I go for the world where no one transgresses another’s freedoms so long another doesn’t transgress theirs. — NOS4A2

So, there is never a justification for transgressing other's freedoms unless one's own freedoms are directly being transgressed. That isn't what you were saying earlier, which was basically that all of the ideologies you listed are equally injurious to our freedoms, which is clearly not the case. You say they all fall into the same category, but does intent actually mean so little to you? Is there no such thing as a greater good worth compelling or limiting people's actions for ever?

I mean, if all it took was a small decrease in quality of life for everyone so that humanity could continue to inhabit the Earth, you don't think that could be justified? In opposing that measure would you not be transgressing the freedoms of countless others - perhaps billions - to live their lives through your principled opposition to having your freedom to pollute and destroy transgressed? I think according to your own reasoning you are wrong, NOS.

Furthermore, there is no redeeming value to be found in ignoring or allowing Jihadism, and I see no reason not to help the people who are most affected by it, which is Muslims, reform their religion successfully, if only because many of them don't want to live in an Islamic state themselves. I mean, those people are having their freedoms transgressed by the Jihadis, are they not? You should want to help them, NOS.



I hope you are just agreeing with him because you took an adversarial position towards the OP in the first place. NOS is being really unreasonable here, as usual.

Neo-nazis aim for a white-ethno state governed by Hitlerian principles. Commies aim for a a totalitarian state and the abolition of property. Republicans aim for a state governed by a piece of paper. Greens want the state to control the economy and the weather. Every power-seeker and politico from fringe to establishment seeks to transgress your rights. That’s how politics works. That should be obvious to anyone with half a brain. What isn’t obvious is that we need to reform one and not the other. — NOS4A2

First off, neo-Nazis are indeed to be fought, just not with rifles or bombs because they don't usually commit to armed warfare against any ideologies or people who oppose them - at least in the US. That is because they would get stomped. So, they scuttle around on the fringes of the internet only coming into the light to seize political opportunities like a mouse might seize upon a rotten bit of cheese to safely further their idiotic agenda and sate their appetites for relevancy. That is very different from Jihadis. They will just cut your head off for disagreeing, stone your wife to death, and take your daughters as sex slaves. One of those two things is a much more overt threat to one's liberty, as anyone with half a brain would be able to tell.

As for the rest of those groups: yes, sometimes those groups seek to transgress one's rights. But there is something to be said for the degree to which freedoms are transgressed, and the reasons for transgressing those freedoms. "Greens", for instance, clearly have no desire to curtail certain freedoms for the sake of curtailing freedoms, but rather to maintain organized life on Earth. Which you should view as absolutely justified if you aren't psychotic. As for communists: yes, communism undoubtedly lends itself to the curtailment of freedoms, I grant that. But you seem to think everyone except for big-brain NOS is being scammed out of their rations by a bunch of grifting idealogues.

That, I would argue, is largely not the case, especially for the groups you just mentioned. One isn't a nazi if one doesn't hate, one isn't a communist if one doesn't want property to be publicly owned, and one isn't a Republican if one doesn't support King Donald when the rubber meets the road. One also doesn't care about the environment if one opposes measures to stop destroying the environment - even if that means curtailing some freedoms in (probably) relatively mild ways. Those are essential qualities that are required for membership of those groups and that inform those groups' ideologies. That is to say, most of those people in those groups understand what they are supporting. If anyone is being misled by ideology, it is the person who would equate the potential for transgressing freedoms between all those groups because they can't understand the limitations of looking at the world in such stark terms as you do, NOS.

So, I would argue that certain ideologies should be reformed over others, largely because the degrees to which freedoms would be transgressed and the reasons for transgressing those freedoms, are, once again, not identical across the ideologies, and the people who support the ideologies know it - just like you do, NOS. A Nazi is not equivalent to a "Green", and you know it. If that still doesn't make sense, here is a quick thought experiment:

Would you rather live in a white, Nazi ethnostate predicated on Hitlerian principles (whatever the fuck a Hitlerian principle is), or a United States that has made some economic sacrifices and sacrifices of personal freedom to support not destroying the environment? Which of those two worlds transgresses more of one's freedoms in all likelihood?

You’ll note the caveat “…so long as he doesn’t transgress another’s right to do the same”. When that happens all bets are off. — NOS4A2

NOS, they literally aim to set up a state governed by Islamic principles, probably through armed conflict. Jihadists must transgress others' rights by definition or they are just cosplaying. That should be obvious to anyone with a big wrinkly libertarian brain such as yourself.

