By the way, I'm using the term "earthy" to mean "of or reflective of earthly qualities", and "earth-like" to denote an afterlife that is sufficiently earthy to be considered potentially predictable by people before dying. I think I was consistent in my usage in my latest post, sorry if not.

In you first example you're talking about things we know about.

But the afterlife? Because we don't know about it we cannot say what is more likely. — Moliere

The point I was making was that given constraints, one guess about the afterlife could be more likely than another. If the afterlife is more earth-like, then people who believe generosity is the key to being admitted to an afterlife in which they are rewarded for their virtuous behavior are more likely to be right than someone who makes the claim that the afterlife will consist of the kinds of things we associate with an unknowable eternal hell.

So, I'm not saying one or the other thing is true, or has to be true, but rather that, given constraints, one is more or less likely to be true, even if both explain why the afterlife might consist of some event(s) - the condition of pigs flying, in my example. We don't have to know if pigs can fly to evaluate if the jetpack is more likely than sprouting wings.

But then I think -- we have no evidence of an afterlife being a particular way. At least I would not count various intuitions of persons as "evidence", though it seems you might. — Moliere

I don't take people's intuitions as evidence in my argument. I argue that those with ideas of an earth-like afterlife have more predictive power even if the likelihood of either ET or an earth-like afterlife can only be estimated to be equal - or even if we must be totally agnostic about the likelihoods.

Furthermore, there are no constraints regarding what might be possible if the afterlife is not earth-like. Thus, if there is a similar chance of the afterlife being some sort of eternal hell or earth-like, the fact that the equally likely earth-like afterlife could be more accurately predicted indicates that those who have ideas about an earth-like afterlife have more predictive power regardless of the truth of whether or not it is earth-like.
— ToothyMaw

I think this is the bit that's causing me to reply most -- if there are no constraints then there's no predictive power. It's an imaginary. Just like since there's no evidence for any of the afterlives, we cannot infer that one afterlife is more or less likely than another -- we have no evidence as these are just beliefs that arise due to the fear of death. — Moliere

I agree: There is no way of knowing if ET or something like it is more or less likely than an earthy afterlife. And since, as you recognize, there are seemingly no constraints on an afterlife that is unlike anything we might experience on Earth, there is very little predictive power involved in trying to ascertain what such an afterlife might consist of. On the other hand, an earthy afterlife, as I made the point, can be more accurately predicted - even if not in its entirety, in all likelihood. So, there are constraints on what an earth-like afterlife could consist of but no constraints on which, or how many, earthy events can be guessed.

Thus, given that we are agnostic about the likelihood of any one kind of afterlife existing compared to another, we can only try to predict the afterlives that we can fathom - which are almost entirely earthy - and they stand to be more accurate as a function of the inherent constraints and combinability of somewhat familiar, earthy events.

That beliefs about the afterlife merely arise due to the fear of death is likely, I admit that. But that doesn't mean that they are false, or not worth analyzing. A man on death row will often do or say anything to be acquitted. Does that mean that his attempts to evade death are invalid? I would say that if the man is committed to living, his fear is his own greatest ally.

People don't try to make me feel better, so why should I toil to do so for other people? Philosophy isn't meant to comfort people. If someone wants a safe space for their phobia they shouldn't engage with people on a philosophy forum, which is the equivalent of the wild west but populated by pedants and egotists instead of just egotists.

Suppose on Vulcan they host an Olympics, very much like our own but instead with Vulcan sports. By virtue of the form "Either one goes to the Vulcan Olympics or one does not go to the Vulcan Olympics after being evaluated to go to the Vulcan Olympics by the Vulcans"

Does this sidestep whether or not the Vulcan Olympics exist in order to then talk about the more probable paticulars of the Vulcan Olympics? How could we possibly evaluate something which we have no familiarity for?

To bring it back to the difference between Eternal Torture vs. an Earth-like afterlife: With how much we know we'd be just as much in the right to claim that the Eternal Torture afterlife is more likely. — Moliere

This is my best attempt at defending something quite difficult to defend, it seems:

First off, I don't see how you could support the assertion that eternal torture is more likely. I think you would need some evidence. Also: is the dichotomy of going to the Vulcan Olympics or not going to the Vulcan Olympics similar to the dichotomy of experiencing an earth-like afterlife or eternal torture? I would say not.

Not knowing if one goes to the Vulcan Olympics or what exactly constitutes Vulcan sports doesn’t equate to it being equally or more likely that the Olympics consists of eternal torture. I grant that the afterlife might consist of eternal torture, but there is no reason to believe that every idea about the afterlife is equally likely to be true insofar as the distribution of the actual possible events in the afterlife that might happen are concerned - even without supplying evidence.

Is it equally likely, for instance, that someone might mount a jetpack on a pig and send it flying, or that a pig might sprout wings? In both instances the condition that pigs can fly, which is unlikely to be true, is met, but, given certain constraints, such as the near impossibility of sprouting wings, one conclusion is more likely than another.

Thus, a guess about what might happen in the afterlife, although unlikely to be true, could be more likely than another, even if both could accurately explain why the afterlife consists of certain events - why pigs can fly.

Why certain guesses are more likely is reflected in how much potentiality they contain: that people should live modestly and donate money to charity is reflected more heavily in the behavior of people who believe such a thing than those who might only believe in an afterlife of eternal torture. Furthermore, those who believe in ET (eternal torture), can and will do next to nothing to affect their plight, probably.

You might claim that we all go to the same afterlife, so what does this matter? The modest people and the ET people go to the same place regardless of their beliefs.

