Virtual is not actual, like simulated alligator is virtual and actual alligator is actual, but both are real, both are physical, both are material. — Zelebg

how is a program in your simulation real, physical, and material?

you are talking about simulating the physical alligator behavior. However, I say the actual mental alligator, simulated or not, will always be virtual (there, but not really there). You seem to think linearly that mental states are like executing objective state-machines (e.g., programs), I say they cannot be as such.

I'm listening, but you are not saying anything except meaningless assertions and empty phrases. Go ahead, define "resonant wave condition". — Zelebg

see above for general framework. I am making it up as I go. Have not gone to implementation mechanics yet, just establishing the basic tools and methods conceptually at this point. At a top level, I'm modeling the conscious "I" in an internal "imagination" sandbox which is a central resonant space that is formed primarily via a sophisticated non-verbal linguistic mechanics and a holographic phase space. I think the non-verbal linguistic mechanics is more like ‘access’ consciousness based on my limited reading on the subject. A connectionist implementation model might be best for that in my system. For the qualia/experience consciousness I expect to rely on a holographic phase space where all the linguistic & sensory/motor objects are transformed into waves which interfere with each other and boundary conditions in meaningful ways. I am modeling the qualia/experience consciousness as a resonant condition that does not actually exist on its own but only emerges as the waves in the container sense the boundary conditions and propagation media landscape to form something you can think of like a standing wave which represents the wave states of the whole system. You can think of the boundary conditions as an internal cognitive boundary/shapes on one side and sensory/motor boundary/shapes on the other side and when tuned to a particular ‘meaning’ waves that pulse the system a resonance condition may form that captures the character of the system as whole in one standing wave, which could be read out with connectionist networks recognizing the various interference patterns. In short, I’m hypothesizing that qualia/experience consciousness is the resonant sound you hear when you thump a container, which resonant sound (e.g., holographic phased standing wave patterns) richly characterizes not only the shape of the container but its material parameters, this resonant sound waves is effectively coherently ‘aware’ of its whole system in a way that you never could be if you separately analyzed all the causal molecules and connections that form the container and the propagation medium the way that Integrated Information Theory suggests is consciousness; thus, at least one reason why (IMHO) their model is devoid of the qualia/experience.

No? Then it has to do with, what? God? Is this a guessing game, you refuse to say? — Zelebg

I have said. You could have asked clarifying questions or critiques as I have of you, but until now, even if flippantly, you have not.

In short, as I've said before, I’m hypothesizing that qualia/experience consciousness is like the resonant sound you hear when you thump a container, which resonant sound (e.g., holographic phased standing wave patterns) richly characterizes not only the shape of the container but its material parameters, this resonant sound waves is effectively coherently ‘aware’ of its whole system in a way that you never could be if you separately analyzed all the causal molecules and connections that form the container and the propagation medium the way that Integrated Information Theory suggests is consciousness; thus, at least one reason why (IMHO) their model is devoid of the qualia/experience.

I am avoiding any direct quantum mechanics as being part of my consciousness simulation model. In that way I’m thinking differently than main mainstream ideas (including Penrose, et. al). However, I do find the need to use macro-quantum mechanic like systems theories to help establish a framework enabling the kind of flowing resonant conditions I’m looking for. As of now, the ingredients of my first order consciousness simulation model include the following:
• Holographic phase space as the main cognitive fabric
• Meaningfully manipulating confinement Boundary conditions to perform calculations and selective state phase changes.
• Employing pilot-wave theory to achieve the macroscopic wave-particle duality I need to achieve a sort of global “I” (particle) state resonating with the global phase-space milieu capturing the whole at a point and the path taken (maybe like a quantum knot) being like a unique qualia experience.
• I’m initially avoiding entanglement concepts in my model. Instead, thinking to use soliton wave theory to transmit unique wave packet signatures within this phase space to bridge distal parts of the system (possibly unifying a multiplicity of sub-module pilot waves) with a common, unified “I” ‘experience’.
• Thinking to model each cognitive sub-module, of the multiplicity, as Bose-Einstein condensate types of phase change particle systems where they can only achieve quantum-like abilities (e.g., cognitive resonance, cognitive interference, cognitive tunneling, particle/wave duality, etc.) when they have been trained/cooled to a ground state truth (e.g., maybe like Boltzmann kind of thermal annealing learning, etc.) . As the sub-modules phase change to the Bose-Einstein condensate state they may interfere and tunnel with/to each other to form a global Bose-Einstein condensate state comprised of a resonating subset of the cognitive sub-modules with a global pilot wave path (quantum knot) which may simulate the unified “I” access and qualia consciousness ‘experience’.
• A parallel linguistic framework.
• A parallel statistical framework.
• A parallel reasoning framework.
• A parallel emotive framework.
• A parallel sensory-motor framework.
• A parallel imagination framework.
• And much more…

