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  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    IX
    This, and the last lecture, are twice the length of the other lectures. Austin is broadening his account here, becoming more explicit as to his method. In this lecture he is also sorting out some of the motivation he ascribes to Ayer. Austin has argued that Ayer makes use of the Argument from Illusion, but that a closer reading shows Ayer does not actually believe the argument. That is, Ayer does not reach the conclusion, that what we directly perceive are sense data, as a consequence of consideration of the Argument from Illusion. Rather, Ayer has other reasons for his view, and uses the Argument for Illusion only rhetorically, as a post hoc justification.

    This lecture, then, examines Ayer's actual motivation.

    But before pursuing Austin's argument, it would be worth looking in a bit more detail at the broader context in which Ayer was writing. What follows is my own potted history.

    Since Hume, the great problem for empiricism has been moving beyond observation. How is it that we can move from what is here, before us, now, to a general principle or a prediction as to what will occur next? How do we get from the observation of a white swan to the principle that all swans are white?

    There are at least three aspects to this problem - it's really a series of problems. First is the problem overtly addressed in the present essay: how is it that we can move from the evidence of our senses, on which empiricism is supposedly grounded, to making true statements about the world? Second is the problem of induction, how we can move from a series of such observations to a general principle, a "law". The third problem is to do with when we might correctly say that one even causes another.

    Ayer was addressing these problems. The two main rival accounts were that of Karl Popper and of fellow logical positivist Rudolf Carnap.

    Roughly, Carnap tried to quantify confirmation - the more observations, the better. This was not very convincing. Popper took on the impossibility of indubitable confirmation, and proposed instead that science was based on proving our conjectures wrong.

    For a long while Popper's falsification was the winner, at least in terms of popularity, although Bayesian analysis owes much to Carnap, and the arguments are far from finished. I'd surmise that Ayer thought of himself as addressing these rivals, and that Austin's quite different account came out of left field for him.
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    ...how pervasive a problem do you see this kind of thinking as being within the contemporary philosophical community as a whole , or the history of philosophy?Joshs

    I don't think it a problem in the wider community, nor with professional philosophers, who tend to be more critical of their own thinking. But it's not uncommon amongst the denizens of these fora. It is often dressed as radical scepticism or relativism. My suspicion is that it is found in those with a little philosophy, but not enough.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Did folk notice ' new thread?
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Shouldn’t type while bikingAntony Nickles
    Sounds dubious.

    Just to be sure, the notion of predictive value is from Ayer, pp 267-268. It's Ayer who would privilege certain sense-data because of a mooted "predictive value"...

    There's also this gem...
    For the only way in which one can test whether a series of perceptions is veridical, in this sense, is to see whether it is substantiated by further sense-experiences , so that once again the ascription of “ reality ” depends upon the predictive value of the sense-data on which the perceptions are based. So long as the general structure of my sense-data conforms to the expectations that I derive from the memory of my past experience, I remain convinced that I am not living in a dream , and the longer the series of successful predictions is extended, the smaller becomes the probability that I am mistaken — p.274

    Ayer only knows he's not dreaming because reality is repetitive. Not much of an argument.

    The most that we can do is to elaborate a technique for predicting the course of our sensory experience, and to adhere to it so long as it is found to be reliable. And this is all that is essentially involved in our belief in the reality of the physical world. — Ayer, P.274

    Almost pragmatic.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Well, I regret engaging with Corvus, and can understand why you might be confused, coming in part way through.

    The point, way back, is that we do things with our utterances.

    The context was the erroneous description of language given here:
    1. Language is for expressing, describing and communicating thoughts and the contents of perception.
    2. Language never have access to the world direct. (sic)
    3. Language is the last activity in the chain of the mental events i.e. you perceive, think, then speak in that order, never the other way around.
    Corvus

    I'll leave you to agree, or not, with this. I hope to get back to the main text.

    (I'd erroneously supposed that Corvus' muddle might segue into Lecture IX, one of the particulars therein being that a word's having a different use need not mean it has a different sense.)

