Yes it does, quite 'directly'.

"Empirical" works for me. Mostly I just mean -- what would I believe, given what I know? A very limited case of "possible", but one we use. — Moliere

Indeed. In that section he's discussing A-level and B-level intensions for words which refer (in that context of supervenience) and distinguishes them so that A-level intension is how the reference a priori such that the reference gives logical necessity to that which it refers.
B-level being that which picks this concept out in the world as it is. Or "as the world turns out" as its put there. I think you're actually slightly closer to the bone, though.

According to the link you’ve provided to the article by Fish:

Naïve realism is a theory in the philosophy of perception: primarily, the philosophy of vision. Historically, the term was used to name a variant of “direct realism,” which claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part). In this, the theory contrasted with theories such as scientific direct realism (which rejected (3)), indirect realism (which rejected (2) and (3)), and phenomenalism, which rejected (1). Today, however, most philosophical theories of visual perception would endorse at least claims (1) and (2), and many would also endorse (3). In this setting, “naïve realism” has taken on a more precise use.

This indicates that one can reject (3) and yet still be a direct realist. It is not the automatic endorsement of indirect realism, as you claim.

As I have repeatedly stated, our point of disagreement remains (2).

Rather, we directly interact with the world as a part of it -- the world interacting with itself, in the broad view. — Moliere

I would ask whether anything could ever count as indirect under this view. On the other hand, if you think of the fact that we, as parts, can be decomposed into parts then there are parts which mediate eachother's interactions with the rest of the world... visual cortical states, sensory states on the retina, photons travelling in the air. I can maybe in some sense interact with patterns in the outside world but not without those patterns appearing on the surface of my retina through photonic interactions and then the correlations appearing in cortical states. If that information is about something that has happened on the surface of a car 30 feet away then I do not see how there is not mediation there which leads from events at the car to what I see.

and all that seems to justify doubt that were some scientist of consciousness to claim they have a brain in a vat which is experiencing I'd simply doubt it without more justification. It's entirely implausible that we'd stumble upon how to do that given the depth of our ignorance. — Moliere

I am not sure I agree. Our experiences are a direct result of stimulation at sensory boundaries so I do not see an immediate biological or physical reason to suggest that artificial stimulations couldn't produce the same experiences in a brain in a vat scenario. Neuroscientists can already cause familiar experiences by artificially stimulating sensory receptors or brain cells.

What would qualify as a constituent of experience? I'm drawing a blank. — frank

If property dualism is correct then qualia I suppose. Otherwise the constituents of experience just are whatever physical things mental phenomena are reducible to.

I addressed that here.

It does follow. Something that exists in one location cannot be a constituent of something that exists in a different location.

Distal objects are not – and cannot be – constituents of something that occurs in the brain.

Naïve realism is a theory in the philosophy of perception: primarily, the philosophy of vision. Historically, the term was used to name a variant of “direct realism,” which claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part). In this, the theory contrasted with theories such as scientific direct realism (which rejected (3)), indirect realism (which rejected (2) and (3)), and phenomenalism, which rejected (1). Today, however, most philosophical theories of visual perception would endorse at least claims (1) and (2), and many would also endorse (3). In this setting, “naïve realism” has taken on a more precise use. As understood today, the naïve realist claims that, when we successfully see a tomato, that tomato is literally a constituent of that experience, such that an experience of that fundamental kind could not have occurred in the absence of that object. As naïve realism, thus understood, sees perception as fundamentally involving a relation between subjects and their environments, the position is also sometimes known as “relationalism” in the contemporary literature. Typically, today’s naïve realist will also claim that the conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense. On such a view, the redness that I am aware of when I look at a ripe tomato is a matter of my experience acquainting me with the tomato’s color: the redness that I am aware of in this experience just is the redness of the tomato. As such a view appears to commit its proponent to a version of claim (3) above—that for one to see an object to have a feature, the object must actually have that feature—the inheritance of the name “naïve” realism seems appropriate. As for whether there can be naïve realist theories of senses other than vision, this is an issue that awaits a more detailed exploration.