This is true, but the people who allow their behaviors to dictate, at least partially, what happens in the afterlife if they are right are committing to predicting what will happen as a function of time and their existence on Earth - unlike ET. That they are indeed predicting what might happen has a much greater chance of being true than ET if the afterlife is earth-like, and, in all likelihood, much less chance if the afterlife is not earth-like. So, what would indicate whether or not the afterlife is earth-like?

I think that's the wrong question.

There is an infinite combination of ways to add the numbers 4 and 5. However, they always add up to a whole number greater than 8. Let's say that there is a hidden whole number greater than 8 we are trying to add to. Since, no matter what combination of ways the numbers 4 and 5 are added, we get a whole number greater than 8, any combination of ways those numbers are added are valid guesses for the hidden number. That doesn’t mean that we will, or even can, accurately guess the hidden number with 4 and 5, but every sum is a valid guess made up of 4 and 5. Therefore, we can predict that the hidden number could consist of some sum of the numbers 4 and 5, if not necessarily both of them.

The analogue to summation is to guess what the afterlife consists of, with the numbers representing events. We know that the afterlife might be earth-like, and if it is (the condition that the hidden number is a whole number greater than 8), we can guess at the actual composition of the afterlife by combining potential elements - the building blocks - we might be aware of on Earth.

Thus, if the afterlife is earth-like, we have significant guessing power, which we don’t have if the afterlife is not earth-like; there are many different (perhaps infinite), overlapping ways to combine earthly predictions of events that could each be discrete events in themselves included in, and “adding up” to, approximations of the real afterlife.

Furthermore, there are no constraints regarding what might be possible if the afterlife is not earth-like. Thus, if there is a similar chance of the afterlife being some sort of eternal hell or earth-like, the fact that the equally likely earth-like afterlife could be more accurately predicted indicates that those who have ideas about an earth-like afterlife have more predictive power regardless of the truth of whether or not it is earth-like.

Why wouldn't there be brains in the afterlife? Maybe upon dying one's memories, for instance, are copied and stored on a computer that then encodes the information into a new, less fleshy brain that will last almost indefinitely? That one died in the process is a given - but one would basically still be the same person, at least as far as memories go. Other aspects of being might be replicable too.

That such an eventuality seems too obviously tailored to human experience and understanding does not mean that it cannot be the case.

I would drop this; the nail that sticks out gets hammered down, if you catch my drift. There are plenty of other places your posts might be appreciated while you let this cool off, such as in my thread in which I responded to you.

Problem with Afterlife is that it is a term which cannot be perceived or verified both empirically and analytically. — Corvus

You agree that when one dies, they either go to an afterlife or cease to exist, right? And also that we cannot evaluate the proposition 'there is an afterlife'?

One is either agnostic or makes the claim that there is evidence that the afterlife does or doesn't exist - that's what matters. Moliere, for instance, says that he believes that if we can evaluate the proposition 'there is an afterlife', he would claim that it is false. He has not provided evidence, but it is of little import, as I agree with you - its existence cannot be verified before dying. However, unlike you, I think it can be perceived - if it exists - insofar as the events of the afterlife can be predicted and then affect, at least partially, one's existence in the afterlife by affecting one's time on Earth.

This is because one could potentially guess what will happen when we die - even if an accurate guess is unlikely. But if we evaluate a number of guesses, we could notice some commonalities, which, given a set of guesses sharing such commonalities, we can infer that those elements shared are more likely to be true given equal probabilities for each guess to be true.

That is, if our intuitions and reasoning about it are worth anything. There is also likely a limit to what can be guessed if the afterlife is like our time on Earth at all, which indicates that the set of potentially accurate guesses is not infinite or can at least be made up entirely of pieces that could be predicted.

"commonalities" — 180 Proof

Lol.

When I actually take the time to decipher what you are saying, like I did with your latest post, I often find that you are saying something surprisingly based quite concisely. Good going.

The only "commonalities" I can discern in the many prevailing "afterlife" scenarios is that they are completely unwarranted substance dualities — 180 Proof

Yes, they appear that way.

anthropic idealized immortality schemes – wishful thinking (i.e. too good to be true)! — 180 Proof

That also appears to be the case.

belief in "the hereafter" tends to devalue here & now both morally (e.g. theodicy, martyrdom) and politically — 180 Proof

Yeah, there is a spectrum as far as that goes, I would say.

I'm not concerned with this part of the equation so much though. I would leave that to people with more eloquence, perspicaciousness, etc. Someone like Vaush, or Christopher Hitchens if he were still around. People who can dynamically criticize culture and politics - something you appear to be quite good at.

Fair enough. Though reading through your post again I can say I'm not sure I understand your chain of reasoning. — Moliere

That's actually good. Maybe you could point out what doesn't make sense to you?

It seems to me we can either evaluate the proposition "There is an afterlife" as true or false, or we cannot evaluate it as true or false. — Moliere

Agreed. I bypass this discussion, however, by stipulating in my argument that one either goes to an afterlife or one doesn't after dying. This is true regardless of whether we can evaluate the proposition 'there is an afterlife'. Then, to follow, if there were an afterlife, what might we expect it to look like? From there, my (bulleted) argument is mostly straightforward.

the fear of death is an adequate explanation for why people bring up the notion of an afterlife. — Moliere

Another good point.

you mean you don't want to just hear my opinion on the matter? — Moliere

I definitely do, sorry if I came across as unwilling to engage.

You don't understand the OP, then. I guess I'll try to explain it, since I have nothing better to do.