    So it's not just the words.frank
    Yep.

    Searle goes in to the background conditions and such in detail, while Strawson moves sideways to intent. It's a big area. Even bigger, if we now include Confucius.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Whole careers cut down to nought by your succinct brilliance, and after just a cursory read of a tertiary source!

    Cheers, Corvus. You win.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    You can't cut down a tree, or influence it in any way, with words.Janus

    Yeah, you can. I put in the order, Trees-are-us came and implemented it. Who cut down the tree? If they find out it was over twelve metres tall, it is I and not Trees-are-us who get fined. I didn't touch the saw, but I cut the tree down by giving an order.

    And all I need demonstrate here is that this is the sort of thing we do say, setting out a way that we do act. That's enough.

    There is a difference between an order and a saw. They do different things. But that is not pertinent. I cut the tree down by giving an order.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Yes, and Austin's approach to truth became part of his fall from grace, via Strawson. So there is plenty to say there, too.

    In these lectures the target has a very odd view, that all we have at hand is the perception, and never the thing perceived. I supose such a one could never cut down a tree, but only a perception-of-tree...
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    As a pedagogical point, are folk here mostly familiar with speech act theory?

    The conversation above with @Corvus has me wondering how much this topic depends on an understanding that language is not purely descriptive. I hadn't considered "How to do things with words" a prerequisite, but perhaps it should have been...?

    Ayer adopts a descriptivist theory of language, of course. Is Austin anywhere arguing against descriptivism in these lectures?
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    This?

    Good stuff. "This was Austin's most important idea: All utterances are the performance of speech acts"
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    I still think words are not actionsCorvus
    Speech Acts
    (The end of that article has some critique of Austin for you).
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    I do not think the confusion mine. My Honours thesis was on this stuff, and was accepted by a panel of academics, receiving a first.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    For some reason you seem to think, no one can understand Austin.Corvus
    No. I think most folk here understand Austin. You are an exception.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    I don't agree with you at all.Corvus
    Obviously. It probably has not been pointed out to you before that we do things with words. A Big Learning for you.

    "I promise to meet with you next Tuesday."

    With that very utterance, the promise is made, and the obligation created. Uttering the sentence "I promise to meet with you next Tuesday" counts as placing myself under the obligation to meet with you next Tuesday.

    Promises are an example of a type of performative utterance that makes something the case... Further examples would be:
    A king in check with no legal move out of check counts as checkmate in a game of chess
    A candidate who has the majority of votes in the Electoral college counts as the president-elect in US constitutional law.

    That one ought keep one's promises is, on this account, not the result of some virtue on the part of the promiser, not an agreement between the promiser and the promisee, not something one is obliged to do because of the negative consequences that would ensue if folk broke their promises, not the result of convention or expectation, but simply what is done in uttering the word of a promise in suitable circumstances.
    Banno
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    But you don't see the fact it was the action which changed the tree not your word.Corvus
    Words are actions. We do things by speaking and writing. Your view of language is far too passive.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    You spoke it to someone with a chainsaw, not to the tree. You still cannot distinguish words and actions.Corvus

    You say that as if the order can't change things. And yet it does.

    if you insist that your words do not connect to the world and that you cannot tell if you are awake or asleep and that the world ceases to exist when you sleep, then there is little common ground on which we might move forward.Banno
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    The fashion at present, as I understand it, is to think of Searle as having propagated a misinterpretation of Austin, that the Austin we see is often understood from Searle's perspective; and that it is well time to re-examine Austin afresh to remove that bias. There's a fair amount of truth in this, I suspect.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    There is no logical ground for me to believe the world exists during my sleepCorvus
    :lol:
    Given this, there is no way that you will be able to understand Austin. You've just got the perception stuff far too embedded in your thinking. It's a bit sad that you have been so mislead, but them's the breaks.