The key parts are in bold.

Specifically, I think that "our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data" means "the conscious 'phenomenal' character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense." — Michael

From above, (2) is the statement that:

...our visual perception of [...] material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part)

I disagree that this has the same meaning as:

...the conscious “phenomenal” character of that experience is shaped by the objects of perception and their features, where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense. — Michael

Please explain how the latter statement concerns the mediation of our visual perception of material objects "by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data".

The existence of something like a mental representation is what it means for our perception of distal objects to be mediated.

I addressed this before when I asked you to explain the difference between "seeing" a mental representation and perception "being" a mental representation. You were unable to do so. And that is precisely because there is no difference.

The existence of something like a mental representation is what it means for our perception of distal objects to be mediated. — Michael

This is not what (2) states. It refers to our visual perception of material objects being mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data. That is, it is a perception of a perception. (2) states that a direct perception is where there is no such mediation; no perception of a perception. If this is what you are arguing for, then you are arguing for direct realism.

I addressed this before when I asked you to explain the difference between "seeing" a mental representation and "having" a mental representation. You were unable to do so. And that is precisely because there is no difference. — Michael

It is not for me to explain because I am not an indirect realist. Indirect realism entails the mediation of our visual perception of material objects by the perception of some other entities. Therefore, the onus is on you to account for us having perceptions of perceptions. If there is no difference between having perceptions and having perceptions of perceptions, then there is no need to account for such mediation and indirect realism is false.

And this is where you're reading something into the grammar that just isn't there. I feel pain, and pain is a mental phenomenon. The schizophrenic hears voices, and these voices are a mental phenomenon. I see colours, and colours are a mental phenomenon.

This is all is that is meant by saying that we feel and hear and see mental phenomena.

This is precisely why, as I have repeated ad nauseam, that trying to frame the issue in such terms as "either I see distal objects or I see sense data" is a confusion and a red herring.

The only thing that matters is whether or not distal objects and their mind-independent properties are non-representational, more-than-causal, literal constituents of conscious experience. If they are then direct realism is true and if they're not then indirect realism is true.

And this is where you're reading something into the grammar that just isn't there. — Michael

I'm not reading it into the grammar. It is one of the defining claims of indirect realism. As (2) states, direct realism is the proposition that "our visual perception of [...] material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part)". If you agree with this, then you are arguing for direct realism. If you want to argue for indirect realism, then you must hold the view that our visual perception of material objects is mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (or mental representations). But you repeatedly attempt to distance yourself from this view.

If you agree with this, then you are arguing for direct realism. If you want to argue for indirect realism, then you must hold the view that our visual perception of material object is mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (or mental representations). — Luke

You misinterpret what "perceive mental phenomena" means. I feel pain, and pain is a mental phenomenon. The schizophrenic hears voices, and these voices are a mental phenomenon. I see colours, and colours are a mental phenomenon. This is all that is meant.

You misinterpret what "perceive mental phenomena" means. I feel pain, and pain is a mental phenomenon. The schizophrenic hears voices, and these voices are a mental phenomenon. I see colours, and colours are a mental phenomenon. This is all that is meant. — Michael

Then where is the mediation of our perception of visual objects by the perception of some other entities such as sense-data?

Then where is the mediation of our perception of visual objects by the perception of some other entities such as sense-data? — Luke

We feel pain – a mental phenomenon – and it is in feeling this pain that we feel the fire. We taste a sweet taste – a mental phenomenon – and it is in tasting this sweet taste that we taste the sugar. We see shapes and colours – mental phenomena – and it is in seeing these shapes and colours that we see the cow.

If you want to argue for indirect realism, then you must hold the view that our visual perception of material object is mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (or mental representations). — Luke

….mediated by the perception of synthesis with some other entities, such as representations.