In this way, I’m looking at macro-scale quantum mechanics analogues as the most fruitful way I can build a consciousness system. I have no doubt that actual quantum mechanical effects (as many ponder) would naturally work with, and or enhance the macroscopic version I’m thinking of.

but ultimately they can only refer to QM or attraction and repulsion of EM fields - distance, mass, velocity, stuff like that — Zelebg

nope. Nothing to do with stuff like that.

Naming things is not explaining, it’s not even describing — Zelebg

Resonant wave conditions? You can call it “ghost”, or “black box condition”, it does not explain anything. — Zelebg

I've laid out a basic framework model for it, but apparently on your deaf ears, which has you making fun by missing the point.

Look, qualia either exists actually or virtually, and we know it does not exist actually. Ok? — Zelebg

As I've mentioned before, that is a meaningless statement. everything is virtual, even our matter. everything mental is virtual. so, obvious qualia is virtual, like our consciousness. virtual does not mean something is not real, at least to someone, somewhere...

I see consciousness as the environment in which intelligence manifests/acts, as well as, the emergent property which comes through the action of that intelligence — BrianW

there is a consciousness which determines the intelligence to be used. — BrianW

I can see why your intuition links the two, esp. in a human/mammal model, but are you saying you believe only consciousness things can have or exhibit intelligence?

How about my a virus counter example, which exhibits a high degree of expressed intelligence yet in no way would we say it has consciousness? Virus are not even considered to be alive.

I did not hear anything there that could be experimentally verified as you suggest. Moreover, how does that address my above issues raised re 'post hoc' and inability for quantum effects to communicate any qualia meaning for a macro qualia consciousness? You cannot so easily just ignore/brush off such obvious problems to your panpsychism style panqualiaism thinking.

re "you might as well call it 'quantum collapse',"
maybe some concepts I'm working with relate to that on macro system scale.

re "'magnetic field density distribution', "
not thinking of that.

re "'holographic diffraction interaction', "
have considered that one and see some potential.

re 'self-looping attractor constraints',
chaotic attractors are likely involved, and are best when not programmatic.

re "'integrated information',"
I don't think much of IIT.

but it can only make sense if you call it by its true name: “program”, — Zelebg

Not necessarily, at its core. No doubt programs and comms will control flow and a program might simulate it (not sure about that); however, resonant wave conditions like what I generally have in mind may be best implemented in asynchronous FPGA or optical parallel (interference) pattern processing. programs and normal von neuman architectures are simply not suitable for holistic modes of beholding systems.

So, from your perspective, what is consciousness? Or, what does it entail? — BrianW

do you mean access or qualia types? I assume you mean qualia kind.

I am modeling the qualia/experience consciousness as a resonant condition that does not actually exist on its own but only emerges as the waves in the container sense the boundary conditions and propagation media landscape to form something you can think of like a standing wave which represents the wave states of the whole system. You can think of the boundary conditions as an internal cognitive boundary/shapes on one side and sensory/motor boundary/shapes on the other side and when tuned to a particular ‘meaning’ waves that pulse the system a resonance condition may form that captures the character of the system as whole in one standing wave, which could be read out with connectionist networks recognizing the various interference patterns. In short, I’m hypothesizing that qualia/experience consciousness is the resonant sound you here when you thump a container, which resonant sound (e.g., holographic phased standing wave patterns) richly characterizes not only the shape of the container but its material parameters, this resonant sound waves is effectively coherently ‘aware’ of its whole system in a way that you never could be if you separately analyzed all the causal molecules and connections that form the container and the propagation medium the way that Integrated Information Theory suggests is consciousness; thus, at least one reason why (IMHO) their model is devoid of the qualia/experience.