    You do know that the world continues while you sleep. Right up until you try to do philosophy. But if you insist that your words do not connect to the world and that you cannot tell if you are awake or asleep and that the world ceases to exist when you sleep, then there is little common ground on which we might move forward.

    So I might leave this conversation there.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    how would one know they are hacked when the point is for the hacker not to reveal they are hacking someone?Antony Nickles
    Yep.
    Can you re-assure me that nothing disastrous will happen if I follow the link anyway?Ludwig V
    Nope. Worked for me, but like Antony I am using Safari.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    By the way, there is no connection between words and the world.Corvus
    :lol: Not in your world, perhaps.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    The contents of your post doesn't seem to have any points against the fact that language is a tool to describe, express, criticise and diagnose the objects and world.Corvus
    :grin: As I said:
    You'll be thinking "Yeah, but each of those is just more expressing and describing"Banno
    I can only set the argument before you. If you can't see it, that's down to you.

    There's a curious myopia amongst those who see language as only "communication" or "information exchange", such that they have a great deal of difficulty seeing how words are actually used by people to build the world. Property, ownership, money, exchange, promises, hierarchies, the everyday paraphernalia of life is constructed by language.

    Austin's student, John Searle, followed through on these ideas. I outlined his approach in Institutional Facts: John R. Searle.

    I suppose this presents an argument for a follow-on thread examining How To Do Things With Words.

    Such stuff is basic philosophical literacy.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Vat-brains. The nemesis of clear thinking.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    I believe Austin may be thinking that we know the concept of dreaming from 'one's own case'.Richard B

    notice that the following is phrased in the first person plural"
    And we might add here that descriptions of dreams, for example, plainly can't be taken to have exactly the same force and implications as the same words would have, if used in the description of ordinary waking experiences. In fact, it is just because we all know that dreams are throughout unlike waking experiences that we can safely use ordinary expressions in the narration of them; the peculiarity of the dream- context is sufficiently well known for nobody to be mis- led by the fact that we speak in ordinary terms. — p.42, my emphasis
    The argument is not that I know dreams are unlike waking experiences, it's that we know. If he were basing this on his own case, wouldn't that be "..it is just because I know that dreams are throughout unlike waking experiences that I can safely use ordinary expressions in the narration of them".

    Not a knock-down case, but Austin, of course, was writing without the benefit of access to Wittgenstein's work, so it is no surprise that he doesn't place much emphasis on distinguishing one's own case from the communal case. It probably did not occur to him that folk might read it as you have.

    So the test does not support your assertion, at least here.
  • Help Me
    Did you think doing philosophy would be easy?

    I was confused as well because I knew Sartre and De Beauvoir to both be hardcore atheists.T4YLOR
    Yeah, take care on the forums. There are a lot of confused folk here.
  • Help Me
    Jean-Paul Sartre, a man of faithVaskane

    That's a bit cruel. Poor . Are you trying to induce more existential shock? Yes, a man of faith, but a devout atheist.

    Did you mean Kierkegaard?
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Can you change the tree with words? Ordering it cut down will certainly change it.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    We're getting off the rails.Antony Nickles
    Yeah, there's a need to go back to the text.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Ok. Let's set this aside, but only for now. It's where all these considerations either come together or burst. But if we go there now we may never finish Sense and Sensibilia.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    His is a misinterpretation of the Tractatus. Where Wittgenstein honoured what could only be shown, not said, Ayer thought we could dispense with it. Much of the best philosophy from the fifties and sixties is a reaction against Ayer, especially the stuff from the four Ladies of Oxford - Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch - who returned ethics to centre stage.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Yep. I linked the text earlier in the thread. I've been re-reading it as I read Austin. (That's part of the reason it takes so long to post on each lecture).