I don't have much to offer to this complex problem. What I would say is that we need to hold Islamic groups responsible for Islamic individuals, such that this pressure causes Islamic groups to eschew Jihadism. — Leontiskos

Fair enough. I do think that it cannot be accomplished by people external to Islam, however, and some progressive Muslims need to take a stand. In fact, I would say that a coalition of progressive, open-minded Muslims pushing for reform would be worth far more than anything any of us could ever do or say from the outside to change attitudes and influence Muslims not to be radicalized.

And surely the way to go about empowering any reformers does not contain committing war crimes, like droning people all over the place or supporting the genocide of the Palestinians.

But I would like to raise a related issue: how do we deal with militant politico-religious groups anywhere, including our own?

How do we deal with American Christian Nationalism? Who is responsible for 'causing' it? Should it be stamped out? Should it be punished? Forbidden? Who has the responsibility for solving the problem of American Christian Nationalism? — BC

Difficult question. A simple answer is that those of us who are not ideologically aligned with or politically adjacent to such groups should go about making it difficult for these people to enact their agenda. Yes, I know. Honestly, I'd have to think about it quite a bit to come up with a more substantive answer on how to deal with it. On whether or not it should be allowed: if influencing the government to adopt Christianity as what would essentially be a state religion is necessary for Christian nationalism to be Christian nationalism (and that might not be the case, if I'm being generous), then we cannot let it exist. I mean that sincerely: it must not exist if we are to preserve the separation of church and state. How we go about fighting something like that, once again, I'm not totally sure.

There ought to be no way to deal with Jihadis save for leaving them alone. In fact, one ought to go out of his way to defend the jihadi’s right to speak, believe, and live he wishes, so long as he doesn’t transgress another’s right to do the same. Nothing does more for Jihadism, and brings more to its cause, than its oppression. — NOS4A2

Does the existence of Islamic reformers actually constitute oppression of jihadists, though? If anything, jihadists would be the ones inclined to impose their own political and religious beliefs on others, probably through force or armed conflict by definition. I mean, they literally want to establish a state based on Islamic principles. I don't see how they couldn't transgress others' rights in the process, and I can't think of many plausible things more antithetical to freedom. Shouldn't a libertarian like yourself have some sympathy for those reformers who want some freedom for themselves?

Okay, cool, that's a lot different from what you were saying. We can actually discuss this.

Do you think there might need to be something at work in one's brain other than an appreciation of how horrible US middle east policy is to get one to blow oneself up on a bus and kill dozens of innocent people while yelling words of praise to one's God? That isn't meant to be snarky; I genuinely wonder how you might rationalize what seems obvious to me: radical interpretations of scripture in the Quran tend towards producing mass-murdering maniacs at a (relatively) high rate. I consider that to be partially a problem with Islam, as those scriptures are given meaning by shared interpretations of a shared book. Although I think our policy definitely factors into the attitudes of jihadists heavily, and almost certainly fuels radicalization, one group just seems to be consistently more belligerent, at least in terms of acting violently for religious reasons, than others.

None of that justifies our barbaric policies or actions, or our potentially worse belligerence on the world stage, of course. I mean just look at our support of the genocide of the Palestinians. There is clearly no justification for that.

Stop supporting Israel
Get US military out of the Middle East
Stop supporting repressive Islamic regimes
Mind our own business
Stop supporting Israel — T Clark

For fuck's sake, T, did you even read the OP? I said that our current foreign policy makes no sense if we care about reducing jihadism. I agree with you that we should pull our military out of the middle east in an intelligent way and stop supporting Israel.

edit: when I talk about supporting reformers, I don't mean with APC's and foot soldiers. Maybe I should have made that clearer?

Duly noted. Thanks, sandwich.

I think I get it, yes. If we suppose that radical interpretations of scripture are a necessary component of jihadism, we get your argument:

1) If the radical interpretations that give rise to jihadism can be religiously tolerated in a secular society, then jihadism is compatible with secularism.
2) Jihadism is not compatible with secularism.
3) So, the radical interpretations that give rise to jihadism cannot be religiously tolerated in a secular society. — Arcane Sandwich

And we can simplify it to get an argument like the one you made in the first place. We get a modus ponens like:

1) If those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture.
2) Those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are not compatible with secularism.
3) So, the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism.

Or am I making a mistake somewhere?

I've got it.

1) If jihadism and the radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are to be tolerated, they must be compatible with secularism.

2) Jihadism and those radical interpretations of scripture that lead to jihadism are not compatible with secularism.

3) Therefore, jihadism and the radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism should not be tolerated.