In this way, I’d say that consciousness can never be self-assess as a snapshot in time, but has to be part of a self-consistent path history (like a story/narrative) that all points to the same resonant focal point/pattern that you call you. Mess with that, and your sense of self consciousness/identity should degrade and vanish into a chaos ideas, facts, memories but without any form, function, or purpose, which I would not call that ‘thought’ or ‘thinking’, so a problem to the Descartes way of evidencing oneself.

Furthermore, under my framework, to establish one’s self-consciousness we have to be able to explore all our boundary conditions that ware resonating within and their nature must be accessible/determinable wrt their form, function, or purpose in influencing the landscape that the consciousness agent in question is resonating with and within. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to observe a time-evolution history path where their ‘thought’ could in-fact modify those boundary conditions and that had a correlated, esp. if *expected*, effect on their conscious state of being to ‘feel’ they are alive and the executive center of the (resonating) system. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to learn and use those associations as tools to manipulate itself (the best it can) to achieve goal states of being. Towards a definition qualia consciousness, I’m thinking that the degree that the consciousness agent in question can do the above, it has ever higher orders of qualia consciousness.

If my theory is experimentally verified — Enrique

since you are opting to not address my counterpoints then maybe you'd at least explain what the experiment would generally look like and generally how would verification work (e.g., what would be tested to produce what result). Without anything substantial/tangible I personally wouldn't be motivated to dig into essays expounding hypotheticals of panpsychism style panqualiaism .

So I'm thinking that microscopic entanglement effects produce at least fleeting qualia in many if not all the universe's environments, — Enrique

I don't see how entaglements help one's qualia of macro physical things like color, taste, passage of time.

You have not addressed any of my many stated problem and counter evidence for panpsychism or panqualiaism models. Care to demonstrate where I'm thinking wrong on that?

I wouldn't advocate panpsychism, my present view is more of a panqualiaism. — Enrique

why not? you make the same kinds of presumptions and metaphysical models. What is wrong with panpsychism in your opinion, which your approach does not suffer?

https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Panpsychism
In contemporary philosophy, panpsychism is offered as a naturalistic solution to various problems inherent in classical physicalism:[3]

1. Eliminativism denies internal existence (including qualia; such as the redness of red, or the specific taste of an apple, as distinct from the neural processes/information representing these experiences). While popular amongst some philosophers, eliminativism goes against human intuition; existing beliefs regarding the sentience of intelligent biological systems (given that the agent/"software" encoded in the brain has evolved to believe that it is conscious; see self-directed theory of mind[citation needed]).

It would at some point have to become self-aware. — NOS4A2

OK, so say I make a robot that evolves its own personality, goals, and decision making by way of a genetic algorithm, and then have it makes its own final action decisions based on its personal/unique personality, and goals, and, in part, on a random number generator to help bias it to action when split decisions are experienced (likely not too different than what most humans do). So, have I not then invented/created a robot which has intentional 'free will' but no self-awareness?

So it would have to learn the limits of its operation before intending how and in which way to operate. — NOS4A2

so, the agent would have to be self-aware?

Anyone else think consciousness might be the faculty (or capacity/ability) for expressing intelligence? (hypothesis in the making) — BrianW

I doubt it. there are so many counter examples of entities that behave quite intelligently but show little/no signed so consciousness. e.g., in an extreme case, a virus exhibits a high degree of expressed intelligence in its attack and survival against all human/plant/animal efforts to eradicate it, yet in no way would we say it has consciousness. Its expressed intelligence comes from its genetic coding/program.

and on in pattern A,B,...C there's a conscious experience. That raises some interesting questions: — RogueAI

or 5. consciousness has nothing to do with switching switches.

Your switch architecture of bran is wrong so your premise/question is malformed.

A further blog post proposes that the substance of perception is emergent from extremely complex additive properties of entangled atomic wavicles, particularly electron interactions, and touches on the implications for our understanding of the universe and human nature if qualia are in fact an aspect of matter's basic structure, — Enrique

is that not, essentially, glorified panpsychism?