My argument results in the conclusion that if we analyze the commonalities of people's beliefs about the afterlife, like your idea - which are totally valid - then we will get something more general than any one idea about what the afterlife might be like. You are providing a specific idea that actually fits into my argument. So, I'm not saying your 'reliving ancestral lives' idea is not equally likely as any other idea, but rather that it doesn't engage the abstract parts of my argument regarding commonalities and probabilities.

To make this more concrete: consider a square dartboard with an invisible bullseye. We know that a dart thrown at this board is no more likely to hit the bullseye than any other part of the board. This is like a distribution of equally likely ideas about the afterlife. However, we routinely see that certain patterns emerge when we actually throw darts at the board; they have a tendency to cluster. This cluster is like a cluster of ideas about the afterlife, all of which could be correct or false. If we average the coordinates of the darts' locations after striking the board, we find that the average coordinates of impact we get is roughly somewhere in the middle. This is like finding the commonalities of people's ideas about the afterlife.

After that, it is up to chance to say whether or not these commonalities are accurate, at least from our perspective, as we cannot evaluate the truthfulness of what will happen until we die, according to the argument.

No, did you even read the OP? I discuss the potential nature of the afterlife if it exists and how we might ascertain it. I don't expect anyone to argue successfully for the proposition 'there is an afterlife'.

Okay, I thought the "fantasy" part was a jab. Yes, your artistic contribution is appreciated, 180.

Why is it not relevant? Your OP is speculating on fantasy, isn't it? — 180 Proof

Yes, it is speculation on the nature of something that we have no evidence for the existence of. But your idea of the afterlife is not supported by an argument. It is just something (admittedly) aesthetically pleasing. That's it.

I'm sure that quote would be brilliant if it were relevant and had some context. Not sarcasm.

In fact, eternal life is not really associated with “years” at all, as it is independent of time. Eternal life can function outside of and beyond time, as well as within time. — sime

Okay, I never disputed that this is possible, but my argument requires that the afterlife is time linear (I think), so that is what I'm discussing. We could talk all day about some sort of cyclical afterlife or something else incomprehensible, or we can discuss the issue with some constraints.

For this reason, eternal life can be thought of as something that Christians experience now. Believers don’t have to “wait” for eternal life, because it’s not something that starts when they die. Rather, eternal life begins the moment a person exercises faith in Christ. It is our current possession. John 3:36 says, “Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life.” Note that the believer “has” (present tense) this life (the verb is present tense in the Greek, too). We find similar present-tense constructions in John 5:24 and John 6:47. The focus of eternal life is not on our future, but on our current standing in Christ. " — sime

This is exactly what my argument looks for. This is precisely it, minus the verification stipulations inherent to Christianity that you mention.

In which case the so-called "after-life" of his Christianity is a misnomer, in that it's conditions of verification aren't considered to transcend the present. — sime

You aren't arguing against me, I hope you realize. That one could be denied Heaven due to actions in the present doesn't mean that they won't find an afterlife in Hell, so either way one is headed for an afterlife.

It seems like it was all about thinking of physics and the nature of possibilities. — Jack Cummins

Minus the physics part I can relate. I know very little about physics. And I've certainly been doubted, so there's that. However, I'm not a published author of any books or papers, so I'm mostly exempt from the ire of naysayers.

Right. Maybe he doesn't go that far. I suppose I would have to read his stuff to really get it.

Tipler appears to be a rather divisive figure.

One book which I read a couple of years ago was Frank Tipler's ' The Physics of Immortality'. In this, the author argued that a resurrection could be simulated, through means of a computerised artificial intelligence. — Jack Cummins

It drew upon Teilhard de Chardin's idea of the 'omega point', as signifying both God and eternal life. There is some ambiguity in the book as to whether such a resurrection would involve an actual computer or not, with 'God' almost being the absolute 'computer'. — Jack Cummins

This sounds like someone trying to justify belief in an afterlife provided by God via science and philosophy: if the afterlife can be simulated with an AI via some sort of apparatus then it stands to reason that belief in a God that cares about each of us enough to create an afterlife for us might be justified, as, ontologically, such a conception of God is purportedly compatible with a scientific worldview given a few additional inferences, such as God being able to perform the functions of this absolute computer, I'm guessing.

However; the author, in spite of his arguments says that he isn't really convinced of the actual reality of an afterlife in simulated form. He also suggests that the 'resurrection' would probably be very different from that imagined by many religious believers. — Jack Cummins

That is good.

You are definitely right, though: my argument would likely flop because of the breadth and depth of the practical, and also largely intractable, philosophical issues it is fraught with.

There is so much conflict about what an afterlife may consist of within various traditions and a lot may be projections of fear or fantasies of bliss, especially in the division between heaven and hell. Ideas may be based on near death experiences and other altered states of consciousness, which may have been inspiration for 'The Tibetan Book of the Dead', and similar texts. — Jack Cummins

I grant all of this. There is tremendous confusion as to what the afterlife might consist of. My argument only deals with this problem in so far as it prescribes a certain amount of precision to our predictions about the afterlife, but very little accuracy, apart from my somewhat arbitrary premises.

The biggest problem is that it is so speculative, with no real clear evidence, which is why so many people do not believe in an afterlife at all — Jack Cummins

Which is totally understandable. I don't believe in an afterlife myself, but I can still try to clarify it if it exists.

I have to say I think Epicurus' argument against an afterlife in the most literal sense convinces me. — Moliere

Unless I'm mistaken Epicurus just makes the point that there is no evidence of an afterlife, and that therefore it is speculation to comment on it. That's what I'm doing - speculating. Mostly because it is a ubiquitous idea. Given certain premises I have constructed an argument, but obviously you disagree with some of them, and that's okay. But that's not so much what I wanted to discuss.