I present the modus tollens version:

1) If religious tolerance applies to jihadism and those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism, then they must be compatible with secularism.
2) Jihadism and those radical interpretations of scriptures that give rise to jihadism are not compatible with secularism.
3) Therefore, religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism or those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism.

edit: it isn't quite modus tollens is it

Thanks, sandwich. I'll use those resources for sure.

Okay, cool.

Yes, I see. I'll try to make it simpler. How do you get the logic symbols in your posts?

1) If certain radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture nor to jihadism.
2) Certain radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism.
3) So, the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture nor to jihadism. — Arcane Sandwich

Looks good. Thanks for simplifying it; I should have done that myself and saved you the work.

Here's my argument, it's a humble modus ponens:

1) If jihadism is incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism.
2) Jihadism is incompatible with secularism.
3) So, the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism. — Arcane Sandwich

Sounds about right. But I don't think many people actually think we should tolerate jihadism. People might, however, think we ought to tolerate the kind of fundamentalism that might give rise to jihadism. Maybe we could modify your argument in some way to account for that:

1) certain radical interpretations of scripture directly give rise to jihadism.
2) If certain radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to those radical interpretations of scripture.
3) if jihadism is incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism.
4) Jihadism is incompatible with secularism.
5) Therefore, because of (1), those radical interpretations of scripture that directly give rise to jihadism are incompatible with secularism.
6) Therefore, religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism or those radical interpretations of scripture that give rise to jihadism.

I'm with you, @ToothyMaw, I think veganism is more ethical than non-veganism. But I just don't see how other people are under the obligation to convert to veganism if they're under no obligation to convert to anything in general. I mean, given that there are several different Ethics out there, how are we to decide which one is the best? Honest question. — Arcane Sandwich

I think it is unreasonable to expect me to be able to resolve the is/ought problem when I argue for veganism, because if we truly didn't already bypass that problem in some ways, no one would be vegan or straight edge or would take up any difficult to maintain moral stances on anything. The fact of the matter is that if one cares about suffering, one should care about animal suffering, and if one doesn't care about animal suffering but cares about human suffering, there is a good chance one is selectively applying the reasoning that unnecessary suffering is wrong according to categories in an arbitrary way. Or one could be a cowardly, sadistic supporter of killing animals whose last refuge is to be found in hiding behind unresolvable philosophical problems (not referring to you, sandwich). But that is almost certainly an edge case and not representative of non-vegans in general.

So, I can only rigorously appeal to other vegans to fight for a world in which animal suffering is minimized by emphasizing what I wrote earlier: a world in which we are all vegan is probably ideal if we want to follow vegan reasoning to its logical conclusion.

None of that is to say that veganism can't be wrong, but it looks like it isn't from where I'm standing.

You know, I think most people walk around thinking that there is no way that they, as individuals, could be ethically obligated to change their lifestyles drastically merely because the necessity of a change hasn't presented itself in their lives. However, I like to think that most people, if they were just in the right state of mind, and were aware of the facts, would value reducing non-human suffering enough to be vegan without it needing to interfere with their lives in some way.

It reminds me of people who think they can fight without training. This belief is entirely irrational and does not present as being irrational until one gets into a fight or actually pursues training, at which point they should realize just how fragile the bridges of their noses are or how easily someone significantly smaller than them could choke them out. At that point, one has been educated, so to speak, on some of their deficiencies.

And if one's delusions of being able to fight survive being folded in half by a purple belt or clubbed by someone who knows how to throw a good leg kick, then maybe nothing can be done for them.

Of course, veganism is different because one has been eating meat their whole life (presumably) and it is socially acceptable, so there is quite a bit of inertia there.

This seems to indicate that if there is a selfish theory of ethics that is sufficiently supported, then we ought to adhere to it, as it seems wrong to just retreat to other less supported theories because we don't like selfishness.
— ToothyMaw

Here is where I disagree. If the evidence in favor of a "selfish ethics" in the style of Ayn Rand is nothing more than Richard Dawkin's book about the selfish gene, then I have the right to ask for two things: a better selfish ethics, and better evidence in support of it. That's just for starters. I then need to see a definitive solution to Hume's is-ought problem. Furthermore, I then need to see why selfish ethics are better for everyone in general (i.e., for society at large) than non-selfish ethics. Finally, I then need to see if selfish ethics are better for non-human animals than non-selfish ethics. Until all of that is delivered, I have no obligation to support an ethics of selfishness, in any way, shape or form. — Arcane Sandwich

I think I agree that all of that would have to be delivered, too. I'm just saying that a selfish ethics is not off the table merely because Ayn Rand or somebody hasn't been able to produce a theory strong enough to deliver on the conditions you list. I agree with you on this one.