I’ve got at least 2 problems with your proposal.
1. All the evidence I’m looking at strongly indicates that consciousness and qualia are ‘post hoc’ phenomenon, and certainly not intrinsic to the system’s component hardware/properties.

2. Besides that, if your proposal or panpsychism were true then would not you expect that the lowest forms of animals with brains could share very similar abilities of material consciousness and experiential consciousness as do humans b/c they all have practically the same hardware (neurons, nerves, connectivity, etc.)? However, we already know that few animals are even self-aware (e.g., few are able recognize themselves and ID their own agency) let alone having Experiential Consciousness.

If you agree that your proposal is very similar to panpsychism then I would think that you should start by experimentally making the above case before going to untestable near supernatural theories of quantum/atomic sources, etc..

Why are you so convinced that qualia consciousness must arise from things like quantum effects instead of simply being a macro-scale phenomenon w/o requiring the quantum effects to do its cool stuff?

BTW, do you also believe in the panpsychism ‘continuity’ requirement and that it precludes machine implemented emergent AI conscious agents? To me, there is nothing about panpsychism continuity or some kind of universal qualia that precludes machine implemented emergent AI conscious agents. If anything, they could be more in touch with the quantum continuum via things like q-bits, quantum wells, single particle systems, etc.

Anyhow, the panpsychism continuity concept seems unworthy of serious consideration b/c for it to matter the continuum chain would have to transmit a continuum of meaning, which I posit is impossible to preserve between dimensions and even between orders of magnitude in scale. For example, Peirce’s synechism concept fails in the simplest of examples like the party game where you get many people (say 10) side by side and have one at one end tell a message to their adjacent, and each repeats the same message to the next. The meaning of the message always is altered, even if subtlely, by the time it is repeated at the other end. Thus, it fails even in that ideal case, of nearly identical cognitive agents speaking the same language living in the same culture. So, we should have almost zero confidence in any kind of meaning existing in subparticles, in far remote locations, being able to communicate their meaning through quantum mechanical random fluctuations to neurons that communicate that as the same meaning to the conscious agent.

Free will, to me, is more a problem with identity. Who or what decides our next action? — NOS4A2

So, would you say a sense of agency is required? Would you say an 'intention" is required to determine/measure if 'free will' of the 'agent' actually occurred? If we are talking about a non-sentient software program in a robot agent then can it be called 'free will' if all the intentions of the robot were predetermined by its programmer? If the agent is not free to reprogram itself to create and act of its own intentions then it would seem it likewise cannot be said to have any meaningful 'free will'.

I find it great that you are struggling at this hard topic with critical thinking and points. I'll address various highlights you pose.

more as a matter or organising what was already there (conscious experience) into different shapes through brainprocessing rather than complicated networks of neurons producing something entirely new. — TheHorselessHeadman

That is not realistic, b/c we know that things like multitude of tastes we have for detection of various molecules are completely made up. e.g., nothing about the hydrocarbon chain of sugar contains the already existing taste of sweetness. Moreover, the only reason we are programmed for sweetness to be a pleasure experience is b/c we need it for survival vs bitter tastes that we associate with molecules that tend to be toxins to us.

but the experience of colors could have existed before there were eyes with which to receive information, and a brain with which to organize the experience of colors into the mental representation. — TheHorselessHeadman

I cannot imagine any evidence or plausible physical mechanism supporting such an idea. However, I wondered about a human version of that idea that I proposed (on another thread) as a way to test towards a genetic programmed 'color' mental object hypothesis:
One Possibility: the 'red' category of color that (most) humans are pre-wired to have the qualia sense of red color that mayexist in the person's cognitive world as a visual object. There are color blind people who see no red. There are also synesthesia people who experience other senses as (e.g., red) color. So, I figure if we had research evidence of color blind people who later gained color vision, saying they experience the qualia of 'red' color prior to gaining color vision, then that might evidence that the cognitive 'red' category does exist at birth. Or if a color blind synesthete 'saw' qualia colors that would also be strong evidence. I've never come across of such experiments or lines of investigations, but if anyone knows anything about that, please post it here b/c it should be quite instructive metaphysically as well.