Not to mention the important and interesting thing about what Epicurus had to say is that we have nothing to fear from death if no afterlife awaits us; we don't have any obligations to please any gods. But that is if there isn't an afterlife or we have no reason to believe in one, the latter of which is compatible with speculation on the matter.

I don't have memories of before I was born, and so why would I continue to have memories after my meat is gone? — Moliere

I'm not sure. I'm guessing that, if the afterlife is anything like our lives on Earth, and I only have the intuitions of a portion of humanity to rely on to support that assumption, then why wouldn't we remember our previous lives? Would we not no longer be ourselves if we just woke up and remembered nothing? That would kind of defeat the purpose of having an afterlife I think if one stops being oneself upon dying.

It seems to me that equivocating the dogmatic fundamentalist with the radical relativist might be a bit inaccurate. First off, it isn't entirely clear if we are talking about all-encompassing relativism, or
just selective relativism, but I'll assume the latter because of this:

Where reason cannot be trusted, where dogma, or rather power relations or pragmatism must reign over it, is determined by needs, desires, aesthetic sentiment, etc. A good argument is good justification for belief/action... except when it isn't, when it can be dismissed on non-rational grounds.In this way, identity, power, etc. can come to trump argument. What decides when reason can be dismissed? In misology, it certainly isn't reason itself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The relativist posits a sort of quasi-reasoning that is consistent in support of their denial of any sort of rigorous, reason-based approach to certain moral questions, whereas the fundamentalist cites a holy book with zero epistemic threshold. The relativist at least makes a practical claim in their denial that could indeed be verified: does morality, in this instance, depend entirely upon circumstance, perspective, culture, etc.? This could perhaps be verified, but the truth of the specific claims in the bible cannot.

You might claim that the relativist is wrong in every single instance in which they invoke this, but it is something that can be proven or disproven by something like this:

For act X, if a law Y prohibiting X exists, does Y exist to mediate human power relations, or does it exist for a fundamentally moral reason?

As an axiom, it demonstrates that the relativist is doing some valid reasoning even when they seemingly abandon it.

So I’ll repeat for the apparently less informed how it got this way once again:

If people are more informed on the history, they couldn't just use the latest headline as their newest political cudgel. That would mean a nuanced understanding on the fact that it was a series of wars started by neighboring Arab states (Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, etc. etc.), who annexed the West Bank and Gaza and never did anything themselves to make these territories into their own self-determining state,.

Then when the Arab countries like Jordan and Egypt and the rest stopped attacking, and it became only Palestinians left with Israelis to make a deal, the Palestinian side, when given a chance to make a state, never took any deals. But yes, for those who do understand some of the history, the terms of these deals will be said by them, as "unreasonable" for Palestinians and thus implies it seems "reasonable" for the asymmetrical warfare "intafadas" that ensued of of suicide bombings, and terrorist rampages and kidnappings into Israel by Palestinians jihadists and terrorists. — schopenhauer1

Okay, you are referencing the Arab-Israeli War. Just because Egypt and Jordan didn't allow the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank to form their own self-determining states doesn't mean that Israel shouldn't.

After the Six Day War and Resolution 242, Israel was supposed to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and West Bank, but they didn't. Thus began an unjust occupation. The first Intifada in 1987 was the result of increasing settlements and the ongoing repression of Palestinians by security forces, not Palestinian bloodlust. Many Palestinian protests were nonviolent, even if some escalated.

Then when the Arab countries like Jordan and Egypt and the rest stopped attacking, and it became only Palestinians left with Israelis to make a deal, the Palestinian side, when given a chance to make a state, never took any deals. — schopenhauer1

What about all of the attempts to implement a two-state solution Palestinians would find favorable in the UN that have been vetoed by Israel and the United States? Did that just not happen?

So then I can use that argument for why Israel kept voting in right wing parties. — schopenhauer1

One group was initially wronged and wronged more severely over a period of time by another group. If the first group starts attacking the second, maybe the initial wrong-doers should try to stop it instead of escalating?

Haha, I don’t know why but this right there is so oddly obvious, in its characterization of Hamas and its rhetoric, it is oddly out of place. Like calling Osama bin Laden only slightly anti-America. What was it that tipped you off? Was it the actions or the rhetoric? — schopenhauer1

If you read what I was saying, I was differentiating between one thing that might be construed as antisemitic and one thing that definitely was. That's why I said it.

That something as repugnant as Hamas would be voted in was a likely consequence of the way Israel treated the Palestinians. They might not have scruples, but they will take up arms against the oppressor fearlessly, and that could be appealing to an oppressed people.
— ToothyMaw

That’s a farce. Hamas was the organizations that killed thousands of Israelis in the 90s and 2000s amidst Oslo peace process not even wanting to give it a chance. They want all of Israel. Then when Sharon pulled Israeli settlements out of Gaza and they held elections, instead of voting in a moderate government, they voted in Hamas and sent rockets to Israel. They also burned down the greenhouses that Israel were left for them to use for their economic benefit. They don’t care about development or a thriving culture for their people. Purely about war. They ran that economy into the ground with all the aid they got. — schopenhauer1

Did Israel not occupy Gaza and treat the Palestinians like shit for decades? And I said that Hamas is bad and doesn't benefit the Palestinians, so we agree on that. If you are saying that the Palestinians wanted a seemingly endless conflict that would eventually conclude with their near destruction, you are patently wrong. What is happening now is largely the result of Israel's actions, actions like sniping civilians at peaceful protests and attacking people's funerals. These are the actions of a terrorist regime, and terrorism invites more terrorism.