    Why do you ask?
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Showing that Ayer's metaphysics is misconceived is itself a deeply metaphysical activity.Banno
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Showing that Ayer's metaphysics is misconceived is itself a deeply metaphysical activity.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    It's a cliché, but you have missed the wood for the trees. Austin is not just analysing speech.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    We're approaching a point of difference, perhaps, in that for me, there is a place, if not for certainty, then at the least for confidence in our understanding, a foundation found in the very actuality of these very considerations. We are not utterly adrift. I'm not sure you will agree.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Ok, just by way of an example, how might Austin have replied to your first point?
    1. Language is for expressing, describing and communicating thoughts and the contents of perception.Corvus
    His first reaction might have been to point out that this is some of what language can do, but certainly not all. In How to do things with words he goes into this in more detail, but as points out we also command, question, doubt, and so on. With these words, we don't just percieve the world, we change it.

    He might then point out that we don't only "express", we also hide, conceal and camouflage; we don't only "describe", we misdescribe, mislead, misdirect; we don't only "communicate", we deceive, mislead and beguile. Where we do one thing with words, we also do the opposite.

    You'll be thinking "Yeah, but each of those is just more expressing and describing" - thereby forcing language in to the boxes you already built for it. But one should avoid the temptation to first decide what language does and then look at the how. A first step might best be to look at the variety of ways in which we do things with words and build a picture of what language does from that. Look, first.

    He might puzzle as to why you give such primacy to perception. Again this might be the result of preconceived philosophical views entering in to your considerations. Giving primacy to perception is indicative of the misplaced need for certainty discussed in many of the posts here, were perception is considered, against the evidence, to be veritable. Again, perception will not bear the epistemological weight philosophers put on its shoulders.

    And if Austin were writing this, there would be a thread running through the text that shows how the very approach you have taken presumes wrongly that a complete answer can be given, an account of language in its entirety, as if the whole of language dwelt within itself.

    So there, against my better judgement, is a beginning of what might be said about just your first point. As Anthony says, the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong.

    This post might seem cruel, but you were insistent. It very much seems that although you are commendably struggling with this material, you haven't yet seen how it undermines much that you take as granted.

    And yet for frank, "(Austin is) just pointing out the way we speak".
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    But how do you help with this, where the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong.Antony Nickles

    I read this and found "All along the watchtower" playing in my head - the Hendrix version...
    No reason to get excited
    The thief, he kindly spoke
    There are many here among us
    Who feel that life is but a joke
    But, uh, but you and I, we've been through that
    And this is not our fate
    So let us stop talkin' falsely now
    The hour's getting late, hey

    There are folk hereabouts who have come to philosophy from elsewhere, usually science or engineering, seeking some sort of validation for the work they have done.

    Others have long, perhaps always, had the niggle that leads them to puzzle over these questions.

    The main driver for this thread was 's OP, not so much because of it's specific content, as that the approach was simply taken as granted for much of that thread. "How do you help with this, where the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong". Engaging directly in the discussion is of no help. Folk have to work through it themselves. Perhaps reading Austin will proved a few folk with the tools one needs to see the error in such threads.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    There's an overtone in the very terms "aphantasia" and "hyperphantasia" that I think is very dangerous. They are not necessarily pathologiesLudwig V

    Quite agree. This seems to be coming to the fore - that there is no single way in which to be conscious.

    The theoretical uses of language are not the core...Ludwig V
    For me the key here was Davidson's A nice derangement of epitaphs. Any account can be actively undermined and falsified by another account. Also, formally, an account can be consistent, but only if it is incomplete; or it can be complete, but only if it is inconsistent. Perhaps this is why "not everything is certain, but equally not everything is uncertain".

    I don't think any of 's three points are cogent. To a large extent that is what this thread is about.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    An excellent series of posts. I can't avoid the suspicion that what you are doing is reading Cavell into Austin; that the arc expressed here is not as explicit as you make it seem. But all the same, that doesn't matter, because it fits what Austin wrote so well. Perhaps one can only read Cavell into Austin because of the Austin in Cavell.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    Ok.

    I've very much appreciated the discussion.wonderer1
    Yeah, it's attracted some fine, intelligent comment, and gone in a few unexpected directions. Most pleasing.