We don’t perceive both the object and the representation of the object. We don’t mediate the perception of the object, re: direct realism of the given; we mediate the affect the object manifests via its sensation, re: indirect realism of the phenomenon, or image, but either as representation.
———-

Then where is the mediation of our perception of visual objects by the perception of some other entities such as sense-data? — Luke

All representation is mental; “mental representation” is redundant, confusing and unnecessary;
Sense data is one thing, representation is quite another; if all representation is mental, then it is the case all sense data is not;
To mediate is to arbitrate or condition; that which is a perception cannot arbitrate or be arbitrated by, another perception. Perception mediated by perception is improper and confusing;
Sense data just is the unmediated empirical affect the object has, that data, that affect, conditioned by something very different, is the subsequent mediated representation of the perceived object. This is indirect realism.

Only in this way is it possible for the object to be external, re: in the world, but the experience of the object internal, re: in the brain. Which, of course, is exactly the way it is for humans, and probably for every intelligence of any kind.

Direct realism has to do with perception of objects; indirect realism has only to do with conditions by which the system continues is procedure, insofar as without something to work with, the system stops, and in the case of humans there would be nothing beyond sensation, which is absurd. The realism of representation merely expresses a necessity for the internal systemic process, the external world be whatever it may.

Something that exists in one location cannot be a constituent of something that exists in a different location. — Michael

:lol:

That's the missing presupposition. As I said, it didn't follow. The above is just plain false or there is no such things as constituents of any kind. Two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time.

What do you think "constituent" means?

Naïve Realism, Seeing Stars, and Perceiving the Past provides a good account of what "constituent" means for naive realism:

[N]aïve realists have to accept what might be called a radically non-Galilean ontology – i.e. an ontology that, far from kicking the sensible qualities upstairs, into our minds, rather locates those sensible qualities within the external world we see and sense. As Campbell (2010, p. 206) puts it, naïve realism ‘depends on the idea that qualitative properties are in fact characteristics of the world we observe’, whereby this is because, according to naïve realism, ‘our experiences have the qualitative characters … they do in virtue of the fact that they are relations to those aspects of the world’.

Naïve realism is thus a radically externalistic view about the nature of perceptual experience. For it implies that our perceptual experiences, rather than being ‘narrow’ mental events which occur just inside the head, instead reach all the way out to the external things they are of and thereby ‘literately include the world’ (Martin, 1997, p. 84). As Logue (2009, p. 25) observes, on naïve realism, our perceptual experiences ‘literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass what the experience is of’.

It also provides a good account of indirect realism, avoiding to frame it in the misleading way that others have:

On the sense datum view, seeing an object, O, is a matter of having some visual experience, E, that has been caused by O in the appropriate way (whereby E's intrinsic nature can be characterised independently of O).

Such visual experiences have phenomenal character, and we are acquainted with this phenomenal character. This is all that is meant by "seeing sense-data/qualia/mental representations".

On the sense datum view, seeing an object, O, is a matter of having some visual experience, E, that has been caused by O in the appropriate way (whereby E's intrinsic nature can be characterised independently of O).

Caused by O in an appropriate way…yes.

Whereby E’s nature can be characterized independently of O….not a chance.

There must be something given by O, first, that makes E possible, and second, grounds that by which the knowledge of O becomes possible.

E’s nature cannot be characterized independently of O. If E could be characterized well enough independently of O, there wouldn’t need to be an O in order to have an E:

(“….We would find ourselves in a position whereby we would require to affirm an appearance without that which appears, which would be absurd….”)

O’s causal conditions must be determined, in order for E to be determinable.

Visual experience occurs when the visual cortex is active. We don't need to talk about what a cow is doing to talk about what the brain is doing.

If property dualism is correct then qualia I suppose. Otherwise the constituents of experience just are whatever physical things mental phenomena are reducible to. — Michael

Makes sense.

A simple summation:

P1. We are acquainted with the phenomenal character of experience.
P2. According to the naive realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of distal objects and their properties.
C1. Therefore, according to the naive realist, we are acquainted with distal objects and their properties.
P3. According to the indirect realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of mental phenomena.
C2. Therefore, according to the indirect realist, we are acquainted with mental phenomena.

Note that the term "mental phenomena" is impartial to property dualism and eliminative materialism.