Perhaps red and blue is a more fundamental property of matter itself and is something that the brain uses and organises to represent information rather than creating it. — TheHorselessHeadman

Unlikely b/c the color conversion and information signals creation all happen in the eye and the optic information (color/shape representation) signals are transmitted through the optic nerve to the back of the brain where they are spatially remapped on the surface of our brain. The optic information optic nerve has no intrinsic “fundamental property of matter itself”, it is just info processing sent to the brain in a pseudo-interpreted form.

It seems to me at least -- from the personal experience of the consciousness which is aware of typing these words, that I am not aware of the brain-processing which is deciding what words to put here. They simply appear, as suggestions from some unknown, and then decisions are made on whether or not to put the words down or not, and the decisions themselves also appear from that same unknown — TheHorselessHeadman

That is well modeled to be the unconscious mind, and decisions and confidence feelings are well documented (by NCC) to be made when certain neuron firing thresholds are passed triggering neural network cascades to avalanche into the action/feeling/perception.

nd according to what physics you conclude that human behaviour is not deterministic in any way? — Zelebg

I retract that broad statement made in haste. Of course that is not true, but what I was getting at is that as soon as a human knows it is expected to behave in a certain stupid way then it becomes more unpredictable that it will continue to behave that predicted stupid way. Computer programs are completely predictable in this way, when they act stupid they will continue to act stupid. If you know the program, its inputs and outputs and decision algos, you can completely manipulate the state-machine to change its behavior to which ever stupid result you want. AI is very easy to trick b/c of this. The programmer always knows how to make the executing program completely determined by the programmer's will and not the programs. Thus, it has neither free will or an "I" as you want to think about it. This is not generally possible to do with humans (we know the KGB, NSA, CIA, et. have tried (and failed) all the ways to force humans to do something it does not want to do!).

Ironically, the above withstanding Human mobility:
https://cos.northeastern.edu/news/human-behavior-is-93-predictable-research-shows/
HUMAN BEHAVIOR IS 93% PREDICTABLE, RESEARCH SHOWS

Try to claim this statement is false: the only explanation we actually already know of, for the existence of things that do not actually exist, such as unicorns or qualia, is virtual existence. Once you realize it is actually true, then my point should be self-evident. — Zelebg

Maybe I'm too drunk or brain damaged to understand the purported obvious genius of your statement(s), but seems obvious to me that the mind is a virtual existence b/c it exists in a conjured (illusion) of 'reality'. How is that obvious point an explanation of anything helpful? The hard problem is not to create a VR of things that do not actually exist, but to create an existence that brings vivid living objectified experiential meaning to things (like color) that are otherwise just data values to be processed and pattern matched as factual object properties.

I already told you "I" is a program in private virtual reality created by the brain — Zelebg

Just because you say so doesn't make that a viable model. private virtual reality doesn't solve the problem of coding a coherent, unified ego-state of "I" that is part of the VR not observing it. If it was just a matter of just writing code in a 'private virtual reality ' don't you think that MIT, Google, IBM (et. al.) would have already done that years ago? You said "I" could be programmed an a recursion I and explained why I think not. You have to propose a plausible coding model for "I" to support your otherwise ungrounded, wild statements.

This thing is a ‘virtual reality’, a world of algebraic abstractions and recursive algorithmic interactions, a realm where almost anything is possible.

The only explanation we actually already know of, for the existence of things that do not actually exist, such as unicorns or qualia, is virtual existence.
. — Zelebg

sounds like hypothetical mumbo-jumbo, not evidence. How do algebraic abstractions help anything re a physical model of 'Self" or "I"?

recursive algorithmic interactions do not seem to be able to contain or objectify "I" as a unitary whole b/c recursion does the opposite, successively approximates a global solution as an series of (not necessarily converging) sub calculations trying to approximate some final state, but the whole history is lost so the final has no sense of the path or parameters which got it there. So, on at least 2 counts my intuition says there is no way the 'Self" or "I" can be implemented as recursive algorithmic interactions.

Haven’t you already agreed with me previously that all the evidence points to “self” or “I” being a virtual entity? Anyway — Zelebg

I don't believe so. Check our thread but I recall agreeing to *imagination* being (at least in some important way) a virtual experience, but that is a far cry from a model of 'self' or 'I'. "Virtual experience" does not equal "Virtual entity". Imagination seems to me to be more like a projection environment for the "I" to play in.