Furthermore, Netanyahu actually supported Hamas, so there's that.

They might not have scruples, but they will take up arms against the oppressor fearlessly, and that could be appealing to an oppressed people.
— ToothyMaw

The first part of your sentence negates the second part. Isis or Boko Harem aren’t righteous SIMPLY because they are fighting a perceived oppressor. That’s an oddly amoral argument for a relation dynamic that doesn’t consider the means and ends of the people involved. — schopenhauer1

I'm not advocating for Hamas, I'm saying that that is how many Palestinians see it probably. I think Hamas sucks. But clearly the Palestinians have some sort of relationship with Hamas that is somewhat neutral, and I can only explain that as a function of the Palestinians wanting men to fight on their behalf.

any Israeli responses to being attacked, like striking the network of dug-in underground tunnels filled with ammunitions, Hamas fighters, and hostages (purposefully built under densely populated areas) will be decried as wrong for exactly the reasons Hamas built the tunnels under these infrastructures in the first place.. to make it near impossible to get to without killing civilians, enacting world outrage, and purposefully entangling their own civilian's lives into the conflict itself, all the while using children and women as soldiers and shields. — schopenhauer1

Okay, so what is the takeaway? Yes, Hamas is going to do whatever it takes to win, but we have zero capability to change them, and it has long been known that support for Hamas among the Palestinians has gone up when conflict flared up between them and Israel. Whichever Generals decided to just go ahead and bomb hospitals and UN schools and what not are not only responsible for specific war crimes, but also give zero fucks about winning in a way that doesn't include the annihilation of the Palestinians.

I mean, what is Hamas supposed to do? Not use every advantage they have? I wish they would just surrender too, but they are the closest thing to freedom fighters (albeit shitty freedom fighters) that the Palestinians have.

Israel thus now has to balance Gazan's civilians with its military goals, but this is the situation that the Hamas-run Gaza has set up. Being that they have no scruples or moral compass other than "jihad" and "fuck the Jews and the Jewish state" — schopenhauer1

Is that attitude not kind of understandable minus the jihad part? I mean, I see nothing too wrong with saying "fuck the Jewish state", for instance, if not "fuck the Jews". That would definitely be antisemitic. But there are reasons, and I'm sure you know them well, for the anger towards Israel. You say we hold Israel to a really high standard. Well, I say we hold the Palestinians to too high of a standard. That something as repugnant as Hamas would be voted in was a likely consequence of the way Israel treated the Palestinians. They might not have scruples, but they will take up arms against the oppressor fearlessly, and that could be appealing to an oppressed people.

I could not possibly go through all of the posts in this mega-thread, but you seem to believe that there is a difference in the moral character of Israel, and the ones supplying them weapons, and Hamas. I think differences exist, but also that one's intentions can be inferred from their actions sometimes. On a surface level it is claimed to be a war, but this "war", at least for the Palestinians, has resulted in a ratio of around 90% civilian deaths to combatants according to some sources, and hundreds of thousands displaced. This looks like a genocide, largely because so many civilians are killed, but also because Israel is adhering to an ineffective strategy in bombarding Gaza. If it was about beating Hamas they would have done something else.

Hamas actually has a better civilian to combatants killed ratio and they are explicitly terrorist. That says a lot. And just because they antagonized Israel, use human shields, deprive their people of aid, etc., doesn't justify terror or wanton killing on the part of Israel. Clearly. Tit for tat stops at war crimes.

Israel's actions indicate either wild incompetence, or a concerted effort to displace and murder Palestinians. Given that it is Israel, I doubt it could only be incompetence. So, it's genocide.

On what basis can you condemn Hamas for its attacks if you see no problem with what Israel is doing today? They're simply using "maximum force necessary to achieve objectives" as well. — Tzeentch

Yes, true, but Hamas carries the added baggage of being Islamic fundamentalists, many of whom hate Jews for reasons not tied to the oppression of the Palestinians. Although that doesn't help.

I'm basically saying that the internal logic of an argument is more important than adhering to some sort of arbitrary dictionary - but those words in question, while there is leeway in the way they can be used, must exist within some parameters determined by the larger body in which the argument exists. The way the word is used is more important than any sort of definition one might point to, but the thing has to make sense.

I think you are mostly right. But this:

One cannot learn one's first language from a dictionary. Therefore there is a way of understanding the meanings of words that is not found in their lexical definitions.

Hence there is a sense of "meaning" that is not found in a dictionary. — Banno

and the points you make based on this seem to be shaky. Just because a child learning a language picks it up without reading a dictionary (although some children do read dictionaries), doesn't mean that the meanings of the words the child learns are not roughly represented by what is found in a dictionary and that the definitions contained within aren't really useful. What you are saying about how setting out a philosophical argument with clear definitions is stifling is not the result of linguistics, but rather the simple point that there is some leeway with the way words are used when arguing within different paradigms.

it’s not intended to be about morals, which are prescriptive, but about meta-ethics, which is purely descriptive. — javra

Yes, dumb mistake. Just replace meta-ethics with morality and my post hopefully makes sense.

Any proposition regarding future states of affairs can either evidence itself “conformant to the reality of what will be” and thereby true/right/correct or, otherwise, “to lack conformity to the reality of what will be” and thereby be false/wrong/incorrect. For instance, the proposition that “the sun will rise again tomorrow” can either be true or false, as will be evidenced in the span of the subsequent 24 hours. — javra

Okay, so we have propositions about what will be that can be true or false. But that isn't the same thing as saying that future states of being or of the universe are false, and a relevant telos is a goal with what I would presume to be a state of being as its end - something that I now grant can be false when referenced against what is actually possible - even if fictitious, and not to make a proposition true. But I get what you are saying now.

a) that one as agent is compelled in an ontologically fixed manner to optimally minimize one’s own present and future suffering — javra

Disregarding that this might not apply to, say, Jihadists, this sounds pretty reasonable. But many people also feel compelled to reduce others' suffering, too. Or they might have any number of moral convictions.