Disregarding 3), our answers to 1) and 2) are mostly different because you seem to hold some reservations about whether or not universal vegan claims can be made in the presence of skepticism about veganism's true moral correctness.
— ToothyMaw

Perhaps, though I'm not sure if I would phrase it like that. Can you elaborate on that point, please? — Arcane Sandwich

I'm saying that you appear to think that the reasoning for veganism, that is, that we ought to stop consuming animal products to reduce non-human suffering, cannot be generalized to apply to everyone, because it is possible that veganism is indeed not correct. I think that this doesn't make much sense if we have no reason to doubt that the reasoning could apply universally. To demonstrate this point, imagine this: there is a world in which everyone is vegan, and a world in which people eat meat and consume animal products. According to vegan reasoning, the first world should be more desirable, all other things equal, because it should entail significantly less non-human suffering. Actually, I would argue that it is a fact that that world would almost certainly entail less non-human suffering.

So, then we ask: if non-human suffering is to be avoided, then should we not try to bring about the world in which everyone is vegan? Aren't we obligated to fight for that? That world is far more plausible than some world where society is organized around some contrived, ethical-killing bullshit that no one is actually willing to bring about.

You might argue that I cannot get an ought from an is, but I think you cannot argue for a world in which we are not all vegan if you want to efficiently bring about the greatest reduction of non-human suffering possible.

As for 3), I didn't do any research and just said what came to mind, and I think your answer is better in some ways.
— ToothyMaw

Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. I'm not sure. At this point in the conversation, it might be useful to cite other people besides just the two of us. Maybe Peter Singer says something in Practical Ethics, but since I haven't read that book myself, I wouldn't know. — Arcane Sandwich

I read it years ago, so my memory of it is cloudy. I'll go see if I can get some material from Singer that supports it one way or the other. I seem to remember something about preference utilitarianism and fruit trees. I'll get back to you.

Our answers are entirely different, lol. But that doesn't mean that we can't agree on other points. — Arcane Sandwich

Disregarding 3), our answers to 1) and 2) are mostly different because you seem to hold some reservations about whether or not universal vegan claims can be made in the presence of skepticism about veganism's true moral correctness.

As for 3), I didn't do any research and just said what came to mind, and I think your answer is better in some ways.

1) No, people are under no Ethical obligation to convert to veganism. Why not? Because veganism might be wrong. That is why it makes sense to discuss it in a philosophical sense and a political sense. I'm not saying that veganism actually is wrong, far from it. For all I know, veganism could be right. — Arcane Sandwich

2) No, if one does not want to be a vegan, one is not necessarily being selfish. At least not if veganism turns out to be wrong. If it turns out to be right, then that is a different matter. — Arcane Sandwich

3) Yes, it is Ethical to be selfish, as surprising as that sounds. There are Ethical theories about selfishness, and people sometimes even talk about a "selfish gene", which is the title of a book by Richard Dawkins. However, what I would argue is that there is no single Ethics, there are may different Ethics or ethical theories, or theories about morals, and, since that is the case, then, by definition, I am under no Ethical obligation to embrace some specific Ethics of selfishness, or any general Ethics of selfishness, or even the very concept of selfishness as a positive moral value instead of a neutral moral value, or even a negative moral value. — Arcane Sandwich

You seem to have answered 1) and 2) in a way that is compatible with the claim that you are under no obligation to accept an ethics of selfishness or to embrace selfishness as a positive moral value, for the reason of there being many different ethics. But I don't think that the existence of many different ethical theories implies that you are under no obligation to embrace any given ethical theory; there are degrees of plausibility, rigor, etc. that indicate if you ought to embrace it.

Allow me to introduce an analogy. There might be a proliferation of, say, ways of opening a chess game that might lead to you winning, but that large number of openings doesn't mean that one or another opening was not superior from a statistical standpoint in terms of the likelihood of it leading to a win. In fact, a calculation regarding this is probably done by any great chess player every time they play a game. I would view the large number of ethical theories in a similar way. Some are more or less rigorous and plausible, and able to be universalized, even if each of them might resolve the question of what is right and wrong in their own way. So, just because something could resolve the question doesn't make it the best choice, or even one of the best choices.

This seems to indicate that if there is a selfish theory of ethics that is sufficiently supported, then we ought to adhere to it, as it seems wrong to just retreat to other less supported theories because we don't like selfishness.

edit: your reasoning seems more linear than I would expect and appears to be pre-loaded with some ideas, such as the idea that the existence of many ethical theories means one has no obligation to adhere to any one theory due to its merits.