Such a program is indeed deterministic at every instant in time, but that does not mean its future functionality is determined at any time, just like humans. — Zelebg

Not true. Your computer program will still have pre-determined behaviors even its functionality and/or goals can be expost facto updated, which is completely unlike humans who's behavior is not deterministic in any way or at any moment in time b/c, unlike the computer program, humans (and rats et. al.) have an "I" which is self-determined sufficiently apart from their genetic code/programming to have true 'free will'. Thus, I reiterate, for your definition and example(s), clearly your computer programming example has no 'free will' (i.e., Freedom of volition) at least b/c it has no 'self' (i.e., no "I" as an independent agent from its programming).

Freedom of volition is proportional to how much it is determined by "self", and inversely proportional to how much is determined by anything else. — Zelebg

OK, that is a start, but conflicting definitions generally will not converge. For this definition then clearly your computer programming example has no 'free will' (i.e., Freedom of volition) b/c it has no 'self' (i.e., no "I" as an agent).

It was incoherent and unrelated to my question. If you can not articulate an answer to WHY — Zelebg

OK. Let's drop the discussion of your definition/views on 'free will'. Seems like a dead end there for me too.

Experience is qualia

So, you believe the emotive experience of, say, fear is a phenomenal qualia (like color) that the we cannot even begin to explain?

Why not? — Zelebg

at least b/c it is an objectified and unified state which happens apart from time and apart from its hardware or embodiment (incl. any programming) and considers/'feels' all constraints at a single moment. state-machine programs or processes cannot achieve that 3rd party state of entwined being. Can you evidence they can?

There is no clear definition of free will. — Zelebg

again, just asking you for your definition of 'free will' for which your statements and examples are based upon. If you continue to resist then I will just assume you have no definition and you are 'testing the waters' (like a sophist) on some ridiculous idea the all computer programs have human style 'free will', but you really don't believe that, which is why you will not provide your definition that supports that degenerate (case) view. I guess I'm trying to "squeeze water from a rock" with you on this 'free will' topic, and I'm not interest in rhetorical banter on things you really do not believe to be well reasoned and true.

A program that can redefine its set of defined functions and goals. — Zelebg

bad example. just b/c the programmed changed its 'goals' it is still a deterministic program which is constrained to a (narrow) set of pre-determined behaviors and functions. So, it seems your example fails my request.

Questions are not answers — Zelebg

Those are obviously leading questions, which do hint at/point to my answers. My leading questions there are effectively begging you for your definition of 'free will'. That gets to the point of where you are coming from. So, why are you avoiding taking your stab at that?

It's like you want me to argue something I do not care about. — Zelebg

I'm just asking you for a clear definition of 'free will' and for you to compare/contrast that to the 'common definition' you apparently alluded to. If you do not care to do that then I dare say all your opinions on 'free will' are not meant to be taken seriously as they are not open for debate towards a truth, but just to state/spread your position.

I have no idea what are we arguing about or why. — Zelebg

your odd definition of 'free will'. You brought up 'free will' in this thread and the OP's topic relates to "I propose that the brain only generates the content of consciousness and not the self that binds it into a whole." One clear hallmark of consciousness is the common meaning of 'free will'. So, your statements saying that a simple computer program is exercising 'free will' would seem to contradict the OP's panpsychist position saying that consciousness (thus free will) can only come about via an "atomic unity evolving from other conscious natural beings in a panpsychist universe and as such can have real causal powers". If you can evidence your definition of "free will" is correct then that could be an argument against panpsychism.

Then you said that the purpose of sentience or consciousness is so we can have "free will", and later confounded your answer more by saying that was not your idea but "common definition".

So, is it not reasonable for you to state what you believe is the 'common wisdom' meaning of "free will" and why you disagree with it? Otherwise, we are left dumbfounded to make any sense of your various less than coherent positions/statements.

eager to hear your reasoned clarifications, unless you have none...

I do not. What are we talking about, what is the argument? — Zelebg

you say a simple computer program is exercising 'free will', and you just said that your definition is not "common wisdom or a Common definition of free will. So, I ask you to state what you believe "is the 'common wisdom' meaning of "free will" and clarify exactly where/how do you reason that is not accurate/true" I'm trying to avoid word games and semantics here.