Note also the technical term "acquainted", as described here.

And as explained above, for the phenomenal character of experience to be constituted of distal objects and their properties it requires that perceptual experiences "literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass what the experience is of".

I would ask whether *anything* could ever count as *indirect* under this view. — Apustimelogist

Well, I hope not. That's the idea! :D

Notice how it parallels the claim of indirect realism -- experience or sense data is what we are directly acquainted with while objects are inferred and judged. My thought is this is a conceptual distinction rather than a scientific one. I don't think it's a matter of knowledge as much as an interpretation of what we know.

I don't know why I'd prioritize ipseity over the object. In a way I'd be more tempted to say we have an indirect knowledge of ourselves more than we have indirect knowledge of objects. We make inferences about the kind of creature we are and we do so through the direct mediation of the familiar world. At the most extreme I'd say there is no knowledge to be had about ourselves, though I know where my car keys are all the same, and that seems a bit too much to me in the same way: conceptual clarity is achieved as the sacrifice of fidelity to our intuitions.

On the othet hand, if you think of the fact that we, as parts, can be decomposed into parts then there are parts which mediate eachother's interactions with the rest of the world... visual cortical states, sensory states on the retina, photons travelling in the air. I can maybe in *some* sense interact with patterns in the outside world but not without those patterns appearing on the surface of my retina through photonic interactions and then the correlations appearing in cortical states. If that information is about something that has happened on the surface of a car 30 feet away then I do not see how there is not mediation there which leads from events at the car to what I see.

If, in this decomposition, one could name something which is not a part of the world then you might have a candidate for indirect realism.

I think it's harder to do than with internal/external, or with Cartesian assumptions. Descartes' philosophy is pretty lock tight if we want to favor it, and it even appeals to a lot of basic intuitions. It's almost like there's a reason we still talk about it! :D

A lot of where I'm coming from is in rethinking these questions at a philosophical level so it's not so much these facts that's at dispute: Rather, I can't see how we'd be able to tell the story about retina, photons, or brains without knowing -- rather than inferring -- about the world.

Else, "retina, photons, brains" are themselves just inferences about an experiential projection in a causal relationship with a reality we know nothing about, but just make guesses about.

The only problem with this view being that we do know things, so it falls in error on the other side -- on the side of certain knowledge which rejects beliefs which could be wrong, when all proper judgment takes place exactly where we could be wrong.

I am not sure I agree. Our experiences are a direct result of stimulation at sensory boundaries so I do not see an immediate biological or physical reason to suggest that artificial stimulations couldn't produce the same experiences in a brain in a vat scenario. Neuroscientists can already cause familiar experiences by artificially stimulating sensory receptors or brain cells. — Apustimelogist

There's a difference between being able to accomplish something, and knowing something.

I'd liken our neuroscientists to medieval engineers -- they can make some observations and throw together some catapults, but they do not know the mechanical laws of Newton or its extensions.

It's more because we're ignorant of how this whole thing works -- even at the conceptual level, which is why it's interesting in philosophy -- so I wouldn't believe it without more. I'd think the person was making some sort of mistake along the way, in the same way that I thought about the Google employee who thought that later iterations of ChatGPT are conscious.

P1. We are acquainted with the phenomenal character of experience.

We experience experience. We are aware of awareness. We are conscious of consciousness.

Yet we are unable to describe a single quale, or any of the mediums upon which they supposedly appear.

Yet we are unable to describe a single quale — NOS4A2

Pain, cold, red, sour, etc.

You can name them.

You can name them. — NOS4A2

Yes. They're primitives, so can't be explained further. I am simply acquainted with them.

You treat them and speak about them like they are objects. If you are acquainted with an object it can be explained further.

You treat them and speak about them like they are objects. — NOS4A2

I don't know what you mean by "object".

I'm only saying that in perception I am acquainted with mental phenomena.

I’m just saying that you’re not acquainted with mental phenomena. We’re so unacquainted with mental phenomena that we cannot even describe one. If we were acquainted with mental phenomena this whole issue wouldn’t be such a struggle.