If one perceives there to be an ethical obligation, and this obligation, appropriately supported by the facts, indicates that everyone ought to do it, then shouldn't everyone do it?
— ToothyMaw

Should they? The usual philosophical retort here is that we're running into Hume's is-ought problem. — Arcane Sandwich

When I mention "facts", I just mean facts related to the treatment of animals and those that indicate we could easily avoid the concomitant suffering by all stopping consuming animal products. So, the "ought" I am talking about is a softer one, as it really only functions in the presence of (what I believe to be reasonable) suppositions consistent with those facts.

Skepticism with regards to the normative moral status of veganism does not mean that people are not obligated to do it, it means that we just shouldn't take it as a decided issue and acknowledge that it can be discussed. But being able to discuss it does not make it not obligatory for everyone in the absence of decisive arguments against veganism.
— ToothyMaw

Here is where critics of veganism say that there are indeed decisive arguments against veganism, and that until vegans can reject those arguments, no one has the ethical obligation to convert to veganism. I'm just playing Devil's Advocate to the best of my ability here. — Arcane Sandwich

You would have to provide one of these arguments, as I can't remember coming across any arguments against veganism that really seemed all that decisive.

I mean, no one would say that it isn't wrong to torture and kill other humans merely because some crazy person (or people) might be skeptical of the validity of the position of being against torturing and unjustly killing other humans in pretty much any case, right? I certainly wouldn't, but your reasoning seems to suggest such a thing could actually be undecided. Note that I'm just talking about the reasoning here; I am not disputing that humans should not be tortured and unjustly killed.
— ToothyMaw

Critics of veganism will point out that there are insufficient metaphysical and scientific reasons for comparing humans to non-human animals, as far as Ethics and moralities are concerned. What would you respond to them, in that regard? — Arcane Sandwich

If one can imagine, or grant, that animals can suffer in ways similar to us, then one can rightly compare humans and animals at least insofar as the capacity to suffer is concerned. And if you do that, it kind of follows that we shouldn't, say, throw lobsters into boiling pots of water if they can consciously perceive pain like a human, if at least partially because we wouldn't do that to a human or something else that could consciously perceive pain. That is to say, if the experience of being boiled alive is consistent across animals and humans, we can establish a baseline that indicates which actions are more or less acceptable without dubious comparisons.

So, I'm not saying that animal suffering is as important as human suffering, or that the two are qualitatively identical, but if you grant that animals can suffer, often really intensely, then it should be as obvious that animal suffering is undesirable as it is that human suffering is undesirable. If you accept that and what I wrote above, then I think veganism follows without comparing humans and animals in fallacious ways.

edit: if my argument at the end there is really similar to someone else's, I didn't mean to copy it. I just wrote what came to mind.

No, people are under no Ethical obligation to convert to veganism. Why not? Because veganism might be wrong. That is why it makes sense to discuss it in a philosophical sense and a political sense. I'm not saying that veganism actually is wrong, far from it. For all I know, veganism could be right. — Arcane Sandwich

Wait, what? If one perceives there to be an ethical obligation, and this obligation, appropriately supported by the facts, indicates that everyone ought to do it, then shouldn't everyone do it? Skepticism with regards to the normative moral status of veganism does not mean that people are not obligated to do it, it means that we just shouldn't take it as a decided issue and acknowledge that it can be discussed. But being able to discuss it does not make it not obligatory for everyone in the absence of decisive arguments against veganism.

I mean, no one would say that it isn't wrong to torture and kill other humans merely because some crazy person (or people) might be skeptical of the validity of the position of being against torturing and unjustly killing other humans in pretty much any case, right? I certainly wouldn't, but your reasoning seems to suggest such a thing could actually be undecided. Note that I'm just talking about the reasoning here; I am not disputing that humans should not be tortured and unjustly killed.

1) Does everyone have to convert to veganism? — Arcane Sandwich

I think this speaks to people thinking there might be some way of ethically consuming animal products as a sort of “out” from veganism, and that does indeed seem to me to be a necessary condition for people not being obligated to be vegan. But, I think that if people consider themselves to be bound by “ought's” so to speak, or any sort of moral obligation, especially with regards to the wellbeing of animals, they should themselves be vegan in the lack of a means of producing animal products without suffering or death (if that is even possible). So yes, everyone ought to convert to veganism.

2) If one does not want to be a vegan, is one being selfish? — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, I think it is probably selfish to not want to be vegan because one would likely be knowingly and explicitly participating in processes that harm animals. If this is the case, there is a good chance this is because of an internal calculation that the suffering is happening far enough away and out of sight enough that one is not participating, or they possess the belief that animal wellbeing doesn’t matter or are just generally apathetic. All of those things, I contend, are selfish reasons for not being vegan. Thus, to not be a vegan because one does not want to be a vegan, appears to be selfish.