What is not clear about that question?

Not common wisdom. Common definition of free will. What's this about, can you phrase it as question? — Zelebg

Sure, what do you say is the 'common wisdom' meaning of "free will" and exactly where/how do you reason that is not accurate/true?

“I” is a kind of program. Are you saying your robot can not have “I” or that no robot ever can have it? — Zelebg

No, but those are not the only options. My current working hypothesis is that 'I' cannot be a program or process, but more of a state of matter/energy that may flow in a medium but not in a programming manner. My posts on other threads give details as to one implementation framework I have in mind.

Experience is qualia, in that experience consists of one or more different and simultaneous qualities. — Zelebg

I disagree. We can experience many things that have meaning w/o the 'hard problem of qualia', like a shape of an object which has a very similar qualia to us as we expect the actual physical object to exhibit. However, the color red we 'see' in our minds is not a 'different and simultaneous qualities' it is a single, vivid, yet conjured projection which we somehow experience as a qualitative visual object apart from anything that can exist externally and not something that can be simply programmed like video game VR. I wonder if color qualia is in its own class. Are there other qualias that likewise have no basis for existing externally? Time qualia sort of exist externally via entropy and pseudo causality, but that arguably be another. any others?

In one case I'm talking about 'conscious free will' as most people understand it — Zelebg

your original statement did not qualify it that way or indicate you were talking about 'common wisdom'. So, if you acknowledge that the 'common wisdom' of most all philosophers/thinkers is that the purpose of sentience or consciousness is so we can have "free will", are you just playing with word of "free" separately from the word "will" as a synonym for 'make decisions' to a say computer program is 'free' to 'make decisions' so it the same thing as what humans call their 'free will'. That just seems like word games unless you ground your ideas in the human context and coherently address all my counter examples.

Deterministic program does not equal deterministic function. — Zelebg

please give us an example of a stable deterministic program which is not constrained to a set of pre-determined behaviors and functions, yet achieves goals and/or has utility.

how is determinism relevant to "knowing itself"? — Zelebg

would you agree that all true independent agents acting in the world have a goal? would you agree that a more meaningful decision made by an agent when it "knows" that its decision(s) is/are best for its overall goals? would you agree that best overall decisions can only be achieved if the agent has a state of awareness (e.g., conscious) of its totality of needs and if the agent has the ability to realign its behaviors and/or beliefs and/or goals according to the experienced/predicted consequences of its behaviors and/or beliefs and/or goals ? If so, then would you not agree that a conscious agent is exercising more meaningful 'free will' than the automaton programmed agent, and a self-conscious agent exhibiting still more meaningful 'free will' than an only conscious agent?

At the other extreme, would we say that an automaton agent having no goals, and making purely random 'decisions' is acting out of any kind of meaningful 'free will'?

what we care about is meaningful animated/living 'free will' not trivial 'free will' of all mater.

, I can also foresee the possible outcomes from my potential choices. This, I think, is where self-consciousness starts to play a role, when I realize that my decisions have consequences. — Metaphysician Undercover

this may be a fair point. However, only few creatures seem to exhibit self-consciousness , yet most all larger animals seem to have consciousness that can do what you say there; e.g., rats and birds do it. We all would agree that mammals have consciousness and all have 'free will'. Reptiles/amphibians less so, but still rather unquestionable. However, insects are pretty much like Zelebg's robot programming which you say has no 'free will'. Your definitions seems to be too lose to be coherent. Can you tighten them up to exclude the counter examples I point out?

The difference with human beings is that we have developed our consciousness in a way which aids us in comprehending possibilities, and assessing possible outcomes from our actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't think that is true. It has been demonstrated that rats have counterfactual reasoning:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982215002134

Free will only requires an agent to make a decision on the possibilities which are apparent. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, why is Zelebg's robot program not able to make a decision on the possibilities which are apparent? Seems to me like every program does that.

I would think that a bee does this. — Metaphysician Undercover

it has been well documented that bees act according to a social program any time they are among other bees so how can you call that 'free will' when their behavior/decisions is completely dictated by the 'will' of the collective at any time dictated by the collective? all social insects likely share the same 'programming'.