Yet some such envisioned future states of being will be unrealizable and, thereby, false. — javra

I'm sorry, what? How can a state of being, even unrealizable and future, be false? Maybe it doesn't satisfy (a) given (b), but it is a state of affairs, not a proposition or something. You could say that a certain state of the universe, or being, could not possibly come to fruition, so therefore it would not be moral to pursue it, however, which you don't quite say here:

Pursuit of such a false state of future being will not minimize one’s own suffering but intensify it, thereby being a wrong notion of what is good. To pursue such false ultimate telos would then be to do what is wrong, or else bad, for oneself. — javra

But who is to say for sure that pursuing a false state of being is truly sub-optimal? Maybe one genuinely believes that climate change is a hoax and one will not be affected, and thereby believes that they are justified in being extravagant in their usage of fossil fuels. This harms other people, but not so much the individual in the short term.

Now that I look at what you are writing some more, you don't differentiate between "future states of being" of the individual with everybody's states of being, and I don't buy that what is good for everyone is always good for the individual.

Here tersely outlined, (a) given (b) is first off taken to be an objective fact. — javra

Presupposing (b), and thus (a), is true to support the argument that purports that there are true or false, or moral or unrealizable, future states of being that we should avoid or pursue, and thus that any realizable end that satisfies (a) given (b) is moral - even if to differing degrees - is circular. So yes, if (b) is true, (a) is too. But why is (b) true? And, once again, even if (b) is true, why is what is good for the individual good for everyone or vice versa?

Addressing just this part, one then gets into the riddle of how no matter what one does one can only be in pursuit of the good. — javra

What does this mean? People definitely don't always pursue the good. Are you talking about why under many ethics people are always obligated to pursue the good?

Next addressing that telos which, ideally, perfectly satisfies (a) given (b), one can again likely obtain more than one conception of what it might be. Given that these alternatives will be mutually exclusive, were any one alternative to in fact be fulfillable as a telos/goal in principle, it would then be the objectively true good, with all other alternatives then necessarily being objectively false, hence wrong, hence bad goals to pursue. — javra

Why would a satisfactory telos be an objectively true good? Your telos is based on a shaky presupposition - that what is good for the group is good for the individual, or that (b) is true in the way you claim. And who are the bad goals bad for? The group, or the individual? You didn't really differentiate between the two.

Furthermore, because of (b), that which is the objectively good end to pursue for yourself will then likewise be the objectively good ends to pursue for all others. — javra

I disagree. What about holding slaves? Even if (b) is true, slaveholders kept slaves for their own benefit, and that doesn't disagree with your argument as far as I can tell. They just did what benefitted themselves, and I'm sure the slaves tried to do what benefitted themselves too, or at least as much as they could, given the circumstances.

The more I think about your argument the more I think you defined (a) too narrowly. There are good goals other than minimizing one's own suffering - but they are more nebulous than your (a), and you seem to have defined (a) in such a way that you could extrapolate such a goal to everyone, as (a) is pretty much true for everyone. But is it really the only relevant consideration?

By the way, what does all of this mean for the pre-existing, intensely religious people that care more about eternity than about minimizing pain on the Earth? According to you, and, given their beliefs are incorrect, they are being serious immoral pursuing such a state of being. It would be a moral obligation to convert them away from religion or to elsewise pacify them.

Indulge for the moment that the dictum of “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” serves as a steppingstone toward one conception of what this objectively good, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 1”

Also indulge for the moment that, as an alternative to this trajectory, the dictum of “It’s good to be the absolute ruler over everyone and everything other” serves as a steppingstone toward another conception of what the objectively true, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 2”.

The two will be mutually exclusive and thereby contradictory: one cannot gravitate toward both at the same time and in the same way. One will be objectively good and the other thereby objectively bad. If one were to figure out which of the two just mentioned teloi is the true objective good, one then would furthermore figure out an existentially fixed (though non-physicalist) “is” via which “oughts” can be established. — javra

Okay, I don't think your assertion that the "is" you have provided is justified. You just assumed (b) was true and then that what is good for everyone is good for the individual. It ends there as an assumption, and I don't think it is even existentially fixed, really.

Consider a population of people existing merely to serve a dictator. Is what is good for the dictator (staying in power) good for the people? This dictator could implement some grand, moral telos like “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” that would benefit everyone, but why? He largely just wants to hold power, and preventing the people from, say, organizing, will serve his needs and be to the detriment of everyone else. Even if the people rise up and overthrow the dictator to implement some sort of new government, many people will likely be harmed in the process. This might be the right telos - liberty, equality, and fraternity for all - the people pursue by overthrowing the dictator, but it is most certainly not to each person's benefit when manifested; the suffering of each person is often not minimized even when implementing a good telos in practice.

Next, take the ought that “people should not be unduly harmed”.

Were telos 1 to be objectively true—hence, an existentially fixed telos that is actualizable in principle and that awaits to be fulfilled—then it would substantiate the just addressed dictum rationally, thereby making the proposition that “people should not be unduly harmed” an objectively good ideal/goal/telos to pursue, for it as such satisfies closer proximity to telos 1. However, were telos 2 to be objectively true, then “people should not be unduly harmed” would be unproductive to bringing oneself into closer proximity to telos 2—thereby signifying that this ought is an inappropriate and thereby bad ideal/goal/telos to pursue. — javra

All I'm reading is: if it sounds like it jives, it jives.