A side effect of the simpler conclusion that just not wanting to be vegan is selfish is that every vegan that wouldn’t want to be vegan because they like meat or animal products would be selfish. So, I’m not entirely sure on this one. I think that another necessary conclusion should be that selfishness - as reflected in eating meat - mostly only matters when it leads to bad actions like eating meat.

3) Is it Ethical to be selfish? — Arcane Sandwich

No, it is not ethical to be selfish, even if we have evolved to be so.

I'm on it, sandwich!

Would anyone else like to participate in this thread by providing another example that we can apply Peirce's Precisive Abstraction to? — Mapping the Medium

Sure, just give me a little bit. Still chewing on that last post; I'm trying hard to understand his semiotics stuff, but it is really abstract.

I'm looking at the wiki for Practical Ethics (1979), but I've noticed that Singer published another book before that one, titled Animal Liberation (1975). Why do you think that Practical Ethics would be the more approachable of the two? — Arcane Sandwich

Honestly, I really don't know Singer's body of work well enough to give a best entry point. I started with Practical Ethics, but I'm sure one could start with Animal Liberation, too.

My interpretation is that they are speaking to "you in general", if that makes any sense. They're not saying "You, Arcane Sandwich", they're not saying "You, ToothyMaw". It's a sort of "you" in general, whoever that person might be.

Regarding the part about the "painful things" that they wish never happened to that "abstract you", they are effectively assuming that anyone (everyone, really) has undergone some painful things in their lives (whatever those "painful things" might be in each individual case), and they're saying that they wish that those (the painful things) never happened to anyone. And they're saying that without even knowing what those "painful things" are in each individual case.

Do you think that my interpretation of that video is more or less correct? — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, I think your interpretation is correct. In addressing this abstract "you" They are acknowledging that no one really escapes hardship - whatever form that might take - and expressing in a personal way the very human sentiment of wishing we (anyone who fits into the abstract you) didn't all have to suffer so much. But we can still console each other and shoulder the suffering together - which might make things a little more bearable. Ergo, that portion of the video.

:up:

Okay, yes, this is interesting enough to maintain at least my interest and suspension of nominalist assumptions or whatever, but you need to throw some meat out there. What are we trying to do? Lecturing us on how Peirce is misunderstood should give way to some sort of discussion of what he was trying to say.

Thank you very much once again, ToothyMaw. I'm not that familiar with the work of Peter Singer. I know of him, but I have not read any of his works yet. What would you recommend that I start with? — Arcane Sandwich

I would just get right to Practical Ethics, although it isn't an easy read in some sections (both in terms of being comprehended and being uncomfortable to read). That book is probably the main reason I ever tried to go vegan (something I'm doing again). I should say that Peter Singer is definitely not reductionist; I was just speaking to that some people who like Peter Singer or what he has to say might think in reductionist terms. Although that might be difficult now that I think about it, as he speaks on so many important things.

Changing the subject, back to this Thread. I am quite huge fan of Earth Crisis myself. Yet (and I say this as a fan), sometimes it seems to me that their message fails to engage with the listener as an individual. And that's something very interesting in its own right. Earth Crisis speak "to the masses", if you will. Well, that's technically inaccurate, since the last lines of their song "Ecocide" are literally "by me, and by you", so, they do engage with the listener as an individual in some sense. However, there is another band that does that far better: Hatebreed. They are not Vegan nor Straight Edge, but they have something in common with Earth Crisis, because they are part of the larger "world" of Hardcore Punk / Heavy Metal. Besides, Jamey Jasta himself (lead singer of Hatebreed) as said on several occasions, even on social media, that Earth Crisis is one of the bands that inspired him to form Hatebreed. So, let's take a look at one of their songs, shall we? — Arcane Sandwich

I actually quite like that song and video. It sends out a positive message, even though the instrumentation and the lyrics are a bit "harsh" for the positivity that they are attempting to transmit to the listener.

What do you make of that, ToothyMaw? Feel free to just "ramble on" about it, even if it has no logic to you. — Arcane Sandwich

I can't help but think about how that video relates to creating change in general.

It seems to me that in order to galvanize people to create positive change, it will always be useful to prescribe actions or directives to people in general (in fact, we have to), but we cannot forget that every person is different; one not only needs to appeal to a common understanding and humanity when attempting to influence people to act towards preserving the environment, adopting ethical veganism, etc. but must also provide a personal context that makes acting make sense. That is done by appealing to the individual in each of us.

