opinion that it's morally okay to hit someone doesn't imply that it's morally okay or not for you to hit someone independently of anyone's opinion. — Terrapin Station

But now you're not addressing the argument.

Premise 2 says "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable".

Opinions have not been mentioned. And premise 2 is manifestly true. So the argument is sound.

You're confusing the opinion that something is the case, with it being the case.

There is, for instance, little doubt that Himmler fully approved of gassing Jews and homosexuals. Indeed, so much so that he approved of gassing himself should he turn out to be either of those things. But that did not make it right for him to do those things, or good for him to do it. And so on.

These things are manifest to reason. Premise 2's truth is manifest to reason.

1, If Gold is water, then if Gold is heated it will turn to steam
2. If Gold is heated it will not turn to steam
3. Therefore Gold is not water. — Bartricks
Okay, that is valid in terms of the formal logic of it.

The problem with your argument above is with your second premise. Why should we assign "true" to "If something is morally valuable, then it is morally valuable irrespective of whether I value it"? — Terrapin Station

Because the reason of most of those who reflect on this represents that to be the case.

If I value hitting someone, that does not mean it is morally good for me to hit them.

In a court case the defence do not think it will be sufficient to exonerate their defendant from any wrongdoing simply to demonstrate that he/she fully approved of what he/she did.

We would consider a defence team who thought that might do the trick to have, well, lost their reason.

Either the collective agreement of moral thinkers is worthy of taking as sound (in which case you could reasonably refer me to them as evidence), or it is not (in which case you cannot and will have to argue your premise from prior axioms). If the former, then you'll need to explain why it is that these thinkers whose conclusions you have just declared trustworthy, largely do not agree with your conclusions. If the latter, then your argument fails as one of its premises has no justification. — Isaac

So, to respond to this, I think if most moral philosophers - or, well, just most people who carefully reflect on the matter - get the impression that moral prescriptions and values are categorical, then that counts for a lot, other things being equal.

Most moral philosophers do get the impression that moral prescriptions and values are categorical. And even among those who might deny it, most are likely to admit that they appear to be (they'll just deny that these particular appearances count).

But most moral philosophers also think that moral truths are necessary truths and so they think that moral values and prescriptions can't alter over time. This strikes them as every bit as self-evident as that moral prescriptions and norms are categorical.

Because moral norms and values could vary over time if they are the values and prescriptions of a subject, they reject subjectivist views.

The combination, then, of the categoricity and necessity of moral norms and prescriptions leads them - most of them - to embrace some form of objectivism.

And some of them embrace objectivism but find its demands too ontologically exotic and so become nihilists.

that's my crude analysis, anyway.

Either the collective agreement of moral thinkers is worthy of taking as sound (in which case you could reasonably refer me to them as evidence), or it is not (in which case you cannot and will have to argue your premise from prior axioms). If the former, then you'll need to explain why it is that these thinkers whose conclusions you have just declared trustworthy, largely do not agree with your conclusions. If the latter, then your argument fails as one of its premises has no justification. — Isaac

I think they don't agree with my conclusion because they are not aware of my argument and/or they think that that there is better evidence that the conclusion is false than that it is true, for most contemporary moral philosophers seem to think that the Euthyphro dispatches it.

But I think most moral philosophers would agree that if something is morally valuable, its moral value is not constitutively determined by our valuings.

And now imagine that there is someone who is kind, and generous and honest but who is not loved by any human - not the object of any other human's valuing attitudes. They are, at least where human valuings are concerned, not-valued.
They're morally valuable though, aren't they? None of us value them, but they are morally valuable.
Therefore being morally valuable cannot consist in being the object of the valuing attitudes of humans.

If you value something - and I take it that you do value some things - then what you are doing is 'valuing' something. It is an activity that you, a subject, are engaged in.

Take loving someone. If you love someone you value them. The person you love is the object of your esteem. That - and no doubt a great deal else - is what's involved in loving someone. To be loving someone is to be adopting a valuing attitude towards them, and to be beloved is to be the object of a valuing attitude.

As for what's morally valuable - well, you are morally valuable, I am morally valuable, character traits, such as kindness, generosity, honesty- these are morally valuable (usually). Happiness is often morally valuable and so on.

Yes. So?

1, If Gold is water, then if Gold is heated it will turn to steam
2. If Gold is heated it will not turn to steam
3. Therefore Gold is not water.

That's valid, yes?

that's my argument.

So another way of making the argument would be this:

1. if being morally valuable consisted in being the object of one of my valuings, then if something is valuable it would not be morally valuable irrespective of whether I value it. (if P, then Q)
2. If something is morally valuable, then it is morally valuable irrespective of whether I value it (Not Q)
3. Therefore, being morally valuable does not consist in being the object of one of my valuings. (Therefore not P)

It seems to me that you are getting hung up on the 'full stop' - that 'full stop' just expresses their categorical nature. That is, when something is morally valuable it is not 'valuable to me', but just 'valuable full stop' - that is, valuable regardless of whether I happen to value it.

Many take that to entail that moral value is objective. But I think that's a mistake, for moral value would retain its categorical nature if being morally valuable consisted in being the object of a single subject's valuings.

So moral values are not themselves valued.

Yes, to say that something is valuable, I think, is to say that it is featuring as the object of a valuing relation. So there's the valuer - who is the one doing the valuing, so the one to whom the thing has value - and then there is the fact the thing is featuring as the object of a valuing relation.

yes, the first premise does not express the conclusion. I am unclear what it could be for something to be valuable yet not be the object of a valuing relation. But I am open to suggestions.

Well it is nice to have opinions. But yours are all false as my argument demonstrates, doesn't it!!

No, the argument is not circular if that's what you mean.

I am not watching any videos. Refute my argument and stop expressing your opinions - they count for nothing at all.

What would you have me call her?

No, not positing, concluding. See the argument for details.

Because:

1. Moral prescriptions are prescriptions of Reason
2. Moral prescriptions are the prescriptions of a subject
3. Therefore moral prescriptions are the prescriptions of a subject, Reason

A subject. The one described in conclusion 9 above. The one whose values constitute moral values; the one among whose prescriptions are moral prescriptions. A god.