At core issue would be, not so much what most people deem to be good or bad (hence, current normality) but, instead, which ultimate telos specified is actualizable in principle and which is not. The former will be the right telos to pursue—what some in history have termed “the Good”—and the latter will be the wrong telos to pursue. — javra

So we should choose between the options available to us according to which ones can be actualized with guidance from a set of principles that are objectively good because they minimize each person's current and future suffering.

I think a case could be made that you could reduce the net suffering of a population this way, but I think my examples show that a good telos might still not be the best thing for each individual. It would probably be impossible to take into account enough variables to implement anything even remotely ideal outside of the current good stuff we have going in many areas.

Honestly, the morality you are outlining sounds more like the philosophy of a race of aggressive aliens trying to take over the universe and less like something any normal philosopher or person would take on, partly because it is a little too self-assured, and partly because there is only one good way to go about doing good: what the analysts tell us to do.

I mean, the pieces might fit, but will we like what we see?

Demonstrating why something like that might be true could constitute merely pointing to a relevant fact about why it is wrong to harm people.
— ToothyMaw

Asking why it’s wrong to harm people is like asking why electrons are negatively charged. There is no answer; some things are simply fundamental, brute facts. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere. — Michael

Sure, one might make mistakes in analyzing such explanations, but the moral person would search for those most true given a set of "brute facts".
— ToothyMaw

One such brute fact might be “it is wrong to harm people.” — Michael

I agree. I also believe that to be a brute fact. But for the purposes of discussing the is-ought divide, I feel obligated to mention that we don't have the kind of philosophical or scientific certitude in the area of morality that we have elsewhere.

I think that you as well as I are certain people should not be harmed, and that also explanations do have to end somewhere. I just like to discuss meta ethics as it is really interesting to me.

If you cannot demonstrate why your particular morality is fundamentally more justified than another's, what reason do I have to follow it?
— ToothyMaw

If by "what reason do I have to follow it" you mean something like "why should I believe you" then maybe you shouldn't believe me if I can't prove it.

But whether or not I can prove it and whether or not you should believe me is a separate issue to whether or not it is true.

If realism is correct then something can be both true and unprovable. — Michael

Perhaps "you ought not harm another" is simply a brute fact about reality, much like "electrons are negatively charged particles" is. — Michael

Demonstrating why something like that might be true could constitute merely pointing to a relevant fact about why it is wrong to harm people. That isn't the same as proving it per se, but it certainly constitutes providing evidence. That is mostly all I would ask for to really ground an ought statement in reality.

And if there is evidence, ought I not believe you? I mean, if realism were true, maybe some facts would exist that couldn't be proven, but these facts could be used to form reasonable explanations for other moral considerations. Shouldn't we also pay attention to those explanations that are most logical, reasonable, etc.? Sure, one might make mistakes in analyzing such explanations, but the moral person would search for those most true given a set of "brute facts".

... it will never be related as strongly as if it corresponded to a fact about reality (or something like that).
— ToothyMaw

The realist will claim that that one ought not murder is a fact about reality, much like that an electron is a negatively charged particle is a fact about reality. — Michael

I know. Are you saying you are a realist and thus that your claim that one ought not murder is a moral fact? It sounds more like you are just adopting a pragmatic way of going about it that appeals to concepts like innocence and obligation and not actual fact hood.

Why is the "ought" in "one ought not murder" morally compelling?
— ToothyMaw

That's a different question. It might be true that one ought not murder even if knowing this doesn't compel me to obey. Perhaps I just don't care about what I ought or ought not do. Perhaps I enjoy doing things I shouldn't.

Meta ethics isn't concerned with what we actually choose to do. — Michael

Yes, meta ethics doesn't concern what we actually decide to do, but one's meta ethical view either does or does not make valid whatever normative efforts one puts forward. If you cannot demonstrate why your particular morality is fundamentally more justified than another's, what reason do I have to follow it? You need to define the space in which you are working in when applying morality, and that means at least a lightweight meta ethical exposition.

To say that the glass ought to break is contingent upon our abstract, perhaps even mathematical, knowledge of glasses. So, to call the likely outcome "correct" if confirmed makes no sense even in the context of a model because such a state of affairs is just that: a likely outcome.


I think you have what I was intending flipped around backwards. It's not the observed outcomes that can be correct/incorrect, it's the models that ground our "is statements." That is, "if my 'is statement' is correct, x ought to happen." If x does not occur, it casts doubt on the "is statement," not the outcome that occured. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, so there is an outcome within the parameters of the model that validates an ought if it occurs. But this ought is totally contingent on the veracity of the "is statements" that make up the model. Thus, they must be grounded in reality if they wish to reflect reality - and in the case of morality must likely also be universalizable. Saying merely that "flourishing is good for the individual", for instance, could contain myriad interpretations as to what constitutes flourishing depending upon which "facts" you start with, and how broad your scope is.

So now let's consider obligations:

c)
Premise: One ought not murder
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder John

d)
Premise: If John is innocent then one ought not kill him
Premise: John is innocent
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not kill John — Michael

I don't think either e) or f) can ever be valid. But so what? Why isn't c) or d) sufficient?