Take Hatebreed’s message here, for example, of self-growth and effecting positive change in one’s life despite. Coupling this kind of message with the idea that we are individuals with our own moral arcs and (in some ways discrete) identities tied to those morals, heavily informed by some larger ideas or ideals, but never quite dictated - at least in a reductive sense - I think one can make a strong case for a subset of the public that is highly mobilized and effective at creating change.

Applying this: the ethical vegan acts ethically despite the influence of the meat industry, general ridicule, apathy towards cruelty, veggie burgers that fall the fuck apart when you bite into them, etc. There is psychological and moral growth to be had in advocating for ideas and ideals and acting morally in a more personal sense. As such, there is something meaningful to strive for other than just the validation of one’s beliefs - one is ethical. One makes the necessary sacrifices. One is making a difference. Accentuating this relationship is a large part of how we edify each other.

Ok. Thank you for letting me know that you are not interested in participating in this thread. Fortunately, there are plenty of threads on this site for you to discuss those topics in. — Mapping the Medium

Thank you very much for your time, Mapping the Medium. I'm out. Peace. — Arcane Sandwich

There is definitely something to be said for keeping threads on track, but:

That was a little...cold. I'm not sure that Sandwich wasn't contributing to the thread, and inviting someone to stop participating in a thread in the absence of belligerence or something kind of needs more justification than just that that person disagrees in a valid way with some core suppositions imo.

But whatever. You made the thread; if you think he is derailing it, you can tell him to go elsewhere if you want.

The way I see it, even if there is no logical contradiction between those two sets of premises (i.e., being Straight Edge and being Vegan at the same time), I still see the peril of reductionism, so to speak. You've stated it very eloquently. The idea, if I understood you, would be something like the following:

1) "Reductionist" Straight Edge: they say that drugs are the cause of every problem in society.
2) "Reductionist" Vegan: they say that the use of animal products is the cause of every problem in society.

Instead, you seem to be suggesting that the following (if anything) would be more rational:

1) In the case of "True" Straight Edge: drugs are not the cause of every problem in society, though they are one of the main problems.
2) In the case of "True" Veganism: the use of animal products is not the cause of every problem in society, though it is one of the main problems.

Is that correct, or is it not? — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, I would say so. Like you seem to be saying, it isn't like people even have to abandon the main thrust of, or the vast majority of the normative claims made by, Straight Edge or ethical veganism to avoid reductionism; they just need to accept that neither provides a totally comprehensive account of what the problems are that face society or what we should do to address those problems. You can still be a devout fan of Earth Crisis and love Peter Singer and avoid this very real peril.

systemic factors — ToothyMaw

I suppose I should at least give one specific, significant factor. Consider the influence of corporations on policy in the United States, for example. That might be able to be related to drugs somehow, I guess, but I think it has far more to do with public apathy, ignorance, etc.

1) In your honest opinion, is it fair for Earth Crisis (and Straight Edge in general) to blame societal problems solely on drugs? Or are there other elements of "society" that need to "take the blame" here, so to speak? — Arcane Sandwich

This question is actually a little more difficult than I initially thought. Because, in a way, Straight Edge seems to have provided an all-encompassing account of what our society faces and how to resolve it and adding veganism just amps that up even further - perhaps in a good way, perhaps not. I’m not sure. But I’ll give my opinion anyways:

No, I don’t think it is reasonable to blame drugs for every problem in society; to do so indicates a reductive way of looking at the problems that face us even if the core reasoning of Straight Edge has an internal logic and high level of appeal.

I will start by pointing out that, although it doesn’t indicate invalid reasoning, it seems that Earth Crisis’s core reasoning, and that of the Straight Edge movement in general (if Firestorm is any indication), is circular: people do drugs because of societal circumstances, this makes people less effective at advocating for themselves or acting morally, which then leads to the use of more drugs and/or the toleration of living on the terms of corrupt cops and politicians who themselves then enable this process.

So, according to this reasoning, it seems that the best thing we can do to interrupt this process is stop doing drugs (Or rise up and resist the bad people with violence). Whether or not that is true, this loop is not closed; there are many more reasons than drugs that people are more or less moral or more or less rational, or more or less good at advocating for themselves, including systemic factors, cultural factors, factors like upbringing - even if that last one could be related to bad experiences associated with drugs. I think that those factors could easily eclipse the problem of people doing drugs in certain circumstances.

Really, you would have to believe that the pernicious influence of drugs has suffused everything to believe that stopping doing drugs will actually rid us of all of our problems. But based on what I’ve read, that one guy (Buechner, I think) from EC said that stopping doing drugs doesn’t actually make one a good person; one still has to act with that added mental clarity.

Alternatively, you could just be a really careful nominalist. Maybe.

edit: nope, probably not

By labeling,
— Mapping the Medium

Again, nominalism isn't a tendency to proliferate labels. Nominalisation is closer to being that. — bongo fury

I think the point is that from a nominalist perspective, deriving noun phrases like "honey has sweetness" (or just "x has y-ness" in a more general form) from a self-evidently true predicate like "honey is sweet", is often valid even in the existence of ambiguity over whether or not honey does indeed possess sweetness statically or intrinsically (and thus, at all) because we are only dealing with the physical particulars associated with a subject (honey). That is to say, if a specific label (y-ness) only arises from the particulars associated with some subject, how can we rightly prescind those qualities or particulars when dealing with that subject wherever we might encounter it? It seems we would need some sort of genuine abstraction or abstract process, and I guess that could be hypostatic abstraction or something.

edit: removed the "mental" part of "mental abstraction"

Right, but this is the part where the "orca lawyer" steps in and says: "But mate, orcas kill for sport sometimes, they get a kick out of it, they think it's fun. So if the orca can hunt for sport and enjoy it, why cant I? Why can't I go and hunt whatever I feel like hunting? Why can't I shoot a 'roo or an elk or a guanaco or whatever it is that people hunt in their respective continents?" — Arcane Sandwich

Since no one else seems to want to respond: that is like asking why one cannot willfully flush their Christmas toy truck decorations down the toilet because a child has done something similar. You could do it, but that reasoning doesn't make it any less destructive to your plumbing. Except in the case of dealing with killing or maiming animals, you just killed or maimed something, so the stakes are a lot higher than having to hire a plumber.

I mean, are we going to swim out there and stop the orcas? Is the orca lawyer committed to waging a campaign to end the unnecessary killing of seals? Is that feasible? Would that be a wise way of spending resources if we want to reduce suffering? Or should we just not kill animals in the tens of thousands in slaughterhouses?

My first thought it that one might prescind qualities from a concept that don't require adherence to a category such that that concept does not possess that quality ambiguously (I'm thinking the result of an incorrect hypostatic abstraction). So, keeping up with the honey example, we could prescind sweetness from honey if it turns out through hypostatic abstraction that honey does indeed possess sweetness, and we can prescind sweetness from honey if it possesses that quality intrinsically or statically, but we cannot prescind sweetness from honey if there is ambiguity in if the honey truly possesses that trait intrinsically or statically in the absence of a valid hypostatic abstraction.

My second thought is that I'm not sure what I'm talking about at this point.

edit: that was mostly a joke. I understand what I'm saying even if the intention behind the creation of this thread is still not entirely clear yet.

You said that life is often beautiful by default. I'm not sure that I agree with that. Can you try to convince me of that, please? — Arcane Sandwich

That would be difficult, as I think I can only speak to my subjective experiences, really, which kind of means I can't say that the world in its entirety is beautiful, but rather it is beautiful (sometimes) when viewed through the lens of my experience. So, I probably can't do that, actually.

Because then you say "clearly not in some ways", and I agree with that, but then you say "as human nature appears to give away to incredible self-destruction, cruelty and apathay". Here's where I would say a fallacy, because a lot of people actually do use this fallacy IRL: "Well what about killer whales when they attack a poor seal that just wants to live? I don't see anyone complaining about that."

What would you say in response to that fallacy? Do you think it's a fallacy, or would you consider it good, sound reasoning on the part of the "orca lawyer"? — Arcane Sandwich

It is clearly garbage reasoning, for the following reasons:

We have little to no control over orcas, and even if we wanted to prevent orcas from doing what they do, we would need to insert ourselves into an ecosystem and disrupt it which could have catastrophic consequences for that ecosystem. So, it is true that orcas cause suffering, but it isn't something we should or can prevent imo. This applies to any predatory animal.

Furthermore, humans very well can mold their behavior such that we don't give in to the darkest parts of our natures, and that is not possible for something like an orca. They just kill to eat because they have to. So, humans can act ethically apart from our evolved instincts, whereas other animals almost certainly cannot.

So, deflecting to orcas is pretty dumb.

edit: didn't mean to call humans animals there.

I appear to be the only who wants anything to do with this, for whatever reason. Yes, it is moral for Earth Crisis to align with PETA and vice versa. Yes, we should all be vegans and advocate for veganism. Once again, only T's from me.

hey, who said that Life was supposed to be beautiful by default? — Arcane Sandwich

I think life often is beautiful by default, honestly. Clearly not in some ways, as human nature appears to give way to incredible self-destruction, cruelty, and apathy. Maybe It's just my privilege or something, though; those chickens in the video certainly don't live beautiful lives.