There seems to be this implicit claim that if "one ought not murder" cannot be derived from "murder is Y" premises alone then it cannot be true. What justifies this claim? — Michael

I think the issue is not that it cannot be true, but rather that such an "ought" is up for debate if it isn't supported by a relevant fact. I mean, if we cannot say that killing that might constitute murder is wrong in a way related to a reality outside of us, then how can we say that one is definitely behaving morally by not killing John? Why is the "ought" in "one ought not murder" morally compelling? I could just as easily claim that we ought to kick dogs and it would be equally as supported as your assertion one ought not kill John, but people wouldn't consider that morally acceptable. You might couch the "ought" in a concept of innocence in (d), but that concept of innocence is, naturally, theoretical and somewhat subjective.

You could, of course, shore up your statements with plenty of compelling reasoning and by appealing to some basic shared principles concerning innocence, but it will never be related as strongly as if it corresponded to a fact about reality (or something like that).

So, I think you are right. I also think your position is inherently weaker but far more reasonable when it is expounded upon than hoping for some more mystical, direct is-ought connection - as much as that pains me to write.

edit: I mean that the moral status of the ought is up for debate, not its trueness

Take: "The glass is fragile, if you drop it, it will break."

We can expand this to "based on all my knowledge of the glass, observations of past glasses, etc. and my knowledge of how the world works more generally, glasses ought to be fragile. If you drop this glass, it ought to break." — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is, fact statements can be seen as statements about what "ought" to happen (what would be the "correct" outcome) if our model of the world is correct. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That the glass will break might be an extrapolation deriving from observing something that occurs so often that you can predict a likely outcome - but there is nothing "correct" about the outcome; the glass breaking is just a state of affairs that will likely obtain that is, technically, totally disconnected from our knowledge. The "ought", then, is not really supported by our understanding of glasses.

In other words: our model of the world is rooted in states of affairs, one of which is the glass potentially breaking. To say that the glass ought to break is contingent upon our abstract, perhaps even mathematical, knowledge of glasses. So, to call the likely outcome "correct" if confirmed makes no sense even in the context of a model because such a state of affairs is just that: a likely outcome. You could, however, say that our prediction was accurate and validated our model of the world if the glass breaks. But there is no real, tangible correctness there.

Why do these realisations lead to melancholy or escapism? Why don’t people change their expectations instead of being mad about human nature? Why isn’t there a discipline that aims to build concepts that are closer to reality? — Skalidris

I think that people are genuinely confused, and when they aren't they are as likely to be devastated by clarity as they are to be enriched by it. People want things to adhere to their naive preconceptions that are usually somewhat inculcated in them, and, as you suggest, what we would need is not a revolution in terms of a series of cyclical epiphanies, but rather a method by which we can dispel the bullshit and prop up truths - especially those truths that have utility or are impactful.

Why do we keep these intuitive concepts that we can’t even define and that are a poor reflection of reality? — Skalidris

They might not represent reality properly, but they do enable the representations of reality that we hold in our heads. None of us are just seeing the world for what it truly is like a machine reads code, but rather we navigate a very complex space that is full of abstractions, contradictions, ambiguity, and emotional influence. In fact, those things are required for a human to navigate the world socially and otherwise, I would argue.

We have so many insights about human nature but yet we keep on using concepts that give us a completely unrealistic view of humans, and cause Weltschmerz whenever we try to learn more. — Skalidris

People are perfectly content not to avail themselves of all of the insights we have into human nature because there are other things to do and it can be unpleasant. I mean, sometimes one gets slapped in the face with an "insight", and it is often times unpleasant, but that sounds like what you are saying one might want to avoid? Are you not kind of suggesting we catalogue human nature and teach it so as to avoid Weltschmertz?

I have a large problem with your analogy in the sense that human decision making is in fact predictable somewhat — LuckyR

Thanks for the reply. I actually agree with that, thus:

While with a true slot machine it is random in the short term which symbols the reels stop on, there is a general pattern to those combinations that determine a “winning” combination. This could be similar to how there are changes in peoples’ experience that they react to predictably, but not deterministically. — ToothyMaw

Maybe I wasn't clear enough, but I do indeed think human behavior is largely predictable, and, thus, the internal computer of the hypothetical slot machine would exist as a gradient of probabilities and would not just be random.

The Bushido code of accepting death is an interesting counterpoint to that. The state of mind is not the cessation of ego but access to a capability outside of its operation. — Paine

I am not familiar with Bushido, but that sounds mostly ideal. Honestly, I don't think anyone just doesn't have an ego, although it may appear that way.

Bushido is pretty cool as a philosophy, heard the word before but never actually read about it until now.

Fear resides in the ego. Every psychological fear rests on the image of myself and every feeling of fear is directly connected with the threat to this image.
A fearless person cannot have a shred of fear from public speech, not because he/she is used to it through exposure but because for him/her there is no sense of threat to the ego/self-image.
So this ego-lessness does not make the person brave because there is nothing to be brave about in the first place. — TheMadMan

It seems to me that the state you describe is at best conditional, as everybody has fears - and if they don't, they just don't know about them yet. Someone mentioned a sociopath: sociopaths might oftentimes have less fear due to some irrational confidence, and many are also narcissistic - in which case it is not a lack of ego that gives rise to the fearlessness, but it is actually the inflated ego itself causing the fearlessness. You should take that into account, I think.

If we are talking about a person who has totally just negated their own ego, then that act itself would probably have required effort and bravery. No one would achieve such a thing easily or in some mundane way, I think. So, we are discussing an incredibly rare person if indeed the two words are categorically exclusive when applied to people, as you claim, which is a different claim than that just the two terms are exclusive.

Otherwise, I mostly agree with you. It is, however, strange that you present it like it is a dilemma ("fearless people can never be brave"), when really it seems like more of a tradeoff than anything to me.